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ANNUAL REGISTER.

VOL. III.

FROM JANUARY TO JUNE,

1803.

LONDON:

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PREFACE.

Of the present Volume, which forms the Register for the half year, ending on the 30th of June, 1803, it would, after what has been stated in the foregoing Prefaces, be unnecessary to say any thing, were there not now omitted a few of those heads, which are to be found in the Supplementary part of the preceding Volumes.

The cause of this omission, which consists chiefly of the Naval and Military Promotions, the List of Patents, the List of New Books, and the Account of Juridical Proceedings, is, the extraordinary length of the Public Papers, and the necessity, which their importance created, of inserting them entire, and in a type that would not render the perusal of them painful. In the next Volume, which will be less occupied with Public Papers, there will be room for most of the heads now omitted; though, as to some of them, it may, perhaps, be determined to exclude them altogether, for the sake of admitting, in their stead, matter more closely connected with Politics and Political Œconomy.

The Collection of Public Papers, relating to the dispute between England and France, is more complete than any other extant, either in English, or in French; and, besides the papers, strictly official, there are two which now make their very first appearance in the English language; one, entitled "*Observations on the King of England's Manifes-*" *to*," the other, "*the King of England's Declaration, accompanied* "*with Remarks.*" Both these writings, the latter of which is attributed to the pen of Mr. Hautrive, were first published in the Moniteur; and, therefore, must have received the approbation of the French government, if, indeed, they were not written and promulgated under its immediate direction. Be this as it may, they are of great public importance, not only because they treat of every point in dispute, bring to light many facts heretofore not publickly known, and display considerable ingenuity and force of argument, but because they contain the statements and the reasoning, on which the French government has

rested its defence, and has committed its cause to the hands of the historian. The disrespectful expressions, made use of, in these writings, towards his Majesty, will, undoubtedly, excite the indignation of every British reader; but, as to the rest of the world, it is to be feared, that this circumstance will not materially enfeeble the general effect of these dangerous productions, which, therefore, should certainly receive, in some shape or other, an answer from His Majesty's Ministers.——— Another paper, worthy of particular attention, is, the Memorial delivered to the French government, by MR. LIVINGSTON, the American Minister at Paris. This paper, the object of which was to prevail on France to relinquish the settlement of Louisiana, is said to have been the work of MR. JEFFERSON himself; and, it fully discovers views, which have been long entertained by the French and some of the American politicians, and which demand the serious and immediate consideration of the British government.

It being the plan of this work to suffer each Volume to embrace no historical matter, which does not, for the first time, appear before the public, during the months, for which that Volume professes to be a Register, the Parliamentary Proceedings and Debates are, of course, brought down only to the 30th of June inclusive; but, the sequel of these Proceedings and Debates, together with the divers Accounts and a List of the Acts, will find a place in the Supplement to the next Volume, in which an humble attempt will be made to abridge, simplify, and elucidate, that voluminous, complicated, and confused mass of materials called Parliamentary Accounts.

To alleviate the labour of reference, in a work of such bulk, and of an almost endless number and variety of articles and of subjects, all possible aid ought to be afforded: an ample TABLE OF CONTENTS is, therefore, prefixed; and, to a very copious INDEX OF MATTERS are added an INDEX OF NAMES OF PERSONS and another of NAMES OF PLACES, from all which, it is hoped, great assistance will be derived.

London, July 1, 1803.

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DIRECTIONS TO THE BINDER.

N. B. *After this page comes the Register, beginning at page* 1, *and continuing on to page* 992. *Then follows the* SUPPLEMENT, *which begins with page* 993, *and closes with the Index of Places.—The Signatures of the Supplement have a* * *before them, except* S S S, T T T, U U U, X X X, *and* Y Y Y, *which have no* * *before them.*

☞ *This Volume must always be bound with a* HOLLOW BACK, *and great care must be taken not to cut too much from the edges of the leaves. There is quite margin enough, if proper care be taken.*

LONDON, January 1 *to January* 8, 1803.

TO THE PUBLIC.

In presenting to the public this first Number of my *Third Volume*, I think it not improper just to state what has been the success of my labours. There are sold, weekly, of this Work, upon an average, in the United Kingdom alone, more than *two thousand* Numbers; which, when it is considered, that only fifty-two Numbers have been published, is, I believe, an instance of success, unparalleled in the history of periodical publications.—The Register is formed into two volumes in a year, one ending on the 30th of June, and the other on the 31st of December, each volume having a Supplement containing rather more matter, in point of bulk, than the Numbers of which the volume is composed, together with a Title and a copious Index.—The first volume has been re-published, and the edition is already nearly sold off. The Supplement to the Second Volume will appear in about ten days from this time, and will be furnished to those gentlemen who take in the Numbers, by the same persons by whom those Numbers are supplied. This Supplement will contain, amongst a great variety of very important articles, *A Complete Collection of all the Debates on the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties*, also of the *Parliamentary Papers for the whole of the last Session*, including the very *interesting Papers relative to India Affairs*, and *A Complete Collection of all the Debates during the present Session of Parliament*, up to the Christmas recess. The other articles are too numerous to be specified in this place; but, I trust, that the two volumes will be found to form A Political Register for the Year 1802, as complete as it is possible to make a work of that kind, and much more so than any thing heretofore offered to the Public. My eyes have been constantly and steadily fixed on the passing political transactions and events, and, taking the contents of the Numbers and the Supplement together, I have, I am persuaded, omitted nothing worthy of being preserved or remembered.

WM. COBBETT.

London, Jan. 1, 1803.

INVINCIBLE STANDARD.

Since my last, (See Vol. II. p. 865.) the two following articles, relative to this subject, have appeared in the True Briton. They are inserted here, 1st. for the purpose of easy reference, when I come to reply to all that has been, or shall be, set up against the claim of LUTZ; and secondly, to show my readers, how little, how very little, what poor miserable tricks, the opponents of that brave soldier condescend to have recourse to.

"We have the *authority* of an officer of rank, "now in this city, who was an eye-witness and "bore a part with the 42d reg. in the engage- "ment in which the Standard of the French In- "vincibles was taken, *to contradict* the report cir- "culated in the English papers, that it was taken "by one LUTZ, a French emigrant, a private in "the Queen's German reg. The Invincibles were "all taken, killed, or destroyed, by the 42d reg. "a full quarter of an hour before the Queen's "reg. came up."—*(Glasgow Herald and Advertiser)* —*True Briton, 4th Jan.* 1802.

No doubt they have authority "*to contradict*" any thing that they do not like. But *who* is this officer? *What* is his rank? and what is his *name?* Why does he not put that to the contradictions, as I did my name to the narrative?

"The glorious circumstance of the capture of "this standard has of late become much the "subject of discussion in the public papers, from "*unauthenticated statements, ignorant assertions, or wil-* "*fully malicious representations.* It has been posi- "tively denied, that Serjeant Sinclair, of the 42d "reg. took the Invincible Standard. No fact can "be more certain. Such has been the statement, "not only of the officers of the 42d, but of every "officer who served in the glorious campaign in "Egypt. In addition to a mass of verbal tes- "timony, we have now that of a most gallant "and respectable officer, who himself was pre- "sent in all the battles in Egypt, and who des- "cribes them in a work just published, entitled, "'A History of the British Expedition to Egypt, "&c.' That officer is Sir Robert Thomas Wil- "son, Lieut.-col. of cavalry, and knight of the "imperial military order of Maria Theresa. Af- "ter describing, with the greatest spirit and per- "spicuity, the battle of the 21st of March, he "says,—'In this battle the French standard was "taken.—Serjeant Sinclair, of the 42d reg. and "a private of the Minorca, whose name unfor- "tunately cannot now be acquired, (this we "presume to be LUTZ), claimed equally the "trophy, and it appears that each merited the "honour; Serjeant Sinclair first took it, but

" ' being ordered forwards by an officer, *he gave it* " ' *to a private who was killed.* When the Minorca " ' advanced, *the French had recovered the colours*; " ' but the private wrested them from the man " ' who had possession, and then bayoneted him." —After this clear and convincing testimony, we think no doubt can remain upon the mind of any candid individual with regard to the truth of Serjeant Sinclair's narrative, or the motives of those who would wish to rob him of an honour which is so justly his due. We are far from desiring to detract from the merit of LUTZ, in recovering the colours after they had been re-taken; but in doing justice to one brave man, it is equally unjust and unjustifiable to calumniate another.—*True Brit. 5th Jan.*

The readers of the Register will remember, that I noticed this error (Vol. II. p. 821) of Sir Robert Wilson, which arose, I presume, from nearly the same causes as the error and consequent mistatement of the Highland Society.—I shall, after a reasonable time has been allowed to that Society, for explanation, resume the subject at large; in the mean time, I beg the reader to compare Sir Robert Wilson's account with Serjeant Sinclair's narrative, published in the proceedings of the Highland Society, (Vol. II. p. 806.) Such a comparison will at once prove how far the above article will operate to the prejudice of LUTZ's claim, or rather of my claim in behalf of LUTZ.

Paine's Letter to the People of the United States upon his arrival in that Country.

This wretched traitor and apostate, who went to America in consequence of a letter of invitation from his *worthy* friend, President Jefferson, (which see Vol. I. p. 756.) has published a letter, by way of recommencement of his labours in the cause of rebellion and blasphemy. We here insert it, not as a curiosity, but as a criterion whereby to judge of the notions and principles of the party, of which, debased as he is, we doubt not he will become a principal organ. That there are, however, people in America who think of this miscreant as he deserves, our readers will perceive by the introduction to his letter; which introduction we here insert, and which is taken from a Maryland village news-paper.

" There is no man known in the U. " States, who has blasphemed so openly " and wicked as Tom Paine. The Chris- " tian would shudder at hearing his ex- " pressions repeated. This man has been " selected by the President, as his most " favoured friend. He has not taken so " much pains to procure a meeting with " any other person. Is this done for the " purpose of insulting the American peo- " ple, by publicly shewing how much he " despises their religious opinions? Or is it " done for the purpose of using him as an " instrument to root out Christianity in " this country? Perhaps the President does " not know that *blasphemy* is a *crime* which " the laws of Maryland punish severely. " It will be necessary for him to procure a " repeal of those laws; or his *friend* may " (if disposed to pursue his ' useful la- " bours,' as Mr. Jefferson calls them) in " this state be checked in his infamous " career. Instead of friendship and ho- " nours, for the first offence he would be " bored through the tongue, and fined " £20. sterl.: for the second offence he " would be branded in the forehead with " the letter B, and fined £40 sterl.; and " for the third offence suffer death. And " yet the very man who has done what in " this state would subject him to such ig- " nominious punishment, who has blas- " phemed his God, and endeavoured to " destroy every vestige of Christianity, he " is the man whom the President of the " United States has invited to this coun- " try, and publicly meets on terms of inti- " macy and friendship Such, people of " Maryland, is the respect paid by your " President to your laws and your re- " ligion!"

To the Citizens of the United States.

LETTER THE FIRST.—After an absence of almost 13 years, *I* am again returned to the country in whose dangers *I* bore MY share, and for whose greatness *I* contributed MY part.—When *I* sailed for Europe in the spring of 1787, it was MY intention to return to America the next year, and enjoy, in retirement, the esteem of MY friends, and the repose *I* was entitled to. *I* had stood out the storm of one revolution, and had no wish to embark in another. But other scenes and circumstances than those of contemplated ease were allotted ME. The French revolution was beginning to germinate when *I* arrived in France. The principles of it were good; they were copied from America, and the men who conducted it were honest. But the fury of faction soon extinguished the one, and sent the other to the scaffold. Of those who began that revolution *I* am almost the only survivor, and that through a thousand dangers. *I* owe this, not to the prayers of *priests*, nor to the piety of *hypocrites*, but to the continued protection of Providence.—But while I beheld with pleasure the dawn of liberty rising in Europe, *I* saw, with regret, the lustre of it fading in America. In less than two years from the time of MY departure, some distant symptoms painfully suggested the idea that the principles of the revolution were expiring on the soil that produced them. *I* received at that time a letter from a female literary correspondent, and in MY *answer* to her *I* expressed MY fears on that head in the following pensive *soliloquy*.—" You touch me on a " very tender point when you say that my friends

" on your side the water cannot be reconciled to " the idea of abandoning America even for my na- " tive England. They are in the right. I had rather " see my horse, Button, eating the grass of Borden- " town or Morissana, than see all the pomp and " shew of Europe.—A 1000 years hence, for I " must indulge a few thoughts, perhaps in less, " America may be what Europe now is. The inno- " cence of her character, that won the hearts of " all nations in her favour, may sound like a ro- " mance, and her inimitable virtue as if it had " never been. The ruins of that liberty for which " thousands bled, may just furnish materials for a " village tale, or extort a sigh from rustic sensi- " bility ; whilst the fashionable of that day, " enveloped in dissipation, shall deride the prin- " ciple, and deny the fact.—When we contemplate " the fall of empires, and the extinction of the na- " tions of the antient world, we see but little more " to excite our regret than the mouldering " ruins of pompous palaces, magnificent monu- " ments, lofty pyramids, and walls and towers " of the most costly workmanship ; but when the " empire of America shall fall, the subject for " contemplative sorrow will be infinitely greater " than crumbling brass or marble can inspire. " It will not then be said, here stood a temple of " vast antiquity, here rose a Babel of invisible " height, or there a palace of sumptuous extra- " vagance ; but, here ! ah painful thought ! the " noblest work of human wisdom, the grandest " scene of human glory, the fair cause of freedom " ROSE and FELL. Read this, and then ask if " I forget America."—*I* now KNOW, from the in formation I obtain upon the spot, that the impressions that distressed ME, for *I* was proud of America, were but too well founded. She was turning her back on her own glory, and making hasty strides in the retrograde path of oblivion. But a spark from the altar of SEVENTY-SIX, unextinguished and unextinguishable throughout that long night of error, is again lighting up in every part of the Union, the genuine flame of rational liberty.—As the French revolution advanced, it fixed the attention of the world, and drew from the pensioned pen of Edmund Burke a furious attack. This brought ME once more on the public theatre of politics, and occasioned the pamphlet, RIGHTS OF MAN. It had the greatest run of any work ever published in the English language. The number of copies circulated in England, Scotland, and Ireland, besides translations into foreign languages, were between four and five hundred thousand.—The principles of that work were the same as those of *Common Sense*, and the effect would have been the same in England, as it has been in America, could the vote of the nation have been quietly taken, or had equal opportunities consulting or acting existed. The only difference between the two works, was, that the one was adapted to the local circumstances of England, and the other to those of America. As to MYSELF, *I* acted in both cases alike ; *I* relinquished to the people of England, as *I* had done to those of America, all profits from the work. MY reward existed in the ambition to do good, and in the independent happiness of my own mind.—But a faction, acting in disguise, was rising in America, that had lost sight of first principles. They were beginning to contemplate government as a profitable monopoly, and the people as hereditary property. It is therefore no wonder that the *Rights of Man* was attacked by that faction, and its author continually abused. But let them go on ; give them rope enough, and they will put an end to their own insignificance. There is too much common sense and independence in America to be long the dupe of any faction, foreign or domestic.—But, in the midst of the freedom we enjoy, the licentiousness of the papers called federal (and *I* know not why they are called so, for they are in their principles anti-federal and despotic) are a dishonour to the character of the country, and an injury to its reputation and importance abroad.—They represent the whole people of America as destitute of public principle and private manners. As to any injury they can do at home to those whom they abuse, or service they can render to those who employ them, it is to be set down to the account of noisy nothingness. It is on themselves the disgrace recoils ; for the reflection easily represents itself to every thinking mind, that *those who abuse liberty when they possess it, would abuse power could they obtain it* ; and therefore they may as well take as a general motto for all such papers, WE AND OUR PATRONS ARE NOT FIT TO BE TRUSTED WITH POWER.—There is in America, more than in any other country, a large body of people who attend quietly to their farms, or follow their several occupations, who pay no regard to the clamours of anonymous scribblers, who think for themselves, and judge of government, not by the fury of newspaper writers, but by the prudent frugality of its measures, and the encouragement it gives to the improvement and prosperity of the country, and who acting on *their own* judgment never come forward in an election, but on some great occasion. When this body moves, all the little barkings of scribbling and witless curs pass for nothing. To say to this independent description of men *you must turn out such or such persons at the next election, for they have taken off a great many taxes, and lessened the expenses of government ; they have dismissed my son, or my brother, or myself, from a lucrative office in which there was nothing to do,* is to shew the cloven foot of faction, and preach the language of ill-disguised mortification. In every part of the Union this faction is in the agonies of death, and in proportion as its fate approaches, it gnashes its teeth, and struggles. MY arrival has struck it with a hydrophobia ; it is like the sight of water to canine madness.

As this letter is intended to announce MY arrival to MY friends, and to MY enemies, if *I* have any, for *I* ought to have none in America, and as introductory to others that will occasionally follow, *I* shall close it by declaring the line of conduct *I* shall pursue.—*I* have no occasion to ask, and do not intend to accept, any place or office in the government. There is none it could give ME that would be any ways equal to the profits *I* could make as an author, for *I* have an established fame in the literary world, could *I* reconcile it to MY principles to make money by politics or RELIGION. *I* must be in every thing what *I* ever have been, a disinterested volunteer. MY proper sphere of action is on the common floor of citizenship, and to honest men *I* give MY hand and MY heart freely.—*I* have some manuscript works to publish, of which *I* shall give proper notice : and some mechanical affairs to bring forward that will employ all MY leisure time. *I* shall continue these letters as *I* see occasion, and as to the low party prints that choose to abuse ME, they are welcome. *I* shall not descend to answer them.

I have been too much accustomed to such common stuff to take any notice of it. The government of England honoured ME with a thousand martyrdoms by burning ME in effigy in every town in that country, and their hirelings in America may do the same. THOMAS PAINE.

City of Washington, Nov. 12, 1802.

Extract from the French Official Gazette, the Moniteur, dated January 1, 1803.

Lord Pelham, a Minister of the King of England, made use of these words in the House of Peers:—"Lord Grenville was "wrong in saying, that we wish to isolate "ourselves. Our intention is to profit, by "every opportunity that may occur on the "Continent, to contribute to the safety of "our country."—This reveals to us the secret of what we have already seen, and it will be proper to recollect it in the events which may succeed.—When we learn that a swarm of Secret Agents, under the orders of Drake, Wickham, &c. inundate Germany and Italy, we may presage that the prophecy of Lord Pelham is realized, and that the Continent is menaced with a crisis. Birds of evil augury, they will bear every where the signal of carnage and devastation.—If war is a scourge more terrible for mankind than famine, pestilence, or drought, what profound perversity must have rendered insensible to all the sentiments of nature, Grenville, Windham, and Minto!—They have endeavoured for several months to disturb Holland, Switzerland, and Germany; they endeavour at this moment to disturb the tranquillity of Genoa, and this is the object of the frequent voyages of the frigate Medusa.—They have endeavoured to bring about a revolution at Naples. Moliterno and Belpucci *have been arrested at Calais*, at the moment when they were embarking to confer at London with the agents of the faction which directed them.—They are arrested, *and their process is commenced.* The Counsellor of State, Thibaudeau, *has already interrogated them several times; their papers are numerous and very interesting.*—Thus they seek also to disturb the tranquillity of the Pope, and two agents, who both took a part in the civil disorders of Rome, have met at Paris, the one coming from London and the other from Italy.—In pursuance of the same system *Mr. Moore appears on the Continent surrounded by the agents of Dutheil*, who are miserably sullied with every crime.—It is also for the purpose of exciting storms upon the Continent, that more than 100 brigands at Jersey, condemned by the tribunals for robberies, assassinations, and incendiary crimes, have sought there a refuge, from whence they embark in fishing-boats, and come upon our coasts to assassinate unfortunate women and unfortunate proprietors.—But these plots are vain; let us hope that they will continue to be so. The French government will always cut the thread of such intrigues, although they may be woven with much art, like the Gordian-Knot. The Continent will remain in peace, but the glory will accrue to the French people, and the remorse to the friends of war. Yes, the remorse, after ten years of war, when a third part of the generation has perished. Is there now a mother in England, Germany, Italy, or France, who must not regard with horror, Grenville, Windham, and Minto! those men who provoke war which they never make. In the bosom of a wealthy and magnificent city, surrounded by all the delights and comforts of life, they provoke the massacre of the rest of mankind.—Is there a sovereign upon the Continent whose essential study is now not to read with attention, and to meditate profoundly, on the speeches and the ideas which reveal that infernal policy, confessed now with a shamelessness unexampled in the history of nations, and which can only be the effect of delirium, the first punishment of crime?—Mr. Windham accuses ministers of not having allies, and at the same moment *he speaks of the Russian nation as ferocious and barbarous* *. The Emperor Alexander will, doubtless, despise such provocations; but if we consult the annals of all people and all times, has not the Russian nation the right *of demanding a just satisfaction?*—At the same time they give *five hundred pounds sterling to a miserable emigrant, for printing a libel against the grandson of Frederick II.* against that wise prince, the friend of his people, to whom Europe owes in part the tranquillity and the repose which it begins to enjoy.—What if the King of Prussia should exact a punishment for a conduct so strange, on the part of a nation with whom he is at peace, on the part of a government for whom he has preserved the state of Hanover?—In order to insult all the governments of Europe, they support the same principles as the Tunisians and the Algerines, who, although at peace, insult the flag of all nations; but it should be recollected, that they only attack weak powers; and certainly *France, Russia, and Prussia, may at length become fatigued with this excess of licentiousness, and say that it shall exist no longer.*—

* See the refutation of this falsehood, Register, p. 859.

They complain of not having allies, and all the diatribes of the faction tend to prove that the Emperor of Germany was betrayed, when advised by a perfidious minister, he twice sacrificed the flower of his armies, in order to support that cause, and not his own.—We may apply to these orators what was said of the Council of Kings of Babylon: "They give all the Counsels which "they ought not to give, and they neglect "those alone which ought to be followed."—These men do not speak either the opinion or the wish of the *English* NATION. That nation so *enlightened*, so *philosophic*, has *other views* and other opinions, and IF IT HAD HAD TO APPOINT ITS REPRESENTATIVES, it would not have chosen Lord Grenville, Windham, or Minto. But what do they wish? They have *ruined the finances* of their country, by their foolish enterprizes; they have lost the good opinion of Europe by their arrogance. The *Prince*, when he discovered them, *chased them from his presence*. They have remained with their regrets, which pursue them, torment them, and give to all their actions, and all their speeches, that furious tone which reveals the state of their minds.—Trouble, disorder, and blood can alone relieve them; they wish for trouble, disorder and blood.—Their speeches are those which the celebrated Milton placed in the mouth of Satan.—But we despise these fallen actors, and we repeat again and again, that *the peace, the whole of the peace, and nothing but the peace*, can consolidate Europe, and England especially. It would be a wise and *patriotic law* which should *prevent those ministers who have retired, from sitting during the first seven years of their retirement, in the Parliament of England.*—Another law not less wise, would be, that every member who insulted a people and a friendly power, should be *condemned to two years silence*. When the tongue offends, the tongue should be punished.—To conclude, it results from all their speeches, that they wish for war; but that they are without allies, and without credit upon the Continent.—We shall therefore have peace, thanks to their discredit.—Tender mothers, good citizens, enlightened philanthropists, bless Heaven for the discredit of that faction; for its credit upon the Continent would be the signal for the death of your children, for the devastation of your Provinces, for the mourning of all nature!!!—(*Moniteur*).

Letter from the Secretary at War for the Island of Sardinia, to the Maritime Prefect at Toulon, relative to the Slaves who were liberated by the Gov. of Algiers.

Sir,—Some uncertain accounts had before informed us of the generous and successful interposition of Rear-Admiral Lessigues, with the Bey of Tunis in favour of a certain number of the inhabitants of the island of St. Pietre, who were carried off by some armed ships from Barbary, in the year 1797. But, we knew not whether we might give faith to that interesting piece of news, till your letter of the 25th of Oct. put an end to all our doubts.—Sir, at the moment at which I have the honour to write to you, his R. H. the Duke de Genevers is in the deepest affliction on account of the sudden death of a brother, whom he tenderly loved, and whose loss is a great public calamity.—An incident so distressing, though it has withdrawn his attention for a time from the concerns of public business, yet has not hindered him from sympathizing in the good fortune of those poor men who are so generously restored to liberty and to their country.—It gives me the highest pleasure, Sir, that I have the honour of testifying to you, in the name of his R. H. that grateful sense which he entertains of an act so nobly humane. I flatter myself that you will have the goodness to make it known to the French gov. which could not have employed a fitter person than yourself to discharge the last act in the completion of views so beneficent.—I am, with the highest regard, Sir, your most obedient humble Servant, *Quejada*,

Nov. 6, 1802. Sec. at War for Sardinia.

Note transmitted by the Swedish Minister to the Deputation at Ratisbon, relative to a Provision for the Ecclesiastical Princes.

His Majesty the King of Sweden has learnt with satisfaction, that several of the co-estates have proposed, that a proper provision shall be made for the Ecclesiastical Princes, who have lost their states by the treaty of peace. Those Princes, whose states have been the continual theatre of the war, deserve the highest consideration. Of this number are the Princes Bishops of Liege and Basle, and his Highness the Elector of Treves. The proposed plan of a contribution of Roman months seems to be less proper, as it depends absolutely on the will of each state in particular, and does not offer to the pensioners a sufficient security. In the 25th and 26th sittings of the Deputation, the Sub-delegates of Saxony and Bohemia treated and discussed this object with so much ability, that it gives a real pleasure to his Majesty to adhere to the principles they have established, and to their propositions. Since his accession to the throne, and during the war now terminated, his Majesty caused his subjects to furnish, with an exactness of which few states of the Empire could give an example, the contingent imposed on him, and the Roman months which had been granted. These charges of the war are too sensible and too burthensome to Swedish Pomerania, to make it compatible with the paternal solicitude of his Majesty for his subjects, to consent that any more charges of the like kind should be imposed on them after the re-establishment of peace. The intention of his Majesty in his quality of Duke of Anterior Pomerania, consequently is to provide against all concession of the Roman months, or other subsidies on the part of all the states of the Empire, which might arise from the affair of the indemnities. *Knut-Bild.*

Ratisbon, Dec. 9, 1802.

Protest of the Bailiff of Ploen against the Proclamation of the Senate of Lubeck.

The free imperial city of Lubeck having, by

a proclamation of the 11th inst. declared its resolution to occupy the whole tract of land belonging to the chapter and bishop of Lubeck, between the Trave, the Baltic, and Himmelsdorf Lake, a line which is drawn above Schwartau, at a distance of at least 500 French-toises from the Trave—I the undersigned do by superior authority, and in the name of his Majesty the King, my most gracious Sovereign, *protest* against the occupation of any village belonging to the chapter, and do in the most solemn manner *reserve* to his Majesty the King, to his most Serene Highness the Prince Bishop, and to the venerable Chapter, all their just rights. *A. Von Hennings.*
From the Castle of Ploen, Dec. 12, 1802.

At the same time appeared the following proclamation:—"In the name of his Majesty the King of Denmark, &c.—The magistrates of the free imperial city of Lubeck, having notified by proclamation of the 11th inst. their intention to occupy a part of the villages belonging to the Prince Bishop and Chapter, to which the King, my gracious Sovereign, can by no means consent. —The subjects of the Prince Bishop and Chapter are hereby desired to pay no attention to the said proclamation, and to pull it down, and deliver it in wherever they shall find it." *A. Von Hennings.*
Castle of Ploen, Dec. 12, 1802.

Tunis, Oct. 19.—The presents which the Tunisian Ambassador carries to Paris for Mad. Buonaparté, consist of two very elegant Moorish female dresses, richly embellished with diamonds. For the First Consul he carries ten beautiful horses, some lions, &c. The Bey received from the French Rear-Admiral Lesseguès, several muskets and pistols of the finest workmanship, from the manufactory of Versailles, and other presents of great value. The Minister, Sidi-Jussuf Sahib-Gauba, received a large diamond ring.—There are now in all 47 Barbary corsairs at sea, which daily take prizes on the Italian coasts.

Constantinople, Nov. 21.—Lord Elgin is making preparations for his return to England, on account of the ill state of his health.—The Porte has received advice that the Beys in Upper Egypt have made exertions to break through the cordon of Turkish troops, to get to the English; but that their design has been frustrated by the Pacha of Cairo.—Col. Sebastiani styles himself French envoy extraord. for the whole Levant.

St. Petersburgh, Dec. 7.—By a French courier returning to Paris, our Monarch has written to the First Consul, and most strongly interested himself in the fate of the King of Sardinia, of Switzerland, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia; observing, that he cannot believe the report, that these three countries are to be incorporated with the French republic. — Admiral Count Mordwinof has resigned.

Genoa, Dec. 11. Political tranquillity is not yet fully re-established in the republic of the Seven Isles. The Russian Admiral on that station was lately obliged to employ both a land and a naval force against the enemies of good order.

Frontiers of Russia, Dec. 11.—A courier from St. Petersburgh, dispatched from the French Ambassador there to Paris, brings advice that the Emperor will accept the guarantee of Malta, as soon as some alterations shall be made to the articles of the treaty of Amiens, relative to that point.

Berne, Dec. 12.—The Administrative Chamber of the Canton of Leman has been authorised to levy a contribution of 25,000 francs in the canton, to make up the sum to be paid for the maintenance of the French troops.

Frankfort, Dec. 14.—It is now resolved that our fortifications shall be demolished. This is the wish of the French govt. and it is indeed very acceptable here.—Only the town-wall will be left standing—The report that the Emperor has ratified the Recess, or plan of indemnities, is not confirmed.

Milan, Dec. 12.—The organic law which establishes the new gov. at Genoa, has been published there. The gov. will consist of a senate, in which a doge is to preside. There are to be 5 great officers of state, viz the ministers of justice and legislation, of the interior, of war, of the marine, and of finance. The senate is to consist of 30 senators; each senator to be 30 years old, and remain in office 6 years. The doge is to be chosen by the senate, and continue in office 6 years; nor can he again be elected till after 6 years.

Berlin, Dec. 18.—Yesterday arrived a Dutch courier, with the exchange of the convention concluded between the court and the Batavian republic, relative to the towns of Savenaar, Huissen, and Malbourg

Vienna, Dec. 18.—On the 15th inst. H. R. H. the Duchess Dowager of Parma arrived here. The Emperor received her at the palace, and led her to her Majesty the Empress.—The order of the French government that the silk of Piedmont, and other Italian States, shall only be sold to dealers in France, will be very sensibly felt at Vienna, and probably cause the failure of several silk manufactures there.

Basle, Dec. 20.—Cit. Hocpyffnef, editor of a German gazette at Berne, has been again arrested, for inserting in his journal, a satire against the minister and general in chief, Ney.

Hague, Dec. 29 —A letter from the Gov. Gen. of the Cape of Good Hope has been received, informing the government that the colony has been restored by the English in the most flourishing condition.—Gen. Victor, Capt. Gen. of Louisiana, is arrived here, and has had several conferences with the French ambassador and the govt. He has examined at Roterdam, and along the Meuse, all the preparations for the expedition. He will remain at the Hague till he embarks, which will take place on board the frigate La Furieuse. The transports will not be equipped this month.—*Dec.* 31. On the 24th inst. sailed under convoy of the corvette De Vlieg, a squadron of transports carrying out troops, civil officers, with ammunition and other articles, to Batavia and the Molucca Isles. That same day sailed likewise a force of 1000 or 1200 men, to Surinam, Demerara, and the West India Isles; in which the govt. intends to keep stronger garrisons than it has yet allowed to be intimated in the newspapers of this country. The troops are to go out in small detachments, and so as to elude as much as possible the notice of other powers.

Paris, Dec. 20.—In the Council of the Administration, which was held this day, the Minister of the Treasury gave in an account of all expenses of negotiations, discounts of bills, services, and transfers of money, discharged out of the treasury, from the 23d of Sept. 1801, to the 23d of Sept. 1802, the 10th year of the French Republic.—The results which he presented were highly satisfactory, the total expense upon those objects collectively, not exceeding the sum of 15 millions of livres, or about 630,000l. sterling, which is ½ less than was the same branch of the expenditure for the year

immediately preceding. This account, with the several documents by which it is authenticated, will be communicated to the Legislative Body at its first meeting, and afterwards printed.—Among the papers laid before the Consuls by the Minister of the Treasury, was a curious statement of the daily expense of discounting the bills of the Receiver-General of the Rev. commencing from the end of the year 8 (Sept. 23, 1800), coming down to the end of the year 10 (Sept. 23, 1802).—Some few days before the battle of Marengo the discount of those bills was at 5 per cent. per month.—In the course of the year 9, it fell first to 2, and then to 1½ per cent per month.—In the year 10 it varied from 15-16ths to 3-4ths per month.—It is now fixed for the whole of the year 11 at ½ per cent. per month.—*There is now no other govt. in Europe whose bills are discounted at so moderate an interest.* At the Council of Administration, which is to be held next Saturday, the Ministers of Finance, and the Public Treasury, will present the general account of the receipts and expenditure of the Republic, during the year 10. Each minister will transmit, at the same time, a particular account of the expenses of his department. In the same council the budget will be drawn up, and presented to the Legislative Body for the service of the year 11.—The *Caisse d'Amortissement* is cancelling in the great book the 5 per cent. consols, which it has bought. The state of its operations will be joined to the general account of finances, which will be presented to the Legislative Body. It will afford results of a nature to satisfy all persons interested in the prosperity of the republic.—*Moniteur.*—Gen. Victor, who is to be Capt. Governor of Louisiana, left Brussels on the 18th, on his way to Holland, where he was to put himself at the head of the French armament, which is shortly to set sail from Helvoetsluys, in order to take possession of that immense country.

Dec. 30. On Wednesday last there was held a council of Finance. The ministers of the finances, and of the public treasury, gave in an account of the receipts for the year 10.—The receipts of the year 10 exceed by 50 millions the estimate of the minister of finance. This estimate itself exceeded the receipts of the year 9, thirty millions. The year 10 thus offers a total increase beyond the year 9, of 80 millions.—It is computed that the receipts of the year 11 will exceed by 30 millions those of the year 10, which would make a difference between nine and eleven of 110 millions. These accounts contain nothing but what is real and effective.—On the 1st Vendémiaire, year 11, all the resources of the year 18 were entire, and the 132 millions of government bills upon the supplies of the year 11, were all in the public treasury. The results of these accounts, in all their details, all the receipts, specifying the amount of each particular tax, in each particular department, as well as the balance at the public treasury, will be printed and published during the approaching session of the legislative body.—*Moniteur.*

Dec. 31.—The members of the legislative body who, according to the forms of the existing constitution were to vacate their seats, will cease to exercise their functions on the 1st of next Pluviôse (Jan. 21.)—Cit. Galli, of the department of the Po, is appointed a counsellor of state for the home department.—Cit. Ségur, a member of the legislative body, is nominated a counsellor of state for the home department.—The legislative body will recommence their sittings for the year 11 on the 1st of next Ventôse (Feb. 20).

Buonaparte's Address to the Helvetic Deputies, published at Paris, Dec. 28, 1802.

The more I learn of your country, so much the more am I convinced that it cannot, with advantage, have more than a single government. By the representative system the democratic cantons would be subjected to the necessity of payments to which they are unaccustomed. The descendants of William Tell must know neither the restraint of chains, nor the payment of imposts. But, on the other hand, for Berne, and the other great cantons, the attempts at pure democracy were absurd. Your different cantons must of necessity have diversities of constitutional arrangement. With three leading exceptions, you must be re-established nearly in the same political order in which you were before. The inequality of rights which subsisted among the old cantons; the relations between sovereign and subject states; with the prerogatives of the Patrician families must be abolished for ever. Under these corrections of the constitutions of the cantons, Switzerland may possess a federative government of effective vigour.—For the maintenance of an independent central gov. your country is, by the invincible parsimony of nature, too poor. Your gov. cannot be other than one which may be supported without a burthensome civil list. You cannot now act that part, among the great powers of Europe, to which you were formerly not unequal, when those which now constitute the great powers, were subdivided into a multitude of petty states. Your real force would be enfeebled, your present militia would be lost by the institution of a standing army. You might, indeed, become great by forming two departments of France. But from France you are separated by the eternal indestructible barriers of nature. Between two powers, between which there is a balance of force and influence, you are safe. Preserve your neutrality, your laws, your political tranquillity, your good morals; and your fortune cannot but be happy. Confederative government enfeebles great states; but, by concentrating, invigorates the energies of those which are small. Besides, whom would you place at the head of your central government? If several persons, would there not be a division of their opinions and interests? If one man, who is there among you, whom you would all be willing to invest with the necessary confidence and authority? I, invested as I am, by the confidence of a great nation, with the power of its supreme magistracy, could not undertake to govern you. Should you chuse a native of Zurich, the inhabitants of Berne would be dissatisfied. By the choice of a catholic, offence would be given to the protestants. By the restoration of the gov. of the cantons, you may become happier than by any merely central gov. During the existence of one single gov. for all Switzerland, what have you known but incessant and unavailing changes? Last year you drove away a diet legitimately nominated by the people. Of your last constitution I cannot approve; a central gov. cannot be maintained among you, without the presence of French troops. Your present gov. knows this by experience. Its members spoke the voice of patriotism, in consenting that the French troops should be withdrawn; but their prudence in that consent was not justified by the events which followed. As a French citizen, I cannot but add that Switzerland, though independent in regard to its own affairs, must not be so in its relations to France.—No English emis-

saries are to be entertained in Switzerland. *With England the Swiss must enter into no treaty* !! The gov. of Berne has ever been in the habit of seeking the support of foreign powers hostile to France. This example was allowed by Reding, and the other leaders in the last insurrection. Such must never again be the policy of Switzerland. France will never permit the Leman territory, of which the inhabitants are by blood and language allied to the French, to become again subjects to the Swiss. The basis of your new structure must be taken from the revolution and the will of the people. In the whole, the people must be satisfied, and no taxes must be imposed.

Decree of the French Consuls relative to the Establishment of Chambers of Commerce.

The consuls of the republic, on the report of the minister of the interior, decree as follows:—Chamber of commerce, decree of Dec. 24.—Chap. I. Art. I. There shall be established chambers of commerce in the following towns: Lyons, Rouen, Bourdeaux, Marseilles, Brussels, Antwerp, Nantes, Dunkirk, Lisle, Mentz, Nismes, Avignon, Strasburgh, Turin, Montpellier, Geneva, Bayonne, Toulouse, Tours, Carcassonne, Amiens, and Havre.—II. The chambers of commerce shall consist of 15 merchants in those towns whose population exceeds 50,000 souls; and of 9, in all those where the population is below that amount: not counting the prefect, who is always, in virtue of his office, to be a member of, and to preside over it, whenever he assists at its sittings. The mayor will officiate, in room of the prefect, in those towns where there is no resident prefecture.—III. No person shall be eligible as a member of the chamber, unless he has himself been engaged in commerce at least ten years.—IV. The functions to be performed by the chambers of commerce are—To draw up memorials respecting the best means of promoting the prosperity of commerce.—To explain to gov. the causes that check or impede its progress.—To point out such resources as may be availed of, to superintend the execution of the public works relative to commerce, such, for example, as the repair of harbours, the navigation of rivers, and the execution of the laws respecting contraband.—V. The chambers of commerce shall hold a direct intercourse with the minister of the interior.—VI. The first institution of the chamber of commerce shall be proceeded in as follows:—The prefects, and where there are none, the mayors in those towns which are not head-residencies of prefects, shall unite under their presidency from 40 to 60 of the principal merchants of the town, who shall proceed by a secret scrutiny, and an absolute majority of votes, to the election of members who are to compose the chamber.—VII. One third of the members of the chamber shall be changed every year; the members who go out are re-eligible. For the first two years after the estab. of the chamber, the members to go out are to be determined by lot. Their places shall be filled up by the chamber, and by a majority of votes.—VIII. Every appointment shall be transmitted to the minister of the interior, in order to receive his approbation.—IX. The chamber of commerce shall give in to the minister of the interior a statement of their expenses, and devise means for defraying them.—The minister will present their statements to govt.

Chap. II. Institution of a general council of commerce.—X. There shall be at Paris a general council of commerce. This council shall reside near the office of the minister of the interior.—XI. The members of the general council shall be appointed by the chambers of commerce.—Each chamber shall nominate two persons, and out of the whole the First Consul will choose fifteen. These 15 shall assemble together at Paris once or twice a year. Three of them shall be always on the spot.—No one shall be eligible unless he be actually engaged in commerce in the town sending the deputation, and unless he be in the town at the time of his nomination.—XII. The minister of the interior is charged with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws. *Buonaparté*, First Consul.

Decree of the French Consuls relative to the Duty on Foreign Muslins. St. Cloud, Dec. 15.

The Consuls of the Republic, on the report of the Minister of Finances, having considered the rates of the customs fixed March 15th, 1791, the law of April 29th, 1799, and the law of May 19th, 1802; having also heard the Council of State on the subject, issued the following order:—I. The duty of 400 francs, payable on every five myriagrams of embroidered muslin imported from abroad, shall be levied also on all other white cottons, stitched, embroidered or striped.—II. The Minister of Finances is to direct the execution of this order. It is to be enrolled among the laws.—*Buonaparté*.—By the First Consul, *H. B. Maret.*

From the London Gazette.—Whitehall, Jan. 1, 1803.—The king has been pleased to appoint the right hon. Thomas Steele and John Hiley Addington, Esq. to the office of paymaster-general of his Majesty's forces.—The king has been pleased to present the Rev. D. Dickson to the church and parish of St. Cuthbert, commonly called West Kirk, in the presbytery and county of Edinburgh, vacant by the death of Mr. William Paul, late minister there.—The king has also been pleased to present the Rev. D. Harris to the church and parish of Fearn, in the presbytery of Brechin, and county of Forfar: and the Rev. C. Anderson, to the church and parish of Gask, in the presbytery of the Auchterarder, and shire of Perth,

The gazette of Saturday contains an order of council, continuing, till the 31st of March, the prohibition against the exportation of any kind of corn or bread from England or Ireland, excepting from one of these islands to the other, and excepting, also, malt and rice.—Another order, of the same date, prolongs, to the like period, the prohibition against the exportation of bulls, oxen, cows, calves, sheep, lambs, or swine, or the flesh of any of them, salted or otherwise; as also of butter, onions, or pulse, excepting only to his Majesty's settlements, the customary bond being given for their delivery therein.

The office of Surveyor of the Woods and Forests is a patent place, of which Lord Glenbervie has long had the reversion. The salary and perquisites amounted to about 4000l. per annum; but the salary is made a nett 3000l. to Lord Glenbervie, and all perquisites are abolished. The place being a patent one, his lordship is in no danger of losing it during his life. It is an office of some business, but not of great labour.

Edinburgh, Dec. 30.—Saturday, at an extraordinary meeting of the Lord Provost, magistrates, and council of Edinburgh, a letter was read from the right hon. Lord Vise. Melville, announcing his elevation to the peerage, and thanking them for

the honour they had so repeatedly conferred on him, in chusing him their representative. A letter was also read from the right hon. the Lord Advocate, announcing his intention of offering himself a candidate to represent the city in parliament, in the room of Lord Visc. Melville.—A letter was voted to their late representative, thanking him for the great services done by him, both to his country and native city, and congratulating him on the honour so deservedly conferred on him by his sovereign.

Bankrupts.—Lane, B. Baker-street, agent.—Parr, W. Dominica, merchant.—Trigg, W. Kingston, corn-dealer—Johnson, T. Newcastle, hardwareman,—Haswell, P. Guildford-street, carpenter.—Perkins, T. Blue-anchor road, Bermondsey.—Hidley, W. East Retford, Nottingham.—Leigh, E. Cheadle, calico-printer.—Winter, J. Combe St. Nicholas, leather-dresser.—Cripwell, T. Ruddington, Nottingham, hosier.—Adamson, J. Manchester, merchant.

It is said that the Special Commission for the trial of Col. Despard and the other persons committed on charges of High Treason, will be opened at the New Sessions House, in the Borough of Southwark, on the 21st inst. when Lord Ellenborough, who is at the head of the Commission, will deliver his charge to the Grand Jury. The other Judges named in the Commission are, Baron Thompson, Mr. Justice Le Blanc, Mr. Justice Chambre.

On Wednesday his Majesty held a Levee at St. James's Palace, which was attended by the Foreign Ambassadors and the Cabinet Ministers. The principal introductions were, Count Woronzof, Count Potockie, and Lord Cavan.

On Tuesday, Mr. Hiley Addington was elected to serve in Parliament for the Borough of Harwich.

General Orders issued by the Earl of Cavan, immediately before his Departure from Egypt:—Head-Quarters, Alexandria, Oct. 10.

As Major General the Earl of Cavan will embark this morning for Malta, Major Gen. Stewart will be pleased henceforward, to take upon himself the command of the troops of the army in Egypt. Major Gen. the Earl of Cavan, in notifying his departure to the troops in this country, earnestly solicits them to condescend to accept of his sincerest and most grateful thanks for their conduct since he has had the honour to command. A conduct not only manifesting such discipline, obedience, and every principle of good soldiers, as must increase the fame and character they have heretofore acquired; but that also rendered his command as easy as it had been flattering and honourable to him. He congratulates the army on their having Major Gen. Stewart as their commander, an officer whose attachment and regard to its interest and comforts, are as well known to every individual in it, as his experience and abilities. To Col. Beresford, Major Gen. the Earl of Cavan's obligations are most justly due, for his able execution of every duty; and particularly for his unremitting attention to the extreme troublesome one, attached to his situation, as commandant of Alexandria; to him solely are its inhabitants indebted for its present well established police; and for the tranquillity they now enjoy.—Lt. Col. Laird, Deputy Quarter-Master Gen., Lt. Col. Moore, Deputy Adjutant-Gen., Dr. Shapter, and every individual at the head of the different departments of the army, are well entitled to Major Gen. the Earl of Cavan's acknowledgment of approbation, for their assiduity and zeal, and for the assistance they have on all occasions afforded him, in forwarding the public service.—Major Gen. the Earl of Cavan is very sensible, that with great ease many officers may be found in the service possessing far superior abilities, and in every respect better qualified to command, than himself; but he is persuaded it would be attended with difficulty to find one that has been more anxiously zealous to promote the welfare and happiness of those he has commanded (especially those in Egypt) than he has been. If this declaration is thought of any value, he assures them of its continuation, and that his gratitude to the army in Egypt will never be obliterated from his memory.

Copy of a Letter from the Secretary at War to the Inspecting Field Officers of the Recruiting Service:—War-Office, 17th December, 1802.

It being thought proper that the pay and contingencies of the staff of the recruiting districts in G. Britain, should from the 25th instant, inclusive, be issued through the general agent for recruiting, resident in London, I have the honour to acquaint you therewith, and desire you will instruct the paymaster of the district under your inspection, that he is accordingly to draw upon Mr. Ridge, instead of Messrs. Cox and Greenwood, for the said service, from the above date. I am further to acquaint you, that agreeably to the tenor of the communication made to the inspector gen. of the recruiting service, in my letter of the 23d ult. the paymaster is not to issue his drafts for the pay and allowance of commanding officers belonging to the staff of the district, until the end of the military month, except in case of any individual officer who may cease to belong thereto in the course thereof; and that he is to prepare a separate estimate of the pay and contingencies of the staff for each month, with a duplicate for the use of the gen. agent, and to transmit the said estimate and duplicate to this office, so that the same may be received here on or before the 12th of each month, in order that the issues may be received accordingly. *C. Yorke.*

General Distribution of the British Army, January 1, 1803.

	Regulars. Cav.	Inf.	Fe. Inf.	Tot Ba.	Inv. Co
England and Wales	20	23	—	43	19
North Britain	2	6	—	8	6
Ireland	8	21	4	33	—
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	4	—	4	13
Gibraltar	—	7	—	7	—
Egypt and Malta	1	8	—	9	—
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	7	1	8	—
West-Indies	—	21	—	21	—
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	6	—	6	—
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	19	—	24	—
On Passage to England or Ireland from sundry places	—	4	—	4	—
Total	36	126	5	167	38*

* Exclusive of the Seven Royal Garrison Battalions at present forming.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

We were strongly inclined to confine our political remarks of this week to the internal concerns of our own country; but, the Moniteur, the Official Gazette of the French government, of the 1st instant, contains an

tionists, that success which now threatens them with total and well-merited annihilation? It will certainly be a mortifying circumstance in our lives to see the press of England destroyed by the mandates of France; but we will not deny, that, when we reflect on the conduct of that press for five and-twenty years past; when we reflect on the large share, which it has had in the guilt of the two great rebellions, which have finally produced the present state of things; when we reflect on its seditious and disloyal principles and precepts, on its base and malignant aspersion of the American loyalists, of the unfortunate King of France and his Family, and on the rancour with which, in many instances, it yet pursues the remains of that family and their adherents; when we reflect on all this, we cannot but feel much less pain than we otherwise should, at its approaching dissolution.——The next topic which presses itself upon our notice is, the revived charge against Mr. Windham, of having spoken degradingly of the Russians. This charge we refuted before, (Vol. II. p. 859.) and, have only to refer our readers to what we then said.—Mr. Windham and Lord Grenville, who have hitherto enjoyed exclusively, the honour of Buonaparté's hatred, have now, it seems, found an associate in Lord Minto. To these three, in particular, the Moniteur expressed great dislike, because, as it observed in a former manifesto, their counsels would be *dangerous to England*; and, as it perceives a possibility of their coming into power as ministers, or, at least, apprehends some danger from their speeches as members of parliament, it has obligingly suggested a method of getting rid of them in both capacities, as thus:—"It would be a patriotic and wise law "which should ordain that displaced ministers should not, for the first seven years "after their dismissal, *be competent to sit in "the English parliament*. Another law, not "less wise, would be, that every member, "who should *insult a friendly people and "power*, should be *condemned to silence for "two years*. When the tongue offends, the "tongue must suffer punishment."*—Now, let it be once more noticed, and well remembered, that the Moniteur, the paper from which these words are taken, is the official gazette of the French government, the London Gazette of France. It has, at the head of each number, the following words:—"Nous sommes autorisés à prévenir nos souscripteurs, qu'à dater du 7 "Nivôse, an 8, le Moniteur, est le seul "journal official:" that is, "We are authorised to inform our subscribers, that "from the 7 Nivôse, year 8, the Moniteur "is the only official journal."—This being the case, our ministers cannot have the smallest pretext for regarding the manifesto, on which we are now remarking, as any thing other than the words of the French government; and, we are sure, that no man of common sense and common spirit will see, or affect to see, in the passage we have last quoted, any thing short of a direct attempt to interfere in and to regulate the proceedings in parliament, to restrain the liberty of speech amongst the members, to dictate the laws which they are to pass, and to chastise those amongst them who may prove refractory to the will of France. Nor was this, even this, unforeseen or *unforetold*, as one of the consequences of the abject tone in which the peace of Amiens was negotiated and concluded. To the pusillanimous conduct of the last parliament itself, we must also attribute a share of this indelible disgrace, the almost inconceivable infamy, with which it is now attempted to mark for ever the character of this nation, once the first upon the scroll of honour. We remember, and so must our readers, that Mr. Elliot was called to account, by the late Attorney-General, for daring to express his doubts of the sincerity of Buonaparté's intentions: Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Pitt pitched the key of submission, by inculcating (what was *never done on any former occasion)* forbearance of language, in debate, as respecting the Consul of France, and, when the Moniteur abused Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham for the part they took in the discussions on the peace, the demi-official paper, the True Briton, cried, well done: "Lord Gren-"ville and Mr. Windham," said that prostituted slave, "are pretty *roughly handled* in "the French official paper, on account of "their violent anti-pacific principles, and, "we must confess, we think, with *justice "enough*." (*True Briton, June* 8, 1802.) Where, then, is the wonder, that the Moniteur now more boldly interferes? Who can blame those, who speak through that vehicle, for now dictating laws to the British parliament, and for threatening to *chastise* its refractory members. Indeed, so evident was it, that the tone of the peace would lead

* "Une loi patriotique, sage, serait celle qui "ordonnerait que les ministres sortans, ne pourraient siéger pendant les sept premières années "de leur sortie, au parlement d'Angleterre.—Une "autre loi, non moins sage, serait que tout membre qui insulterait à un peuple et à une puissance amie, fût condamné au silence pendant "deux ans. Lorsque la langue pêche, il faut "punir la langue."

to this result, that we ventured to predict it at the time :—"Of his animadversions he" [Buonaparté] "has been unusually liberal. "He has emitted his venom on all those, "who have ventured to question the moderation and sincerity of his views, and "has given us no very unintelligible hint, "that such disbelief may, *ere long, be followed with chastisement.* The ministerial "print, (the True Briton), has already cried "*peccavi*, and this circumstance, while it "will, doubtless, serve as an example to "other offenders, enables us to form a tolerably correct judgment of the disposition "of those, who will, probably, have it in "their power to torture us into silence. "Nor has the Consul confined himself to "a censorship over the language and sentiments of our news-papers: he has *shewn "a disposition to enter the chapel of St. Stephen*; and, as far as words can go, to be "an imitator of a 'great man' of our own "country, whom, in more than one trait, "he appears to have chosen as a model. "Cromwell, indeed, sent a troop of horse "to silence those who had the hardihood "to dispute *his* moderation and sincerity. "But, Buonaparté is only a young man "yet; and, we have no doubt, that he "lives in hopes to see the day, when a second Pride's purge shall consummate what "the Moniteur has so happily begun. We "are perfectly serious. It is the nature of "such a man to be presuming; and, it cannot be denied, that the experience which "Buonaparté has already had of our baseness, is well calculated to encourage his "presumption. The gross violation, the "open and daring violation of the laws "of our country, committed, with impunity, by the bearers of the preliminary "treaty, was, we fear, the beginning of a "series of acts, under which the constitution of England is destined to perish." (*Register, Vol. I. p.* 317.)—We shall be asked, perhaps, if we do *really* think, that this prediction is in the way of fulfilment; if we really think, that the ministers are base enough to propose laws at the dictates of Buonaparté, and, if they were to do so, that the people are base enough to approve of their conduct. To the former we answer, that we should hope not; to the latter, we say, NO. No: the people of England are not yet sunk to this dreadful state of degradation: God grant that they never may! We would rather see them extirpated to the last man; we would rather, were it the will of Heaven, see them swallowed by the earth, or crushed by the thunderbolt, and share in their awful fate, than behold that day of everlasting shame and infamy! But who shall assure us that that day will not come? Who that has observed the progress of Spain, of Holland, of Switzerland, of Germany; who that has observed our own progress, that recollects what we were, and that sees what we are; who that has seen how far we have fallen in the space of eighteen months, and how fast we are still falling, shall say, that we shall not reach the bottom? No great event, such as that of which we are now speaking, was ever brought about all at once. The empire of Germany has been for some time sinking to its present state; France did not, in a few months, acquire the power to regulate the legislative assemblies of Holland and Switzerland. We have, considering the short space of time since our decline, or rather our fall, began, made a greater progress than either of those once independent powers. First, his Majesty's Secretary of State for foreign affairs debased himself, or his office, at least, by beseeching an audience of a *commissary for prisoners*; next the *abandonment of the honour of the flag*; next the affair of *Lundberg and Lauriston*; next that of *Napper Tandy*; next that of *Captain d'Auvergne*; next the *prosecution of Mr. Peltier*, while the national exhibitions of Paris represent our government as the *hirers of assassins*, and while the official gazette of France styles our Sovereign *the rewarder of assassins*; and who, then, shall assure us, that, after some few other intermediate steps, we shall not at last come to that which the Moniteur has now recommended? Who that has heard the sentiment, that "*no change ought to take place in "our ministry, lest such change should furnish a "neighbouring power with a pretext for going to "war with us*;" who that has heard this sentiment will dare to assert, that the assembly, in which it was uttered, and by which it could be tolerated, and even received with approbation, will never yield obedience to the mandates of that "neighbouring power?" The practice of France is, to throw out to all nations hints of her *distant* intentions. We are not, therefore, to conclude, that the *projet de loi*, now announced to us is a mere vapour, because she does not insist upon its *immediate* adoption. She is profoundly skilled in the nature of the human mind, which she first familiarises with her notions, and when that is once done, the road to success is much less difficult than men generally imagine. She has talked of a "Western nation," consisting of the French, the English, the Italians, &c. She is inculcating the opinion, that such an union would *prevent wars*; and, who shall say, that that

opinion will not be generally, as it already is partially, adopted? Who shall say, that this motive, at all times so powerful with a rich and enervated people (and particularly so with this nation at this time) co-operating with the indignation and disgust which men must feel at being governed by such people as the Addingtons, will not produce the effect which the rulers of France have in view? With a constant dread and admiration of its enemy, and a constant distrust and contempt of its own government, no nation ever did, or ever can, long maintain its independence: under such circumstances, the votary of wealth sees, in the power of the foe, a pledge for his security, while men of other minds feel the consolation, that, in losing their country and its name, they also get rid of its disgrace. —But, the Moniteur, at the same time that it demands the expulsion, or the silencing, of the parliamentary adversaries of France, makes an appeal to the *people*, and, in a manner by no means equivocal, calls upon them to revive their clamours for a *reform of the parliament itself*. "These men" [Mr. "Windham, &c.] act according to neither "the opinion nor the *will* of the English "*people*. That people so enlightened, so "contemplative, have different sentiments, "and a different spirit: and, if they had "had the *choosing* of their representatives, "they would not have chosen Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Lord Minto *." —Mr. Reeves was prosecuted, by order of the House of Commons, for representing the two houses of Parliament as no more than *branches* of the government of England, and for saying that those branches might be hewn off and cast into the fire, without destroying the trunk. What will those jealous and zealous guardians of our liberties now say to the Moniteur, who has struck at the very root of the tree? Mr. Wilberforce and the other *reformers* will, doubtless, approve of these hints from the other side of the water; nor should we at all wonder, if they were to furbish up, and give us a new edition of their old speeches at the Yorkshire meeting, and of other documents, relative to those precious projects of the "*safe* politicians," which were turned to such admirable account by Hardy and Horne Tooke. The truth is, that the Moniteur knows us well, much better than we know ourselves, and it very artfully and ably avails itself of that knowledge.—That *war is ruin to this country* is the maxim on which all the operations of France proceed. This secret she has learnt from ourselves; it was, on our part, the basis of the peace of Amiens; it has, by clear implication at least, been a thousand times declared by the ministers, and is daily and hourly openly, and in explicit terms, avowed by their adherents all over the country; indeed, it is notorious, that it was, and is the standing reply to every argument urged against the peace. While this maxim continues to be held, we shall have no war; nor can we ever hope to see any check to the insults and encroachments of France. Let who will come into power, the situation of the country will, in this respect, be the same: and, those who hope that Mr. Pitt's return to the helm (which, by-the-by, Buonaparté's *projet de loi* renders impossible for five years yet to come) would save us, do not seem to perceive, that we are in a calm instead of a storm, that we are in danger of perishing from a leak, and not from the mismanagement of the rudder. The minds of the people are debased; they have, by the conditions of the peace and by the arguments in justification thereof, been taught to believe, that war, for *any cause*, is ruin; that it is, as we formerly expressed ourselves, the *accursed thing*, and that it ought to be avoided at the risk even of life itself. The consequences of this dangerous and degrading notion were predicted by Mr. Windham, and his prediction is now most amply and awfully verified:—"What "the condition and feelings of the country "would be in this latter case" [a renewal of the war], "I need hardly point out. The "dread, in fact, of what they would be, "will operate so strongly, that the case "will never happen. The country will "never bear to put itself in a situation, in "which the sense of its own folly will "press upon it in a way so impossible to be "endured. At all events, with its present "feelings and opinions, the country never "*can* go to war again, let France do "what she will: for, if we are of opinion, that war, continued at present, "must be ruin, in the course of a few "years, what do we suppose it must be, "when, to replace us, where we now are, "we must begin by the recovery of that "list of places, which the present treaty "has given up? France, therefore, *will be "under no necessity of going to war with us*: and, "nothing but her own intemperance and "insolence, and an opinion of our endurance

* "Ces hommes ne font ni l'opinion ni la volonté du peuple Anglais. Cette nation si éclairée, "si méditative, a une autre marche et un autre esprit: et si elle eût eu à nommer ses representans, "elle n'auroit pas choisi Lord Grenville, Windham, Minto."

" and weakness, beyond even what they " may be found to deserve, can force " upon us that extremity. She has much " safer and surer means of going to work; " means, at the same time, sufficiently quick " to satisy any ordinary ambition: *she has* " *nothing to do but to trust to the progress of her* " *own power in peace, quickened, as often as she* " *shall see occasion, by a smart threat of war.* I " cannot conceive the object, which a ju- " dicious application of these two means is " not calculated to obtain. *A peace, such as* " *France has now made, mixed with proper pro-* " *portions of a seasonable menace of war*, is a " specific, for undoing a rival country, " which seems to me impossible to fail." *(Speech on the Preliminaries, Nov. 4, 1801.)*— This is now fulfilled to the very letter. France does *trust to her power in peace* (and a fearful progress she is making); she does quicken it, now and then, with a *smart threat of war*; and she is going on towards the accomplishment of our ruin even faster than Mr. Windham himself could have supposed: she is going on to take country after country under her protection, she is drawing her battalions round all our colonies, posting them at every entrance and out-let, and the moment we dare to *look* at her (for the ministers profess to do no more), she gives us a smart slap on the cheek through the means of the Moniteur; she depreciates our funds, and threatens us with further and more serious chastisement.— And, what say the ministers to all this? It is evident, that, though the chief load of the abuse is poured out on Lords Grenville and Minto, and Mr. Windham, the blow and the threat are, in this last instance, aimed at the present ministers, the speech of one of whom [Lord Pelham] furnishes the text. What, therefore, do they say to all this? Hear, reader, and blush at being under their rule:—" The character " of Madame Buonaparte has been much " *misrepresented.* She is a *lady* of plain and " unaffected manners, extremely civil and " attentive, and at all times desirous of " making every body about her happy and " contented."—This, this base, this crawling paragraph, was inserted in that very number of their demi-official gazette, which contained the hostile manifesto of the Moniteur, on which manifesto not one word of disapprobation was bestowed! But, mark well, that it was the sentiment of *Lord Pelham*, and not of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies, that the Moniteur, had censured; and we must desire our readers not to be astonished, if that nobleman should not long remain amongst " the *safe* politicians."

Having bestowed so much of our room on this subject, we shall be compelled to postpone what we intended to say on some others, and to be very concise as to the rest. —The public papers have stated, that the Dutch have *refused* to make the *loan* required by France. This, we believe, is not so: on the contrary, we have every reason to suppose, that the loan has actually been concluded on, as we have now before us a letter from Holland by the last mail, containing the following remark:—" The *additional* " taxes, occasioned by the loan, are at pre- " sent 8½ per centum on the capital and 7 " per centum on the income, which may " be computed, in all, at 17 per centum " upon the income!"

Malta will, we believe, be given up in a short time. The pretended *guarantee*, which our ministers will affect to have obtained from Russia, is, in fact and in truth, a *mandate* on the part of that power, conjointly with France, that *we should fulfil the treaty of Amiens!* This is the valuable guarantee, which they are about to obtain from Russia. —In their demi-official journal of the 30th of October last, they assured the public, that they would retain in their hands a compensation for the recent aggrandizement of France: " If the Chief Consul," said they, " annexes Piedmont to the republic, let *us* " *keep Malta*—if he interferes in the affairs " of Holland, *let us keep the Cape, Demarara,* " *and Essequibo.*"—Well; he has annexed Piedmont to the republic; he has interfered, and he does interfere, in the affairs of Holland: but Malta is to be given up, as the Cape and Demarara and Essequibo already are.—It is not, however, that the ministers have, since that time, changed their opinion of the views of Buonaparté, but that he has changed his opinion of them, and has, *since* they published the above quoted words, publickly declared *approbation of them*, and deprecated the views of those *who wished to remove them from their places.* We beg our readers to pay attention to this circumstance; it is the clue to all their conduct.

The speech (see p. 14) of Buonaparté to the Swiss deputies, or rather to those creatures who are called the Swiss deputies, being a tissue of falsehoods, contradictions, and nonsense, well seasoned with bombast and arrogance, is, in every respect worthy of its author. If he be really convinced, that *one government only* is not suitable for Switzerland, why has he forced Switzerland to submit to *one government only?* And, why should not the descendants of William Tell wear chains and pay taxes? Ought their neighbours to supply all their wants? By

what decree of heaven is it, that all those who have not the honour of descending from William Tell, are to pay tribute and wear chains?—But, we must postpone any further comments on the nonsense of the Consul, till another opportunity, only requesting our readers to observe, that, on this, as well as all other occasions, Buonaparté has not failed to speak most despightfully and insultingly of England, all connexion with which he absolutely and peremptorily forbids, under pain of the severest chastisement. He describes us as a nation "hostile to "France," and, as a *proof* of this hostility, he alludes to the attempt, or rather the alledged attempt, of our poor ministers to renew, or rather to continue, our old connection with the Swiss!

On domestic matters we have no room to insert the observations, which several transactions appear to call for: we cannot, however, refrain from saying a word or two on the transmigrations and re-transmigrations of that keen, that wise statesman, that flower of "THE *family*," Mr. J. Hiley Addington, who, after bobbing up and down, and backward and forward, like a Will o'the Wisp, after being shoved to and fro like the bolt of a door, seems, at last, to be settled, for a little while, at least, at the Pay office, upon about *two thousand pounds* a year; and most heartily do we congratulate our readers on the event; for, as we before stated, we really began to apprehend, that "the family" had fixed its rapacious eyes on the bishoprick of Durham. The church has had a narrow escape!

It is now, we are told, decided, that Mr. Addington is to come down, after the recess, and propose a grant of £.200,000 to the Stadtholder! With what face the ministry will do this, without explaining to the country, how this expense comes to fall upon it, at last, we know not; but, for braving out such a transaction, there is, perhaps, nothing like your *modest, conscientious, well-meaning* men, one of these, with his hand upon his heart, in a tone and attitude half theatrical and half methodistical, will, without a blush, utter what any other of God's creatures would be ashamed but to think.

Another blow, another cup of humiliation, is at hand, to convince his Majesty of the fatal effects of submitting to the counsels of a ministry without birth, public character, or talents. This blow, of which the ministers themselves are not, perhaps, yet informed, is no less than a seizure (as part of the indemnities) of *the dominions which come to the elector of Hanover at the death of the Margrave of Anspach, while those of that prince's dominions, which fall to the lot of Prussia, remain untouched.* And will not the blood of the Addingtons mutiny at this? Will they, whose dominions have been so greatly augmented by their gracious sovereign, they who have, indeed, got part of his own royal domains, will they tamely suffer him to be robbed of his German territories, of his hereditary possessions? * * * * * * We regret, that want of room prevents us from pursuing this subject.

POSTSCRIPT.

On the subject of the INVINCIBLE STANDARD I must, without further delay, trouble the reader with a few words.—A publication has appeared, at Edinburgh (where the 42d regiment now is), containing, not any evidence gathered from the officers or any other persons of that corps, but a long string of abuse on the writer of LUTZ's narrative, and a poor pettifogging criticism on the testimony of *Corporal Schmid.* The statement of the Sinclairs is *repeated* and *insisted* on, and so is that of Ker Porter of Panorama notoriety; and the writer, who signs himself "A RETIRED OFFICER," calls upon the *Attorney-General* to do the rest by prosecuting me for a *libel* on the Highlanders!!!—And is *this* all that can be said and done against the cause of LUTZ? Is this all that *Edinbro,* with the 42d regiment in its belly, can bring forth?—I do not know, that I should not be justified in imputing this publication to the 42d regiment, and in treating them accordingly; it is published in the same place where they are; it is immediately republished in London by HERIOT, the same Scotchman who published the proceedings of the Highland Society. These circumstances are strong. I will, however, suspend my reply for a little while longer! a fortnight more will, I think, be quite sufficient time for the 42d regiment to *disclaim* the pretensions set up by Sinclair, and for the Highland Society to correct the error, which they have been the means of promulgating.

LONDON,

TO WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, ESQ.

SIR,—Having, in my last letter (Vol. II. p. 745), shown, that the mere circumstance of not having been in office (even supposing you fit for office) and of not having received a title, is, in itself, no proof, nor even presumption, in favour of that "*honesty*," that "*uprightness*," those "*pure intentions*," or that wonderful "*disinterestedness*," of which you make so ostentatious a display, and of which a stranger to English patriotism would really think you to be the exclusive possessor; having shown, that, even from your own declarations, it is evident, that the principal object of your ambition, is, to preserve your seat for the county of York, to continue to be the representative of "*a little kingdom*;" having, as I think, established these points, it remains for me to inquire, whether the *means*, by which you have hitherto secured this object, have not, through the weakness and credulity of others, largely contributed towards the adoption of those measures, which, in their several ways and degrees, have finally produced our present embarrassment and disgrace.

In this inquiry, it is not my intention to follow you through all the little windings and turnings of your political life, to hunt out those temporary errors and follies, of which, probably, you have long ago repented; but, to confine myself to the principal of those public subjects, in which I recollect you to have acted a conspicuous part, and with respect to which you have persevered, in opposition to the dictates of reason, of experience, and of public good. These subjects are: 1. Parliamentary Reform; 2. The Persecution of Mr. Reeves; 3. The Slave Trade; 4. The Projects respecting Tithes, &c. 5. The Regicide Peace; 6. Continental Connexions. On all these most momentous questions, either your influence prevailed over Mr. Pitt, or Mr. Pitt, unfortunately for him and for his country, happened to agree with you in opinion; and, I think, it must now evidently appear, that, though you greatly assisted him in breaking down, or rather in undermining the high, the anti-commercial, the anti-financial spirit of the country, he has, at last, paid most dearly for that assistance.

1. With *Parliamentary Reform* upon your lips you came into public life. At an age hardly ripe enough for the management of any considerable private concern; with not a single grain of experience in public affairs: with very little knowledge of men, and none of nations; with talents, which, in spite of twenty years cultivation, still remain far, very far indeed, beneath mediocrity; with an inordinate thirst for sway, and with an abundant stock of that presumption of which a conceit of *extraordinary purity* is at once the cause and the effect: thus equipped, you, all at once, started forth, a puritan in religion and in law, a *reformer* of the church and the parliament.—Of the clamours for parliamentary reform, first begun by you and your associates, how numerous and how great have been the evils! No small portion of all the discontents and dangers, which have existed, and which, in some degree, do still exist, both in England and Ireland, arose from the doctrines inculcated by the parliamentary reformers, whose wild notions, whose incoherent plans, and whose nonsensical phrases even, were adopted by all those seditious and treasonable combinations, which, at one time, threatened the existence of the monarchy, and which were not suppressed, without measures, the necessity of which every friend of true freedom must have lamented and must still lament. That the success of the rebels in France operated as a powerful *encouragement* to those of this country there can be no doubt; without the heart-cheering example of the former, it is probable, indeed, that the latter would never have attempted to form a "British Convention;" but, without the pretext, furnished by the parliamentary reformers, by you and your coadjutors, by the Wyvills, the Beaufoys, and the rest of those, who, under the garb of meekness, aspired to controul, and who actually did controul and overpower, the mind of Mr. Pitt, without that pretext there would have been no assemblies of delegates, none of those affiliated societies, out of which the justly dreaded British convention arose. To

you and your associates of 1782 and 1785 we trace not only the *pretext*, generally, of the corresponding societies, the societies of United Irishmen, &c. &c. but also the leading *principles*, upon which these societies proceeded, and even the precedent, as to *manner* and *form*, by which they were organized and in which their seditious efforts were conducted. That the "well-meaning "men" of 1782 and 1785, did not wish to destroy both king and parliament, I am ready to allow; but, that they did by their "Quintuple Alliance," by their "Con- "vention of Delegates," by their resolutions to obtain the sense of the people "in their "different parishes or smaller districts," by their repeated inflammatory declarations and addresses; that the "*safe* politicians" did, by these means, chalk out the plan, and even lay the foundation, of that "monument of human wisdom," which the British convention were about to raise, is a fact, the truth of which, I am certain, no man of sincerity will attempt to deny. But, indeed, this point has been judicially decided. Horne Tooke, who was prosecuted for *high treason*, rested his defence, principally, upon the fact, that the Society, of which he was accused of being the leader, had in view, *no other object, than that which had been pursued by you and your coadjutors*; the judge, in summing up the evidence, after six days' trial, declared, *that the contrary had not been made out.* Lord Chief Justice Eyre, after stating that the London Corresponding Society was instituted in 1792, professedly *for the purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform*, on the plan of the reformers of 1782 and 1785, proceeds thus:—"I think the "evidence is so; and, though a great deal "of violence very soon followed, which "might have led me to *question* the truth of "their original principles, yet I think it "ought to be taken, *that that Society was* "*instituted upon those principles*; unless one "could have distinctly seen, in the evi- "dence, to the very bottom of the foun- "dation of that Society, and seen that it "was formed for the purpose of acting "under a secret influence and direction to "some other end, using a Reform of Par- "liament as a colour only. I think there "was some attempt to make this out; but "it seems to me, *that they did not go far* "*enough to maintain that proposition.*" As soon as the judge had closed, the jury acquitted the prisoner.—Here, then, Sir, we have a complete commentary on your wisdom as a reformer of the state. It can hardly be supposed, that his Majesty's Cabinet, aided by the advice of the Lord Chancellor and the other law officers of the crown, would have instituted the prosecution against Tooke, had they not been fully satisfied as to the nature of the crime laid to his charge; and, if you admit this, which you will scarcely refuse to do, the obvious conclusion is,—that the principles, broached and promulgated by you and your coadjutors, were such as led to the commission of high treason, such as led to the most heinous of all earthly offences, *the compassing of the death of the King!* It is in vain to say, that Tooke and his associates had objects in view which you never thought of; for, though that might be, yet it appeared, to a judge and jury, after one of the most patient trials upon record, that their Society was *instituted upon your principles*, and the indictment will prove, that the *institution* of their Society made part of the crime alledged against them.—If the evil consequences of your wild and presumptuous projects had extended no further than the imprisonment, the transportation, or the death, of a few individuals, there would, even in that case, have been a loud call on you for repentance and for an open and explicit avowal thereof, which appears to me to be the least atonement with which the nation ought to have been satisfied at your hands; but, Sir, the records of our righteous and merciful courts exhibit merely the symptoms of those consequences, which, to be duly appreciated, must be sought for in the alarms in England and Scotland, in the rebellion in Ireland, in the mutiny in the fleet, and in all the concomitant effects, domestic and foreign, of these ever to be lamented events. No one, who has paid the least attention to the embarrassments created by the war, need be told, that the far greater part of them arose from causes purely internal. The discontents in Ireland, which at last ended in an open and sanguinary rebellion, were instigated by societies formed on the pretext of Parliamentary Reform. Those discontents, together with the well-founded alarm, arising from the same source, existing in England and Scotland, hung, during the greater part of the war, like a mill-stone about the neck of our government, cramped all our operations, excited confidence in our enemies, and distrust in our allies. You, Sir, who are of the school of the economists, and who are, on all occasions, so anxious to show your attention to the pecuniary interests of your "little kingdom" of constituents; you, who so deeply deplore the "pressure" on the people, may, out of your tender regard

for them, have possibly been led to ascertain the probable extent of the expense occasioned by those internal troubles, which arose from the combinations grounded on your project of reform, and which expense will not, I imagine, be found to amount to less than *fifty of those millions,* which, since the year 1792, have been added to the burdens of the nation. Indeed, if we include the expenses of the numerous armed associations, called forth by these domestic dangers, the loss of labour occasioned thereby, and the emigration of artizans from his Majesty's dominions, owing to the same cause, not five times fifty millions would repair the national injury, which has arisen from an attempt to carry your principles of *reform* to their full and natural result. And, shall we, Sir, after this, silently admit your almost exclusive claim to public *economy* and political *prudence?* Shall we tamely hear you repeat your insinuations of *indiscretion* and *madness* against those, who wish to rouze the nation to a sense of that danger, into which you and your *prudent* associates have plunged it, but who never, like you, were so indiscreet or so mad as, by their conduct, to furnish a justification for persons accused of high treason? Shall we, after this, submit to the unbearable insult of being told, that you and your associates are the only *prudent* men, the only "*safe* politicians?" * * * * * * Want of room compels me to postpone the other points 'till another opportunity.—I am, in the mean time, yours, &c. &c.

London, 12th Jan. 1802. W. COBBETT.

ON THE NAVY BILL.

SIR,—At a time when the greatest caution ought to be observed in the conducting of public affairs, both with respect to œconomy and legality, this bill sets both at nought. The Lords of the Admiralty, and the Commissioners of the Navy have full and exclusive powers to enquire into and remedy any and every abuse that does exist in the dock-yards. During a war, in which the unexampled exertions of the country equipped a navy unheard of in former times, consisting of upwards of 600 ships in commission, the admiralty departments under the late administration, clogged as they were by the two mutinies, and other circumstances of great and peculiar difficulty, were conducted in a manner that reflects the highest honour on them. There were no complaints on the parts of the commissioners of their inability to do their duty, on account of their multifarious occupations. It was reserved for the present period of peace, with a navy diminished by more than an half, and with a proportionate decrease of business in the naval departments, that we were to hear that the boards of Admiralty and navy were inadequate from their great press of business, to enter into the examination of frauds committed in their particular departments, of which they only are the proper and immediate judges, and to correct which, is one of the peculiar and important ends of their appointment. In a legal point of view the bill is equally objectionable. Our best and most constitutional lawyers have ever deprecated the extension and increase of oaths in all legal proceedings, as being very injurious in a moral point of view, and tending to familiarize men to an appeal, which only ought to be resorted to in the most solemn and important occasions. Hence one great objection to the excise laws, customs, &c. But this bill proceeds further, it gives power to certain commissioners to tender oaths to the party accused, in order to convict themselves, in direct opposition to the well known adage of common law, *nemo tenetur seipsum accusare.* Some years ago three commissioners were appointed to audit the public accounts, to enquire into all abuses, to represent them, and point out such remedies as should appear to them best adapted for the purpose; they accordingly visited the several dock-yards, and amongst the rest Portsmouth, where they staid nearly two months, made the strictest and most minute enquiries into every thing concerning them, examined every person in and out of them that could furnish them with any information, inspected every document, paper, book, and account that could throw any light on a subject so interesting to the public as the administration of the dock-yards. Every abuse existed then that exists now, no alteration or check whatever having been interposed to restrain them, and the commissioners having made their report, the matter has laid dormant from that time, (which was previously to the year 1790 to the present,) except indeed, that two more commissioners have been added to the three, making the number of such commissioners for auditing and examining the public accounts, five. The Admiralty Board consists of 7 commissioners, the Navy Board of a comptroller, deputy comptroller, two surveyors, and six commissioners in London, and four resident commissioners at the four principal dock-yards, making 21 commissioners for conducting this branch of the public service, certainly of the greatest con-

cern and last importance. Amongst these are many individuals who have risen to their present eminence through a gradation of office, commencing in the lowest scale of rank, even as low as apprentice to a shipwright. In consequence they are most fully acquainted with every minute circumstance of the dock yards and their administration, and were thereby the most proper persons to examine into the abuses practised in them, and to prescribe the remedies. The four resident commissioners at the four principal dock yards are old experienced officers in the navy, and have hitherto been recommended to this distinguished situation from the port list, on account of their knowledge, talents, and services. Now, if instead of creating new officers unacquainted in the smallest degree with the minutiæ and intricacies, as well as the more important branches of the naval department, and burthening the public with a new charge, at a time when the most rigorous œconomy is, on account of our necessary pressures, become so indispensably requisite, one commissioner was to be detached from the Admiralty Board, another, or even two from the Navy Board, and they were to be associated at each dock-yard with the resident commissioners, and aided by former enquiries, they would seriously set to work to ascertain the existing abuses, and adopt remedies to them, the whole business would be readily completed, and without a single addition of expense to the country. If they in the course of their investigation found any difficulty in examining witnesses out of the dock-yards, it would be easy enough then to devise some compulsory measure, without having immediate recourse to the present project, so unconstitutional in a legal, and dangerous in a moral point of view. As to the persons employed in the dock-yards, they will be ready enough to take any oath tendered to them, as their refusal would subject them to dismissal, and their perjury to an indictment. The abuses practised in the dock yards have been a subject of just complaint for many years past; they are carried on to an extent almost incredible, and to a calculated amount of £500,000 annually. But will the present proposed bill remedy them? Will the appointment of men, in consequence of parliamentary interest, or the *ipse dixit* of the First Lord of the Admiralty, be a likely means of eradicating the evils complained of? If twenty-one commissioners perfectly acquainted with every abuse, and well versed and exercised in the whole management of the dock yards, are incompetent to the eradicating of the existing frauds, how can a set of men appointed *de novo* from the predominant interest of the hour be *eo instanti* sufficiently experienced in affairs of such great and intricate complexity, and combining infinite details to new model, improve and put them on such a basis as shall, for the future, shut out the avenue to peculation, fraud and abuse. Whoever is acquainted with the dock-yards, or their administration, must know that the present measure is a most despicable job, calculated to serve only ministerial and interested purposes, to extend the already overgrown patronage of the First Commissioner of the Admiralty, to feed his numerous and insatiate expectants, and to create an establishment with powers and objects extraordinary and undefined, and nugatory, as to any good effects that can result from it. A too great readiness to depart from established usages seems to be the prevalent desire of the present day. The most wholesome laws, combining the most salutary checks to dishonesty, peculation and abuses, which exist in full force at the present moment, and which require only common attention and industry to be understood and put in practice, are hastily abandoned for new plans, and to serve and extend new interests, and to create new offices, various and complicated, which instead of clearing the way to discovery, punishment and remedy, make it only more crooked and intricate. The dock-yards have severely felt this innovating mania. New order has hastily succeeded new order. To an order to-day, to-morrow a countermand; to day Mr. Bentham is particularly marked out for exclusion; to morrow paraded through every storehouse; to day the labour is done by men and horses; to-morrow the yard is converted into a storehouse of machinery. The reservoir in Portsmouth dock-yard is worked by horses to-day, to-morrow by a steam engine, the day after by men. The introduction of new plans has introduced new interests, and the dock-yards have presented scenes of faction and intrigue, which have been carried to an unparalleled height, insomuch, that the resident commissioner has frequently found himself a mere cypher, wherein formerly his word was law, and has been subjected to the disgraceful measure of restoring those men to their former situations which they had been discharged from, for mal-practices and misconduct, according to the domineering interest and successful faction of the day. Nay, the Admiralty Board frequently interfere in no-

minating to the very lowest situations, in opposition to the personal recommendation of the resident commissioner, who is frequently constrained to enter persons, whom he has great cause to distrust, in the point of honesty, sobriety, and proper principles. Moreover, may not the Ordnance, the Victualling, and other departments (in which undoubtedly many abuses prevail) after the present example, so eminent in idleness and disinclination to business, may not they come forward and propose similar measures in their boards? If the First Commissioner of the Admiralty shall successfully procure such a great extension of his interest and patronage, will it not be a precedent for a Master-General of the Ordnance or the ruling party of the day, to follow the present example, at once so gratifying to ministerial influence and desirable to needy followers. When the very few hours of attendance, by the commissioners at the public boards to ordinary business, is considered, we may, and we have a right to insist on a longer attendance to correct, and a more intelligent industry to remedy any abuses which have arisen or crept into any department of the state, perhaps originating, at least in part, from that very sluggish and slender attendance and application. The Commissioners of the Navy, till this war, managed the Transport Service also, for which, on their own representation, they obtained an increase of salary to the amount of £200 per annum. This branch of service has been transferred to a separate board, but the increase of salary has not been transferred with it; on the contrary, the combined salary of £800 per annum has been still further increased to £1000 in lieu of some fees which they lost, in consequence of the removal of this very branch of business. From all which premises the following deductions may be made.—That the Commissioners of the Admiralty and Navy are fully competent to enquire into, ascertain, and remedy all the existing evils and abuses in the dock-yards, over which they have a full, complete and entire jurisdiction.—That the laws at present in force, are fully adequate to the punishment and correction of every fraud, peculation, and mal-practice in the naval departments.—That those laws only require attention to discover, industry to prosecute, and the exertion of the powers they confer, to enable the Admiralty and Navy Boards of themselves to reform all existing abuses, and to punish their perpetrators.—That this can and ought to be speedily done, without charging the public with one additional farthing of expense, and without neglecting in the smallest degree the accustomed routine of public business now in this time of peace. Upon comparing which with the war establishment, the manner of its being conducted, and the numbers to conduct it, we may reasonably conclude the Navy and Admiralty Boards to have entire and full leisure to turn their whole thoughts. Time and attention to the investigating abuses, which have, it is to be feared, originated from causes more or less connected with negligence, inattention, and want of constant and regular investigation.—At all events, it is the indispensible duty of the House of Commons, as stewards of the public purse, to guard with unceasing vigilance any attempt, however specious, or from whatever quarter originating, that shall in its consequences add to the pecuniary pressures, already so very great, without being certified beyond all doubt. That the public affairs in the above-mentioned boards, on account of the great press of business under their management, have not time to give the subject the important consideration it so loudly calls for; and at the same time to inspect with a laudable suspicion and jealous circumspection a measure which more than carries with it a desire of certain officers to shift a burthen from themselves, so peculiarly their own, to the shoulders of others not so able to bear it, at the expense of the public, and to the extension of a patronage already too great. But above all to resist with manly firmness and indignation any attempt, under whatever mark presented, that shall in any the remotest degree infringe on the undoubted privileges and dearest rights of the subject, recognized by the common law of the land, and secured by our envied and invaluable constitution. R. B.

December 17, 1802.

This was written some days ago as will appear by the date, and long before the bill was passed; but finding you have taken up the subject in Saturday's Register, has induced me to make some additional observations.—It requires no very extraordinary powers to discover abuses in the dock-yards, they are pretty plain and visible. That the public has been most grossly imposed on in the article of hemp cannot be doubted, as the ample fortunes of more than one individual testify. But while a pompous display of acute investigation is shown in the overcharge of the article of casks used in the rope houses, to the amount of a few hundred pounds, and to which every clerk

in the rope-yard must have been privy, frauds to an amount almost incredible are suffered to go unpunished, and the guilty plunderer lives in a state of splendour, which at once proclaims his dishonour, and the shameful negligence of those men in office, by which he escapes with impunity. Much has been said about the purity and disinterestedness of the present Admiralty. Does the following circumstance evince it? The porter of the dock-yard at Portsmouth was allowed £30 per annum, a house to live in, and also a chaise or coach-house for his carriage and stable for his horses. At first sight it must appear singular, that a porter, whose business there is literally to attend at the gates, and most minutely to inspect every ingress and regrees, should have a coach-house and stable to keep his carriage and horses, and that too upon £30 a year; but he had the profits of the yard tap, where beer is sold to the workmen. These profits have been estimated to amount to from £600 to £700 per annum. This place had generally been given to some messenger or very inferior person in the Admiralty service. In consequence, however, of some great interest made for this situation on the last vacancy, the First Lord of the Admiralty inquired into these circumstances, and very wisely conceiving that two creatures are better than one, he appointed two porters to divide the profits, who will have two houses, two chaise houses, and two stables, where there was one only before. This is one proof amongst many others of their great attention to economy and laudable zeal in eradicating abuses. So much for the porter. As he is the lowest in the scale we will go up to the highest, viz. the resident commissioner. It had been for many years a part of his duty to pay ships, for which he was allowed 40s. per day *when employed*, which formed a part of his income; but the Admiralty have taken away this branch of his employ, and employed a second port admiral on *constant pay* at a very great increase of expense to pay the ships, and, in consideration of the commissioner's losing these emoluments, his salary has been increased very considerably. The present comptroller of the navy was offered a pension equal to his emoluments if he would resign his situation in favour of a present Lord of the Admiralty, so likewise was a resident commissioner if he would do the same in favour of another lord of the same board. This is that Admiralty which is above all ideas of favouritism, and which in its outrageously virtuous endeavours to reform abuses in its own department would have laid the axe to the very root of constitutional liberty solemnly guaranteed to the subject by the coronation oath.

January 3, 1803.

MR. ADDINGTON'S MODEST ASSURANCE.

SIR,—The MODESTY of your *conscientious, well-meaning man*, is strikingly exemplified in Mr. Addington's speeches on the address. It were to be wished for the nation that the ministers were men of abilities: it were desirable for their supporters that they had even the reputation of talents: let them be discreet if they cannot be wise: at least it does not become them to make a display of their deficiencies or to seize on every opportunity for demonstrating their incapacity.—This reflection suggests itself upon reading the reports of Mr. Addington's speeches on the address as they appear in the public papers.—One would imagine that any sensible minister, however desirous to uphold the peace of Amiens, would at least use cautious and moderate language under the circumstances in which the nation is at present placed, so evidently critical, so confessedly embarrassing. But such is the frame of Mr. Addington's mind and intellect that he views it with delight and triumph, and when reminded of the calamities it has produced, he cannot refrain from exultation.—"If, says he, I am a delinquent, I confess I am a hardened one: "for I do declare that I never reflect on "the share I had in restoring peace to my "country, but with the most heartfelt satisfaction."—Yet in the midst of this triumphant boast he immediately reverses the scene, and declares that all Europe is in a situation which no man *laments* so much as himself—and then forgetting every idea of peace, he boasts of our state of preparation for war, and takes the utmost credit to his administration for having kept up a navy and army double, both in force and expense, to which was maintained after the peace of 1783.—Some persons may doubt as to the common honesty of this harangue, but I think no man can doubt as to the common sense of it.—How this triumph mixed with lamentation, this peace accompanied with a preparation for war, this continued system of war expense and doubled establishment can give the most heartfelt satisfaction, vulgar men may find difficult to reconcile, and we must leave to Mr. Addington himself to explain.—Let us then hear him again: thus the great man proceeds.—"Nay I do not scruple to add,

" that even if encroachments or insults of-
" fered to the country should again lead to
" hostilities that still that calamity will not
" destroy *that* satisfaction, for I should
" know I had done my duty, and that I
" had no cause to reproach myself with
" subsequent events."—Such is Mr. Adding-
ton's explanation and defence of the perfect heartfelt satisfaction which he feels at the peace: and whatever I may think of it in other respects, I must confess it to be truly astonishing! Happy, happy man!—If a new war follow upon the heels of his peace, if ruin and destruction flow from it—it is nothing to him, he has done his duty—he is not responsible for future events: no calamity, no misery can ever shake his firm-set happiness, or impair for a moment that perpetual and heartfelt satisfaction which he must ever feel from having directed the signature of the treaty of Amiens!—The above passage I have quoted is certainly the climax and *acmé* of Mr. Addington's eloquence; no other orator ever ventured a flight in any degree so daring, nor can he himself boast any other passage equally transcendent.—Yet I cannot help adverting to some few other parts of his oration, which, though not extraordinary for him, would highly surprize from any other speaker. Mr. Addington pleads in favour of his peace "that not being able to a-
" bridge the power of France on the Con-
" tinent, it was wise to economise our
" means and husband our resources, in order
" that if again we should be unhappily
" called upon, we might be either able to
" co-operate with effect with the continental
" powers, or furnish the means by which
" they might be called into vigorous ac-
" tion."—Who would not think from this passage that we were now in a state of profound peace and complete security? That we and our enemy were entirely disarmed? That Europe was in a state of independence and tranquillity, and that we were reducing our establishments to the situation they were in before the war, and introducing the most vigorous systems of retrenchment into every part of our service. Yet our real state is the diametrical reverse. And whilst Mr. Addington is framing this curious argument, the funds are sinking under a loan of £25,000,000 made to secure the first year of his blessed peace. The people are called upon to submit to fresh burthens for the second year, and he himself takes credit for not having disbanded a single soldier he could avoid; for having at present a greater force than at several periods during the war, and for keeping up an establishment double in amount both for land and sea, to what was maintained after the disastrous peace of 1783.—Another source of consolation and satisfaction to him is, that having made the peace of Amiens we can never again *singly* contend against France, and that we must wait to assist a confederacy of continental powers with arms and subsidies.—Who, then, upon hearing this line of policy adopted by the minister would not conceive that in his arrangement of peace, he had not only secured our old allies, but made an augmentation to their number? On the contrary, he has the heartfelt satisfaction to reflect that of those powers who are able, none are willing, of those who are willing, none are left able, to confederate with and to assist us. Yet to these alone are we to trust; for he says, Great Britain cannot venture to go to war by herself.—To give the last stroke and entire finishing to all this display of political and diplomatic talent, and to exalt his triumph in the peace to the utmost, he boldly, and I will add here at least *truly*, asserts that the peace was in no degree a peace of necessity, and that we are now able to continue a war for seven years without exhausting our resources.—Such is the argument of the prime minister of the British Empire, the great mover and director of all our affairs, on whose foresight, abilities, sagacity, and firmness, the nation is to depend at this awful period.—He states that we were not under the least necessity to make peace:—That we have full resources for a continuance of war for seven years.—In other places he states our numerous and unexampled triumphs and our naval superiority in every part of the globe:—Yet in this proud situation he makes a degrading peace with France; and, because he could not abridge her continental empire, he transfers to her our marine dominions and concedes the greatest naval and colonial stations on the globe—Martinique, St. Lucie, St. Domingo, Cochin, the Cape, and the Mediterranean.—During the negotiation, he suffers the Italian Republic to be added to France, and admits her obtaining Elba, Louisiana, and Parma by fraud; and after the peace he acquiesces in the annexation of Piedmont, the revolution of Germany, and the invasion of Switzerland, and thus sanctions and confirms the most complicated and insulting mass of treachery, fraud, oppression, insult, aggression, and encroachment, that ever was displayed upon the globe.—This miserable

state to which he has reduced Europe and ourselves is so glaring, that with all his insensibility he is forced to lament it most deeply; it is on the other hand so dangerous, that he cannot discharge a soldier, that he is proud to double all our establishments, to call for additional burthens on the people, while he has rendered us so weak, that we cannot go to war without allies, and his peace has destroyed all our alliances.—Thus in this wretched and deserted state, when we have no friends on the continent, and cannot fight singly, when France is encroaching daily, and we dare not interfere in her career—what are his thoughts?—He looks back with complacency to the cause of all—he has done his duty—he cannot reproach himself with subsequent events—he glories in being a hardened delinquent—and shall even reflect on the share he had in restoring peace to his country with the most heartfelt satisfaction.—To a character capable of conceiving and advancing such a tissue of inconsistency, absurdity, and weakness, are the fate and fortune of the empire committed in the most tremendous crisis the world ever exprienced. What in the name of God are we to expect from a man who cannot utter common sense with ordinary reasoning and consistency for the space of *a few minutes?* and who crowds into a short harangue more real folly and contradiction than ever disgraced the exercise of a school-boy.—I will acknowledge, however, there is one man in this kingdom, a new friend and supporter of Mr. Addington's administration, who could have held such sentiments without the same inconsistency and absurdity—I speak of Mr. Fox.—He rejoiced like Mr. Addington, that the peace of Amiens was glorious; but that it was glorious, not to England but to France. Mr. Fox is a man of superior abilities and sagacity, he knew the nature of the peace, he clearly saw its tendency to depress his country and to aggrandise our enemy, and he rejoiced in it. Would to God Mr. Addington were, for a moment, gifted with similar abilities to those of Mr. Fox, while he retained his love for his country: he would then see the true tendency of his measures as clearly as Mr. Fox; and, seeking the glory of England, not the glory of France, he would lament, in sackcloth and ashes, the fatal moment, when he ordered the preliminaries to be signed; he would retire from a situation to which he is confessedly inadequate; he would be cautious in adopting the measures of those who palliate the fraud, the treachery, the aggressions of France, rejoicing in an infamous peace, because it gives triumph to the enemy; and he would advise his sovereign to take those men to his counsels who are as distinguished in true zeal for their country as they are beyond all comparison the fittest from their experience and talents to conduct her affairs.—But whilst we suffer ourselves to be directed by such abilities as those of Mr. Addington, and by such principles as those of Mr. Fox; while guided by the heart of the one and the head of the other, the man who gloried in the success of France, the man who is blind to the degradation of England; as there can be no hope, there can be no consolation: ulterior and increasing distress is all we can expect—a perpetual foreboding of fresh humiliation—a fearful looking on of coming destruction. DETECTOR.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS.

1. *The Substance of the Speech of the Rt. Hon. Henry Addington, in the Committee of Ways and Means, on Friday, Dec.* 10, 1802. *Hatchard.*—We think it proper to apprize our readers that the pamphlet, bearing the above title, which has been advertised with so much ostentation, is nothing more than the very accurate report of the minister's budget-speech, which will be found in page 778 of our second volume. For what purpose this speech, which occupies *two pages and a quarter* of our Register, should be swelled into a twelvepenny pamphlet of *thirty-eight* octavo pages, we are at a loss to conjecture. In the speech of a minister of state, ushered into the world with such pomp and solemnity, one is naturally prepared to find a mass of political, commercial, and financial information.—But no!—*Parturiunt montes, nascitur ridiculus mus.*

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Convention concluded between Prussia and the Batavian Republic, in November, 1802.

Be it known to all whom it may concern, That his Prussian Majesty being firmly resolved to observe and scrupulously to fulfil the stipulations agreed upon in favour of the Batavian Republic in the Convention signed at Paris the 23d May, between his Prussian Majesty and the French Repub. respecting the cession of the territorial property hereafter pointed out; and, being desirous to proceed to the preliminary and complete execution of the first treaty which is the basis of it, the two powers have agreed previously to regulate by an arrangement the mode and the conditions of that cession; and in that view they have authorized, viz. his Majesty of Prussia, Mr. C. H. C. Count Haugwitz, his Minister of State, &c. &c.; and the Batavian Repub. Citizen C. G. Hultman, her Envoy Extraordinary, at the Court of Berlin,

who, after having mutually exchanged their full powers, agreed to the following articles:—Art. I. Agreeably to Art. II. of the treaty of Paris, already deferred to, his Majesty the King of Prussia renounces for himself and heirs, all claims, pretensions and propriety over Swinaar, Huissen, and Malburg, locked within the Batavian Repub. and cedes, abandons, and gives them up for ever in full sovereignty and property to the Batavian Repub. to be possessed by her, and united with her territory.—II. The complete surrender of the ceded districts shall take place, if possible, within the term of three months, after the dispositions relating to it, and upon the ground of which the undersigned will hereafter negotiate, shall be adjusted to the mutual satisfaction of the two contracting powers. By consequence there shall be appointed without delay, and reciprocally by both parties, commissioners, who will repair to the spot, in order to take these objects into consideration, and to decide upon them in the manner agreed upon.—III. The two contracting powers will, like good neighbours, and agreeably to the principles of perfect equity, come to an amicable understanding respecting every thing that concerns their respective interests, not only with regard to the commercial intercourse between their contiguous dominions, and the navigation of the Rhine, but also with respect to the construction and repairs of the hydraulic works, which are connected with the common safety of their adjoining territories.—IV. The Batavian Republic takes upon it to discharge the debts of these districts; and more especially of those debts for which these districts are especially mortgaged; as likewise its quota of those debts which it is to sustain as a part of the collective debts of the Duchy of Cleves. In order, however, to obviate all the difficulties that might start up in the application of the 1st Art. it is expressly understood that there shall not be charged upon the Batavian Repub. but those debts only which arise out of those formal loans which have been contracted by the dominions of the Duchy of Cleves, or the corporations and communal bodies of the ceded districts; and finally those debts occasioned by the expenses which have been incurred for their respective administration. The liquidation of those debts shall be settled by the commissaries of both parties, conformably to the legal and juridical proofs which shall be given in and submitted to the commissioners of the Batavian Republic.—V. All the deeds, titles, and acts, relative to the public and private property of the ceded districts, shall be faithfully given up to the commissaries of the Batavian Repub. and in the supposition that there might arise a collision of interests with the Prussian Provinces, to which these districts formerly belonged, there shall be drawn up at common expenses authentic copies, which shall likewise be deposited in the hands of the Batavian commissaries.—VI. The present Convention shall be ratified by the two parties; and the exchange of the ratifications shall take place within the term of four months, counting from this date, or sooner, if possible.—In faith of which we, the Plenipotentiaries of his Majesty the King of Prussia, and of the Batavian Repub. have, in virtue of our full powers, signed the present Convention, and affixed to it our respective seals.—Done at Berlin the 14th Nov. in the year of our Lord, 1802.—*Count de Haugwitz.*—*Hultman.*

Decree of the Imperial Commission, presented at the Dictatura of the Diet at Ratisbon, dated Dec. 14, 1802.

The Principal Imperial Commissary is commanded to declare, that the Emperor has no difficulty in agreeing that the definitive conclusum of the Deputation of the Empire, though not yet ratified, should be in the mean time communicated to the Diet of the Empire, and submitted to its discussion, in order that those difficulties, which still with-hold from it the imperial sanction, and which the treaty of peace and the constitution of the Empire will not suffer us to overlook, may at last be removed, and that the final and legal termination of the affair of the indemnities, may be, in regard to all parties concerned in it, accelerated as much as possible. His Imperial Majesty is so much the more firm in his adherence to these measures, because the mediating powers have, to the propositions of indemnities, injoined others, which affect the fundamental constitution of the Empire, and are not such as the Deputation has powers to decide upon.—These objects his Imperial Majesty thinks it his duty to recommend to all the States of the Empire, being pursuaded that they will be anxiously vigilant to preserve the constitutional proportions between the authority of the two religions of the Empire, as these have been fixed by different treaties of peace, and by the decisions of the Diet, with all the relations, proportions, and balances of the constitutional parts of the Empire, as one great political body, in order to give perpetuity to a constitution, the effects and the beneficent protection of which have so many ages, and amidst such variations of circumstances, given splendour, prosperity, and independence to the whole Germanic Body.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Leghorn, Dec. 15.—The Batavian fleet under Ad. De Winter, which has been cruizing on the coast of Africa, arrived here on the 9th from Cagliari in Sardinia. It will pass the winter here. It consists of three ships of the line, of 70 guns, and a galliot.

Brussels, Dec. 22.—Yesterday Gen. Berthier arrived here from Paris, and the next day continued his journey into Holland.

Hague, Dec. 28.—Government has presented to the legislative body the plan of a voluntary loan for 24,000,000 florins, for the expenses of 1803. The proposal caused a considerable depression in our funds. *Dec.* 30.—The last accounts from the Texel state, that the corvette the Ulieg had sailed with the transports, having on board troops, &c. destined for Batavia and the Moluccas. Several vessels have also sailed with troops for Surinam, Demerary, and the other West-India colonies.—The discontent of the merchants of Amsterdam, in consequence of the plan of finance proposed by the legislative body, manifests itself in the addresses which they are daily presenting against it.

Berne, Dec. 29.—Letters from Paris, of the 24th Dec. announce that a new sitting of the Helvetic congress was held on the 22d, at which the commissioners of the conservative senate presented *a plan of a constitution*, conformable in its principles to the contents of the letter of the First Consul to the deputies of the 18 cantons. The plan was discussed in the same sitting, and *unanimously adopted.*—The deputies of the different cantons were already assembled, in order to deliberate on

a project of cantonal organization; but in each deputation the opinions were so contradictory, that it had not been possible to unite respecting the basis of the future constitution of the principal cantons of Zurich, Berne, &c.

Basle, Dec. 27.—We expect the limits between the French Republic and Switzerland to be soon fixed. France requires the cession of a small part of the canton of Soleure, which is called Leimenthal, and comprehends the five villages of Bettwyle, Witterswyle, Hostfletten, Roderstorff and Mezerle. For this cession the canton of Soleure will be indemnified. None of these villages but is somewhat considerable. They were assessed with the war tax; but, on he knowledge that there was a design of ceding them to France, they have requested Ney to procure them to be relieved from the assessment. Ney has accordingly recommended their request to the Helvetic government. He used in his recommendation the words—"As these communities will probably *become a part of the French Republic*, as soon as the limits of territory between France and Switzerland shall have been definitively fixed."—*Dec.* 28.—It is now looked upon as certain, that Ney has taken some official steps, in order to prevail upon the regency of Constance, and the other Austrian authorities established on the frontiers of Switzerland, to drive out of that part of the country the Swiss emigrants who still continue to recruit men, that they may be ready to return with arms in their hands on the first favourable opportunity.—The intelligence from the cantons of Lugano and Bellinzona is not satisfactory: every thing serves as a pretext for agitation.—Three battalions of French troops are expected at Berne to augment the garrison of that place.—Gen. Serras, Commandant at Lucerne, has intimated to the constituted authorities of that place, that it will be necessary to reconstruct gun boats to be stationed on the lake, each mounting four guns.

Paris, Jan. 5.—The senate adopted on the 4th inst. a *senatus consultum* presented to it on the 30th ult. in the name of the govt. The following are the principal dispositions of it:—There shall be for every tribunal of appeal, a senatorship, endowed with a house and an annual revenue of 25,000 francs. The senatorships shall be possessed for life, and the senators who shall obtain them, shall reside with the tribunal three months in the year at least. They are to be conferred by the First Consul upon a triple presentation of the senate.—There shall be applied to the senate, for its salary, four millions to be taken from the produce of the forests, and an additional million of national property in the united departments of the Rhine and of Piedmont.—The senate shall have a chancellor and a treasurer charged with the administration of its property, and of all the details of its police. A guard of honour shall be especially attached to it.

DOMESTIC.

On Tuesday, the Hound sloop of war arrived at the Motherbank, in sixteen days from Gibraltar. It brings an account of a mutiny having broken out on the 6th of Oct. on board his Majesty's ship Gibraltar, of 84 guns, on her passage from that port to Malta, in company with the Superb, Dragon, and Triumph. The mutineers took possession of the ship, and run her under the sterns of the others, cheering them in the hope that the crews would join them. Disappointed in this expectation, the mutineers became panic struck, and were easily subdued by their officers. The ring-leaders were secured, and three of them had been hanged before the Hound sailed from Gibraltar. The following mem. founded upon the minutes of the Court-Martial, has been published by Admiral Bickerton.

Kent, Oristogni Bay, 4th Nov. 1802.

MEMO.—"Whereas it appears in the minutes of the late court-martial on the mutineers of the Gibraltar, that the detachment of marines, serving on board that ship, bore no part in the disgraceful proceeding of the 6th of Oct. last, but much to the credit of their officers, and themselves, maintained the character of the loyal and respectable corps to which they belong, by a steady adherence to their duty; the Rear-Admiral takes this public method of expressing his approbation of their good and soldierlike conduct, and requests Capt. Johnston to accept his thanks. *R. Bickerton.*"

"To the respective captains, &c."

From the London Gazette, St. James's, Jan. 5, 1803.—His Excellency Count Woronzow, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias to this court, having been absent for six months, by leave of his Imperial Majesty, and being now returned, had this day a private audience of his Majesty.—*Whitehall, Jan.* 3, 1803.—The King has been pleased to appoint the Rt. Hon. Sylvester, Lord Glenbervie, to the office of surveyor-general of His Majesty's woods, oaks, forests, and chaces.

Bankrupts.—Turner, S. Laytonstone, farmer.—Davies, R. Lamb St. cheesemonger.—Whitehouse, Sarah, Tamworth, mercer.—Fellows, E. Camberwell, haberdasher.—Kemp, J. Mark-lane, wine-merchant.—Neale, J. Brick-lane, salesman.—Wright, T. Horsley, clothier.—Lewis, W. Swansea, batcher.—Savage, H. and I. Broadwall, comb-makers.—Pilkington, W. Exeter, hop and seed-merchant.—Peckwarth, T. Rottesford, butcher.

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED	THUR
Bank Stock.	187¼	—	—	—	186¼	186½
3 pr. C R An	72	71⅛	71⅝	71⅝	71¼	71⅜
3 per C. Con.	—	71⅜	71⅛	71⅛	71⅛	71
4 pr. C. Con.	87½	87⅝	89¾	86⅜	86⅞	86⅞
5 pr. Ct. Ann	101⅝	101¾	101¼	102	99⅞	100⅛
Bank L. Ann.	20 7/16	20¼	20⅛	20⅛	20¼	20½
D° S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	102⅛	100⅞	102⅛	102	102⅛	102⅛
Omnium ...	3½dis.	4 dis.	4 dis.	4 dis	3½dis	4 dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	35	10	2 us.	Leghorn	49¾
D°, at sight	35	5		Naples.....	41¼
Rotterdam	35	11	2 us.	Genoa	45½
Hamburgh	34	2	2 us.	Venice, 52 livres piccole	
Altona....	34	3	2 us.	effective per £. ster.	
Paris 1 day	24	8		Lisbon	67½
Paris	24	12	2 us.	Oporto	67¾
Bourdeaux,	24	13		Dublin	12½
Cadiz ...	53¼		eff.	Bilboa	35¼
Madrid ..	35½		effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	52s. to 60s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 220s
Rye.....	35..38	Hay per load....	80..147
Barley.....	23..27	Beef, per stone	4s.0d. to 6s.
Malt.....	40..45	Mutton	5s. 4d. to 6s 6d.
Oats	15..22	Veal	6s. 0d. to 8s. 0d.
Pease (white)....	30..38	Pork....	4s. 8d. to 6s. 0d.
Beans (horse)....	33..37	Tallow	4s. 6½d.
Flour per sack ..	44..48	Av. of Sugar pr cw	36s. 9d.
Seconds.....	40..44	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal.,,,.	53..00	Bread 9¼d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

A great portion of our space, under this head, was last week occupied by observations on the false, insolent, and hostile language of the French official paper; and, we think it our duty to commence our present remarks on the continuation which we find of that language, in the same infamous vehicle: The article to which we last called the attention of the Public, and which will be found at length in p. 6 of the present volume, was dated on the 1st of January: it was a new-year's gift for the Richmond-Park Ministry; some of whom have, it is thought, no very great objection to civilities of that sort. What we are now about to hold up to the indignation of our readers appeared in the Moniteur of the 2d of January. It is intended to keep up the suspicion already excited against England in many parts of the continent, to bar, as soon as possible, every port and avenue against our commercial and diplomatic agents, and to hint *(faire sentir)* to the different powers, that to receive, to entertain, to harbour, or to shelter such agents, is the ready way to incur the dreadful displeasure, and the consequent vengeance, of the mighty, the vindictive, the rapacious, and bloody republic. The passage alluded to runs thus:—
" There are commercial houses at Franck-
" fort, Nuremburg, and Hamburgh, which
" have long been the channels through
" which all the crimes that were excited
" upon the continent were paid for. If it
" were true that *the faction hostile to the repose*
" *of Europe* would continue *to sacrifice the trea-*
" *sures of that brave people, illustrious in so many*
" *respects*, and to second the views of Du-
" thiel, Dandre, the Bishop of Arras, Gren-
" ville, &c. we advise them to make use
" of more circumspection, and the magis-
" trates of those cities to be careful; for all
" countries, and commercial towns chiefly,
" *which gave refuge to the agents of that faction*,
" because their magazines are beyond
" the seas, and which introduce into this
" contest money and not blood, ought to
" feel by experience that *war carries with it*
" *disasters*, of which their weakness may
" render them *more the victims than others*.
" Cities, whose existence is connected with
" commerce, are therefore more interested
" than any one that the peace, so happily
" established, should be of long duration.
" —Several journals have published from
" the Moniteur, that M. Fingerlin had
" been the banker of the miserable Dandre,
" and the *atrocious* Wickham."—The words in French are, *l'atroce Wickham*. Had we time, it would be quite unnecessary to dwell at any considerable length on this at once artful and insolent passage. Its chief object is, so to terrify the commercial cities and towns upon the continent, that no person suspected even of being an English agent, shall find rest for the sole of his foot. The flattery to the *people* of this country is also gross enough; but we are not amongst those who feel, or who affect to feel so very confident, that this flattery is " thrown " away upon our enlightened countrymen." We are, on the contrary, very much afraid that it is sown in a genial soil. After the rejoicings at the peace of Amiens, after the anxiety for peace, which we daily and hourly observe, in almost all ranks of this humbled and degraded people, we cannot so far deceive ourselves, we cannot attempt so shamefully to impose upon the world, as to affect to believe that the good opinion, the friendship, and favour of Buonaparté, is not, in this kingdom, sought after with the greatest possible eagerness. Nay, truth and sincerity bid us go further, and declare, that we dread the effect of these attempts to divide the people from their government; for, if they continue in the degraded state of mind produced by the peace, and by the arguments and maxims on which that destructive measure was defended, why should *they* " ex-
" haust their veins and their treasure," merely for the sake of living under one government in preference to another? If, to obtain peace, it was right to abandon the interest and honour of their country; if they have been taught to sacrifice to this object all that themselves or their forefathers held dear, where shall we look for a reason whereon to justify the resumption of their arms?—The great point, however, in the present extract from the Moniteur, is, that its attack is clearly directed against the present ministers. The name of *Grenville* is indeed mentioned; but, as it is absolutely impossible to conceive, that treasure, and particularly " the treasure of that brave " *people*," (the English) could be sent to the continent by any persons except the ministry; it follows of course, that, according to the French official journal, the ministry are now become " the faction hostile to the " repose of Europe;" a conclusion which becomes undeniable, when we consider that Mr. Wickham, who is here surnamed the " *atrocious*," has been made a Privy Counsellor by this very ministry, and is at this moment a Secretary of State. " *L'atroce* " Wickham!" The *atrocious* Right Honourable William Wickham! This is not, per-

haps, quite so infamous as asserting, that His Majesty stood ready to bestow the order of the Garter upon a successful assassin; but, it is too infamous to pass unnoticed by government, especially when the prosecution of M. Peltier is considered. Deboffe, the vender of Peltier's Journal, was at first joined in the prosecution, for retailing a joke upon Buonaparté and his wife; but, from the very same shop, he boldly utters the Moniteur, with all its libels on our country, our parliament, and our King. The conduct of Deboffe, who, we are informed, is an excessively timid mortal, is a complete epitome of that of the governments of Spain, Batavia, England, &c. &c. He rejects with horror, we are told, any work that contains the most distant insinuation against Buonaparté; but he never takes the pains even to look at the libels which he circulates *from the Paris press*. Deboffe is right: he knows that when Buonaparté tolerates, the bookseller is safe: he well knows, that were he ten thousand times as timid and feeble as he is, no one would dare to touch him for publishing the French official gazette. We have mentioned the conduct of this obscure person, as an instance of the all-searching and all-pervading power of Buonaparté. Poor Deboffe, though the light of the sun scarcely ever reaches his abode, has felt the influence of the Consul: he has heard of Lundberg the Swede, of Napper Tandy, of Captain D'Anvergne, and of M. Peltier: he perceives, he knows; without any calculation or reasoning upon the matter, he feels, that as the publisher of Buonaparté's official gazette, no one dares to touch a hair of his head; and, were the infamous Moniteur to style our Sovereign an assassin, instead of a rewarder of assassins, as it already has done, it would be sold with as little dread as if it were the Book of Common Prayer. The House of Commons before the last discovered that a writer had, by a rhetorical figure, compared it to a branch, which might be cut off, without killing the trunk. The context rendered this figure perfectly inoffensive; a court of justice afterwards, by a solemn decision, declared it to be so; yet did this slip of the pen keep the legislature in a flame for several days: it was proposed to burn the book by the hands of the common hangman, and to drag the author, on his knees, to the bar of the House! What then, shall be done to the vender of the Moniteur, which has dictated laws to the present House of Commons, has directly attempted to restrain the freedom of speech in that assembly, and has distinctly proposed a project for the expulsion of such members as will not hold their tongues on certain subjects, offensive to France and her allies? What will this patriotic and spirited assembly do to the promulgators of "so outrageous, "so sacrilegious an attack on the constitu-"tion?"*. What are become of all the high notions of Messrs. Sheridan, Wilberforce, Grey, and Fox? Will they, can they silently suffer a hundred thousand copies of this infamous libel on the House of Commons to be circulated? ..... Complain no longer, Reeves; your cause is amply avenged!

On the continent there are other great projects in contemplation.—Buonaparté's *projet du jour* is, we understand, to unite to France all that part of the Batavian Republic which lies on the left bank of the Rhine. This is the true reason why the French head quarters have been fixed at Breda. While this bargain is going on between the Consul and the Batavians, it is supposed he will traffic for the rest, on the right bank of the Rhine, with the King of Prussia, whom, in obedience to the *livre des destins*, we are, it seems, to believe to be the *grandson* of the great Frederick, notwithstanding that monarch had *no child* †. For the execution of the projects, Buonaparté waits, we believe, only for the adhesion of Russia; and fearing that the friends of that power may, sooner or later, succeed in dissolving the spell by which it is at present blinded and misled, he is hastening, whilst his influence remains unimpaired in that quarter, to the execution of those projects, which he would otherwise have, for

* It must be observed, that, while *all* the English papers re-publish the libellous articles in the Moniteur, only part of them speak of those articles as false, scandalous, and libellous. The True Briton, for instance, has re-published, and, of course, circulated, several of them, unaccompanied by a single word by way of exposure, or in disapprobation. "*L'atroce Wickham*" was circulated without any comment. This is really beyond what one could have conceived possible. It might be natural for the demi-official gazette of "the *modest* and *candid* ministry" to quote from the Moniteur a libel on Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham, and to observe thereon that "it was *just enough*;" but, that it should circulate libels on the ministers themselves was a degree of baseness not to be expected. The fact is, it must have the libel as being an article of news, and it dares not treat it as a libel for fear of offending Buonaparté!

† On this subject the *Courier de Londres* has the following remark:—"*Le Roi de Prusse, petit-fils de "Frédéric II! Voilà un grand trait d'Ignorance de la "part du précepteur-général des nations. Mais il est "permis à un petit bourgeois d'Ajacio de ne pas connoître "parfaitement les Maisons Royales de l'Europe.*"

a little while, postponed. What the Dutch are to have in exchange for their territory Buonaparté is about to receive from them, we know not; but we should not be surprised if Prussia were to receive another slice of our Sovereign's hereditary dominions. When the Dutch first settled in North America, and began their traffic with the Indians, they persuaded those ignorant creatures, that, for want of weights to weigh their furs with, a Dutchman's hand and foot might be used instead, the former weighing ten pounds and the latter twenty. What sort of bargains the poor Indians drove with them it is easy to imagine: and, Buonaparté really seems to be destined to punish, by a proceeding somewhat similar, the shameful and cruel imposition.—The Moniteur is continually inculcating the necessity of *weakening* still more the House of Austria, in order to provide more abundant security for the tranquillity of Europe; that is to say, the necessity of destroying Austria; and, our readers may be assured, that its destruction is resolved on. It is already talked of, on the Continent, that the final plan is, to confine the Emperor to his Ducal dominions, and it is confidently believed by some, that this is a part of the grand project of dividing Turkey between France and Russia, and of *indemnifying* Prussia at the expense of Austria. To this project, which is by no means so romantic as some may imagine, the presidentship of Italy, the union of Piedmont, the subjugation of Switzerland, the partition of Germany, and the present measures with regard to Holland, are all looked upon as preparatory steps.—And is the illustrious House of Austria to fall! History may say, that the "perfidious "minister" (as the infamous Moniteur styles Baron Thugut) was most lamely seconded, not to say most shamefully deserted, in his endeavours to resist the arms and influence of France; but, the same history, if it be not as partial and as false as the Moniteur, will say, that the *wise*, the *prudent*, the *safe*, Count Cobenzel and his colleagues, whom Buonaparté, at times, honours, as he does our ministers, with his approbation, have, by their *conciliating* system, that is to say, by crouching at the feet of the Consul, accelerated the ruin of their Sovereign and their country.

Again people ask, *whether England is to have peace or war?* To which we answer, *peace*; if this state of things can be called peace; if, with an army of 130,000, and a fleet of 50,000 men, and with Omnium fluctuating between four and eleven per cent. below par; if this can be called peace, peace we shall have, until Buonaparté has obtained (for obtain it he will) the complete fulfilment, on our part, of the treaty of Amiens, and until he is ready to invade India, Jamaica, or Ireland; till then we shall *enjoy* our present sort of repose, but not one moment longer.

We, some time ago, (Vol. II. p. 704) noticed the arrival of a troop of French *commercial agents*, whom our government had refused to receive as such, but who had been sent over by Buonaparté, *in spite of that refusal*. These persons were then just arrived in London, whence they have since been distributed amongst our different seaports; and, we are well assured, that the *commercial* agent at Hull is a *colonel of engineers!* That others of his commercial comrades are of the same, or of a similar description, no one can doubt. But, this is nothing with the "*prudent* ministers who "govern Great Britain!" This is nothing with your "*safe* politicians," who, with that puritanical *sang froid*, that modest assurance, for which they are so renowned, will tell you, that there is no danger from these men, because they are, like all other foreigners, *liable to the operation of the alien law*; when they well know, that, be the conduct of these persons what it may, they no more dare to send them out of the country than they dare to demand satisfaction for the ill-treatment of Capt. d'Auvergne, or for the infamous libels against our King, contained in the French official gazette. "We, too, have an alien law," said Lord Castlereagh. Yes, my Lord, and so we had when *Lundberg* landed in the country and proceeded to London, not only in despite, but in contempt of that law. Yes, my Lord, the alien law may operate in *favor* of France, but it never will operate *against* her, while its execution depends upon you and your colleagues.

It is with great pleasure, that we perceive, as well from a notice given in the House of Commons, previous to the recess, as from other indications of the minds of those who are capable to do it, that the veil of popularity is likely soon to be torn from the scenes which are passing at the Admiralty. We are only fearful, that this salutary work may be performed when it is too late. Our navy, which many regard as the last remaining prop of our security, so far from being in the state described by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, so far is the Admiralty, from being able, upon a sudden emergency, to send to sea *forty* additional ships

of the line, in the space of *a month*, so far from being capable of verifying this Munchausen-like statement, we believe that, were it to defend the country even against an invasion, they would not, in the above mentioned space of time, be able to send to sea *five* additional ships of the line. The fact is, that the whole of this mighty machine is at a stand, and is falling, as fast as possible, into irretrievable ruin. The wild and furious measures of the Admiralty, in their domiciliary visits to the dock-yards, have driven away all the shipwrights, caulkers, and other artificers, skilled in their business; and, so far from any saving arising from these measures, so far from a saving of *three millions*, as the demi-official paper has asserted, expenses have been incurred beyond all former example. * In contemplating the military department of the navy, no less serious apprehensions arise. That sort of conduct which Lord St. Vincent practised towards Sir John Orde, and which he has, unfortunately, now an opportunity of extending to the whole of the officers of the navy, has so disgusted every officer of rank, of spirit, and of merit, that no one of that description can be found to make a tender of his service. Hence the various stations remain unrelieved, and the crews, who have served all the war, are to their great disappointment and discontent, compelled to remain abroad, without even the prospect of relief. Without due respect being paid to officers of *every* rank; without a most tender regard to their honourable feelings, it is in vain to expect subordination amongst their inferiors. When we look back at Lord St. Vincent as the commander of a fleet, we cannot but be astonished at the too evident change in his way of thinking. Those powers, which he enjoyed, those very powers which he deemed absolutely necessary to the existence of discipline, are now cut off from the officers of the navy, whose situations are rendered intolerable by the manifold neglects and insults they experience from men, one of whom, if we are not mistaken, the First Lord himself has heretofore publicly declared (with what justice he best knows) not fit to be trusted with the command of a single ship! The persons alluded to are, in whatever light we view them, totally unfit for the office they are in. Their elevation has tended to the decline, and, we greatly fear, that, in co-operation with other measures, it will end in the ruin of the British navy. We take this opinion from no individual: we have heard much on the subject, and, we are fully persuaded, that, if the sentiments of every officer in the navy could be collected, there would not be found above *three* whose voices would not confirm our opinion. The hyperbolical compliments, bestowed on Lord St. Vincent by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, must, by every one who is acquainted with the present situation of things, be regarded as nothing more than a veil for his hatred and fear of him. Mr. Addington must know, that war, or that subjugation, is at no great distance; but every day of delay, is a day of shelter to him and his colleagues. When war comes (if it ever *can* come) their ignorance, improvidence, and imbecillity, must be exposed: then, instead of finding a navy, ready not only to defend us from invaders, but again to bear the thunder of Britain to every corner of the globe; instead of finding a navy like this, we shall find a huge skeleton of a navy, and nothing more. On some future occasion it may be necessary for us to show, that our dock yards have not only been deprived of those sinews of war, which the late upright and provident Board of Admiralty had collected, but that they have been (probably by way of "drawing closer the bonds of peace and amity") made the means *of supplying the arsenals of France!*—In a word, the whole system of the Admiralty is such as demands the serious attention of the parlia-

* On this subject we beg leave to refer our readers to an excellent article, p. 37. of this sheet, to the statements of which we will here add a more full and authentic account than we before possessed respecting the ship MARS.—This ship, having been taken into dock to repair, she was surveyed, and a report made to the navy board of her defects. The estimate of repairs amounted to £11,000. The work was ordered to be done. It was done, and she was turned out, as fit for service; but when she arrived at the Jetty Head, she was found to be in so imperfect a state, that she was obliged to be re-surveyed, and, in consequence thereof, she was ordered into dock again. Another estimate was made, and, it appeared, that £9,000 was still wanting to put her into repair, *after Mr. Tucker had turned her out as* COMPLETE! Lord St. Vincent *saw* the whole of these transactions.—It is worth remarking, that the commissioners, appointed to enquire into the abuses of the navy, have nominated as their secretary a MR. WILLIAMS, a very young man, who was, about two months ago, promoted from being a junior clerk in the navy office, to be clerk to the rope yard at Woolwich, by the interest of Mr. Tucker, which Mr. Tucker, the late secretary of Lord St. Vincent, was, not long ago, a *purser* of a man of war, and is now a *Commissioner of the Navy*. As Mr. Williams was totally unknown to any of the five commissioners, his appointment shows what influence the First Lord may have in the commission, of which it is now pretty well known, that he *intended* to be at the head, with Mr. Tucker for a secretary! What are the public services of Mr. Tucker the public has yet to learn.

ment and the people. It is a system, which we regard as radically vicious, and, we trust, it will instantly be changed.

In our second vol. p. 732, we noticed the answer, which was given by Mr. Addington, relative to the right of cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras; a right which, it was then *reported*, the Spaniards were, at the instigation of France, about to eject us from, in virtue of the non-renewal of former treaties, in the treaty of Amiens. What we then argued upon as a report, is now, we have good reason to think, authentically confirmed. We shall, however, postpone the animadversions, which such a fact is calculated to extort, until we have more full and certain information on the subject.—The prohibition to cut *logwood*, joined to that which France has imposed on Spain respecting *wool*, may be reckoned amongst the first, though, perhaps, not the least of those "blessings," which the peace has already brought upon the trade of the country. All in good time, however! The blows will fall thicker and heavier as the machine becomes mounted.—In the mean time, we cannot refrain from again reminding our readers of what was said, on the subject of Honduras, during the discussions relative to the treaty of Amiens, beginning with an extract from one of Mr. Cobbett's letters to Lord Hawkesbury.—"The right of cutting dying woods "and mahogany in the Bay of Honduras, "rests, like the rights before mentioned, "solely upon positive and special convention "between our Sovereign and the king of "Spain. We have no claim on, nor have "we ever preferred any pretension to, the "sovereignty of the lands, on which this "right has hitherto been exercised. In "former treaties, as in that of 1763, for instance, we obtained a renewal of the permission, in rather loose and general terms, "to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras. "This permission was again renewed at the "peace of 1783; but Mr. Pitt, sensible of "the importance of the privilege, wished to "secure its enjoyments by stipulations more "specific and solemn, which he obtained "in the convention signed at London, in "1787. This convention, together with "the former stipulations on the subject, "were abrogated by the war; and, as a "renewal of them has not been obtained at "the peace, the right to cut logwood and "mahogany may, of course, be numbered "amongst those encumbrances, of which a "happy riddance has been procured by the "treaty of Amiens. How long the Spaniards, acting under the mandates of "France, will suffer us to trade to Honduras I cannot say. It is possible that "they might find some amusement in tantalizing us with hopes of forbearance; in "regarding us as tenants at will, continually "liable to ejectment. But, when they "reflect on the cession of Trinidad, which "we have so honestly and so honourably "obtained, they cannot but seize with eagerness every opportunity to injure our "interests, and to mortify our pride. The "enjoyment of the logwood trade will, "therefore, be of short duration, and I shall "be much disappointed, if our wood cutters "are not very soon ejected, and that too "with all those injuries and all those marks "of contempt, which the subjects of Britain must now expect to meet with from "every nation in the world, however base "its disposition, or however feeble its "power." (*Register, Vol. I. p.* 499.)—Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and Mr. Elliot, repeatedly warned the parliament that the consequences of the omission to renew former treaties would inevitably be the loss of every thing, which we held solely by those treaties; and, amongst other objects, they particularly mentioned the right of cutting logwood in the Bay of Honduras. What said the ministers in reply? They deny the position generally; they denied, that war abrogated treaties, and they boldly declared, that the right of cutting logwood was not affected by the non-renewal of the convention of 1787. The Lord Chancellor, in answer to Lord Grenville, in the House of Lords, on the 4th of May, 1802, said, that, "if, by the omission to mention former treaties, *they were "all to be considered as abrogated*, he had no "difficulty in saying, that an address ought "to be voted to his Majesty, praying that "he would dismiss his present ministers "from his counsels for ever. But, he trusted, that *the fact was far otherwise*, and that "the conduct of ministers deserved no such "censure."—Lord Hawkesbury said, on the same subject, that "the right to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras was ceded "to us in 1787; that it was a settlement "which we *possessed of right*, and to which "the Spaniards were as much bound to "refer as we: this was, he said, in truth, "*no omission at all.*" (Speech, 13th May, 1802.)—The Master of the Rolls, in the same debate, said, that "our right to cut "logwood, &c. in the Bay of Honduras, "was *a right of possession*, preserved throughout the war, and *not annulled by the peace.*"

(Speech, 14th May, 1802.)—These, the Chancellor and the Master of the Rolls, at least, are high authorities; and, even the opinion of Lord Hawkesbury is entitled to some respect, when we remember, that the whole of his speech was fully and unequivocally approved of by Mr. Pitt. Now, then, we have only to see whether the men who defended the peace upon arguments like these, will defend these arguments against the mandates and the arms of Spain; or, whether they will yield the point, and with it a right, the enjoyment of which has long been, and is now more than ever, essentially connected with the prosperity of several very material branches of our manufactures.

We shall close our present summary with a few words on *finance*, not having room for a tenth part of an article which we had prepared upon the subject, and which we shall not fail to give at length in our next. In the demi-official paper of the 12th instant, the ministers, who, as the reader must, long ago, have observed, are not the wisest of mankind, have published the following account of the "*growing* state of the revenue," as Mr. Addington was pleased to phrase it: —"We are *happy* to be able to state, for "the *satisfaction* of the Public, that the sur- "plus of the consolidated fund, ending "the 5th of January 1803, amounted to "1,248,032 l.; being an excess of 399,329l. "in the three quarters, beyond the 4,500,000l. "which was calculated as the amount of "the surplus of the consolidated fund for "the whole year, ending the 5th of "April 1803."—Now, we will not say, that Mr. Addington is not *happy* at being able to make this statement; for we most sincerely believe, that he is totally incapable of perceiving the result to which it leads. With others, however, we are inclined to think that no *satisfaction* will be felt, except where there already exists a strong desire to see the decline and ruin of our commerce and finances. Full of doubts as we were with respect to the sanguine statements contained in the Budget-speech of the minister, our anxiety to see them verified did, in some measure, banish that distrust which we ought to have entertained of any and of every thing coming from such a quarter, under similar circumstances. If, however, we have participated in the deception of the country, we have not been amongst the last to perceive, and shall not be the last to expose, that deception. Taking the Chancellor of the Exchequer upon his own information and assertions, as to the past, experience has already proved, that, *as to the future*, as to the source on which he has bidden the nation to rely for credit and security, there is a fearful falling off. In short, the *consolatory* account now published completely blows up the minister's system, and convinces us, that, to maintain expenses equal to the present, *new taxes* must, next year, be laid on to an almost unbearable amount, or the government must again have recourse to *loans*.

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

TYRO on the surrender of Malta shall appear in our next.

DETECTOR will, we hope, accept of our apology for delaying so long the insertion of his most valuable article.—We shall hope for a continuance of his favours, which cannot fail to produce a good effect.

T. F. on the Post-Office Grant is received. The writer has our best thanks. When we have time to arrange all the materials, which we have collected on that subject, we will take the liberty, with T. F.'s permission, to submit them to him. So many objects crowd upon us, that some of them must of necessity be retarded in their progress to the press; but, if we have life and health, for a few weeks longer, we will, unless the abuses we complain of are remedied, place Mr. Freeling in a situation to be envied by no human being, except, perhaps, the renowned Serjeant Sinclair.

LOOKER-ON's remarks on the probable causes of the recent mutinies are unavoidably postponed 'till our next.

*** From a desire to furnish our Readers, as soon as possible, with a correct translation of *L'Empire Germanique*, (the work which has given such alarm to Buonaparté, and which we mentioned so much at length in our last week's Summary,) we have resolved to keep back our Supplement ten days longer.

THE INVINCIBLE STANDARD.

When my narrative, on this interesting subject, first made its appearance, the reader will please to recollect, that several of the London newspapers not only called in question, but flatly contradicted, my statements; and, it will not be forgotten, that a notification (copied by me in Vol. II. p. 868) was inserted in *all* the London papers, promising a refutation of part, at least, of my narrative, and a confirmation of the truth of the narrative of Serjeant Sinclair, as published in the name of the Highland Society. Four weeks have now elapsed, and this promise has not yet been performed; nor has there, that I have heard, been any attempt made to perform it, unless we regard as such, the malignant abuse, against LUTZ and myself, poured forth by Stuart, Perry, and Heriot, three degenerate Scotchmen, who conduct the Oracle, the Morning Chronicle, and the True Briton and the Sun. A passage has, indeed, been quoted from Sir Robert Wilson; but, the reader will recollect, that I stated, in my narrative, that Sir Robert had been *misled* in the same way that the Highland Society had, and that his error would be *corrected* without loss of time. This I now repeat; and, besides, the account of Sir Robert Wilson is in *downright disagreement*, as to *every* circumstance, with the account of Sinclair; how, therefore, the one can confirm the other I leave the ingenious defenders of Sinclair to determine. ——I feel great contempt for the conduct of the Scotch newspaper people in calling LUTZ a *deserter*, &c. &c. of which every honourable Scotchman must be ashamed; but, I will confess, that I am disappointed at the *silence* of the 42d regiment and of the Highland Society. The taking of this standard has been regarded as an action singularly honourable. This honour has been, in the most public manner, attributed to the 42d regiment by the Highland Society; which Society has ordered a medal to be struck, and a vase to be fashioned, in commemoration of the deed. I have stated, and, I trust, I have proved, to the satisfaction of that brave regiment and their countrymen, that the honour in question belongs to another corps; and, unless my statement can be controverted with success, I think the Public has some right to expect, on the part of the Highland Society, a contradiction of the statement, which was published in its name. How far there may be an obligation upon the 42d regiment, and on Major Stirling in particular, to come forward and disclaim the pretensions, advanced by Sinclair, in their name, I must leave to be determined by their own sense of justice and of honour, from which I cannot but hope for a favourable decision.—There are some persons weak enough to imagine, that the discovery is a mere *nine days' wonder*, and that, by giving the question the go-bye, with a sort of loose uncircumstantial contradiction, LUTZ will be forgotten, and the honour will, by degrees, revert to the first claimant. But this must not be. If I live, if *shall* not be. What was, at first, a matter of choice, perhaps, is now become a matter of *duty*. I will give an attentive hearing to, I will chearfully publish and put upon record, any thing which the 42d regiment, or the Highland Society shall think proper to communicate; but, if they both persist in silence, the publication which was made in the name of the Society must become a subject of very serious and widely-circulated remark. ——I have, from the date of my narrative to the present day, observed the utmost fairness towards the 42d regiment, the Highland Society, and the Scotch nation in general. It has, as I before hinted, been my fortune to be, in almost every stage of my life, particularly attached to Scotchmen; and, there are not, at this moment, very many considerable countries in the world, where there are not to be found Scotchmen, who are warmly my friends. I know the foibles as well as I know the virtues of that nation; and, though I am not a "*safe* politician," I did not put pen to paper upon this business without being fully aware of the consequence. The friendship between me and the Scotchmen, to whom I have just alluded, arose from an attachment, which we felt in common, to our king and our country; a source the most honourable in itself, and which, on their parts, was productive of instances of public spirit, such as I have never seen surpassed. But, as I gained their friendship by walking

in the path of truth and justice. I will not believe that I shall lose it by still walking in that path; I will not believe that there is a man whom I ever have, at any time, called my friend, who does not despise the reptiles of the Morning Chronicle and the True Briton, who, not being able any longer to deprive the gallant LUTZ of his well-merited laurels, have had the baseness to stigmatize him as a *deserter*, for having, after being carried by force to join the rebel army, made his escape to the army of his sovereign.

I seize this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of a great number of letters, on this subject, and to beg the writers thereof to excuse me for not having answered them, which would, indeed, have been absolutely impossible.——The sale of the portrait of LUTZ, which was intended to raise a sum of money for him, has proceeded very well; and, when a sufficiency of time has been given for the Highland Society to publish a reply to my narrative, the public will be duly informed of what further measures it may be proposed to take in order to procure a proper reward for the man who took the Invincible Standard, of the value of which deed, some estimate may be formed from the proceedings of the Highland Society, and from the *medal* and the *cup* mentioned in those Proceedings. Those who press an *immediate* subscription, I beg leave to remind, that nothing of that sort can be done with propriety, 'till his Royal Highness, the Commander in Chief has had time to institute a regular enquiry, and to obtain a legal decision of the point in dispute. As far as I can judge at present, the second week in February may be looked forward to as a proper time, in every respect, for fixing on an efficient plan for doing, in this affair, in which the honour of the country is so deeply concerned, whatever may then remain undone.

London, 18*th Jan.* 1803. WM. COBBETT.

ON THE
NAVY AND THE MUTINY.

Sir,—The recent event in the Mediterranean, where the spirit of mutiny has again reared its dreadful crest, naturally calls for our most serious consideration, and induces us to look for some cause to which we can assign so extraordinary a proceeding. In the midst of a peace, (a safe and secure one as our wise ministers would wish us to believe) is it possible that such an explosion should take place, unless there existed some deep and extraordinary reason for it? Does it not prove more than all that has been said before, that the incapacity of our admiralty is such, that from the top to the bottom of the whole machine, every part is out of order and going wrong? The puffs of Mr. A. and Lord St. V's. former high character as an officer, can never contradict these facts which are crowding so fast upon one another. We must trace back from the beginning of this administration those causes which have had, and are likely still to have such dreadful effects. In the last day of the sessions, an admiral said, "it was ground "of a nature too delicate to tread upon;" and, in general, we find that almost every person deprecates the discussion of the subject as too dangerous even to hint at, and we are advised to go as children go in a church yard, with their eyes shut, that if there are any hobgoblins, they may not see them. Good God, what puerile and wretched arguments are these! Are we to see the last remaining prop of our hope (a pretty strong one yet, in spite of mismanagement) cut away from us, and not endeavour to save it? No; let us see it by a plain exposure of facts, some remedy may not at least be pointed out, even if the ignorance or fear of our ministers should prevent its execution.

Far be it from me not to abhor and condemn the conduct of men, who, under any form of government or rule, take the remedy of abuses into their own hands. But in governments both civil and military, men will complain if they are ill treated, and if those complaints are not attended to, the most serious consequences are likely to arise It is a fact well known to every officer in the British navy, that if the *just* complaints of the men, transmitted through the proper channel, their own officers, had been attended to, the first mutiny in the fleet would never have happened; nor would the men have been taught that dreadful lesson, which they have so frequently practised since that period. The admiralty, at the time of that mutiny, gave every credit and support to the officers of the navy, and placed a confidence in them which they deserved by their patience and perseverance. Has that been followed up by the present Lord and his associates? No; on the contrary, every degradation and humiliation has been heaped upon them, and they are deprived of every little patronage and comfort, which could give them consequence in the eyes of the men they were expected to command, and the very promotion of the lowest rank of petty officers, is now taken into the hands of the Admiralty, for the purpose of bestowing them on the creatures of the First Lord and his dependants. No officer has the power of rewarding merit, and the highest gratification of a great and generous mind is taken away. No wonder then, that the officers are dissatisfied; no wonder that the Admiralty, in vain, are looking for applications for ships and commands; no man of spirit or of a liberal mind can endure the slights he must undergo, or the total want of every common attention, if he submits to the drudgery and disgrace he is certain of meeting, in any communication with that Board, to which he ought to look up to for support. Such is the actual situation of the officers of the navy, since the peace: let us now look to the subordinate classes, and mark the wisdom which has accompanied every action of the present government. In order that no class of people in this country should be ignorant of the blessings, which Messrs. Addington and Co. meant to diffuse by the salutary measure of peace, printed papers were sent to the fleet, announcing the event, accompanied with orders to read and stick them up in every ship. The poor and ignorant sailors immediately thought (perhaps under the same idea as the most of the country did) that peace meant a cessation from the duties of war, a disbanding of the forces by sea and land, that the ships were to be paid off, and that those men who had been taken from the merchant service, to fight the law-

ful battles of their king and country, might return to cultivate the arts of peace; that others, who had been balloted by their parishes, to serve during the war, might revisit their native homes, and return to their original avocations. These were the ideas, which naturally enough suggested themselves to ignorant men. But no such thing was meant by the enlightened ministry: and, in addition to this disappointment, will it be credited, that the folly, the vanity, or whatever other motive one can ascribe it to, induced the Admiralty to send to the commanding officer in Bantry Bay, where the fleet then was, a print of a tree, which they called the *Tree of Liberty*, two of which were ordered to be distributed to each ship; these prints were, a tree, decorated with the pictures of all their favourite officers, who had led them to glory; in the centre of the trunk, stood conspicuously, the picture of Earl St. Vincent, the patron saint of this *Tree of Liberty*. To damp, however, the joy which it might occasion, by the same post which brought this extraordinary present, orders were received to *confine* the officers and men to their ships, and not to suffer any communication whatever with the shore. The ignorant minds of the sailors were again bewildered, they could not discriminate between the shadow of liberty, hung up at the mast, while the reality was denied them, by orders from the same power, which held the illusion before their eyes. No explanation was allowed; and, instead of being paid off, they were ordered to the West Indies. Was it, therefore, very surprising, that the uninformed and boisterous minds of the men, agitated by such contradictory and ridiculous mummery, should burst forth into a flame? The spirit, the perseverance, and activity of their officers, however, prevailed, and after the Admiralty had given way and ordered the fleet back to Spithead, they proceeded to their destined station, where they are at present, but under such an apprehension is their present excellent commander in chief, that not a boat is suffered to pass from ship to ship, without a guard; so that officers, going upon duty, look as if they were prisoners, under the escort of marines with loaded arms. I will ask the most unprejudiced persons whether this be not the effect of bad councils or of bad management? And yet, the satellites of the Admiralty are ordered to villify the officers of the fleet, and to ascribe to them, the mutinous disposition of the sailors!

It is now two years since the blessings of peace were announced to the fleet as well as the nation at large, and yet can it be believed, that the squadrons upon foreign stations have not been relieved by fresh ships, or ordered home. It is so, however, and the effect of it has been the mutiny on board the Gibraltar in the Mediterranean. Can it be otherwise, how can the men bear with patience to hear read that Act of Parliament, which secures to them their pay every six months, and not reflect that their country is violating, not only its compact with them, as men serving during the war, but actually debarring them from the pay which is due, many of those ships having two, three, and four years pay due to them? The admiral's ship in the West-Indies, at this moment, has four years due, and yet no merit is ascribed either to the officers or to the men for their quiet and exemplary conduct and forbearance. These are facts, that they would not exist under any Admiralty but the present, is notorious; and that they do exist under the present is entirely owing to its negligence, its want of information, and its want of the common knowledge of human nature. One can scarce look any way, but symptoms of such evident neglect and want of knowledge present themselves, that the minds of uninformed men are lost in astonishment, and cannot account for the stagnation of both the military and civil departments. Not a dock-yard is supplied with its proper artificers and labourers, since the discharges took place in the summer; not a post officer relieved, or any appointments of flag officers to command them; no arrangements of vacancies of any kind, and even the favourite service, which indeed has deserved so well at the hands of Lord St. Vincent, the marines, is left in the lurch with the rest, as near thirty commissions of various kinds remain unfilled at this moment. A. R.

EVACUATION OF MALTA.

SIR,—I again take up my pen on this most most important subject, in consequence of various suggestions and remarks which have lately appeared in the public prints, and particularly the two following articles.

"*Frontiers of Russia*, Dec. 11.—A courier from St. Petersburgh dispatched from the French ambassador there to Paris, brings advice that the Emperor will accept the guarantee of Malta, as soon as *some alterations shall be made* in the articles of the treaty of Amiens relative to that point."—"We have heard that the ministers are about to give up Malta; and the pretext is, we are told, that Russia has, at last, accepted of the *guarantee*, which word, in the general change that has been made in the political dictionary, signifies no more than a mere recognition or acknowledgment." (*Cobbett's Pol. Reg.* v. 2. p. 890.)—From these and similar paragraphs I have good reason to believe, that very many people take for granted that our evacuating Malta, intirely depends upon, and waits for nothing more than this much talked of guarantee of Russia. Yet, after a very careful perusal of the articles of the treaty of Amiens relative to the evacuation of Malta, I cannot discover that either Russia, or any other of the powers therein named, can by accepting the guarantee to which they are invited, acquire any other rights than those of forwarding, (either by prevailing on the knights to attend, or by any other mode of negotiation), the execution of the stipulations of the treaty which are to *precede* our evacuation of the island, and of securing the possession of it to knights after it shall have been evacuated. Being however, fully persuaded that the stipulations in the treaty of Amiens on this subject, are by no means so well understood as they ought to be, I most earnestly intreat that you will find room to republish them in this letter, with such of the following remarks as you shall think worthy to be inserted.

" Art. 10. The islands of Malta, Gezo, " and Comino, shall be restored to the order " of St. John of Jerusalem, to be held on " the same conditions on which it possessed " them before the war, and under the fol- " lowing stipulations."

Obs.—It cannot therefore be given up by its present possessor (the K. of G. Britain) to any other power, but it must be restored to the order and to the order only, who are to *possess* it under certain stipulations. Even to withdraw the British troops and abandon it to the inhabitants themselves would be a violation of this article.

" Stip. 1. Then follow the several stipu- " lations. The knights of the order, whose " *langues (tribes)* continue to subsist after " the exchange of the ratifications of the " present treaty, are invited to return to " Malta as soon as the exchange shall " have taken place. They shall *then* form " a general chapter and proceed to the " election of a grand master, chosen from " among the natives of those nations who " shall preserve their *langues*. Unless that " election has been already made since the " exchange of the preliminaries!"

Obs. The word " *then*" *can only* mean " *when the knights shall be returned.*" And so construed, the stipulation is perfectly clear. It may however be objected, *that if the knights do not return in compliance with the invitation, may they not meet elsewhere to elect a grand master, rather than that the island should not be restored to the order pursuant to artic.* 10.—But this objection is too obvious to have been overlooked by the negotiations at Amiens, and nothing could be more easy than to have worded this stipulation so as to leave the case stated in the objection (would it ever happen) open to discussion. This was not done; whether because the negotiators could not agree upon making such a provision, or because they thought it unnecessary, or because they knew (what I think very likely) that by the rules of the order the election of a grand master must be made in the island, it matters not; the stipulation expressly directs such election to be made by the knights *then*, i. e. *when they shall be returned*; it speaks of no other election; it makes no provision for future discussion in case such election should not be made.

Obs. 2. No election of a grand master was made between the exchange of the preliminaries, and the ratifications of the definitive treaty; consequently the exception contained in the conclusion of this stipulation is a nullity.—Stipulations 2 and 3. " The governments of the French republic, " and of Great Britain, desiring to place " the *order* and island of Malta in a state " of entire independence with respect to " themselves, agree that there shall not " be in future either a French or an Eng- " lish *langue*" &c. &c. then follow rules for establishing and maintaining a Maltese *langue*.

Obs. I stated thus much of these stipulations to shew that they contain nothing relative to the independence of the island exclusive of the order, but only of the order and island conjunctively, and forming one state.—Stipul. 4 " The forces of his Bri- " tannic Majesty shall evacuate the island " and its dependencies, within three months " from the exchange of the ratifications, or " sooner if possible. *At this epoch it shall* " *be given up to the order in its* present state, " *provided* the grand master or commis- " saries, fully authorized according to the " rules of the order, shall be in the island " to take possession, *and* that the force " to which is to be provided by his Sicilian " Majesty, as is hereafter stipulated, shall " have arrived there."—By the terms of this stipulation the evacuation of the island by the British troops is purely *conditional and contingent*, depending upon two joint events, which the negotiators themselves at Amiens must have known might or might not happen; and which still may or may not happen. These events are, the grand master or his lawful commissaries being in the island to receive possession, *and* the Neapolitan troops arrived to secure that possession to the order. And the conditions being conjunctive, until both these events shall take place, the British troops cannot evacuate the island without a manifest violation of this stipulation.—It may perhaps be asked,—Are then the British troops *never* to evacuate Malta? To this question the answer seems to be as complete as it is obvious,—No other provision for their evacuating it, than what is contained in this 4th stipulation, is made by the treaty of Amiens; and it is not pretended that there exists any *other* engagement for their evacuating it.—*Stip.* 5, Merely regulates the composition and command of the garrison after the order shall be in quiet possession and the Neapolitan troops withdrawn; on this at present there can be no question.—*Stip.* 6. " The independence of " the islands of Malta, of Gezo and Co- " mino, as well as the present arrangements, " shall be placed under the protection and " guarantee of France, Great Britain, Aus- " tria, Spain, Russia and Prussia."—*Obs.* Whatever new ideas may be attached to the word " guarantee;" it does, by the law of nations, signify, " A state, which, at

" the request of other states, undertakes to " see that those states faithfully execute " some treaty or agreement into which " they have entered;" consequently the powers, named in this stipulation, have a right to see the treaty of Amiens punctually executed; but they have acquired no other right whatever.—*Stip.* 7, 8, 9, and 10, consist entirely of regulations for the government of the island, when in the quiet possession of the order, and are therefore inapplicable to the present circumstances.—*Stip.* 11. " The regulations contained in " the paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, and 10, shall " be converted into laws, and perpetual " statutes of the order in the customary " manner; and the Grand Master, or if " he shall not be in the island at the time " of its restoration, his representative, as " well as his successors, shall be bound to " take an oath to their punctual observ- " ance."—*Obs.* I insert this stipulation merely to shew, that the negotiators at Amiens uniformly, and even anxiously, adhered to the idea and intention, that *the island should be given up to the Order, and to their Grand Master only.*—*Stip.* 11. " His Sicilian majesty " shall be invited to furnish 2000 men, na- " tives of his states, to serve as a garrison " in the different fortresses of the said " islands. That force shall remain one " year, to bear date from their restitution " to the knights. And if, at the expira- " tion of this term, the Order should not " have raised a force sufficient, in the judg- " ment of the guaranteeing powers, to " garrison the island and its dependencies, " as is specified in the fifth paragraph; the " Neapolitan troops shall continue there " until they shall be replaced by a force " deemed sufficient by the powers." *Obs.* The sole object of this stipulation is to provide a sufficient garrison to secure the Order in its possession of the island, until the Order shall have provided a sufficient garrison of its own troops. That this is clear, and that the Neapolitan troops have no right to enter the island until the Grand Master, or his lawful representative is there present to receive them, manifestly appears from the 5th paragraph to which *this stipulation refers:* for by that paragraph it is expressly provided, that, " The commander- " ship in chief of the garrison, as well as " the nomination of the officers, shall per- " tain to the Grand Master: and this right " he cannot resign, even temporarily, ex- " cept in favour of a knight, and in con- " currence with the advice of the council " of the Order."—*Stip.* 13. " The different " powers designated in the 6th paragraph, " to wit, France, Great Britain, Austria, " Spain, Russia and Prussia, shall be invited " to accede to the present stipulations." And when Russia or any other powers shall have accepted the guarantee, should that power call us to evacuate the island, our answer is ready;—" The preliminary steps, " the previous conditions, expressly direct- " ed, and therefore indispensably necessary, " by the treaty of Amiens, are not yet " performed, but they may be performed " hereafter. Until there be a Grand Mas- " ter elected, according to the rules of the " Order, and present, either in person, or " by his lawful commissaries, in the island, " and until 2000 Neapolitan troops shall " have arrived, the British troops cannot " evacuate the island, without an undenia- " ble contravention of that treaty of " Amiens, of which you profess to be a " guarantee." Such is the only answer which our ministers can honourably or honestly give, I mean *honestly* with respect to their own country and the Order of Malta, to whom both the British and French governments have bound themselves to restore the island. I hope our ministers have given this answer, and that they will adhere to it. Should any change of circumstances require a different answer, it will be soon enough to think of it when the previous conditions, indispensably necessary to the evacuation, shall be performed.—But the writer of the article, above copied from the St. James's Chronicle, tells us, that the *Emperor will accept the guarantee of Malta, as soon as some alterations shall be made in the articles of the treaty of Amiens, relative to that point.* And are we then to purchase this guarantee by any additional cessions to those we have already made, pursuant to the restitutional treaty of Amiens? Are we to admit and pay Neapolitan troops to keep possession of the island until the French government shall order them to evacuate it? or is the *guarantee* to be changed into a *garrison* of the Emperor of Russia, for the more effectually securing the independence of Malta? I hope not. Yet it is a very prevalent opinion, that some negotiation is on foot, relative to the evacuation of this island; and the bare suspicion of negotiation, where there exists no honest or honourable subject of negotiation, is extremely alarming. For myself, I will only say, *faustiore tamen, ut precor, omine*, as Mr. Dundas said of the Cape of Good Hope, that the minister who shall dare to evacuate Malta, except in strict conformity to the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, will deserve to lose his head.

IGNOTUS.

Extract from the Moniteur of the 10th January, 1803.

The letter which is about to be stated, has been sent to the chief of the secret police*. We have thought, that coming from a man better able than any other to know the labyrinth and the atrocity of the plots of the former English ministry, because he participated in every intrigue, this letter will be of some interest to the people of France. Those atrocious men, who threw into Quiberon the flower of our old officers of marine, to have them sacrificed, have not ceased to have in their pay secret assassins, always ready to strike in the dark, like the assassins of the Old Man of the Mountain in the time of St. Louis; it was they who recommended and paid the 3d Nivôse, and Georges, Dutheil, the old bishop of Arras, who were the principal instruments of that abominable plot, enjoy public protection and a large pension in England. They have armed the French against the French, under divers pretexts; but having for object the annihilation of us. They have wished to realize what they had engraved upon their charts, to efface the beautiful France from the table of European powers.—Inhabitants of La Vendée, the Morbihan, the Côtes du Nord, the Manche, the Orne, it is above all to you that this is addressed. The levy of the conscripts was completed among you with great eagerness. When your prefects gave an account of this to the First Consul—"It is the best proof (said he) that they could give me, that they are grateful for all I have done for them, and their sincere desire is to repair their own evils more than those of others, because they are the part of the family that has suffered the most."—More than any other part also, you have injuries to punish, and if ever these wretches excite war upon the continent, you will revenge your miseries and your disasters.—These men, who have paid for the commission of all crimes, are devoted to the contempt of Europe. Cast a look at the Island of Jersey. It is still filled with brigands, who quit it only to disturb your tranquillity. That infamous Georges sold you to them, and when the chiefs, who at different times have been at the head of the civil war, but who always preserved a French character, such as Chatillon, Dautichamp, &c. shall have written all the atrocities which are in their knowledge, posterity will place the Grenvilles, the Windhams, in the rank of persons who have dishonoured modern Europe. But happily those times are passed. It is in vain that these terrible men would scatter gold—they can no longer divide us. The French of all parties, of all opinions, rallied and united, will sustain the glory and grandeur of their country—for all remain now persuaded, that it was wished to effect the destruction and misery of France. But if, when divided, we have always rendered their plots useless; if we have extended our limits to the boundaries of ancient Gaul; if we have had the power to extend them further; if we have stopped, it is because we willed it.—Who would dare to attack us!!! So long as we shall remain united, so long as we shall not lend a guilty ear to the insurrections of hired and bribed men, they will rage with jealousy in beholding us.—They may serve some plots; try poison and the poniard, the arms of cowards. They keep always in reserve and load with benefits the agents who have served them in their criminal attempts—it is because they reckon upon making use of them again. When states have no resource but in crimes; when the chiefs and leaders of a nation, who as John the First said, "ought ever to be the refuge of honour and public morality," live and confide only in such hopes, then a nation is very ill governed: the first effect of crime is always to fall upon him who meditates it.—The letter is from a person named Bertonnier, who, noticing the last invective in the Moniteur, opposes the idea of placing the emigrants, Dandre and Dutheil, in the same class. He asserts that Dandre, though he directed the operations of the royal agency at Paris, never manifested an opinion tending to the assassination of any one, even the directors; and that he recommended it to him to avoid all connexion with the English agents, except for the purpose of discomfiting their plots, which tended all, he adds, to the keeping up civil war in France.

* We do not insert this letter here. It's object will be seen from the close of this article. It is, of itself, of no importance, either in our eyes or those of the Moniteur, which has made use of it as a pretext to introduce a new attack on this country, which attack it is our business to comment on.

Having seen, in the newspapers, some lines, entitled "AN ODE for the New Year, by H. J. PYE, Esq." we thought we would turn our hand to a similar composition; but, having counted our fingers for several hours to no purpose, we had recourse to MR. SHERIDAN's mode of obtaining fame, and were about to pass the following verses as our own, 'till a friend represented to us, that to such a privilege no one was entitled but a "*witty senator.*"

ODE FOR THE NEW YEAR.

Extracted from Dryden's "COCK *and the* FOX."

The plot contriv'd, before the break of day,
Sly *Renard* through the hedge had made his way;
The pale was next, but proudly, with a bound,
He leap'd the fence of the forbidden ground;
Yet, fearing to be seen, within a bed
Of coleworts he conceal'd his wily head;
There skulk'd 'till afternoon, and watch'd his time
(As murd'rers use) to perpetrate his crime.
O *hypocrite*, ingenious to destroy!
O *traitor*, worse than Sinon was to Troy!
The Cock, that of his flesh was ever free,
Sung merrier than the mermaid in the sea:
And so befell, that as he cast his eye,
Among the coleworts, on a butterfly,
He saw false *Renard*, where he lay full low;
I need not swear he had no list to crow;
But, cry'd, *cock! cock!* and gave a sudden start,
As sore dismay'd and frighted at his heart.
But, the false loon, who could not work his will
By open force, employ'd his flatt'ring skill—
"I hope, my lord," said he, "I not offend;
Are you afraid of me, that am your friend?
I were a beast indeed to do you wrong;
I, who have lov'd and honour'd you so long:
Stay, gentle Sir, nor take a *false alarm*,
For, on my soul, I never meant you harm:
I come no spy, nor as a *traitor* press,
To learn the secrets of your soft recess:
Far be from *Renard* so profane a thought,
But by the sweetness of your voice was brought.
And, since I speak of singing, let me say,
As with an upright heart I safely may,
That, save yourself, there breathes not on the ground,
One like your father for a silver sound.

As he, to raise his voice, with artful care,
(What will not beaux attempt to please the fair?)
On tiptoe stood to sing with greater strength,
And stretch'd his comely neck at all the length;
And, while he strain'd his voice to pierce the skies,
As saints in raptures use, would *shut his eyes*,
That, the sound striving through the narrow throat,
His winking might avail to mend the note."
The Cock was pleas'd to hear him speak so fair,
And proud beside, as stupid people are;
Nor could the *treason* from the truth descry,
So was he ravish'd with his flattery.
Then Chanticleer, of whom the story sings,
Stood high upon his toes, and clapt his wings;
Then stretch'd his neck, and *wink'd with both his eyes*,
Ambitious as he sought th' Olympic prize.
But, while he pain'd himself to raise his note,
False *Renard* rush'd, and *caught him by the throat*.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Dec 8.—The Porte has received the disagreeable intelligence, that its army in Egypt has been entirely defeated by the Beys.—The French Chargé d'Affaires, Citizen Ruffin, has complained of the preference granted by the Porte to the English navigation in the Black Sea.—Col. Sebastiani has legitimated himself at Cairo, as French plenipo. in the whole of the Levant. After he had taken a view of every thing remarkable at Cairo, and had executed the commissions he had in charge, he proceeded to Suez.

Milan, Dec. 16.—It is said in the Gazettes here, that after the departure of the King of Etruria, a Tuscan deputation waited on the French Gen. Clarke, at Florence, to express the wish of the country, that they might either receive again the Grand Duke as sovereign, or, if this could not be complied with, that the First Consul would be pleased to place himself at the head of the govt. of Tuscany, in the same manner as he is in the Italian republic. Gen. Clarke received this deputation very favourably, and assured them, that he would transmit their wishes to the First Consul.

Petersburgh, Dec. 18.—By virtue of a convention concluded with the Pope, our court has accepted and recognized M. Arezzo as nuncio from his Holiness, on condition that he shall abstain from all rights of jurisdiction over the catholics in the Russian Empire, and that he shall not exercise any apostolic functions.

Prague, Dec. 24.—Yesterday her royal highness the dutchess dowager of Parma arrived here under the discharge of cannon, and alighted at the Royal Tower, where preparations had been made for her reception.

Brussels, Dec. 26.—A squadron is now fitting out in Dunkirk, which is to take on board troops and artillery for the French possessions in the East Indies, that is, for Pondicherry. Such men are particularly selected for the troops as have already been accustomed to warm climates in Italy and Egypt.

Hague, Dec. 28.—The day before yesterday arrived here Cæsar Berthier, who is going to Louisiana as chief of the staff under Gen. Victor. The latter has made a journey to Helvoetsluys to review the armament with which he is to sail, within a month, for Louisiana. The transports in this armament, which are to take on board 60,000 troops, will be escorted by three ships of war. At the same time another fleet, with troops and colonists, will sail from Rochfort for Louisiana. It is said, that the French will, at the same time, take possession of Florida.

Berne, Jan. 4. The Helvetic govt. has addressed the Gen. in Chief, that the arms taken from the inhabitants of Switzerland may remain deposited in the arsenals of Berne, Zurich, Lucerne, Soleure, &c. but Gen. Ney has received new and very precise orders to transport the artillery, arms, and ammunition, to Geneva and Lausanne.—*Jan.* 6. Gen. Ney and his wife set out yesterday for Basle. The decree of the French Consuls, laying a duty of 4 per cent. upon the importation of foreign muslins, has very much injured the Swiss manufactories, particularly that of St. Gall. Strong representations have been made to the Helvetic minister at Paris, on the subject.

Ratisbon, Jan. 5.—This day a courier from Paris brought to the French minister the news, that on the 25th ult. was signed at Paris, a convention which regulates the indemnities of the House of Austria and the Grand Duke of Tuscany.—*Jan.* 6. We expect here, with much interest, the return of a French courier sent to Petersburg, to invite the Emperor to accede to the convention concluded at Paris by Joseph Buonaparté and Count Cobentzel, and which determines, in a definitive manner, the indemnities of the Grand Duke of Tuscany.—The day before yesterday a courier passed through this city with the convention relative to the indemnities of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, which he was carrying to Vienna, to be submitted to the ratification of his Imperial Majesty.—The deputation of the Empire held its 36th sitting the day before yesterday, when, on the observation of the directorial minister, that there was nothing new since the last sitting, a conclusum was adopted, importing that the Directory should transmit to the Diet, in the accustomed forms, the report of the deputation, which it should communicate to the Imperial plenipo. and pray him at the same time to make his report to his Imperial Majesty.—The report of the extra. deputation was carried to the dictature of the Diet yesterday by the directorial minister of Mayence.

Brussels, Jan. 7.—Gen. Belliard has received orders from the First Consul to make preparations for forming a camp of 12,000 men in the environs of Brussels. The troops which are to compose it, will be drawn from the 24th and 25th milit. divisions, and will be reviewed by the First Consul in person, during his stay within our walls. Gen. Belliard has brought us this intelligence, on his return from the capital.

Paris, Jan. 12.—An *adventurer* who had assumed the name of Fox, and who called himself an Englishman, and a colonel in the service of Russia, was arrested at Liege on the 4th inst. On being taken before a magistrate, he said his name was Falk, and that he was a native of Mons. *He is suspected of several swindling tricks.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Proclamation of the Colonial Prefect of St. Domingo to the Army and to the Inhabitants of that Colony, dated 2d November:

Citizens Soldiers,—The night which has just passed, is a night of mourning for us. The Commander in Chief, Leclerc, your Captain-General, is no more! an incurable disorder has snatched him from you. He had scarce reached the prime of his life; but he was a conqueror in battle, and he was wise in council. He was at once a hero and a sage. The brother-in-law of Buonaparté is no more! but he will live in your hearts. The brigands, of whom he was the terror, will rejoice

at his death; but you will punish them for their detestable joy. The General of Division, Rochambeau, will take the place of General Leclerc. He has just delivered the South and the East from the banditti by whom they were desolated. He is the person chosen by the Government, and by the General whose loss you lament.—The French Government watches over you, and will never abandon you.—*Daure*, Colonial Prefect.

P. Boyer, General of Brigade, to the Minister of Marine and Colonies, dated November 9.

Citizen Minister,—General Leclerc died on the night between the 1st and 2d November. In him the army has lost a father whose only care was to promote its happiness and glory. The colony has lost a Governor whose only ambition was to promote its prosperity. He called me to receive his last wishes, which I communicate with this letter. The army is in mourning for the loss of its General, and St. Domingo will for ever regret one who wished to ensure its happiness and tranquillity. —I have the honour, &c.—*Boyer.*

Head-Quarters at the Cape, Nov. 1, three o'Clock in the Morning.

P. Boyer, General of Brigade, certifies and attests, that General Leclerc caused him to be called into his presence, and ordered that a vessel should be dispatched to acquaint General Rochambeau, that he should succeed him (General Leclerc) as Captain-General, and also as Commander in Chief of the Army, &c. &c.—[Then follows a Journal sent by Peyre, Physician in Chief to the Army of St. Domingo, containing an account of the illness of General Leclerc, which terminated in his death.]

The General of Brigade, Chief of the Etat-Major of the Army of Saint Domingo, to the Minister of Marine and Colonies.

Citizen Minister,—In the month of June Toussaint Louverture was arrested and sent to France. The plots of that brigand being at an end, tranquillity was more than ever assured. The organization of the colony made every day a new progress, and the justest hopes promised to the unfortunate colonists, future prosperity, and seemed to announce the end of their evils. They approached the haven.—The disarming of the negroes, an essential operation, and the first basis of tranquillity, was pursued with as much activity as success.—Some slight insurrections broke out. A man of the name of Sans Souci, hitherto confounded amongst the negroes, assembled around him several unfortunate Congos, and endeavoured to set fire to the habitations. Pursued by the general who commanded in the northern part, he escaped into the most distant Mornes, and we heard no more of him.—The heat was, however, excessive; it became impossible to make any movement. The least elevated mornes presented to us obstacles proportioned to the inconveniencies of the temperature. The number of brigands increased. Our hospitals were filled with sick, and every day the sickness made new ravages. The brigands calculated its progress with a secret joy.—The insurrection reached the quarters of Marmalade, Dondon, and Moustique: our troops were every where, and fought with courage. The quarters were re-conquered, and a part of the brigands punished and disarmed.—In the latter end of August, Ch. Belair, an atrocious African, who had hitherto submitted to the republic, rose in insurrection on the heights of Artibonite. A party of the colonial troops, who had been in our pay, joined him. After different combats, the wretch was taken, with his horrible wife. A military commission condemned him to death on the 15th of October.—In the south, different partial insurrections equally obliged our troops to leave their quarters. General Desbureaux put the brigands to the route, and succeeded in re-establishing tranquillity.—The negro Domage revolted in the quarter of Jérémie, and burnt several habitations. This wretch was arrested, tried, and put to death.—The quarters of Leogane, Jacmel, and Bains, were also the theatre of different insurrections. Our troops every where quelled them, and the chiefs died the death of criminals.—Since then, the southern part has been tranquil. The Spanish part is defended by the white population rising *en masse*, and who have done ample justice to all the negroes who attempted to penetrate thither.—The northern part is a prey to the most dreadful disturbances. Dessalines, Clervaux, and Christophe are with the brigands. Their boldness increases with our weakness. Maurepas and a great number of the chiefs are arrested, and are on board the squadron.—In the beginning of November the general in chief, seeing the season a little improved, and impatient to repress a troop of those Africans who had taken a position before the Cape, in the plain of the north, ordered general Brunet to fall back upon him, resolving to disperse the brigands; but fate had decided otherwise. He fell sick in the latter end of October, and died on the 2d of November. —The army, witnesses of his solicitude, his constant labour, and indefatigable activity, wept for him as a chief and a father.—At the report of his death, the brigands advanced with dreadful cries; but the general of division Clausel, every where checked them.—On the 6th of November circumstances becoming more urgent, and the generals resolving not to wait any longer for general Rochambeau, a general attack took place. The enemy were every where repulsed and pursued: they evacuated the plains, and took refuge in the mornes.—We expect with impatience the 300 men, of which the 86th made part: we reckoned on their arrival in the latter end of September, and they have not yet appeared.—The sickness has made dreadful ravages; the oldest men never remember a year so sickly.—Some time before his death, General Leclerc transmitted sealed instructions for general Rochambeau, whom a vessel went in search of. General Watrin has set out to replace him. What was provided in the instructions has been punctually executed.—General Dugua, chief of the Etat-Major, died in the beginning of October, after a few days illness.—The ravages begin at length to diminish, although the season has been considerably delayed, and there has not been as much rain as we had reason to expect at this time of the year.—Health and respect,

(Signed) *Boyer.*

DOMESTIC.

Yesterday being the anniversary of the festival in honour of the birth of Her Majesty, who completed the 58th year of her age on the 19th of May last, the same was observed with the usual splendour and magnificence. The court was numerously attended.

From the London Gazette, Jan. 14, 1803. Whitehall, Jan. 7, 1803.—The King has been graciously pleased, in consideration of the signal and very distinguished services performed to his Majesty, and to his ally, the Ottoman Emperor, by Sir William Sidney Smith, Knight, Commander and

Grand Cross of the Royal Swedish Military Order of the Sword, a captain in the royal navy, and representative for the city of Rochester in the parliament of the United Kingdom; and to evince the sense which his Majesty entertains of the great ability and heroic perseverance manifested by him, the said Sir W. S. Smith, upon divers occasions, and more especially of his able and highly distinguished conduct in the defence of the town of St. John d'Acre, in Syria, in the year 1799, his royal licence and authority, that he may bear the following honourable augmentations to the armorial ensigns borne by his family, viz. on the Chevcron a Wreath of Laurel, accompanied by Two Crosses Calvary; and, on a Chief of Augmentation, the Interior of an ancient Fortification, in perspective; in the Angle a Breach; and, on the sides of the said Breach, the Standard of the Ottoman Empire, and the Union of Great Britain, as then displayed: and, for Crest, the Imperial Ottoman Chelengk, or Plume of Triumph, upon a Turban; in allusion to the highly honourable and distinguished Decoration transmitted by his said Imperial Majesty to Sir W. S. Smith, in testimony of his esteem, and in acknowledgment of his meritorious exertions in the aforesaid defence: and the family crest, viz. A Leopard's Head, collared and lined, issuant out of an Oriental Crown. The said arms and crests to be borne by him the said Sir W. S. Smith, and by his issue, together with the motto—"CŒUR DE LION." And, although the privilege of bearing supporters be limited to the peers of the realm, the knights of his Majesty's orders, and the proxies of princes of the blood royal at installations, except in such cases wherein, under particular circumstances, his Majesty has been pleased to grant his especial licence for the use thereof; yet, in order to give a further testimony of his Majesty's particular approbation of the services of the said Sir W. S. Smith, he has been graciously pleased to allow him to bear, for supporters to his arms, A Tiger guardant, navally crowned; in the Mouth a Palm Branch, being the symbol of Victory, supporting the Union Flag of Great Britain, with the inscription "JERUSALEM, 1799." upon the Cross of St. George; and A Lamb, mutally crowned; in the Mouth an Olive Branch, being the symbol of Peace, supporting the Banner of Jerusalem: the said armorial ensigns being first duly exemplified according to the laws of arms, and recorded in the Heralds' Office.—And also to order, that this his Majesty's said concession, and especial mark of his royal favour, be registered in his college of arms.

Limerick, Jan. 8.—Last week M. Apjohn, Esq. and Capt. R. Lloyd having received private intimation of a large quantity of iron being brought into the village of Pallis-green, in this county, they went in the dead of the night, on the 4th inst. to the forge of one Barkly, and observing 5 persons therein, broke in at the front door, and secured Thos. Tierney, the other 4 having escaped. In the forge was found a number of pikes quite hot. Tierney was committed to the county-gaol.—Some days past intelligence was received, that a rising would take. On Thursday last such information was received as rendered it the duty of the civil and military powers to take every precaution. Crowds of inhabitants with the Mayor and Sheriffs repaired to the Exchange, and remained under arms. The several corps of yeomanry, &c. with a squadron of the 9th Lt. Dragoons remained stationed at their posts. At 7 o'clock on the above night, a party of about 50 attacked the house of Lt. Col. Bourchier, at Kilrush, within 14 miles of this city. On breaking into the house, the first person they met to oppose them was a faithful servant whom the Col. had brought from the reg. This man they hacked in a barbarous manner. The Col. was that night at Limerick, and it appeared that he and his servant were their intended victims. Owing to the spirited conduct of Lt. M'Mahon, who happened to call that evening, Mrs. Bourchier and her children were protected from the brutal rage of the rebels. After entirely destroying the furniture of the house, windows, &c. taking all the fire arms with them, they broke open the stables, took thereout six horses. Only one of the rebels have been yet apprehended. They declared that there would be a general rising of their friends, on that night; on the hill of Knockgreany, and other rising grounds, lights were visible, supposed to be signals.

Bills of indictment have been found against *Despard* and his associates, thirteen in all, who will be tried on the 5th of February.

Bankrupts.—Hodges, T. Warehorn, dealer.—Brooks, J. Liverpool, porter-brewer.—Irvine, S. Manchester, manufacturer.—Higgins, J. and R. Birmingham, platers.—Epps, W. and J. Epsom Inn keepers.—Hughes, H. and M. Moorhouse, Manchester, dealers.—Pierson, T. and W. Sammen, Milk-street, Irish factors.—Castley, R. Doncaster, horse-dealer.—Watson, J. Lynn, druggist.—Sturges, J. Northampton, dealer.—Younghusband, R. Tower-hill, merchant.—Jones, H. Cowlane, cheesemonger.—Banks, C. York, bookseller.—Sutton, F. Liverpool, soap-boiler.

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THUR.
Bank Stock	187¼	—	186½	—	—	—
3 pr. C. R. An.	72	71	71⅛	—	71⅛	71¼
3 per C. Con.	—	71¼	70½	—	70½	70⅝
4 pr. C. Con.	87½	86⅜	86¼	—	86¼	86½
5 pr. Ct. Ann.	101⅝	101¾	101½	—	100½	100½
Bank L. Ann.	20 7/16	20¼	20⅜	—	20⅜	20⅜
D° S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	102⅜	99¾	99⅞	—	102¼	102⅛
Omnium	3½ dis	4 dis	3¼ dis	—	5 dis	4 dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36 10	2 us.	Leghorn		50
D°, at sight	35 8		Naples		41¼
Rotterdam	36 1	2 us.	Genoa		46
Hamburgh	34 3	2 us.	Venice, 51 livres piccole		
Altona	34 4	2 us.	effective per £. ster.		
Paris 1 day	24 8		Lisbon		67¾
Paris	24 12	2 us.	Oporto		68
Bourdeaux,	24 13		Dublin		12¾
Cadiz	35¼	eff.	Bilboa		35¼
Madrid	35½	effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.		

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat prq.	52s. to 60s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 220s
Rye	35 .. 38	Hay per load	80 .. 147
Barley	23 .. 27	Beef, per stone	4s. to 6s.
Malt	40 .. 45	Mutton	5s. 4d. to 6s 6d.
Oats	15 .. 22	Veal	6s. 6d. to 8s. 0d.
Pease (white)	30 .. 38	Pork	4s. 8d. to 6s. 0d.
Beans (horse)	33 .. 37	Tallow	4s. 6½d.
Flour per sack	44 .. 48	Av. of Sugar per cwt	36s. 9d.
Seconds	40 .. 44	Salt, per Bushel	13s. 10d.
Coals per chal.	53 .. 00	Bread 9½d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

We concluded our last Summary with an intimation of our design to attempt, in the course of our present number, a more detailed exposure of the fallacy of the Minister's financial statement than we then could find room for. To the brief hints accompanying that intimation, the Treasury have made a reply, which they have caused to be inserted (with

some trifling variation in the order and in the phraseology), in every paper, we believe, that is published in the cities of London and Westminster. How far this reply is calculated to answer the intended purpose, we shall, by and by, be able to judge; but, we cannot, for a moment, refrain from expressing our satisfaction, that the modest Mr. Addington has endeavoured to vindicate any part of his conduct, which, when we consider how high he stands in the opinion of Buonaparté, is an act of condescension, which this poor trodden-down nation had scarcely a right to expect at his hands.—The paragraph, which we before quoted from the demi-official paper of the Ministers we must repeat here, as being the text for our comments:—"We are *happy*," said the True Briton of the 12th instant, "to be "able to state, for the *satisfaction* of the Pub- "lic, that the surplus of the consolidated "fund, ending the 5th of January, 1803, "amounted to £.1,248,032 being an ex- "cess of £.399,329 in the three quarters, "beyond the £.4,500,000 *which was calcu- "lated as the amount of the surplus of the con- "solidated fund for the whole year, ending 5th "of April*, 1803."—The CONSOLIDATED FUND, is, as our readers must recollect, the aggregate produce of all the taxes, those of the Land and Malt excepted. A certain portion of this aggregate is constantly appropriated by parliament to the discharge of the interest of the national debt; and whatever sum that aggregate contains over and above the amount of the said interest, is called the *surplus* of the consolidated fund, and is, of course, reckoned amongst the ways and means for defraying the expenses of the year. When, therefore, parliament is called upon for the supplies to meet those expenses, it is the practice for them to vote a certain sum upon the credit of the consolidated fund, that is to say, a certain portion of the *surplus* arising from that fund; but, it will be readily conceived, that, in the amount of the sum thus voted, they always take care to keep very far within the amount, at which the whole of the surplus is estimated. Indeed, this is an invariable rule; and now we come, at once, to the application of these remarks, in the detection of a shameful falsehood, attempted to be imposed upon the Public in the above paragraph from the True Briton. The surplus of the two quarters up to the 5th of October was stated at 3,800,000l * the demi-official paper, adding thereto the surplus of the quarter ending on the 5th of January (1,248,032 l.) says, that it makes "an ex- "cess of 399,329 l. * in three quarters, "beyond the 4,500,000 l. which was *cal- "culated* as the amount of the surplus of the "consolidated fund for *the* WHOLE YEAR, "*ending 5th of April*, 1803." Now, the fact is, that there was a *vote* of 4,500,000l †. (in the manner above stated) upon the credit of the surplus to April next; but, the sum of 6,500,000 l. was "*calculated*" as the amount of that surplus; nay, the 6,500,000l. was not only "*calculated* as the amount of "the surplus;" but, it was taken as a calculation far *below* what the Chancellor of the Exchequer taught the parliament and the nation to rely on ‡. Thus, then, this paragraph, which could not possibly have reached the Public without the knowledge, nor, indeed, without the consent, of the treasury, contains a falsehood evidently intended, by a confusion of terms, of times, and of sums, to elude exposure and to prolong the delusion spread abroad by means of the consolatory budget.—Having fixed this point, we shall now proceed to an examination of the other statements of the paragraph.—Mr. Addington having, as we have already seen, stated the produce of the two quarters (we speak always of the *surplus*), ending on the 5th of October, at 3,800,000l. the average of which is, 1,900,000 l. it appeared to us by no means "*satisfactory*," that the quarter to the 5th of January should produce no more than 1,248,032 l. We knew, indeed (what has, since our last, been published, in explanation, by the treasury), that the dividends payable out of the consolidated fund, in July and January, exceeded those due in April and October, and, consequently, that the surplus of those former quarters must be less than that of the latter quarters; but, allowing half a million for this purpose, even then the quarter ending on the 5th of January will be found to have produced no more than £1,748,032. To know what proportion this bears to the produce of each of the two former quarters, we must first add to the £3,800,000, which was the aggregate surplus of those quarters, the £500,000 for additional dividends in July, and then we shall find, that, had it not been for those dividends, the average of the July and October quarters would have been £2,150,000, whereas the quarter ending on the 5th of July has produced, including £500,000 for additional dividends, no more than £1,748,032. Shall we be told, that the additional dividends are

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 778.

* There appears to be an error in the figures here: 1,248,032 l. added to 3,800,000 l. makes an excess of 548,032 l. But this is nothing to the argument.

† See Register, Vol. II. p. 778.

‡ See Register, Vol. II. p. 780.

higher in amount? This will act in a way that the Treasury are not aware of. But, for argument sake, put these additional dividends at a million in the July, and in the January, quarter; still there is a great defalcation, for the average produce of the July and October quarters would then be £2,400,000, while that of January would amount to only £2,248,032. The way, however, to place this contrast in a fair and strong light, is to suppose the January quarter to be, in every respect, equal to that of July; and, then we shall find, the surplus of the October quarter alone must have amounted to no less than £2,551,968, rather *more than double* the amount of the surplus for January.—Perceiving, therefore, that, whichever way the subject was turned, it still presented a rueful face of defalcation, the ingenious gentlemen at Whitehall fell upon a trick, which never had, as far as we know of, at least, before been played off. We shall give it in their own words, as published in the True Briton of the 18th inst. "It appearing that the statement of the "amount of the surplus of the Consolidated Fund, on the 5th of this month, has "been *misunderstood*, and considered as less "favourable than the Chancellor of the "Exchequer had given reason to the Public to expect;—we are *happy* to be able, "for the *satisfaction* of our readers, to explain a few circumstances attending it.—"The average surplus of the quarters ending in July and October last, having "amounted to £1,900,000, while that on "the 5th of January, amounted only to "£1,248,000, *it has been supposed*, that a "diminution has taken place in the revenue. The fact, however, is, that this "apparent defalcation *arises* SOLELY *from a "postponement of a payment of the customs, "proceeding from the unusual quantity of "sugar now bonded, and from a large sum "due from the East-India Company, the payment of which is suspended during the adjustment of an account between government "and that body.* These sums together, "amount to upwards of £800,000, which, "if paid in, would have made the produce "of the last quarter *considerably above* the "average of the two preceding.—It must "however, be observed, that the dividends, "payable in January and July, exceed "those due in April and October, by upwards of one million; and therefore that "the ordinary surplus of the Consolidated "Fund, in those quarters, is so much less. "—And that Mr. Addington only stated "his expectation of a surplus of six millions and a half, in the year ending January 5, 1804; a sum which has been "exceeded by the actual receipts of the "year ending January 5, 1803, which have "amounted to £6,750,000."—So! the defalcation first arises "*solely*" from a postponement of the payment of the customs, and, in the next sentence, great part of it arises from the additional amount of the dividends. We have before noticed the effects of this latter cause, which we shall have occasion to allude to again, in another view of the subject; but, as to "postponement of payment of the customs," we cannot, for one moment, allow it to have any weight at all, in proving that no defalcation has taken place in the produce of the quarter. There is a postponement at *every* quarter; there *must* be a postponement; part of the produce of one quarter *always* falls into the receipt of the succeeding one; and, were we to deduct that part of the produce of the October quarter, which fell into the receipt of the January quarter, the net proceeds of the surplus of the latter, instead of £1,248,032 would not have amounted to more than about £500,000. Again: Mr. Addington did, we are told, build his calculation, for the future, upon the produce of the three quarters ending on the 5th of October, 1802; but did he, in stating the amount of that produce, deduct any thing for the sum, which was *produced* in the quarter ending in January, 1802, but not *received* till the quarter ending April, 1802, and which sum was, we believe, much greater than that which is now said to be kept back by "postponement of the payment of customs?" No, no; he made no such deduction, nor will he, in his account of the produce of the present quarter, which will end in April, make any deduction for the sums which have grown due in the last quarter, and which will be received in this. The fact is, and it is a fact well known to every person at all acquainted with public accounts, that every quarter is estimated according to its *receipts* and not according to any thing else. There is no other certain way of coming at the state of the revenue. To admit of any other sort of proof would be to expose the Public to endless delusion. If a minister, when he finds a falling-off in one quarter, can throw the defalcation upon the preceding or succeeding quarter; if he can build his calculations sometimes upon the *produce* and sometimes upon the *receipt*, as it best suits his purpose; if he can thus shuffle his minus and his surplus backward and forward at his pleasure, there is an end of all check upon

him and of all reliance on his statements; the members of the House of Commons may sit and gape at him, like clowns round the stage of a mountebank, but as to information or profit, they can derive no more from his budgets, than the said clowns do usually derive from the lottery bag of the pompous itinerant doctor.—Rejecting, then, as our readers must, with the utmost disdain, this miserable trick, this shameful attempt to deceive them, this gross insult on their understanding, they will perceive, and, with us, will deeply lament, that there is a serious falling-off in the produce of the revenue. We do not say, that this falling-off will continue: we hope it will not: but, it is our duty to make known the truth, particularly in contradiction to falsehoods, which, if they were not invented for the express purpose of public deception, are, at any rate, calculated to produce that effect.—The next fallacy, which demands detection is this:—"Mr. Addington only "stated his expectation of a surplus of "£6,500,000 in the year ending the 5th "of January, 1804." This is another trick nearly upon a level with the last, whether we consider its intention or awkwardness.

SUPPLIES.	
Navy (2,439,378 less than this year)	£4,230,000
Army (2,300,000 less than this year)	5,200,000
Ordnance	800,000
Miscellaneous services of the United Kingdom	1,300,000
Total joint contribution	£11,530,000
Britain's separate charge for the B. proportion of the above sum	500,000
Total to be provided by Great Britain	£10,533,000
Balance, or clear surplus	1,062,000
Total	£11,595,000

WAYS AND MEANS.	
Land and malt tax	£2,750,000
Surplus consolidated fund, estimated according to the produce of the three quarters ending on the 5th of October, 1802	7,845,000
Lottery	500,000
Contribution of the E. Ind. company	500,000
Total	£11,595,000

Now, let the reader say, whether it be true, that "Mr. Addington only stated his "expectation of a surplus of £6,500,000 in "the whole year ending on the 5th of Ja-"nuary, 1804;" and let Mr. Addington's friends justify, if they can, this shameful attempt at imposition.—This, then, being the statement, which caused so much joy at the Exchange, and which led the sagacious statesmen of the old opposition to observe, that the minister had taken an eighteen years' lease of the Treasury Bench; this being the statement to which we are bidden to look for a proof of the blessings of the peace of Amiens, and on which we are taught to rely for protection against the intrigues and the power of France, it behoves us to examine a little into facts upon which it is founded, and to enquire how far it has been verified by the experience which we have already had.—And first, as to the foundation of the statement, we perceive, that it is the aggregate of the surplus for the three quarters ending on the 5th of October last, which aggregate amounted to £5,884,903. In order to make out an estimate for the future, the minister takes the average of these three quarters, which (casting away the parts of a thousand,) he finds to amount to, £1,961,000 and, adding it to the aggregate of the three other quarters, he has the surplus of four quarters, amounting, of course, to £7,845,000 according to the above consolatory statement of his ways and means. But, did it, or did it not, occur to this able financier, who has taken such a long lease of the Treasury Bench, that there were two quarters in every year, (July and January,) in which the di-

Yes, in the statement of the Ways and Means, Mr. Addington did, indeed, content himself with taking credit for £6,500,000 as the surplus of the Consolidated Fund for the year 1803; but, he did that by way of *superabundant precaution*, and by no means taught the public, "the *generous* PUBLIC," whom he has "the honour to *serve*," that they ought to reckon £6,500,000 as the utmost amount of that surplus. On the contrary, taking as a basis the aggregate surplus of the three quarters, ending on the 5th of October, 1802, which aggregate surplus he put at £5,884,903, he took the average of these three quarters as the amount of the fourth, and, casting out the hundreds, stated the total at £7,845,000 which he called the "surplus of the Con-"solidated Fund, estimated according to "the three quarters, ending on the 5th of "October, 1802." These are his very words, as will appear not only from our report of his budget-speech (Vol. II. p. 782), but from *his own* report of that famous specimen of financial bombast, as published, in a twelve-penny pamphlet, by Mr. Hatchard of Piccadilly. But, we think it fair to give his statement at length.

vidends, payable out of the consolidated fund, were much greater in amount, and in which the surplus was, of course, so much less in amount, than in the other two quarters? In other words, did it not occur to him, that there were *two high quarters* and *two low quarters* in every year, and that, out of the *three* quarters, from the aggregate surplus of which he drew his average, *two* were high quarters? Will he say, that the difference, occasioned by the variation in the amount of the dividends, is not great enough to be of any material importance in such an estimate? No; he will not say this, because some one will have the compassion to tell him, that, in that case, an alarming defalcation in the quarter which has just terminated, is irrefragibly established; and that, every penny which he deducts from the difference of surplus, occasioned by the variation in the amount of the dividends, must, of course, be added to the defalcation of the present January quarter. The exact amount of the difference (occasioned by the dividends) between a high and a low quarter, we have not, at present, an opportunity of ascertaining: the treasury paragraph above, extracted fron the True Briton of the 18th instant, states the difference at a million, or upwards; but, whether it means a million in the whole year, or a million in each of the two quarters, is not quite clearly expressed. If the difference be £500,000 in each of the two quarters, then the defalcation in the Jan. quarter is £401,965 and the total amount of the future surplus for the year (accruing to the average of the three quarters ending in Oct. 1802) would be £7,345,000. If the difference between a high quarter and a low one be £1,000,000 in each of the two quarters, then the defalcation in the January quarter is only £151,968 but, upon the same principle, Mr. Addington's surplus for the year (even according to his average of the three quarters ending in October 1802) would amount to no more than £6,845,000 instead of the £7,845,000 on which he has encouraged the nation to rely as a security, not only against the enemy, but also against new taxes and loans! Our readers will recollect, that, when the budget was brought forward, we expressed our fears, that the minister had been deceived; that, "as "something was certainly wanted by way "of set-off to the accumulation of disap- "pointment and disgrace in our foreign "affairs, something to weigh against 50,000 "seamen, and 130,000 soldiers, the dark "and intricate recesses of the Treasury, "might, perhaps, be regarded as the safest "scene wherein to hatch the pious fraud;" but, we, at the same time, fully acquitted the *minister* of any intention to deceive. We thought the materials of the budget had the appearance of being far fetched, and that its statements were purposely confused. We confess, however, that we could not have supposed, that any one would have put into the hands of the Prime Minister of Great Britain, a statement so fallacious as that, on which we have now thought it our duty to comment. What! when there are two high and two low quarters in the year, to take the aggregate of *both* the high ones and *one* of the low ones, in order to find *an average for the four!* Then again, to make, upon that average, an estimate of a surplus, and to hold forth that surplus as the foundation for the credit and security of the country! And, at last, to send this imposition out amongst the people under the sanction, in some sort, of the House of Commons, those watchful guardians of the public purse! What will the world say? What will the base world, who envy us our glorious constitution, say to all this? Will they not begin to suspect, that the House of Commons itself is not quite so well-informed and so vigilant as they ought to be? In short, who will, after this detection, ever again place confidence in the financial statements of the treasury?——It now remains for us to draw such a conclusion, respecting the future amount of the revenue, as appears to be warranted by the foregoing arguments and facts. —That the Chancellor of the Exchequer estimated the future annual surplus of the consolidated fund at £7,845,000 has been proved by a quotation of his own words and figures; but, that he should have estimated it much lower has also been proved; and to these proofs are added that of the surplus for the year ending on the 5th of Jan. which, according to the treasury statement above extracted from the True Briton, amounted to no more than £6,700,000 instead of £7,845,000 In this view of the subject, therefore, the receipt falls more than £1,000,000 short of Mr. Addington's estimate. But, if we ground an estimate for the future quarters upon the receipt of that ending on the 5th of Jan. the result will be still more unfavourable. The receipts of that quarter amounted to £1,248,032, and, of course, the receipt of four quarters would be £4,992,128; but, as Jan. is one of the two low quarters, we must suppose, that two of the other quarters in the year will be higher. How much is not exactly known. At the lowest £500,000 and at the highest, probably, £1,100,000. Taking, then, the average of these, which is £800,000 and adding it to each of the quarters, the estimated receipts of the whole year

will be £6.592,128 instead of £7,845,000; the result of all which is, that we may expect our future receipts to fall short of Mr. Addington's statement in the sum of £.1,252,872 per annum, even if our trade and commerce should continue at its present height.——If this be so, what becomes of the flattering estimate, which will be found in this sheet, p. 83? Where are we to look for the "*clear surplus*" of £.1,063,000 after defraying the expenses of the year? Will there not, on the contrary, be a *clear deficiency* of £187,872 a year, even supposing the public to undergo the very considerable *reduction*, which the Minister flatters us he shall be able to make? A reduction is *possible*; but who will say that it is probable? Who that looks at Europe; who that hears the language of France; who that sees her measures, in Louisiana and the Floridas, in the East Indies, in Egypt, in Holland, and opposite the mouth of the Thames; who that thinks of the fleet and of Ireland; who that hears, sees, and thinks of, all these objects, can possibly entertain a hope of a *diminution* in our naval and military expenses? Besides, there are some heavy items of miscellaneous services soon to be provided for: amongst others, a grant to the Stadtholder of (it is said) £.200,000. The sums for spoliation of American property will amount to about £.2,000,000 including the various expenses attendant thereon. The debts due to British subjects from the Americans, which debts have been abandoned by the government of this country, and which it will, of course, fall upon that government to make good, amount to about £.2,500,000 or £.3,000,000. The balance stated to be due to his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, is £.240,000. If, therefore, our readers are of opinion, with us, that *no great diminution* will take place in our naval or military establishment, even if the above enumerated miscellaneous services will demand *nothing at all*, in addition to those calculated on by the Minister, they must be convinced, that the interest of the public debt cannot be duly discharged without more *loans*, or without *new taxes*, to a very considerable amount.—We shall now dismiss the subject with observing, that, while we are sincerely persuaded of the fallacy of the conclusions, which we have controverted, only because we thought them fallacious and leading to deception, nobody will rejoice more sincerely than we shall, if time should prove, that we ourselves have been deceived. It has always been our opinion, that the great danger of this country arises from *a reluctance to look its situation in the face*, a feeling which it imbibed from a man, who, if he had followed the impulse of his own great mind, would never have been called "the Minister of existing circumstances." Nothing is so destructive to the spirit of a people as to lead them along blindfolded, from event to event, without giving them any general feeling, without holding out to them any common motive of action, without ever shewing them distinctly, what they have to hope, or what they have to fear. Such a people are always taken by surprise, and their conduct is generally what it is natural to expect in similar circumstances. To prepare our countrymen, as far as it is in our power, for the imposition of new taxes, is the object of these comments. Were Englishmen what we could wish them, then, indeed, such a preparation would be unnecessary; then would they think nothing hard, nothing burthensome, that contributed to the preservation of the freedom and the honour of their country.*

The affair of *Honduras* has taken a turn somewhat new, or has, in its developement, brought new circumstances, at least. It now appears, from a statement evidently drawn up and published by the authority of the parties concerned, that, by means of our arms, we had, *during the war, extended our limits at Honduras.* "Their extension, in-" deed," says the account to which we allude, "was become perfectly necessary, for "we had so cleared the country in our pos-"session of logwood, that any more which "we wanted to procure was got at so great "an expense, on account of its distance "from the coast, that it enhanced its cost "almost beyond what it would bear. This "being the case, and having, by right of "conquest, acquired such additional terri-"tory, and in such a favourable situation, "that we could not only cut, but transport "it down the rivers to the coast, at a com-"paratively trivial expense; it became an "object of the greatest importance to have "this additional acquisition secured in the "treaty of peace.—To this end, the mer-"chants at Honduras made the proper re-"presentations to their correspondents in "London, and, in consequence of this, a "deputation from the committee of the "principal merchants of London, trading to "Honduras, immediately after the prelimi-"naries of peace were signed, waited upon "Lord Hobart, one of his Majesty's prin-"cipal Secretaries of State, with a memo-"rial, representing their situation, and pray-"ing that it might not be lost sight of, but "receive every requisite confirmation in the "usual form. Another deputation of the same

* We had prepared some remarks on the state of the *commerce* and *navigation*, but these, which are at some length, must be deferred 'till our next.

" committee, waited also upon Lord Hawkes-
" bury, with another memorial to the same
" effect, while the definitive treaty was
" drawing up, and long before it was signed.
" The British ministry cannot, therefore,
" plead ignorance on this important subject."
—These Honduras merchants are very incorrect in their concluding remark; the British ministers, be it known to them, could plead *ignorance* after the memorial as well as before it: they can with truth and propriety, plead ignorance, at all times and in all matters, except where their own immediate interests are concerned. If a memorial had been delivered in about a house and land in Richmond Park, the modest and conscientious Mr. Addington would have read it over as often as a penitent counts his beads.—In our next we propose to insert the whole of the article published by the Honduras merchants; till then we shall, therefore, reserve what we have further to say upon the subject; but we cannot refrain from noticing here, the closing remarks of this publication:—" The case
" appears," say they, " to be so plain, that
" we see no reason why the cavils of
" France (we cannot call it Spain) should
" be treated with much deference.—We
" have the right, we have the power, and
" Buonaparté should be taught that he must
" not domineer when he has not the abi-
" lity to act. *There are fifty chicaneries of*
" *this sort in both the Indies, and the best way*
" *is to treat them in the beginning with con-*
" *tempt, and to resist them with vigour*—If
" ministers accept the establishment at
" Honduras on the old footing, they will
" shew much condescension. They ought
" to insist peremptorily on our right, and
" if they revert to the old footing, *they*
" *ought to obtain an equivalent. This tone*
" *would speedily bring the French and Spa-*
" *niards to reason.*"—There is nothing like *feeling* to bring people to their senses! These men of logwood gave their approbation to the peace, which produced the evils of which they now complain; or, at least, if they disapproved of it, they did not make their disapprobation known. Those who did not come forward *against* that disgraceful compact, were *for* it. In such a case there can be no real silence, or neutrality. We, therefore, pity not the men of logwood, and are only sorry that the injury is not confined to themselves. Nor, indeed, does the nation, generally speaking, deserve any compassion: it must suffer, it will suffer, and it *ought* to suffer, for its baseness in applauding the treaty of Amiens, and in silently submitting to the daily and hourly degradation brought on it by the ministry of Richmond Park.—The extension of our Honduras boundary *during the war*, and the *worthlessness* of what we " possessed of right," as Lord Hawkesbury phrased it, will form a very decent pretext for giving up the settlement altogether, which, our readers may be assured, will be the termination of the affair, and which, in conjunction with the laws, lately passed, in Spain, relative to the *wool* of that country, must prove materially injurious to a considerable branch of our manufactures.

In p. 75, we have inserted another libellous extract from the Official Gazette of France. That execrable gazette, which styles our sovereign the rewarder of assassins, has now revived the charge, against Mr. Windham and others, of having secretly fomented the troubles in France, for *the purpose of destroying the royalists*. Those amongst the royalists who yielded to the republicans are spoken well of, while GEN. GEORGES, who faithfully and gallantly persevered to the last, is styled the " *infamous*." Were we in the place of General Georges, we would most assuredly prosecute the venders of this libellous, this most base and detestable gazette.—In our next, we shall enter more at length upon the subjects of this extract, and shall, at present, content ourselves with a short remark or two on the *defence*, which a daily paper has had the goodness to make for Mr. Windham. In this defence the writer boldly asserts, that Mr. Windham *never wished to destroy the royalists*, and, in order to support this assertion, he states that that Rt. Hon. Gent. was a perfect *enthusiast* in the cause of those persons, and that this *wild* enthusiasm led him into many *indiscretions* with respect to them, and rendered him the *dupe* of all their exaggerated tales—The real object of a " *defence*" like this is easily perceived. The whole article is no more than a continuation of those malignant misrepresentations, by which the nation have so long been deceived, with regard to the character and conduct of Mr. Windham—We shall have another opportunity of examining Mr. Windham's conduct and opinion with respect to the royalists, and the royalist war; and, as to his " wild
" *enthusiasm*" and his " *indiscretions*," we call upon his " *defender*" to point out an instance, a *single instance*, of either. But, lest this officious " *defender*" should prove contumacious, as we are rather afraid he will, we think it right just to mention a few, " *indis-*
" *cretions*," in which, at least, Mr. Windham has had no part. Mr. Windham was not amongst those who, under the foolish name of *Parliamentary Reform*, sowed, through the kingdom, the seeds of discontent, treason,

rebellion, and bloodshed. He did not call for the *hands of the hangman* to destroy what a court of justice deemed to be perfectly innocent. He was no inventor of the *Board of Agriculture*; he sent no circular invitations to the grand juries *to clamour against tithes*, and to shake to their very basis, the sacred foundations of property. Mr. Windham, with all his "*wild enthusiasm*," never bragged of *marching to Paris*; he counselled not the *peace of Amiens*; he approved not of that disgraceful and ruinous compact; much less did he "rejoice at it, *because* it was *glorious to* "*France* and *to the First Consul*." Amongst the *discreet* persons, who went to Maidstone *to swear* that Arthur O'Connor's principles were *the same as their own*, the name of William Windham is not recorded; nor have either his former or his present conduct or opinions ever been cited as *justificatory* of men accused of high treason; accused of *compassing the death of the king!*—We could proceed much further in this way; but we keep something in reserve for a reply to some future "defence."

The intelligence from Constantinople, dated Dec. 8, states, that the Ottoman army in Egypt, has been defeated by the Beys. A part of the former were, it is said, made prisoners, and almost all the rest cut to pieces, very few having escaped, and those, it would appear, owed their preservation to the garrison of Cairo, who made a sally in order to save them. It is further stated, that the ammunition and provisions of the Turks fell into the hands of the Beys, who suspended their pursuit only at the solicitation of the English. This intelligence may, perhaps, be relied on; but, there is another report, coming from the same quarter, and through the same channel, on which we can place no reliance. It is this: that our Ministers have demanded, from the Porte, 36,000,000 of piastres (about £8,000,000 sterling) as a reimbursement of our expenses in re-conquering Egypt; and that, they have signified their intention of retaining the places, now in our possession, till they have received the sum so demanded.—We do not believe a word of this. The ministers who should make such a demand would deserve the severest and most ignominious punishment that a court of justice could inflict. Yet, dishonest, shamefully dishonest, as such an act would be, it would not, if we are to regard some of our diurnal politicians as being serious, want for an apologist. "The "*justice* of such a claim," says a morning paper, "*nobody can dispute.* It has been sanctioned by "*the example of France* with respect to *Holland* and "*Switzerland!!!*"—So! this is English honesty! This is the language of a public print in that country, which is represented as being "too honest" to have any connexion with the other powers of Europe! If, indeed, there exist any *agreement* between us and the Turks for such a reimbursement, that alters the case; but, if not, the claim is as unjust as it is impolitic. The *pretext*, at any rate, is the most contemptible and impudent that ever was invented; for, it is well known to the whole world, that the French expedition to Egypt was ultimately directed against us; and that it was combated purely *for our own sakes*, the Turks may appeal to all our declarations, in and out of parliament. The example of the French, too, as a *sanction*, is curious! We are, at last, openly recommended to attempt to rival the French in those acts of rapacity, against which we have, for ten years past been incessantly railing. Having been cheated ourselves, not from our too great honesty, but our excessive folly, we are told to try whether we cannot become cheats ourselves, and, *connoissant notre monde*, whether we cannot, in our turn, find others, whom we, too, can kick. Every thing, surely, like a litigious and vexatious demand upon the Turks, should be avoided, especially at this moment, when the French are, as appears by all the intelligence from that country, working day and night to eradicate the last remains of our influence in Turkey. Such a demand, made under such circumstances, would produce consequences, far outweighing the value of the piastres; yet, we are by no means certain, that the policy of the paper above quoted, would not, and will not be relished; for, your "*safe* "politicians" know of nothing otherwise than as it can be told out in money; what is it worth at market.—In the midst, however, of "the embar- "rassing circumstances and painful suspicions," respecting our situation relatively to the Turks, this paper finds a ground of *satisfaction* in the "exemplary" conduct of our troops, in Egypt; and, as a specimen of this conduct, it mentions, "the freedom from all religious *prejudice*, which "was shewn by their firing a salute on the festival "of MAHOMET." Now, what has afforded the Morning Post so much *satisfaction*, has, we must confess, had a different effect on us; and we cannot help regarding this salute as something a little like the ceremony of *trampling on the cross*, to which the Dutch used to submit in order to preserve the friendship of the Japanese. The Swiss protestants, in the service of France, though drawn up, on such occasions, with the French regiments, never used to salute at the elevation of the host. We like not this facility in giving up the signs of our faith: we would rather have given up the 36,000,000 of piastres. So different are our sentiments from those of the politician, on whose notions we have thought it necessary to comment.

NOTICES.

T. M. may be assured, that we have not overlooked the party invective, which the Ministers have made shift to obtain from the pen of the Poet Laureat, whose Ode we shall insert in our next, accompanied with such comments as it appears to call for. In the mean time T. M. will, we hope, do us the justice to believe, that we fully participate in the general indignation, which the beginning of the last stanza of that performance has excited.

☞ To his translation of "*L'Empire Germanique, réduit en Départements, sous la Préfecture de L'Electeur de* * * *," MR. COBBETT is now adding "*A Me-* "*moir on the Political and Military State of Europe*," by the same author, published some time ago.—These two tracts serve to elucidate each other, and, taken together, they form a most complete view of the recent events on the Continent, as well as of its present situation.—The Work will be ready for delivery on *Tuesday next*, and will be sold by *Mr. E. Harding*, 18, *Pall-Mall*. *Price* 2*s.* 6*d.*

LONDON,

TO WILLIAM WILBERFORCE, ESQ.

SIR,—Before I proceed to the remaining points of my proposed discussion, I think it necessary to notice a new project, in which you appear to have taken a leading part, and which has, in my opinion, a tendency extremely dangerous to the real freedom and happiness of the country. You will easily perceive, that I allude to your strange proposal for effecting a *compulsory* adoption of the new system of *inoculation*. At a meeting held by a Society, formed for the purpose of "exterminating the small-pox," held at the London Tavern on the 19th instant, you and a DR. CLARKE, are reported, in the public papers, to have expressed yourselves as follows:—"MR. WILBERFORCE "rose, and having questioned Dr. B. re- "specting *the prejudices* that still existed "against this new inoculation, observed, "that in his opinion the first step which the "meeting should take would be to form a "committee, and then to apply *to parliament* "for its *countenance* and *support*. He ob- "served, that it was a great national ques- "tion; and he was confident that a peti- "tion to parliament would find very pow- "erful succour; that it would call forth the "exertions of the lord lieutenants of coun- "ties, and the *magistrates* and parish offi- "cers; and through their means the whole "country would enjoy the benefit resulting "from this discovery."—"DR. CLARKE "followed much in the same strain; and "observed that he thought that in future *no* "*person ought to practice the old mode of inocu-* "*lation, except under very particular circum-* "*stances*, and *with the approbation of the civil* "*magistrate*, not that he wished to abridge "the *liberty* of the subject, or to countenance "the least interference of the state in matters "relating to life and health, but that no one "had a right to injure the community in the "exercise of that privilege."—Now, Sir, without entering into any inquiry as to the merits of DR. JENNER'S system of inoculation, give me leave to ask you, how you can reconcile a proposition like this to the spirit of that *constitution*, of which you profess to be so great an admirer, and to that *freedom*, of which you wish to be regarded as one of the principal supporters? That you agree with Dr Clarke, that *you* have in view *an Act of Parliament* to *compel* people to have their children inoculated with the Cow Pox, or not to have them inoculated at all, is, I think, evident enough, else why "apply to Parliament for countenance and *support?*" Parliament has *already given* that countenance and support, which, supposing the discovery to be a good one, it was proper for it to give. It has munificently rewarded Dr. Jenner for his labours, and for communicating their result to the nation at large; and, having so done, it has left his system to that encouragement and support, which it will be sure to meet with from successful experience. But, it seems, there are "*prejudices*" against this system, which it is necessary to destroy by force. Sir, that there are *prejudices*, and very strong ones too, I am ready to allow; and if I were to say, that these "prejudices" extend to a very great majority of even the medical men, in the kingdom, I believe, I should not be erroneous in my statement. But, I cannot agree, that these "prejudices" ought to be eradicated by *force*; nor is it, perhaps, very fair to use this degrading term, as expressive of the dislike, which so large a portion of the community entertain to the system, which you are so anxious to compel them to adopt. The charge of "prejudice," Sir, has been preferred but too often and with but too fatal success, against every one opposed to *change*. How many millions of times has it been brought against the monarchists of France, and, in England, against the opposers of parliamentary reform? The truth is, that whoever has been found to object to innovation, however wild in itself, however destructive in its consequences, has constantly been accused of "prejudice;" and, as prejudice, thus used, implies a mixture of *ignorance* and *perverseness*, and, as few persons are willing to be thought ignorant and perverse, the dread of this imputation has most powerfully contributed towards the success of that system of plunder, of bloodshed, and of blasphemy, which has, for the last ten years, overwhelmed the nations of Europe. But, why need I travel so far in search of facts to illustrate and establish my argument, when your society itself has fur-

nished me with such excellent materials? There was, as you must well remember, Sir, a strong and very general objection, which, for a long time, prevailed against the *old* system of inoculation; and you cannot have forgotten, that this objection was termed "*prejudice*," and the persons entertaining it were regarded as *illiterate*, *ignorant*, or *perverse*; yet, it now appears from the address of your society to the public, that it would have been well for the human race, if the "prejudice" of those "illiterate, ignorant, or perverse" persons had universally obtained; for you now tell us, that "inoculation, by spreading the "contagion, has considerably *increased* its "mortality." With an example like this before our eyes, Sir, ought we not to be very cautious how we adopt a new system of inoculation?—But, it is not to the endeavours of your *society* that I object. Those endeavours seem to be directed to the mere *encouragement* of a system, of the good effects of which they are fully persuaded. In their resolutions and addresses, they propose no *force*. So far all may be right. What I am opposed to, what I am alarmed at, is the proposition of you and Dr. Clarke, to obtain for the support of the system, *an Act of Parliament*, which would, in its operation, be nothing short of a *compulsion* on every man to suffer the veins of his child to be impregnated with the disease of a beast, or, to expose its life to the utmost violence of the most furious and most fatal of all human contagions—a measure to be adopted in no country where the people are not vassals or slaves.—I like not this never-ending recurrence to Acts of Parliament. Something must be left, and something *ought* to be left, to the sense and reason and morality and religion of the people. There are, as I observed on a former occasion, a set of "*well-meaning* men" in this country, who would pass laws for the regulating and restraining of every feeling of the human breast, and every motion of the human frame: they would bind us down, hair by hair, as the Liliputians did Gulliver, 'till anon, when we awoke from our sleep, we should wonder by whom we had been enslaved. But, I trust, Sir, that the Parliament is not, and never will be, so far under the influence of these minute and meddling politicians, as to be induced to pass laws for taking out of a man's hands the management of his household, the choice of his physician, and the care of the health of his children; for, under this sort of domiciliary thraldom, to talk of the liberty of the country would be the most cruel mockery wherewith an humble and subjected people was ever insulted.

From this digression I now return to the points of discussion proposed in my former letter, p. 33.

2. *The persecution of Mr. Reeves* is intimately connected with your dangerous, and fortunately, abortive projects of *Parliamentary Reform*. Those projects led, as I have already shown, to the formation of the seditious and treasonable societies and combinations, with which the nation was agitated, during the former years of the war; and, it is well known, that Mr. Reeves invented, and placed himself at the head of those "LOYAL ASSOCIATIONS," which, as Mr. Dundas (now Lord Viscount Melville), truly and manfully stated, "did the coun-"try infinite good," and which associations never would have been necessary, had it not been for those principles of Parliamentary Reform, on which the seditious and treasonable societies were founded. Mr. Reeves having, with the aid of his loyal associates, roused the country to a sense of its danger from internal commotion; having created a power, and, at that time, the only power, capable of counteracting the hostile power already in motion; having succeeded, in checking and even in subduing the combinations against which his efforts were immediately directed; having thus arrested the progress of the mortification, which was fast approaching the very heart of the monarchy, and having perceived the cause from whence the danger had arisen, he next began the process of a radical cure, without which he wisely concluded, that dangers similar to that which had just subsided, must inevitably return. With this view he published a "LETTER," which he very properly addressed to the "*Quiet good sense of the people of England*," in which letter he discussed the nature, the principles, the form, the operation, and the effects, of the English government. In the course of this discussion, and in his description of the constituent parts of the government, he made use of the following words: —"The kingly government may go on, in "all its functions, without Lords or Com-"mons." * This, though only a *part of a*

* If only the *whole sentence* had been taken, the sense of the whole would have instantly appeared to be perfectly harmless.—"The kingly govern-"ment may go on, in all its functions, without "Lords or Commons: it has heretofore done so "for years together, and, in our times, it does so "during every *recess* of Parliament; but, without "the King, his Parliament is no more."—But, notwithstanding the scandalous garbling which this sentence underwent, notwithstanding the manifest, the crying injustice of culling out a single

paragraph, and even of *a sentence*, and though abundantly guarded and qualified by the context, was alleged, by some persons in the then Parliament, of whom Messrs. Sturt, Sheridan and yourself were at the head, to be a " malicious, scandalous, and seditious " libel, containing matter tending to create " jealousies and divisions amongst his Ma- " jesty's loyal subjects; to alienate their af- " fections from our happy form of govern- " ment, as established in Kings, Lords, and " Commons, and to subvert the true prin- " ciples of our free constitution; and a high " breach of the privileges of the House." These were the words of the motion, which was made by Mr. Sheridan, which was supported by you, and which, with the memorable and honourable exception of *Mr. Windham* and *Sir William Dolben*, was unanimously adopted by the then House of Commons, on the 26th of November, 1795. —The House having legally ascertained, that Mr. Reeves was the author, or, at least, the publisher, of the letter, Mr. Sheridan (on the 14th of Dec. 1795), after professing his wish " to set an example of *lenity* and " *mercy*," and suggesting the propriety of " *removing Mr. Reeves from any place of* " *trust*," concluded with the following motion:—" That one of the said printed " books" (the letter) " be burnt by the " hands of the common hangman, in New " Palace Yard, Westminster, on Monday " the 21st day of this instant December, at " one of the clock in the afternoon; and " that another of the said printed books be " burnt by the hands of the common hang- " man before the Royal Exchange in Lon- " don, on Tuesday the 22d day of this in- " stant December, at the same hour; and " the Sheriffs of London and Middlesex do " attend at the said time and places respec- " tively, and cause the same to be burnt " there accordingly."—To this *lenient* and *merciful* motion an amendment was proposed by Mr. Dundas, and finally carried, leaving out the whole except the word " that," and substituting an address to his Majesty to cause Mr. Reeves to be *prosecuted* for the alledged libel. Mr. Dundas, who was not in the House when the former motion passed, behaved, on this occasion, in a manner that did him infinite credit. He boldly stated the motives, which had induced the opposition to make this attack upon Mr. Reeves, and severely reprobated the attempt now made to render the House at once party, prosecutor, and judge. Lord Sheffield said, that he saw " one " set of men, instead of prosecuting a libel " against the constitution, meant to *perse-* " *cute* a man whom they considered as hav- " ing *counteracted their views*; and, on the " other side, a desire to *shrink from and with-* " *hold the common protection* due to a man, " whom it was evidently intended to op- " press, although they did not consider him " as guilty."—In consequence of Mr. Dundas's amendment, a prosecution was commenced against Mr. Reeves, whose letter a court and jury determined *not to be a libel*, and it has, accordingly, been republished, and is now to be purchased in every book-shop in London.

Before I remark, Sir, on the part which you took in this persecution, I think it necessary to advert to one of the circumstances, under which the matter was brought forward. It was ushered into the House of Commons, and contended for the precedence, with a defence of Citizen Lee, made by Mr. Sturt, Mr. Grey, and others, but particularly by Mr. Grey. Now, Sir, this Citizen Lee, having escaped from the hands of justice in England, came to the city where I lived at that time (Philadelphia), and where, in order, I suppose, to furnish an illustration of Mr. Grey's defence of him, he hung out at the door of the house where he lodged, absolutely out in the street, a large printed paper, for the purpose of collecting subscriptions to a work, which he proposed to put to press under the patronage of the citizens

member of a sentence, for the purpose of prosecution, the base news-printers of London refused the friends of Mr. Reeves to insert in their papers, not a justification, but an explanation of the passage which had been quoted from his letter! There was an absolute league of these printers, and Heriot in particular, who was at the head of the Treasury, whose very types had been purchased out of the public money, refused to insert in his paper the *entire sentence*, though accompanied with no comment at all!—And these are the blessings of the *British press!* This is the "*birthright of Britons*," the "*palladium of free men!*" Beshrew me but it glads my heart to see that Buonaparté has taken hold of it! He will, if I am not much deceived, amply avenge the cause of Mr. Reeves and of all the other loyal men, whom this press has uniformly defamed. There is a long account to settle with it in behalf of the American, the French, and the Irish loyalists; a long arrear of punishment due for fomenting and feeding the several rebellions, the success of which, has finally raised up a man capable of inflicting on it a suitable chastisement.—The House of Commons too! What will they say to the insolent publications of the Moniteur, which are circulated through every part of the kingdom, and the *translations* of which are also sold with as little apprehension as a man would sell a bible? Will the House of Commons look over this? Can they possibly wink at a publication, in which laws are dictated to them, in which it is, in so many words, proposed to sew up their mouths for two years, to "*punish their tongues*," if they use those tongues too freely! Will not Mr. Sheridan make a motion to have this malicious libel burnt by the hands of the common hangman, though it comes from the press of the French gov.

of Philadelphia, entitled, "A HISTORY OF "THE CRIMES OF THE TYRANT GEORGE "GUELPH, COMMONLY CALLED KING OF "GREAT BRITAIN," to which proposals he found, in a city containing sixty thousand souls, but *five* persons infamous enough to put their names; and, in consequence of this hopeful debut, the citizen was, in a very short time, hooted out of Philadelphia, and soon after took up his quarters in the jail of New York.—Such was one of the execrable villains, who were *defended* by the persecutors of Mr. Reeves!

But, Sir, from the defenders of Citizen Lee, Mr. Reeves had to expect persecution: not so from *you*, whose former dangerous errors he was endeavouring to eradicate from the minds of the deluded people, and who now professed to be engaged in the same cause with himself; yet, I have every reason to believe, that it was you whose advice determined Mr. Pitt to abandon and to sacrifice him. At any rate, your name appeared amongst the foremost of those, who demanded punishment on his head, and who replied, or *attempted* to reply, to Mr. Windham's defence of the publication. "We "are now," said you, "endeavouring to "check *seditious* and *libellous* publications of "an *opposite* tendency; it, therefore, becomes "us, in order to vindicate ourselves from "the charge of injustice and *partiality*, when "publications of a seditious nature are un-"der contemplation, to take proper notice "of the *insidious* pamphlet now before us."* And this was the ground on which you voted for the prosecution! These are your notions of justice! These are the notions of a "well-meaning," a "conscientious," man! Of a man who, on all convenient occasions, prefers his claim to a monopoly of upright and conscientious motives, and also of political prudence!—What, I pray you, Sir, had Mr. Reeves's pamphlet to do with those "seditious and libellous publications of an "*opposite* tendency," which it was in the contemplation of the House to prevent? Because it had become necessary to pass two Acts for the punishing of *treason* and *sedition*, was it, "*therefore*," necessary to punish *loyalty*? because Horne Tooke, and Hardy, the shoemaker, had so far acted upon the principles of Parliamentary Reform as to endanger the existence of the state; because it had become necessary in 1795, to punish, as seditious libels (which they really were), publications, which the Reformers had issued, with impunity, in 1782 and 1784; because it had become necessary to punish those unlawful, inflammatory, mischievous publications, tending immediately to a radical revolution, to the complete destruction of the parliament, the monarch, and the monarchy; because it had become just and necessary to punish publications like these, was it, "*therefore*," just and necessary to punish a publication of an "*opposite* tendency," a publication full of loyalty, and containing not a single sentiment which was not, and which is not, strictly conformable to the law of the land, and to the doctrines of the Church? How came it "*conscientious*," I pray you, to pursue, to harass, to punish Mr. Reeves, for the sake of vindicating yourself "from the "charge of *injustice* and *partiality*" with respect to another matter, in which Mr. Reeves had no concern? It must be confessed that, at a time when two Acts, two Acts extremely necessary, but containing provisions theretofore unknown to the laws of this country; it must be confessed, that, while Acts like these were passing through the House, and while it was well known that the disgraceful and fatal cause of them sprang from the principles of the Parliamentary reformers, it was very natural for those reformers to seek for some sacrifice wherewith to appease the clamours of their ancient associates, some sop wherewith to stop the mouth of the discarded Cerberus, or, to repeat your own words, some opportunity of "vindicating yourselves from the "charge of *injustice* and *partiality*;" but, would not justice have suggested another sort of sacrifice than that which was fixed on? Would it not have called on you and Mr. Pitt and Mr. Beaufoy for a manly acknowledgment of your errors; for an explicit retraction of the dangerous principles, of which, through youth and inexperience, you had contributed to the propagation; for an expression of deep repentance for the past, and a promise of being more prudent for the future? Such conduct would have indicated true greatness of mind, and such, I hope, would have been the conduct of Mr. Pitt, had he not in this, as in too many other cases, yielded to your advice.

The evil consequences of the abandoning and the persecuting of Mr. Reeves, both with respect to the parties and to the nation at large, have been much greater than you would be ready to acknowledge, or, perhaps, than you really are aware of; for, not to be able to penetrate beneath the surface of events does, indeed, appear to be an indispensable requisite in a "*safe* politician."—At the time when the persecution took place, I was very well situated for forming a tolerably correct opinion as to the effect, which it produced in the world. I had an opportunity of knowing the sentiments, on this subject, of the officers of the executive government in America, of the members of

* Debrett's Parl. Rpts. vol. 43, p. 421.

the legislature, and, in one way or other, of nearly all the highest and best informed men in that country, and I do solemnly declare, that I never heard the persecution of Mr. Reeves spoken of but with the utmost indignation, or contempt, of the parties by whom it was urged. One gentleman in particular I knew, at whose table Mr. Pitt had, for many years, constantly been the first toast, and who, after reading the debate, to which I have above alluded, not only discontinued this mark of his respect, but who actually new-named a country seat, which, in his enthusiastic admiration of the English minister, he had called *Pittshill*.—With respect to myself, the impression which was produced by the reading of that debate is never to be effaced. I had but just then entered on the career of politics. I had published only two or three of my pamphlets. Full as I was of admiration of Mr. Pitt, ardent as was my zeal in defence of his measures and his character, I leave you to guess, Sir, at my feelings upon hearing of the treatment of Mr. Reeves, of the *abandoning* and the *persecuting* of the founder of the LOYAL ASSOCIATIONS! It operated, on the powers of my mind, like one of those shocks that hurries the blood back again to the heart! "Ah, ah!" said I, "is it thus that *loyalty* "is rewarded in England? Is it thus that "Mr. Pitt supports those who support "him? If so, it is better to leave loyalty "and Mr. Pitt to support themselves."—Unable, however, to resist the desire of opposing the enemies of my country, I continued those labours which had already been attended with no inconsiderable degree of success; but, at the same time, I made a solemn resolution never to expose myself to the ingratitude experienced by Mr. Reeves.

Now, Sir, though you may ask, with a sneer, *what harm did all this do to Mr. Pitt?* it amounts, at least, to a strong corroborative proof, not only of the injustice towards Mr. Reeves, but of the *evil consequences* of that injustice. We Philadelphians knew nothing of the persecuted gentleman. None of us ever expected to see him. We were strongly prepossessed in favour of every thing said and done by Mr. Pitt. And yet, I can truly declare, that this transaction did, in America, at least, more injury to the character of Mr. Pitt than any other act of his administration, not excepting those acts which were regarded as hostile, and which certainly were highly injurious to that country. And, observe, Sir, that America was the only foreign nation where the real merits of the case could possibly be well understood. There our language is spoken; there our laws prevail; there the people had been accustomed minutely to discuss the principles of the British government; and, there, with a loud and unanimous voice, the persecution of Mr. Reeves was condemned. If you tell me, that, in spite of this condemnation; in spite of the distrust, which the abandoning Mr. Reeves may have excited both at home and abroad, in the breasts of both writers and statesmen; if you tell me, that, in spite of all these, and of whatever other evils I can attribute to the adoption of your advice, Mr. Pitt is still a great man, and that, come to Parliament when he will, a majority is still in his favour; if you tell me this, I beg leave to remind you, that a minister may preserve *his own power* unimpaired, while *that of his country* is crumbling into dust; and that, a majority in Parliament will not, when the hour arrives, parry the balls of Buonaparté. Amidst all the heinous and innumerable crimes of the French revolutionists, they have rigidly and uniformly observed that most essential national virtue, *fidelity to their adherents*; and that we have neglected this virtue is, unfortunately, but too notorious. France has constantly protected the rebels of other countries who joined her standard, while we have, on all pressing occasions, as constantly abandoned the royalists fighting under ours:—France has exalted the rank and extended the dominions of the princes who espoused her cause, while those who relied upon the protection of England have lost both their territories and their rank:—France has undertaken a new war for the sake of her partizans in Switzerland; England, rather than delay the conclusion of peace for an hour, basely abandoned the Royalists of La Vendée:—France demanded, and obtained, the release of a British subject, condemned for high treason by a British court of justice; England abandoned and persecuted the founder of her loyal associations:—France is the mistress of the world, and England is ready to crouch at her feet.—Such, Sir, has been the course, and such the consequences, of that "*safe*" system of policy, which you and other "*prudent*" men imposed upon Mr. Pitt, which met with an ample exemplification in the abandoning and persecuting of Mr. Reeves, and which, unless it be rooted out of the heart and the mind of the government, must and will inevitably lead to the destruction of the monarchy and the subjugation of the people.—I have the honour to be, Sir, yours, &c.

London, 25th Jan. 1803. WM. COBBETT.

Ode for the New Year, 1803, by H. J. Pye, Esq. Poet Laureat.

Though the tempestuous winds no more
The main with angry pinions sweep,

Though raging 'gainst the sounding shore
No longer howl the impetuous seas;
But soothed to rest, the billows sleep,
Save where soft Zephyr's tepid breeze
Fans with its silken wing the rippling deep;
Yet still with unremitting eye
The *pilot* marks the uncertain sky,
The seaman watches still the gale,
Prompt or to spread or furl the sail,
Mindful of many a danger past,
Tost by the turbid wave, check'd by the adverse blast.

II.

Not keen Suspicion's jealous glance,
Not fierce Contention's feverish rage,
Shall bid Britannia point the lance
New Realms to grasp, new Wars to wage.
In conscious rectitude elate,
In conscious power securely great,
While she beholds the dang'rous tide
Of battle's crimson wave subside,
Though firm she stands in act to dare
The storms of renovated War,
Her ready sword, her lifted shield,
Provoke not the ensanguin'd field,
More than the wary *pilot's* cautions urge
The wind's tempestuous strife, or swell the foaming surge.

III.

O from our Shores be *exiled* far
Ambition's wilful and restless crew,
Who through the bleeding paths of *War*
False Glory's dæmon-form pursue,
Whose burning *thirst*, still unsubdu'd
By *deluges of guiltless blood*,
Glares on the regions round *with fiend-like eyes*,
While scarce a vanquish'd world its wish supplies;
Yet ne'er may Sloth's inglorious charm
Unnerve the manly Briton's arm,
Nor Sophistry's insidious art
E'er lull the manly Briton's heart.
May Peace, with Plenty by her side,
Long, long o'er Albion's fields preside;
Long may her breath, with placid gale,
O'er Commerce swell the happy sail;
But roused in Justice's sacred cause,
Insulted rights or violated laws,
Still may her sons with fierce delight
Flame in the gleamy van of fight,
Spread o'er the tented plain, or brave
With warlike prow the hostile wave;
And on each firm ingenuous breast
Be this eternal truth impress'd,
Peace only sheds perennial joys on those
Who guard with dauntless arm the blessings Peace bestows.

We have inserted the above ode for the purpose of shewing our readers to what an excess of party malignity your "*modest*, "*well-meaning*, *conscientious*" men will sometimes go. The reader will at once perceive, that Mr. Pye has been ordered to put into rhyme the creed of the "*safe* politicians;" and, it must be confessed, that his version is perfectly correct, though part of it is little more than a paraphrase of a passage in the Moniteur, as will, we trust, clearly appear from the following comparative view:

POET LAUREAT.	MONITEUR.
O from our shores be *exil'd far* ambition's wild	The *war faction* of England, Lord Grenville,

and *restless crew*, who through the *bleeding paths of war* false glory's *dæmon-form* pursue, whose burning thirst, *still unsubdu'd by deluges of guiltless blood*, glares on the regions round with *fiend-like* eyes, while scarce a vanquish'd world their wish supplies. — Yet ne'er may sloth's inglorious charm unnerve the manly Briton's arm, &c.

Lord Minto, and Mr. Windham, have nothing left but their remorse, which *pursues* them, *torments* them, and gives to all their speeches that *furious* tone which reveals the state of their minds. *Trouble, disorder*, and *blood* can alone relieve them; they wish for *trouble, disorder*, and *blood*. Their speeches are those which the celebrated Milton has put into the mouth of *Satan*.

It is impossible not to perceive here an exact coincidence of sentiment between the ode of his Majesty's poet laureat, and the columns of that infamous gazette, in which his Majesty has been styled *a rewarder of assassins*. Mr. Pye has been made (for we never can suppose it a voluntary act) to add his mite to the united exertions of the ministry and the old opposition, and the chief object of which exertions is *to lull the nation to sleep*, an enterprize for which, as appears from the very circumstantial relation of a celebrated modern critic, the Laureat, is wonderfully gifted.—"Mr. Pye," says the author of the Pursuits of Literature, "with "the best intentions, if not with the very "best poetry, translated the verses of "Tyrtæus the Spartan. They were de- "signed to produce *animation* throughout "the kingdom, and amongst the militia in "particular. Several of the reviewing ge- "nerals were much impressed with their "*weight* and importance; and, at a board "of general officers, an experiment was "agreed upon, which unfortunately failed. "They were read aloud at Warley Com- "mon, and at Barham Downs, by the ad- "jutants, at the head of five different regi- "ments, at each camp, and much was ex- "pected. But before they were half finish- "ed, all the front ranks, and as many of the "others as were within hearing or verse "shot, dropped their arms suddenly, and "were *all found fast asleep!* Marquis Towns- "hend, who never approved of the scheme, "said, with his usual pleasantry, that the "first of all poets observed, that, "*sleep is* "*the brother of death*."—Remembering this curious fact, and fearing that the nation might be roused by the exertions of the "new opposition," the Richmond Park ministry seem to have put Mr. Pye's soporifick powers in a state of requisition; and, if we are not misinformed, the zeal with which they have been exerted on this occasion, is to obtain the laureat the honour of a place in Mr. Gillray's excellent caricature, called "BRITANNIA'S LULLABY," of which the

principal personage is, Mr. Addington in the character of an *old woman*.

A HINT TO "THE FAMILY."

SIR,—Give me leave through the channel of your paper, which I know will not escape the notice of our safe and prudent ministers, to recommend to their attention a project which a late measure of theirs has suggested;—namely, the appointment of a board of commissioners for executing the offices of the Lord Chancellor and of the Judges, (they still retaining their rank and emoluments) with new and suitable powers, and the commissioners to consist of the friends of *the family* solely, with Mr. Hiley Addington, decorated with a peerage, at their head, only to save appearances, it may be proper to have one eminent lawyer amongst them.—I am sure the utility of this project must be obvious to you, Mr. Cobbett, and therefore, shall not enter at large into my reasons in support of it: one circumstance, however, I cannot allow to escape me, it will render any communication with the present Lord Chancellor in a great degree unnecessary to his wise brother chancellor, and consequently prevent the measures of the latter being crossed in the House of Lords, as on certain late occasions.—It will be proper to allow Mr. Hiley Addington, as first commissioner, an annual salary of at least £20,000, and I recommend this in preference to applying to a parliament for a remuneration, because it being barely possible that the people of this country may be roused from their present lethargy to a just sense of the obligations they owe *the family*, it may not be quite prudent to trust to a future parliament for a suitable provision for so respectable a member of it.—Perhaps, several strong objections may be urged by the gentlemen of the law, as well as others, to my plan; but I profess, that after the most serious consideration, I can find none more weighty than these which have been made against a late bill, and so satisfactorily answered by the friends of *the family*.—For myself, Mr. Cobbett, unless I see in the True Briton or Sun, of which you need not doubt I am a constant reader, an advertisement calling me to take upon myself the office of secretary to the New Board, I shall, if my scheme be adopted, content myself with reflecting on the good I have done my country, and the proof I have given of my attachment to *the family*.—How far the appointment of a like commission to take care of the affairs of the church may be proper, I leave to wiser heads to determine, and as to the other learned profession I will by no means touch on that, lest I should be supposed to make any particular allusion to the first great man of *the family*. I remain, &c. &c.

Prescot, 22d Jan. 1803. MARCUS.

HONDURAS.

The following paper has been some few days in print, and is understood to come from the parties, who are more immediately interested in the trade to Honduras.

The report of a difference between this government and the court of Spain, on the subject of the British establishments at Honduras, is now very generally credited.—Colonel Barrow, who is now gone out to take the command of the British settlement at Honduras, is the same officer who, in the year 1798, with Captain Moss, of the Navy, since dead, repelled a very formidable attack of the Spaniards under General O'Neil, consisting of a numerous land force, and a flotilla of boats. But this armament was compelled to retreat with considerable loss. In consequence of this success, the British boundaries were considerably extended; their extension, indeed, was perfectly necessary, for we had so cleared the country in our possession of logwood, that any more which we wanted to procure was got at so great an expense, on account of its distance from the coast, that it enhanced its cost almost beyond what it would bear. This being the case, and having, by right of conquest, acquired such additional territory, and in such a favourable situation, that we could not only cut, but transport it down the rivers to the coast, at a comparatively trivial expense; it became an object of the greatest importance to have this additional acquisition secured in the treaty of peace.—To this end, the merchants at Honduras made the proper representations to their correspondents in London, and, in consequence of this, a deputation from the committee of the principal merchants of London, trading to Honduras, immediately after the preliminaries of peace were signed, waited upon Lord Hobart, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, with a memorial, representing their situation, and praying that it might not be lost sight of, but receive every requisite confirmation in the usual form. Another deputation of the same committee, waited also upon Lord Hawkesbury, with another memorial to the same effect, while the definitive treaty was drawing up, and long before it was signed. The British ministry cannot, therefore, plead ignorance on this important subject.—It is unfortunate, perhaps, that nothing was stipulated upon this subject in the treaty of Amiens. We do not mean, that by the omission or by the general abrogation of former treaties, our right to cut logwood in the Bay of Honduras is cancelled.—But negotiating with parties who were extremely likely to cavil, it would have been wise to anticipate, as far as possible, every ground of dispute. The French negotiated throughout, as Lord Bolingbroke says of them, during the negotiation of the peace of Utrecht, "like pedlars, or, what is worse, like attornies." It was necessary, therefore, to bind them down like pettifoggers, who wished to take advantage of every flaw.—But, regretting that these precautions were not employed, we assert, with confidence, that the pretensions of the Spaniards to molest our "establishment" at Honduras, are most captious and unwarrantable. It is true, that in treaties of peace, as in all other positive contracts, obligations not specified are not to be easily presumed. But treaties that have once existed, though not perpetual in all their stipulations, have, and ought to have, permanent consequences. The state of possession in Europe

is, in a thousand ways, the effect of cessions, exchanges introduced by treaties no longer in force. The very act of a new treaty, between states at least, ratifies and confirms the state of possession in things not altered. It is only the new cessions, the new state of possession, that becomes the subject of convention. Trinidad is ceded by Spain, by the treaty of Amiens. Our rights to cut wood, &c. in the Bay of Honduras, a thing of less value, perhaps, than the island ceded, are not mentioned, but are they, therefore, given up? Had Spain deprived us of that possession during the war, and if no stipulation had been made in the treaty of Amiens for restoring it, there might have been some pretext for supposing that the right was wholly extinguished. But this was not the case. We continued in full possession of every thing we had previously enjoyed. That possession, such as it existed, is, confirmed, not abrogated, by the new t. of peace. Our rights to cut logwood in the B. of H. therefore, stand just where they did. This principle is so clear, that it is scarcely necessary to quote any authority for it. "The non-renewal of treaties," says Mably, "gives no right to reclaim a domain which has been ceded; for," says he, "the treaty subsequent to that which is not renewed, establishes the respective and actual state of the contracting parties; and it would be a violation of that treaty to attempt to enter upon the possessions ceded by a preceding treaty, under pretence that it is no longer binding." The rule applies equally to such a right as we formerly enjoyed, as to a right of absolute sovereignty.—It is clear, therefore, that supposing the right of this country to cut logwood at Honduras had been established originally by the Conv. of the 14th of July, 1786, the latest upon the subject, that right would be now as perfect and complete as could be desired. Spain might just as well pretend that we have no right to Jamaica or Gibraltar, because the treaty of Madrid of 1667, in which the possession of Jamaica is only recognized, and the treaty of Utrecht, in 1713, where Gibraltar is ceded, are not renewed. But, in fact, the right of this country to cut wood at Honduras is not so much created as explained by treaty. It is a right clothed with a long possession. As far as we recollect, the first recognition of it is in the treaty of 1763, renewed in the treaty of 1783, and explained by the Conv. of 1786. It is there mentioned, and always has been considered as something short of dominion or sovereignty.—It is a sort of servitude of a very real and substantial nature; and, after being so long enjoyed, so repeatedly recognized, it is impossible for any publicist to argue that it is abrogated by the silence of the treaty of Amiens. Indeed the argument, we apprehend, goes very much in favour of this country, if we are to admit general reasoning to fix the nature and extent of our right. We do not know that it might not very fairly be argued, that by the silence of the treaty of Amiens we are in a better situation than we were. We apprehend that our servitude, our tolerance, our precarious habitation (for we had not power to build a fort or keep a garrison, &c.) is converted into a full and complete dominion, as far as conquest can confer it. We have remained in possession during the war: we have built forts; we have strengthened our position. The Spaniards, seeing all this, chose to be silent at Amiens! Is it to be presumed, however, that by our silence we abandon an old contested privilege, retained and strengthened during the war? The Spaniards, by the treaty, confirm generally all our possessions in all parts of the world, not noticed and altered by the treaty of Amiens. They therefore acknowledged our possession as it stood. If they are to draw the point of Honduras into litigation, we deny that they have a claim of right, or that we are obliged to sue for an indulgence. Precedents are in our favour. The Spaniards by the treaty of 1667 did not choose to cede formally Jamaica, which Cromwell had taken from them, but they confirm generally our possessions. Could they pretend, did they pretend, that after the conclusion of the treaty of 1667, they could have given our settlers in Jamaica a notice to quit? Certainly not. In the present case they have no more right.—If they were displeased with our continuance at Honduras, they ought to have stipulated by treaty for our removal. That they have not done. They ought to be very glad if we agreed to hold our rights to Honduras just as they formerly stood. If they quarrel about the matter, ministers ought to give orders to strengthen our position at Honduras, send out reinforcements, and bid the Spaniards defiance. This we are disposed to think should be the course.—The case appears to be so plain, that we see no reason why the cavils of France (we cannot call it Spain) should be treated with much deference.—We have the right, we have the power, and Buonaparté should be taught that he must not domineer when he has not the ability to act. *There are fifty chicaneries of this sort in both the Indies, and the best way is to treat them in the beginning, with contempt, and to resist them with vigour.*—If ministers accept the establishment of Honduras on the old footing, they will shew much condescension. They ought to insist peremptorily on our right, and if they revert to the old footing, *they ought to obtain an equivalent. This tone would speedily bring the French and Spaniards to reason.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Letter from the Capt. Gen. of Guadaloupe to the French Min. of Marine and Colonies. Dated Basse-Terre, Nov. 15, 1802.

CITIZEN MINISTER—I have already had the honour to give you an account of the crimes committed on the night between the 6th and 7th of October, by a band of brigands, of all colours, who assassinated twenty-three citizens in different quarters of Guadaloupe.—A special tribunal was charged with the prosecution and trial of these crimes, connected with a conspiracy, which the punishment of the chiefs has extinguished.—The principal of these conspirators were Millet, Lagirardine, Jean Barbe, and Peter Barse, all blacks, stained with every species of crimes.—The first two destroyed themselves after they were condemned to suffer death; the third was executed with his accomplices.—Since these examples the colony of Guadaloupe has been much improved in regard to internal tranquillity.—Those from whom the colony must still be freed are composed of the remains of rebels, wandering about in the woods, where they are daily perishing by famine and want.—If there still exists in the communes of this island a few partisans of these crimes, they conceal themselves; but I have taken such measures as will soon enable me, with certainty, to discover them.—I had the honour to inform you, that I had received intelligence of various bodies of rebels who were forming, in the islands of St. Thomas and St. Bartholomew, new plots against Guadaloupe.—I have obtained certain information of this circumstance, by the return of the frigate La Didon, which I had dispatched to demand these rebels to be given up by the respective governors

of these two colonies.—Some vessels belonging to rebels, who had escaped from Guadaloupe, and which were employed for keeping up a communication with their confidential friends in that island, were there found. One of them had still on board a small quantity of ammunition, part of which they had thrown into the sea when they saw the French frigate approaching. But notwithstanding the precipitation employed in this business, they had not time to complete it when the frigate cast anchor close to them. The brigands abandoned the vessel, and went to conceal themselves in the woods. M. de Watterstorff, commandant of the Danish Islands, has given strict orders for their being arrested. But at St. Barthelomew, M. Hankerheim, the governor, did not think himself authorised to pursue the same steps.—I send you my correspondence with the Swedish governor, in order that the government may deliberate on the conduct, which the tranquillity of the colonies requires from all the powers of Europe; for it is not certainly the intention of the Swedish government to give an asylum in its possessions to brigands, who, after having polluted with all their crimes the French colonies, hope to make preparations with impunity for the commission of new ones, in a neighbouring territory in friendship with the republic. Health and respect, (Signed) LACROSSE.

[This letter is followed by another from Gatereau, commissioner of government in the special tribunal of Guadaloupe, to rear-admiral Lacrosse, containing an account of the trial and death of the principal conspirators.] "The suicide committed by Jean Barbe," says the commissioner, "in the prison of Saint Anne, proves how much he dreaded the justice of the tribunal, and the sudden death of Girardine in that of Point-à-Petre gives us reason at least to presume that he wished to avoid the shame of punishment."

The examination of Peter Barse, says he, who alone had the courage to survive the confession of his crimes, will make known to you the plot which they had foolishly formed, when their minds were heated by the spirituous liquors with which they often got intoxicated at the house of Millet and Lagirardine. You will, no doubt, be convinced, with the tribunal, that this conspiracy was concerted only by these three villains, who not being able to conceive the hope of long exercising authority over the rebels, would have left the colony in their power, after getting possession of their plunder.—The colony has to lament the death of 23 of its inhabitants, who perished on that disastrous day. The avenging justice of the tribunal has reached and destroyed their assassins. Unfortunately it has not yet been able to discover the places where they buried the gold and silver, which they took from the victims. It is estimated at 250,000 francs. It was an impenetrable secret with these villains, who always make false declarations.

Letter from Rr. Adm. Villeneuve, Commander in Chf. of the forces in the Windward Islands and at Cayenne, to the Min. of Marine and Colonies.—Dated on board the Jemappe, Nov. 21, 1802.

Citizen Minister—I arrived in this harbour on the 15th, having sailed from Point-à-Petre, in Guadaloupe, on the 9th. I passed at Basse-Terre the Capt.-General Lacrosse, and the colonial prefect Lescallier, with their whole suite, and then proceeded to this island.—The state of Guadaloupe appeared to me more satisfactory than it is generally supposed to be in France, and even in Martinico. Agriculture is in full activity throughout the whole of Grande-Terre, and all the western and northern part of the island. Cabesterre alone, which has in general been burnt, appears to be in a state of distress. Sugar, and other colonial productions, are in such abundance at Point-à-Petre, that the magazines are entirely full, and casks are even seen in the streets. The freight to France is excessively dear, and vessels for transporting the goods are not be found.—The war of the blacks is reduced to nothing. It consists merely of a few excursions of miserable wretches, who issue from the woods to carry off provisions from the plantations. The troops still left, with reinforcements which have lately arrived, will be sufficient to insure the safety of the island, and you may rest assured, that in a little time, the brigands will all be seized in their last retreats.—Health and respect. (Signed) VILLENEUVE.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Dec, 10.—The French Colonel Sebastiani, who has been received by the Pacha of Cairo in the most distinguished manner, has embarked at Damietta, on board the French frigate Cornelie, to go to Syria. He will visit all the principal ports of the Levant.—Yesterday evening Ghalib Effendi, our late Ambassador Extraordinary at Paris, arrived here, and brought with him the French Ratification of the Treaty concluded between France and the Porte.—The number of troops, as well Mamelukes as Arabs, which the victorious Beys in Egypt have with them in the neighbourhood of Alexandria, is about 4000.

Loretto, Dec. 10.—Yesterday the Image of the Holy Virgin, which had been carried to France during the revolution, was brought back hither from Rome, and welcomed with the discharge of cannon, and ringing of bells. It was carried on a superb frame, borne by eight bishops, and placed in the Holy House.

Florence, Dec. 27.—Our Sovereign and his family were at Valence on the 11th, and were to set out for Carthagena on the 13th, in order to return to Tuscany.

Ratisbon, Jan. 6.—Yester. the Protocol was opened in the 2 First Col. of the Em. for the ratif. of the Gen. Conclusum of the Dep. In the Elec. Col. Saxony and Branden. have voted. The latter has also given his vote in the Col. of Prin. for Magdebourg and his other posses. In the 2d Col. have also voted Saxe Weimar, Saxe Gotha, and Eisenach, Brunswick Wolfenbuttel, Hesse-Cassel, Baden, Wurtemberg, Lubeck, Holstein, Oldenburg, and Salm; and also the Counts of Witteravia, Franconia, and Westphalia. All the Representatives of the Eccl. States were absent except those of the Principality of Ratisbon. The latter are, the Baron d'Albini, and the Ct. de la Tour. They were legitimated on the 6th in the quality of Sub-Del. to his Highness the E. A. Chan. as provisory possessor of the Prin. of Ratisbon. All the votes given have been in favour of the complete ratif. of the Gen. Conclusum. The min. of Lubeck, in giving his vote, reserved himself with respect to the regulation of the interests of his Prince, and referred to the mem. which he lately addressed on that subject to the Dep.—In the Col. of Imp. Cities, Nuremburg is charged provisorily with the Directory, until something shall be agreed upon the subject.

Stuttgard, Jan. 7.—If we may believe several of the German Gazettes, very important Neg. have been for some time on foot at Paris, between Lord Whitworth and the Min. Talleyrand. They relate in part to the Evac. of Malta and Egypt,

and to the affairs of Parma and Etruria. England exacts from France a promise, that in any case she shall not send troops either to Malta or Egypt; but the French government has rejected such a proposition, because it is not mentioned in the treaty of Amiens. As to the affairs of Italy, Lord Whitworth has also received an answer in the negative; and so much the more precise, as it was never intended to treat with the Court of London on the affairs of the Continent, that Court not having in the Neg. for Peace which took place with Austria, taken any part with respect to the affairs of the Ger. Emp. or Italy.

Hague, Jan. 8.—Gen. Victor and the Chief of the Staff, Cesar Berthier, will immediately set out for Helvoetsluys, to embark with the French Exp. for Louisiana. The fine Corps of Guides, selected by the Gen. from the Dragoons of Breda, consists of 160 men, who take their horses with them. This Corps will be commanded by the nephew of the Ambas. Semonville, Cit. Carnoville, who has been the Diplomatic Eleve of the Fr. Legation. The number of transports in this Exp. it is now understood, will be only 18.

Berne, Jan. 9.—Various reports are in circulation respecting the Swiss Constitution, of which nothing is yet known for a certainty.—We learn anew, that there is a question of uniting to France the Canton of Leman, and a part of that of Basle; and this report gains the more credit, because, though the French are emptying the arsenals throughout Switzerland, and taking the milit. stores, &c. to Lausanne, yet no such measure has been adopted with regard to the arsenal of Basle. —The French troops in Swi. have received rein. particularly cavalry. The 6th reg. of horse chas. have arrived from Genoa at Berne, where they will remain in garrison. Two squad. of the 12th reg. of hussars have received the same destination.

Berne, Jan. 13.—The courier from Paris who arrived yesterday, brought us the constitution of our canton decreed by the deputies, and approved of by the First Consul. The canton is divided into districts, and the districts into tribes. The citizens of the canton, enjoying a fortune of 1000f. have alone the right of voting. Each tribe names an elector out of fifty citizens. The union of those electors forms the electoral body of the canton, which names the grand council, composed of two hundred and ninety-nine members. It is to that council that the legislative power is confided. It appoints to all places. Twenty-seven of its members form the petty council, from which are to be taken two avoyers, a treasurer, and a chancellor, who form, with the two oldest and the two youngest counsellors, the executive committee. The grand council appoints from among its members those who are to form a tribunal of civil appeal, and a criminal tribunal.—The same letters announce, that the cantonal organizations of Basle, Fribourg, Lucerne, and Soleure, are also completed; and that they resemble those of Zurich and Berne. The most remarkable difference between the old and new constitution of the cantons, formerly aristocratical, is the political equality between all the citizens who compose them, the application of which is to be found chiefly in the composition of the electoral bodies.—The provision by which the exercise of the administrative and that of the judicial power are confided to the same body, has excited many remonstrances. It is supposed, that provision will be changed.—We learn further, that the establishment of a general Helvetic diet, to assemble once a year, and to consist of one deputy from each canton, is agreed upon. To establish a certain equality among the different cantons, the deputies of the greater cantons are to have different voices in proportion, respectively, to their population. The meetings of the general diet will be in turns, at Zurich, Berne, Basle, Soleure, Friburgh, and Lucerne. The deputy for the place at which the diet meets, will be president for the time being.

Brussels, Jan. 13.—It is reported, that the King of Prussia is about to visit his possessions in Westphalia, and that he and Buonaparté will have an interview, during their intended tours, which are to take place at the same time.—15. The inhab. of Antwerp are preparing trium. arches for the reception of the Consul, on his journey into our depar. They wish to testify to the restorer of the commerce of the Scheldt, their gratitude for the benefits which it confers, and which promise to restore the splendor which that city enjoyed in the 15th century.

Hamburgh, Jan. 14.—By authentic accounts from Berlin, of the 11th inst. Prince Ruspoli has at last determined to accept of the grand mastership of the order of Malta, having been invited to do so by a brief of the pope, and having had the same request made to him by some great powers. His highness desires, however, the compliance of France with certain conditions he thought proper to propose, previously to his entering on the functions of that exalted dignity. Should he persist in his refusal, it is reported, that the order of Malta will be suppressed. "The Teutonic Order will, it is said, share the same fate.

Hague, Jan. 18.—The following is the text of the law relative to the loan, which is considered to be of such great importance to commerce in general. —The amount of the loan shall not exceed the deficit in the rev. of the year 1803, for the expenditure of the state during that year. The annual rent of the capital is not to exceed 1,400,000 florins, and the obligations which are to be delivered to the cred. shall bear but an int. of 3 per cent.—Those who shall subscribe to the loan, one Batavian rescription of the nominal value of 1000 florins, payable after the peace, shall, by adding to it 800 florins in specie, receive three national obligations of 1000 florins each, bearing 3 per cent. interest. Those who shall subscribe an obligation of the E. I. Comp. payable, with 800 florins in specie, shall also receive three national obligations, each of 1000 florins, at 3 per cent.—The interest in arrears due in the year 1800, shall be made good to the sub. and paid out of the 800 florins, which they are to add to their obligations. All the Bat. rescriptions payable after the peace, which shall not be subscribed to the new loan by the 22d of next Sep. shall be converted into perpetual stock at 4 per cent.—The above-mentioned India obligations which shall not be subscribed during the year 1803, shall not be payable *(onlasbaar)*, and shall be considered as if their numbers had not been drawn out of the lottery. Some further provisions are to be made, by which certain other funds may be subscribed, which bear an interest of 2½ per cent.—An obligation of 1000 florins at 3 per cent. will then be delivered in exchange for an obligation of those funds of the nominal value of 700 florins, but 200 florins in specie must be added.—To insure a capital, necessary to pay the interest of this loan, there is to be an increase of a 10th, or 10 per cent. upon all duties on the following articles: wine, vinegar, distilled liquors, mineral waters, tobacco, beer, cattle, horned cattle, butter, salt, soap, wood, coals, and turf,

horses, seeds, coffee and tea consumed, servants, and articles of luxury.—The increase of 10 per cent. will be only for two years: after which it will be replaced by general imposts. The new tax is to take place from the 1st of July.—The tax upon the net produce of successions is to be increased 10 per cent.—When this measure was determined upon in the legislature, there were 14 for and 13 against the sanctioning it. The people complain openly of the increase upon the taxes.

Paris, June 20.—The con. concluded on the 25th ult. will not be officially published till after the exchange of the rati. but the substance of it is in general circulation at Ratisbon. The treaty is signed by the Russian as well as the French and Imp. ministers. Austria cedes the Ortenau to the Duke of Modena, and receives in exchange the bishopries of Trent and Brixen, to be incorporated with the Austrian monarchy. The G. Duke invited to renounce Trent and Brixen, obtains the bishopric of Eichstadt, except the six superior Bailiwicks of that country, which are to be united to the principality of Wurtzburgh: the G. Duke also obtains a part of the Up. Palatinate; but he formally engages not to fortify Eichstadt. Bavaria is to preserve the six superior Bailliwicks of the bishopric, but is to indemnify the G. Duke by ceding property which the Elector possesses as D. of D. Ponts, in Bohemia. The Elector keeps all his possessions on the Inn. The town of Passau is to be ceded to him by Austria. The Elector A. Chancellor obtains all the tolls of the Rhine, on the right bank. Prussia is to keep the part of the territory of Nuremburg, which she occupied last war.

Paris, Jan. 21.—The journey of the First Consul into the nine departments of Belgium is determined upon, and will take place sooner than was expected. The young men of the different towns through which he is to pass, are forming themselves into military companies, to receive him with due distinction.—We have received intel. that the Emperor ratified, on the 5th instant, the Conv. concluded on the 25th of Dec. relative to the Supp. Indem. to the G. Duke. The exchange of the Ratif. is to take place at Paris.—All the attempts made by the Imp. Cabinet to enter into a new defin. alliance with Russia have totally failed.—During the year ending the 22d of Sept. 1802, the number of births in Paris were 21,018, of which 5,499 were illegitimate. The number of marriages, during the same period, were 4,694 of divorces 902. The number of deaths were 20,390.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Notice to the Masters of American Vessels. Dated American Consulate, London, Jan. 24, 1803.

Official information (from Tunis) have just been received, that the Tripolitan Admiral, Lisle, having two zebecs and a kirlanghie under his command, is ready for sea, and intends passing the Streights, to cruize in the Atlantic. It is probable that he may be joined by a zebec which has already sailed, and by another zebec, a polacre, and a kirlanghie, which are nearly ready for sea. With a view of decoying such vessels as may unfortunately fall in his way, he has clothed his crews in blue jackets, overalls, and hats.

DOMESTIC.

DUBLIN, *Jan.* 19. A requisition of several magistrates of the county of Tipperary has been made to the deputy clerk of the peace, to summon a special session of the peace, to be held at Clonmell, on the 21st instant, to consider the state of that county, and the propriety of applying to gov. to have certain parts of it proclaimed, agreeably to the provisions of the Insurrection Act. *Jan.* 20.—In our last, we had the satisfaction of stating, that through the exertions of Lord Donoughmore, tranquillity had been completely established in the counties of Waterford and Tipperary. We have now the further satisfaction of adding, that his ldp.'s spirited example has excited an emulation amongst the noblemen and gent. of county of Limerick to pursue a similar conduct.—Early on Saturday morning last, the Northern mail-coach was attacked near Drogheda by seven armed men, who, after firing several shots, and wounding the coachman severely, robbed the coach and passengers, and carried off the bags. Rewards have been offered for apprehending the robbers.—The same night the post-boy with the Wexford mail was robbed on Galloping Green by two persons armed.—On Monday night, the Limerick mail-coach was attacked at Cherryhill, near Kildare, by a large gang of robbers, who fired several shots at the coach and horses. The attack was gallantly resisted by the guard, who returned shot for shot, and having killed two of the robbers, carried on the mail in safety. One of the horses was severely wounded.

Intelligence from Gibraltar of the 29th ult. gives an account of a *mutiny* in the garrison. The following may be relied on as an exact statement of the circumstances.—It is the custom, in every regiment in the army, to pay to the non-commissioned officers and soldiers, at the end of every two months, whatever balances may be due to them on their several accounts of subsistence. On the 24th of Dec. the 1st reg. of foot (commonly called the Royal Scotch) being the corps of which H. R. H. the Governor is himself the Colonel, having received their balances, got drunk, and insisted upon going into the town. This having been strictly forbidden, and the prohibition having been understood by the men as proceeding from the adjutant, they, with arms in their hands, forced their way out of the barracks, and, being inflamed with anger against the adjutant, their first object was to seek for him, with an avowed intention of taking his life. Failing in their bloody purpose, they proceeded to the barracks of the 25th regiment, which, being composed chiefly of their countrymen, they thought the more likely to join them; but, fortunately they were disappointed. From the barracks of the 25th reg. they went to those of the 54th reg. where they were received by a fire from the grenadier company, which wounded several of them. Here ended the affair of that night. The mutineers returned to their barracks, and the next day, the Duke, after properly animadverting on their conduct, thought proper to pardon it.—On the 26th of Dec. however, the 25th reg. who had behaved so well on the 24th of the month, having now received their balances, and having also gotten drunk, broke out in exactly the same manner that the Royals had done before; and, as the grenadiers of the 54th reg. were marching to assist in quelling this second mutiny, a party of artillery, drawn out for the same purpose, being ordered to fire on some of the mutineers of the 25th, unfortunately killed one man of the 54th, wounded several others of the same reg. killing, at the same time, two of the mutineers.—On the 29th of Dec. when the latest intelligence came off, a general court-martial was sitting upon the trial of fourteen or fifteen of the ring-leaders.—The

mutiny, from every thing we have seen and heard, appears to have had nothing of disloyalty, or of politics, in its motives.

On the 14th inst. pursuant to advertisement, a general meeting was held, at the London Tavern, of the BRITISH CREDITORS IN THE FRENCH FUNDS. —Mr. IMPEY took the chair, and rose to explain the object for which the meeting had been convened. He began by adverting to the memorial presented by the Committee in the name of the creditors at large to Lord Hawkesbury, and to the result of the different interviews which they had with his Lp. since the 20th Sept. ult. down to Wednesday last. It were unnecessary to enter into any detailed account of the preceding interviews, because what passed in that of Wednesday is contained the general result of all the others Mr. Impey then proceeded to state to the meeting the grounds on which the Brit. creditors in the Fr. funds thought themselves justified in resting their claims, and which he had submitted to the consideration of the noble Sec. of State. These grounds he reduced to three heads:—1st. The conditions held out by the Fr. Gov. at different periods to induce foreigners to take a share in their loans, assuring them that in such cases they should not be subjected to the laws by which their natives might be bound.—2d. The stipulations of the commercial treaty, conformable to which a notice of twelve months should be given to Brit. subjects to remove their property in case of the breaking out of a war.—3d. The 14th article of the treaty of Amiens, by which it was stipulated, that all sequestrations on either side on funds, revenues, &c. shall be taken off immediately after the signature of the definitive treaty. None of these conditions had been complied with in the present case; but, notwithstanding the inconveniencies the British holders of French stock had already suffered, yet they were willing, nor could they think it an unfair or presumptuous expectation, to be put on the same footing with the subjects of the French Gov. To the justice of that Gov. they were not reluctant to submit their claims, and if his Lordship approve and abet their views, it was their wish to forward a memorial to his Ex. Ld. Whitworth, praying him to present the same to the French Gov. hoping at the same time that his Lp. would kindly second their request to L. Whitworth, and exert his best endeavours to give weight to their representation. To the grounds here adduced, Lord Hawkesbury made a few objections, not, he said, such as his own mind would prompt him to urge; but which he thought it was as likely might be urged by others. In the first place it might be thought equitable that British creditors should be dealt by in the same manner as the Prussian or Austrian creditors. 2d. It might be said, that no stress could be laid on the commercial treaty of 1786, because that treaty could not be supposed to exist after the passing of the Alien Bill. 3d. The treaty of Amiens was supposed to have in view property in *esse*, and not that which had been sequestered, or the payment of which had been suspended.—Whatever might be the force of these objections, he was not inclined to lay any stress upon them; but all he imagined himself able to do was to recommend the matter to Lord Whitworth, and in that view he should write a letter to his Lp. requesting he might espouse the cause of the claimants in the manner which to him might appear best calculated to obtain their object.—With this determination of the noble Sec. of State the meeting seemed to be *highly satisfied*; —and on the suggestion of Mr. Saunders, it was proposed that Sir Elijah Impey, who was now at Paris, should be requested to act as their agent, and that a power of at. should forthwith be sent to him for that purpose. This proposition was unanimously agreed to.

Bankrupts.—Chapman, J. Liverpool, merchant. Danks, T. Oldbury, innkeeper.—Fawcets, T. Old Change, merchant.—Short, J. Alfred-place, Southwark.—Delvalle, J. Savage's Gardens, tobacco-broker.—Miller, G. Bodmin, vintner.—Allen, J. Bartlett's Buildings, taylor.—Berger, T. Cockspur-street, hatter.—Jones, J. Penmaon, drover.—Midkiff, J. Liverpool, merchant.—Simpson, Elizabeth, Rolles Buildings, taylor.—Hindley, R. Salford, wine-merchant.—Sadler, Eliz. Westbromich, grocer.—Porwell, M. and W. Wells, shop-keepers.—Wrighton, D. Little Alne, flax-dresser.—Warren, J. Sandy's-street, weaver.

Marriages.—A few days ago at Ash, in the county of Surrey, the Rev. James Beaver, rector of Childry, Berks. to Miss Henrietta Halsey, eldest daughter of Henry Halsey, Esq. of Henley Park.

Deaths.—On Tuesday last, in Wimpole-street, the lady of Admiral Sir Peter Parker.—On Friday, in Manchester Square, Sir H. Lambert, Bart.—On the 12th, at Edinburgh, the Right Hon. Lady R. Bruce.

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THUR.
Bank Stock	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 pr. C.R. An.	71⅛	71⅝	71¼	—	71½	71⅜
3 per C. Con.	70⅝	71	70¼	—	70⅜	70⅜
4 pr. C. Con.	86¼	87⅛	86¼	—	87⅛	87
5 pr. Ct. Ann.	100½	100¼	100½	—	100⅝	100½
Bank L. Ann.	20¼	20⅝	20 15/16	—	20⅝	20 15/16
D'S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	102⅞	103⅛	102¾	—	103⅛	103
Omnium	4½ dis	4⅝ dis	4½ dis	—	4⅝ dis	4⅝ dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C. F.	36 2	2 us.	LEGHORN		50
D°, at sight	35 10		NAPLES		40¼
ROTTERDAM	36 3	2 us.	GENOA		46
HAMBURGH	34 3	2½us.	VENICE, 51 livres piccole effective per £. ster.		
ALTONA	34 4	2½us.			
PARIS 1 day	24 8		LISBON		68¼
PARIS	24 12	2 us.	OPORTO		68½
BOURDEAUX,	24 13		DUBLIN		13
CADIZ	35½	eff.	BILBOA		35¾
MADRID	35¼	effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.		

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	46s. to 62s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 224s
Rye	35 .. 38	Hay per load	75 .. 140
Barley	24 .. 28	Beef, per stone	4s. to 5s.6d.
Malt	43 .. 47	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	15 .. 22	Veal	6s. 0d. to 7s. 6d.
Pease (white)	33 .. 39	Pork	4s. 8d. to 5s. 8d.
Beans (horse)	34 .. 38	Tallow	4s. 6d.
Flour per sack	45 .. 50	Av. of Sugar pr cwt	37s. 2d.
Seconds	40 .. 45	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal	52 .. 57	Bread 9½d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

Towards the close of our last summary we made an extract or two from a paper, which appeared to us to have been published by the merchants immediately concerned in the trade to the B. of Honduras. That paper we have now (see p. 110) inserted entire. —It will be perceived, that these gentlemen, think their rights *unimpaired* by the non-renewal of former treaties. It is *our* opinion

that those rights are totally abrogated by that non-renewal; and, on some future occasion, when we have more room and time than we have at present, we shall offer to our readers the reasons, on which this opinion is founded. In the mean time, we shall here briefly state the opinions advanced *in Parliament*, by the opposers of the treaty of Amiens.—Our right to the use of the limits, as settled and enjoyed before the war, was not asserted to be necessarily abandoned; but it was asserted, that the security of an express recognition, in this, and other similar cases, being omitted, every channel was left open to the ancient disputes of contradictory claims, and the possible decision of the sword, as any one of those points might be ground of a new war, or new humiliation in the abandonment of it. Mr. Windham put the argument very happily in his opening speech for taking the treaty into consideration. It was, he observed, "as if a "man, in private life, having been quieted "in the possession of an estate, by a solemn "instrument under the hand and seal of the "opposite party, should cancel the deed, or, "when it had been cancelled, neglect to "revive and renew it; and when his friends "remonstrated with him, should answer: "Oh; what signifies the deed? My right is "as secure as ever. My solicitor and coun"sel tell me I have an excellent cause to "go into court with. If I have not the "deed, I have as fine a law-suit as heart can "wish!" It was afterwards stated, by others on the same side, that they did not wholly dissent from the position, that the basis of the treaty being evidently the state of possession before the war, we ought to be considered as retaining that sort of usufructuary possession, which we previously had, however begun, and which we had in fact exercised before our first treaty with Spain relative to America, in 1670. But the main point was, whether the min. would *defend* this position by the last and best argument of kings and states. If so, it was said, our right to Honduras, though the weakest, in itself, of all our claims recognized by the former treaties (because it admitted the sovereignty to be in Spain) was not yet relinquished; but then, the min. must declare themselves ready to maintain this right by a new war, when they had declared, that so many more important objects were not worth the continuance of the war, with all the advantages which we then possessed, but which we had now given up; and, if it was worth a new war, why was it not worth insisting upon in the treaty, to prevent a new war, when we were bargaining for peace with a richer fund for the purchase than we ever possessed at the most triumphant termination of any former contest?—These were the arguments used in Parliament, and that they were irresistible was clearly proved by the miserable defence which was opposed to them even by the Master of the Rolls.—But, what shall be said to the low trick of hiding from the Parliament and the nation the important circumstance, now first made public by the Honduras merchants, that we *had extended our limits during the war*, and that "this "extension was become absolutely neces"sary, for we had so cleared the country, "in our possession, of logwood, that any "more which we wanted to procure was "got at so great an expense, that it en"hanced its cost almost beyond what it "would bear," and, that, in short, without the extension of limits, the settlement was *good for nothing to this country!* Not a word of this was the Parliament suffered to know, though, as it now appears, the Honduras merchants, had fully stated it in a memorial to Lord Hawkesbury, pending the negotiation of the treaty. The knowledge of this circumstance, so material to the just appreciation of the conditions of the treaty, because it rendered a positive and specific confirmation so essential, was closely hidden from those who were to decide on the merits of that treaty; and, if we are to judge from their arguments, it was not known to the Master of the Rolls or the Ld. Chancellor, or to Mr. Pitt! Look at all their speeches, and you will find, that they speak of Honduras as a settlement where NOTHING *is to be given up*; as a settlement *totally unaffected by the peace*. But now, behold, it appears, that the peace is to rob us of all that part of the settlement *which is of any value*; and, as we before observed, our readers may rest assured, that this will be seized on as a lucky pretext for withdrawing our settlers altogether: foreseeing that France will command it, we shall, as in the case of the *lilies*, prevent the command, by an *anticipated obedience!* Poor, miserable shift! As if the world were to be deceived by this! As if our motive were not seen through! As if a paltry subterfuge like this could save us for only one moment from the contempt of mankind! *

* When the hour comes to surrender this settlement, there will not be wanting a great number of persons to discover, just then, for the first time, as Lord Ellenborough did with respect to the *honour of the flag*, that it *never was good for any thing*, and that we ought to be glad to *get rid of it*.—By way of preparation against these Fox's arguments, we just state, that the trade to Honduras employed 1500 seamen, and 12,000 tons of shipping, and the population of the settlement is computed at 4000 souls, which necessarily consumed a large quantity of British manfactures, beside what found their way, through the settlement, into the Spanish territory, and were paid for in specie.

By turning to p. 119, our readers will find a sort of report respecting the state of the debts due to *British creditors in the French funds.* These stock-jobbers had, it would appear, entertained a notion, that the 14th article of the treaty, which brought us the "blessings "of peace," would bring them the payment of their sequestrated stock, not recollecting that the word *pay* has long been abolished from the French language, except as it applies to those on whom the Republic may have demands. It is really a good jest, that these poor rich men should have taken in a serious sense that ironical article of the treaty! Ld. Hawkesbury and the honest Talleyrand must have fine diversion with them! "To the *justice* of the French gov. they are *not* "*reluctant* to submit their claims." Poor creatures! they know well, that it is useless to appeal to any thing else. They know well, that the English government *dares* not stir a hand to assist them. "To the *justice* of the French "gov. they were not," they said, "unwilling "to *submit* their claims, and if his Ldp. ap- "proved and abet their views, it was their "wish to forward a memorial to Ld. Whit- "worth, *praying* him to present the same "to the French gov. *hoping*, at the same "time, that Ld. H. would *kindly* second "their request." If Buonaparté had the money to spare, it would be good sport to insist, that this *hoping*, *praying*, *submitting* crew should crawl upon *all fours* from Calais to St. Cloud, a condition of payment to which they would cheerfully submit.—The language of these people furnishes a striking proof of the fallen state of this nation. In general, no persons are so bold and clamourous as your monied men, who are apt to conceit that even a prime min. is nothing more than their caterer. Were such men ever before known, in order to obtain the fulfilment of the conditions of a solemn treaty in their favour, to "*submit* "their claims" to the justice of the party indebted to them, and to give up all reliance on the remonstrances or the power of their own government? The truth is, that persons, of almost every rank and degree, are beginning, as it was easy to foresee they would, *to look to the French government for protection*, to throw themselves *on its mercy*, to give up all notion of *resistance*, of any kind, to the will of France; they are, as often as an occasion offers, beginning to throw themselves *on the mercy* of the French government, and to look to that government, and to that government alone, for *protection!*—Lord Hawkesbury's answer, too, is not a little curious. He has not said, that a refusal on the part of France, to fulfil this stipulation of the treaty, would be just; but he has suggested such objections as *may be* urged, and has by no means signified his intention to resist those objections, though one of them, (that respecting the effect of the Alien Bill) is, be it well observed, in direct opposition, as we may hereafter have occasion to show, to the former assertions of himself, of Mr. Pitt, and of almost every member of the present administration.—But, in short, if France is disposed not to fulfil the stipulation in question, some excuse *must* be found for not attempting to *compel* her to do it. As in the case of Honduras, all the ministers are anxious about, is, a *pretext* for yielding up the rights of their country, a long story, strung together with *ifs* and *buts*, wherewith to bewilder the people, and to present to the world a shew of remaining dignity.

It has long been the practice of the French revolutionists to cause first to be promulgated, in other countries, those facts (true or false), and those sentiments, which they, for some reason or other, wish not to have the appearance of originating with themselves. Of this sort is an article, (see p. 114). which has lately been published, at Stutgard, and republished in the Paris papers, and the principal object of which is, to renew the assertion, that *England has nothing to do with the affairs of the continent*, and that, if France chooses to send troops to Malta or to Egypt, England has no right to interfere therein, *because no mention is made thereof in the treaty of Amiens* Upon this subject, it has been observed, in one of our daily prints, that France, in refusing to admit of the proposition of Lord Whitworth (see the article alluded to), and in insisting to hold us to the treaty of Amiens, "*is not to blame.* She "has a right," continues this print, "to abide "by that treaty, and is not bound to make "further *concessions* without an equivalent. "If the treaty of peace has not bound up "France sufficiently from sending troops to "Malta, or Egypt, that is the fault of the "British ministers who made the treaty." Now, though we never have, and never can, justify either those who *made*, or those who *approved* of, the treaty of Amiens, we cannot join in the charge, which this writer has preferred against it, and which amounts to nothing short of an acknowledgment, that, by the said treaty, *we have, both now and for ever, forfeited all right to make use of either persuasion or power to prevent the subjugation of any other country besides our own.* It is somewhat strange, too, that this writer should reject, with disdain, the very same principle, when applied to *Parma* and *Etruria*, respecting which also, it is said, our minister at Paris, has made a remonstrance. "England," says he, "has a right para-

" mount to all treaties; a right in common " with every other great state, to watch, " that no one power acquires an undue ac- " cession of territory, or an undue ascen- " dancy, and to watch, above all powers, " France, her natural and constant enemy " —And, why, we should be glad to know, does not this " paramount right" hold good with respect to *Malta* and *Egypt* as well as with respect to *Parma* and *Etruria?* Is it because the preserving of the two former from the clutches of France is more immediately necessary to our interests, than is a like preservation of the two latter?—As to the real state of the case, relative to Malta and Egypt, our opinion is, that France will endeavour to send troops to both, but to the latter in particular, where her emissaries now are in full activity; and, we are very sure, that there is no power, Russia excepted, capable of preventing the accomplishment of this project, *without having recourse to arms.* Whether Russia will insist upon the real independence and security of Malta and Turkey with its dependencies, is more than we can say. Much depends upon the *sort* of ambition, with which that empire is actuated. At any rate, in order to obtain the necessary guarantee from Russia, Great Britain must act that part, which is becoming only in a power of the *second rank.* This is the *level,* which Buonaparté's paper says we have been so long seeking, and which, under the auspicious guidance of " THE " *Family,*" we have at last happily found :— a just punishment for applauding the disgraceful peace, by which those low, obscure, untried, unknown men were enabled to sink the country to a level with themselves.—As to PRINCE RUSPOLI's accepting, at last, of the Grand Mastership of Malta, as is stated in the Hamburgh intelligence, we do not believe a word of it. If that island should not finally become an article in Buonaparté's wholesale and retail shop of indemnities, at which we should not be at all surprized, probably the Baillie Tomassy, now at Messina, will be appointed Grand Master.

Our readers will perceive, that a convention has been agreed on between Austria and France, relative to the Gr. D. of Tuscany, but of the terms we imagine little is yet known. A little time, however, must bring them to light. They are not, indeed, an object of much interest; they can contain nothing more than merely a very small mitigation of the blow against the Imperial family.—The Swiss constitution is said to be completed; but of this we have received no certain information. In the mean time Switzerland is provided with a most ample and comfortable *protection* from all injuries, foreign or domestic. General NEY, the French *Ambassador,* has 2,000 men under him in the city of Berne (a pretty good *suite* for an Ambassador). There are 1,000 more in its dependencies. Gen. SARRAS, with 2,000 men in the canton of Lucerne; Gen. BORNEAU, with 4,000 men in the canton of Zurich; 4,000 more in the Pays de Vaud, and 2,000 in the north of Switzerland; single battalions occupy Basle, Friburgh, and Soleure; and the Helvetic troops, who are under the command of the French, are chiefly employed *in levying contributions!*—Happy effects of *neutrality!* Happy effects of that system, which the old opposition proposed in the year 1793! Happy effects of " *profiting* from the mutual injuries of conflicting nations!" The Swiss may now learn, perhaps, to feel for the French emigrants, whom, after drawing from them their last shilling, they hunted from their cantons. Had the Swiss joined heartily in the cause of the allies, Europe might still have been free: at any rate, Switzerland could not have been more completely enslaved.

We quote the following passage from the Mg. Post of Thursday last.—' By a Philadel- ' phia paper of the 15th December, which ' we received yesterday, it appears the Ame- ' ricans have taken the alarm at the ap- ' proach of the French in Louisiana.' The paper alluded to says, " We have authority " to state, that government is taking *all the* " *necessary steps to prevent any reasonable* " *ground of uneasiness arising on account of* " *the French occupying Louisiana,* New Or- " leans, &c. in consequence of which, it is " supposed, *our Western boundary will become* " *insecure.*" ' If the danger to the United ' States of America be such as here repre- ' sented, we well know what will be the re- ' sult. By *cajoling and menacing, Buonaparté* ' *will reduce them to as absolute a state of de-* ' *pendence as Holland.* He will squeeze sums ' of money when he pleases, and *in any future* ' *war with Britain, he will cut off one of our* ' *greatest commercial resources.*'—As the man in the play says, " *We* have certainly *heard this* " *before,* somewhere or other;" and, we have little doubt but our readers will remember having seen every word of it in Mr. Windham and Mr. Elliot's speeches, almost a twelve month ago. We are afraid, too, that we cannot say, in this, as in many other cases, " better late than never," for, if we are not greatly deceived, these sentiments might as well *never* have been expressed as to be kept back until now. Mr. Windham, in his speech of the 3d of May, 1802, said, in speaking of the cession of Louisiana to France, " What a present have we made to " the Americans? We have placed a ser- " pent in their bosom, by which they will " be ultimately devoured. We have put

" them in that state in which they must " become willing slaves under the dominion " of France; and, as men always detest the " instrument less than the cause, and turn " their resentment upon those, whom they " can make to feel it most, the Americans " will not, of course, hesitate between us " and the French; and thus we shall ulti- " mately forfeit the friendship of America " by the aggrandizement of the French in " that quarter."—So that the M. Post is rather *tardy* in pointing out the dangers to be apprehended from the cession of Louisiana. It is nothing to do this *after* the Americans have expressed their alarm; that is the act of a mere news-monger: but there required some statesman like knowledge to do it the moment the cession was heard of, and, of course, long before the sentiments of the Americans could be known.

In the same print, on which we have just commented, and which is well known to speak the sentiments of Mr. Sheridan and the small politicians more immediately attached to his non-descript way of thinking, we find, under the aforementioned date, a curious article, entitled, " UNDUE DESPONDENCY." The writer blames the *despondency* of the country, which he attributes, in the first instance, to the " New Opposition," and to Mr. Windham in particular, but then proceeds, under the malignant disguise which we have often stripped off, to *defend* or *palliate*, that conduct in him, as " a truly noble and *manly despair*:"—" a *desponding* tone mixed with *quixotic* notions:"—" to die with arms in our hands rather than yield one jot of our honour:"—and this he should applaud, if our situation were such as *Mr. W.* " *represented*;" if " the power of France were really so *irresistible*, so *incapable of restraint*, either from principle *or fear*."—Now, who would not, from all this, imagine, that the New Opposition had clamoured for the peace of Amiens, as a measure of *absolute necessity?* that they had, with Mr. Fox, declared our situation to be such as " not to permit us *to enquire about the terms*," and, with Mr. Sheridan, that, it was " a peace which every man *was glad of*, but which no man *was proud of!*" Who would imagine that the very gentlemen here accused of " *undue despondency*," of having " represented the power of France as totally *irresistible*, and *incapable of restraint*," who would imagine, that these very gentlemen are, at other times, called the " *war*-faction," and that this very Morning Post has accused them of a wish prematurely to plunge the country in a war? Who ever heard before of a " *desponding* tone" proceeding from " *quixotic* notions?" The truth is, these small politicians having wished to obtain a reputation for *prudence*, having wished to encroach on the monopoly of our " *safe* politicians" in Downing Street, by declaiming against the New Opposition as being too eager for war, now think to obtain a character of vigour and steady fortitude, by holding up the New Opposition as preachers of despondency. Never did Ld. Grenville, or any of the party who opposed the peace, " represent the power of France to be irresistible, or her ambition as incapable of restraint, from fear." Quite the contrary. But they said, and they still say, that the advantages which the treaty of Amiens gives her, once confirmed, consolidated, and improved, by the peace on one side, and the effect on the other, of perpetual concession and submission, in breaking down, debasing, and destroying the spirit of the country, will, together, be likely to make any future struggle more hazardous in every respect, proportionably for the length of the intermediate delay. They must think, that, if there be any long interval, the operation of these causes will make a new war only the occasion of a still more inglorious and injurious peace, even if we succeed, by our present defensive system, to escape absolute subjugation. Yet, with these sentiments, they did *not* advise immediate hostilities, much less did they recommend any " *desperate resolution*:" they declined the question altogether, professedly because, for the first time after a treaty of peace, there was no regular parliamentary information whatever of the actual state of this country with relation to France; whether the treaty was executed or not; whether it was likely to be executed; or whether any unforeseen difficulties had arisen to keep it in suspence; or, still more generally, what were the disposition and assurances of our late enemy. They were called upon to bring charges against the ministry, without a record, communication, or paper of any kind which could fix them to any one point: they were desired to argue the state of the country from rumours, reports, private intelligence, and public newspapers; and, they refused, according to their duty as peers and members of Parliament, to bring any thing to a direct decision there, on such unusual and derogatory evidence. Yet, in the mean time, they endeavoured, by the general effect of their language, to stimulate and goad the Gov. the Parliament, and the Country, into animation, energy, and vigour. And, is there, in this conduct, any thing of exaggerated *despair*, or of the wild *quixotism?* But, the small politicians, having first clamoured for *peace on any terms*, and then affected to " *mourn*" at the *terms* of a peace which they were " *glad* of" in the lump; having resolved to support a minister whom they despise, for the low and selfish purpose of keeping out a minister whom they hate; having involved themselves in endless inconsistencies, and being withal totally destitute of all real political principle and knowledge, they are now endeavouring to preserve some degree of consequence by misrepresenting those who have pursued one direct and steady cause of honour.—So much for the *Small Politicians!*

NOTICES.

OUR CORRESPONDENTS will have the goodness to excuse us till next week.—We have now in hand no less than *eleven* letters, from different correspondents, and on different subjects, all of which we wish to insert; and, in order to be able to do so, we shall next week publish *two sheets*, a step, which, during the session of Parliament, we shall probably be obliged to repeat on the first Saturday of *every month*. Of this, however, we are not certain. It will entirely depend upon the quantity, which we may possess, of important and original matter.

MR. COBBETT's translation of " *L'Empire Germanique, &c.* together with " *A Memoir on the Political* " *and Military State of Europe*," by the same author, is now published, and is sold by E. HARDING, No. 18, Pall-Mall, price 2s. 6d.—It is proper to notify, that this work will be inserted entire in the Supplement to Vol. II. of the Register, which will positively be published *next Saturday*.

LONDON,

ESSAYS.

CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY.

SIR,—I have been a watchful observer of the progressive state of naval affairs during the administration of Earl St. Vincent, and am very, very sorry to say, our navy is not in that flourishing state the situation of affairs require.

With regard to the artificers of the Dock Yards, I contend they have been treated with too much severity. There certainly was a want of a proper subordination, but to effect the reformation, it was not necessary to resort to the violent measures which were adopted by the Admiralty.—In May, 1801, an extensive discharge took place in order that *discipline* might be restored, and therefore a great number of innocent and deserving persons were dismissed, without any discrimination whatever; owing to a particular order the officers of the yards were under, to discharge those men, to whose lot it had fallen, to collect a six pence from each individual, which had been remitted to London, for the support of a deputation of their trade, who were in town petitioning for an increase of wages. If the deputies themselves had given offence, I think the discharge should have been confined to them, and not have extended to those who were ignorant of any transaction, beyond the general intention of their embassy; the consequence was, that the country has lost the service of near three hundred of the best shipwrights, which the Dock Yards to this day have not recovered.—The visitation of the Admiralty to the yards cannot have escaped your notice, a visitation that has procured them so *much credit*.—What! are they entitled to credit, for having discharged a number of men, at a time when the approaching rigour of the season, would deprive the generality of them of an opportunity of procuring for themselves and families a subsistence? For burthening parishes with heavy rates, by reason of the numbers that became objects of parochial charity? and for driving others to seek an asylum in foreign countries? No, I hope there are but very, very few Englishmen who can sanction such unnatural and impolitic proceedings.—I am inclined to attribute the credit they have obtained, to the two or three solitary instances of abuse they have discovered, which are magnified beyond all bounds, and for which the whole civil department of the navy is stigmatized.—It is much to be lamented there is so little charity in the world, that ten thousand men should be considered in an infamous light, because a few undeserving and peculating characters have been amongst them.—It has been said that Lord St. Vincent by his *wise* and *politic* system of economy has saved three millions per annum, and another person asserts that the annual peculations have amounted to £500,000. I shall therefore offer one powerful argument in opposition to those Munchausenlike statements, (statements which have originated from an intention to defame and vilify every person concerned in the internal government of the Dock Yards); by stating the whole expense of the yards in the year 1798, both for materials and workmanship amounted to no more than £1,994,000. Then how is it possible that three millions could be saved, or that peculations could be carried on to an amount exceeding a quarter of the whole expense? This I am certain of, that any one who has the smallest knowledge of naval affairs must see the fallaciousness of the assertions.—In every Dock Yard there is a description of people called cabin-keepers, pound-keepers, &c. whose duty it is to take charge of certain stores and issue them when wanted. These appointments have been generally filled up by shipwrights and artificers rather advanced in years; to which offices, as the employment was not laborious, they were perfectly competent, and were certainly, more to be depended on than young men.—Many of them, who at this time are equal to the task, have been discharged.—Some it is true were past labour, but it is generally admitted, that there are also several who are still capable of working, and who of course will work for individuals.—Indeed some artificers whom the Admiralty discharged as incapable of performing their duty, are now earning, in merchants yards, at the rate of eight or nine shillings per diem.

It has been asserted by a member of that board, the Dock-Yards are *full of artificers*, the truth of which I positively deny, for in one yard the shipwrights are now nearly two hundred short of the peace establishment, with a very little prospect of the numbers being encreased; and instead of making every exertion to repair the fleet, in some of the yards they are employed in pulling old ships to pieces. Surely it would be wiser, in the first place, to put the navy in a state of active employ, and after that is accomplished, works of less consequence might be carried on.—When the admiralty visited the yards in Sept. last, they discharged a number, with a promise of superannuation, four months have now elapsed without any provision being made for them, and the men already begin to think, the Admiralty have either forgotten their well deserved claims, or that they are to be consigned to their parishes without the promised remuneration. So much for their want of attention to the pressing calls of their fellow creatures. *O! tempora! O mores!*—I cannot resist making some observation with regard to the circumstance of the dismissal of the late builder of Plymouth Yard.—But in the first place, I must inform you that Lord St.Vincent's, then private secretary (Mr. B. Tucker), had a brother who was a foreman of the shipwrights in a merchant's yard, and who at *all* events was to be *provided* for, in one of the King's-yards.

He was therefore taken from his situation, and directly made an assistant to the master shipwright at Plymouth, (which is the second employment in the shipwright branch). This hasty appointment was a thing unheard of; for before any one could be promoted to that station, it had always been customary to serve, not only their apprenticeship in the Dock Yard, but to rise progressively to the rank of quaterman, foreman, master mastmaker, or boat-builder, before they could be an assistant; instead of which, *favouritism* and *partiality* prevailed.—There is one circumstance which requires particular attention. Soon after Lord St. Vincent was at the Admiralty, Mr. Marshall, the builder, received an anonymous letter, cautioning him to be on his guard, as it was the intention of the Admiralty to dismiss him.—In April last a committee of the Navy Board went to Plymouth, by an order from the Admiralty, to enquire into certain abuses, which *some one* had given them information of. At the head of the committee was Mr. B. Tucker (who at this time is a commissioner of the navy), dismissal was the result of the investigation, and immediately Mr. Tucker's brother was appointed builder.—This I am persuaded of, (and I am far from being singular in my opinion) that could Mr. Marshall have availed himself of a court martial, he would have been as honourably acquitted, as the late Sir W. Parker and General Innis. In page fifty-nine of the second number of the third volume of your Register, the circumstance of the ship Mars is related, otherwise I should have offered some observations thereon. But this I must be allowed to say, that I am of opinion had any other man betrayed such an evident want of judgment, he would have been dismissed, as unfit to hold a situation of that importance; but fortunately for Mr. Tucker, he was the private Secretary's brother, and therefore only had a *reprimand*. It is worth remarking, that previous to the enquiry taking place, which ended in the dismissal of the Plymouth officers, the late Clerk of the Cheque, who was an intimate friend and favourite of Lord St. Vincent's, was provided for by being placed on the superannuated list, and therefore escaped those charges in which otherwise he would have probably been included.—I will now advert to the general disposition of the officers and seamen towards the public service. With regard to the officers, I am persuaded *disgust* is the prevailing sentiment; and as for the sailors it appears but too evident how *they* stand affected.—Take a view of the ports where ships are fitting, and you will find that scarcely any enter, for ships that were commissioned four or five months since are still laying for want of hands, and although they have been commissioned so long a time, there is little or no prospect of their complements being completed, an alarming circumstance, considering the situation this country stands in. Hence the mutiny which has recently occurred, for had it been in the power of the Admiralty to have procured men for the ships which are now under orders to relieve those that are abroad, that much to be lamented and unfortunate circumstance would not have happened.—Notwithstanding this incontrovertible representation, the Chancellor of the Exchequer asserted, that were it necessary fifty sail of the line could be put to sea in a month. Perhaps it is right (and I will admit it is), to make it appear our navy is in the most prosperous state, at all events it is highly necessary for our repose, Europe should think so. For my own part I sincerely wish it was, but a thorough information convinces me it presents a most gloomy prospect.—And how can it be otherwise when the study of the present rulers of the Admiralty is to *persecute* and *degrade* every class without discrimination under their jurisdiction.—The Admi-

ralty Board with all their pretensions to economy, would not have scrupled to have burthened the Public with additional expenses, provided the comptroller of the navy and a resident commissioner had accepted the offers made to them, as observed by your correspondent R B.—In short, they stop at nothing, however impolitic and unwise, to gratify any favourite project they may have formed.—Some little time since, a member of that board asserted, that the Admiralty had a right to dismiss any individual without assigning to them a reason. I paused and hesitated when I came to the passage, being doubtful whether I was reading the speech of a *British senator,* or the declaration of a *Spanish inquisitor.* That men are to be turned into the street, like dogs from a kennel, with every degradation, without any chance of their having an opportunity of clearing themselves in the opinion of the world; is such treatment as every honest Englishman must shudder at: surely give a man a chance of exculpating himself, and if he fails in that, then, and not until then, punish him.—Many high encomiums have been passed on the Admiralty for their attention to the correction of abuses —But I contend they are not entitled to those hyperbolical compliments which some uninformed people so liberally bestow; for the new regulations which took place the 1st. July, 1801, and which did away one of the greatest evils complained of, that of permitting the workmen to carry out chips, was suggested by the commissioners of enquiry in 1784; not that I mean to say the regulations were planned by the commissioners of enquiry in toto; for I believe the greatest part originated with Earl Spencer, and were put in a train to be carried into execution long before Lord St. Vincent was at the Admiralty; and therefore, they cannot be entitled to popularity for having only put in force the measures that were framed by their predecessors.—It has been an unfortunate circumstance for many individuals, that the leading persons at the Admiralty had so long a list of favourites, who *were* to be provided for, at *all* events; had it been otherwise, many who are now drinking of the bitter cup of sorrow and affliction, would still have enjoyed comfortable appointments. —Almost every individual in the civil and military department seems to entertain the same sentiment, and it is painful to state that *distrust* and *murmurs* are predominant. —Are these times to add (by the violent and oppressive manner of a department of the government) to the disaffected of the country? Surely not, for if ever it was needful that Britain should be united, I know of no one period that required it more than the present. Under the present Admiralty people will not, they cannot have confidence: *too* many are still smarting under the baneful effects of their violent proceedings.—Even amongst themselves, it is well understood they cannot agree, and therefore a house divided against itself must fall; and the sooner that takes place, the better it will be for the welfare of Great Britain.

23d Jan. 1803. W. B.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Convention between Austria, France, and Russia, signed at Paris on the 26th Dec. 1802.

His Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, having signified that he could not consider the 5th article of the treaty of Luneville, as far as it relates to his Royal Highness the Archduke Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Tuscany, as sufficiently fulfilled by the plan of indemnities agreed to by the Deputation of the Empire; and as the First Consul of the French Republic, on his part, has nothing more at heart than to contribute to the entire and perfect fulfilment of that treaty, it has been resolved, with the consent of his Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, to agree on certain modifications to be introduced into the plan accepted by the Deputation of the Empire, to render it conformable to the principles of the treaty of Luneville, and such as may receive the ratifications of the Emperor and the Empire.—For this purpose the high contracting powers have appointed their respective plenipotentiaries, namely, his Majesty the Emperor, King of Hungary and Bohemia, the Sieur John Philip, Count Cobentzel; and the First Consul of the French Republic, Citizen Joseph Buonaparté, who having exchanged their full powers, have agreed on the following articles:—Art. I. To enlarge the indemnities stipulated in favour of his Highness the Duke of Modena and his heirs, his Imperial Majesty cedes the district or province Ortenau, with all its dependencies, to be united to the Breisgau, and his highness and his heirs shall possess these two provinces without any exception or limitation, according to the 4th article of the treaty of Luneville, which, with respect to the duke, is to be understood as well of the Ortenau as of the Breisgau. —Art. II. To indemnify his Imperial Majesty for the cession of the Ortenau, the two bishopricks Trent and Brixen shall be secularised, and his Majesty shall receive possession of the same, and all their property, rights, and revenues, only under the condition that he shall provide for the the maintenance, for life, of the two Prince-bishops and the Chapters, as shall be agreed on, and for the future dotation of the clergy, which, in these dioceses, shall be placed on the same footing as in the other provinces of the Austrian monarchy.—Art. III. To complete the indemnities of his Royal Highness the Archduke, Grand Duke (of Tuscany), the bishopric of Eichstadt shall be added to what has already been assigned to his Royal Highness by the general conclusum, or recess, of the 2d of Frimaire (Nov. 23), to be possessed by his Royal Highness and his heirs, in full sovereignty and independence, with all the property, revenues, rights and prerogatives connected therewith, as possessed by the Prince-bishop himself at the time of the signing the treaty of Luneville; only with the exception of the districts of Sandsee, Wernfels, Spalt, Oberberg, Hornburg, and

Warburg, with all the dependencies of the bishopric of Eichstadt, contained in the territories of Anspach and Bayreuth, which shall remain to his Electoral Palatine Highness of Bavaria, and shall be recompensed to his Royal Highness the Archduke, Grand Duke, by a suitable equivalent from the domains of his Electoral Highness of Bavaria in Bohemia, and in case these should not be sufficient, from other revennes of his Electoral Highness.—Art. IV. For the confirmation of the said stipulations, and the property and other rights which his Imperial Majesty, as sovereign of the Austrian hereditary states, and head of the Empire, has agreed on and ceded for the completion of the plan of indemnities, his Majesty engages to employ his influence that the general plan of indemnities, as modified by the present convention, shall be ratified by the Empire, and that it shall, without delay, receive the Imperial ratification.—Art. V. It is expressly understood, that after the exchange of the present act, the territories mentioned in the preceding articles shall be taken possession of, both in the civil manner, by the princes to whom they are allotted, or in their names; also that the city of Passau, and the suburbs of Instadt and Illstadt, shall be immediately evacuated by the troops of his Imperial Majesty, and given up to his Electoral Palatine Highness of Bavaria, but under condition that the fortifications of the city shall not be enlarged or strengthened, but only maintained in their present state; and that no new fortifications shall be erected in the suburbs of Instadt and Illstadt. Also in the territory of the bishopric of Eichstadt, no new fortifications shall be erected by his Royal Highness the Archduke Ferdinand or his heirs.—Art. VI. The First Consul of the French Republic will unite with his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias to procure the electoral dignity for his Royal Highness the Archduke Ferdinand.—Art. VII. The high contracting parties guarantee reciprocally the fulfilment of every thing contained in the preceding articles, and the minister plenipotentiary of his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias shall be invited to accede to the present convention, for and in the name of his Imperial Majesty, as a contracting principal.—The present convention shall be ratified within twenty days from the present time, or sooner if possible.—Done at Paris, the 5th Nivose, of the year 11, (Dec. 26, 1802).—(Signed) *Phil. Cobenzel.—Joseph Buonaparté.—Count Markoff.*

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Genoa, Jan. 6.—This day three French ships of the line have entered our port, under the command of Vice-Admiral Bedou, after a voyage of twenty days from Brest; each with a crew of 560 men. On board this squadron, the Polish demi-brigade will embark, after being reviewed.

Florence, Jan. 7.—We yesterday received, by a Courier from Leghorn, the agreeable intelligence that the Spanish fleet which brings back our Sovereigns, had arrived within sight of that Port, but a contrary wind prevented the disembarkation of their Majesties.

Amsterdam, Jan. 15.—Yesterday the Legislative Body at the Hague resolved that the Batavian Rescriptions should be changed into State Obligations. The plan is not exactly known, but the principal outline is said to be, that to a rescription of 1000 florins, 800 florins shall be added in ready money, for which shall be given three obligations, each of 1000 florins, to bear an interest of 3 per cent. at least. In consequence of this determination, the Batavian Rescriptions have to-day fallen to 60; but they find many buyers at that price, and will probably soon be higher.

Hague, Jan. 15.—The French expedition to Louisiana, is delayed by the severity of the weather; the ships destined for it are all frozen in at Helveotsluys. One hundred and thirty women and two hundred children, are to go with this expedition. The troops consist of six battalions of Infantry, 190 Dragoons, the Corps of Guides, and a detachment of Artillery.—We are returning throughout our Republic to our old institutions and customs. Many of the partizans of the Stadtholder have been admitted into different Municipal Offices, and the Government of the City of Amsterdam has published a Proclamation, restoring the Guilds or Corporations which had been abolished by the second Legislative Body, through the whole Republic. No person can now carry on any manufacture or fabrick in Amsterdam, within the laws of the late Corporation, who is not free of the Guild.

Brussels, Jan. 20.—It appears that it is not in the vicinity of our city alone that an encampment is to be formed for 12,000 men. Accounts from the borders of the Rhine mention, that an equal number of troops is to be stationed on this part of the frontier.—The general commanding the 27th military division, has received positive orders to this effect. According to the same advices, the Prefects of the four new departments are to meet in a few days at Coblentz, to confer with Citizen Dauchy, on all matters that concern their governments. General Beliard had set out, on the 13th, for Paris, with the greatest precipitation; he returned yesterday evening, but did not stop a moment. He proceeded immediately to Ghent, where the Counsellor of State, Pellet de la Lozere, still is. It is not known what occasioned this precipitate journey, and this return equally precipitate.

New York, Dec. 25.—The accounts from New Orleans confirm the apprehensions which the inhabitants of the United States entertained on the subject of the cession of Louisiana to France. A letter from that place, dated October 28, states, that no Spanish vessel is allowed to load with any thing but Spanish produce, and that only for France, Spain, or the Colonies. Another letter of the 29th of the same month, mentions that the ship Matilda, from London, was not permitted to land her cargo, and the consignees of a number of vessels from Europe and the United States had dispatched orders for the Captains of the respective ships not to proceed up the river, as their cargoes could not be received.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Message of the President of the United States of America, to the Congress, on Wednesday, Dec. 15, 1802.

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.—When we assemble together, Fellow Citizens, to consider the state of our beloved country, our just attentions are first drawn to those pleasing circumstances which mark the goodness of that Being from whose favour they flow; and the large measure of thankfulness we owe for his bounty. Another year has come around, and finds us still blessed with peace and friendship abroad; law, order, and religion at home; good affection and harmony with our Indian neighbours; our burthens lightened, yet our income sufficient for the public wants, and the produce of the year great beyond example. These, fellow citizens, are the circum-

stances under which we meet; and we remark, with special satisfaction, those which, under the smiles of Providence, result from the skill, industry, and order of our citizens, managing their own affairs in their own way, and for their own use, unembarrassed by too much regulation, unoppressed by fiscal exactions.—On the restoration of peace in Europe, that portion of the carrying trade which had fallen to our share during the war, was abridged by the returning competition of the Belligerent Powers. This was to be expected and was just. But, in addition, we find, in some parts of EUROPE, *monopolizing discriminations*, which, in the form of duties, tend effectually to prohibit the carrying thither our own produce in our own vessels. From existing amities, and a spirit of justice, it is hoped that friendly discussion will produce a fair and adequate reciprocity. But should false calculations of interest defeat our hope, it rests with the Legislature to decide whether they will meet inequalities abroad with countervailing inequalities at home, or provide for the evil in any other way.—It is with satisfaction I lay before you an Act of the British Parliament, anticipating this subject, so far as to authorise a mutual abolition of the duties, and countervailing duties, permitted under the treaty of 1794. It shews, on their part, a spirit of justice and friendly accommodation, which it is our duty and our interest to cultivate with all nations. Whether this would produce a due equality in the navigation between the two countries, is a subject for your consideration.—Another circumstance which claims attention, as directly affecting the very source of our navigation, is the defect, or the evasion, of the law providing for the return of seamen, and particularly of those belonging to vessels sold abroad. Numbers of them, discharged in foreign ports, have been thrown on the hands of our Consuls, who, to rescue them from the dangers into which their distresses might plunge them, and save them to their country, have found it necessary, in some cases, to return them at the public charge.—The cession of the Spanish province of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the late war, will, *if carried into effect, make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations*, which will, doubtless, have just weight in any deliberations of the Legislature connected with that subject.—There was reason, not long since, to apprehend that the warfare in which we were engaged with Tripoli, might be taken up by some other of the Barbary powers. A reinforcement, therefore, was immediately ordered to the vessels already there.—Subsequent information, however, has removed these apprehensions for the present. To secure our commerce in that sea, with the smallest force competent, we have supposed it best to watch strictly the harbour of Tripoli. Still, however, the shallowness of their coast, and the want of smaller vessels on our part, has permitted some cruizers to escape unobserved; and to one of these an American vessel unfortunately fell a prey. The captain, one American seaman, and two others of colour, remain prisoners with them, unless exchanged under an agreement formerly made with the Bashaw, to whom, on the faith of that, some of his captive subjects had been restored.—The Convention with the State of Georgia has been ratified by their Legislature, and a re-purchase from the Creeks has been consequently made, of a part of the Tallassee country. In this purchase has been also comprehended a part of the lands within the fork of Oconee and Oakmulgee rivers. The particulars of the contract will be laid before Congress so soon as they shall be in a state for communication.—In order to remove every ground of difference possible with our Indian neighbours, I have proceeded in the work of settling with them, and marking the boundaries between us. That with the Chactaw nation is fixed in one part, and will be through the whole within a short time. The country to which their title had been extinguished before the revolution is sufficient to receive a very respectable population, which Congress will probably see the expediency of encouraging, so soon as the limits shall be declared. We are to view this position as an outpost of the United States, surrounded by strong neighbours, and distant from its support. And how far that monopoly, which prevents population, should here be guarded against, and actual habitation made a condition of the continuance of title, will be for your consideration. A prompt settlement too, of all existing rights and claims within this territory, presents itself as a preliminary operation.—In that part of the Indian territory which includes Vincennes, the lines settled with the neighbouring tribes fix the extinction of their title at a breadth of 24 leagues from East to West, and about the same length parallel with and including the Wabash. They have also ceded a track of four miles square, including the Salt Springs near the mouth of that river.—In the department of finance it is with pleasure I inform you that the receipts of external duties, for the last twelve months, have exceeded those of any former year, and that the ratio of increase has been also greater than usual. This has enabled us to answer all the regular exigencies of Government, to pay from the Treasury, within one year, upwards of eight millions of dollars, principal and interest of the public debt, exclusive of upwards of one million paid by the sale of bank stock, and making in the whole a reduction of nearly five millions and a half of principal, and to have now in the Treasury four millions and a half of dollars, which are in the course of application to the further discharge of debt and current demands. Experience, too, so far authorises us to believe, if no extraordinary event supervenes, and the expenses which will be actually incurred shall not be greater than were contemplated by Congress at their last session, that we shall not be disappointed in the expectations then formed. But, nevertheless, as the effect of peace on the amount of duties is not yet fully ascertained, it is the more necessary to practise every useful economy, and to incur no expense, which may be avoided without prejudice.—The collection of the internal taxes having been completed in some of the States, the officers employed in it are of course out of commission. In others they will be so shortly. But in a few, where the arrangements for the direct tax had been retarded, it will still be some time before the system is closed. It has not yet been thought necessary to employ the agent authorised by an Act of the last Session, for transacting business in Europe relative to debts and loans. Nor have we used the power confided by the same Act, of prolonging the foreign debt by re-loans, and of redeeming instead thereof, an equal sum of the domestic debt. Should, however, the difficulties of remittance on so large a scale render it necessary at any time, the power shall be executed, and the money thus unemployed abroad shall, in conformity with that law, be faithfully employed here in an equivalent extinction of domestic debt. When effects so salutary

result from the plans you have already sanctioned, when merely by avoiding false objects of expense, we are able, without a direct tax, without internal taxes, and without borrowing, to make large and effectual payments towards the discharge of our public debt, and the emancipation of our posterity from that mortal canker, it is an encouragement, fellow citizens, of the highest order, to proceed as we have begun in substituting economy for taxation, and in pursuing what is useful for a nation, placed as we are, rather than what is practised by others under different circumstances. And whensoever we are destined to meet events which shall call forth all the energies of our countrymen, we have the firmest reliance on those energies, and the comfort of leaving for calls like these, the extraordinary resources of loans and internal taxes. In the mean time, by payments of the principal of our debt, we are liberating, annually, portions of the external taxes, and forming from them a growing fund, still further to lessen the necessity of recurring to extraordinary resources.—The usual account of receipts and expenditures for the last year, with an estimate of the expenses of the ensuing one, will be laid before you by the Secretary of the Treasury. —*No change being deemed necessary in our military establishment*, an estimate of its expenses for the ensuing year, on its present footing, as also of the sums to be employed in fortifications, and other objects within that department, has been prepared by the Secretary at War, and will make a part of the general estimates which will be presented to you.—Considering that our regular troops are employed for local purposes, and that the militia is our general reliance for great and sudden emergencies, you will doubtless think this institution worthy of a review, and give it those improvements of which you find it susceptible.—Estimates for the naval department, prepared by the Secretary of the Navy for another year, will in like manner be communicated with the general estimates. A small force in the Mediterranean will still be necessary to restrain the Tripoline cruizers: and the uncertain tenure of peace with some other of the Barbary powers, may eventually require that force to be augmented. The necessity of procuring some smaller vessels for that service, will raise the estimate; but the difference in their maintenance will soon make it a measure of economy.—Presuming it will be deemed expedient to expend annually a convenient sum towards providing the naval defence which our situation may require, I cannot but recommend that the first appropriations for that purpose, may go to the saving what we already possess. No cares, no attentions, can preserve vessels from rapid decay, which lie in water, and exposed to the sun. These decays require great and constant repairs, and will consume, if continued, a great portion of the monies destined to naval purposes. To avoid this waste of our resources, it is proposed to add to our navy yard here a dock, within which our present vessels may be laid up dry, and under cover from the sun. Under these circumstances experience proves that works of wood will remain scarcely at all affected by time. The great abundance of running water which this situation possesses, at heights far above the level of the tide, if employed as is practised for lock navigation, furnishes the means for raising and laying up our vessels, on a dry sheltered bed. And should the measure be found useful here, similar depositories for laying up, as well as for building and repairing vessels, may hereafter be undertaken at other navy yards, offering the same means. The plans and estimates of the work, prepared by a person of skill and experience, will be presented by you without delay; and from these it will be seen that scarcely more than has been the cost of one vessel is necessary to save the whole, and that the annual sum to be employed towards its completion may be adapted to the views of the Legislature as to naval expenditure.—To cultivate peace, and maintain commerce and navigation in all their lawful enterprizes; to foster our fisheries as nurseries of navigation, and for the nurture of man, and protect the manufactures adapted to our circumstances; to preserve the faith of the nation by an exact discharge of its debts and contracts, expend the public money with the same care and economy we would practise with our own, and impose on our citizens no unnecessary burthens; to keep in all things within the pale of our constitutional powers, and cherish the federal union, as the only rock of safety; these, fellow citizens, are the landmarks by which we are to guide ourselves in all our proceedings. By continuing to make these our rule of action, we shall endear to our countrymen the true principles of their constitution, and promote an union of sentiment and of action, equally auspicious to their happiness and safety. On my part you may count a cordial concurrence in every measure for the public good; and on all the information I possess which may enable you to discharge to advantage the high functions with which you are invested by your country. (Signed) *Thomas Jefferson.*

On the 22d December, the Governor and Council of Essequibo and Demerara, and the Districts thereunto belonging, published a Proclamation notifying to the Inhabitants, that Anthony Meertens, the newly-appointed Governor-General of those Colonies, had arrived with the Batavian Troops, and after the Colonies had been duly surrendered to the Batavian Republic, had appeared in the Council assembled, and delivered his Commission from the Batavian Directory, as Governor-General, which Commission is as follows:

The Directory of the Batavian Republic, to all to whom these presents may come, health. Be it known, that, having judged it necessary for the advantage and service of the country to appoint a Governor General for the colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, we hereby name and appoint such a governor, in the person of Anthony Meertens, on whose abilities, fidelity, and vigilance, we can perfectly rely, charging him to conduct himself in his post faithfully, according to the oath he has taken to his country, and agreeably to the duty of a good and faithful governor-general, according to the instructions he has received, or shall hereafter receive, hereby commanding all, and every one to acknowledge, respect, and obey the above-named Anthony Meertens, in the before-mentioned capacity, and to render him every aid and assistance in whatever he may judge for the advantage of the colony.—Done at the Hague the 11th May, 1802.—*Samuel Van Hoogstraaten, V. P.*

The governor and council then order, that the said Anthony Meertens shall be acknowledged and obeyed as governor-general of the colonies of Demerara and Essequibo, by all the colleges within the said colonies. They add, that all the inhabitants within the same are *ipso facto* released, by the restoration of the colonies to the Batavian Republic, from the oath of fidelity which they took to his Britannic Majesty at the time of their surrender, and they require them in consequence to

take an oath of fidelity to the governor-general of the following tenor:—"I promise and swear, that "I will be faithful to the directory of the Batavian Republic, as the supreme authority to "which I am subject; to the council of the American colonies and possessions, and to the governor-general of these colonies, that I will render "them all due obedience, that I will take no part "in any conspiracies, cabals, or factions; but, on "the contrary, support the general tranquillity, "safety, and welfare, with all my power, and resist every thing that may tend to disturbance or "injury, and, on all occasions, conduct myself as "becomes a good and peaceable citizen, and inhabitant, without suffering either favour or affection, hope or reward, fear of the loss of property or life, or any other motive to induce me "to swerve from my duty."—All the inhabitants of Demerara who shall not have taken this oath and signed their names to it in a register, before the last day of January, and those of Essequibo who shall not have taken it, and signed in the same manner, before the last day of February, will be compelled to leave the country.

Remonstrance of the Civil and Military authorities of Constance against the Article published by the Moniteur, relative to the English agent, Mr. Moore. (Vol. 2. p. 881.)

Several gazettes, both French and German, have repeated after the Moniteur, the official journal of France, an article from Constance, dated 15th December, which concerns Mr. Moore, an English gentleman, his stay, and his occupations at Constance. The facts contained in that article being immediately connected with this city, cannot be so well ascertained any where else as here. Of these facts the following only are strictly true:—1st. Mr. Moore has been in this city, but he left it the 15th December, consequently ten days before the date of the said article. 2d. One Rocket went from Constance to London. 3d. The ci-devant Bailly Wagner lodged at the Aigle until he had hired a private house. 4th. Mr. Moore lived here in the most quiet manner. All the rest of the article is a direct falsehood: and it is difficult to conceive how any correspondent could have ventured to furnish the French Official Journal with an article in which there are more lies than lines. The Imperial Commandant of this city and the directors of the police have though themselves bound in honour and in duty to make the present declaration.—*Constance. Jan. 2d.* 1803.

DOMESTIC.

On Wednesday his Majesty held a levee at Saint James'.—At one o'clock the grand convocation of the clergy of England arrived from Westminster Abbey, having previously finished the holding of the convocation in the Jerusalem Chamber. It was attended by his Grace the Archb. *of Canterbury*, bishops of Winchester, London, Ely, Litchfield, St. Asaph, Hereford, Rochester, Bath, and Wells, Bristol, Rev. Drs. Glasse, Gordon, Tattersall, and Fisher, Rev. Mr. Moore, Rev. Mr. Nares, and the Rev. Dr. Vincent, dean of Westminster, who was appointed prolocutor to the convocation, in which capacity he delivered to his Majesty the address of the clergy, on the meeting of the new Parliament.

Downing Street, Jan. 29.—The King has been pleased to appoint William Drummond, Esq. to be his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Sublime Ottoman Porte.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Hugh Elliot, Esq. to be his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the court of Naples.—The King has been pleased to appoint Anthony Merry, Esq. to be his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States of America.—The King has been pleased to appoint Edward Thornton, Esq. to be his Majesty's Secretary of Legation at the Hague.

Crown Office, Jan. 29.—Members returned to serve in this present parliament.—*Borough of Gatton.*—Philip Dundas, of New Norfolk Street, Grosvenor Square, Middlesex, Esq. in the room of James Dashwood, Esq. who has accepted the office of steward of his Majesty's manor of East Hendred, in the county of Berks.

Whitehall, March 20, 1802.—The King has been graciously pleased to give and grant unto his Excellency Thomas Earl of Elgin, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Sublime Porte, his royal license and permission to receive and wear the insignia of the Order of the Crescent, given to him by the Ottoman Emperor.—*Aug.* 21. The King has also been graciously pleased to give and grant unto his Excellency Sir John Borlase Warren, Baronet, Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath, Rear-admiral of the White Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet, and his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the court of St. Petersburgh, his royal license and permission to receive and wear the insignia of the Order of the Crescent, transmitted to him by the Ottoman Emperor.—And also to command, that these his Majesty's concessions and declarations, together with the relative documents, be registered in his College of Arms.

Bankrupts.—Wood, W. Liverpool, flour-dealer.—Teesdale, J. the Younger, Boston, merchant.—Presgrave, E. Spalding, merchant.—Prickett, T. Warwick-lane, scrivener.—Burnett, S. Petersfield, victualler.—Wright, T. Leeds, merchant.—Calton, G. Sheffield, linen-draper.—Hull, W. Upper Boddington, Northampton, and L. Hull, Banbury, cow-dealers.—Rogers, W. Dipley Mill, Southampton, miller and malster.—Quagle, M. Liverpool, merchant.—Porter, R. C. Kingston-upon-Hull, ironmonger.—Boorman, J. Headcorn, timber-merchant.—Jackson, F. Basinghall-street, factor.—Cooke, J. Manchester, merchant.—Toy, E. Plymouth-dock, draper.—Jeffery, J. Bristol, cutler.—Garwood, J. Royston, victualler.—Pennington, L. Warrington, corn-dealer.

Births.—On the 9th ult. at Hains Castle, Lady Errol, of a daughter. On the 29th ult. at Cottle's House, Wilts, the Lady of B. Hobhouse, Esq. M.P. of a daughter.—*Marriage.*—On the 20th ult. Maj. Gen. Gent to Miss Temple French.

Army on the 1st Feb. 1803.	Regulars				
	Cav.	Inf.	Fe. Inf.	Tot Ba.	Inv. Co
England and Wales	20	27	—	47	—
North Britain	2	7	—	9	6
Ireland	7	22	3	32	—
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	5	—	5	—
Gibraltar	—	6	—	6	—
Egypt and Malta	1	7	—	8	—
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	6	1	7	—
West-Indies	—	21	—	21	—
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	5	—	5	—
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	20	—	25	—
On Passage to England or Ireland from sundry places	—	6	—	6	—
Total	35	132	4	171	6

Navy on the 1st Feb. 1803.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot.
In Port and fitting, and with sealed orders	9	2	32	43	86
Guard Ships	0	0	0	0	0
In the English and Irish Channels	0	0	5	15	20
On the Downs and North Sea stations	0	0	10	13	23
At the West-India Islands and on the Passage	2	0	5	21	28
On the Jamaica station	9	0	9	9	27
America and Newfoundland stations	0	1	4	5	10
Cape of Good Hope, East-Indies, and on the Passage	6	7	13	17	43
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	0	0	3	6	9
Mediterranean and on Passage	10	2	21	14	47
Hospital and Prison Ships	1	0	0	0	1
Total in Commission	37	12	103	144	296
Receiving Ships	7	0	7	0	14
Serviceable and repairing for Service	30	2	9	0	41
In Ordinary	99	11	91	70	271
Building	24	0	10	3	37
Total	197	25	220	217	659
Ordinary.					
Portsmouth	39	3	26	11	79
Plymouth	46	1	22	21	90
Chatham	43	7	28	2	72
Sheerness	5	2	8	9	24
River	3	0	31	28	62
Total	136	13	107	71	327

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THUR.
Bank Stock	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 pr. C. R. An.	71⅜	70⅞	—	71	—	71⅛
3 per C. Con.	70⅝	70¾	—	70½	—	70⅝
4 pr. C. Con.	87¼	87⅛	—	87	—	87
5 pr. Ct. Ann.	100¾	100¾	—	100¼	—	100½
Bank L. Ann.	20 5/16	20½	—	—	—	20¼
D° S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	103½	103⅝	—	103⅜	—	103
Omnium	4½ dis	4½ dis	—	4⅜ dis	—	4⅜ dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36 2	2 us.	Leghorn	50
D°, at sight	35 10		Naples	40¼
Rotterdam	36 3	2 us.	Genoa	46
Hamburgh	34 3	2½us.	Venice, 51 livres piccole	
Altona	34 4	2½us.	effective per £. ster.	
Paris 1 day	24 8		Lisbon	68¼
Paris	24 12	2 us.	Oporto	68½
Bourdeaux,	24 13		Dublin	13
Cadiz	35½	eff.	Bilboa	35¾
Madrid	35¼	effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	46s. to 62s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 224s
Rye	35 .. 38	Hay per load	75 .. 140
Barley	24 .. 28	Beef, per stone	4s. to 5s. 6d.
Malt	43 .. 47	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	15 .. 22	Veal	6s. 0d. to 7s. 6d.
Pease (white)	33 .. 39	Pork	4s. 8d. to 5s. 8d.
Beans (horse)	34 .. 38	Tallow	4s. 6d.
Flour per sack	45 .. 50	Av. of Sugar pr cw	37s. 2d.
Seconds	40 .. 45	Salt, per Bushel	13s. 10d.
Coals per chal.	52 .. 57	Bread	9¼d the Quar. Loaf.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

In taking up the pen to discharge this our weekly duty to our readers, we have seldom had before us so many topics of importance as at this moment. Some of them we must put off till another opportunity; but the following ones, however brief and imperfect the sketch, we cannot suffer to pass unnoticed for another week; to wit: —1. *The right of cutting wood at Honduras*; 2. The speech of the American President, particularly as far as it relates to the *cession of Louisiana to France*; 3. Projects relative to *St. Domingo*; 4. The conduct of the *Admiralty*; 5. The state of *Parties*.

The right of cutting Logwood. —We gave in our last sheet (page 110), a publication from the Honduras merchants, relative to this right; and we, at the same time, intimated our own intention of discussing the question, which, with the reader's indulgence, we shall now attempt to do.——It was before stated, that, whatever might be the nature and quality of our right, the ministers were equally to blame for having left it open to dispute, and for having closely disguised from the parliament the real state of the settlement, as we now find it was laid before them by the parties interested therein. But it is no longer a question between the ministry and the parliament that we have to consider: it is a question between England and Spain backed with the counsel and the power of France; and, as it is probable, that the valuable settlement at Honduras, after an enjoyment of nearly a century and a half, must be shortly given up for ever, or be defended by arms, it behoves us to ascertain, with what precision we may, what are the grounds, on which our right is now to be maintained. — The logwood merchants affect to believe, that it will be an *indulgence* to the Spaniards, if we do not insist upon continuing to occupy the limits as extended during the war: "If they "quarrel about the matter," say these heroic gentlemen, "ministers ought to give "orders for *strengthening* our position at "Honduras, send out *reinforcements*, and "bid the Spaniards *defiance*. We have the "right, we have the power, and Buona-"parté should be taught that he *must not* "*domineer*, when he has not the ability to "act." It is surprizing how brave your timid animals become when their dearest possessions are in danger! But, as the honourable feelings of these gentlemen were not powerful enough to urge them forward, in opposition to the ruinous and disgraceful treaty of Amiens; as they could view, with indifference, the base abandon-

ment of their country's allies, the surrender of its bulwarks, and the exposure of its very existence as an independent nation; as they were reconciled to all these sacrifices for the sake of obtaining the "blessings of peace," they will certainly excuse us, if, before we cast away that dear bought "blessing" merely for their sakes, we take time to enquire, whether or not we have justice on our side.—There is no doubt, that a war *dissolves all existing treaties* from the very nature of war; and, all treaties being dissolved by war, mere peace does not renew them. "Then," say the merchants of Honduras, "by the same rule, "Spain may demand Gibraltar or Jamaica, "because the treaties of 1667 and 1713 "were not renewed at Amiens." Not so. There are some points, which, when once ceded, do not require to be renewed after a war; but there are others that do. Treaties, or parts of treaties, as we observed, on a former occasion, *cease* of themselves the moment they are *fully executed*. Gibraltar was not only ceded but taken possession of. The stipulation was executed, and its force was at an end. But, if Spain had, by a stipulation of the same treaty, obtained or reserved the privilege of selling oranges in the town, or of keeping a number of persons to dig stones out of one of the quarries, such a stipulation would have been found to be *unexecuted* at the breaking out of the war between England and Spain, and would, of course, have ceased to be any longer binding upon England, until again positively renewed.—The erroneous conclusion of the Honduras merchants (or rather their lawyer), proceeds from their confounding a *right of dominion* with a *right of convention*, which are not more different in their origin than in their nature and effects. The right of dominion (like that of Gibraltar for instance), once ceded, need not be renewed after any subsequent war; because it is a complete right, and requires neither the act nor the will of any other power to preserve the existence or enjoyment of it. But all rights, which are not rights of dominion, which are encroachments on that right, which are to be exercised in the dominions of *another* power, which require not only the past but the present and the future consent of that power, and an active continuance of his permission, must be renewed after a war. Such are rights of *commerce*, of *fishery*, of *drying fish*, of *cutting wood*, &c.—The Master of the Rolls, in his defence of the treaty, rightly took this line of arguing, but he fallaciously contended, that our right to cut wood at Honduras was like a right of dominion, and therefore need not be renewed.* He did not distinguish between those rights, which are to be exercised in *one's own dominions*, and, therefore, require the interference of one power only; and those rights, which are to be exercised in the dominions of *another* power, and which require the consent of two parties—a circumstance which, in the affairs of nations, always implies a covenant of some kind or other.—The proof that this doctrine is sound, is, that, in all treaties, the right of dominion, once ceded, is seldom, if ever, renewed; and, that rights of the other species, if meant to be revived, are always renewed specifically: nor is there, we believe, an instance of the contrary, and, it is well known, that the *practice* of nations is the *law* of nations.—The argument of the ministers, is, that we have kept possession during the war, and that, as (according to VATTEL), at a peace, every thing is to remain in *statu quo*, if not altered by specific articles, we still have the right to possess. But, is this really and truly the meaning of VATTEL? We think not. "The state of "things at the instant of making the treaty "is held to be legitimate, and any change "to be made in it requires an express specification in the treaty; consequently all "things not mentioned in the treaty, are to "remain *as they were at the conclusion of it.*"† True, and all we have to determine, is, what, as relative to the present point, was "*the state of things*" at the instant of making the treaty of Amiens? Why, the war had abrogated the convention of 1786; it was in *that state* at the conclusion of the peace, and as this state was not changed by any express specification in the treaty, the convention remained abrogated, and the right ceased.—But, say the ministers, we kept possession during the whole of the war. Granted; but, though the possession was preserved, the *nature* of it was changed. From being possessors by covenant, as friends and allies, you became possessors without covenant, as adversaries and as enemies, which is clearly proved by the attempt actually made by the other party to drive you out. Peace came: as we had clearly and unequivocally acknowledged, in 1783 and 1786, the whole right of sovereignty and dominion to be in the King of Spain, the Spaniards said nothing, in the treaty of Amiens, about Honduras: on their part, there was no occasion for any stipulation on the subject: they knew that we were, at that moment, in forcible possession of the exercise of a privilege to cut wood, and of a part of their shore in south

* See his speech, Vol. II. Supplement, p. 1346.
† Vattel, L. IV. Sect. 21.

America; but, as they knew, that we no longer possessed either by treaty, they, of course, regarded us as occupiers or conquerors, and, as all places occupied or conquered are, by the treaty of Amiens, to be restored, what we possessed at Honduras must of necessity be restored. The logwood lawyer goes upon the point of *possession*, but he does not appear to consider its nature, and that our possession, not being grounded on a right of dominion, but on a right of an inferior kind, must, to be good and valid, be specifically revived. The instances which he brings of Gibraltar, Canada, and Newfoundland have already been noticed; but what is the case as to the *fisheries* in the Gulph of St. Lawrence and Newfoundland? The French, aware of the principle we have stated, have not neglected to renew *their* rights, of this sort, by the treaty of Amiens! * Shall we be told, that there is a distinction here; and that the French did not *possess* the use of the fisheries *during the war* as we did that of the logwood districts? Who knows this? Who knows, that there were not French fishermen on the Banks every day in every season during the war? And, the poor fishermen of St. John's know, to their sorrow, that there was one part of the war when the French were completely masters of all the Banks. The French government knew this; but, it also knew, that we claimed the right of dominion in the fisheries in question, and therefore, it wisely renewed its conventional right to the use of them, which right had been abrogated by the war. This pretext of a right of possession, founded on a successful resistance of the Spaniards during the war, was, we think, satisfactorily replied to in a letter to Sir Frederick Eden: "We traded to Honduras, "we built huts and cut wood there, by "permission of the King of Spain; a per- "mission secured to us by treaties existing "before the war. From the commence- "ment of the war, the permission ceased; "and, do you really imagine, Sir, that our "continuing to cut wood without permis- "sion, during the war, is a conclusive "proof of our having a right to continue "to cut wood during the peace? Because "a tenant has kept forcible possession of "your house for a long time after the ex- "piration of his lease, shall he thereon "found a right to possess it for ever?" We call upon the logwood lawyer to answer these questions.—As to the quotation from Mably † it is expressly limited to rights of *dominion*, and is, in itself, very true: but, the inference (like that of the Master of the Rolls) extended to the case of Honduras, which has nothing to do with a right of dominion, is false. This distinction we take to be the hinge of the question.—Suppose, then, it is true, that the Spaniards have ordered us to quit Honduras, what argument have we to oppose to such an order? Can we say we are possessors by covenant? They will ask what covenant. Suppose we say, by the treaty of 1783, or by the convention of 1786? They will reply: those covenants were dissolved by the war, and you have not renewed them. Shall we next say, that we have kept possession during the war? Granted, say they; but you did so against our will; you did so as enemies and not as friends, by force and not by treaty; and, as you have not desired to continue your possession by a new treaty, we beg leave to exercise our right as Sovereigns, and to bid you depart, in which we are justified by the law of nations, and by your conduct. You were so sensible that your right here was purely a right of convention, and that, after every war, it merely depended upon continuing it by specific treaty, that you never failed so to continue it, at the end of every war, from 1670 to 1783; and, as you have not observed this precaution at Amiens, you have forfeited your right, and we insist upon the exercise of ours.—We should be glad to hear the reply of the logwood lawyer and the Master of the Rolls.

AMERICAN STATES AND LOUISIANA. —In p. 136 of this sheet, will be found the message of Mr. Jefferson, President of the United States of America, to the two Houses of Congress, at the opening of their session, which began, it appears, on the 15th of Dec. last. A paper like this embraces, of course, a great number of important objects. In order to form a right judgment relative to which, we beg leave to recommend, to such of our readers as may not be conversant in American affairs, to peruse the articles respecting that country, which will be found in the body and in the Supplement of Vol. I. of this work, and which are, in some sort, necessary to explain the views of the President, with respect both to foreign and domestic concerns. But, in the topics of this message, there is one, in which we, our readers, and our country, are more immediately interested: we mean that of the cession of Louisiana to France. "The cession," says the President, "of "the Spanish province of Louisiana to "France, which took place in the course "of the last war, will, *if carried into effect*, "*make a change in the aspect of our foreign re-*

* See Art. XV. Register, Vol. I. p. 326.

† See the article we allude to, p. 115.

" *lations*, which will, doubtless, have just " weight in any deliberations of the Legis- " lature connected with the subject."—This is perfectly *equivocal*; but, when viewed in conjunction with the alarm expressed by the people in every part of the United States, it is well calculated to produce that effect, which it really has produced on the small politicians, who conduct some of the London newspapers, and who appear to be, at last, awakened to some sense of the danger to be apprehended from this cession. But, the manner in which they communicate their sentiments to the public is truly curious. One affects to regard the danger as something which he himself had perceived, though he had, till now, thought it proper to conceal it from the profane vulgar; while another acknowledges it to have been foreseen, but observes, that the " specula- " tive politicians have hitherto considered " the cession as likely to be attended with " molestation *only* to the United States;" whereas, by this cession, " France has got " into her hands the *key of South America and* " *the Spanish mines.*"—Now, justice to ourselves and to our cause compels us to recall to the minds of our readers what we have said upon this subject, and to refer them to a dissertation as well as a map upon the subject, in Vol. I. of this work, p. 443. One passage from that dissertation we must quote, because it so completely destroys the assertions of the Morning Chronicle respecting our having extended our views of the danger of the cession to the United States of America *only*. " From the cold " regions of the North, from the haunts of " the martin and the beaver, let us now " turn to the glowing mines of the South. " In ceding Louisiana to France, Spain has " not stipulated for *boundaries.* The do- " minion which France formerly claimed " (and she never recedes), extended, on " the sea-board, towards the South, as far " as the Rio Bravo. The mouth of this ri- " ver, which affords good anchorage for " vessels of any size, places the all-power- " ful Republic at no more than 60 miles " from St. Andre, 123 miles from Panuco " and Yago, and 300 miles from the city of " Mexico itself, to all which places there " is a road from Rio Bravo much easier to " pass than the space between Philadel- " phia and Pittsburgh, which cost the " American militia a march of only one- " and-twenty days."—And yet the small politician, who conducts the Morning Chronicle, has discovered that " speculative po- " liticians have *hitherto* perceived danger *only* " to the United States!" The passage above quoted was published in the month of May last; and let not the " *safe* politi- " cians" say, that the Definitive Treaty was then made and ratified, and that it was *too late* to prevent the evil, for, the same, in substance, was said in one of the letters to Ld. Hawkesbury, on the Peace :—" Loui- " siana borders on Mexico, my lord, and " I can assure your lordship, that *your march* " *to Paris*, even in 1793, would not have " been so easy as a march from *New Orleans* " *to the city of Mexico.* Ten thousand French " soldiers, inured to the hardships and fa- " tigues of the camp and the field, accus- " tomed to danger as the eagle to the tem- " pest, and attracted by the richest prey " that ever tempted the rapacity of man, " would snatch this glittering prize from " the feeble and enervated hands of the " Spaniards, with much greater ease than " a handful of their ferocious and sanguinary " ancestors took it from its ancient pos- " sessors."—This was published on the 22d of October, 1801; and yet, it is now discovered that the source of danger here spoken of, has " *hitherto*" escaped observation! But this is an old trick of the small politicians, who, like their great leader, Mr. Sheridan, are famous for picking up, and appropriating to their own use, sayings and opinions, which they think are forgotten. They may, indeed, say as to the present case, that they never read the Register; but this excuse will not do with respect to Lord Grenville's speech of the 4th of May, where his lordship said, that, the " cession of Louisiana gave the French " an immense influence on the north as " well as the south of America. It gave " them the command of our West India " navigation, and it brought them within " 300 miles of the city of Mexico, the " march to which would be as easy as from " Chester to London; and, he had no " scruple to affirm, that, on the unfurling " of the first standard of an expedition " from Lousiana to Mexico, the whole of " the western inhabitants of the United " States would repair to it in arms."*—And yet the small politicians never before heard it suggested, that *Mexico* was in any danger from the cession of Louisiana. The fact is, that they are, upon all occasions, loth to acknowledge, that the opposers of the peace, whom they sometimes call the *Grenville Party*, and sometimes the *New Opposition*; they are extremely loth to acknowledge, that these gentlemen were correct in their opinions, respecting the consequences of the peace. They feel that they are entitled to no share of the honour of that opposition; and, therefore, they are

* Register, Vol. II. p. 1222.

uncommonly anxious to derogate, in some way or other, from the merit which events are daily attaching to it.—Returning to the President's message, and the opinions of the American people, it is now acknowledged, in that country and in this, that great danger is likely to arise to them both from the cession of Louisiana to France. How clearly this was predicted, how strongly it was dwelt on by those peers and members of parliament who opposed the treaty of Amiens, must be well remembered; not, therefore, to swell this article beyond the limits which we have to allot to it, we shall content ourselves with quoting the opinions of the makers and defenders of that fatal and degrading compact;* the opinions of the "*prudent* ministers," and the "*safe* politicians," beginning with that most sapient statesman, the minister of Richmond Park, who, in reply to Mr. Windham, sagaciously observed: that "His "right honorable friend laid great stress "on the establishment of the French in "Louisiana, and had said that the French "power could now put in danger the "whole of the continent of America, north "and south; but his right hon. friend could "not say, that if the French had not this "extent of territory *there*, they could not, "if *St Domingo* were tranquil, and affairs "were at rest with them in *that quarter*, "become, by means of a large military "force, *formidable to either North or South* "*America!*"†—His colleague, his worthy colleague, the solid young Lord Hawkesbury, the "steady young man," as the shop-keepers call him; this "*prudent* mi-"nister," expressed himself on the subject in the following "*safe*" and sensible manner: —"As to the political advantages, which "France will derive from the possession "of Louisiana, *I doubt whether they can be of* "*much consequence*. Gentlemen have said a "great deal about the influence, which "this possession threatens to give France "over the United States of America. To "this I answer, that it is the policy of "America to keep an equal balance be-"tween France and us, and that the pro-"bability therefore is, that the possession "of Louisiana, by *placing the French upon the* "*back of America*, every maxim of sound "policy will incline the latter to cultivate "a more intimate connexion with this "country." He next observed, that Mr. Windham, by supposing the danger to America to be so great, "*under-rated the* "*population and power of the United States*, and "forgot the *successful exertions*, which they, "when colonies of this country, made "against the French in 1756, though the "latter were then in *possession of both Louisiana* "*and Canada!*"*—The Saint Domingo General followed next. This gentleman, who appears to be not less able in the senate than in the field, and who shone not less in the debate on the treaty than at Port-au-Prince, or before the walls of Ferrol, said, that, "of Louisiana he had heard, that it "would enable France to attack the United "States on one side and Mexico on the "other; but, when Louisiana was *formerly* "in possession of France, it was totally "*imbécile*; and it had not increased in "population since it came into the hands "of Spain. But it was contended, that "the possession of Louisiana would give "the French great influence eventually "over the councils and measures of the "United States: here there was one ob-"servation that naturally occurred to the "mind of every man, which was this: "*We possess Canada, yet that possession does not* "*enable us to influence the United States*; and, "if this be the case, with *how much more force* "*does the argument apply to Louisiana!*"†—The Master of the Rolls, whose name we mention here with deep regret, said, that "With respect to the cession of Louisiana, "the value and importance of that cession "had been only *discovered within a few nights* "*preceding*. It was *formerly* in the possession "of France; but *she had not been able to draw* "*from it those advantages, which, it was con-*"*tended, she would derive from it now*. With "respect to *danger* arising from it, he could "not perceive that degree of injury to "this country, which had been pourtrayed. "The only *danger* likely to result from it "that he could discover, arose from bring-"ing France in contact with the United "States of America," [which was the very thing that Lord Hawkesbury rejoiced at]. "It *might* happen, that, in the *course of ages*, "some danger would result from this con-"nexion, but it could not be soon."‡—Such were the opinions of the "*safe* poli-

* It may be useful, however, to refer our readers here to some of the passages, to which we allude, in the speeches of those who opposed the peace.—Supplement to Register, Vol. II. Mr. Windham, p. 1157 and 1204; Mr. Elliot, p. 1193; Lord Grenville, p. 1222; Mr. Elliot, p. 1231; Lord Grenville, p. 1273; Mr. Windham, p. 1295 and 1298; and Sir W. Young, p. 1328.

† Debate of 3d May, 1802. Register, Vol. II. p. 1211.

* Debate of 13th May, 1802. Register, Vol. II. p. 1309.

† Debate of 14th May, 1802. Register, Vol. II. p. 1377.

‡ Debate of 14th May, 1802. Register, Vol. II. p. 1344.

" ticians:" such were the opinions of the makers and defenders of the peace of Amiens; of that peace, which the " witty " senator " said *every* man was *glad* of but *no* man was *proud* of; that blessed peace, at which Mr. Fox, the " patriot Fox," rejoiced, because it was " *glorious to France* " and to the *First Consul:*" such were the opinions, such were the words, of those men, to whom we are to look for the preservation of the country from the fearful dangers that now menace it! The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs talks of *placing the French upon the back of the Americans* in order to *attach* the latter to England, while the Master of the Rolls apprehends no danger from it except bringing the French and Americans *into contact*. The very circumstance, on which one of these statesmen builds his hope, is the only circumstance which excites fear in the other! Then, to see them producing the history of the war of 1756, when the now United States were colonies of England, when the people were devoted to England, and were aided by an English army on their frontier, and by an English fleet in the river St. Laurence; when there was hardly a single settler to the westward of the Appalachian mountains, when the river Mississippi was known to the Anglo-Americans by name only, and when no man ever dreamt of sending flour and beef down that river to the sea: to see the resistance made to the French by the Anglo-Americans, in this state of things, produced as a proof of the resistance they will *now* be able and willing to make; to see this argument seriously urged in the British Parliament, and that too by the minister whose peculiar duty it was to understand and to watch over the foreign affairs of the nation, must have created in the minds of all intelligent foreigners a considerable portion of that contempt, with which this miserable country is now spoken of, in all parts of the world. Yet, was even this surpassed by the Richmond-Park minister, who, in order to convince the House of Commons, that Mr. Windham was deceived, and that the cession of Louisiana to France was a thing of little or no consequence, observed, that, if that nation had a mind to attack Spanish America, or the United States, *she might do it equally well from* ST. DOMINGO!!!!!! Poor man! Wretched country, to be committed to a guide like this! To argue with such a thing would disgrace the name of reason; to expose its ignorance would be a libel on the eye-sight and the hearing of our readers. Attack Mexico and Kentucky by the way of St. Domingo, as easily as from the mouth and the banks of the Mississippi! Gracious God! why dost thou . . . . . but we will not complain: we have no right to complain: the simple fact that such a man has been minister for two years together, to say nothing of the acts of his ignorant and selfish administration, is, of itself, a sufficient proof, that the country is unworthy of remaining independent.——Having reminded our readers of the opinions entertained, respecting Louisiana, we should now offer them some remarks on President Jefferson's views, as to this particular point; but these we must reserve till our next. We must, however, not delay to observe, that our American letters, of the 27th of December, inform us, that the States of Kentucky, Tennesse, and the North Western Territory, had presented a memorial to the Congress of the United States, complaining against the measures adopted by the Spanirds at New Orleans, the object of which was to deprive the said states of the navigation of the Mississippi, " a freedom," say they, " *absolutely necessary* " *to our existence.*"—Why, so we said last year about this time. The " *ages,*" of which the Master of the Rolls was pleased to talk, have already rolled away! The importance of the possession of Louisiana, which he said Mr. Windham had " *discovered* only a " *few nights before,*" now appears not to have been a chimerical notion.

ST. DOMINGO.—Much has lately been said and written about this island. We have always thought, that the French would finally subdue the blacks, and make the country at once a productive colony and a rendezvous for their army, a *point d'appui,* whence to stretch forth their power as occasion might offer against our colonies, beginning with Jamaica. There has hitherto been more difficulty than we expected, attending this project; and, if flying reports from America and Jamaica are to be believed, the complete subjugation of the French part of the island will yet cost many thousands of troops; but not nearly so many as it would have cost, if our ministers had loved their country more and their places less; if they had refused to suffer the French armament to sail, 'till the signing of the definitive treaty, which would have given Toussaint time to fill his magazines, to repair his fortifications, and to embody his troops; and which would also have brought the armament to land at a moment when the yellow fever would have aided the blacks. But, say the ministers, " we wished for the French to succeed." Did you so? Why, then, your wishes have hitherto been defeated.—But, referring our

readers to what we have said before on this subject *, we have now to call their attention to a circumstance, which, though not entirely unforetold, will appear somewhat surprizing to those who have not watched the progress of national degradation. It is proposed to lend or let *English ships* for the purpose of carrying out troops to assist in the subjugation of St. Domingo: it is said, that ships have, by the permission of government, actually been hired for this purpose, and, from the language of the demi-official paper, we should not be at all surprized to find, that the ministry had, in one way or another, very considerably contributed to the forming of a depository of men and of arms, which will, at no very distant period be employed against our colonies. We stated, some time ago, that the provisions, supplied by the Americans to the army of St. Domingo, were paid for *in London*; and we shall not be surprized, if, upon enquiry (which certainly ought to be instituted), it should appear, that the British government was, and is, the *guarantee* for repayment to the House of Baring and Co. †. The demi-official paper takes great pains to prepare the public for some such discovery as this, as well as for the hire of the shipping. "It" [the subjugation of St. Domingo] "is, in "some degree, *a common cause*, and it might "be wise and prudent, in the British Go-"vernment, to *aid*, in some measure, this "undertaking." ‡. In answer to every thing, which is urged against the suicidial measure here suggested, it is said, that *the West India owners*, "the persons *most inte-"rested*," are for it. On this argument, the Morning Post of the 2d inst. has the following very just remarks:—"All those "who are the West India proprietors zea-"lously contend for giving them every aid. "—They wish to live under the British "Government rather than the French, *but "they would prefer the French to the dominion "of the Blacks*. This may be good argu-"ment in Jamaica, but it is most pernicious "reasoning in London. If once our colo-"nial subjects are allowed to calculate *the "prudence of their allegiance*, there is an end "of our colonial empire."—This is true, and very well said, and it certainly has not the less merit for being a faithful repetition of the statement and opinion of Mr. Windham in the debate of the 13th of May, 1802 §. Yes, the West India merchants are the "persons *most interested*," but in *what* are they most interested? Is it in the honour and independence of England, or in their own property? Is it in preventing that property from *falling into the hands of the French*, or from being *totally destroyed?* Every one, and particularly every West Indian, must know that France, with a military power well established at St. Domingo, must soon become the mistress of all that part of the world, particularly when she has established herself at the mouth of the Mississippi. "If we have the policy," said the *Mercure de France*, "to unite the industry "of the colonist with *the warlike spirit of the "buccaneer*, the West India islands will soon "become to her [St. Domingo] *what Eu-"rope is to France.*" This may be, perhaps, no very great cause of alarm to some of the proprietors of sugar plantations, who would, probably, rather spend their revenue in France than in England. We are really afraid, that many of them have made their calculation, have reconciled themselves to the necessity of *transferring their allegiance*. Not that, in general, they love, the French; not that they would not rather remain under the British Government; but they begin to regard it as being not so much a question of choice between the British and the French governments, as between the French government and the Blacks, and they would rather enjoy even a small portion of their property under the former, than lose it entirely under the latter. Shocking as is the thought, we greatly fear, too, that the same sort of feeling is fast, very fast, extending itself over the mother country. The merchants, the manufacturers, the dealers, the stock-holders and the money-holders of every description, have, for some time, been looking to the *possibility* of becoming the subjects of Buonaparté. They have not, indeed, promulgated the sentiment to the world; they have not probably yet debated on it, in their clubs or committees; they have refrained, perhaps, from talking of it in their cups; they may possibly have hidden it from the partners of their bed, and even from the partners of their purse: but, they have in their *dreams*, kneeled at the feet of the Consul, whom, to their great astonishment, they found to be a mighty good sort of a man; they have, in their waking moments, *thought* about subjection to him; they have mooted the question in their minds; in a word, they have looked, and they do look, to the power of Buonaparté, as a dernier resort, as a last refuge for their wealth.

THE CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY.—This was a topic on which we had much to say, but for want of room, we are obliged to defer it 'till another opportunity. We cannot, however, refrain from congratulating

* Particularly in Vol. II. p. 784, 5, 6, 7 and 8.
† See Vol. II. p. 698.
‡ True Briton, 29. January.
§ See Register, Vol. II. p. 1297.

Lord St. Vincent and the satellites, who have the happiness to move within his gentle influence, on the very zealous and judicious champion they have found in the conductor of the Morning Chronicle, who has so often panegyrized Fox and O'Connor, and who has stigmatized, as a *deserter*, the man who took the much boasted Invincible Standard. We congratulate his Lordship in particular on having found such an apologist, and also on the manner, in which that apologist has acquitted himself. He says, in speaking of the famous Admiralty *tree of liberty*, of which our correspondent gave some account *, " with respect to the *facts* we never heard " of them before." Now, we had not only heard of them before, but we had had, as we have at this moment, the very thing itself before our eyes. We have now lying upon the table, on which we are writing, not only a picture of this lovely tree, but one of the very identical trees, which were stuck up on the masts and in the cabins of the ships, at the very moment when an order was given out to confine to those ships both the officers and the men. This charming tree is printed in the centre of a sheet of post paper, having at the top, these words, thus printed:—" PEACE!! the result of our naval victories!!" And below, in a semicircle over the top of the tree, these words: " The British Tree of LIBERTY." —The tree, which is an oak, is loaded with goodly fruit, the names of several of our most distinguished naval commanders, written in white spaces in the form of an egg. All the other names are placed about amongst the branches, but that of the First Lord, one of the " *modest* ministry," is placed upon the *trunk*, and is *larger* than any of the rest. An account of the several victories is printed on the sides, and at the bottom, of the tree; but that of Lord St. Vincent is printed in characters one size *larger* than the rest, and is placed in the *centre*, though, by its taking that position, the chronological order is destroyed! A more striking instance of vanity and folly, has, perhaps, seldom appeared amongst the innumerable imbecillities, to which human nature is unhappily subject, either in childhood or in age!

STATE OF PARTIES.—The demi-official paper, the True Briton, of the 11th instant, contains an article, which, from its pompous inanity and its modest assurance, we at once attributed to the Richmond-Park minister, but which, upon inquiry, we find good reason to believe it to have proceeded from the pen of that other ornament of " THE FAMILY," Mr. J. H. Addington, uncle to the Clerk of the Pells. That this gentleman should write common sense for the space of two columns and a half of a long newspaper will, we know, by some persons, be totally discredited. That we cannot help. It is sufficient for us that we state what we think to be the fact; to command belief is not in our power.—The object of the article in question, is, to convince the public, and Mr. Pitt in particular, that the present ministry is too strong to be shaken even by him. The writer sets out with a grand display of all the different forces, which the ministry have at their command; and, after endeavouring to justify the minister for declining, on some occasions, to defend the conduct and character of Mr. Pitt, when either or both were attacked by the old O'Connor and Maidstone opposition, he proceeds to state, that rumours have got abroad respecting an union between that opposition and the ministerial party, whereon he makes the following most curious remark:—" Had the government [meaning " the ministry] been weak, these rumours " might have made some impression on " us; being strong, and daily increasing in " strength, and therefore in no want of " such alliances, we disbelieve them. The " *necessity* of such an union, we can only in " *one case* anticipate: and that is one which " of all others, we the most deprecate, but " about which *we are quite at ease*."—This is a direct threat to Mr. Pitt. They here tell him, that, as long as he chooses to let things go on in their present way; that is to say, to support them and *to keep out of office himself*, they would rather have his friendship than that of the Maidstone people; but, that, if he suffers himself to be turned against them, they will unite with his old and avowed adversaries. They do, indeed, deprecate the *necessity* of such a measure, but they, at the same time, cavalierly observe, that it is a matter, about which they are " *quite at ease*."—But, lest Mr. Pitt should not be deterred by this threat of a coalition against him, they next take care to point out the difficulty of the part he would have to sustain in opposition to them; and this is done under the colour of exposing what they have the modest assurance to call the *inconsistency* of Lord Grenville, which " inconsistency," by the by, they deduce from a most shameful falsehood of their own inventing. " To " these two great measures," [the Convention with Russia and the Peace with France] " Mr. Pitt *gave his unequivocal support and* " *approbation*." And yet Lord Grenville tells " us, that Mr. Pitt is the only person, at " the present crisis, *capable of saving the* " *country!*"—This dilemma (which is not

* See Vol. III. p. 67.

so for Lord Grenville) they have invented purely for Mr. Pitt. It is, word for word, a repetition of the charge of Mr. Sheridan against Mr. Pitt, upon the supposition that the latter meant to return to power. From Mr. Sheridan the charge might be fair enough, but, as coming from them, nothing could be more hostile, more malignant.—At the close of this curious essay, there is another stroke obviously intended to decry that sort of talent, which Mr. Pitt is universally acknowledged to possess in a superior degree, and for which, indeed, he is indebted for his fame.—" The measures of a " government," say they, " may be very " wise, and highly salutary to the country, " though unaccompanied with the display " of *extraordinary* ORATORICAL talents!"—Yes, good honest men, plain men, men in the middle classes of life, as Mr. Wilberforce said, may be excellent judges of public measures; but, unfortunately, in searching after these men in the middle classes of life, we have gone too far, and have taken them out of the *lower* classes of life. But, then comes the question, *who* was it that raised these low people? Who was it that stirred up these lees? It was Mr. Pitt! yea, it was Mr. Pitt himself! And he now has the mortification to see himself treated by them as the Colonnas and the Medicis were by Sixtus V.—And, let it not be supposed, that vengeance is within the reach of Mr. Pitt. Let it not be supposed, that to send these people back to their native obscurity is so easy a matter. In enumerating their friends, had they not been restrained by their modesty, they could have mentioned one much more valuable than all the Foxes, and Tierneys, and Greys, and Erskines, and Sheridans in the world; we mean Mr. Napoleone Buonaparté, a name that makes your well-meaning men turn pale and sets their teeth a-chattering in their head. Twice already we have said,* and we now say it for the third time, that, " the *prudent* mini- " sters know, that there is another set of " statesmen working day and night to pre- " vail on Mr. Pitt to cut off the thread of " their existence; but, *with Buonaparté at* " *their back*, they might bid defiance to the " Fatal Sisters themselves."—The Addingtons feel the truth of this as forcibly as does Deboffe. They remember well the sentiment of that patriotic gentleman, who " wished to see *no change of ministry*, be- " cause, as the present ministers were known " to be of a *pacific disposition*, if they were " changed, such change might furnish A " NEIGHBOURING POWER with a *pretext for* " *going to war with us*." They know but too well, that he spoke the voice of the country, and they know that that voice will enable them to set Mr. Pitt at defiance. This they have now done: nor, indeed, can any one, as far as we know, blame them for so doing: it is, in itself, rather a manly act: but, they might have done it with a little more suavity, in a manner less overbearing, less humiliating to Mr. Pitt, who though his political influence be diminished, still retains, and will ever retain, that respect and veneration, which is due to splendid talents, and to long, zealous, and disinterested services.

The CONVENTION between France, Austria, and Russia, which will be found in p. 134, shall be noticed in our next.—The hold which France is gaining on this country, by various means, shall also be a subject of remark.

* See Vol. II. pp. 573 and 889.

NOTICES.

A. T. may be assured, that we have not overlooked the scandalous misrepresentation which the Small Politicians have given of our exposure of Mr. Addington's financial statement. We will not ask how long it is since these gentlemen began to feel an anxiety for the credit of their country; but we call upon them to overset the facts and the arguments, which they have, as yet, thought proper to meet with nothing but an ill-natured envious falsehood —These Small Politicians (by which we mean Mr. Sheridan and his tribe of shallow-brained followers) have, in a late long and dull publication, given us their creed, which, in few words, is this: Mr. Pitt ought not to return to office, Mr. Fox is devoted to France, Mr. Windham is the true friend of his country but is the enemy of news-papers, Mr. Addington is a poor weak foolish man, but a poor weak foolish ministry is best suited to the present crisis, from which latter opinion some persons suspect, that the Small Politicians are speaking one word for Mr. Addington and two for themselves.

The SUPPLEMENT to Volume II. is at length *completed*; and will be ready for delivery on *Thursday next*.

Two sheets will be published next week, and will contain all the communications of our correspondents, which we have hitherto been obliged to leave out, and amongst which are some which will be found highly important.

In consequence of the great demand for Number 3 of the present Volume, containing an exposure of the fallacy of Mr. Addington's Financial Statements, the Public are respectfully informed, that it has been reprinted, and is now ready for delivery. The " Narrative of the taking of the Invincible Standard," and Mr. Cobbett's " Letter to Lord Auckland on the Abuses of the Post-Office" have also been reprinted.

LONDON,

To Foreigners.

On Wednesday the 16th instant, I shall publish, in the *French language*, the first number of a monthly work, to be entitled, Le Mercure Anglois de Cobbett. It is to consist of one sheet of the same form, but containing more matter than this, and is to contain a translation of such parts of the Register, as may be thought useful or interesting to politicians on the Continent of Europe. The work will have a stamp, and will, of course, be transmitted through the Post-Office, in the same manner as other newspapers. The second will be published on the first Wednesday in March, and a number will be published on the first Wednesday of every succeeding month. The price will be *One Shilling* each number. The work will be published by Mr. E. Harding, No. 18, Pall Mall, by whom orders, postage paid, will be received, and diligently attended to.

The principal objects of this publication are, 1. To endeavour to counteract, in some degree, the effect of the falsehoods and misrepresentations, which are spread over the Continent by means of the French Gazettes, particularly the Moniteur; and, 2. To convey to foreigners such facts and observations, as may enable them to form a just opinion of public men, public measures, and public opinion, in this country.

It must be obvious to every one, who looks back to the causes of the present deplorable state of things, that the ambitious demagogues of France, who, under the name of liberty, have finally brought about more real slavery than ever existed in Europe at any former period, owe the success of their nefarious projects to the *force of opinion* operating in favour of their views. They never, except, perhaps, in the case of Egypt, invaded any country, till their all-seducing doctrines had created them a party, frequently consisting of nine-tenths of the population; till the loyal and patriotic principle had been killed or neutralized; till they had to encounter nothing but a feeble, unwilling, constrained opposition, resistance without resentment, the bodies of enemies with the souls of friends. The means of thus gaining the minds of men, of obtaining this powerful ally in every country, were, flattery and menaces, truth and falsehood, employed as the circumstances of persons, time, and place might dictate, and conveyed to the world through the innumerable channels of the Parisian press. That press, which, under every succeeding tyrant, or set of tyrants, has constantly been rendered subservient to the views entertained by Republican France against the freedom, independence, and happiness of other state, is, still devoted, with renovated malevolence and ability, to the same domineering, insolent, and wicked purpose, in the accomplishment of which it is assisted by a *language*, which, unfortunately for the world, is universally read and spoken, by all those who have any considerable share in influencing the measures of nations.—This instrument, keener than her sword, more to be dreaded than her million of soldiers, the tyrannical, rapacious, bloody, and sacrilegious Republic is now directing, with all her vigilance, and all her might, against the liberties, the property, the lives, and the souls of all that part of mankind that has hitherto escaped the ultimate effects of her predominance.—To succeed, however, in this diabolical project, to produce a catastrophe commensurate with the acts and incidents of the hideous drama which she has been exhibiting on the theatre of Europe during the last twelve years, she must first destroy the British Monarchy, and thereby enslave the British nation: for, while that Monarchy stands, while that nation is independent, Europe will still look for better days, hope will not be entirely extinguished in her bosom, and France, whose fears, like those of the robber, have greatly contributed to her encroachment and cruelty, will still dread the hour of retribution. Therefore, though she has barricadoed her plunder by fortresses, tier upon tier, though country upon country, though vassals, allies, friends, and neutrals, stand between her and danger, yet fear still haunts her mind, and she has, with respect to England, adopted the sentiment of the gloomy and sanguinary usurper, Macbeth:

> ..... What need I fear of thee?
> But yet I'll make assurance double sure,

And take a bond of fate: thou shalt not live;
That I may tell pale-hearted fear, it lies,
And sleep in spite of thunder.....

In order to effect this purpose, on which her mind is constantly bent, her great object is, to cut off this country from all connexion with the nations of the Continent. With this intention it is, that she is now employing every art that her ingenious malice can suggest, to excite in those nations a jealousy, envy, and hatred of England; to persuade them, that we are wallowing in riches at their expense; that we are ever ready to plunge Europe into war, because we share in none of its evils, but, on the contrary, profit from the distresses which other nations mutually bring upon each other at our instigation; that we become rich by their poverty, strong by their weakness; that we live merely by the miseries of the rest of mankind; that our existence as a great and independent nation, is an universal curse, and that, of course, we ought to be subjugated, or destroyed.

While she is thus aiming at the destruction of England by the hands of foreigners, she is not unmindful of the use that may be made, in that enterprize, of Englishmen themselves. She has observed, that we, unhappily, have amongst us one set of men calculated to further her views even more effectually than those who, like Napper Tandy and O'Connor, are absolutely, and almost openly, in her service. The persons to whom we allude, she well knows to be of a low, selfish, narrow-minded description; men who, in their pharisaical cant, have stigmatized all the nations of the Continent as being *too dishonest* for England to have any connexion with, and who must necessarily be despised by those nations. To these despised and despicable men it is her endeavour to give influence in England, while she is persuading the Continent that those English statesmen, who are friendly to Continental connexions, wish to form such connexions for no other purpose than that of plunging the Continent in war, for the profit of England alone: thus contriving, by a grand, extensive, and well-combined system of deception, to make the Continent suspect England, and England suspect the Continent; to stimulate them to mutual reproaches; to excite in them a wish for each other's destruction; to divide them for ever, in order to devour them one at a time.

In the making of these destructive impressions, she is aided, first, by the fear which men entertain of her power; for whosoever speaks to a trembling audience, is sure to be heard with attention. Secondly, she has at her command a language almost universal. Thirdly, from one cause or another, she has, for the *propagation of falsehood*, the press of the whole world, while, at the same time, she possesses the power of *suppressing truth* in every part of the world, England and Anglo-America excepted. In these countries her libels are detected and exposed, but, owing to the many obstacles arising from circumstances of time, place, and language, particularly the latter, the detection and exposure reach, but in a very few instances, beyond the limits of the English and American dominions. The Register is, indeed, read in every court of Europe; but, if it is considered how few, comparatively, are those who, even in courts, read the English language, how imperfectly they understand it, and with how much difficulty they communicate to others what they do read, it will be obvious, that any publication, in English, must be very confined in its influence, and that influence extremely slow in its operation. As an humble attempt, therefore, towards removing the most formidable of these obstacles, the present publication is intended; and, though I do not think that my feeble efforts will preserve my country and the world from that universal deluge of falsehood and corruption, which the press in France, and under the influence of France, is now pouring down; though I am not so presumptuous as to attach this degree of importance to my labours; and though, in truth, I feel totally incapable of resisting the tremendous mischief myself, I am not without some hope of exciting an efficient resistance in others; a hope founded on the goodness of my cause, elevated by considerations of duty and of honour, and fortified by the sanction of experience.

London, 12th Feb. 1803. WM. COBBETT.

Invincible Standard.

On Saturday, the 5th instant, the following NARRATIVE appeared in a London newspaper, entitled, *The St. James's Evening Chronicle*, from which paper it has been republished in all the London journals; and it is with peculiar satisfaction that I give it a place in the Register, the readers of which will not, I trust, be displeased to find, that their confidence in the correctness of my statement has not been misplaced.

NARRATIVE *(by Authority) of the Movements of the 42d Royal Highland Regiment on the 21st of March*, 1801.

On the morning of the 21st of March the picquets of the reserve had given their fire and retired, when Brig. Gen. Oakes ordered the left wing of the 42d to advance. Major Stirling, who commanded this wing, gained the left of the re-

doubt, in which the 28th reg. had taken post and were engaged, when he immediately encountered the enemy in front. They were at this time endeavouring to force the redoubt, the ruins and the corps which communicated from thence to the sea. To the left of the Major's position, the road from Alexandria to Aboukir, passes through a considerable hollow which separated the 42d from the Guards, a space which was unoccupied by any troops in the first line. On this road the officers of the light company descried and gave information of a column of the enemy, directing its march upon their flank, and having with them a standard and a field-piece. The major himself soon after ascertained this column to be French, and directed the officer, commanding the light company, to be ready to form front to his flank, in case any attempt should be made to turn it. The firing at this time was very smart, both in his front and to the right.—Passing by the rear, he had just reached the right of the wing he commanded, when he heard a discharge of grape, and on returning rapidly to the left, saw a French battalion in his rear, with a field-piece and six horses, and two loaded camels behind them. Conceiving himself likely to be placed between two fires, he did not hesitate to order the wing to face to the right about and charge. The order was obeyed with a spirited promptness, which insured the discomfiture of a part of this corps, and obtained possession of the gun. The head of the enemy's column, followed by Major Stirling, directed its movements on the ruins, and was met by the right wing of the 42d under Lt. Col. Alexander Stewart, who here joined in the conflict. —Thus pressed, a part of the column sought shelter in the ruins, which they entered, receiving the fire of some companies of the 58th reg. The 42d at this time closed in with them, and their standard was taken from the bearer by Major Stirling, who consigned it in charge to a non-commissioned officer. The survivors of the enemy immediately surrendered, and were marched prisoners to the Beach, by Ensign Hillas of the 42d reg.—Both wings of the 42d, now quitting the ruins, formed battalion, under the orders of Lt. Col. A. Stewart, and proceeded to the ground which the left wing had occupied at the commencement of the action, on the left of the 28th redoubt.—Along with the 28th, the reg. was now engaged in opposing the repeated attempts of the enemy to force the redoubt; attempts repeated also, in the same manner, by fresh bodies endeavouring to come round its left, apparently to break the line of the 42d, and force the redoubt. —The column in front kept up a heavy fire, advancing at the same time, when Sir Ralph Abercromby coming up to the 42d reg. gave orders that the enemy should not be allowed to gain the height.—Orders were at that moment given by Lt. Col. A. Stewart to charge, which was instantly done, and the French infantry were driven down the declivity to a considerable distance in front, and left of the position of the reserve. They retreated through the intervals of their cavalry, who were now observed, as the smoke cleared away, close to the left of the 42d.—The exertions of this charge had disordered the line, and Lt. Col. A. Stewart judging that the enemy's cavalry were preparing to charge in turn, ordered the 42d to form quickly on the grenadiers and prepare to receive them. This moment was selected by the enemy for a desperate charge. It was doubtless a moment in which a regiment, pressing close on a retreating enemy, cannot be supposed to be correctly in line. The charge of the cavalry was made *en masse*, and in some places penetrated the intervals which had been occasioned by the movements to form on the grenadiers, an order which in the continued fire of musquetry could not be distinctly heard by the whole battalion. The right were protected by the fire of the 28th on the redoubt, and Brig Gen. Stewart bringing up his brigade at this critical moment, his own regiment gave the enemy a close and well directed fire, which allowed time to the 42d to join their efforts to those of the rest of the reserve, and of the foreign brigade, repelling the cavalry. This service was speedily accomplished with the effect stated in the dispatches of the commander in chief. The rest of the action consisted in sharp shooting and cannonading as stated in the same dispatches.—The non-commissioned officer, (Serjeant Sinclair) to whom the standard was given in charge, was wounded in the rear of the regiment, and by him the standard was lost.—The 42d reflect with great satisfaction on the prompt and effective support they received from the 28th reg. the 58th reg. and Queen's German reg. with whom they more immediately acted.—The above Narrative was drawn up from information furnished by the officers concerned, and at their desire it has been submitted to our inspection; and we declare it conformable to our best observation and recollection of the facts.

(Signed) *A. Stewart*, Major and Lt. Col. 42d R. H. Regiment.
James Stirling, Major and Lt. Col. 42d R. H. Regiment.

There are, as the reader will perceive, in this NARRATIVE, but two sentences, which have any reference to the Standard, and they contain nothing which, even in the slightest degree, impairs, or has a tendency to impair, the claim which I had the honour to prefer in behalf of the gallant LUTZ; but, on the contrary, they do, as far as negative evidence can go, establish and confirm the justice of that claim. "The 42d regiment," say the Narrators, "at this time closed in "with them" [the enemy] "and *their standard* was taken from the bearer by Major "Stirling, who consigned it in charge to a "non-commissioned officer."—"The non-commissioned officer (Serjeant Sinclair) to "whom *the standard* was given in charge, "was wounded in the rear of the regiment, "and *by him the standard was* LOST!" This is all. Here is nothing controversial; nothing but the simple statement of two facts; to wit, that Major Stirling took a standard, and that Serjeant Sinclair lost it again; facts which were never called in question, and which I have not the least inclination to deny. Leaving, then, the claim of LUTZ to stand upon the incontrovertible evidence which I before produced, and which is not attempted to be controverted by this narrative, I shall, for the present, content myself with just pointing out the disagreement between the narrative of Serjeant Sinclair, as published in the name of

the Highland Society, and that which is now submitted to the Public.

Serjeant Sinclair said (or was made to say), that the standard, which Major Stirling took, was the *Invincible* Standard. The narrative, signed by the field officers, affixes to it no such epithet. Colonels STEWART and STIRLING do, indeed, refrain from stating, that the standard, taken by the 42d regiment, was *not* the Invincible Standard; and, though Major STIRLING himself took it, it is possible, that he may not recollect, or may not have been able to distinguish at the time, whether it was or was not the same standard which was finally brought to England; but if Major STIRLING is not, from want of recollection, or from whatever other cause, able to say, that the standard he took was *not* the Invincible Standard, it inevitably follows, that he is not able to say that it *was* the Invincible Standard.

Then again, Serjeant Sinclair asserted (or he was made to assert), that the standard, committed to his charge, was "PICKED UP," by his side, "while he lay in a state of *insensibility*." But, Colonels STEWART and STIRLING say nothing about the standard's being *picked up* from the side of the serjeant. They say he *lost* it, and that is all. The circumstance of *picking up*, was the most material of his whole narrative, as its evident tendency was to rob Lutz and his regiment of the honour of having taken the standard from the enemy. This circumstance is now dropped, though, be it observed, Serjeant Sinclair must, of course, have been examined, previous to the drawing up of the regimental statement.

Thus it appears, then, that there was not only no ground for stating that LUTZ *picked up* and brought in a standard, which was the prize of the 42d regiment, but that it is altogether uncertain whether the standard brought in by LUTZ was the same standard that was lost by that regiment. That there is, in England, but *one* French standard, which was taken in the battle of Alexandria, is well known: it is equally well known, that that standard was taken from the enemy by LUTZ; and, it now appears, from the best possible evidence, that the 42d regiment themselves do not know, that they ever had this standard, even for one moment, in their possession, though the justly indignant Public will not fail to recollect, that it was openly proposed, by the Scotch editors in London, to send this symbol of victory to be kept in the city of *Edinburgh!*

As to the narrative itself, it is, perhaps, in most respects, as suitable a statement as could have been drawn up; for, though some persons think, that, after all that has been said, something rather more *explicit*, as to the particular point in dispute, might have been expected in an official statement of the 42d regiment; yet when one duly reflects on the example of a regiment's involving itself in a newspaper dispute, it may appear to have been absolutely necessary to abstain from all allusion whatever to any former publication. There is, however, one circumstance here, which presents rather an unfavourable aspect. It is this: The 42d regiment must have seen the proceedings of the Highland Society, as well as my narrative in behalf of LUTZ; and, as their reluctance to appear in a newspaper has been overcome in the latter, I could wish to see a satisfactory reason why it was not overcome in the former case. Having suffered the Highland publication, with all the embellishments of Serjeant Sinclair (or his prompter) to circulate, for a whole year, uncontradicted; having silently seen the honour of the standard, and, indeed, all the honours of the battle, attributed to themselves; having, with the same inflexible taciturnity, waited for the finishing of the medal and the cup; having thus suffered the honour of taking the Invincible Standard to be forced upon them, without an appeal to the press, it does, I think, remain for them to explain, why they have made such an appeal, when that honour was about to be restored to the soldier and the corps, to whom it belonged. I cannot help observing, too, that I perceive, with deep regret, that, even in this narrative, there appears a disposition still to ascribe *to the 42d regiment alone, the chief glory of the day.* This is not, indeed, so glaring as in the proceedings of the Highland Society, where other regiments were introduced merely as the wall and the moonshine of the dramatis personæ, and where the Queen's German regiment was only mentioned for the purpose of insinuating that one of its soldiers "*picked up*," or *stole away* the Invincible Standard. The present narrative is more just, but yet it does, in the main, represent the 42d regiment as having been the *principals*, and the other corps as little more than their *auxiliaries*, their scouts and reserves. I lament this the more, as it must naturally tend to excite resentment in the other corps, who behaved so gallantly on that day, and to disturb that harmony which ever ought to exist in the army.

With respect to the abusive and malignant paragraphs that have, in the several newspapers, been subjoined to the NARRATIVE, by way of remarks, I must leave the public to determine to whom they ought to

be ascribed, not doubting that they will meet with, as they certainly merit, the contempt of every honest and honourable man.

The claim of LUTZ now being established and confirmed beyond all controversy, I shall, in my next, offer some observations as to the REWARD to which he is entitled.

London, 8th Feb. 1803. WM. COBBETT.

P. S.—The lovers of truth and justice will be glad to hear, that, amongst the numerous copies which have been sold of LUTZ's portrait, several have gone to Petersburgh, Vienna, and Berlin; from which latter place I have received a request to publish my Narrative in *French* as well as English.

Since the above was written, the following excellent article has appeared in the *Morning Chronicle*, from which my readers will perceive, as I do with great pleasure, that that paper has now made some reparation for its former injustice to LUTZ.

INVINCIBLE STANDARD.—From the different narratives which have been published respecting the Invincible Standard, it appears clearly that Major Stirling, of the 42d regiment, took a French standard, which was afterwards lost. The *Narrative* published by the officers of the 42d regiment, however, does not state that the standard which Lutz carried to head quarters was the identical standard which Major Stirling had taken, and Sinclair had lost. Perhaps in the confusion, Major Stirling might not have examined it with such accuracy as to be able to identify it. The evidence of Lutz having taken the standard, which he brought to head-quarters, *is not in the slightest degree affected* by the Narrative of the officers of the 42d. Serjeant Sinclair's assertion, that Lutz picked it up after he himself was wounded, is an *absurd* conclusion of his own mind, and *is not founded on any testimony or evidence whatever*. Admitting, however, the standard brought in by Lutz to be that which Major Stirling had previously taken, of which, though it could perhaps be gathered from other circumstances, the narratives afford *no* evidence, it is very probable that the French soldiers who wounded and cut down Sinclair, seeing a French standard, or indeed any Standard, would take it back. In the one case it was preventing a trophy remaining in the hands of the English; in the other it was taking one from them.—It appears that much unnecessary and useless dispute has arisen from the premature credit which was given to the narrative of Sinclair, and founding upon it conclusions totally unsupported by evidence. The 42d regiment, it is proved and admitted, behaved with great gallantry, but their injudicious friends, by ascribing to them *the whole glory* attached to the capture of the Invincible Standard, as it is called, placed them in a situation which *must be unpleasant to them*. The mere circumstance of taking a standard does not of itself prove any superior or exclusive merit in any corps, particularly when movements and attacks are combined. The French, with whom the 42d were engaged, were, it is admitted by their officers, defeated, not merely by their exertions, but by the exertions likewise of some companies of the 58th regiment and other corps; and the 28th regiment, the 58th, part of the 40th, and the Queen's regiment, all behaved just as well as the 42d. The attempt to give an exclusive merit to any in particular creates jealousy and heart-burnings in the rest. The 42d ought not to lay any claim to the standard which Lutz brought in, because it was unquestionably LOST by them; nay, as it is proved by several witnesses, and agrees with probability, that it again fell into the hands of the enemy, and was then taken by Lutz, *to Lutz the merit, whatever it is, belongs*. It would be idle to enquire what sort of property, or if any property can be created in a standard once taken and then lost. Surely it is absurd to say, that there can be any the most naked and metaphysical species of property formed by the momentous occupation of a thing in battle which may be won and lost fifty times over. A regiment, which, in the beginning of a battle, had taken a piece of cannon, would act very absurdly to claim that cannon if it had been retaken by the enemy, and then taken and kept by another regiment. The merit of having taken the cannon may remain, but it does not in the slightest degree diminish the glory of those who took it a second time. As to the present question, it is of the same kind. *It was not owing to the 42d that the standard reached head-quarters*. It does appear to have been retaken, and was just as much the property of the enemy as it was before the battle began, but for Lutz and the exertions of the different corps who were engaged, and who aided the 42d, pressed by the superior numbers of the enemy. We see no reason to prefer one regiment to another, neither do we see reason why the 42d regiment should *lay any claim* to that standard which is now in England, unless they can clearly demonstrate that Lutz picked it up, or rather stole it from Sinclair, *the contrary of which is established by the best evidence yet produced.—Morning Chronicle, Feb.* 11, 1803.

TO THE PEOPLE OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

You will now, probably, remember that, after having, in the year 1796, shewn you the fatal effects which must inevitably arise to you from *the cession of Louisiana to France*, and after having been outrageously abused and reviled by you for so doing, turning from you with that disgust and disdain, which your conduct was well calculated to excite, I foretold not only your present troubles, but the time and manner of their arrival and their operations, concluding with these words: "I also will laugh at your calamity; "I will mock when your fear cometh." Yet, believe me, I do not *laugh* at your calamity; I do not *mock* at your fear. With some few exceptions, I have long forgiven and forgotten all the injuries, with which the worst of you, in your folly and your madness, endeavoured to load me; while, on the other hand, I cherish the remembrance of all those acts of indulgence and of friendship which I have, in greater abundance than any other person, experienced at American hands. If, in the State of Pennsylvania, there are twenty miscreants, who,

if strict justice had her course, would perish by me or by my sons, there are hundreds for whom we ought, were it necessary, to lay down our lives. If no man ever had more enemies, no one ever had half so many friends, and these the warmest and most sincere. Never, therefore, does America, and Pennsylvania in particular, come athwart my mind unaccompanied with the best wishes for their prosperity and happiness.

With these sentiments it is that I now take up the pen to address you once more on the subject of Louisiana, or rather, of those acts of rigour and injustice, if not of open hostility, which I am more than ever persuaded, you will have to submit to, or to resist, on the part of your new and insolent neighbour.

In 1796, I earnestly laboured to persuade you, that, unless, before a peace took place between England and France, you got the better of your prejudices and formed an alliance with England, that peace would inevitably place the French at the mouth and on the banks of the Mississippi, which would be soon followed by the utter ruin of your Western States, if not by a dissolution of the Union.* The moment the peace came, the cession, or rather the *surrender*, of the territory in question to France, was announced to the world; and so far my prediction was confirmed. Still, however, you had *hopes*. It is the great characteristic of all those, who fall by the arms or intrigues of France, to entertain a sort of vague undefined hope, long after all foundation for what is worthy of the name of hope has ceased to exist. You amused yourselves with a notion, that France had no serious intention of settling in Louisiana; or, that, at any rate, she might be wheedled or bribed from her design. Vain imagination! Yet you were told, that negotiations were set on foot for this purpose; and, your minister at Paris really was *heard* upon the subject, but a hearing was all he obtained. Indeed, to suppose, that France would, except for some immense equivalent, abandon a project, the greatest that even her gigantic ambition ever conceived, and, at the same time, the easiest of execution; to suppose that she would, merely for the sake of retaining your good will, yield, or delay to take possession of, a territory, which must eventually give her the command of North America and the West Indies; to suppose that she would, in one single stipulation, and without half a world in exchange, relinquish her hold on the produce of the United States, the mines of Mexico, and the navigation of England, was a stretch of credulity even, I should have thought, far beyond the ample creed of a mercantile American politician. The deception is, however, now at an end: your President has informed you, that Louisiana is to be taken possession of by France, and we, on this side of the ocean, see her armament, for that purpose, ready to quit the ports of one of her allies, with whose present situation it may be well worth your while to familiarize your minds. And here I cannot but recollect, the joy with which you hailed the entrance of the French into Amsterdam! Far be reproach from my heart! but I must ask, if you do not now repent of your folly and injustice? if you do not now anticipate an awful retribution?

But, to make you feel the effects of French fraternity, to give you a foretaste of that which is to come, it has not required the arrival of a French army in Louisiana, nor even of a French agent at New Orleans. The Spaniards, at whose defeats, while they were opposed to your beloved France, you constantly exulted, are, by the means of those defeats, become the vassals of France, the instruments in her hands, the claws with which she occasionally extends her grasp beyond her own physical capacity; these Spaniards, for endeavouring to develope whose subaltern intrigues your government had once the folly to persecute me;* these fallen and despied Spaniards, are now become the rod for the commencement of that flagellation, under which your country is to smart. The Intendant of New Orleans has, it seems, issued an order, that none of your produce shall be introduced into that port, without paying a duty of six *per centum ad valorem*, and that it shall not be exported except to countries pointed out by the Spanish government. This restriction has, of course, been severely felt. Your agents are flocking home from New Orleans, your merchants trading thither have their vessels sent back empty and their property blocked up, and your cultivators in the four states, whose only out-let is by the mouth of the Mississippi, are clamouring with discontent.† And, are you surprized

* See the passage alluded to, extracted into Vol. I. p. 199.——See the entire Tract in Porcupine's Works, Vol. IV. p. 271.

* See Porcupine's Works, Vol. VII. p. 352.

† On the 2d Dec. 1802, the following message was transmitted to Congress by the president, relative to the violation of the treaty with Spain.

"Gentlemen, I now transmit a report from the "Sec. of State, with the information requisite in "your resolution of the 27th inst. In making "this communication, I deem it proper to ob- "serve, that I was led by the regard due to the "rights and interests of the United States, and to "the just sensibility of a portion of our fellow- "citizens more immediately affected by the ir- "regular proceedings at New Orleans, to lose not "a moment in causing every step to be taken

at this? Was not this precise case pointed out to you a twelve month ago? Read again a letter, which I addressed to you, on the 2d of March last,* and which was republished in a great part of your three hundred newspapers In that letter you will find the following words:—"By your treaty "with Spain, you obtained the free navi- "gation of the Mississippi. This freedom "you have now to obtain from France; "and be you well assured, that she will "not grant it without an equivalent. What "this equivalent may be, it is impossible "for me precisely to point out; but be it "what it may, you must yield it, or yield "your hopes to retain the dominion of the "Western States, which would be instant- "ly ruined by the closing of the Missis- "sippi, and which, to avoid that ruin, "would transfer their allegiance to the "power, on whose pleasure their prospe- "rity will solely depend."—But still you *hoped*! I read your reflections on my letter; I saw and I pitied your blindness. You thought my fears were "not totally desti- "tute of foundation," but you disliked my "desponding tone," and asserted that I under-rated your power. No, no; alas! it was not your *power* that I doubted of, but your *will*. Like us, you have the arms and the hands, but, like us, you want the directing mind and the animating soul wherewith to oppose the sagacious, bold, and persevering foe, who is now approaching the very vitals of your country.

I have heretofore expatiated upon the evils, which will, which unavoidably must, be produced, by the shutting you out of all the ports in the late Spanish, now French, territories, and from closing, in fact, the River Mississippi against you. Begging leave, therefore, to refer you to what I have said on that part of the subject, † I propose to confine myself, at present, to an inquiry whether or not France has a *right* to exclude you from the use of the ports and the waters here mentioned; a question, which, I am afraid, must be determined in the *affirmative*.

And here pray let me caution you to divest yourselves, in the present instance, of that overbearing turn of mind, which you have contracted from the success of your revolution, from the flattery heaped on you by Europeans, and particularly from your transactions with England, which have rendered you, amongst nations, what, amongst individuals, one would term *a spoiled child*. Let me beseech you to recollect, that you have not *now* to negotiate with a power, accustomed to concession; with a power, which, for the sake of peace and plenty, would receive £600,000 as a commutation for a debt of £5,000,000. France has no debts, no stock, in your country; you have no hold on her, and, if you had, she would sever herself from it, though it cost her a limb. Count, therefore, I conjure you, on nothing but on *right* and on *might*: of the latter I shall speak hereafter; it is to a few observations relative to the former that I now have to request your patient attention.

The territories, which have now passed from the hands of Spain into those of France, include all the land on the western bank of the Mississippi, from its mouth to its source, and, on the eastern bank,* from the mouth of that river to the *Portage de la Croix*, which, reckoning the windings of the river, is more than 200 miles from the principal entrance at *Fort Balise*, and about 70 miles above *New Orleans*. Thus France has the sovereignty of the soil, on both sides of the river, for the space of 200 miles from its entrance, a space which you have, it appears to me, no other right to navigate, than that which you derive from the treaty concluded with Spain in 1795, according to which treaty, his Most Catholic Majesty "has agreed, that the navigation of the "said River Mississippi, in its whole "breadth, from the source to the ocean, "shall be free only to his subjects and the "citizens of the United States, unless *he* "should extend this privilege to the sub- "jects of other powers, *by special conven- "tion*."† —Then, it is, in a subsequent part of the same treaty agreed, that, "in con-

"which the occasion claimed from me, being "equally aware of the obligation to maintain, in "all cases, the rights of the nation, and to em- "ploy, for that purpose, those just and honour- "able means which belong to the character of the "United States.

"Signed) *T. Jefferson.*"

The message was accompanied by letters from the American Consul at New Orleans, the proclamation of the Intendant, a letter from the Governor of the Mississipi territory, written to the Governor of Louisiana, and a letter from the Governor of Kentucky to the president.—Three hundred passengers have arrived at Baltimore from New Orleans.

* See Register Vol. I. 202.

† See Porcupine's Works, Vol. IV. p. 271—Register, Vol. I. p. 199.—266,—443—540—797.—Register, Vol. II. p. 6—27—38—59—125—148—187—233—248—387—412—630—826.

* It is said, that France is to have all Florida, but I know *for certain*, that she is to have all the territory lying between the Mississipi and the river *Tombechbe*, which, after traversing the Western part of Georgia, falls, at the end of 300 miles, into the *Bay of Mobile*.

† Article IV.—See Laws of the United States, Vol. IV. p. 224.

" sequence of the stipulations contained in " the fourth article, his Most Catholic Ma- " jesty will permit the citizens of the " United States, *for the space of three years " from this time*, to deposit their merchan- " dizes and effects in the port of New " Orleans, and to export them from thence " without paying any other duty than a " fair price for the hire of the stores; and " his Majesty promises either to continue " this permission, if he finds, during that " time, that it is not prejudicial to the in- " terest of Spain, or, if he should not agree " to continue it there, he will assign to " them, on another part of the banks of " the Mississippi, an equivalent establish- " ment."*

It is of a breach of this latter stipulation, of which, as I have already noticed, you now complain, and, not without some foundation, if we were to consider the King of Spain as still being the sovereign of Louisiana; for, it does seem, that, when a transitory covenant, though fulfilled, has been continued on in its observance, even without being renewed, it continues to be binding on one of the parties as long as it is strictly complied with by the other. But, independent of the sovereignty having long ago been transferred to France, this stipulation is encumbered with so many circumstances, the engagement, on the part of his Catholic Majesty, is so perfectly indefinite, as to the time, manner, and place, of assigning, " on *another part of the banks* of the " Mississippi, an *equivalent* establishment;" there is, in short, such unbounded latitude for interpretation, that it would be very hazardous to assert, that what you now complain of is really a breach of the treaty of 1795, even supposing the sovereignty of Louisiana to be still in the King of Spain; and, when we consider the Spaniards as being themselves possessors by sufferance, or rather, as being nothing more, in the present instance, than the *agents* of France, your ground of complaint, on this score, vanishes altogether.

But, the great question is, whether you have or have not, in consequence of the cession to France of the territories now under our view, lost, not only all right to the use of any port or place therein, but also to *navigate* on any of that part of the River Mississippi, which lies between the *Portage de la Croix* (the termination of your own territory) and the sea, a space, as I before observed, of more than two hundred miles. It appears to me, that you have lost this right, and I once more bespeak your patience, while I state the reasons, on which this opinion is founded.

That your right of navigating upon the waters (if not extended by specific convention) terminates at the same point with your right of walking upon the land, by the side of which those waters run, is a principle universally acknowledged; it is founded in reason, in justice, in the law, and in the practice of nations, with the very existence of which it is coeval. I remember, indeed, when your wild democratic scribblers clamoured against the government for not *compelling* the king (I am afraid they called him the " crown- " ed monster") of Spain to open the mouth of the Mississippi to the produce of your lands; for not compelling him to yield you your *natural* rights. I remember much of this incoherent and hectoring bombast, and though it might excite nothing but a smile, when applied to such a neighbour as the feeble and sluggardly Spaniards, it will, if applied to the French, prove, I fear, something worse than ridiculous. Those profound writers, who conduct the London newspapers, have, I perceive, done you the honour, in this case, to espouse your cause, and most vociferously to assert your claims and echo your complaints; but, give me leave to caution you not to place too much reliance on these diurnal civilians, whose minds are as volatile and whose principles as transient as the flying folios on which their opinions are inscribed. No; listen not to these jurists of the mob; from their hazarded and noisy assertions turn to the dictates of reason and the maxims of the law. —" Rivers and lakes," says MARTENS, " are " useful for navigation or for fishing, or for " other emoluments arising from their pos- " session; and, therefore, the powers that " are *masters of the banks* have a right to ap- " propriate the use of them *exclusively to " themselves*." After thus stating the principle, he proceeds to the practice of nations in this respect: " In general," says he, " they do forbid foreigners to fish on them; " but, with respect to *navigation*, as such a " prohibition would produce retaliation, and " as it is contrary to the commercial liberty " generally introduced in Europe, foreigners " are now permitted, in time of peace, to " navigate freely and without restraint. " This liberty is founded, in part, on *trea- " ties*, and, in some demi-sovereign states, " on *law*. But, in every case, where it is " only founded *on custom*, that custom does " not hinder a nation from making *what- " ever regulations and restrictions it pleases*, or " from exercising over such parts of its ter-

* Article III.—Laws U. S. Vol. IV. p. 237.

" ritory *all the rights of sovereign domi-*
" *nion.*" *

Since, then, it is evident, that your right to navigate on the waters of the Mississippi, from the point where your territory terminates to the mouth of that river, is, and must be, from its very nature, purely a right of covenant, and rests solely upon the treaty of 1795, it remains to be considered, whether that treaty is or is not any longer in force; whether France, the new possessor of Louisiana, is, or is not, bound to adhere to the stipulations, made with you, relative to that country, by its former sovereign, the King of Spain.

To make out the affirmative of this question both your and our newspapers will swarm with arguments and cases. It will be urged, even to satiety, that, when a man purchases a farm encumbered with a foot-path or a cart-way, he receives the encumbrance along with the property, the conveyance of which does by no means impair the individual or public right, the exercise of which constitutes the encumbrance. But, the principles and practice of the municipal law relative to property, though they sometimes serve to illustrate, must not be confounded with, those of the public law relative to dominion, the reason of which is too evident to need pointing out. Accordingly, it is a principle, in which, I believe, all the writers on the law of nations are perfectly of accord, that, " Treaties, properly so called, " *cease to be obligatory*, when the sovereign " power, with whom they were concluded, " ceases to exist, and when the state *passes* " *under the dominion of another power.*" †

This, like every other principle of public law, is founded in the nature and necessity of the cases, to which it is applied; for, so very different are, and must be, the relationships of different powers towards any one power, on so many other conditions does every separate condition depend, that a treaty, or part of a treaty, made between any two powers in the world, can scarcely ever be such as to admit of a change of parties on one side or on the other, of the truth of which a more forcible illustration cannot be cited than the very instance before us. Should you, however, in defiance of reason and of written authority, insist upon bending the obligations of the treaty of 1795, to the maxims of municipal law; should you still insist, that, along with the territory of Spain, France became the possessor of all the stipulations which her predecessor had made relative to that territory, and that, of course, from the moment of the cession, she became one of the parties to the treaty, as far as it related to your privileges on, and in the mouth of, the Mississippi; should you persist in this course of reasoning, then are those stipulations certainly no longer in force, for, *since* Louisiana was ceded to her, since she, according to your doctrine, became, in the place of Spain, a party to some of the stipulations in the treaty of 1795, there has subsisted *a war between you and her*, by which war those stipulations, being merely of a *commercial* nature, were, to all intents and purposes, abrogated and annulled, in which state they still remain, because unrenewed and unnoticed in your pacific convention of 1800.

This, then, is the dilemma to which you are reduced: if France, by receiving the sovereignty of Louisiana from Spain, became a party to the stipulations in your favour, those stipulations have been abrogated by a subsequent war; and if she has never become a party to the stipulations, they can, of course, with respect to her, have no obligation. Thus, in whatever light, I have been able to view the question, your conventional right of navigating on, and using the ports of, the Mississippi, clearly appears to be at an end; and, as you can have no other right than that of convention, it seems to me no less evident, that France, as the sole sovereign both of the land and the waters, has an indisputable right to make, relative thereto, whatever regulations and restrictions she pleases, and, of course, absolutely to exclude you from any of, and from all, the privileges, which you have therein latterly enjoyed, of deposit, entrance, and navigation.

Submitting these arguments to your serious consideration, I reserve, for another letter, some remarks, which I have to make on the claim that France will probably prefer to the sovereignty of the territory, on the *eastern* bank of the Mississippi, comprising part of the North Western State, part of Georgia, and the whole of the States of Tennessee and Kentucky: as also on the consequences of the several measures she will be likely to adopt, and on the means of *preventing* those consequences.——My object is, to make you look your situation in the face, to prepare you for defence, with the pen and with the sword; and to call down just indignation, if not punishment, on the heads of those, by whose ignorance or whose wickedness the menacing calamity, both to you and to us, has been produced.

London, 10*th Feb.* 1803. WM. COBBETT.

* Martens's Compendium of the Law of Nations; London edition, 1802, p. 167, where he cites several public papers.

† Martens's Compendium; London edition, 1802, p. 56.—The same principle will be found stated more at large by VATTEL, BYNKERSHOECK, ZOUCH, and others.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Milan, Dec. 30.—The minister of the interior, in consequence of having received information, that in several communes of this Rep. secret societies are established, and private meetings held, has given notice, that no society of this kind can be suffered without the express permission of the gov. and that the officers of police must always have free admission to them. All who offend against this notice, will be considered as disturbers of the public peace, and treated accordingly.

Genoa, Jan. 6.—The Italian Gazettes say, that a French corps will march to Tuscany, and embark at Leghorn. It is added, that if the English shall longer refuse to evacuate Malta, a French army will march to Naples, and thence proceed to undertake further operations.

Ratisbon, Jan. 17.—The Imperial Plenipo. received on the 15th a courier from Vienna, with advice, that on the 13th inst. the exchange took place, of the ratifications of the convention concluded at Paris on the 26th Dec. relative to the G. D. of Tuscany's indemnities.

Vienna, Jan. 19.—The G. D. of Tuscany has accepted the convention that has been concluded relative to his indemnities, though he has lost more than he has received. The late Chancellor of the Netherlands, M. Von Crumpipen, has been appointed by H. R. H. commissary to take possession, in his name, of his new states.

Berne, Jan. 21.—There have been of late frequent disputes between the citizens and the Helvetic soldiers; to prevent them in future, the commandant has sent detachments to several of the public-houses in the environs of the city.

Jan. 25.—It is said that Gen. Ney has presented a note to the council of execution, in which he complains that English merchandize are sold from different parts of Switzerland to the inhabitants, on the frontiers of France. Gen. Ney has pointed out where these depôts of English merchandize are, and has desired that rigorous measures may be adopted to prevent this contraband trade in future.

Basle, Jan. 26.—We have received from Paris the important intelligence that all the cantonal organizations are finished and approved of by the First Consul. They will be officially transmitted to the superior authorities of the 19 Cantons, for the purpose of being presented, for the *acceptance* of the people of Switzerland. The general constitution for Switzerland will be discussed, and there is every reason to think that it will be adopted.

Hague, Jan. 25.—The business of the Batavian rescriptions payable after the peace is not yet terminated. The Batavian govt. has answered the note presented to it on this subject on the part of the French govt. The answer has been sent to Paris, and we wait the result.

Paris, Jan. 27.—Gen. Lannes, Envoy Ext. and Minister Plenip. to the Prince Regent of Portugal, was on Sunday presented to the First Consul, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs. At this audience he took leave of the First Consul, previously to his return to his station at the Portuguese Court. —The First Consul recommended to him to do justice to, and to protect the French trade at Lisbon, as he had begun to do in the first year of his mission. He particularly signified that he was satisfied with Gen. Lannes's services in that station, up to the present hour.—Moniteur.

Feb. 5.—In consequence of the intelligence of the death of Gen. Leclerc, and the succours of which the army stands in need, the Minister of War has called for volunteers in the different corps. Near 60,000 veterans have inscribed themselves.—The First Consul has ordered the Minister of War to testify his satisfaction to those brave men, to announce to them that 15,000 men being about to take their departure, new succours are not at present necessary, and to inform them, that he sees with the greatest satisfaction, that love of glory and danger which manifests the energy of Frenchmen, and which is a sure guarantee of the prosperity of the great people.—Moniteur.

Basse Terre, Guadaloupe, Dec. 2.—This colony continues to be one of the most tranquil of the Antilles. The brigands, reduced to a small number, and for the most part without arms or ammunition, are pursued even by the field negroes. Some, driven from the hills by famine, have appeared on the heights of the Commune of Petit-Bourg: they have been either taken or killed.—The judiciary organization is terminated. That of the civil Admin. is accomplished. The colonists, satisfied with their lot, are sedulously employed in commerce and agriculture. Every thing goes on rapidly and with order, to a certain prosperity.

Cape, St. Domingo, Dec. 14.—The 86th demi-brigade, which was expected in Nov. arrived in the course of the present month.

Paris, Feb. 2.—The consistory for the proclamation of the French cardinals was held at Rome on the 17th Jan. As soon as they were proclaimed, the Sec. of State dispatched Prince Justiniani, guard-noble to his Holiness, to give him advice of their nomination.—According to the usage, Prince Justiniani travelled as a courier: he passed through Lyons, where he delivered his first dispatch to the Archbishop of that diocese. He then proceeded to Paris, where he alighted at the residence of the Cardinal Legate: thence he repaired to the house of the Counsellor of State, charged with the care of the public worship. After that he delivered the dispatches with which he was charged for the Archbishop of Paris, and Archb. of Rouen, who was accidentally at Paris. He set out again in the evening for Tours, where he is to fulfil a similar mission to the Archb. of that place. When the Archb. of Paris and Rouen were officially informed of their nomination, each of them presented himself at the audience of the First Consul, to return him thanks. The First Consul gave them permission to carry the badge of their new dignity, which has been presented to them by the bearer of the dispatches from the office of Sec. of State. The hats are to be brought by the prelate Dorea, whom his Holiness has made choice of to be his apostolic envoy, and who was to have left Rome 12 days after the first courier.—His Holiness pronounced a discourse on the occasion of this nomination in the consistory of the 17th Jan.—"The First Consul of the French Repub. says his Holiness, "always desirous of promoting union, has, by joining with us in the concordat, re-established the Catholic religion, which was almost extinct in France, and placed it in such a state that hopes are entertained of its gaining strength every day. This illustrious personage having promised us all his care towards the accomplishment of so great an object, has written to us, that in order to attain it more speedily, he conceived it would be of advantage to create four cardinals among the newly instituted French bishops.—"The desires and demands of this personage, to whom, next to God, we are indebted, not only for having diverted the furious tempests which had arisen against the church, but also for the re-estab.

of the Catholic religion in a nation whose dominion is so extensive, have touched our soul; we therefore grant this promotion in the same manner as Leo. X. of happy memory, granted a similar one on the concordat between him and Francis I."—His Holiness then proceeded to nominate J. Fesch, Archb. of Lyons, uncle to the First Consul; J. de Dieu Raymond Boisgelin, Archb. of Tours; E. H. Cambaceres, Archb. of Rouen; the 4th he reserves *in petto*. To these, his Holiness adds, in consideration of the reception, he received at Venice, in the time of his distress, a son of Saint Marc, or patrician of Venice, P. A. Zozzy. There was also a nomination of three Cardinals for the Roman state: F. M. Locatilli, J. Castiglioni, and C. Erskine.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Letter addressed by Mr. Jefferson, President of the United States, to the National Institute of France.

Citizen President and Secretaries. — I have received the letter by which you had the kindness to announce to me, that the National Institute of the Arts and Sciences has elected me as Foreign Associate for the class of Moral and Political Sciences. I receive this favour with a sensibility equal to the respect which a body of *savans* of the first order ought to inspire. Without having any right to pretend to the title of their colleague, I accept it as a proof of the spirit of fraternity, which unites in one family all those who cultivate letters and the sciences, in whatever part of the globe they reside. Accept, citizens President and Secretaries, for yourselves and your colleagues, the assurances of my high consideration and of my respect.
Washington, Nov. 14, 1802. *Th. Jefferson.*

Decree of the French Government relative to the Port and Commerce of Rouen. St. Cloud, Jan. 23.

The govt. of the Republic having considered a report by the minister for internal affairs, ordains as follows: — Art. I. In the port of Rouen, there shall be a staple for the reception and sale of all goods and commodities from the colonies, or elsewhere, which are not prohibited by law.—II. The town of Rouen shall provide suitable public buildings for the staple. A plan of the ground and buildings shall be presented to the gov. That plan, if approved, will receive the sanction of a special order from the gov.—III. The staple at Rouen shall be considered in law as a part of Havre. Ships freighted for Rouen shall therefore first present at Havre exact accounts of the quantities and qualities of the goods which they are to deliver at Rouen. The chief officer of the customs at Havre, shall, upon receiving such account, formally record and authenticate the declaration conveying it. The officers of the customs at Havre, when there are no suspicions of smuggling, shall be at liberty to exempt any vessel from the necessity of entering the port of Havre. Ships arriving at Rouen from Havre shall present the account authenticated by the principal officer of the customs at Havre, to the custom-house officers at Rouen, when these come on borad the said ships in the river. If the goods are not exactly such in quantity and quality as the authenticated declaration describes them, the owners shall be held guilty of an act of fraud. The cargo shall be inspected at its entrance into the staple of Rouen, and if its value be either greater or less than it is stated in the declarative act, this shall be taken as a proof of the fraud.—IV. The weight and qualities of all cargoes of goods re-exported from Rouen, shall be specified in a manifesto from the director of the customs at Rouen. That manifesto shall be transmitted to the chief officer of the customs at Havre. At Havre the cargo shall be inspected in comparison with the manifesto. If the goods be either greater or less in value, than is there expressed; this shall also be regarded as an act of fraud.—V. The minister of the treasury, and the minister for internal affairs, are directed to put this decree in execution, and to add it to the register of the laws. (Signed) *Buonaparté.*

Extract from the English Argus, printed at Paris.

Paris, Feb. 2.— In the English news-paper, the Argus, there is this day a very remarkable observation respecting the conspiracy of the 3d Nivôse. The writer is examining how far Mr. Windham can be considered as implicated in that horrible plot, and whether the late administration can be supposed privy to it. His words are—if we had no other proof of this privacy than the odious protection given to Georges, by the cabinet of St. James's, and by its agent at Lisbon, it would not be fair to make the accusation that they were concerned in the plot. But we are not to be guided in our judgment by mere suspicions or slight proofs, when we are in possession of an open avowal of the crime. In the debates on the preliminaries of peace, Mr. W. rose, and among the advantages of continuing the war, to which he attached great importance, he mentioned *the probability of seeing some opportunity recur of making an attempt on the life of the First Consul.* Such is the declaration of a member of parl. made at one of its most numerous meetings. I was present, continues the editor, when this observation was made; and I call on every member of parl. then present, to vouch for the accuracy with which I have stated Mr. W's. expression. I particularly call on Mr. Nicholls, at this moment in Paris, who spoke in terms of great indignation of this sanguinary provocation of the ex-minister of war. But I go farther, and since I have named a member of parl. now in Paris, I ask Mr. N. whether it is not true, that after having heard of this horrible project from the mouth of Mr. W. he went to ask Mr. Addington, *whether he meant to touch on the article of the assassination?* and received for answer, that he was unwilling to do this, from a fear of giving offence to Mr. Windham.—*Clef du Cabinet.*

DOMESTIC.

Gibraltar, Jan. 10.—The garrison is as quiet and regular as usual. The 3 ringleaders in the late disturbances, were shot on the grand parade, on the 4th, in presence of the whole garrison, who were under arms on the occasion. The firing party was drawn by lot from the men of the 25th reg.

The unhappy sufferers manifested great contrition for their crime, and acknowledged the justice of their sentence, which seemed to make a deep impression on the troops, who, as usual, were afterwards marched by file past the dead bodies.

On Monday, the 7th inst. came on the trial of *Edward Marcus Despard* for High Treason. The *Attorney General* addressed the jury in a speech of considerable length. The number of witnesses called were 17. Mr. Serj. *Best* and Mr. *Gurney* addressed the Court in behalf of the prisoner, and were replied to by the *Solicitor General*. The arguments of counsel on both sides being concluded, *The Lord President* summoned up the evidence in a speech of nearly two hours. At 2 o'clock on Tuesday morning the jury retired, and after remaining in the Traverse Room 35 minutes, returned a verdict of GUILTY, but recommended the prisoner to mercy, on account of the high testimonials to his character and conduct.

On Wednesday, the 9th. inst. the remaining prisoners in confinement for High Treason, were put upon their trial, which continued till H.-past 6 on Tuesday morning; after the charge of the Chief Justice, the jury retired, and deliberated till 8 o'clock, when they appeared in court, and returned the following verdicts:—John Wood—*guilty*.—Thomas Broughton—*guilty*.—John Francis—*guilty*.—Thomas Newman—*guilty*, recommended to mercy.—Daniel Tyndall—*guilty*, recommended to mercy.—James Sedgwick Ratton—*guilty*.—William Lander—*guilty*, recommended to mercy.—Arthur Graham—*guilty*.—Samuel Smith—*not guilty*.—John M'Namara—*guilty*.—Thomas Philips—*not guilty*.—John Doyle—*not guilty*.—Sentence of death was pronounced on all who were found guilty, Edward Marcus Despard included; after which the commission ended. (*A correct report of the trials will be preserved in the Supplement to Vol.* 3.)

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Thursday, Feb 3.—LORDS.—Two petitions against the Woollen Manufactury Bill, and several petitions relative to the mode of hearing appeals, were presented.—Lord Ellenborough brought in a private bill from the judges, and certain papers previously ordered were laid on the table.

COMMONS.—A new writ was issued for the election of a member for Ipswich, in the room of Chs. Alex. Crickett, Esq. deceased.—Mr. Keene moved for a variety of documents, among which were several letters from Ld. Macartney to the court of directors of the East India Company, during the years 1784 and 5; copy of the minutes transmitted by Ld. Hobart and Ld. Clive, to the Court of Directors in 1799 and 1800.—Mr. Tierney presented a petition from Midhurst complaining of an undue election.—Mr. Corry presented a number of financial accounts and petitions relative to Ireland.—A new writ was issued for Hastings, in the room of Lord Glenbervie, who since his election has accepted of the place of Surveyor of His Majesty's Forests.—Mr. Ormsby presented a petition from the Corporation of Sligo.—Mr. J. C. Beresford presented a petition from the royal canal company, praying for leave to chuse directors, &c. and to bring in a bill to alter and amend the act past in the last session of the Irish parliament.

Friday, Feb 4.—LORDS.—The Ld. Chancellor stated, that a number of Peers had given in their lists respecting the appointment of members of that house to compose the board of East India Judicature.—Certain accounts directed to be annually laid before parliament were presented.—The Ld. Chancellor moved, that so much of the Act of Union as relates to the mode of summoning four of the Irish Bishops to attend in parliament, be referred to the Committee of Privileges on Thursday next.—Certain documents relative to the state of the convicts employed at Portsmouth, and on the river Thames, were presented.

COMMONS.—A petition from the Malsters of Newark-upon-Tweed, and another from the Corporation of Liverpool, relative to the formation of new Wet Docks were presented.—A person from the commissioners for the reduction of the national debt, presented the annual accounts.—Gen. Gascoyne moved for an account of the number of ships, &c. employed in the transport service, from Jan. 3, 1801. to Jan. 3. 1803.—Mr. Vansittart moved for an account of the amount of notes of the Bank of England, from the 1st. of June to the 1st of Aug. 1801, and so on for every two months till the 1st of Feb. 1803, distinguishing the amount of those under £.5—Mr. Corry moved for an account of the ordinary revenues and extraordinary resources of Ireland; for the imports and exports of Ireland for the last 18 years; for the number of vessels built in Ireland last year, with their tonnage, &c.; for the number of vessels cleared outward and entered inward from the ports of Ireland last year; and for an account of the public and unfunded debt of Ireland.

Monday, Feb 7.—LORDS—Counsel was heard on the Scotch Appeal, Sir W. Lawson, *v.* R. L. Ross, Esq.—Ordered, on the motion of Lord Walsingham, that all the Lords present do form a committee to-morrow, for the purpose of inspecting the list of names delivered in for the East India Judicature.—Certain accounts were presented, relative to the reduction of the National Debt.

COMMONS.—Mr. W. Dundas moved, that the time for receiving private petitions be enlarged to the 18th inst.—Agreed to.—The Sheriffs of London presented at the bar, three petitions, 1st. for leave to bring in a bill for enlarging Smithfield market, 2d for leave to establish a corn market; and 3d, for an advance of money from the consolidated fund, to carry into effect an Act for the Improvement of the Port of London.—An account was presented, from the Bank, of the number of Bank Notes in circulation, pursuant to the order of Friday last.—On the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, for leave to bring in a bill to continue an Act of last Session, for continuing the restriction on the payment in specie by the Bank of England, a short debate ensued; the speakers were Mr. Addington, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Fox, Mr. Banks, Lord Hawkesbury, Sir F. Baring, and Mr. Vansittart.—Leave granted.

Tuesday, Feb. 8.—LORDS.—The report of the committee appointed to examine the list of names for the East India Judicature was presented, and referred back to the committee, in order that their lordships might inquire whether any of the peers whose names were set down were disqua-

lified. Lord Pelham moved that the Woollen Manufactures Bill be referred to a committee of the whole house, on the 8th of March.

COMMONS.—A committee was appointed to try the petition for the Burgh of Dumfermline. —A petition was presented from the town of Carnarvon, forleave to bring in a bill for improving the harbour of that place.—Mr. Alexander brought up the report of the Committee of Supply for Irish Affairs, upon which a short conversation on the state of the poor of Ireland took place between Mr. Bagwell, Mr. Corry, Mr. Wickham and Gen. Tarleton.—Resolution agreed to.

St. James's, Feb. 2, 1803.—This day Baron Silverhjelm, Minister Resident from the King of Sweden, had a private audience of His Majesty, in which he delivered new credentials, giving him the character of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Sweden.—*Feb.* 2, 1803.—The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of knighthood on Major Charles Holloway of the Royal Engineers.—*Downing-street, Feb.* 5, 1803.—The King has been pleased to appoint Col. T. Hislop to be Lieut. Gov. of the island of Grenada and its dependencies.—*Whitehall, Feb.* 2. 1803.—The King has been pleased to order a Congé d'Elire to pass the great seal of the United Kingdom of G. Brit. and Ireland, empowering the dean and chapter of the Cathedral Church of Bristol to elect a bishop of that See, the same being void by the translation of the Rt. Rev. Father in God Folliott Herbert Walker, late bishop thereof, to the See of Hereford: And his Majesty has also been pleased to recommend the Hon. and Rev. G. Pelham, D.D. to be by them elected bishop of the said See of Bristol.

Prince of Wales's Council. County of Cornwall.—At a council of H. R. H. the Prince of Wales, held at Carlton-House the 1st day of Feb. 1803. T. Rawlings, of Padstow, Esq. was appointed sheriff of the County of Cornwall for the year 1803, by H. R. H. the Prince of Wales in council.

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THUR.
Bank Stock.	—	—	—	—	—	—
3 pr. C. R. An.	71	71	71⅛	70⅜	—	70⅞
3 per C. Con.	70½	70⅜	70⅜	70¼	—	70⅜
4 pr. C. Con.	86⅞	87⅛	87⅛	87⅛	—	86⅜
5 pr. Ct. Ann.	100¼	—	—	100⅜	—	—
Bank L. Ann.	20½	20½	20½	20½	—	20¼
D° S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	103¼	103⅜	103⅜	102¼	—	103½
Omnium ...	4 dis	4⅜ dis	4½ dis	5¼ dis	—	5 dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C. F.	36 2	2 us.	LEGHORN	50
D°, at sight	35 10		NAPLES.....	40¼
ROTTERDAM	36 3	2 us.	GENOA	46
HAMBURGH	34 3	2 us.	VENICE, 52 livres piccole	
ALTONA....	34 3	2 us.	effective per £. ster.	
PARIS 1 day	24 8		LISBON	68½
PARIS	24 12	2 us.	OPORTO	68
BOURDEAUX,	24 13		DUBLIN	12⅞
CADIZ ...	35¾	eff.	BILBOA	35⅞
MADRID ..	36¼	effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	46s. to 62s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 224s
Rye.....	35 .. 38	Hay per load....	75 .. 140
Barley.....	24 .. 28	Beef, per stone	4s. to 5s. 6d.
Malt.....	43 .. 47	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	15 .. 22	Veal	6s. 0d. to 7s. 6d.
Pease (white)....	33 .. 39	Pork....	4s. 8d. to 5s. 8d.
Beans (horse)....	34 .. 38	Tallow	4s. 6d.
Flour per sack ..	45 .. 50	Av. of Sugar pr cw	37s. 2d.
Seconds.....	40 .. 45	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal....	52 .. 57	Bread 9¼d the Quar. Loaf.	

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Address of all the respectable inhabitants of Gibraltar to his Royal Highness the Duke of Kent, delivered on the 1st of Jan. 1803.

We, the merchants and other inhabitants of Gibraltar, feel ourselves particularly called upon, at this period, to approach your Royal Highness with sentiments of the most ardent attachment and duty.—We acknowledge with gratitude, that we have enjoyed under your Royal Highness's just and mild government the fullest protection for our persons, rights and properties.—An attention, hitherto unexampled, has been paid by your Royal Highness to the health and comfort of the inhabitants: our complaints have been answered—our grievances redressed—and our interests consulted on every occasion, with an alacrity and zeal which cannot fail to impress us with the deepest sense of your Royal Highness's goodness and condescension, when we reflect upon the other numerous and important duties of your Royal Highness's exalted station.—Placed, as we are, at a distance from our beloved Sovereign, at no period have we felt the blessings of his paternal government so sensibly and so beneficially, as since his virtues have been represented to us in the person of your Royal Highness.—Be pleased then, Sir, to accept the assurance of our unalterable attachment to your Royal Highness, an attachment not more strongly secured by our loyalty to the best of Sovereigns, than by motives of personal esteem to a mild and just governor of Gibraltar, and of gratitude to a powerful and gracious protector.

Committee of Merchants and others, Shippers of Goods from the Port of London to America, the West Indies, the Baltic, the Mediterranean, and other Foreign Parts; appointed to examine into the Depredations lately committed on their Property in the Port of London, and to detect and punish the Offenders, and prevent the like Practices in future.

At a meeting held on the 19th day of Nov. 1802, of the merchants and others, shippers of goods, it appeared from a statement then produced, that many very grievous and alarming depredations had lately been committed upon their property, and that various quantities of Goods had been stolen out of the trunks, boxes, and cases, in which they were packed, after the same had been delivered out of the merchants' warehouses, for the purpose of being shipped from the port of London, and which were supposed to be so stolen in their way to the Wharfs, from the Wharfs, or on the River Thames; and after such plunderage the trunks, boxes, and cases, had, in many instances, been carefully packed up again, corded and matted; but when open out at the place of destination, nothing was found therein but stones and rubbish. In other instances, part of the goods only were taken away, and the Excise seals broken; and in several instances, smaller trunks, boxes, and cases, had been substituted, and filled with part of the goods contained in the trunks, boxes, and cases, in which they had been originally packed up, and the rest wholly stolen; and which nefarious conduct appeared to have been systematically carried on for a considerable time, to the great loss of the owners and others interested therein.—Resolved, That the grievances complained of at this meeting call loudly for some adequate remedy.—That a committee be appointed to examine into, and investigate the same, and use the necessary means to detect and punish the offenders, and consider of some proper plan to prevent the like depredations in future.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

It is generally our lot to begin our remarks, under this head, with an apology of a *want of room*, which our readers, perhaps, regard as totally unnecessary. Be that as it may, we think it right to observe, that this circumstance alone prevents us from entering, in the present sheet, into those observations which we have to make on the CONVENTION, lately concluded between Austria and France. Some other topics we are also obliged to postpone; and on the following ones, which call for immediate attention, we shall hereafter find occasion to speak more at large: 1. Col. Sebastiani's Report to the French Consul; 2. The Mission of Gen. Lasnes to Lisbon; 3. A Paris publication relative to Mr. Windham; 4. The Employment of English Shipping in the Service of France; 5. The Disposition of the American Govt.

COL. SEBASTIANI'S REPORT TO THE CONSUL OF FRANCE.—On the audacity of this curious performance, which will be found in p. 215, it is entirely useless to remark: it is, and must be apparent to all the world; but the humbled world has so long been accustomed to this species of insult, it is so drilled to an abject submission to the will of France, that she seems, at last, to be, in some measure, authorized to assume the tone and the language, made use of on this occasion. It is useless, too, to express astonishment or indignation at the mission of Sebastiani, relative to our army in Egypt, or at the demand, made by the Envoy, on our General commanding that army. To enquire how, after all that has happened; how, after the massacres of Alexandria and of Jaffa, an emissary of Buonaparté could find confidence to present himself, totally defenceless, before the inhabitants of Egypt and the commanders of the Turks, or how it came to pass that he was so graciously received by both; to make an enquiry like this, though it should result in a clear development of the causes, would be of equal inutility. The only question worthy of our solicitude, is, what is the *object* of the report? And this question will at once be satisfactorily resolved, by comparing the practice of France, in this case, with her former practice under similar circumstances.—If we look over the gloomy history of the last fourteen years, from the seizure of Avignon, which was highly applauded by the English journalists, to the late cruel invasion of Switzerland, which those journalists condemned, we shall find, that, previous to the commission of every act of encroachment or hostility, the French have uniformly signified their intention to the world, and that too, not only in the same style and manner, but also through the columns of that same Moniteur, which, at this moment, conveys their behests to the utmost corners of the earth, and the uninterrupted existence of which, while its successive editors have been destroyed, renders it no imperfect type of the Republic itself. These intimations serve two great purposes, the first of which is to disguise some principal part of the plan and of the ultimate object. To keep the whole a secret would be impossible, and, therefore, enough is developed to bewilder, mislead, embarrass, and to produce inactivity in those, from whom opposition might reasonably be apprehended. But, the chief purpose is, to familiarize the minds of men to the possibility, and even the probability, of the stroke which is about to be inflicted on them, and, at the same time, to subdue their spirits, to deprive them of all hope from resistance, and to reconcile them to submission, by a grand, a dazzling, and a terrific display of her means. This is the art by which France has extended her power; by which the lowest of mankind have risen to more than imperial sway, and by which crowns have been tumbled in the dust; and, never was this potent art more judiciously employed, or, we fear, with a fairer prospect of success, than in the instance before us.—No resentment has been expressed, at this report, in those English journals, through which our wise and modest ministers are accustomed to convey their impotent attacks on their adversaries; we have observed, from that quarter, nothing that has even the air of disapprobation; and, though the re-occupation of Egypt is evidently the intention of Buonaparté, we have good reason to believe, that the commands of Col. Sebastiani will be instantly obeyed, and that Gen. Stuart and his army will evacuate the only posts remaining in our hands.—Had we retained the Cape of Good Hope, the occupation of Egypt by France might have been of little consequence; but, with that important post also in her hands, she will, in a very little time, shake to its centre our much envied power in India.—The fate of Malta still hangs on the balance, and, indeed, the Cape is said not to be completely given up; but, if the question becomes that of war or peace, we have very little hope, unless a speedy change in His Majesty's servants takes place, to see either of these important stations preserved to Great Britain.

MISSION OF GEN. LASNES TO LISBON.—This is, perhaps, the grossest affront, that ever was offered to any independent nation, and particularly to a nation, to whom the affronting power professes to be bound by the ties of amity. LASNES is not only (see p. 179) sent back to Lisbon, but sent with an *entire approbation of his conduct* towards that justly offended Court. A proceeding more inoffensive than that of the Portuguese towards him cannot be conceived; and, the sending him back in this way, amounts to nothing short of a declaration, that that country is in a state of vassalage to France. So glaring is the insolence of this measure, that it has awakened the anger, real or feigned, of the London Morning Chronicle, which is known to speak, on most occasions, the sentiments of Mr. Fox. "It will," says that journal of the 5th instant, "be shameful if this "country *permit* the French to trample upon "Portugal."—*Permit!* But, does Mr. Fox recollect, that GEN. LASNES is one of the most zealous agents for carrying that "commercial "*rivality*," (in English *rivalship*), which Mr. Fox says is the *only* object of France, and from which he apprehends no mischief to this country? Does he, besides, recollect, that he approved of the peace because "it was glorious to France "and to the First Consul," of that peace which

exposed Portugal to be trampled on, which sanctioned the trampling on her, and which must be changed into war, before we can even think of preventing this degradation of our antient and most faithful ally? "*Permit*," indeed! what a word to be made use of by him, who was nine years calling for peace "on any terms," and who now tells the people of England, that "they *may* be subjugated but they must *eat!*" What a word to be made use of by a writer, who must know, that we cannot protect Portugal without arms, and who tells us, that, to employ those arms is certain and instant death!—"*Permit*," truely! if the present system is continued but a little longer, we shall not have to enquire what *we* ought to permit France to do in Portugal, but what she will permit *us* to do there. She is not ready for the measure yet, but, the moment she is, she will order the ports and harbours of that country to be shut against us, by which operation she will call to her aid the clamours of no contemptible portion of our merchants and manufacturers, who will blame, not the ambition and injustice of France, but whatever may remain of the spirit of resistance in their own government.

A FRENCH PUBLICATION RELATIVE TO MR. WINDHAM. In page 182 of the present Number will be found an article, published at Paris, in a paper called the ARGUS, which is well known to be conducted by the condemned and pardoned traitor ARTHUR O'CONNOR. This article repeats the charge, which has heretofore been preferred by the Moniteur against Mr. Windham, of having encouraged an attempt to assassinate Buonaparté, and the *proof*, which the Moniteur has obstinately refrained from producing, this vile traitor affects to have discovered in a speech delivered in Parliament by the gentleman accused. We should not have noticed this libel had not our attention been awakened by a *defence* of Mr. Windham inserted in the London Morning Chronicle, where, though the charge is repelled, the writer observes, that Mr. Windham said, upon the subject, what was, perhaps, not very *discreet*. Now, the fact is, that Mr. Windham, so far from ever having abetted, by any of his speeches, a scheme of assassination, has, on all occasions, declared his conviction, that no good could be expected to this country from any change that could possibly take place in the *persons* of the revolutionists at the head of the government of France. In his speech of 4. Nov., 1801, this opinion was fully and explicitly stated.* Mr. Windham never attempted to build a hope upon so uncertain, so disgraceful a foundation. We, too, the Paris traitor has thought it worth his while to accuse of instigating the assassination of the Consul, and of speaking, on this subject the sentiments of Mr. Windham. If we have spoken that gentleman's sentiments, here they are, as expressed several months ago. "Buonaparté has returned to "Paris safe and sound, in spite of the prayers "and predictions of the timid herd, who were "in hopes of losing their fears in his loss of "life. There are none but the basest of cow-"ards, who look to the death of this man as a "deliverance from danger. Yet, disgraceful "as is the facts, the hope of no small portion "of the advocates of peace have no better, no "more honourable foundation. Those who, "like ourselves, were opposed to a disgraceful "peace with Buonaparté, do not, nor ever "did, entertain any such foolish hope; we "know that if he were dead to-morrow, ano-"ther, perhaps even more dangerous, would "arise to fill his place: we are for the em-"ployment of no base means of offence or de-"fence, but are for a fair and honourable con-"test between the two nations, in which, with "God's good help, we should hope to come "off victorious, and to rescue our country from "impending ruin and slavery." † —In truth, there is no man of mind who counts the *person* of Buonaparté as of any great consequence, one way or the other. The little daring Corsican happened to be chosen as a proper organ of the will of the republican French, but almost any other man of courage would have done as well. He is perfectly illiterate; every thing that falls either from his lips or his pen bespeaks not only a want of acquired knowledge but a native emptiness, and, were it not for the million of soldiers that are at his back, his bombastical manifestoes and phillipics would excite nothing but disgust and ridicule. No, no; it is not this *man* that England and the world has to fear; it is the spirit of the French Republic, that restless, that ambitious spirit, which must be subdued, or which will subdue this country. There are a thousand, ten thousand, men in France, either of whom would fill the Consulship as well, or better, than the Corsican. None but the cowards who tremble at his name, the vulgar politicians, whose views never extend beyond the present moment; none else, have any hope of good from the death of this man.—Why this charge is so often revived against Mr. Windham is very evident. It is one of the ways, in which the French tell the people of England, that *Mr. Windham must be kept out of power*. There was a time when such an intimation would have produced a contrary effect; for, it is pretty clear, that the man, whom our greatest enemy hates most, must be our best friend; but the preservation of the *honour* and *independence* of England is no longer the principal object of her degenerate sons, the preservation of *peace*, on any terms however degrading and ultimately destructive, is all they care for or think of, and, therefore it is, that the French are continually preferring, against Mr. Windham, such loud and outrageous complaints as must produce an impression in the minds of the people, that, if he, or his friends were in power, peace could not be preserved with France. We do not say that Mr. Windham is the *only* man capable of saving the country; but this we have no scruple to say, that, if it be saved from the tremendous dangers that threaten it, that salvation must be wrought by an adoption of the *principles* of Mr. Windham; those principles may, and those principles alone can, preserve this kingdom from being an appendage to France.—No wonder, then, that he is hated by the French; no wonder that they rack their

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 1164.

† Vol. II. p. 666.

invention for charges against him; no wonder that they misrepresent what he has said, and impute to him what he never has said; no wonder, in short, that the traitor O'Connor should lend his hand to destroy the reputation of Mr. Windham, or that traitor should be indirectly seconded by the London Morning Chronicle, by that very paper in which O'Conner was defended.

EMPLOYMENT OF ENGLISH SHIPS BY THE FRENCH. It is still said, that English ships are to be employed by the French in sending out troops to St. Domingo. The ministers, it seems, have acted with their usual *candour*. They have neither refused nor permitted the hire of the ships in question. Buonaparté will, if he be wise, have them at any price; because he will have the *sailors* along with them, and it will be his fault if the latter ever return to the service of England. It would, perhaps, be prudent to send some of them back, by way of call-birds, to entice others, or, as occasion might serve, to inculcate, in the British fleet, those principles, which may, with no very great difficulty, be taught them during an expedition to St. Domingo. The fact is, that every British sailor, going upon this service, will fall by the yellow fever, or, which is infinitely worse, will become, in heart, a republican Frenchman. Another evil arising from this contract, is, the new and additional hold, which France will thereby obtain on the hearts, that is to say, the purses, of this nation. Every guinea, which she adds to her debts here, is another link added to the chain she is forging for us. The Americans owed us *five millions* sterling; a solemn treaty was made for its payment; they chose not to pay, and we commuted the sum for *six hundred thousand pounds*, because we would not go to war; and we would not go to war, because British subjects have always in America, seven millions of money owing to them for goods, and hold about ten millions more in the funds of that country. This fact, while it points out the consequences of our becoming the creditor of France, is no very feeble illustration of the maxim of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies, that the country is to be defended and preserved by its *capital* alone.

DISPOSITION OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT. Much pains seems to have been taken to inculcate a belief, that the American government is hostile to France, and of course, friendly to England; but, we must confess, that we perceive no symptoms of either. The President's official declaration is, as we before observed, *perfectly equivocal*, and, in his more private acts, we can see nothing that favours the opinion above stated. He has, like Sir Joseph Banks, and Mr. Fox, accepted, with great satisfaction, the *honour* of a membership in the National Institute of France, the honour of being adopted into the "WESTERN FAMILY;" and, if what we see in the American papers be true, he has shown his friendship for our country and his respect for our King by inviting the British Chargé des Affaires to dinner, in company with TOM PAINE, a man famous for nothing but his blasphemy, and his hatred of England. It is even stated, in those prints, that the Chargé des Affaires actually dined with this man. We do not believe it, we cannot believe that Mr. Thornton would do any thing improper, and especially a thing like this; but, if it be so, if he, being the representative of our sovereign, really has placed himself at table in company with an out-law from England, a libeller of, a rebel and a traitor against, that sovereign; if this really be true, certain we are, that Mr. Thornton ought never to have an opportunity of again bringing upon his king and country such indelible disgrace. But we repeat our confident hope, that the report is false: we had once the honour to know Mr. Thornton, and, from all that we ever had an opportunity of discovering, respecting both his religious and political principles, he is the last man in the world whom we should suspect to be capable of an act so disgustingly disgraceful. Be this as it may, however, we think, there can be no doubt, that PAINE was sent for to America by the President, that he has been received by him with open arms, that he is kept about his person, and is one of his privy-counsellors. This, though not a positive proof, is, at least, a strong indication of Mr. Jefferson's political bent, and particularly of his disposition towards England, against the sovereign and government of which the miscreant PAINE has renewed his attacks even since his arrival in America. As to what is said in the London newspapers about MR. JEFFERSON having expressed his abhorrence of the tyranny of BUONAPARTÉ, and his opinion that it would be necessary for America and England to unite in repelling his ambitious aggressions, we believe but very little. Mr. JEFFERSON does not love fighting; he always preferred running away, when he had an opportunity of so doing; and, we are sincerely persuaded, that, as to the honour and independence of his country, he would not care to venture much for the preservation of either, or of both together. America is, in fact, very much under the rule of a small band of English and Irish traitors, who, with the potent aid of a few printing presses, are able to do more than any hundred thousand of the richest men in the country; and these miscreants are ready for any thing that may, either immediately or remotely injure Great Britain; a sort of feeling, in which, by the by, we are afraid they will not find it extremely difficult to make the President participate. In short, we place no reliance on Mr. JEFFERSON's good disposition towards England. He hates England from the bottom of his soul; he must and he will hate her; and most cruelly will our government be disappointed, if it expects ever to receive from him any hearty co-operation for the purpose of frustrating the views of France.

NOTICES.

We have received, from our worthy friend Mr. J. TIETENSER, "a parting word to Candidus with "a little truth to Verax."—This letter shall appear in our next without fail.

*** A new edition *(being the fifth)* of No. 25, of Vol. II. containing the NARRATIVE OF THE TAKING OF THE INVINCIBLE STANDARD, has just been printed, and may be had at every place where this work is usually sold.

LONDON,

MR. ADDINGTON AND THE MAIDSTONE OPPOSITION.

SIR,—Observing a statement in the Sun Newspaper of Tuesday last, purporting to be a picture of the political parties in this country, wherein the writer has insidiously attempted to throw a most undeserved odium on Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, &c. and spoken in terms of great praise of certain political characters, on account of their having given their hitherto with-held support to Mr. Addington and his measures, and also insinuating that the late opposition to the Navy Bill for remedying abuses in the Dock-yards, &c. originated in pique and improper motives, I cannot suffer such a paper to pass unnoticed or unanswered.—The opposition to the Navy Bill was on two grounds; first, the infringement of the law of the land; and secondly, its inexpediency, and the pretext it afforded the Admiralty, and Navy Boards, of getting rid of a very great part of their business, at the public expense, and to the increase of an overbearing patronage. The opposition to that measure had in view the real, sound, and radical cure of the disorders in the Dock-yards, by constitutional means, in a speedy and easy manner. It wished to compel those commissioners who had been for years receiving the public reward for their alleged services, to cure those disorders that had crept into the departments under their management, at least, in part through their lax attendance to the business entrusted to them. Let any one step forth and invalidate, if he can, the statements that have been made on this head. Let him advance, he shall be met with damning proofs, and proofs upon proofs.—As to the other topic in that demi-official paper, the acquisition of certain political characters to the ministerial party, I wish the minister much joy of his new associates. Alas! What does the public service gain by it? Had those same men come forward with their approbation and support of measures during the late contest for our very existence as a nation, we should not be under the painful necessity of having to make the allusions we do to our present dangerous situation. I assert, Sir, in the face of the whole kingdom, that our present difficulties and dangers in great part proceed from the uniform and systematic opposition of these very men, to every measure, however salutary, of the late administration: That opposition paved the way for the disgraceful peace of Amiens: that opposition did away all those vulgar prejudices, love of our king, country, and constitution. They began with the greatest praise of the French revolution, in and out of Parliament; *that glorious monument of human wisdom* was echoed in our ears at every meeting of the disaffected, that could be got together from the lowest dregs of the people. Nay, the speaker's mace (certainly in republican jargon, *a bauble*,) did not impose the decent and necessary restraint on parliamentary debate, but every expression of contempt and infamy, couched in language the most coarse, was bestowed on every measure that tended in the smallest degree to the protection of the British crown and constitution, and to the check of the horrors of republican success. On which side did these men range themselves? Did they vote supplies for carrying on the war into which we were forced by our inveterate enemy in our self defence? Did they not stigmatize every legal means resorted to (almost indeed too late) for the suppression of treason itself, as illegal and tyrannical? Did not they assert, over and over again, that no treasonable plots did exist; and to crown all, did they not at Maidstone put the seal to their former conduct, by identifying their politics with those of the most infamous and abandoned traitor that ever did exist. Nay, has not the chief leader of that opposition repeatedly said, "I rejoice at peace because "it is glorious for France and the First Con-"sul." And yet, can the *respectable Mr. Addington*, can he, the friend of *Pitt and his gold*; of that Pitt whose wise measures formed a saving barrier to the desolating career of French horrors, can he call these men to his aid in the hour of peril, when the gaunt banner of Buonaparté waves over Italy, Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium, and Holland? The line of conduct pursued by these men, taught our foe to consider us as a divided people; it emboldened his unbounded pretensions and aggressions; it appalled the royalists; it kept back those from declaring themselves in our favour, who otherwise would have entered most heartily into our cause, the cause of Europe and the civilized world. But when the trials at Maidstone ended so triumphantly for treason, when the evidence there given was known in France, its rulers already promised themselves the utmost success here. When they heard that a nobleman of the highest rank, and a privy counsellor too, presided at a club, and gave as a toast the "sovereignty of the people," they pictured to themselves the Earl Marshall's staff of honour emblazoned with all the kingly achievements, by republican and jacobin arts turned into the deadly pike surmounted with the cap of liberty, and reeking with the blood of every thing ancient, noble, and honourable. It was on this division, in and out of Parliament, that they founded their

hopes of final triumph. It was this that raised and appointed *the army of England.* They argued, and very wisely too, that matters must be very far gone indeed, when British senators became their advocates and eulogists, and branded the confederacy entered into by England on the purest grounds, those of self defence, as a combination of tyrants and despots. To make good this part of my assertion, I appeal to the repeated declarations of honest X. Y. Talleyrand to Lord Malmesbury during his embassy at Paris.—To our representations he opposed, as the strongest counterpart, the divisions among ourselves, and the bold designs of the patriotic party, as it was most falsely called. And can the acquisition of these men be a matter of triumph to any minister? No, no; surely not. It may indeed be a matter of triumph to the venal conductor of a newspaper, that is all things by turns to all men, to panegyrize such a coalition; but to those who have the honour and interest of their country at heart, it is a matter of dismay. What good can come from such a monstrous union?

Non tali auxilio nec defensoribus istis
Tempus eget.

In this day we want those tried men, whose unseduced principles and firm attachment to the crown and constitution of these realms, have steered us through the most troubled and dangerous period this country and Europe ever saw, and who have proved themselves well fitted to encounter the portentous difficulties which await us on every side. Those praisers of the French revolution are *not* the men; I fear them, I distrust them, I hate them in and out of place.—They cannot serve God and Mammon, they cannot admire Republican France, and love Old England; they cannot worship the Goddess of Reason with her Pike and Bonnet Rouge, and venerate the Imperial British Crown and Mitre at the same time.

I am, &c. R. B.

5th February, 1803.

ON THE EVACUATION OF MALTA.

SIR,—I have observed that the intelligence and opinions given in your Register are for the most part well founded; but I suspect that the following article in your Paper of the 8th inst. was not inserted with your usual attention. "Malta will, we "believe, be given up in a short time. "The pretended guarantee, which our "ministers will affect to have obtained "from Russia is, in fact and in truth, a "*mandate* on the part of that power, con- "jointly with France, that we should fulfil the treaty of Amiens." (p. 30).—That Russia and France may have required the evacuation of Malta in a mandatory style I can easily believe; and, notwithstanding the recruits lately sent thither, and the supposed orders for a part of the Egyptian army to re-inforce that garrison, notwithstanding the manifest and incalculable importance of this island to Great Britain, and our undeniable right under the existing circumstances to retain it, yet have I strong apprehensions that our ministry may be induced to yield to this imperious and unreasonable demand: but that this evacuation of Malta has been demanded, or will be agreed to as a *performance of the treaty of Amiens*, I never can believe until I see it publicly avowed. For to set up this pretence in such pointed contradiction to the terms of that treaty would, on the parts of Russia and France, be an useless waste of insolence and falsehood; whilst on the part of our ministry, it would be a foolish and hopeless attempt to make the nation believe—basely prone as it seems to be to believe any thing that promises to defer, even for a single month, a renewal of the war—it would, I say, be impossible to dupe even this nation into a belief, that the evacuating of Malta, until a Grand Master, or his lawful commissaries were present in the island to assume the government of it, would, with any appearance of propriety or truth, be called a *performance of the treaty of Amiens.* No, Sir; whenever that baleful event shall take place, it must be in virtue of a new negotiation, derogatory from the treaty of Amiens. Under this conviction, I have repeatedly and carefuly examined the treaty; and the only passage which seems, as far as I can discover, to afford the slightest opening to a new negotiation on the subject of Malta, is to be found in the second stipulation of the tenth article. The words are these: "The governments "of the French Republic and Great Bri- "tain, desirous to place the *order and island* "of Malta in a state of entire indepen- "dence with respect to themselves, agree," &c. &c.—and then follow the particular stipulations. Now, I can imagine, that the Courts of St. Peterburgh and Paris, presuming on their own power and the apparent disposition and conduct of this country, might insist—That by the spirit of the above declaration, which serves as an introduction to all the subsequent stipulations relative to the evacuation of Malta, it is clear that the principal aim and primary object of the contracting powers were, that Malta should be completely independent of themselves. That by the words of the fourth stipulation the island was

indeed to be restored to the Order, having assembled and regularly elected a Grand Master, which were considered to be such practicable and certain events, that they were expected to take place within three months, or possibly less, as appears from that being the time fixed for the withdrawing of the British troops. But unforeseen circumstances having prevented those events for almost a whole year, and there being now no prospect or probability that the Order will assemble and elect a Grand Master; good faith requires that the treaty of Amiens shall be executed as far as it is practicable, and pursuant to its true spirit and meaning. For this purpose, it is become requisite that a negotiation should be opened, in order that a time may be fixed for the British forces to evacuate, and for the Neapolitan garrison to take possession of Malta, as it is provided by the treaty of Amiens; which garrison, under the protecting guarantee of Russia, may keep that island completely independent both of France and Great Britain.—Having thus stated the most plausible reasoning that occurs to me in favour of a new negotiation on this subject, I will now offer what seems to be a fair and honourable answer on the part of the British ministry. —By the express terms of the treaty of Amiens, "the island of Malta is to be "restored to the Order, and the British "forces are to evacuate it, when a Grand "Master, duly elected, or his lawful com- "missaries shall be present to assume the "government of it." The words are plain and positive; there is no alternative, no provision for our evacuating the island in favour of any other power, or under any other circumstances. And this you do in effect acknowledge, by appealing from the *letter* which admits of but one construction, to the *spirit* of the treaty, which might open a wide and dangerous field to vague conjecture and sophistical interpretation: and in truth, we may learn from history, that appeals of this sort seldom terminate in any increase of good understanding or amity. So that it seems upon the whole to be more for the good of mankind that treaties of peace should be performed to the letter, even with some inconvenience, rather than that the spirit of them should be too curiously inquired into, or insisted on. Having stated this remark as a ground of general objection to the proposed negotiation, we will now answer particularly to the arguments which you have offered in support of the proposal.—From the declaration in the beginning of the fourth stipulation you infer, that the independence of the island of Malta was the principal aim and primary object of the contracting powers. We deny that any such inference can be fairly drawn from that passage. The words are, "desirous to place the "*order and the island* in a state of indepen- "dence." It is clear, that they were considered as one joint object; neither the one nor the other was a principal aim or primary object; they are never treated of as separate, or even separable; and as far as the form of the treaty can mark any priority of consideration, it is in favour of the *Order*, which occupies the three first stipulations of the tenth article, with provisions for its restoration; and in all the subsequent stipulations it is evidently supposed that the Order is re-established.—You say, that "the assembling of the Order "and the election of a Grand Master were "*expected* to take place within three months, "as appears from that being the time fixed "for withdrawing the British forces."—All the remaining knights being either Spaniards, Italians or Germans, France had facilities to procure an assemblage of them, which England could not have; possibly therefore you might at the time have good reason to expect that such an assemblage and an election might take place in three months. But we do not mean to discuss your expectations. For ourselves, we declare, that we formed no expectation as to the *time* when those events might take place; whether it were in three months or three years, was not, in our opinion, a matter of any consequence. The important point to us was, that the *Order*, and the *Order only*, should have possession of the island: because we thought, as we still think, that the *Order* would always find it to be its true interest to take no part in any war which England might hereafter have with France, or any other power, and would therefore always observe an impartial and strict neutrality. The peculiar institution and situation of the Order warrant this opinion, which we cannot extend to any other power in Europe; the situation of every other power being very obviously and essentially different.—But "*unforeseen* "*circumstances* have (it seems) prevented "the re-establishment of the Order." Supposing the knights to be, at the time of the signature of the treaty of Amiens, disposed to re-establish their Order, we do not recollect any circumstances that have happened to change that disposition, except the confiscations of their estates in Spain and Germany, by which the revenues of the knights have been so considerably reduced, that they may think themselves no

longer able to maintain their Order and the Island in a safe and respectable state. Possibly these confiscations were not foreseen at the time of signing the treaty of Amiens: but we cannot suppress our opinion, that they were not effected without the interference, or at least the acquiescence of France; and if France did in any way contribute to them, it would be highly unjust if she should now insist upon opening a negotiation for a new regulation of Malta, and thus avail herself of the difficulties which those confiscations have opposed to the literal performance of the treaty of Amiens.—It is however said by you, "that "there being no prospect or probability "that the Order will be re-established, "good faith requires that the treaty shall "be executed as far as it is practicable "pursuant to its true spirit and meaning." —We profess to be not only desirous to execute, but to have in fact executed the treaty with perfect good faith, as punctually and as speedily as it was practicable to do so. And we do not evacuate Malta because it is *not* practicable to do it pursuant to the letter and spirit of the treaty, if by the word "spirit" is to be understood the *intention of the parties*. We engaged by the letter of the treaty to restore Malta to the Order; and we have offered important, as it appears to us, sufficient reasons to prove that we should not have agreed to put that Island into the hands of any other power. We therefore say, that our intention is fully expressed in the treaty. If your intention was different from, or went beyond the words of the treaty; if, for instance, your meaning was that the British forces should evacuate Malta absolutely, and not conditionally only; could any thing be more easy or more glaringly obvious than to have proposed a proviso, that "in "case the Order should not be re-established within a given time, we should evacuate the Island in favour of some other "power;" or more generally, "that a "negotiation should be opened for the "further regulation of the article respecting Malta?" We do not mean even to hint that we should have agreed to such a proviso; but, if that *was* your meaning, why was it not declared, instead of signing a stipulation which expresses in the most explicit terms a different meaning? You will not surely answer, that this omission was purely accidental, and a mere oversight! That avowal would be too disgraceful to your ministers who negotiated, and your government which ratified the treaty; nor could such an answer be admitted without striking all confidence in future negotiations and treaties. You will not surely allow that you were unapprized of one of the most evident and beneficial principles of national law. "that any political pos- "session or right which is to be changed "on certain specific conditions is under- "stood to remain unchanged until those "conditions are performed!" Yet we do not perceive on what other ground you can allege that your intention was not fully expressed in this fourth stipulation, or, in other words, that there is a difference between its letter and its spirit.—For the foregoing reasons we say, that you have no right or reasonable cause to require a negotiation to be opened for the evacuation of Malta. But we further declare our opinions, that such a negotiation could not answer the end you propose, namely, that we should put that island into the possession of a Neapolitan garrison. For, by your own construction, Malta is to be entirely independent of both England and France. But we consider the King of Naples himself to be not sufficiently independent of France to secure the independence of any place garrisoned by troops under his command; and therefore it is expressly provided by the fifth stipulation, that the Grand Master should have the commandership of the garrison, and consequently of the Neapolitan troops that were to be sent by the twelfth stipulation. But by the admission of a Neapolitan garrison under the command of the King of Naples, we plainly say, that the dependence of the Island would be only transferred from Great Britain to France, with this striking difference; that its remaining dependent upon Great Britain is, under the existing circumstances, pursuant to the treaty of Amiens; whereas its being rendered dependent upon France, would be in direct opposition to it.—To remove this objection, "Russia (it is said) will become guarantee "for the independence of Malta in the "hands of the King of Naples."—The confidence, which one state can place in another state, as guarantee of some particular object, must be in proportion to the power, local situation, and interest of the guarantee. To the power of Russia, whenever it can have opportunities of fully exerting itself, we can make no objection. But the dominions of Russia seem to be most inconveniently situated for a guarantee of Malta to the King of Naples; since France might wrest that Island from Naples, and use it in a manner extremely injurious to the trade and foreign possessions of Great Britain, not only before Russia could exert herself in maintaining her guarantee,

but even before she could receive intelligence of its having been violated. Nor can we perceive that Russia has any very cogent interest in preserving the independence of Malta, or why she should be very forward to engage in a war with France, for the purpose of procuring to Great Britain a reparation for the injury she might have sustained by a violation of that independence. On the contrary, we can discover a possibility that Russia might expect to reap some advantage from Malta being in the hands of France, instead of a state of entire independence. And if, in order to enable Russia to act more efficiently as a guarantee, by being nearer to the scene of action, a part of the garrison were to be composed of Russian troops; then we can see something more than a bare possibility that Russia may be tempted to make use of Malta for certain purposes of her own, instead of adhering to her engagement as guarantee.—It is a delicate thing to impute any hostile designs or plans of aggrandisement to powers with whom we are at peace: but to save time, we will venture to declare frankly our apprehensions and the causes of them. Suppose France were to compel the King of Naples to yield up the possession of Malta, it is natural to expect, that this act of violence, which could be evidently directed against Great Britain only, would be immediately followed by a descent in Egypt: for our defeat of her first attempt to reduce that country to a French colony was not accomplished in so rapid and triumphant a manner, as to render a second expedition hopeless. In this situation of affairs, might not arguments be offered on the part of France, which might induce Russia to turn her arms towards Turkey, rather than join her forces to those of Great Britain, in order to restore Malta to a state of entire independence! The Empress Catharine pointed out to her successors the road to Constantinople as their most practicable and natural path to aggrandisement; and a favourable opportunity might shew that her recommendation has not been forgotten. On the other hand, if Russian troops were permitted to form a part of the garrison of Malta, we are of opinion, that Russia might in time prevail upon France to consent that the Neapolitan troops should be withdrawn, and the garrison consist of Russians only. The consequence would be, that one Russian fleet stationed in the Black Sea, and another at Malta, would put Constantinople and the whole Black Sea and Archipelago at the absolute disposal of the Emperor of Russia. And why should France not consent? Formerly, indeed, while a balance of power in Europe was thought worth preserving, France had a strong interest in protecting the Grand Signior, the situation of whose dominions enabled him to be an useful ally to France in her contests with Austria, whose territories on the side of the Danube were always accessible to the Turks. But that interest is now done away by the incalculable superiority of France, and the complete humiliation of the House of Austria. We can therefore see no reason to expect that a concern for the integrity of the Ottoman empire would prevent an arrangement (which may one day be thought of) between the two powers, by which France might obtain the secure possession of Egypt, in return for permitting Russia to make acquisitions from the Turkish dominions. To any arrangement of this kind, Malta, even in the hands of the Order, would oppose considerable difficulties. For, the operations of a British fleet in the Mediterranean could be farther extended, and it might keep the sea with little loss, or hazard, through the year, by having Malta a neutral port, as a place of refuge for her distressed ships. Nor would that island again serve as a rendezvous for a French fleet, or a secure point of communication between Alexandria and Toulon. These reasons, which induced us to agree that Malta should be restored to the Order, may convince you that we were sincere in asserting, that it never was our intention to yield it to any other European power. For Malta, in the possession of Great Britain, must not only add much more surely and effectually to the security of her commerce and foreign possessions, but may also prove to be the only permanent and insurmountable obstacle to a plan of aggrandisement, which experience forbids us to regard as a merely visionary project.—To conclude; her own particular interests, the general interests of Europe, the express terms, and the evident intent and spirit of the several stipulations of the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, all unite in determining Great Britain to decline the proposed negotiation.

IGNOTUS.

WEST-INDIA COMMISSION.

SIR,—I prefer addressing myself on a question of considerable importance to you, rather than to any of your brother journalists, as your paper appears to me to be conducted on the most independent principles:

"Nullius addictus jurare in verba magistri,"

unbiassed by any name, however great, un-

influenced by any party, however powerful, the sole object you seem to aim at, is to support the great cause of truth and of your country. Having passed too, some years of your life on the other side of the Atlantic, you know something more of the British Empire, than that part of it, the shores of which are washed by the British seas, and can the more easily detect any mis-statement or misrepresentation of which, unconsciously to myself, I may be guilty; in either of which cases, I request what I am about to offer may not be permitted to meet the public eye.—A hint, the papers inform us, was some time past thrown out in the House of Commons, that the interests of the West-India Islands were not sufficiently or properly attended to by government. The observation was not suffered to pass unnoticed, Mr. Vansittart being reported to have stated in reply, that the vast importance of those numerous and opulent colonies, was fully felt by administration, who would eagerly seize all fit opportunities of promoting their welfare. How far this assurance may be relied on with respect to those now in power, I presume not to determine. Certainly as referring to all who have preceded them in his Majesty's service, an assertion of this nature would want proof to support it; and I fear much there are yet no solid grounds on which to build hopes, that we are now about to see an exception to the rule. No one acquainted with West-India affairs who has had any occasion to have communication with people in authority here, but must have been often surprized at questions put to him, betraying the grossest ignorance of the internal policy and civil history of these important settlements. Some have gone so far as to assert, that there is not the most petty borough in the united kingdom, the interests and prevailing parties in which are not more studied and better understood by ministers, than those of the great Island of Jamaica itself, one of the brightest jewels in the British diadem. It may be thought refining too far to infer, that to this negligence may be ascribed all the evils the nation at present suffers, and those still greater misfortunes there is too much reason to fear she has still to look forward to. In a total ignorance of facts and opinions on the Western Continent, there can be no doubt the American war took its origin; and to the same cause must the manner in which it was conducted, and its too much lamented event, be ascribed.—That from

"Hoi fonte derivata clades, in patriam populosque fluxit,"

seems to be a truth now so generally admitted, that I will not trespass, Sir, upon your indulgence by any arguments to confirm it; having matter of much more importance, than retrospect, to which I wish to call the attention of your readers.—Ignorance, Mr. Cobbett, of the concerns of great constituent parts of an empire is a serious fault in those entrusted with its administration; and not far less deserving of censure than a gross violation of their rights: of which a most striking instance has, within the by-gone year presented itself.—In the last session of the last Parliament a bill was brought in to examine into the army accounts in the West-Indies, founded exactly on the same grounds, and in every respect a counterpart* with that which was first introduced in the present session, to inquire into the supposed abuses in the navy department.—Into the necessity, the expediency, or the propriety of either one or the other of these bills, it is not my purpose to inquire, and I shall dismiss what I have to say on the subject in few words. The history of the last of these two bills, you have yourself given, in so masterly a manner, that there is nothing for me to add to your account. There can be but two ways of thinking on this occasion. Either the injury government is supposed to have sustained, and the necessity of knowing the extent of the evil for the purpose of future regulation is so great, that a constitutional principle *ought* to be sacrificed; or, admitting the evil to exist to the full extent it is supposed, it should rather be endured (as my Lord Chancellor is reported to have asserted) than such a principle be infringed.—On this question men may very naturally think differently; but there surely can be no difference in opinion, that the Parliament of this country is in duty bound, as carefully to guard the rights and privileges of British subjects who reside in any part of the Antillean Archipelago, as of those whose habitations are in Portsmouth or Plymouth. In the present instance has this been done? During the passage of the first bill through both houses, not a syllable was said, not a murmur was heard in opposition to it; it passed: and commissioners are said to have gone out armed, at least as far

* That these two bills were originally twin brothers will not be disputed: nay, a young member brought forward in debate the one as a precedent for the other. The same gentleman mentioned another bill in the reign of Charles II. and said it was a good precedent, as having been carried through the House of Commons in opposition to the court: as if any transaction of that reign either on one side or the other, could justify an infringement of the people's rights. We may next expect to hear of the veracity of Titus Oates, or the guilt of poor old Lord Strafford.

as Parliament could arm them, with every one of those powers, which, in the second instance, are so strenuously objected to, and in the end not granted. Every argument used on the late occasion is a reflexion on what passed before; and every amendment made by the present, a libel on the conduct of the last Parliament. If this is admitted, as per force it must in this country, what will be the comments made upon it in the islands? And with such glaring facts as these before their eyes, it is not the fair promises or fine words of a member of administration that will satisfy the colonists, that the suspicions they have long had but too much reason to form, are ill grounded.—Their feelings and their sentiments are by many held not worthy regard, who reason, that as the West-Indians cannot better themselves, it is of little moment how much they consider themselves aggrieved, since they can be under no protection so advantageous to them as that of the British flag. If this observation, Mr. Cobbett, is true, is it generous? is it worthy of a British mind? In private life how should we consider the man that gave utterance to such a sentiment? and what scorn and contempt would not he appear to deserve who should be governed in his conduct by a way of thinking like this? Far different will be the feeling of every good man, and of every wise politician to whom the reins of government may be entrusted: he knows that to make any description of citizens most useful to the state, is to impress them most strongly with the conviction that they, their persons, their rights, and their properties are all as dear to him, and as sacredly considered as those of any other of their fellow-subjects.—This conviction coming home by proof upon their minds, an active loyalty, an alacrity to bear their full proportion of the public burthens would immediately evince themselves: no measures, no remonstrances would be heard. Every man would feel himself engaged in one common cause with his brother at the other extremity of the empire, and such an active co-operating spirit pervading the whole mass, the colossal powers and all the great talents of the Gallic tyrant might be defied: and our country once more stand forth with effect the guardian and protectress of the rights of Europe. Would to God, Mr. Cobbett, there was any prospect of this pleasing picture being realized! The inhabitants of the islands are all naturally attached to this country.

"England with all thy faults I love thee still," is a sentiment felt from Bridge Town to Savannah la Mar. Surely, then, common decency should be shewn towards them, and their feelings not insulted as every man's amongst them must be, by the different reception two bills, exactly alike in their principle and operation, but the one to take effect in the West-Indies, and the other in England, have met with in a British Parliament. TROPICUS.

ON THE NAVY BILL.

SIR,—The ministers, declare themselves in Parliament, to entertain the highest respect for the persons presiding at the Admiralty and Navy Boards for several years back, and pronounce those gentlemen free from blame; yet the Chancellor of the Exchequer says, at the same time, that abuses to an immense extent were discovered 9 or 10 years ago in the naval department, and communicated to Parliament; which abuses have increased ever since, and particularly during the last 18 months. He represented also, it is true, that Parliament when first made acquainted with these discoveries judged it impolitic to institute a retrospective enquiry with regard to them, being on the eve of a war. But are we therefore to hold those persons innocent, who after detecting such abuses, suffered them, for ten succeeding years, to *increase* under their management; the same reasons that would justify a delay of enquiry into such frauds, did not imply a toleration for their future continuance. A discovery is made in 1793 of peculation in the civil department of the navy to the annual amount, I believe I am correct, of a million and a half, which is suffered to increase until 1803 without any person being to blame, and the minister, now entrusted with the finances of the country, stands up in the House of Commons and asserts it, in the same breath that he asks of the House a further supply of 13 or 14 thousand a year, which is immediately granted, for what? To promote the same fruitless discoveries! Can real reform be expected from such men and such measures?—To render this assertion consistent, Mr. Addington must mean to insinuate, that these abuses, though discovered, could not be checked.—Then why put the country to additional expense, for probing wounds he despairs of healing. Again, had the first Lord of the Admiralty entertained that respect due to the Navy Board, as second in consequence to his own, he would not have introduced the bill in question, without previous communication of his design to Sir A. Hammond (the much esteemed comptroller of the Navy Board.) The Navy Bill I strongly suspect will be found nugatory.—Power was originally

lodged with the first Lord of the Admiralty, (and still continues in his disposal) which, if properly applied, would correct every future abuse in his department: if not, for the immediate occasion, Parliament ought to have increased his power; and for the purpose of retrospective enquiry, a committee of the House of Commons was the best resource.—Your correspondent of the 15th, R. B., has ably stated, that commissioners are already too numerous in the naval department, for any probability of benefit, to arise from their number being increased. In the ordnance, which has been less suspected of malversation than the others, *there are none.*—The provisions respecting prize-money, which the Navy Bill contains, ought not to have been connected with it, and were so most certainly for the ill concealed purpose of throwing over the whole a veil of popularity.—The distribution of prize-money, is an interesting and important subject, which ought to have been separately and immediately brought under consideration; delay and confusion must arise from its being classed with the naval enquiry which, report says, is to go back to the times of James the 2d; documents of that period, having been demanded by the commissioners from those offices, where the originals are lodged. —As to the fitness of those appointed to execute it, I think with you, the several naval Boards would have afforded a better selection; a selection certainly possessing more knowledge of the subject to be submitted to them, at least of those relative to purchases, sales, &c.; and whose operations would have been unattended with any additional expense.—For the purpose of more general enquiry, men of the first rate abilities and independence should have been chosen. Sir Charles Pole, I have generally heard spoken of as a good sort of man, of a very accommodating disposition; qualities, which alone, it might be supposed, would not entitle their possessor to the very singular situation he now holds, and the distinctions that have lately been heaped upon him.

Sir Charles Pole is the officer who was judged the best qualified to succeed the gallant Lord Nelson, in command of our fleet in the Baltic, (where he had never served) though that command had been previously promised to Sir J. Colpoys. Soon after, when the Admiralty determined (for unknown reasons) to take the command of the blockade of Cadiz from Sir James Saumerez, who had served there with very distinguished credit during several years, and who had about that time, fought two gallant actions with the French and Spaniards in the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, by which he has immortalised his name; Sir Charles Pole was again selected as the most able Admiral for that service; and provisionally to succeed Lord Keith, in the command of the Mediterranean fleet. This gentleman's talents must have been undervalued by the Public. Lord St Vincent has surely found him to possess powers of a very extraordinary kind, for he has even condescended to put himself under his controul, though one of the oldest Admirals in our service; an arrangement apparently very objectionable, but not new in his Lordship's system of naval management. When commanding off Cadiz, as I am told, he sent the *master* of the Ville de Paris on board the Centaur, then commanded by Captain Markham, (now one of the Lords of the Admiralty,) to put that ship in good order, directing the *captain* to aid and assist that master in the operation!—However considerable Sir Charles's abilities may be, he will find it no easy task to reconcile his situation of Commissioner and Admiral; his friendship for Lord St. Vincent, and his guardianship of the public interest, when he has to enquire into the abuses of the Board of Admiralty at which his patron presides, to whom he appears greatly indebted; and whose successor, as a termination of his late career, he is, perhaps, to become, should his Lordship from *real* illness be unable to execute the duties of First Lord.—Interrogating the Board of Admiralty is unquestionably to form part of Sir Charles' undertaking, or the whole enquiry will prove useless. Public money has been squandered in the purchase of hemp and iron, in the building and fitting ships, &c. This is a serious evil, but not greater than wasting it by *unnecessary* promotion of officers, which is also prejudicial, by degrading the service, and increasing the *gigantic* patronage of the Admiralty. Nor are these the most important points for his investigation; the general dissatisfaction and disgust now prevalent in all departments of the naval service; numbers of *boys* parading the streets as captains and lieutenants; ships put in commission when *without a plank* on their bottom; others ruined by mismanagement; deserving captains refused their flags on the most shameful pretences; strangers and men ignorant of the service, brought into our Naval Boards, and Dock-yards, over the heads of old servants; —these are fatal symptoms of that corruption, which consumes the vitals of our Navy.

If the country flatters itself, Sir Charles Pole has skill and resolution enough to apply such caustics as will stop them; if they farther hope, the Admiralty will submit to

be cured by him; their faith and expectation exceeds all that I can entertain, but most cordially shall I rejoice in seeing it justified.—Yet I must repeat, a want of subordination in those whose duty is obedience; a cruel waste of that public spirit and attachment to their profession, which our naval officers must feel or cease to be the men that have upheld their country, by shewing themselves; are all evils brought on us by the Admiralty, and far more fearful in their consequences than frauds on the public purse; it is not poverty but *prostration of character*, which a great maritime empire ought to dread! NAUTICUS.

A Representation from the Honourable Board of Trade to his Majesty King George I. asserting and proving the Right of the Subjects of Great Britain, to cut Logwood in the Bay of Campeachy.—To the King's most excellent Majesty.

MAY IT PLEASE YOUR MAJESTY,—The Right Honourable Paul Methuen, Esq.; one of your Majesty's principal Secretaries of State, having transmitted to us on the 15th of Nov. last, by order of his Royal Highness, a letter or memorial he had received from the Marquis de Monteleone, ambassador extraordinary from his Catholick Majesty, relating to the trade carried on in the West Indies, and to the settlement made by your Majesty's subjects on the island of Trist, and on or near the lake or marsh de Terminos, in the province of Jucatan: in which parts he represents, 'That they employ themselves in cutting of logwood, or (as the Spaniards call it) 'Campeachy wood, and that the Spanish viceroy 'and governor had proposed to dislodge them 'from thence, but that his Catholic Majesty 'would not send his orders before he had given 'your Majesty notice of it, not doubting, but that 'according to all the treaties of peace, and particularly that made at Utrecht, your Majesty 'would oblige your said subjects to leave the 'aforesaid lake de Terminos, and give positive 'orders to your governors of Jamaica, and of the 'other islands, not to suffer the least trade to be 'carried on for Campeachy wood, and to declare, 'that if, in the space of eight months, they do 'not leave the said place, they shall be looked 'upon and used as pirates.'—We beg leave to represent to your Majesty, that although we did humbly propose such methods as we esteemed proper and necessary to support the cutting of logwood in the West Indies, when the said Mr. Methuen was on departure for Madrid, yet on this occasion when a trade of so great importance to our navigation and the American colonies, is in danger of being lost, we have again carefully perused the books and papers in our office, and received from the merchants and others the fullest information we can hope to obtain, which hath taken up much time; and we do now humbly crave leave to lay before your Majesty the past and present state of this trade, with the arguments that formerly engaged your Majesty's royal predecessors to protect and support the same; to which we shall add some observations, and the reasons that induce us to conclude, your Majesty's subjects have now as full and ample right to this trade, as to any other liberty or privilege that has been allowed by the crown of Spain, and enjoyed by them, by virtue of any treaty whatsoever.—In the first place, therefore, it must be observed, that logwood is one of the products of the province of Jucatan, which extends itself into the north sea, in form of a peninsula, about 100 leagues in length. The Spaniards are possessed of San Francisco de Campeachy, its capital town and port, which has been thrice taken by the English, and besides they have two other inland towns, Meridia and Valladolid, of no great importance, having few inhabitants; but the rest of the province, before the logwood cutters were settled, was, in a manner, wholly desolate and uninhabited.—Nevertheless, it must be allowed, that the Spaniards had, from time to time, cut wood in several places near their own settlements; but during the hostilities that were committed in the West Indies before the year 1667, they deserted that employment, being frequently interrupted by the privateers, both by sea and land, who by degrees becoming acquainted with the coast, and with those parts where the wood grew, that were most remote from the Spaniards, they, at last, fell into the trade, and laid the foundation of their future establishment.—Their first settlements were near to Cape Catoche, but upon (if not before) the publication of the treaty concluded at Madrid, in 1667, by the Earl of Sandwich; they likewise settled near Suma-Sunta, adjacent to the Laguna de Terminos, and to Trist and Beef islands, which being the most convenient place for cutting of wood, and a tolerable harbour for their ships and vessels, the whole trade soon centered there. For notwithstanding the aforesaid treaty was principally intended to settle and adjust our commerce with his Catholic Majesty's dominions in Europe, yet, 'a 'general, firm and perfect amity, confederation 'and peace being thereby agreed, and concluded '(as in the first article) between the two crowns, 'to be observed inviolably, as well by land as by 'sea and fresh waters, and between the countries, 'kingdoms, dominions and territories belonging 'unto, or under the obedience of either of them, '&c.' it was concluded, that the peace extended to America as well as Europe; whereupon many of the British privateers that had before used those seas, to the great interruption of commerce, were then induced to quit their former course, and to settle with the logwood cutters in the Laguna de Terminos; so that in the year 1669, their numbers were considerably increased, and great quantities of wood were transported both to Jamaica and New England.—The American treaty for restraining depredations in those parts being afterwards concluded by Sir William Godolphin in July 1670, added to their strength by encouraging several others of the privateers, or seamen, to fall in with this employment of cutting wood, to which it was now generally supposed they had a right by the said treaty.—And as the logwood trade was of the greatest importance to Jamaica, on the 10th of March 1671, Sir Thomas Lynch, then governor of that island, not having received any orders how to govern himself in this affair, transmitted to the Lords of the Council the reasons that induced him to encourage the same under proper regulations.—1st. That the English had done so for divers years.—2dly. It was in desolate and uninhabited places.—3dly. That this seems a possession granted by the American treaty.—4thly. It might give a right to seclude the Dutch and the French, if we should break with Spain.—5thly. The Spaniards had not, to that time, made any complaints of it.—6thly. This employ makes the reducing of the privateers more easy, and—7thly. That it will employ 100 sail

annually, and bring in more to his Majesty's customs and the nation's trade, than any colony the King hath.—Whilst these arguments were under consideration, the Earl of Arlington laid before the lords of the committee, a letter from Sir Thomas Modyford, the late governor of Jamaica, dated the 16th of May 1672, wherein, after he had given an account of the great extent or compass of the country, in which the logwood grows; how meanly the Spanish towns, on the aforesaid tract of land were peopled; and of the places frequented by the English, he adds,—That they have used this trade for three years past, at first finding it by the sea-side, but afterwards being forced to go four or five miles up into the country for their refreshment, they had planted Indian provisions, and built houses there to keep themselves and their provisions from the sun and rain: that, in general, they had affirmed to him, never to have seen any Spaniards or other person, in all the time of their working, although they had gone six or seven miles further into the country to kill deer, &c. This possession, he says, in the West Indies, is held the strongest that can be, viz. falling of wood, building of houses, and clearing and planting the ground.—Sir Thomas Lynch, to confirm what he had before asserted, and to justify his proceedings, in Nov. 1672, sends home the copies of several depositions he had taken from the masters of ships, and others concerned in the logwood trade, and of a proclamation he had issued out for the better regulation and security thereof, importing,—That whereas he was informed, by the oaths of many credible witnesses, that his Majesty's subjects have used to hunt, fish, and cut wood in divers bays, islands, and parts of the continent, not frequented or possessed by any of the subjects of his Catholic majesty, and had, for some years, peaceably done the same without any molestation; nevertheless, divers vessels having been seized at anchor and under sail by some pirates and fugitives of this island, and being in danger of being so surprised again, therefore he orders and appoints all vessels sailing out of the Port Royal, for the aforesaid lawful employments, to go out together in small squadrons, four at least in company, and to give bond to keep company with, and to obey him, whom he should make commander for the voyage, and their mutual defence, and what they should lawfully do in their own defence, and for the preservation of his Majesty's subjects, their ships and goods, be authorised and warranted, &c.—In January following, the Secretary to the Lords of the Committee by their order, advises the said Sir Thomas Lynch, that he had acquainted him with their lordship's pleasure fully, concerning cutting of logwood, and that they did altogether allow of the same, provided those rules were observed, which they had formerly directed, and which were agreeable to what the said governor himself had already mentioned.—This allowance of carrying on the trade as aforesaid, gave fresh vigour to those engaged in it, though about this time the Spaniards began to interrupt them in the prosecution thereof, and to dispute their right to that liberty they had so long quietly enjoyed.—For we must insist on it, as an undoubted and uncontested fact, that from the publication of the treaty in 1667, until about two years after the conclusion of the American treaty, the logwood cutters had never been in the least disturbed or molested in their employment, either directly or indirectly; nor does it appear, that the Spanish governors took any umbrage at it, or made any complaint about it; much less did they pretend to an exclusive right, or that it was contrary to the laws of their commerce.—Nay, so far were they from expressing any resentment on this account, or making it a pretence to justify the first hostilities they committed, in violation of the treaties both of 1667 and 1670, that when Sir Thomas Lynch sent to Don Fernando Francisco Descavedo, the governor of St. Francisco de Campeachy, to demand satisfaction for two English ships which had logwood on board, and were taken by some Spanish men of war; in his answer to that charge on the 6th of April 1672, he takes no notice of our cutting logwood, or that those ships had any on board, or that we had settled on the Laguna de Terminos, nor had he any other complaint to make by way of retaliation, save that an English vessel had taken a Spanish bark at the Laguna de Terminos bound to Tobasco, which is the more remarkable, because the said Laguna was, at that time, and had been several years, actually in our possession.—It must likewise be further urged, that before the Queen Regent of Spain had published a royal cedula, bearing date the 22d of June 1672, which orders, 'That such as should make invasion, or trade 'without license in the ports of the Indies, should 'be proceeded against as pirates, &c.' it does not appear that cutting of logwood was esteemed by the Spaniards to be an invasion, and trading without license; but by virtue of this cedula, it was at length carried to that height, that if our ships had but any logwood on board, they were confiscated without remedy.—Upon this subject, the Earl of Arlington, on the 19th of March 1674, wrote to Sir William Godolphin, then ambassador at Madrid, as follows:—'In a word, his Majesty 'is so sensible of the sufferings of his subjects in 'this particular, that you must endeavour, by all 'the skill you have, to procure some liberty for 'the cutting of logwood, in those remote parts, 'where the Spaniards have none, and his Majes-'ty's subjects have had long abode and residence; 'and the rather, for that we find, by all the re-'plies we have seen, they justify themselves by 'that single point of cutting logwood, nay even 'of finding it on board our vessels, which to us 'appears very unreasonable.'—And Sir Lionel Jenkins, the judge of the Admiralty, in his report to his late Majesty King Charles II. of the 8th of October 1675, intimating, 'That the Ame-'rican treaty does require a further elucidation 'and adjustment between your Majesty and the 'crown of Spain; for it appears by the judgment 'of the Queen, in the matter of Campeachy, and 'by their Cedulas Reales, that they affix a new 'interpretation upon that treaty, in declaring 'what shall be private or not private, prize or 'not prize, without communicating, it seems, 'with your Majesty, and without publication, 'that may reach your Majesty's subjects.'—Thus, by a Spanish Auto, or a decree of that court, which was inconsistent with, and made *(ex post facto)* after the ratifications of a public and solemn treaty, it was manifestly intended, not only to debar the British subjects of that liberty they enjoyed before the said treaty was made, but in some measure, to deprive them of the common right of all nations, whereas, if your Majesty's subjects did actually hold and possess the Laguna de Terminos, and the parts adjacent, at the time of the conclusion of the American treaty, as hath been already proved, the last clause of the 7th article will determine to whom the same belongs, viz.—'Moreover, it is agreed, that the most serene 'King of Great Britain, his heirs and successors,

'shall have, hold, and keep, and always possess, 'in full right of sovereignty, seignory, possession, and property, all the lands, countries, 'islands, colonies, and other places, be they 'what they will, lying and situate in the West 'Indies, or in any part of America, which the 'said King of Great Britain and his subjects, now 'hold and possessed, insomuch they neither can 'nor ought hereafter to be contested or called in 'question for them, upon any account, or under 'any pretence whatsoever.'—And as long as the 8th article of the same treaty subsists, it will appear very extraordinary, that the Spaniards should pretend to any dominion or power in the ports or havens where they neither had fortifications, nor magazines, or in those places which were not possessed by them, because these descriptions are undoubtedly laid down by the treaty, as the sole and distinguishing marks of the sovereignty of the crown of Spain in those ports and places, which only we were to forbear sailing to and trafficking in, whilst all other ports and places were left open and free.—But notwithstanding the said treaty was so strong in our favour, the Spaniards having thereby compassed the two main ends they proposed to themselves, viz.—1st, The securing their West India trade to themselves, by excluding us, and consequently all other nations, from trafficking with them; a point which could never be before obtained, though it was strenuously insisted on, in the reign of King James I. and afterwards in 1630.—2d, The dispersion of the privateers, who had long miserably harassed and distressed the Spaniards' settlement, and notably checked the increase both of their power and trade in those parts, but are now entirely reduced, by the great care of the English governors, and by their entering into the logwood trade.—Yet the only advantages Great Britain aimed at by the treaty, viz. that her subjects might carry on their trade without interruption, and peaceably enjoy those places they then held and possessed, were, in a great measure, absolutely defeated.—For, after the publication of the aforesaid royal cedula, many of our ships were made prizes, under that pretence, sometimes by Spanish men of war, at other times by English pirates, seduced by the governors into the service of Spain, and afterwards by the Biscayneers, that were sent to cruise in those seas.—And, upon the same pretence, in April 1680, several ships under the command of Don Philippo de Varedda Villegas, arrived at the island of Trist and the Laguna de Terminos, attacked our logwood-cutters, whilst separated from one another, and dislodged them from thence.—Moreover, the Spanish governors encouraged by this success, and little regarding the just right of your Majesty, or your subjects, even to plantations still more distant from their dominions, did soon resolve upon another expedition, and in 1682, surprised New Providence, one of the Bahama islands. —But these places were again soon repeopled, and the trade from Trist and the Laguna, in 1682, was greater than ever.—The rise and progress of the logwood trade, from about the year 1667, to the year 1682, being thus stated, and laid before your Majesty, we presume it would be too tedious, and not very material to the point in question, to enter into the particulars, how, and in what manner, it was afterwards constantly carried on; and how it has been, from time to time, interrupted and supported until the year 1713, when the adjustment and settlement thereof was again under consideration, both at Madrid and Utrecht.—But since the Spanish ambassador insists on it, that by the treaty of peace made at Utrecht, in which (he says) it is stipulated, 'That the lands or other 'places which had been taken in the Indies dur- 'ing the war, should be evacuated; your Majesty 'is engaged to oblige your subjects who are come 'to the lake de Terminos, to leave it immedi- 'ately.' We most humbly take leave to represent further to your Majesty:—That if his Excellency would hereby insinuate, that your Majesty's subjects are but lately, and during the war, come to the Laguna de Terminos, this is a mistake in fact; for it appears by the aforementioned depositions, sent by Sir Thomas Lynch, and Sir Thomas Modyford, that they were there in 1669, and for some time or years before; and it is well known to the Spaniards, that they have been ever since possessed of that part of the country, except for two or three months after the aforesaid assault in 1680.—Neither will what the said ambassador asserts from the treaty, answer the end for which it was produced.—By the 8th article it is, indeed, agreed by his Catholic Majesty, 'not 'to alienate any of his territories in the West In- 'dies, to the French or any other nation; and 'upon this condition her late Majesty engages, 'that she will endeavour and give assistance to 'the Spaniards, that the ancient limits of their 'dominions in America be restored, &c. if it shall 'appear that they have in any manner been bro- 'ken into, and lessened in any part, since the 'death of King Charles II.' But to argue from hence, that the Laguna de Terminos, in possession of the English before the year 1670, must be evacuated, when this treaty has only reference to what has passed since the demise of the said King Charles II. is very extraordinary.—But if the ambassador refers to the memorial on the affairs of commerce, that was signed at Madrid, the 13th of July 1713, by the Lord Lexington, and the Marquis de Bedmar, we must confess, that the article relating to the logwood trade, proposed therein by his lordship, had not then its effect: but we are assured it was from thence, among other things, referred to the discussion of the plenipotentiaries at Utrecht.—What passed particularly on this affair at Utrecht, doth not appear to us; but by the treaty of commerce concluded the 28th of November following (of which the said ambassador takes no notice in this memorial) and wherein the several interests of the two crowns, and their subjects, with respect to commerce, were more particularly under consideration, it is manifest, that the rights and liberties insisted on by the British subjects in the West Indies, were adjusted by the Lords Plenipotentiaries, and that a clause in the treaty, which determines this contest relating to the cutting of logwood, beyond all possibility of dispute for the future, was then agreed upon and concluded; it being expressly stipulated in the first article after the confirmation and ratification of the American treaty in 1670, as follows;— 'Without any prejudice, however, to any liberty, 'or power, which the subjects of Great Britain 'enjoyed before, either through right, sufferance, 'or indulgence.'—If, therefore, this comprehensive clause (which relates only to the West Indies) confirms, secures, and re-establishes those liberties, which the subjects of Great Britain enjoyed in America before the treaty in 1670, it necessarily follows:—That they having then enjoyed the liberty of cutting logwood, without any interruption (as hath been fully proved) either through right, sufferance, or indulgence, they are again entitled by this treaty, to the same liberty, in as plain and express words as can be used or

imagined —And that your Majesty may be more fully apprised of the importance of this trade, the same will be effectually demonstrated by the following account of the quantities of logwood imported since the war, viz.

	T.	C.	Q.	lb.
In 1713, —	2189	15	3	22
1714, —	4873	14	3	24
1715, —	5863	12	1	14
1716, —	2032	17	2	5
In four years, Tons	14965	2	3	9

That is, *communibus annis*, tons 3741, which cannot be computed at less than £.60,000 per annum though the price is at present reduced from £.40 to £.16 per ton, whereas, before your Majesty's subjects were settled there, it was worth £.100 the ton.—Nor is this trade less necessary than beneficial to your Majesty's dominions, by reason of the great encouragement it gives to our seamen and shipping, which at all times requires a particular attention, but now especially, when it is daily observed, that very many British mariners, either through defect of the laws, for want of employment at home, or in hopes of greater advantage abroad, enter themselves into foreign service. —Upon the whole, therefore, we are humbly of opinion;—That the subjects of this your Majesty's kingdom, for some years before, as well as after the conclusion of the American treaty in 1670, did enjoy an uninterrupted liberty of cutting logwood in the Laguna de Terminos, and in other places not inhabited by the Spaniards in the province of Jucatan, either through right, sufferance, or indulgence.—That the said American treaty did establish a right in the crown of Great Britain to the Laguna de Terminos, and the parts adjacent; those places, at the time of the treaty, and for some years before, being actually in possession of the British subjects.—That the royal Cedula issued out by the court of Spain, was a violation of the aforesaid treaty, forasmuch as the carrying on the trade to the Laguna de Terminos, was thereby interpreted an invasion, and the logwood-cutters accounted pirates.—And that your Majesty's subjects having been (at least) suffered to enjoy the liberty of cutting logwood as aforesaid, before the conclusion of the American treaty (although your Majesty should not insist on your said right to the Laguna de Terminos) yet that the same liberty is absolutely granted and confirmed by the treaty of commerce made at Utrecht.—And we do further think it our duty to represent to your Majesty, that although the said Spanish ambassador seems to declare in his memorial, that no attempt should be made to dislodge your subjects settled on the Laguna de Terminos, in a less time than eight months from the date of his said memorial; yet they were dislodged and taken prisoners in the same month the memorial was delivered, as appears by several affidavits sent to this board by General Hamilton, your Majesty's governor of the Leeward islands.—All which is most humbly submitted.—Signed, *Suffolk, J. Chetwynd, Charles Cooke, J. Molesworth, D. Pulteney, M. Bladen.*

Whitehall, Sept. 25th, 1717.

Report made to the French Consul by Col. Sebastiani, extracted from the Moniteur of the 30th of Jan. 1803.

On the 16th of September I embarked at Toulon on board the Cornélie, and on the 30th I arrived at Tripoli. I immediately wrote to Baron Cederstrom, the Swedish Rear-Adm. as well as to the min. of the Pacha, to offer them my mediation to terminate the differences existing between the Swedish Court and the Regency. My mediation was accepted: the min. and the Rear-Adm. repaired to the Commissarial House of France, and we entered on the negotiation. The two parties were far asunder; the Pacha demanded a considerable sum, and an augmentation of the annual tribute. He urged a treaty made two years ago by an envoy of the K. of Sweden, which assured the payment of 245 thousand heavy piastres, and of an annuity of 20,000; he added, that two years of war had subjected him to extraordinary expenses, and that he used great moderation in conforming himself to the treaty in question. M. de Cederstrom only offered, in the name of his Court, 100,000 piastres for the redemption of the Swedish slaves, who were to the number of a hundred and fifty, and an annuity of 5000 piastres. After much debate, I succeeded in making them sign a treaty which fixed the payment of the ransom at 150,000 piastres, and the annuity at 8000.—On the 1st of October I was presented with much pomp to the Pacha, who received me in the most distinguished manner. The exchange of the ratif. of the tr. of peace took place, and the Ital. Rep. was formally acknowledged. I caused its flag to be hoisted on the Commissarial House of France, and it was saluted by the frigate and the place, with 21 guns.—It was not without difficulty that the Pacha consented to acknowledge that Rep. He feared that all Italy was comprized in this new Rep. and that, in consequence, he would be obliged to respect indiscriminately all the ships of commerce of that part of Europe:—this would destroy his marine. I gave him the necessary explanations, and particularly those which related to the object of his apprehensions, and he replied to me, 'Certainly I wish to be at peace with the Ital. Rep. without too much injuring my interest; but if it were still more difficult, I would do it, since the great Buonaparté desires it.'—The Pacha of Tripoli is a brave and enterprizing man, the friend of France. The English have furnished succours to his brother, who is at present at Derne, without means or credit. His plan is to raise the country against the Bey.—The political and administrative affairs of the regency are conducted by Seid-Muhammed-el-Deghais, Min. of the Pacha. This man is full of sagacity, and has even some notions of European politics. He has been in France, and preserves for our country a predominant sentiment of affection.— On the 2d of Oct. I set out from Tripoli, and on the 16th arrived at Alexandria: the same day I waited upon Gen. Stuart, Comt. of the English forces by land and sea. I communicated to him the order of the Min. for Foreign Affairs, which enjoined me to proceed to Alexandria, and if the Eng. still occupied that place, to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the tr. of Amiens.—Gen. Stuart then told me, that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected; but seeing that I insisted, and that I desired an answer less vague, he de-

clared to me, that he had no orders from his Court to quit Alexandria, and that he even believed he should pass the winter there.—Gen. Stuart is a man of *médiocre* talents: he has for his aid-de-camp a Fr. emigrant, called the Chev. de Sades, a man of talent, and an enemy of France, who has much influence over the Gen.—I went the same day to see Khourchid-Ahmid, the Pacha of Alexandria and the Capitan Bey, Com. of the Forces of the Ottoman Porte.—After the customary compliments, and some language agreeable to the Sublime Porte, I announced to them, that the agents of French commerce would assemble in Egypt. This communication gave them the greatest pleasure, and they did not conceal that they saw with grief the stay of the Eng. in the country. I told them, that their stay could not be much longer, and that the general peace left no doubt of their approaching departure.—On the 17th I visited the Cheik El-Messiry. The same day I also visited the Cheik Ibrahim Mufti.—On the 18th I visited the Coupure du Khalidj, which has formed the Lake Mareotis. The current of the waters of the Lake Madié is still very strong, and if the Porte does not make haste to re-establish this important canal, the overflows which take place on the little tongue of land that separates the two lakes, will render the opening so considerable, that it will be impossible to travel. I do not think that the Swedish engineer sent by the Porte to direct these labours, has the necessary talents. The formation of the Lake Marcotis appears to have contributed to the salubrity of the air. The city has no other water than what it draws from the wells of Marabouf. This little fort I found guarded by an Eng. and Turkish garrison, in order to protect the inhabitants who came to draw water.—I employed the day of the 19th in perambulating the town, and receiving different individuals who came to visit me.—On the 20th, I set out for Cairo, escorted by two Turkish officers, and six Fr. soldiers, whom I had taken on board the frigate, but contrary winds obliged me to return to the port.—The next day I was at Aboukir, where I passed the night. I profited by this opportunity to visit the fort, which is in a very ruined state.—On the 22d, I arrived at Rosetta, after having visit the Fort Julien; I saw the same day Osman, Aga, and Duvanny of the town, as well as all the Christians who reside there.—The 23d I was at Faoné, where I visited the commandant of the place, the Cadi, and the Cheiks; I received from the latter, and from all those whom I entertained, protestations of attachment to the First Consul.—I passed the next day at Rahmanie, where I visited the Cheik Muhammed Abou-Aly; the fort of the town is almost entirely destroyed.—I visited on the 25th, at Menouf, the Cheik Abdin, whom the First Consul had appointed Cadi. The other Cheiks of that town who came to visit me, held the same language as those of Faoné. I said to them, 'The First Consul loves your country much, he speaks of it often; he interests himself in your happiness; he did not forget you, and recommended you to the Porte. He has made peace with Europe, and this country will feel the interest which he takes, and the recollection which he has preserved of the poor Cheiks of Egypt.'—Muhammed Kachef-Zourba Matzellem, who commanded at Menouf on my journey through that town, has been beheaded in consequence of being accused of communications with the Mamelouks.—The two forts of Menouf are destroyed.—I arrived the same day at Boulak. I sent immediately Citizen Joubert to inform the Pacha of Cairo of my arrival.—The next morning, the 26th, the Pacha sent 300 cavalry and 200 infantry, commanded by the principal officers of his household, to accompany me to him, amidst a great many discharges of artillery.—Having arrived at the Pacha's, I said to him, 'Peace has been concluded between the French Rep. and the Sub. Porte; the ancient relations of amity and commerce have been re-established, and I am charged by the Great Consul Buonaparté, to assure you of his benevolence, and to announce to you the arrival of Commissaries of the Fr. Commerce in Egypt.' The Pacha answered me, 'The benevolence with which the First Consul has honoured me, penetrates me with gratitude, and his commercial agents shall meet here the most friendly reception.'—I proceeded then to the house which the Pacha had prepared for me.—I received the same day the visits of all the principal men of the country, and of the Copt Intendants.—On the 27th I again repaired to the Pacha, with whom I had a long conference. I spoke to him in these words: 'The First Consul takes in you, and the country which you govern, a very lively interest, and desires to contribute to your happiness; he has charged me therefore to offer you his mediation, in order to make peace between you and the Beys.

The Pacha thanked me warmly and sincerely for the interest which the First Consul took in his behalf, but he protested to me, that he had the most positive orders from his court, to make a war of extermination upon the Beys, and not to enter into any arrangement with them. I observed, that the unfortunate circumstances which had happened to the Ottoman troops (they had been beaten five times successively by the Mamelouks), rendered their position very critical, and that obstinacy exposed them to the loss of the province. He then communicated to me the order of the Porte, and I saw beyond a doubt that it was not possible for him to enter into any accommodation. I informed him that I intended to visit the different Cheiks of Cairo, and also Madame Murat Bey, and to inspect the environs and fortifications of the city. He ordered immediately that the guard which he had sent should accompany me wherever I wished to go, informing me, that he would use every means in his power to render my stay at Cairo agreeable.—The same day I commenced my visits, beginning with the Cheik Abdallah-el-Chescanoi, of the Great Mosque. As I was expected by him, he had assembled a considerable number of Cheiks. The conversation turned upon the interest which the First Consul took in Egypt, on his power, his glory, and on his esteem and benevolence for the learned Cheiks of Cairo.

Their answers expressed their attachment to his person.—He must have been a witness like myself, to the enthusiasm excited at the view of the portrait of the First Consul, to form an idea of the exaltation of their sentiments. I have given it to all the principal Cheiks of Cairo, and of the towns where I have travelled.—On the 28th I invited the Cheik Omar El-Berky, prince of the Shiriss: he was ill, and I saw only his son.—The Cheik Suleiman El-Fargoumy, received me with much friendship, and assured me of his boundless admiration for the First Consul.—The Cit. Joubert and Beye have certified to me that the inhabitants of Cairo never testified so much attachment to France as on my arrival.—When we pass along the streets, every body salutes us. Their astrologers make predictions every day as to what concerns the First Consul. —On the 29th, I went to visit Madame Murad Bey: her intendant had already prayed of me that I would grant her an interview. I informed her, that the First Consul had charged me to interpose my mediation, in order to make their peace with the Sub. Porte; but that the Pacha had ordered that no negotiation should be entered into.—I employed that day and the following in visiting the citadel, the isle of Ro da Gizé, Boulak, and all the other little forts which surround the city. The Turkish soldiers murmured to see me visit their forts, but I feigned not to hear them, and continued my course and my observations.—On the 29th, in returning to fort Dupuy, a soldier menaced me with his attagan, but as the inhabitants of the city testified highly their indignation against him, I did not stop at his menaces, and continued my route. A moment afterwards Mustapha Oukil, one of the chiefs of the city, passed before me on horseback. In passing, he reproached my guides with marching before a christian, and above all, before a Frenchman, and menaced them with the bastinado after my departure. I could not be silent under such an insult; and upon my return I sent Cit. Joubert to the Pacha, to make my complaint, and demand a prompt redress. I declared to him that I expected this man would come publicly to me to ask my pardon, place himself at my disposal, and implore my pity. He found that Mustapha was greatly protected by the Pacha, and wanted to arrange it otherwise; but I persisted by declaring formally to the Pacha, that if this reparation was not made in the manner in which I demanded it, I should instantly depart, and immediately write to Paris and Constantinople to state my complaint. This declaration produced all the effect which I expected; and Mustapha, alarmed, came on the following day to me, conducted by Rosetti, and he publicly asked my pardon, and put himself at my disposal. I told him that my first intention had been to cut off his head, and that I only gave him his life at the solicitations of the Pacha and M. Rosetti; but if in future he should ever insult the French, or those in their suite, his destruction would be inevitable. This affair, which was instantly spread throughout the whole city, produced the best effect.—The same day an attempt was made to excite the Albanese against me. Two letters from Rosetta written by Eng. protegées, assured that there had been seen upon the coasts of Narolia, a French fleet of 300 sail; that we were marching against Constantinople, and that my visit to Egypt had no other object but to deceive them, and blind them to their dangers. I made the mercht. come to me who had received the letter: I made him give it me —I instantly sent it to the Pacha himself, telling him that this absurd news was spread to occasion disorders, and to endeavour to alter the good understanding which existed between France and the Sublime Porte; and I guaranteed the falsehood of it with my head.—The Pacha had discovered the snare, and did not fall into it. He even communicated to me a letter from Gen. Stuart, which he had just received, and to which was joined an order of the day, of the First Consul, when he commanded the army of Egypt. This order of the day was dated in Aug. 1799, and recalled to the recollection of the Egyptians, that Constantinople was tributary to Arabia, and that the time was now come to restore Cairo to its supremacy, and to destroy the Eastern empire of the Ottomans. Gen. Stuart begged the Pacha to consider the spirit of that order, and to judge from it of our attachment, and of our peace with the Turks. I was indignant to find that a soldier of one of the most polite nations of Europe should degrade himself so far as to instigate assassination, by means of such an insinuation—the Pacha treated me with the greatest politeness, and the Eng. at Cairo were witnesses of the attachment of that city to the French.—I received a deputation from the monks of Mount Sinai, whom I recommended to the Pacha: I wrote to their superior, to assure them of the friendship and protection o the First Consul.—The monks of the Propaganda at Cairo, whom I placed under the national protection which they enjoyed before the war, celebrated a *Te Deum* for the prosperity of the First Consul. I assisted at this ceremony, at which all the christians of Cairo were present. The evening before my departure (the 2d of Nov.) I had another interview with the Pacha, and recommended all the christians of Cairo to his protection, as well as the Turks, who during the residence of the French in Egypt, were connected with them. He not only promised to respect them, but even to treat them with bounty.—On the 3d, I set out in a conveyance of the Pacha's in order to repair to Damietta.—The Pacha ordered me to be escorted to Boulak, with the same honours that I received on the day of my arrival. I had written to Capt. Gourdin, to repair to Damietta with the frigate, in order to convey me to Syria. —On the 5th, I stopped a short time at Simenoud, and afterwards at Mansoura, where I saw the commandant of the city and the Cheik Esseid-Muhammed-El-Chenaoni, who came to see me, as well as all the other Cheiks. I spoke to them in the same manner as the other Cheiks of Egypt, and received the same promises of attachment. The tower of Mansoura is destroyed. The same day I arrived at Damietta.—The next day I went to Ahmed-Pacha-Behil, a creature of the Grand Vizier's; he returned my visit the same day.—He conducted himself perfectly well to me during my stay in that city.—

On the 7th, I went to visit the fort of Lesbe and the towers of Bogaz. They have not continued the works of that fort, which is in a bad state: those of Bogaz are in a good condition. There is a garrison of 200 men in the fort and in the towers.—On the 8th, I received the visit of Hassan Toubar: his influence over the inhabitants of Mensale is still the same.—On the 9th, I went to Senenie, where I saw the Cheik Ibrahim-El-Behlout, he who behaved so well to the French under the orders of General Vial, when they were taken and imprisoned. The First Consul had exempted his village from all contributions. —I saw all the Cheiks at Damietta, particularly Ali Khasaki, whom the First Consul had invested with a pelisse: he is possessed of great credit, and is much attached to the French. There are at Damietta two christians, who are men of merit, and may be very useful to us:—they are M. Bazile and Don Bazile. They are possessed of good information, have very considerable fortunes, and are very highly respected. In Egypt, chiefs, merchants, people, all like to talk of the First Consul—all offer up prayers for his happiness. All the news which concerns him spread from Alexandria or Damietta to the pyramids and the grand cataracts, with astonishing rapadity. On the 14th the frigate arrived at Bogaz from Damietta. I immediately set out for Acre, at which place I arrived on the 19th.—

The 20th of Nov. in the morning, I dispatched Citizens Joubert and Legrange to Dgezzar-Pacha, with a letter, in which I stated to him, that peace being concluded between France and the Porte, the relations of commerce should be re-established on the footing they stood before the war, and that I was charged by the First Consul to confer with him on these objects. I begged of him to answer me in writing, if he was inclined to treat with me. In some hours the messengers returned—Dgezzar had received them coldly. He expressed his desire to see me personally, but was unwilling to write. Every body advised me not to see him, without an assurance written by himself; but this he appeared unwilling to do: but notwithstanding this cautionary advice, and his obstinate refusal to write, I determined to repair myself immediately to Acre.—I repaired to the house of the Commissary of the Seven Isles. Very soon after, the Drogoman of the Pacha, informed of my arrival, came to conduct me to the Pacha, who received me in an apartment where he was unattended, and which was without any other furniture than a carpet. He had on one side of him a pistol with four barrels, a small air-gun, a sabre and a hatchet. After inquiring as to my health, he asked me, whether I was not persuaded that our end is pre-ordained in Heaven, and that nothing could change our destiny. I answered that I believed as he did, in predestination. He continued to speak for some time on that subject. I perceived, however, that he affected a degree of simplicity, but that, at the same time, he wished to pass for a man of wit, as well as for a just man. He repeated several times—'It is said, that Dgezzar is barbarous—this is false, he is but just and severe. Request of the First Consul, not to send me, as Commissary of Commercial Relations, a lame or a blind man; because such a person would be sure to say, that Dgezzar had made him so.' Soon after, he said, 'I desire that the Commissary you may send shall reside at Seide; as that is the most commercial port in my dominions: besides, it is not necessary he should reside here, where I shall be myself the French commissary, and shall take care that your countrymen be well received. I highly esteem the French. In stature Buonaparté is small, but he is nevertheless the greatest of mankind. I know that he is greatly regretted at Cairo, where they wish to see him again.'—I made a few observations on the peace between France and the Porte; to which he answered, 'Do you know why I have thus received, and feel so much pleasure at seeing you? It is because you come unauthorised by a *firman*, and without any orders from the Divan. I have the greatest contempt for its blind vizier. They say that Dgezzar is a Bosnian, a man of straw, and cruel to excess; but nevertheless, I can stand the ordeal. I was once poor. My father had nothing to bequeath me but courage. I have achieved my own elevation, by dint of exertion. This, however, does not make me proud, and Dgezzar, perhaps, will soon finish his career, not that he is old, as his enemies report, (he then performed some of the manœuvres of the Mamelukes, in their mode of rising their arms, &c. which he really executed with surprising adroitness and agility), but because, most likely, God will have it so. The King of France, once so powerful, has perished.—Nebuchadnezzar, the greatest of all Kings, was, when his time was come, killed by a fly, &c.' He made several other observations in this strain, and afterwards spoke of the motives which induced him to make war upon the French army; from the whole of his demeanour it could easily be seen, that he wished to be on good terms with the First Consul, and that he stifled his resentments.—The following is the apologue, which he used to demonstrate the causes of his resistance. 'A black slave,' he said, 'after a long journey, in which he had suffered the greatest privations, arrived at a little field of sugar canes—he stopped therein and indulged himself in partaking of the delicious liquor they afforded, and at length was determined to remain on the spot. Very soon after, two travellers, who had followed him came up. The first said to him, *Salamallee* (the mode of wishing health). The devil take it, answered the black. The second traveller then approached, and inquired why he had answered in such a way to so good a wish. I had very good reason for it replied he; if I had, answered in a friendly manner, the man would have entered into conversation with me, and afterwards sat down beside me; he would have partaken of my refreshments, and finding them desirable, would have endeavoured to obtain exclusive possession.'—I recommended to the favable attention of Dgezzar the christians and the convents at Nazareth and Jesrusalem; he assured me that he would treat them with much regard. I did not forget the *Mutuales*, and received the same assurance in their behalf. Dgezzar frequently observed to me, that his

word was, with him, more sacred than treaties. Our conversation was interrupted for some moments by a kind of military music, which he performed in a very agreeable stile.—The palace of Dgezzar is built with much taste and elegance; but, in order to arrive at the apartments, a number of turnings are necessary. At the foot of the staircase, however, is situated a prison, the gate of which is allowed to be open from noon till evening. I saw a number of the unfortunate inhabitants. In the courts I observed twelve field-pieces well mounted, and in admirable order. Never did I encounter a sight more hideous or repulsive than that of the minister of Dgezzar, whom I met in going out. The Pacha had caused one of his eyes to be put out, and his nose and ears lo be cut off. I saw in the town more than a hundred individuals in the same state. On beholding the domestics of Dgezzar, and even the inhabitants of Acre, one would imagine himself in the resorts of Brigands, ready to assassinate. This monster has imprinted the mark of his atrocious character upon every thing within the limits of his power. I had an opportunity of seeing while at Acre, the procurateur of the *Propaganda*, as well as that of the Holy Land. Of the former, and of the Commissary of the Seven Isles, I collected some information concerning the present state of Syria, and the fortifications of Acre, of which I had seen but a part—I was not suffered to visit them. The procurateur of the Holy Land is grateful to the First Consul for the protection he had afforded the monks. He assured me that my recommendation to Dgezzar would be very useful. He hinted to me Dgezzar's earnest wishes to be on good terms with the First Consul. It is certain that the former behaved very well to the crew of a French vessel which put into Acre shortly before my arrival.—Dgezzar occupies all Palestine, with the exception of Jaffa, where Aboumarak Pacha has been besieged nearly five months, by a force of 9000 men. This operation prevents Dgezzar from carrying on hostilities with the desired vigour, against the Emir of the Druses, who for the space of a year, had paid him no tribute.—Tripoli is tranquil at present: it is different at Aleppo, whence the Pacha has been driven. Damascus is in open rebellion against the Porte:—not only has the Pacha of the Divan been expelled, but the Aga who commanded the Citadel for the Turks, has been delivered up by the soldiers to the insurgents, who have decapitated him. Tripoli is now under a rebellious Pacha, who is a creature of Dgezzar, who has lately ordered him to protect the pilgrims from Mecca. In a word, all Syria is with Dgezzar, and the Ottomans are as much detested here, as in Egypt.—The Mutuales live peaceably n their villages; they have, however, been obliged to retire from the borders of the sea: Aboumarak is now at the last extremity; this man is equally inconsiderate and cruel, and is surpassed only by Dgezzar.—The Christians are even more in dread of him, and tremble for their future situation. The monks of the convent of Jaffa have withdrawn to Jerusalem.—The 21st Nov. I quitted Acre. As the winds were unfavourable to a voyage to Jaffa, I set sail for Zante, where I arrived the 4th December. I landed the same day, but the ship's company were put under quarantine. I repaired to the house of the French commissary, escorted by the officers of health.—I soon learned that the isle and the Rep. were split into different parties, and that even the tranquillity of the place was threatened. I assembled the members of the Constituted Authorities, and the principal persons of the town, at the house of the Gov. M. de Calishipode. After having represented to them the interest which the First Consul took in their welfare, I induced them to lay aside that spirit of party which distracted them, and to wait without passion, and in silence, the new constitution.—These few words were received with enthusiasm, and all of them exclaimed "France for ever! Buonaparté for ever!" These cries were reiterated on my going out, by more than 4000 men, who followed me to the door. The gov. and the Russian commandant were alarmed at it; and I learned by the French commissary, on the following day, that two of the leading men were sent to prison, but that, on his solicitations, and fearful of my reproaches, they were set at liberty in the course of the night. I went to the Conciergerie, and had the gov. brought there. I spoke to him strongly on the irregularity of his conduct. He was alarmed, and promised that he would look upon those who cried out 'Live the First Consul,' as good citizens, and should in future treat them as such. —As he sent in the course of the night a courier to his government, and I had reason to believe he had made a wrong report, I immediately wrote to the *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Rep. at Corfou, to inform him what had passed, and that I was setting off for Messina.—I do not stray from the truth in assuring you that the islands of the Ionian Sea will declare themselves French as soon as an opportunity shall offer itself.

ENGLISH ARMY IN EGYPT.—That army, commanded by General Stuart, consists of 4430 men. They wholly and exclusively occupy Alexandria and the neighbouring Forts. The Turks who formed the garrison of some of these Forts, have been removed. Lately the English gen. has occupied Demanhour with 100 infantry and 100 horse, under the pretext of curbing the Arabs. The English have made no necessary works for the maintenance of the Forts; the Pallisades are almost entirely destroyed, and the branches occasioned by the rains have very much damaged all the new fortifications. They occupy none of the works which are beyond the line of the Arabs, and all the redoubts which existed at the departure of the French army are destroyed.—The Pacha of Cairo furnishes to the English army corn, rice, wood, and provisions, without any payment. The consumption is treble what it should be; they commit great waste. A great misunderstanding reigns between General Stuart and the Pacha.

[*To be concluded in our next.*]

LONDON,

INVINCIBLE STANDARD.

It was our intention to have addressed the public, for the last time, on this subject; but, having heard, that his Royal Highness the Commander in Chief has it in contemplation to bestow a suitable reward on LUTZ, we think it right to wait, till we are more fully informed on that point. In the mean time we insert here, for the perusal of our readers, an extract from a work of great eminence just published; and we request the partizans of the Sinclairs, the Highland Society, and all others, who have had the injustice to complain of our publications on this subject; we request them to reply to CAPTAIN WALSH. Let them recollect, that the Captain's work is a large and costly book, that it will be put into all the libraries, public and private, that it will be read by the present and by the succeeding generation; therefore, let them now, if they have just cause, make their complaint, or let them for ever after hold their tongues.

Extract from a Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt, including Descriptions of the Country, and of Gibraltar, Minorca, Malta, Marmorice, and Macri. By Captain T. Walsh, of his Majesty's 93d Regiment of Foot, and Aide-de-Camp to Major-General Sir Eyre Coote, K.B.

" A Standard, covered with the military " exploits of the corps to which it be- " longed (according to General Reynier, a " battalion of the 21st demi-brigade), fell " into the hands of the Minorca or Queen's " German Regiment. It was *taken* by a " private named ANTHONY LUTZ, for which " he received a Certificate from the Adju- " tant-General, and the sum of twenty " dollars. This man, never having learned " to write or read, was incapable of being " made a serjeant, to which post he would " otherwise have been advanced. In the " early part of the action, a standard had " been wrested from the French by the " 42d Regiment, which was, however, un- " fortunately *retaken from them*." P. 101.

TO THE RT. HON. LORD HAWKESBURY, H. M'S. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

MY LORD,——Of the six letters, which I addressed to your Lordship, in the months of April and May last, (1) on the Definitive Treaty of Peace, one was, as you may probably recollect, on the subject of the cession, made by Spain to France, of the invaluable province of *Louisiana*; which cession, having been announced to the world previous to the signature of the said treaty, did, in that disgraceful and destructive compact, receive, through the fatal advice of you and your colleagues, the tacit consent and sanction of His Majesty. (2) The evils of this consequence of the treaty of Amiens have not been tardy in making their appearance: to bring them forth, to render them evident to all the world, has not required that long process of time, that " course " of ages," in which the Master of the Rolls was pleased to admit the possibility of an inconvenience, arising from the cession of Louisiana. Of the curious reasoning, however, made use of, on this subject, by your Lordship and your colleagues, I shall speak more fully by-and-by. The object of the present letter is; 1. to give an account of the measures which have already taken place, with respect to the interests of the Anglo-Americans, as connected with the cession; 2. to describe the feelings excited by those measures; 3. to trace out the line of conduct, which will hereafter be pursued by the French, and to show what will be the effect thereof on the Americans: To state my opinion as to the ultimate consequences with respect to the commerce, the navigation, the power, and the independence of England.

1. The measures, which have already taken place, with respect to the interest of the Americans, as connected with the cession, are no less striking in themselves than rapid in their

(1) See these letters, Register, Vol. I. p. 353—398—427—443—489—515.

(2) See treaty between France and Spain, Reg. Vol. I. p. 52.—See also p. 44 of that vol. where the consequences of the cession are pointed out.

uccession. By the treaty, concluded between Spain and the United States, at San Lorenzo el Real, on the 27th of October 1795, the latter obtained a right of free navigation and of deposit, such as is described in the articles of that treaty, cited in my last letter to the Americans. (3) The longer enjoyment of this right has now been prohibited, and of this prohibition, the following is the history.—On the 16th of October last, just when the season was approaching for the arrival of the cotton and other American produce at New Orleans, the Spanish Intendant of Louisiana, JUAN VENTURA MORALES, issued a proclamation, forbidding the Americans to deposit their merchandize there upon the usual terms, which prohibition was not accompanied with the designation of any other place, in the Spanish, now French, territories, where they might make their deposit. (4) Upon an application from the American factors at New Orleans, it was signified to them, that the prohibition was absolute as to the discontinuation of any and of every privilege arising out of the treaty; but that, the deposit might, by way of indulgence be continued for a short time, and, during pleasure, upon condition of their paying the established duty of the port, amounting, upon an average, to about 6 per centum, immediately after the entry, and a like duty upon exportation, which condition, as the Americans observe, is, in effect, little short of an act of confiscation. On the 19th of October, two American boats, which arrived loaded with flour, were, in spite of the remonstrances of the parties concerned, prevented from depositing their cargoes; and thus the prohibition was, at once, carried into practice.—An official report of these transactions having been communicated, by express, to W. C. C. CLAIBORNE, Governor of the Mississippi territory (5) and to J. GARRARD, Governor of the State of Kentucky, (6) the former wrote to MANUEL DE SALVADO, the Spanish Governor of Louisiana, requesting an explanation, (7) and stating the injustice of the prohibition complained of, to which request, he had, it appears, not received any answer, when the last advices came away. The Governor of Kentucky communicated the information, which he had received, to the legislature of that state, (8) who, thereupon, passed certain resolutions, declaring the proclamation of the Spanish Intendant to be "a direct infraction of the "treaty of 1795," (9) which resolutions were followed by a joint memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the said state, addressed to the general government of the United States, that is to say, to the President and both Houses of Congress. (10) —On the 22d of December, seven days after the opening of the session of congress, the President, in compliance with a resolution passed by the lower House, on the 17th of that month, communicated to them by message, the several papers, above mentioned, relative to the subject, together with a report thereon, which had been, on the 21st of December, made to him by MR. MADISON, Secretary of State of the general government. This message of the President, (11) like the passage in his opening message relative to the same subject (12), is extremely vague and indefinite; and, the report, as it is called of the Secretary of State, (13) is a mere list of the papers, by which it is accompanied. The secretary does, indeed, term the prohibition, at New Orleans, a "*violation* "*of the treaty*;" but he affects to believe, that this violation has not been duly authorized by the government of Spain; and, as to France, no allusion whatever is made, either in the report, or in any of this long list of papers, though the people of America appear well convinced, as every one must be, that the order for all the harsh measures complained of originated with her, and with her alone.

2. In describing the feelings, excited by these measures, in the breasts of the American government and people, it would be necessary, had I time, to enter into a previous description of the two classes of persons in that country, which two classes are, with respect to their political opinions and their foreign attachments, diametrically opposed to each other. On this subject I must, however, content myself, for the present, to speak incidentally, or perhaps not at all. The feeling of resentment, against those who have caused the prohibition at New Orleans, seems to be as general as one could reasonably expect; and though the Kentuckians and the French faction do, indeed, speak of *Spain* as being the aggressor, it is evident enough, that the blame is, at the bottom, universally ascribed to France. Your Lordship has heard the language of the government; I will now lay before you what I regard as a pretty fair specimen of the language of the *people*. It is an extract from the American Daily Advertiser, published at Philadelphia on the 26th of December last. This print is the oldest in America, and is

(3) See the preceding number, p. 174.
(4) See the proclamation, p. 242.
(5) See M. W. E. Huling's letter, p. 242.
(6) See Meeker and Co. letter, p. 244.
(7) See his letter, p. 243.
(8) See his letter, p. 244.

(9) See p. 241. (10) See p. 241. (11) See p. 241. (12) See p. 137. (13) See p. 241.

the property of Mr. Poulson, the librarian of the city, a man of property, of excellent character, of very extensive connexions, of great information, and of considerable talents.—" Will not the same *imperious neces-* " *sity*, on which the murder of the negroes in St. Domingo is now attempted to be justified, be urged in justification of similar atrocities on our Western waters, should the French be permitted to take possession of Louisiana? Do they not claim, under this title, the whole of our country westward of the Alleghany mountains? And may not the tranquil possession of this extensive territory require, also, the total extirpation of the present race of settlers in Kentucky, in Tennessee, &c.?—for which purpose will not hordes of savages be let loose, with their tomahawks and scalping knives, along our widely extended frontiers? The partiality of the Indians for the French is too well known, and their ferocity, when countenanced by hostile foreigners, is always tremendous. There is but one sovereign remedy against such complicated evils, and that is, *to take immediate possession of New Orleans, Mobae and Pensacola.* The occupancy of these posts, *will serve the purposes of negotiation, as well as of self-defence, which is the primary object at this eventful crisis.*— Already is the public sentiment beginning strongly to manifest itself in regard to the conduct of Spain through her authorized agent, the Intendant of New Orleans. The expression of just indignation and disposition to repel aggression, which marks the well-timed and spirited memorial of the Kentucky Legislature to the President and Congress, is re-echoing from different quarters of the Union, and the National Legislature is impressively urged to the adoption of decisive and vigorous measures of redress. That France, instigating the imbecile and pusillanimous cabinet of Madrid, is in reality the secret mover of the recent infringement on our rights, there are irresistible reasons for believing. Of the cession of Louisiana by the latter to the former we have (in addition to the president's message) various corroborative evidence, and the policy of France or rather Buonaparté in forcing Spain to deliver it up unconditionally and unshackled by stipulations with the United States is palpable and self evident. *In fact, the Paris Gazettes assert that it is now ceded to the French Republic in the same state in which Spain formerly received it, that is, disencumbered of the privileges of deposit and free navigation to the Americans.*"—This is the very question, my Lord, which I discussed in my last letter to the Americans. I was compelled, from every reason which suggested itself to my mind, to decide it against our friends; and, I am sorry to perceive, that the assertion here attributed to France, has not, as yet, at least, been met, in America, by argument. Indeed the *legal* right of France to shut the Americans out of the ports, and to cut off their navigation of the mouth of the Mississippi, does not even appear to be controverted.—But, to proceed with the extract:—" The inference from the act of " French diplomacy, is clear and unequivo- " cal. Buonaparté may now make a new " bargain and dictate his terms of a fresh " grant of the same privileges of which he " has recently deprived us by his coercion " of Spain.—If we believe in the cession of " Louisiana to France, we can find no dif- " ficulty in viewing that the late measure of " the Spanish Intendant as a prelude to our " being interdicted ere long the free navi- " gation of the Mississippi.—*France, thus* " *holding at her disposal the important rights of* " *deposit, and free ingress and egress by sea, can* " *then, and most assuredly will temper and ne-* " *gotiate with the western country, and having* " *an inestimable boon to offer, and probably the* " *additional privilege of trading to her Euro-* " *pean and West India ports, on the favourite* " *footing of colonists, will thereby easily secure* " *their good will, and detach them from the* " *Atlantic states.—The dismemberment of our* " *empire, and the dissolution of our union being* " *thereby affected, the close of this tragical* " *drama may be as easily imagined as de-* " *scribed.*"—Now, my Lord, before I proceed further with my quotation, I beg leave to request your Lordship to pause a little here, and to compare the opinion of this American writer, with the opinion which I had the honour to submit to your Lordship on the 21st of March, 1802. (14) " With so " awful a prospect before us, and so polite " and crafty an adversary to contend with, " does not prudence, and the solemn con- " siderations of safety and self preservation, " dictate the imperious necessity of losing " not a moment in occupying Louisiana " with our troops, and arresting from Spain, " who has daringly infracted her treaty with " the United States, and insulted our go- " vernment, the only sure pledge of our fu- " ture security.—If this all important de- " sideratum is not already secretly obtain- " ed through the negotiation of our govern- " ment, we can never hope for another and " so fair an opportunity of possessing it. " The hostile act of Spain now invites and " challenges the easy enterprize, and already " are *the irritated inhabitants of the Western* " *country brandishing the arms of vengeance,* " and ardently waiting the signal of attack " under the sanction and authority of the

(14) See Register, Vol. I. p. 443.

" general government. Of the consequences " of a war with Spain alone, we have no- " thing to dread, but every thing to hope; " even from a contest with France, we " have nothing to apprehend, that can be " compared to the precious object at stake, " our independence and security against all " attempts to disunite the Western from the " Atlantic states.—A fortunate and *propi-* " *tious occurrence of circumstances unite,* and " form the adoption of prompt and decisive " measures. France, led by a military and " despotic chief, who by his gigantic strides " towards universal dominion, has *again* " *awakened the remaining independent powers* " *of Europe to opposition,* has just failed in an " arduous and fruitless attempt to re-con- " quer St. Domingo, and re-organize her " West-India islands. The fatal conse- " quences of her great disasters, when " known and felt by her ruined merchants, " will recoil on the head of Buonaparté, and " by tarnishing the splendor of his military " fame, must essentially diminish public " confidence, and paralize all his future " operations —Europe and the West Indies " will afford an ample field for the exercise " of Buonaparté's skill and address, without " scattering his forces and weakening his " strength by colonizing Louisiana, and " sending invading fleets and armies against " the United States. From the *known dis-* " *position of the British cabinet,* and the com- " plexion of HER PRESENT MOVEMENTS IN " CONCERT WITH AUSTRIA and RUSSIA, " *she would rejoice in so fair an opportunity of* " *curbing the ambition and power of France,* " *and cementing her connexion with the United* " *States.*—The inevitable consequence of " America and Great Britain united in a " war against France and Spain, even with- " out the aid of Austria and Russia, must " be the loss of all the possessions in the " West Indies and continents of North and " South America, of the latter party. 'Tis " therefore to be presumed that they would " never hazard a contest, the chances of " which would be so unequal and favour- " able to her adversaries."—Alas! my Lord, how little did this gentleman know of the " *disposition of the British cabinet!*" How lit- tle did he know, alas! of the system and the motives of the "*prudent* ministers," of the "*safe* politicians!" Here is another proof of what *might* have been done, of what might *yet* be done, but of what will neither be done nor attempted by you and your colleagues.—Your Lordship will per- ceive, that the observations I have here cited were written in December, just at the time when the Americans had heard of your fa- mous *remonstrance in behalf of Switzerland,* and of the no less famous Swiss *subscription* which was proposed in that republic-loving print, the Morning Chronicle: and, it is evi- dent, that a considerable portion of the con- fidence of the Americans, of their hope of successful resistance, was founded on these transient symptoms of a disposition in Eu- rope to resist the further encroachments of France.

To trace out the line of conduct, which will now be pursued by the French, with regard to Louisiana, and to shew what will be the effect of that conduct in the Ameri- cans, is a task much less difficult to perform than your Lordship may imagine; but this part of the subject, as well as that which re- lates to the consequences, which will ulti- mately result from the cession, with respect to the commerce, the navigation, the power, and the independence of England, I am re- luctantly compelled to reserve for another letter.—In the mean time I have the honour to be, &c &c. WM. COBBETT.

London, 16th Feb. 1803.

A PARTING WORD TO CANDIDUS, WITH A LITTLE TRUTH FOR VERAX.—TO THE EDITOR.

Reading, Feb. 2, 1802.

Sir,—Poor CANDIDUS, growing tired, I suppose, of keeping up a fictitious charac- ter any longer, so plainly betrayed himself in his third, and still more in his fourth let- ter, by his virulence against all the late and some of the present connexions of Mr. ADDINGTON, the palpable irony of his panegyric on my illustrious friend himself, and his tenderness for Mr. FOX, that I had intended to let him drop into oblivion with- out any further notice. He took away all the pleasure of tracing his treachery, by making it too glaring to be overlooked. But in the STAR of Thursday last, I discovered my old antagonist in a new shape—under the signature of VERAX. A superficial critic, at the first glance, might, perhaps, doubt of their identity. He might say, that CANDI- DUS certainly is not VERAX, and VERAX is not CANDIDUS; the pretended man of can- dour has no more veracity than what escapes from him against his will, and the asserted man of veracity has not a single particle of candour. This is true: but I very well know the gentleman in question. Indeed we in this neighbourhood are all of us well acquainted with the fertility of his pen; and let any man, if he has patience, wade through the letter of VERAX, and then tell me, whether he does not find it to contain the same sentiments with the four letters of CANDIDUS, the same dull joke of com- plaining that I am in jest, the same flimsy

pretence of bringing charges in my name which I never made, and then taking care not to refute one of them, the same rancour against Mr. PITT, and the same avowed dislike of my friend's great leading measure, the Peace. The only difference is, that the writer has now lashed up his candour into a passion; he rails at me, without reserve, from beginning to end of his paper.

With this explanation, I trust that VERAX will not expect me to take any direct notice of him, except to inform him, that whatever he thinks, I am not yet sore enough to be angry. I shall therefore apply myself to him rather under his former name, when he kept a little more within the bounds of propriety and good manners There is one topic, however, to which I alluded in my last, that certainly has been wrested from me; I mean, the treachery of his lavish compliments to you, Mr. COBBETT, as having produced reluctant conviction in the country, to the prejudice of my friend He has now made ample amends by as furious an attack upon you. You had impartially inserted in your Register my detection and exposure of his artifices: in the blindness of his resentment he confounds you and me together; and sacrifices his old grudge against Mr. ADDINGTON to his new enmity against you. The consistency of this conduct probably made it necessary for him to change the mask

The unerring clue to guide us through the crooked ways of this sly mischief maker, is the desire which he every where manifests, the attempt, with which he sets out and concludes, to make an open breach between the present and the late Chancellor of the Exchequer. Now, Sir, I believe with you, that the stability of my friend in office does not depend on the support of Mr. PITT. No, Sir! he will owe it to that happy middle-line of wisdom and virtue which attaches to him, and unites among themselves, persons and characters the most dissimilar, his own SOVEREIGN and the FIRST CONSUL of France, Mr. PITT and Mr. FOX, Mr. SHERIDAN and Mr. HAWKINS BROWNE, Sir GREGORY PAGE TURNER and Mr. WILBERFORCE, those who love peace for the sake of economy, and those who approve large establishments for the sake of security, those who are afraid of St Domingo becoming a great military station in the hands of the French, and those who dread its being the centre of a negro empire, statesmen who think that a minister ought to lose his head for surrendering Malta or the Cape, and generals who declare that we can only take colonies and settlements for the purpose of giving them up again; in short, Sir, all but Lord GRENVILLE, Mr. WINDHAM, and some half a dozen followers of their interested and quixotic notions, not deserving the appellation of a party. Yet firm and unshaken as he stands, gratitude forbid, that ever my friend should encourage the slightest disrespect towards his early benefactor! Can he ever forget? No: I am persuaded he never will—that when there was not an attorney in Westminster-Hall who had the sagacity to discover his talents so far as to trust him with a half-guinea motion, Mr. PITT intuitively discerning his modest merit, raised him at once to be the first commoner of Great Britain. And all the world agrees that no man ever became the robes and full-bottom wig better. Yet, when he was called to his present situation, such were the sneers of the silly and narrow-minded (and you know, Sir, what a majority they form in every country) that he could hardly have been able to have made out any ministry at all, if Mr. PITT had not used all his influence to strengthen and support him. Mr. ADDINGTON has a due sense of this service; he is always ready to acknowledge it; and none but his pretended friends and real enemies will seek to deny or disguise it.

In a song at a public dinner, complimentary to Mr. PITT, (where by-the-by, wanting that politeness which my friend so properly showed to his Reading neighbours, he did not attend in person) the late minister was called, "The pilot that weathered the storm;" and the appellation particularly moves the spleen of CANDIDUS. He gets foul of it both in his first and his last letter. He wants to transfer and appropriate it to Mr. ADDINGTON. Now certainly it was not Mr. PITT, but my friend, that brought the vessel of the state to her actual moorings, where she now lies so snugly, and rides so safely and pleasantly. Yet ask him, and he will fairly tell you, Sir, that he only continued the course, which his predecessor was steering, not when he abandoned his post, as CANDIDUS says, but when unable, as he thought, to remain longer at the helm, with honour to himself and utility to his country, he put the wheel into his Mate's hand. The genuine candour and veracity of Mr. ADDINGTON would make him scorn the adulation of the assertion, that "by his wise and "spirited measures the northern confede-"racy was broken, and Egypt conquered;" for when has he hesitated to confess, that under Mr. PITT the fleet was equipped, which gained the victory off Copenhagen, and the army sent, which completed the recovery of Egypt, just in the nick of time to allow of the stipulation in the preliminary articles for restoring it to the Porte? The

only real merit of our present able ministers was the availing themselves so dextrously of that fortunate opportunity. The other instance selected to shew my friend's wise and spirited measures, "the saving of Portugal," I should have hoped that even CANDIDUS would have been too ingenuous and liberal to have mentioned. I will take upon me to say, that no man more than Mr. ADDINGTON laments (and if he had been able, he would have remedied) the scandalous juggle between the treaties of Badajos, Madrid, and Paris, by which Portugal was robbed both in Europe and South America, under an assurance of preserving her integrity.

This might be sufficient to any other adversary. CANDIDUS, however, must not be suffered so to escape. What can he, with his sentiments, mean, by praising my friend for "*weathering the storm?*" I who think of the peace as my friend himself described it, may seriously give him that praise. But CANDIDUS professes, Sir, to agree with you; he set out with quoting a passage from a speech (*his own*, if I do not mistake) at the Reading meeting, representing our situation under the treaty as no better than a truce full of danger to us, and advantage to BUONAPARTÉ; and in the close of his correspondence, affecting to disclaim flattery, he avows "*his conviction, that unless the most* "*vigorous system be pursued, the consequences of* "*the peace must be fatal to our dearest inte-*" *rests.*" What, then, in the name of common sense is it, that he calls, "*weathering the storm?*" His notion of good seamanship, in a stiff gale, with a tight, staunch, sound ship, an able crew, and plenty of sea-room, seems to be, that, the first moment the wind will serve, you should run yourself upon a lee-shore, among shoals, sands, and breakers, to await there the bursting of the black clouds that gather from every part of the horizon. No, no, even CANDIDUS cannot be so absurd. It is impossible that he could have had any other aim than to hold up my friend to derision, and set him at variance with Mr. PITT.

Hitherto we have seen this writer endeavouring to injure and affront Mr. PITT by insidious praises of my friend. But he has a sting, with another sort of poison, in his tail. In a note, at the end of his last letter, he tries to ruin my friend, by a false attack on Mr. PITT. He says, and he prints the emphatic part in capitals, that "he then knew, and "he *still knows*, only one imperious reason, "which should force us to give up MALTA. "—THE VICTORIOUS MARCH OF AN IN-"VADING ARMY OVER SHOOTER'S "HILL." And this with a feeble effort, which serves to mark his treachery, he endeavours to fix entirely on Mr. PITT, because that gentleman defended the treaty in Parliament: as if he could so sink my friend's responsibility, supposing the cession of MALTA to be such as he represents; as if it were not a charge, against my friend, of extreme baseness, to suppose that he wishes it; as if it were not an insinuation the most degrading to the dignity of his character, that he is the puppet and instrument of another! Besides, Sir, does not all the world know, that while Mr. PITT has been absent, and down to the present moment, our able ministers, instead of taking occasion from the hostile spirit manifested by the French government, as some wild and desperate men would have done, to retain MALTA, have been most assiduously and anxiously employed in finding out means to smooth every difficulty in the way of the restitution demanded by the treaty of Amiens? Indeed CANDIDUS himself takes care to let us understand that his opinion applies to the present state of things. He "*still knows only his one imperious reason.*"

The next merit of my friend is, we are told, that he repealed "the oppressive and invidious" Income-Tax. Sir, my friend firmly and handsomely, did his duty in laying the heavy burthen of the new increase on the assessed taxes, of the new tonnage duty on shipping, and the new customs on the whole circle of our manufactures and commerce, in exports and imports; and he deserves credit for this. He deserves it also for the manly style in which he lately told the country, that if the continuance of our present establishments should hereafter be necessary, he would not shrink from laying three or four millions a year more upon us. But I can claim no merit for him, I am persuaded he would claim none for himself, on account of his conduct relative to the Income-Tax. It was always considered as a war-tax merely from year to year; and the Chancellor of the Exchequer would not have surrendered it, if he had been obliged to carry on the war. Mr. PITT, as he was bound in justice to his successor and to the public, settled, arranged, and almost alone defended the new tax on Malt, Beer and Ale, which provided for the arrears; and if I can rely on reports from Bisham Abbey, the scene exhibited on that occasion, in the House of Commons, was the immediate object of Mr. SHERIDAN'S idle pleasantry about the helper on the coach-box looking round every minute to the coachman on the roof. CANDIDUS, I doubt not, had heard this, as well as myself, and for that very reason introduced the repeal of the Income-Tax.

There remains but one more of those remarks on Mr. ADDINGTON's public character, which CANDIDUS pretends, was the sole purpose of his writings: and it is of some little antiquity, as if he could find nothing else worthy of commendation, since my friend became minister, he reminds us that, some years since, the present Lord Chancellor, when Attorney-General, brought in a bill, which he says would "have shut "the gates of knowledge on mankind" by extinguishing newspapers, but it was altered at the suggestion of "a high character "in the House," which he presumes must have been my friend. I am not acquainted with the fact one way or the other; but every body must be sensible, that no minister ever paid more becoming attention to newspapers, or made them more important engines of government, than my friend; and I trust, they will in return give him the same disinterested, judicious, and consistent support, as those incomparable journals, the *Sun* and *True Briton*. Wherefore, then, when it was so easy to have referred us to the many excellent articles, with which my friend, through his secretaries and clerks daily *enlightens* us, and keeps *true British* feelings alive in our bosoms, are we to be sent back to this obscure old story? Is not the intention plainly to convey a hint to LORD ELDON? For when is this letter dated? Just three days after his Lordship was thought to have shewn some symptoms of improper refractoriness (1) in a debate on a favourite measure of government, which he was pleased to call "arbi- "trary and unconstitutional;" an incident, which filled all the admirers of my friend, who resemble CANDIDUS, with sanguine hopes of being able to get him into their power, by fomenting a quarrel between him, and the first of his colleagues for character and reputation. Between ourselves too, I suspect, Sir, that there was another secret purpose in calling the attention of the public to this neglected anecdote. For you must know, that I borrowed from my neighbour Mr. ———, a respectable practitioner of the law in this place, the volume of Parliamentary Debates for 1798, and finding the Newspaper Bill in the table of contents, turned to it with the utmost eagerness: figure then to yourself, if you can, my unspeakable mortification at seeing there not a syllable of my friend, but a great deal of Mr. SHERIDAN, who was on that, as upon every occasion, the principal champion and protector of the press.

Let me now ask once for all, what a contempt must CANDIDUS entertain for the understanding of mankind, if he imagines, that any one can believe him to be the serious panegyrist of our unparalleled premier, when after promising in the first letter a sketch of his public services, after keeping us in suspense full two months (for such is the interval between the dates of the first and the fourth letter) after ushering in the subject, by repeating that it was his principal inducement to appear before the public; he at last disappoints us with these mock-praises, this satire in disguise, which I have been examining! He applied the neighbourly term of "simpleton" to all his fellow townsmen; so now, I suppose, he hopes to make them amends, by shewing them that he thinks every man in his Majesty's dominions "a simpleton."

The real purpose of all this twisting and turning is obvious. This is one of the nondescript small politicians, whom you have so happily hit off in your last number. They longed for peace; when it arrived, did not like it, yet approved it; rail against the designs of France; call for vigour, and end with "*no war*." They have no one positive tenet in their creed, but an eternal hatred to Mr. PITT. They profess attachment to Mr. FOX, while they secretly want to get rid of him as an incumbrance. They have no love for Mr. WINDHAM, because he has some good principles. They cannot speak with common civility of Lord GRENVILLE, since he spoke civilly of Mr. PITT. They treated my friend at first with lively scurrility, and now they court him with sober flattery, but always pointing their commendations so as to be invective against his predecessor, or some of his actual colleagues, always aiming to separate and insulate him, that they may prepare the way to join or ruin him, as may best suit their convenience. But he is too wise to be so caught. They may try to no purpose, till they are weary. Indeed, Sir, these gentlemen remind me of a peculiar disease, which as I heard from Mr. ADDINGTON's worthy father, was some time since discovered in our cattle. It arose from a maggot in the brain. The poor creatures, that were affected by it, could never go two yards in a straight forward direction, but were driven round and round in all sorts of curves and serpentines, till they were exhausted and died.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.

J. TIETENBER.

(1) We believe our correspondent alludes to the second reading of the Navy Abuse Bill, for some account of which curious debate see Reg. Vol. II. p. 892.—*Editor.*

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Milan, Jan. 25 --The Minister of the Interior has decreed, that the portion of territory hitherto comprized within the jurisdiction of the Vice-Prefectorate of Castel Nuovo, and situated near that of the Appenines, shall remain provisionally under the jurisdiction of the Prefect of Panaro, who shall lay before the Government a particular account of the respective communes and confines that may fall under his immediate inspection.—The sale of purified and common salt, by wholesale or retail, is prohibited throughout the Italian Republic, and permitted only to persons authorised by Government.

Vienna, Jan. 24.—According to letters from Petersburgh, his Imperial Majesty does not cease to interest himself in the amelioration of the lot of the King of Sardinia The union of Piedmont to France will not present any obstacle to the success of his measures. Another object in which the Emperor of Russia takes much interest, as well as our court, is respecting the Indemnities of Bavaria, in return for the cession of the Bishopric of Eichstett.—We learn, that the Port of Venice will be immediately declared free, as well as that of Trieste; the commerce of Venice has required it for a long time.

Ratisbon, Jan. 27.—The Imperial City of Nuremberg will, it is said, be ceded to Bavaria, upon condition of receding it to the King of Prussia, who will give in exchange some portions of territory suitable to that Prince.

Jan. 28.—A Reclamation of his Serene Highness the Archduke Ferdinand, son-in-law and presumptive heir of the Duke of Modena, has been submitted to the consideration of the Diet, in which that Prince grounds his pretensions to the Chapters, Convents, and Abbeys included in the Brisgau, as being annexed to the antient right of Sovereignty with which the former Government was invested. His Highness also advances claims upon the Imperial Cities of Offenburgh, Gengenbach, and Zell, devolved to the House of Baden, and which he considers as comprised in the Imperial Bailiwick of L'Ortenau, which is ceded to the Duke of Modena, as well in the plan of Indemnities, as by the Convention of the 26th of December. It is not supposed that this Reclamation, so important in itself, and so obviously prejudicial to the Margrave of Baden, and to the Order of Malta, will be admitted.

Berne, Jan. 30 —A great fermentation prevails in the Upper Country. We suspect some secret plots. General Ney, after the explanations which have been given to him, sent yesterday to Thium one of his Aids-de-Camp.

Basle, Feb. 3.—A considerable ferment still prevails in many of the Cantons. In the country of Berne, and in the Oberland, there have been many scenes of serious tumult, between the peasants and the French soldiery. Many individuals have been killed, and General Ney has issued orders for arresting the authors of these disturbances, in order to have them tried for the offences; and in consequence several have been apprehended. The General has sent some troops into the Oberland.—We have just heard that the Helvetian Diet, formed upon the principles established by the general Constitution, are to be assembled immediately on the return of the Deputies from Paris. The first meeting is to take place in the city of Fribourg.

Brussels, Feb. 4.—They write from Treves, that divers large detachments, which were last month under marching orders for the frontiers of Switzerland, are ordered not to proceed. It appears, that the camp intended to be formed in the new Departments on the left bank of the Rhine, is shortly to be fixed in the plain of Andernach. The First Consul intends to visit those ports in person, to inspect the new fortresses established between Mentz and the frontiers of Holland, and to see that this part of France shall present a respectable line of defence. He will then be better able to decide between the plans given in for that purpose by General Andreossi, now Ambassador to England, and those furnished by the Officers of Artillery, who were, some time since, sent with that view to the banks of the Rhine.

Paris, Feb. 7.—The Government have passed a Decree for regulating the affairs of the isles of France and Reunion, by means of a Captain General, a Colonial Prefect, and a Commissary of Justice: the Captain General is to have the command of the forces by land and sea; the Colonial Prefect is charged with the care of the finances, and the general administration of the islands; and the Commissary of Justice, with the judicial department.—A letter from Brest, under date of the 31st ult. says, "The day before yesterday were passed in review the deported negroes who were at Pontanezen. A part of them are destined to be embarked, the remainder will form a military corps, to be placed at the disposition of General Decaen, Captain General of Pondicherry. —The alarming symptoms of the illness of the Apostolic Legate have disappeared. The First Consul sent to the assistance of the Legate his own physician, M. Corrisand, who joined his attentions to those of M. Portal.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

PAPERS RELATIVE TO LOUISIANA.

Letter from JAMES GARRARD, ESQ. *Governor of Kentucky, to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of that State, dated Nov.* 29, 1802.

SIR,—I do myself the honour to inclose to you copies of two letters, and a copy of a proclamation issued by the Intendant of the Spanish government of Louisiana. They contain information highly interesting to the citizens of the western country, and I pray you to lay them before the House of Representatives.

(Signed) JAMES GARRARD.

Resolutions of the House of Representatives of the State of Kentucky, dated Dec. 1, 1802.

The committee of the whole House this day took into consideration the governor's communications, as to the shutting of the port of New Orleans against the Americans, and came to two resolutions thereupon, and an address to the general government on that subject, which were unanimously agreed to as follows—Resolved unanimously, "that the proclamation of the Intendant of the port of New Orleans, of the 18th of "October last, is a direct infraction of the treaty "of friendship, limits, and navigation, concluded "in October, 1795, between the United States "and the King of Spain, in this particular—that "by the said proclamation, American citizens "are forbidden to deposit their merchandizes "and effects in the port of New Orleans, without "an equivalent establishment having been assigned to the United States, on another part of "the banks of the Mississippi, conformable to "the provision of the 22d article of the said "treaty.—Resolved, That the governor be requested to forward the following memorial to "our senators and representatives in Congress,

" to be by them presented to the president of the " United States, the senate and house of repre- " sentatives of Congress."

Memorial of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, to the Congress of the United States.

Having on a former occasion, when we represented the obstruction to the navigation of the River Mississippi, experienced the attention and justice of the general government, in providing, by a treaty with the court of Spain, not only for the free navigation of that river, but for what, in our remote situation from the ocean, was absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of it, a place of deposit for our produce.—We deem it necessary barely to state to you, that by an infraction of that treaty, we are deprived of these advantages, in violation of the treaty between the United States and the King of Spain, concluded at San Lorenzo el Real, in October, 1795. The Intendant of the port of New Orleans, has by a proclamation of the 18th of October last, forbidden American citizens to deposit their merchandizes and effects in the said port, without having assigned to the United States an equivalent establishment on another part of the bank of the Mississippi.—We rely with confidence on your wisdom and justice, and pledge ourselves to support, at the expense of our lives and fortunes, such measures as the honour and integrity of the United States may require.

Message of the President of the United States of America, transmitting a Report from the Secretary of State, with the information requested in a Resolution of the House, of the 17th instant, relative to the violation on the part of Spain, of the 22d Article of the Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and Navigation, between the United States and the King of Spain.—Dated Dec. 22, 1802.

Gentlemen of the House of Representatives—I now transmit a report from the Secretary of State, with the information requested in your resolution of the 17th instant.—In making this communication, I deem it proper to observe, that I was led by the regard due to the rights and interests of the United States, and to the just sensibility of the portion of our fellow citizens, more immediately affected by the *irregular* proceeding at New Orleans, to lose not a moment in causing every step to be taken which the occasion claimed from me: being equally aware of the obligation to maintain, in all cases, the rights of the nation, and to employ, for that purpose, those just and honourable means which belong to the character of the United States.

Thomas Jefferson.

Report of the Secretary of State to the President of the United States.—Dec. 21, 1802.

The Secretary of State, to whom the Resolution of the House of Representatives of the United States of the 17th instant, was referred by the President, has the honour to inclose to him, the letters and communications annexed, from the Governor of the Mississippi territory, the Governor of Kentucky, and from William E. Hulings, formerly appointed Vice Consul of the United States at New Orleans. In addition to this information on the subject of the resolution, it is stated from other sources, that on the 29th of October, American vessels from sea remained under the prohibition to land their cargoes; and that the American produce carried down the Mississippi could be landed only on paying a duty of 6 per cent. with an intimation that this was a temporal permission. Whether in these *violations of treaty* the officer of Spain at New Orleans has proceeded with or without orders from his Government, cannot as yet be decided by direct and positive testimony; but it ought not to be omitted in the statement here made, that other circumstances concur with the good faith and friendship otherwise observed by his Catholic Majesty, *in favouring a belief that no such orders have been given.*

James Madison.

New Orleans, 18th Oct. 1802.

Sir,—I have the honour to inclose you an extract from a decree this day published by the Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, by which you will see that the Americans are no longer permitted to deposit their merchandize in this city. No information of any other place being appropriated for an American deposit, is yet given; nor have we any reason to hope that the Government has such place in view. The season for the cotton from the Natchez, and other produce from the settlements higher up, to come down, approaches. The difficulties and risks of property that will fall on the citizens of the United States, if deprived of their deposit, are incalculable; their boats being so frail, and so subject to be sunk by storms, that they cannot be converted into floating stores, to wait the arrival of sea vessels to carry away their cargoes.—The port is also this day shut against all foreign commerce, which can only be carried on by Spanish subjects in Spanish bottoms —I am, &c.

Wm. E. Hulings.

The Hon. James Madison, Esq. Sec. of State.

Translation of an Extract from a Publication made 16th October, 1802, by Juan Ventura Morales, Intendant of the Province of Louisiana, &c.

As long as it was necessary to tolerate the commerce of neutrals which is now abolished, it would have been prejudicial to the Province, had the Intendant, in compliance with his duty, prevented the deposit in this city of the property of the Americans, granted to them by the twenty-second article of the treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation, of the 27th October, 1795, during the limited term of three years. With the publication of the ratification of the treaty of Amiens and the re-establishment of the communication between the English and Spanish subjects, that inconvenience has ceased. Considering that the twenty-second article of the said treaty, takes from me the power of continuing the toleration, which necessity required; since after the fulfilment of the said term this ministry can no longer consent to it without an express order of the King. Therefore, and without pejudice to the exportation of what has been admitted in proper time, I order, that from this date the privilege which the Americans had of importing and depositing their merchandize and effects in this capital, shall be interdicted: and that the foregoing may be publickly known, and that no body may allege ignorance, I order it to be published in the usual places, copies to be posted up in the public sitioes; and that the necessary notice be given of it to the officers of finance, the administrator of rents, and otherwise, as may be necessary.—The present being given under my hand, and countersigned by the underwritten notary of finance, *pro tempore*, in the office of intendancy of New Orleans, 16th Oct. 1802.—(Signed)—*Juan*

Ventura Morales.—By order of the Intendant,—*Pedro Pedesclaux.*

Near Natchez, Oct. 29th, 1802.—Sir,—I have the honour to enclose you a letter, which I last evening received from Mr. W. E. Hullings, together with a translation of an extract from a publication made by Juan Ventura Morales, Intendant of the province of Louisiana, &c. dated October 16th, 1802. These dispatches announce, that the port of New Orleans is shut against foreign commerce, and also the American deposit.—Not understanding from the Intendant's proclamation, whether or not another place on the banks of the Mississippi had been assigned by his Catholic Majesty, (in conformity to our treaty with Spain,) for "an equivalent establishment," I have, by letter, requested (a copy of which is inclosed) information upon this point from the Governor-General of the province of Louisiana; when his answer is received it shall be forwarded to you.—This late act of the Spanish government at New Orleans has excited considerable agitation at Natchez and its vicinity: it has inflicted a severe wound on the agriculture and commercial interests of this territory, and will prove no less injurious to all the western country.—There being at present an interruption in the post between this territory and Tennessee, and supposing it of importance that the government should be early apprized of the late event at Orleans, I have forwarded this letter by express to Nashville, where it will be deposited in the mail.—I am, Sir, &c.—*Wm. C. C. Claiborne.*

The Hon. the Secretary of State, of the United States.

New Orleans, 18th October, 1802.—Sir,—I have to announce to you, that this day the port is shut against foreign commerce, and not against foreign commerce only, but against American deposit in this city. In the decree posted up in the public places no mention is made of any other place appointed for a deposit. You will use this information as you may think proper.—I am, &c.—*Mw. E. Hullings.*

Wm. C. C. Claiborne, Governor, Mississippi Territory.

Natchez, Oct. 28th, 1802.—Sir,—I was this day informed, that in a proclamation issued on the 16th inst. by the Intendant of the province of Louisiana, it was announced, "That the citizens "of the United States should no longer be per-"mitted to deposit their merchandizes and ef-"fects in the port of New Orleans."—Information of an event so immediately interesting to the citizens of the United States, led me to peruse attentively, "The treaty of friendship, limits, and "navigation, between the United States of Ame-"rica and the King of Spain," and upon adverting to the 22d article, I found it expressly declared, that, "His Catholic Majesty will permit "the citizens of the United States, for the space "of three years from this time, to deposit their "merchandizes and effects in the port of New "Orleans, and to export them from thence, with-"out paying any other duty, than a fair price for "the hire of the stores; and his Majesty promi-"ses either to continue this permission, if he "finds, during that time, that it is not prejudicial "to the interests of Spain, or, if he should not "agree to continue it then, he will assign to "them, on another part of the banks of the Mis-"sissippi, an equivalent establishment." I have here quoted the words of the treaty, and find them too explicit to require comment, or to admit of a doubtful construction.—If, therefore, his Catholic Majesty has discontinued his permission to the citizens of the United States, to deposit their merchandizes and effects at the port of New Orleans, will your Excellency be good enough to inform me, whether any, and what other place on the banks of the Mississippi has been assigned (in conformity to the treaty) for "an equivalent "establishment."—The subject of this enquiry is so interesting to the commerce of the United States, and to the welfare of her citizens, that I must request your Excellency to favor me with an early answer.—Accept assurances of my great respect, &c.—*Wm. C. C. Claiborne.*

His Excellency Manual de Salvado, Governor General of Louisiana.

The Governor of Kentucky to the President of the United States.—Frankfort, Nov. 30, 1802.

Sir,—Two days ago I received the inclosed letters of Dr. James Speed, and Meeker and Co. from New Orleans; together with a copy of a proclamation issued by Juan Ventura Morales, intendant of the Spanish government of Louisiana; and which I do myself the honour to inclose, for your information. The citizens of this state are very much alarmed and agitated; as this measure of the Spanish government will, (if not altered) at one blow cut up the present and future prosperity of their best interests by the roots. To you, Sir, they naturally turn their eyes, and on your attention to this important subject, their best hopes are fixed. Permit me to request you will give me information on this business, as soon as you can say with certainty what we may rely on; and let my solicitude, on this occasion, be my apology for this request.

With sentiments of respect, &c.

James Garrard.

Extract of a Letter from Messrs. Meeker, Williamson and Patton, to his Excellency James Garrard, Esq. dated at New-Orleans, Oct. 18, 1802.

The intendant has this day issued a decree declaring the port of New Orleans to be shut; and what has been very unexpected, and we conceive contrary to every principle of right? that the right to deposit by the Americans shall no longer exist, without granting any other eligible place as an equivalent stipulated by the 22d article of the treaty between the United States and his Catholic Majesty. The governor of this province at first shewed every disposition to counteract this measure; but as the publication has been made six hours without his taking notice of it, we are apprehensive that he has relinquished the intention of opposing it; and in this state of doubt we remain.

Orders of the Commander in Chief of the French Army in St. Domingo.

Dec. 4.—The expedition against F. Dauphine, under the orders of the gen. of divis. Clausel, presented itself against that place on the 1st, at two P. M. The brigands shewed every where a resistance, but the ships of war placed themselves with such promptitude and judgment to cannonade the fort and protect the descent, the debarkation was effected with such exactness and celerity, that the enemy was defeated on all sides; he was pursued with such vivacity, that he was obliged to abandon the guns which he wished to carry off, and he had time to burn only five houses. The progress of

the fire was quickly stopped by the activity of the troops; 25 pieces of artillery, besides those of Fort St. Joseph, have fallen into our hands. The loss of the revolters has been considerable, and we have been fortunate enough not to lose a single man. We found the magazines filled with different kinds of provisions. — Gen. of divis. Clausel, praises highly the gen. of brigade, Kavalette, and the zeal and intrepidity of the officers and soldiers of the 86th demi-brigade. —The marine, commanded by Capt. Guillemet of the Hannibal, having under his orders L'Embuscade, La Guerrière, and the corvette La Sagesse, perfectly seconded this expedition, and did not a little contribute to its brilliant success. The gen. in chief expresses his perfect satisfaction with the officers by land and sea, who were employed in this expedition. He presents as a national recompence, sabres of honour to capt. Guillemet of the Hannibal, commanding the naval forces on the expedition; and to capt. Jonette, a. d. camp to gen. of brigade, Lavalette.—The general in chief,

Rochambeau

Dec. 7.—The gen. in chief orders the supercession of the chief of brigade, Boyer, ex-commandant of the first legion of gendarmerie; he shall be detained in the civil prison of the Cape till he gives in his accounts, after which he shall be sent to France.

General Boyer, Chief of the Staff of the Army of St. Domingo, to the Minister of the Marine and Colonies.

The General in Chief, Rochambeau, Citizen Minister, thought it his duty not to lose a moment in occupying Fort Dauphin. Scarcely had the 86th demi-brigade disembarked than the two first battalions were put under the command of General Clausel, with the addition of a corps of the National Guard of the island.—The Hannibal ship of war, the frigates La Guerriere and L'Embuscade, and the corvette La Sagesse, appeared before that place on the 10th of this month about mid-day. The debarkation was instantly effected, the enemy were routed at all points, and pursued with such impetuosity that they left all their artillery behind them, all the cannon of Fort St. Joseph, and evacuated the town without having time to set fire to it. The loss of the brigands was considerable, while we were fortunate enough not to lose a single man.—The General in Chief demands of the First Consul sabres of honour for Citizen Guillemet, Commander of the Hannibal, and for Captain Jouette, Aid-de-Camp to General Lavallette.—Health and respect, *Boyer.*

Hector Davre, Colonial Prefect, Administrator in Chief of the Army, to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies.—Cape, 11 *Frimaire.*

General Watrin, Citizen Minister, has died at Fort Republicain. France loses in him one of its most distinguished officers, and the Colony one of its principal supports. The army feels this loss severely.—Health and respect, *Daure.*

Sebastiani's Report to the First Consul, concluded from page 224.

STATE OF THE ARMY.

Dillon's Regiment—Emigrants.....450
British Chasseurs—Ditto.....550
Role's Regiment—Swiss.....600
Wetteville's Regiment—Ditto.....680
The 10th Regiment Infantry—Eng...600
The 61st Regiment Infantry—Ditto...650
The 88th Regiment Infantry—Ditto...400
Dragoons of the 26th Light—Ditto 350
Artillery—Ditto.....150

Total 4430

THE TURKISH ARMY.—Muhammed, Pacha of Cairo, who has taken, it is not known why, the title of viceroy of Egypt, does not command the troops in person. Muhammed Aly-Serr-Chersme, who had the command since my arrival, was killed before Gaza; they are now under the orders of Jussef Kiahia. Tair is Pacha of the Arnaoutes, who compose the greatest part of this army, amounting to about 16,000 men. They from time to time receive reinforcements.—Chourchid-Ahmed, a Pacha of two nails, is at Alexandria with 600 men, who occupy no fortification. This Pacha is, as one may say, a prisoner with the English.—The Turkish army consists of 7610 men, and that of the Arnaoutes of 8500, making a whole of 16,140.—It is useless to add, that this is not an army, they are men ill armed, without discipline, without confidence in their chiefs, and enervated by excessive debauchery. The chiefs are in every thing like their soldiers; ignorant even of the first principles of the military art; and uniformly actuated by the love of wealth, they think of nothing but of obtaining it, and of finding the means of carrying it off in safety. *Six thousand French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt.*

ARMY OF THE MAMELUKES.—The army of the Beys is composed of 3000 Mamelukes, of 3500 Arabs of the tribe of Ababde of Chark, and of 3500 of the tribe of Binialy. Muhammed Bey Elfy married the daughter of the Cheik of the first, and Maarzouk Bey son of Ibrahim Bey, the daughter of the Chick of the tribe of Binialy. The power in this army is divided between Ibraham Bey, who is the chief, Eley Bey and Osman Bey, who has succeeded Murad Bey. Their head-quarters are at Djergé. They have 80 French deserters, which form a small corps of artillery. To the present time they have beat the Turks in every action, and the Egyptians prefer them to the Osmanlis. The whole of Upper Egypt has submitted to them.

SYRIA.—*Acre.* The body of this place has been repaired; the port has been covered with a small horned work, and the tower of the angle by a half-moon. They have likewise made a small fleche, in front of the palace of the Pacha. —All the works are well kept. The weakest part is that towards the sea, and particularly the point which defends the entrance of the port.—The forces of Dgezzar are at present 13 or 14,000 men, of which 9,000 are employed at the siege of Jaffa. Jerusalem and Nazareth are occupied by the troops of the Pacha of Acre. The Naplonsains serve against Aboumarsk.—*Jaffa.* The Vizier, after the taking of Egypt, caused the body of the place to be re-constructed, which is at present in a very good state. Aboumarak, Pacha of Palestine, who defends

this place, has a garrison of 4000 men.—*Gaza* is occupied by 400 troops of Aboumarak.—The Emir of the Druses has refused to Djezzar his annual contribution, and has raised a respectable armament. The Pacha waits till the fall of Jaffa to attack him. The English wished to interfere as mediators between the Emir and Djezzar, but the last refused their mediation.—The Porte has, at this moment, little connexion with Syria.—(Signed)—*Horace Sebastiani.*

DOMESTIC.

On Wednesday, his Majesty held a levee at Buckingham House, which was numerously attended. After the levee his Majesty held a Privy Council, and after the council broke up his Majesty gave closet audience to the Lord Chancellor, the Secretaries of State, &c.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Wednesday, Feb. 9.—Lords.—Counsel was further heard in the case, Lawson *v.* Ross.—Naturalization Bills of Messrs. Lutterloke, Greffulhe, Schutz, and Deiland, were read a second time.

Commons.—The House proceeded to ballot for a committee to try the petition against the election for Shaftesbury.—Mr. Keene moved to discharge the order made on the 3d, for a variety of papers relative to the affairs of the Carnatic, which being done, the hon. gent. moved for a variety of other papers on the same subject.

Thursday, Feb. 10.—Lords.—An officer from the customs presented certain accounts relative to the produce of that part of the revenue upon East-India commodities.—The Earl of Limerick presented a document relative to the creation and return of Irish peers preparatory to the sitting of the committee of privileges.

Commons.—The House proceeded to ballot for a committee to try the petition against the election for Dublin College.—Mr. Rose moved for leave to bring in a Bill for the improvement of the Port of Southampton.—Bank Restriction Bill read a second time.—The usual lists, in pursuance of the East India Judicature Bill, were ordered to be prepared, and a committee was appointed to examine the returns, and report the same to-morrow.

Friday, Feb. 11.—Lords.—The Naturalization Bills of Messrs. Lutterloke, Schutz, Griffulhe, Dieland, and Schiedzbeker, were read a third time and passed.—Lord Pelham presented a copy of the recent convention entered into between his Majesty and the United States of America.

Commons.—The House proceeded to ballot for a committee to try the petition against the election for Great Grimsby.—Mr. C. Dundas moved, that an order for taking into consideration on the 22d inst. the merits of the Kircudbright election be discharged, and instead of 22d inst. to insert 24th March.—Agreed to.—The Secretary at War moved for leave to bring in a Bill to increase the period for which the Militia were to be called out to exercise from 21 to 28 days. Leave granted.—In a Committee of the House on the Bank Restriction Bill, some amendments took place, and the Bill ordered to be read a 3d time on Monday.—The Heydon Port Bill was read a second time.—The list of members chosen to form the court of East India Judicature was presented. A new writ was ordered to be issued for Yarmouth, in the county of Southampton, in the room of J. P. Murray, Esq. who has accepted the office of steward of his Majesty's manor of East Hendred, in Berks.

Monday, Feb. 14.—Lords.—Counsel were finally heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Lawson *v.* Maxwell and others. The report of the Committee of Privileges relative to the sitting of Irish Spiritual Peers, &c. was read, and ordered to be printed.

Commons.—Mr. Steele presented the estimates of the Army Extraordinaries.—Col. Lennox moved for leave to bring in a bill for establishing a Chapel of Ease at Brighthelmstone.—The bill for regulating the period for which the militia are to be exercised was read a first time.—A petition was presented from the apothecaries and druggists of the Borough of Southwark, against the Medicine Act.—The Bank Restriction Bill was read a third time, and after some verbal amendments was passed.—On the motion of Mr. Wickham, leave was granted to bring in a bill for preventing certain revenue officers in Ireland from voting at the election of Members of Parliament.—Mr. Rose brought up the report of the bill for the improvement of the Port of Southampton.—Petitions were presented from Leeds, Halifax, and other places, praying for some alterations in the Cotton Apprentice Bill.—Mr. Manning presented a petition from certain inhabitants of London and Westminster, praying for a bill to make a Canal from the Reservoir of the Grand Canal at Paddington to the New Docks at Wapping.—Referred to a Committee.

Tuesday, Feb. 15.—Commons.—The House proceeded to ballot for a Committee to try the merits of the Nottingham Election.—Militia Training Bill read a second time.—Petitions were presented from the Brewers of Manchester, Kent, Cornwall, &c.—Southampton Port Bill, read a first time.

Wednesday, Feb. 16.—Lords. A Bill for naturalizing J. C. H. Vingotton, was brought in and read a first time.—Bank Restriction Bill read a first time.—Lord Pelham delivered a message from the King respecting a new arrangement of the affairs of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, and moved that it be taken into consideration this day se'n night. (*See the Commons.*)

Commons.—The house proceeded to try the merits of the petition respecting the election for Barnstaple.—Col. Sloane brought up a petition from the trustees of the British Museum, praying for Parliamentary aid; he also moved, that an account be laid before the House of the sums usually granted to the British Museum, and also an account of their expenditure. The Bill for preventing certain revenue officers in Ireland from voting at Elections was read a first time.—Mr. Addington delivered the following message from his Majesty relative to a new arrangement of the affairs of H.R.H. the Prince of Wales, viz. His Majesty having taken into consideration the period which has elapsed since the adoption of the arrangements which the wisdom of Parliament thought necessary for removing the incumbrances upon the affairs of the Prince of Wales, and having adverted to the progress made in carrying them into effect, recommends the situation of the Prince to the attention of the House of Commons; and notwithstanding the reluctance and regret which his Majesty must always feel in suggesting any additional burthens upon his people, he cannot but resort with confidence to the experienced liberality of his faithful Commons, trusting that they will adopt such measures as are best calculated to promote the comfort, and support the dignity of so distinguished a branch of his Royal House."

SPRING ASSIZES.—*Oxford.*—Justice Lawrence and Justice Chambre.—Reading, February 28.—Oxford, March 2.—Worcester and City, March 5.—Gloucester and City, March 9.—Monmouth, Mar. 12.—Hereford, March 15.—Shrewsbury, March 19.—Stafford, March 23.

Western.—Baron Thompson and Justice Le Blanc.—Winchester, March 1.—Sarum, March 5.—Dorchester, March 10.—Exeter and City, March 14.—Launceston, March 19.—Taunton, March 25.

Northern.—Lord Ellenborough and Justice Rooke.—York and City, March 5.—Lancaster, March 19.

Norfolk.—Lord Alvanley and Justice Grose.—Aylesbury, March 5.—Bedford, March 10.—Huntingdon, March 12.—Cambridge, March 16.—Thetford, March 19.—Bury St. Edmunds, March 24.

Home.—Baron Hotham and Justice Heath.—Hertford, March 7.—Chelmsford, March 9.—Maidstone, March 14.—Kingston, March 21.—Horsham, March 28.

London Gazette, Feb. 12, 1803.—At the court at St. James's, the 10th of February, 1803.—His Majesty in council was this day pleased to appoint—Josiah Wedgewood, of Gunville, Esq. to be sheriff of the county of Dorset, instead of John Arbuthnot, of Weymouth, Esq.—John Pooley Kensington, of Putney, Esq. to be sheriff of the county of Surrey.—T. H. M. Gwynne, of Llanelwith, Esq. to be sheriff of the county of Radnor, instead of T. Grove, of Owen Ellan, Esq.—J. Windsor, of Vaynor, Esq. to be sheriff of the county of Montgomery, instead of R. Knight, of Gwernygoe, Esq.

BANKRUPTS.—Passman, J. Doncaster, machine, maker.—Allen, F. Pall Mall, milliner.—Wickins, L. St. Clements', haberdasher.—Coleman, J. Fetter-lane, painter.—Smith, W. Durham, ship-builder.—Gibbs, W. Box, Wilts. miller.—Taylor, J. and H. Cowley, Gainsborough, merchants.—Jackson, J. Oxford-street, linen-draper.—Wagner, J. Lower Tooting, callico-printer.—Joyce, W. and W. Bachelor, Bristol, Silversmiths.—Richardson, T. and T. Worthington, Manchester, merchant.—Hopwood, J. Worcester, glove-seller.—Eyres, S. Manchester, corn-dealer.—Durner, J. G. Liverpool, merchant.—Ashton, W. Kingston upon Hull, brandy-merchant.—Clifton, W. Kingston upon Hull, brandy-merchant.—Buck, M. Clapham, Yorkshire, dealer.—Atkinson, H. Howarth, shopkeeper.—Gabbitas, M. T. Brinsyard, farmer.—Clancy, W. Waterford, merchant.—Hughes, M. Hackney, milkman.—Horrocks, T. Rippondale, bleacher.—Emerson, J. Bitton, brass and spelter maker.—Williams, J. G. Marshall-street, merchant.—Nimisno, H. Bristol, merchant.—Bruce, S. Oldham, dealer.—May, S. H. Great St. Helen's, merchant.—Girling, H. Hackney-road, shoemaker.—Hewlett, G. Shipton Lee, dairyman.—Green, E. Charles-street, Soho-square, man's mercer.—Collyer, W. Pullox Hill, horse-dealer.—Thomas, J. Chester, malster.—Wright, J. Manchester, cotton-spinner.—Parker, J. Birmingham, plater.—Holbrow, Haynes, Haynes, and Henderson, Gloucester, chemical preparers.—Donnison, J. Prescott-street, merchant.—Davies, R. Shrewsbury, porter-merchant.—Janson, J. Blackburn, cotton-manufacturer.—Michell, W. Somersetshire, clothier.—Hook, J. Bermondsey, leather-dresser.—Fearon, J. P. Upper Gratton-street, dealer.—Cole, C. Drury lane, victualler.—Bright, T. Inner Temple-lane, stationer.—Barnard, J. Jun. Bedford, corn-factor.

Births.—On Thursday the Hon. Mrs. I. Markham, of a son.—On Saturday evening, the Hon. Mrs. Baird, lady of Lieut. Col. Baird, of a son.—On Sunday, the Countess of Uchester of a son.—At Rochester, the lady of the Hon. and Rev. Dr. Marsham, of a daughter.—On Monday, the lady of the Hon. Spencer Percival, of a son.

Marriages.—At Hanmer in the County of Flint, Lord Kenyon to Miss Hanmer daughter of Sir T. Hanmer, Bart. of Battesfield Park.—On Friday, Capt. G. Hope to Lady J. Johnstone, daughter of the Earl of Hopetown.—At Ballindean, in Perthshire, on the 9th inst. the Hon. Major-General Hope, to Miss Wedderburn.

Deaths.—On Sunday sen'night, aged 55, Thomas Hammond, Esq. of York, brother to G. Hammond, Esq. under Sec. of State.—On Saturday, Lieutenant-Colonel F. Manners, of the 96th regiment.—On Friday, the 4th inst. at Paris, the lady of Sir A. Grant, Bart.—At Dublin, on Sunday, the 6th inst. Colonel Blquiere.—At Dusseldorf, in her 28th year, Baroness Hompesch, lady of Major-General Baron Hompesch.

STOCKS.	FRI.	SAT.	MON.	TUE.	WED.	THUR.
Bank Stock	—	—	187½	—	—	—
3 pr. C.R.An.	—	70⅛	70⅜	—	70⅜	70⅝
3 per C. Con.	—	70	70⅛	—	70¼	70⅝
4 pr. C. Con.	—	86⅝	87	—	87⅛	86⅝
5 pr.Ct. Ann.	—	—	—	—	100⅝	—
Bank L. Ann.	—	20	20½	—	20½	20¼
D°S.1778&9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct.1797	—	103	103¼	—	102¼	103½
Omnium.. .	—	5¼ dis	5 dis	—	5¼ dis	5 dis

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C. F.	36 2	2 us.	LEGHORN	50
D°, at sight	35 10		NAPLES.....	40¾
ROTTERDAM	36 3	2 us.	GENOA	46
HAMBURGH	34 3	2 us.	VENICE, 52 livres piccole	
ALTONA....	34 4	2 us.	effective per £. ster.	
PARIS 1 day	24 8		LISBON	68½
PARIS	24 12	2 us.	OPORTO	68
BOURDEAUX,	24 13		DUBLIN	12⅝
CADIZ ...	35¾	eff.	BILBOA	35¼
MADRID ..	36¼	effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	45s. to 61s	Hops per cwt.	200s to 220s
Rye.....	33 .. 36	Hay per load....	70 .. 140
Barley.....	22 .. 27	Beef, per stone	4s.6d. to 6s.
Malt.....	41 .. 46	Mutton	5s. 4d. to 6s 4d.
Oats	15 .. 21	Veal	6s. 0d. to 8s. 4d.
Pease (white)....	33 .. 39	Pork....	4s. 8d. to 6s. 0d.
Beans (horse)....	31 .. 36	Tallow	4s. 4d.
Flour per sack ..	45 .. 50	Av. of Sugar pr cw	39s. ½d.
Seconds.....	40 .. 45	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal....	00 .. 00	Bread 9½d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PARTIES.—THE ADDINGTONS, AND MR. PITT.

The millenium of politics seems to be fast approaching: there is scarcely any distinction of *parties* left; for, though we do, indeed, hear talk of the new and the old oppositions, there is in reality no opposition of party, and, if we except a few individuals, a perfect indifference appears to prevail as to the consequences of the present system of public measures. The same men who were alive two years ago are still alive, but their minds seem to have been changed; the rule of the Addingtons and Hawkes-

buries, which is more like a burlesque of government than any thing that ever appeared before in the world, has rendered public life so ludicrous and disgusting that it really requires more than common fortitude to enable a man of character to interfere, even for the sake of preventing the destruction of his country. The absence of opposition, which is to be ascribed to this disgust, to this loathing inspired by the scene altogether, the Addingtons have the modesty to attribute to an universal acquiescence in the *wisdom* of their measures. Happy people! To them all is sun-shine. They live and laugh under a load of contempt which would sink any other of God's creatures to the grave.—And well they may laugh, for they are advancing on *à grand pas*, towards a monopoly of every thing that is profitable, as well as of every thing, which, before their time, used to be accounted honourable. Like the snakes of South America they are winding themselves round the limbs, the carcass, and throat of John Bull. Poor John may roar as long as he pleases; he will roar most hideously by and by, but that will not save him from the effects of their deadly embrace: nor, indeed, ought it to save him; it was his degeneracy, his baseness, that placed him under their controul, and that still makes him submit to it in silence. Let him suffer. He deserves the very utmost of that punishment which is in store for him.—What we have constantly stated as our opinion respecting the durability of the present ministry, is now, we think, fully verified. Had MR. PITT possessed the *power*, he certainly would, after what has passed, have had the *will*, to sink the Addingtons into that obscurity, from which he was so indiscreet as to raise them. He has not the power: he feels that he has it not: he is, indeed, at last, awake, but, alas! he awakens only to a sense of his debility; he rises like Sampson the arms of Delilah! No: MR. PITT *cannot* eject "the family." We conjure our readers not to deceive themselves. There is no hope from this quarter. A vast majority of those who used to support MR. PITT against all the world, would now support "the family" against that very MR. PITT, because the latter is not approved of by Buonaparté, and because any changes which he might wish to make in the present system, "might expose the country to the "horrors of war." Some of the friends of MR. PITT may think differently from us, on this point, and, full of confidence in his power, will endeavour, perhaps, to prevail on him to exert it; but, our readers may rest assured, that he will never make the hazardous experiment.—M. J. H. ADDINGTON is, we are told, sworn into his Majesty's most honourable Privy Council! "The "*Right Hon.* John Hiley Addington"!!!! —Resentment must now cease to exist in the breast of MR. FOX!—However, thank God, Mr. Hiley is not yet a bishop!—The demi-official paper, through the columns of which "the family" convey their sprightly observations to the world, has made an attempt to defend these rapid and unparalleled strides of the Addingtons, by alluding to the example of Buonaparté and his relations: "The partizans of the new oppo- "sition, full of the haughty and high aris- "tocratic notions of their leaders, affect to "despise every person who cannot count a "dozen coronets in his family; but, ex- "perience, very late, and even *present* ex- "perience, shows, both in *this* country and "*in France*, that what *is called* NOBLE BIRTH "is not absolutely necessary to the conduct- "ing of national affairs."—Whence a paragraph like this, whence sentiments like these, could alone proceed, is, we think, evident enough. But, without having any very great respect for the Buonapartian race, we cannot admit, that they are upon a footing with our "family." As to *birth*, indeed, they may be nearly upon a level, Buonaparté's father being a village attorney; but, in point of qualities, and of actions, where is the similarity? The Buonapartés may be, as Lord Hawkesbury termed them, Corsican Adventurers, but as long as courage, understanding and talents shall be held superior to pusillanimity, ignorance, and imbecility, so long must it be an insult to common sense to attempt to raise the Addingtons to a level with the Buonapartés. Nor, to say the truth, should we be at all surprized if this act of temerity, on the part of our modest gentlemen, were to bring them a severe rebuke from the Moniteur. Their boasting relative to the finances has called forth a pretty sharp reproof, and we would have them take care how they revive the irritation, by putting themselves upon a footing with their betters. Squabbles less serious than this have sometimes terminated in *war*; and, dreadful indeed would it be, if we were, after having made so many sacrifices, after having submitted to every species of injury, insult, and disgrace, for the sake of avoiding a "horrid appeal to arms;" dreadful indeed, at once supremely dreadful and supremely ridiculous would it be, were we, at last, to make this "horrid appeal" for the purpose of deciding the precedence in point of birth between the

sons of a village-attorney and those of a village-doctor!

ST. DOMINGO.—The intelligence from this island is more favourable to the French than it has been for some time past. Were it not for fear of putting the Richmond Park ministry to the blush, we would ask them, what is now become of all their hopes and predictions about the *evacuation* of St. Domingo! Mr. Addington will easily comprehend what we mean, when we say, that this evacuation is not so easily effected as that of Malta.—When the last advices came away, trade was so far revived at Cape François, that the American agents were writing to their principals to ship them India and other goods from the United States. The war continued between the French and the Blacks; and, though we do not believe above one half of what has been said about the cruelties committed, on either side, we can easily conceive, that the destruction has been very great. In the mean time, Buonaparté seems resolved to add this sable nation to his long list of conquests. Troops have embarked, on this expedition, from *Leghorn* and from *Corsica*; the *Polish* demi-brigade has been embarked at *Genoa*, and a considerable part, we are told, of the garrison at *Brussels*, have volunteered on the same service, and are to embark at Dunkirk.—Thus, it is not *France* altogether, which supplies the means of French conquests. The people of France see that their government can, if necessary, call forth the arms of others to fight their battles. And yet we hear people talk of the *exhaustion*, which the war of St. Domingo will cause of the population and resources of France!—On the subject of the ultimate effects (with respect to England) of the restoration of the colonial authority of St. Domingo, the Maidstone Opposition have lately uttered some curious sentiments. They perceive clearly enough, that the people of this country must very soon begin to be alarmed for the fate of Jamaica; and, as their plan is to blind and benumb the nation, *till it is* TOO LATE *to act with effect*, they are endeavouring to check the progress of every opinion that has a contrary tendency. Hence the essay, to which we allude, and in which they most strenously deprecate any *mention* even of the danger, which is to be apprehended to our own colonies, from the establishment of a great military and predatory force in St. Domingo; alleging, as their reason for this cautious silence, that it is serving the cause of Buonaparté *to point out to his soldiers the easy prey, which Jamaica offers to them*, an anti-patriotic act, which they ascribe to the New Opposition! As if the soldiers of Buonaparté wanted a stimulus of this sort to lead them to St. Domingo; and, were that the case, as if the prey would not be pointed out to them more directly and intelligibly than through the speeches of the New Opposition, not one of which speeches did, or will, the army of St. Domingo ever read, or hear cited! "We "cannot," says the Maidstone patriot, "say to France that she shall not re-oc- "cupy St. Domingo; we cannot say to "her, that she shall never entertain the "design of fitting out an armament from "St. Domingo, against the island of Ja- "maica. *If we cannot do these things, what is "the use of conjuring up the phantom of future "ills, to torture our present existence, without ob- "taining the least information how we could avoid "them?*—What are we to do now, after "the peace of Amiens, lest the French in "the next war should attack Jamaica? "Why truly, the only thing that can be "done, is to be *prepared for the worst*, and to "defend Jamaica when it shall be *attacked*, "as *well as we can*."*—Without stopping to examine, by the maxim here applied, the conduct of the leader of the Maidstone Opposition during the last war, when it was necessary to pass a law respecting newspapers, when it was absolutely necessary to abridge the liberty of the press, in order *to prevent intelligence being communicated to the enemy* by him and his associates in and out of doors; without stopping to make this examination, we will ask how, if the sentiment here laid down be adopted, it is possible ever to discuss, or, at least, to *oppose*, any one measure of government affecting our foreign relations? Allow of this rule, and the faculty of speech, in a member of parliament, becomes perfectly useless, except for the noble purpose of eulogizing the conduct of those, who have it in their power to confer places: allow of this principle, and the regal attributes are instantly transferred from the Sovereign to the Ministers; the Chancellors, the Secretaries, and Under Secretaries, can do no wrong, and, for aught we know, their persons may be all sacred down to the very door-keepers: in short, if this degrading principle be allowed, the servants of the King are the masters of the parliament and the people.—Because our country cannot now, *after* the treaty of Amiens, say to France, "you shall not ruin my colonies," the New Opposition are to blame for ascrib-

* Morning Chronicle, 13 Feb. 1803.

ing the approaching ruin of those colonies to the treaty of Amiens: because the evil is now rendered *inevitable*, we are not to complain against those who have brought that evil upon us! But, this is not exactly the argument: it is still more absurd and impudent. 'Because we cannot now *prevent* France from entertaining a design 'against the island of Jamaica, we ought 'not to say that she *has* that design; and, 'when it shall, at last, appear that she not 'only entertains, but is actually engaged 'in the execution of, this design, we are 'then to be prepared for *the worst*, and are 'to defend Jamaica *as well as we can*'!—This is, perhaps, the grossest insult that ever was offered to the understanding of a nation. There never was any thing so audaciously base. Yet, the leader of the Maidstone Opposition knows well what he is doing: he knows the people, whom it is his object to deceive, to lull, and to lead under the yoke of Buonaparté: and, to say the truth, a people that can be so led, and by such a man, deserves to wear such a yoke.—We deny the premises of the argument; we say, that we *can* yet prevent France from forming any design against Jamaica that should be dangerous to that colony; but this is only to be done by measures, which would probably lead to *war*; and war is "*certain ruin*;" or, in the emphatical expression of the Maidstone philanthropist, "the country *may* be sub-"jugated, but the people *must* EAT."—This is the standing reply to every argument for offence or defence, and this reply will, we are afraid, yet be made, when the enemy shall be landed in Norfolk or in Sussex.

The *Letter of Napper Tandy* has not been overlooked. It is a very excellent specimen of the effects of national degradation—Nothing has been finally arranged yet respecting the future government of the Swiss.—Another convention, besides that which has been published, has been concluded between France and Austria, in which the latter has formally sanctioned the changes which has taken place in Italy, and also the measures of France with regard to Switzerland.—Great distress has been experience, and is yet experienced, in Prussia, from the prohibition to export raw silk from Piedmont.—The edict issued in Spain, with regard to the wool, will, in a very short time, be severely felt in England.—When all the channels of commerce are opened in Belgium, and when the money-lovers have seen, that the French government is fairly settled, and appears likely to stand, the capital will fly from all countries to the favoured and defended dominions of France.

CONVENTION BETWEEN FRANCE, AUSTRIA, AND RUSSIA. } Our readers have seen (p. 134), that the affair of the Indemnities has, at last, been terminated by a convention between France and Austria, acceded to afterwards by Russia. Austria is, we perceive, besides the loss of the Brisgaw, ceded to the Duke of Modena by the treaty of Luneville, now to give up the Ortenau, for which sacrifices she is to receive, as an indemnification, the permission of Buonaparté to appropriate to her own use the revenues of the bishopricks of Trente and Brixen, situated in the Austrian province of Tirol. It will be much about the same, if the Consul or his successor should (which God forbid!) give the King of England leave to seize on the revenues of the bishoprick of Durham. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, in consequence of his renouncing these bishopricks, is, it seems, to receive certain morsels of other states, and is to be made an Elector of the Empire!—But we have not room at present to enter into an exposure of the several parts of this shameful transaction, which we cannot but regard as the death-blow of the Germanic body.

NOTICES.

The several articles relative to the *Navy* shall be duly attended to.——Our next will contain *A Letter to Lord St. Vincent*, on several parts of his public conduct, and on the present alarming situation of the fleet.——Our other correspondents will be so good as to excuse us till next week.

The SUPPLEMENT to VOL. II. is, at length, ready for delivery. A full account of the numerous valuable documents it contains will be given in our next.

Complete sets of the first Six Numbers of VOL. III. may now be had of the respective publishers.

☞ The 1st Number of the MERCURE ANGLOIS DE COBBETT was published yesterday.—It is sold by E. HARDING, No. 18, Pall Mall. and by DULAU and Co. Soho Square. The 2d Number will be published on Wednesday the 2d of March.

LONDON,

COBBETT's ANNUAL REGISTER,

COMPLETE FOR THE YEAR 1802.

The Second Volume being now finished, I venture to offer the two volumes to the public as an ANNUAL REGISTER FOR THE LAST YEAR; and, as the most copious and complete work of the kind, that ever appeared in this or in any other country. When I first described the nature and proposed contents of this publication, I prepared my readers for "such alterations, "additions, and improvements, as time "and experience might suggest." Many and useful have been the suggestions of these patient monitors. After having finished the two volumes, which complete the first year of the work, I now regard it as having assumed its permanent form and manner.

The second volume, like the former one, may be considered as divided into two parts; the first consisting of the numbers, which have been published weekly during the *half year*, or, of a reprint of those numbers; the second, of the Supplement. The former of these divisions contains a collection of all authentic documents, appertaining to state affairs, or to matters of political economy, whether they immediately relate to this country or not; and, in making this collection, care has constantly been taken to recur to such compacts and transactions of past times, as do, or may affect the circumstances of the present time.—During the Session of Parliament, a weekly account of the proceedings is given, reserving the Debates, corrected and at full length, to be given in the Supplement to the volume. As occasion requires, and time affords opportunity, brief Notices are given of such new Books as relate to history, politics, or political economy, or that bear upon subjects connected therewith. The preceding heads are followed by a selection of such Foreign and Domestic Intelligence as appears to be of public importance; to which is added, a Record of Appointments, of Bankruptcies, Births, Deaths, Marriages, Prices. The scale of these articles has, in the latter numbers, been abridged; but whatever has been left out in the body of the work, will be found in the Supplement. —Besides the aforementioned matter, which is necessarily supplied by time and events, each sheet of the work contains the Editor's observations relative to all the most important current events and transactions. These observations are, for want of a more comprehensive phrase, called Summaries of Politics, and, upon an uninterrupted perusal of them, they will, I think, be found to form a complete series of statements, arguments, and reflections: and, when, to this series, are added the detached articles from correspondents, whether in the form of Essays, Letters, or Extracts, the whole of the numbers, taken together, forms a Chronicle, not only of events and transactions, but of the opinions, feelings, and motives connected therewith.

The compilers of Annual Registers have adopted a different, and, in my opinion, a far less perfect mode of arranging their materials, which it is their custom to divide into classes, instead of placing them in the order in which they were first communicated to the Public. According to their method, all the State Papers are so inserted as to follow each other without the intervention of other matter; and so of the Proceedings in Parliament, the Historical Remarks, &c. &c. But it is, I think, evident, that this classification can be attended with no one advantage, while it has many very great disadvantages. Considering the Register merely as a book of *reference*, it is of little import how the materials are arranged, so that they are all included in the book, and are pointed to by the Index in such a manner as to be found with perfect facility; but, as a book for *perusal*, the chronological order is certainly the most favourable to a clear, an easy, and satisfactory comprehension of the divers matters contained in it. At first sight, it may appear, that the chronological order followed without reference to the difference in the kind of materials, produces, in one and the same sheet, a heterogeneous mass of Treaties with Foreign Powers, Debates in the Parliament, Intelligence from abroad, Occurrences at home, Fluctuations in the Stocks, Price of Bread, Political Reflec-

tions, &c. &c. Yet, upon closer observation, it will be found, that there is a very intimate connexion between all these; that they explain and elucidate each other, and that, though widely different in their nature, the reader must see them all, and all together too, in order to have a full and fair view of the political picture, of which they are the component parts. An article, on the contrary, contained in a Register where the classifying order is pursued, has seldom any connexion with those which immediately precede or come after it; and, in the studying of it, the reader very rarely indeed derives any aid from the situation in which it is found. Where, for instance, is the connexion between two State Papers? What help, in general, does the one afford towards the just appreciation of the other? To know what was thought and said of the new division of Germany, to obtain any knowledge respecting it, other than that which is to be drawn from the Declaration of France and Russia, recourse must be had to those other sources of information, which here accompany the Declaration, but which, in a work otherwise constructed, must be sought for elsewhere, not always with a certainty of success, and never without considerable pains.

The twenty-six sheets, which form the Chronicle for the half year, did not, however, appear to me to be quite sufficient to render the work complete. Several articles presented themselves, which, though too long to be inserted in the weekly numbers, were absolutely necessary to the completion of my plan. These, I therefore, resolved to publish in a half yearly Supplement, to be supplied, at a moderate price, to the purchasers of the weekly numbers; and, in this second volume, I have taken advantage of the convenience offered by this plan to render the work a *complete* Parliamentary Register also, which it was not, at first, my intention to do. This part of the work will, in future, be more regularly placed. At present, the Table of Contents must be consulted to know where to find the different parts of which the Parliamentary Register is composed.—The contents of the Supplement to the second volume are as follows:

1. *Parliamentary Papers.*—All the principal reports, returns, accounts, estimates, &c. &c. (being upwards of *sixty* in number) which were laid before the Parliament during the *last* session.

2. *Parliamentary Debates*, at length, on the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties with France. These debates, which were the only ones of much interest during the session, and which are, and long will be, constantly wanted to refer to, are here collected and arranged with great care, and from the best materials.—This head, together with the preceding one, and the reports of Parliamentary Proceedings in the body and supplement of Vol. I. will be found to form a Parliamentary Register of the *last* session much more complete, as well as more interesting, than any other that has been published.

3. *A List of the New Parliament*, together with a selection of the addresses to the Electors, in different parts of the kingdom.

4. *Parliamentary Debates*, from the commencement of the *present* session to the recess, collected and arranged with great care.—These debates, together with the sort of Journal of Proceeding which has been kept, during this session, in the Weekly Numbers, forms a complete Register of the Parliament down to the recess; and the next Volume will, of course, continue it down to the end of the session, including all the accounts, reports, estimates, &c. &c.

5. *Papers relative to India.*—Under this head are contained, not only the Official Papers laid before Parliament, but all such others as I have been able to collect, and as appeared to me likely to be useful to my Readers.—There are not less than *seventy* articles under this head.

6. Statistical Table relative to the Cape of Good Hope.

7. *Public Papers.*—All Papers of this description which were omitted in the weekly Numbers.

8. *Foreign Official Papers.*—Many Dispatches, Decrees, &c. which were not published in the weekly Numbers.

9. A translation from a work entitled "*Etat Commercial de la France*," containing comments on Mr. Dundas' Speech relative to the effects which the treaty of Amiens will have on our rights in India.

10. Extracts from Charmilly's Letter to B. Edwards on the effect of the restoration of St. Domingo to France, and on the general consequences of a regicide peace.

11. Memoir respecting Malta.

12. Letter respecting the Grand Mastership of Malta.

13. Count Dietrichstein's observations in reply to the charges brought against him by the English newspaper, called The Times, relative to his conduct in Italy, and to the views of the Imperial Court at that time.

14. Papers relative to the conduct of Mr. Fox.

15. *Miscellaneous Articles*, containing, amongst other things, all the advertisements, resolutions, songs, &c. &c. relative to the Statues and Birth Days of Messrs. Pitt, Dundas, and Addington.

16. Complete Lists of Patents, with a specification thereof, enrolled in the year 1802.

17. *Juridical Proceedings.*—Under this head is contained an account of all such cases, which, during the last six months, have come before the several courts of justice, and as appear to me to contain any thing novel, or peculiarly important, whether from their nature, their consequences, or from the rank, &c. of the parties.

18. A List of the Titles of all the New Books, which have been published, in the United Kingdom, or in the Continent of Europe, and in America, during the last six months.—When I speak of the "last six months," I am to be understood as meaning, the six months ending Dec. 31st for this kingdom, Nov. 30th for the Continent of Europe, and Sept. 30th for America. In my next list I shall go back to these several epochs.—The books are divided into thirty-two classes, and are upwards of *fifteen hundred* in number. The titles are all translated into English, but care has been taken to mention the language in which the work is published, and the place where published. This is, I am led to hope,

the completest thing of the kind that ever has been attempted. It has cost no small pains, and I trust it will be found to be of great and extensive utility.

19. The German Empire divided into Departments under the Prefecture of the Elector of * * *; to which is prefixed, a Preface of the Translator, and also an Introduction, consisting of a Memoir on the Political and Military State of Europe, by the same author.—Translated from the French by Mr. COBBETT.

20. Lists of Promotions, Preferments, Dispensations, &c.

21. View of the Prices of Bread, of the Value of the Funds, of the Bills of Mortality, &c. &c. &c. during the six months.

22. *Indexes.*—1st of *Matters*; 2d of *Names*; 3d of *Places*.

I have here merely enumerated the principal *heads* in the Supplement, without attempting to specify the particular articles under each head, which will be done in the Table of Contents to the whole volume.

To class the several articles, in a Table of Contents, according to their different *subjects*, would, I conceive, render the table so complicated as to be almost, if not quite useless; and, indeed, after having long considered of the matter, I am well convinced, that the only rational classification that can be adopted is that which I have lately followed in each of the weekly numbers, the heads of which, without any reference to the *subjects*, which are of almost infinite variety, distinguish nothing but the *sorts* of Documents, or Papers, which sorts are very few in number. I have, therefore, adhered to this division.—I. *Public Papers*; that is to say, Treaties, Conventions, Manifestoes, Armistices, Declarations, and, in short, all papers, of whatever name or purport, made or issued by any Government or Governments, and which treat of matters, in which more than one nation has a direct and evident part or concern.—II. *Foreign Official Papers*, such as Decrees, Proclamations, Dispatches, Orders, Petitions, Memorials, &c. &c. are and ought to be preserved. Many of them, indeed, it would be useless to insert in a work like this: but others are very necessary to enable the politician to form an opinion, not only as to the interior situation, but also as to the exterior views of other countries; and, for the same purpose, he should have correct information respecting the pecuniary, the military, and other resources of the principal nations, particularly such as are, by their situation, power, and disposition, in any degree formidable to ourselves.—III. *Parliamentary Papers and Debates*, of which nothing need be said, but that they form a complete Parliamentary Register, elucidated occasionally by the Editor's notes.—IV. *Domestic Official Papers*, are of the same description as that which has been given of Foreign Official Papers.—V. *India Papers*. This class is rather a deviation from my plan; the documents being of the same sort as, and coming fairly under the head of, Domestic Official Papers; but India is so considerable a branch, it is so distinct from the rest of the Empire, and the papers relative to it are so numerous, that it seemed convenient to give them a separate head.—VI. *Essays*. Under this head I have placed all the Letters, Addresses, Dissertations, and Extracts; and also all articles of whatever description originating with the Editor and his Correspondents, amongst which are included, of course, the Summaries of Politics, the principal topics of each of which are merely pointed out.—VII. *Notices of New Books*.—VIII. *Poetry*.—IX. *Juridical Proceedings*.—X. *Lists* of various kinds.—Mere Intelligence, whether foreign or domestic, can never be very important without appearing, first or last, in an official document or paper of some sort or other; and, besides, the intelligence, as well as the table of Prices, the Gazette articles, &c. recur too often and too regularly, and are too clearly pointed out by the Indexes to need being mentioned in the Table of Contents.

To specify the separate articles, contained under the several divisions abovementioned, would occupy the pages of a large pamphlet; but, it may not be entirely useless to state the number of articles, in the two volumes, under each division or head, respectively.—Of Public Papers there are 116; of Foreign Official Papers, 163; of Parliamentary Papers, 68; of Debates, 57; of Domestic Official Papers, 36; of India Papers, 62; of Essays, 218; of Critical Notices of New Books, 39; of Pieces of Poetry, 15; of Juridical Cases and Trials, 42; of Lists, 22: and, amongst these are the two lists of Books, containing the titles and descriptions of all the works, more than *three thousand* in number, published in Europe and America, during the year 1802.

Such a mass of matter, and of matter so various, certainly requires every facility that mere editorship can afford. To effect this object a Table of Contents is now prefixed; and there are THREE INDEXES at the end, one of *Matters*, one of Names of *Persons*, and another of Names of *Places*; so that, notwithstanding the immense bulk of the work, and the almost endless variety of its contents, I am persuaded that very little difficulty, in point of reference, will ever occur.

Of the manner and quality of the work, I must now leave the reader to judge, but respecting the *quantity* I beg to be permitted

to say a few words more.—A *guinea and a half* for *one octavo volume* has a high sound; but if the purchaser will take the trouble to make the comparison, he will find, that this one octavo volume, which is sold for a guinea and a half, well and neatly bound with a Russia back, contains as much print as *ten common octavo volumes*, which ten volumes are sold, in boards, for *seven or eight shillings each*; and, of course, the Register is, as I stated with respect to the first volume, proportionally, much *cheaper* than any other book published in London. In the advertisement of that volume, it was stated that it contained as much as *four* common octavo volumes; but it was meant to say *eight*. The present volume is much thicker, as well as fuller of print; and, indeed, I scruple not to say, that it contains as much letter press as the twelve volumes of Johnson's works. This is a fact of which any one may satisfy himself with very little trouble. —Then, in comparing its price with that of other Annual Registers, it will be found to be just about twice as much in amount; but, on the other hand, the contents of the ordinary Annual Registers will be found to form only one department of my work, which does, in fact, embrace, 1. An usual Annual Register; 2. A Parliamentary Register; 3. Collection of State Papers, each of which has heretofore formed a separate work, and the price of these three works, together with that of detailed original tracts, and translations, would, for the year, amount to a sum not much short of *eight* guineas, while my two volumes sell for *three*. WM. COBBETT.

London, 18 *Feb.* 1803.

☞ The work is sold by E. HARDING, Pall Mall; RICHARD BAGSHAW, Bow Street, Covent Garden; RICHARDSON, under the Royal Exchange; J. MERCIER, Dublin; and by all the Booksellers and Newsmen in the Kingdom.—The volumes may be had separately.—Those gentlemen, who have taken the Weekly Numbers, and who wish to be supplied with the SUPPLEMENT only, will please to address themselves to the persons who have supplied them with the numbers.—The price of the retail Supplement is 8s. 9d.—Particular care should be taken to direct the binder to bind the volume with a *hollow back*, by which means it will always open easy, and lie flat when open.

WEST-INDIA COMMISSION AND NAVY-BILL.

SIR,—Your correspondent, TROPICUS (page 202) has taken notice of the two late Bills of Inquiry, the West-India and the Navy, for the purpose of contrasting the manner in which they were passed, without entering into the merits of either. I know nothing of the latter; but on referring to my signature, it will not appear surprising if the other has attracted my attention; and if you will excuse the manner for the sake of the matter, and accept a few words, on that subject, from a plain man of business, who has no pretensions to fine writing, they are at your service.—The history of the first is shortly this: When the expenses of the war, particularly in the West-Indies, began considerably to exceed the estimates made by the treasury, it became a favourite idea in that quarter, that matters in the islands were not properly conducted. A correspondence has been published between a gentleman in office, and another who had been employed there in a public situation, in which it was sung out by the one, and re-echoed by the other, that all who had been concerned in that part of the world, with money transactions of the army, were no better than thieves and pickpockets, and the whole body of West-India merchants, viz. merchants in the West Indies, were stigmatised as a set of hucksters that would set their names to any thing. An enquiry was by both agreed upon to be necessary; though it was acknowledged by the one, and not contradicted by the other, that it was contrary to the rules of evidence that any one should be made to accuse himself. Nevertheless, a bill was introduced into Parliament in which this principle was not attended to; but that and many other powers were granted, and it was thought proper that the person who had been the principal accuser should be appointed one of the judges of the parties concerned; or, lest this term should be cavilled at, one of the commissioners to make the inquiry. This bill passed, as you have been already informed, without any opposition.

Now, Sir, you are very much mistaken if you suppose, from any thing I have said, that I am an enemy to this bill, or rather to this inquiry. On the contrary, if government has been defrauded, it is highly proper it should be known by whom, and in what manner. All I object to is any thing that savors of partiality or oppression. What is good for the goose, is good for the gander. What is wrong in one case cannot possibly be right in the other: and the original Navy Bill having undergone so many amendments, the West India Bill should be new modelled to resemble it, or the objections to the first Navy Bill ought to be waved, and it made the same as the West India Bill. But this is not all. Are these the only two branches of the public service in which it is possible to suppose any thing has gone wrong? If not, why are they the

only two pointed at? You yourself have told us a thing or two of the Post Office: but whether it is this P. O. or any other P. O. the A. O. the N. O. or any other letter of the alphabet that goes before O as initials, if enquiry is right in one 'tis right in all. Why should all men, down to every sub-commissary in the West Indies and every underling in the dock yards, be hauled over the coals, and all big and little every where else remain unquestioned? No Sir, they should all, whether they live in *Yards* or *Palaces*, in Squares or Alleys, be put on the same footing. Mr. Wilberforce, it (is natural his name should occur to me first, who know the mighty good he and his *motions* have done to the *cause of humanity* in St. Domingo and elsewhere:) he, I say, and others who think with him, will tell us, and no doubt they will tell us true, that no honest man will shrink from this ordeal, and that only those will oppose it who are conscious to themselves of guilt. Let every man, in *every* department of the public service, be put upon his oath to declare whether, directly or indirectly, he has derived any advantage, to the injury of government, from his situation in office. If this is done, no one will have a right to complain: if it is not done, let certain folks give themselves what airs of patriotism or public spirit they please, they will never convince the dispassionate and discerning, that these enquiries have originated in any thing else than private pique and unprincipled ambition. I am Sir, your's, &c. A WEST INDIA MERCHANT.

DESPARD AND HIS ASSOCIATES.

The following article is taken from the MORNING POST. We insert it here with great pleasure, as expressing our sentiments, in a manner more happy than we, perhaps, should have done; and as coming from a source somewhat more *authentic* than we can pretend to have access to, with respect to COLONEL DESPARD'S long habits of treasonable thinking and conversation.

"When Thomas Muir was on shipboard in the Thames, on his way to Botany Bay, he listened to the suggestion of presenting a petition to Government, by which his sentence might have been remitted, and he might have escaped all those misfortunes which ended in his death. But a deputation from the London Corresponding Society waited on him, represented the disgrace of such a step, the glory his sufferings would shed around his name and their cause, and how much his martyrdom would increase their strength and numbers. He listened to them. His fate is known.

"The same use is now made of the fate of Colonel Despard and his associates. The few who wish well to the designs he entertained endeavour to excite compassion for his misfortunes, and by working on the feelings of a humane people to make converts to their cause. They hope that the blood of Despard will raise thousands in their favour, and that his death will revive and reanimate their partizans. Hence the artifices to produce pity for Despard, and indignation at the Government. Among the well-informed classes of society, detestation of the man is disarmed by assurances that he must have been insane when he talked of such wild designs; among the poor ignorant classes it is said he suffered because he was "a friend to the poor."—If you abhor treason, you are told Despard was a madman: if you are discontented with public affairs, you are told he was a hero. It is also said he was irritated by the refusal of Government to pay his claims. This, we believe, is much nearer the truth than that he died for the poor; but this apology strips him of all the glory of martyrdom, and brings him nearly to the level of a highwayman. His partizans assume any shape to avert public resentment, and turn his fate to their purpose. It is the duty of every good subject to see that Despard's punishment becomes a salutary example. Has the Government, or has Despard acted justly? Shall the Government, or shall Despard's partizans derive advantage from his death? Shall Despard's headless corpse walk into every tap-room, to make proselytes with an hundred fold the success he experienced in his life; or shall the arm of the law appear with all its just terrors to prevent the spread of treason, and the recurrence of such scenes as that of Monday? Those of the middling and upper ranks may smile at alarm; but let them explore the lower classes, and they will see it is not altogether without foundation. The word of the dying has great weight with the ignorant, who cannot believe that in death a man would tell a falsehood. When O'Coigley was executed at Maidstone, he accused every person concerned in his prosecution, magistrates and all, of perjury! When Despard was executed at Southwark, he declared he was innocent, and that he died because he was a friend to the *poor* and the *oppressed!* The poor, who feel effects without being able to judge of causes, may believe him a martyr. That a large mob, collected from among so many scores of thousands of the poor, as exist in

this city, should be misled, when their passions and their ignorance are worked upon by the artful and profligate, is not surprizing. The spectators of Despard's death pitied him; and, from the crowd and compassion that prevailed, if he had been executed at Kennington Common, drawn more than a mile through the populace, some confusion would, probably, have occurred.

"However easily the lower classes may be misled, no doubt can remain of Colonel Despard's guilt among those who were well acquainted with him.—He made no secret of his designs, and WE WILL VENTURE TO AFFIRM, THAT NO ONE OF HIS FAMILIAR ACQUAINTANCE WAS IGNORANT OF THEM. To his openness the government is indebted for the discovery, we conjecture, more than to the evidence of accomplices, such as Windsor and Emblyn. Despard *has talked for years of such plots as that of which he has just been convicted.* He was impressed with the opinion that a revolution was not to be effected by extensive associations, through which the design would transpire and be frustrated, but by a small party of desperate men, who, having struck one great blow, such as the assassination of the King, and filled the city with consternation, would find thousands to support them. However probable it may be that such a scheme would fail, yet certainly it held out better prospects of success than one founded on numerous and extensive associations, among a people not disposed to countenance a treasonable conspiracy.

"Much praise is bestowed on Colonel Despard for bearing up in his situation with so much fortitude, and for dying with so much firmness and equanimity. This virtue, if virtue it can be called, is common to nine in ten of the felons executed at Newgate. Cowardice is much more rare among men than courage. If a man dies without remorse for an atrocious crime, shall we admire his courage? Are not repentance and contrition the virtues which we should admire in him in such a situation? Was Despard's crime an atrocious one? Did he betray repentance or contrition? Should not his conduct excite horror rather than commiseration? Macnamara was the only interesting person on the scaffold. He prayed so fervently, and seemed so desirous of making his peace with Heaven, that he drew tears from those who best knew where to place their pity.

"We again warn the public to be upon their guard. Attempts are making to raise, out of the death of Colonel Despard, strength to the cause for which he died. It is by compassion for his fate that treason is to be propagated. The cant of humanity should be stripped of its disguise. Let these tender hearts pity the fate of Bellamy, executed at Dublin for forging to support his wife and children.—If their feelings be so very susceptible, they may find many objects more deserving of their tears than Colonel Despard.

THE TRAITOR'S EPITAPH.

May this dreary abode be for ever unknown,
For ever, by Virtue, by Pity, untrod;
Unbreath'd be his name, and unhonour'd his stone:
The foe of his country, his Monarch, his God.

C. C.

EPIGRAM

On hearing of Disapprobation expressed at the late Executions for High Treason.

Ye who, of Treason's arts, *abroad*,
We own distinguish'd haters,
Now mourn (lest Freedom should be awed)
The lot of *home-bred* traitors:
Why seem your wishes, to restrain
The Assassin here, less hearty?—
Grant half the means, and George will reign
As safe as Buonaparté.

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS, from p. 48.

2. *A Few Days in Paris; with Remarks characteristic of several distinguished Personages.* 8vo. p. p. 60.

The author of this little pamphlet informs us, in the preface, that what he presents to the public is the substance of several letters, written to various individuals in England, during his residence in France. The work before us presents us with a disgusting picture of the state of manners in modern Paris. It contains some curious anecdotes of the court of the Thuilleries, and of our English patriots who were cringing last summer at the levees of Buonaparté. As a specimen of the performance, we shall present our readers with a few short extracts, and conclude with recommending the whole to their perusal.

COURT OF THE THUILLERIES.

"It must not be imagined that the court of the Thuilleries bears any resemblance to those of ancient times and long established governments: in them the monarch is acknowledged (in our's beloved) by the great body of the people. In the principal courts of Europe, the sovereign and his house indulge, more or less, in friendly intercourse with many families around them. This cannot have place either at Malmaison or St. Cloud, or at the Thuilleries. It would be tedious, and might appear personally invidious to go into the causes of this; *they must be striking* to every man of sense. Indeed, were it not for the English

who resort to Paris, the Thuilleries would have little of the character of a court; *not one family* of estimation in France gracing it with their presence. The monthly assemblage, then, at the Thuilleries, may be considered as a military levee, at which the constituted orders of the state appear in all their finery, and the Second and Third Consuls, in particular, indignant spectators."—p. 12

FOX AT BUONAPARTÉ'S LEVEES.

"But it was truly painful to see Mr. Fox regular in his attendance at the new court of the Thuilleries, and to reflect how almost entirely he had estranged himself from the High Court of Parliament of his own country. It may be asked, what there was in his first interview with the Chief Consul, that could induce Mr. Fox to present himself so constantly before him? On the part of the consular Chief, the conversation was coarse and violent. It is a fact, that the First Consul proceeded to charge Mr. Windham, in conjunction with Mr. Pitt, with being the instigator of the attempt upon his life, in the construction of the *infernal machine*. Mr. Fox repelled the foul aspersion; but such was the rancorous hatred of the First Consul for these honourable men, that he repeated his most settled conviction, that they were the great movers in the conspiracy against his life. The conversation then turned on politics. Buonaparté said, the Emperor was raising great difficulties on the settlement of the German indemnities; that he had forgot that *he* had been in possession of his dominions two or three times; and that if the treaty of Luneville could be reconciled, he, General Buonaparté, would order it much otherwise. I forbear to state Mr. Fox's answer, as I am not quite sure of the fact*. But of this I am too certain, that the British senator was at the Thuilleries a few days after the atrocious proclamation against the Swiss. That any Englishman should, by his presence at that court and capital, give the least support, and, in some degree, sanction, to that cruel government, is a painful thought; but that Mr. Fox should continue to go there—!! Having gone through this monthly ceremony of parade and hypocrisy, let me ask what there is to detain an English gentleman one moment longer in Paris."—p. 16.

SIR JOSEPH BANKS AND THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE.

"Having mentioned the National Institute, it may not be uninteresting to know, that this society is an engine of great *political* power in France, to support the present government, and more especially that of Buonaparté. He is at the head of it, and the members probably named, if not maintained, by him. As Sir Joseph Banks has styled them "the first literary society "in the world*," *no doubt* they are so: but be this as it may, with these characters united, it is not unimportant what they do. But was it well in Sir Joseph, to overshadow his native British oak by the aspiring vine. With what indignant concern would his friends, the late Mr. Burke and Sir Joshua Reynolds, have read this unhallowed production! Mr. Burke, in one of his sublimely prophetic effusions, has remarked, "that there is *that* in the French Revolu- "tion, which those who admire, would in- "stantly imitate: those who do not hate "it, love it."

BUONAPARTE'S DRESS.

The following is an Accurate Estimate of the First Consul's Gala dress.

A velvet embroidered suit, full dress uniform of a French General, -	£125	0	0
Half-boots, with gold embroidery, -	6	0	0
A military hat, best beaver, - -	1	10	0
Diamond button for the hat (weight 227 carats) - - -	232,000	0	0
A Sabre, with a best Damascus blade, - - - - - -	10	0	0
Hilt of Sabre of solid gold, 27oz. -	108	0	0
Diamond in the mouth of Crocodile, called "the Regent," -	126,000	0	0
Diamond eyes of Crocodile, - -	1,500	0	0
Epaulets of best brilliants, -	30,000	0	0
Total value,	£397,741	0	0
Analysis of the above—			
Clothes and *stuff* articles, including embroidery, gold-hilted sabre, &c.	251	10	0
Ornamental part,	£397,490	0	0

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Genoa, Jan. 29.—The three French ships commanded by Rear-Admiral Eidou having on board 2018 men of the Polish demi-brigade, set sail from hence yesterday afternoon with a favourable wind; they were joined by another vessel from Leghorn which appeared in sight of our Port last Sunday.—There remains here only 400 Poles who will, as it is understood, be embarked on board the Frigate and the Corvette which arrived this day.

Ratisbon, Feb. 4.—The Deputation of the Empire held yesterday its 40th sitting. The Directorial Ministers collected the votes on the note of the Ministers of the Mediating Powers concerning the order of the votes at the Diet. Bohemia referred to the votes which it gave on the same subject in the 38th sitting. Saxony proposed to transmit to the Diet, and the Imperial Plenipo-

* This conversation passed in the hearing of several gentlemen, strangers to Mr. Fox.

* See his letter on being admitted a Member of the National Institute of France. Reg. Vol. I. p. 327.

rentiary, the note, as a supplement to that of the 16th of last month. Brandenburg recognized in the note a new proof of the solicitude of the Mediating Powers, of which the object is to prevent all suspension in the deliberations of the Diet, and all dispute with respect to rank. It proposed to the Deputation to transmit the note to the Diet, as a Supplement to the Conclusum of the 23d of Nov.; the other Sub-delegates having agreed to this proposition, it was converted into a Conclusum.—The Sub-delegate of Bavaria then gave the explanation which he had reserved in the sitting of the 19th of Jan. on the Convention signed at Paris on the 26th of Dec. He made, in the name of his Court, a Declaration, by which he demanded for the cession of the Bishopric of Eichstett, an equitable compensation, and prayed the Deputation to transmit his demand to the Ministers of the Mediating Powers. Bohemia said he would make a report upon the subject to his court. Brandenburg approved of it, Saxony, the Grand Master of the Teutonic Order, Wurtemburg, and Hesse Cassel, reserved themselves till the opening of the Protocol.

Berne, Feb. 5.—We do not yet know the contents of the Act of Mediation which has been transmitted to the Helvetic Congress at Paris. We know only, that this Act consists of 20 Articles, 19 of which regard the Cantons, and one the Central Government. Each Member of the Committee has received a printed copy at a meeting held with the French Commissioners.—They have made their remarks upon each Article, which the Commissioners have engaged to transmit to the First Consul.—We regard this Act of Mediation as the basis of the new Helvetic Constitution, and it is thought that it comprizes all the Cantonal Organizations, and the Central Organizations.—Of the 60 Deputies from different Cantons who went to Paris to assist in the plans of the First Consul of France; 45 demand, that the Government lately established should be made permanent; 15 wish that the old Government should be restored nearly in its primitive force.—In the first 45, are 3 Deputies from the Helvetic Senate, 29 from Diets of the Cantons, 7 from different rural Cantons, from Arau, a Privileged City, 5 who were in the Deputation because they were before in official authority. The other party consists of 5 Deputies from Aristocratic Cantons; and 7 from Privileged Cities.

Paris, Feb. 16.—The Court of Vienna has formally recognized the King of Etruria. The Spanish Ambassador in that Capital has transmitted to the Count de Cobentzel, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Letters of Notification announcing the accession of the King to the Throne of Tuscany. These Letters had been presented several times to the Minister, who had hitherto refused to receive them.—The Helvetic Government has addressed to the National Prefects of the Cantons of Basle, Soleure, Berne, Fribourg, and Leman, a circular letter, enjoining them to take the greatest care to prevent the *importation of English merchandize* into Switzerland, and for that purpose to inspect the depôt of merchandize within their jurisdiction, and to establish guards on the frontiers, &c. This measure has been adopted in consequence of the representations of the French General Ney.

Fribourg, Jan. 29.—Every thing announces that the French troops are on the point of quitting us, when this country will be taken possession of on the part of the Sovereign to whom it was destined by the Treaty of Luneville. Yesterday the French depôt, which was here, left us. The battalion, which still remains, will likewise follow very soon. It is said, that it is to prepare quarters for it at Zurich, that the Aid-de-Camp of the Chef-de-Brigade, Rouville, went to Switzerland, a few days since. The Regencies of Baden and Furstenberg have been requested to grant a passage to two Companies of the Austrian Regiment of Bender, which will immediately arrive to take military possession of the Brisgau and the Ortenau, in the name of the Duke of Modena.

Hague, Feb. 6.—In the Report which the Council of the Interior has presented to the Directory, concerning the addresses of several merchants who have declared for or against the law, relative to the importation and sale of woollen manufactures, the Council favours the interests of those who have declared against the importation of these articles. The Directory, to enable itself maturely to examine this Report, has proposed to the Legislative Body not to give effect to the law of the 26th of last year, (according to which, at the end of the month of Feb. of the present year, these manufactures, especially dyed woollens, are not to be permitted to be imported or sold in the Republic, under pain of confiscation, &c.) until it shall have examined the Report of the Council of the Interior. The proposition has been referred to a Special Committee. The commerce of this country waits with impatience a definitive decision, which, it must be apparent, is of extreme importance, not only to the manufactures and fabrics of this Republic, but also to the commercial part of it, which traffics in foreign manufactures.—Two hundred men from the depôt of Colonial troops at Enkhuysen, have been marched to Horn, to be organized in three divisions of infantry destined for the Cape of Good Hope, to supply the place of the troops lost in the Vreede, which was wrecked in the month of December last, on the Coast of England.

Ratisbon, Feb. 8.—The Official Gazette of Munich announces, that the Imperial troops have entirely evacuated Passau.

Augsburg, Feb. 8.—They write from Leghorn, that the Spanish squadron which brought back the King and Queen of Etruria, sailed on its return for Spain, on the 22d of January. The English squadron, under Admiral Bickerton, is still cruizing off Sardinia and Malta, and observes every thing that passes in the Mediterranean. A frigate from this squadron arrived in the port of Leghorn, on the 25th ult. when an officer landed, and immediately set out for London, with dispatches from Admiral Bickerton.

Paris, Feb. 17.—Subscriptions being about to be entered into at Orleans, for the purpose of erecting a statue of the celebrated Joan of Arc, in that city—the project, and the deliberations of the Municipal Council of Orleans on the subject, were presented to the First Consul, who wrote on the margin as follows:—"Write to Citizen Crignon "Desormeaux, Mayor of Orleans, that this deli- "beration is very agreeable to me.—The illustri- "ous Joan of Arc has proved, that there is no "miracle that French Genius cannot produce, "under those circumstances where national inde- "pendence is menaced.—United, the French na- "tion can never be conquered; but our more "calculating and adroit neighbours, *abusing the* "*frankness and integrity of our character*, have con- "stantly sown amongst us those dissensions from "whence resulted the calamities of that epoch, "and all the disasters related in our history.— "Paris, Jan. 30, 1803.—*Buonaparté.*"

New-York, Dec. 31.—On Tuesday the 31st inst.

Stephen R. Bradley, Esq. President of the Senate *pro tem.* gave a dinner to a select number of the Senators, the heads of Departments, &c. Thomas Paine was a guest; and was waited on to the hotel, where they dined, by Dr. Logan, Senator from Pennsylvania.—*Mr. Paine, a few days since, dined by invitation with the President, in company with the* BRITISH MINISTER.—*Mercantile Adv.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Letter from General Ney to C. Mohr, Secretary of State, published at Berne, Feb. 9, 1803.

I am informed, Citizen Secretary, by reports which have reached me both directly and indirectly, that a number of foreign vagabonds infest the high roads, and commit all sorts of crimes. Robbery, murder, fire-raising take place in various quarters, while no measures to repress them are adopted by your Government, or to protect the safety of travellers, of the inhabitants, and their properties. This indifference multiplies and emboldens malefactors, and deprives the inhabitants, who rely upon the protection of the laws, of all confidence when they see them remain unexecuted or eluded by the . . . enemies of . . . France . . . and Helvetia. Several petitions have reached me from persons stiling themselves patriots and good citizens reclaiming the arms they had voluntarily surrendered. They complain that those they call insurgents had concealed theirs from discovery, and that, afraid of falling victims to such, they require back their arms to defend their families, their persons, and properties. I have complied with some of these applications made by persons in the neighbourhood of Zurich, where, by my orders, General Barbon has given them back their arms. It must likewise be within the knowledge of the Helvetic Government that the political opinions of the mass of the people are influenced by men who have openly attacked the lawful authority, in spite of the declared intention of the First Consul to cause to be respected the provisions of the laws and the measures that might be the result of them till after the Cantonal arrangement and the establishment of the new order of things. These men dare to boast that they will render them illusory, or at least will render their execution difficult. They threaten to exercise vengeance upon those who employ vigour to reduce them to obedience. These insurrectional measures appear to have intimidated and to have weakened the system of Government. The interior Police of the Cantons is so ill conducted, that no information of the culpable proceedings of the enemies of public tranquillity comes before the tribunals to enable them to display severity against the numerous offences and enormities which are the consequence of them. Emissaries of England, officers in her pay, and the old pensioners of that power enlist under the eye of the Civil Authorities without their giving any obstruction whatever to it. Numbers of men receive pay in money, to second, on the first signal, their audacious enterprizes, in case the new order of things was not agreeable to them. The agents of the secret Police are in some sort dependent upon them, because they receive large gratifications. A Counter-Police, skilfully directed, exists in every part of Helvetia, and all the secrets of Government come to their knowledge.—The MEDIATOR OF HELVETIA (Buonaparté) is treated with very little ceremony in the libels and pamphlets which circulate among the people. The French soldier is considered as the enemy of Helvetic liberty; and many of them have accordingly fallen the victims of the resentment and animosity directed against them, although in general the French troops in this country have observed a wise and moderate conduct, and practised that discipline which causes the property and safety of citizens, whatever be their opinions, to be respected.—All these considerations, Citizen Secretary, oblige me to call upon you to lay before the Executive Council the observations which have been dictated to me by my solicitude for Helvetia, and to request the Council to cause to be maintained and executed without restriction, such measures as are calculated to secure the tranquillity of the proprietors and the safety of the citizens, and to cause to be expelled from the country the vagabonds who trouble its repose, and to prevent the recruiters from taking away men whom commerce and agriculture may usefully employ. The Police also deserves their attention. You may assure them that I will second with zeal whatever tends to promote the welfare and happiness of Helvetia.—(Signed)—*Ney.*

Proclamation issued by General Rochambeau on the 19th of Dec. 1802, permitting the Importation of Wares and Merchandize in Foreign Bottoms, on paying a per centage.

Art. I. The Arrêté of the Captain-General, of the 15th Fructidor (10th year), which permits the importation of different articles of produce into this colony, in foreign bottoms, paying 10 per cent. duty, is renewed.—II. Foreigners may import into this colony all wares and merchandize not enumerated in the above-mentioned Arrêté, subject to a duty of 20 per cent. *ad valorem.*—III. The Colonial Prefect shall make out every six months a tarif of the value of all the wares and merchandize imported under the 2d article. The duty of 20 per cent. shall be fixed by this tarif.—IV. The importation of goods permitted by the 5th and 2d article of this Arrêté, shall only take place at the Cape, Port Republicain, and the Port of St. Domingo.—V. The present Arrêté shall be in force immediately after its publication.—VI. The Colonial Prefect is charged with the execution of the present Arrêté, which shall be printed, published, and posted up, and inserted in the Official Gazette.—*D. F. N. Rochambeau,* Capt. Gen.

General Boyer, Chief of the Staff of the Army of St. Domingo, to the Minister of Marine and the Colonies.

Head-Quarters at the Cape, 15 Frimaire.

The General in Chief, Citizen Minister, has instructed me to have the honour of informing you of the movements which took place on the 27th of last Brumaire.—At day break the brigands attacked the Mole with a large force. The General of Division, who commands in that quarter, suffered them to approach to the entrance of the place, and when he saw them fairly encompassed by the ambuscade which he had laid for them, he gave orders for a general charge. They then found themselves exposed to two fires, the one from the town, and the other from the exterior line, which General Brunet had masked. The fire was kept up with great spirit, and in a few hours the field of battle was strewed with the bodies of the negroes who had fallen. Among the killed, six of their principal leaders. Not one of their cavalry escaped.—In this affair we lost only eight men.—General Brunet praises highly the courage of all the troops which were engaged, and in a particular manner the intripidity of his Aid-de-Camp, Puton, who received several sabre

wounds, after having killed a number of brigands, with whom he fought hand to hand.—The General in Chief requests the First Consul to present Captain Puton with a sabre of honour.

Napper Tandy to Lord Pelham. (From the Paris Papers.)

My Lord, when we are obliged to take up the pen in defence of our characters, our letters stand in need of no apology. Without fatiguing you, therefore, with any, I shall enter immediately upon the subject ; and as you have thought proper, as well as Ld. Spencer, to bring my name in an indecent manner before the public, I shall begin my defence with the same freedom you have used in attacking me. To say that you have both been wanting in what the rules of decency required, would be the mildest censure your conduct deserves ; with equal reason can I say, that you have violated the laws of justice ; for time alone can discover, what connection there was between the Malt Bill, which was the subject of discussion, and Napper Tandy. Had it not been for one of the assertions you made, I should not have brought the affair before the public, but would have been contented with seeing myself disfigured by your Billingsgate orators, in both Houses ; for there are men, my ld., whose censure is the highest recommendation one can have ; and, I am sincere enough to confess, that, I consider your lordship as worthy of the first rank in this class. You have declared, or the printer for you, that I made discoveries to govt. I assert, that that declaration is false. This may appear to your ears not very civil language ; but it is the voice of truth, and I repeat, my ld., that it is a mean and audacious falsehood. I never had any relation nor correspondence with your govt. ; or if I had, that govt. knew my character too well to attempt to make me temporise. Had you been content with saying, that there were particular circumstances in my case, you would not have swerved from the truth, for you know all, though you have only suffered a part to appear. With respect to my life, I never thought I owed any gratitude to your govt. for it. I owe my life to the great and generous people, to the first of men, to the hero, the pacificator, who said, that if I fell, I should fall with eternal lustre. It is for the cause of that people that I am ready to shed the last drop of my blood. I can recapitulate, with satisfaction, my past life, spent in the service of my country, whilst I look with pity and contempt upon those who, by prostituting themselves, have been raised to the first offices of the state. I am more proud of the name of French citizen, than I should be of the rank of a titled slave. I am, my ld., with the same sentiments I have always entertained and cherished long before I knew you a petty Secretary of the Castle of Dublin, a friend of universal benevolence, and an enemy to those only who build their fortune upon the ruin of their country.

Bourdeaux, 30 *Nivôse*. *Napper Tandy.*

DOMESTIC.

On Monday morning the 21st inst. the sentence of the law was executed on the following traitors, viz. Edward Marcus Despard, John Wood, John Francis, Thomas Broughton, James Sedgwick Wratten, Arthur Graham, and John Macnamara. The execution took place on the top of the New Gaol in the Borough. After hanging about half an hour their heads were severed from their bodies, and the executioner exhibiting them separately to the view of the populace, exclaimed, "This is the head of a Traitor."

TRIAL OF MR. PELTIER.

On Monday, the 21st instant, the justly celebrated MR. PELTIER, was tried before Lord Ellenborough and a Special Jury, on an information, filed by the Attorney-General, for a libel on NAPOLEON BUONAPARTÉ, First Consul of France, which libel was published in a periodical work, entitled L'AMBIGU, of which work MR. PELTIER was the editor and proprietor.

The information having been read, the Hon. Spencer Percival (the Attorney-General) entered, of course, on the arguments in favour of the prosecution. He stated, that the words charged in the information were libellous ; that they had a tendency to stir up sedition and rebellion against Buonaparté, and to cause his assassination ; and that, unless the offence was punished, the peace happily subsisting between England and France, might be interrupted, and that war, bloody and expensive war, might finally ensue. In order to prove that this was no extraordinary proceeding, he cited the instance of Lord George Gordon, who was prosecuted for a libel on the late Queen of France, as also that of JOHN VINT, the Editor of the Courier, who was prosecuted for a libel on the Emperor of Russia.—The caution he threw out with regard to the publishing of an account of the proceedings of the court, in this case, was curious and no less curious than *novel*.—"If," said he, "I could suppose that my learned friend "[meaning Mr. M'Intosh] would lend himself to "the spirit in which these papers are written ; if "he should for a moment think he could serve "his client by a republication of the libel ; if he "were instructed, and thought it consistent with "his duty to go over the same discussions, and "to repeat the declamation and invective of "which we now complain, then, indeed, an extensive field would be opened for his ingenuity "and eloquence. He would have to expatiate "upon the most extraordinary event, of the most "extraordinary occurrence, in the most extraordinary and eventful revolution recorded in the "annals of history. But if no other higher consideration deterred him from pursuing such a "course, the interest of his client would be sufficient for this purpose. *Because I think that this "libel tends to endanger the tranquillity between this "country and a nation with whom we are at peace, I "prosecute the author.* That charge brings me, and "it brings the defendant, this day before you. If "the information is thought well founded—if "you pronounce a verdict of guilty, when the "time comes for apportioning the punishment, "if it appear that by the defendant's instructions, "the first court of justice in the kingdom is made "a vehicle for slander and defamation, all the ill "consequences of the libel are aggravated and "enhanced. I should ill discharge my duty to "the Public, I should ill shew my regard for the "proper administration of the English Laws, if I "did not press upon the Judges TO TAKE CARE "*that a calumny was not increased by the means employed to check it, and* BY THE PUNISHMENT THEY "INFLICTED *to shew*, not only to France, but to "the whole of Europe, that a British Court of

" Justice impartially determines upon the guilt " of those accused, and *is not the means of extended* " *defamation.*"

After the Attorney-General had concluded, and the evidence had been examined, Mr. M'Intosh, one of the council for Mr. Peltier (the other being Mr. Ferguson) entered on the defence, in a speech, which lasted three or four hours, but which contained, relative to the case of Mr. Peltier, very little more, we believe, than what will be found in the following report, which is copied from the *Morning Post.*

My Lord, and Gentlemen of the Jury, I would not so far depart from my duty, or from the respectability of the body to which I belong, as to lend myself to the *passions of any client.* Whatever respect is due by the law to the rulers of any country, that respect shall be paid by me. Nay more, whatever concerns liberty, that dearest and best of all the interests of man, may indeed call forth my warm feelings, but I shall know how to repress these feelings in every instance in which they are not borne out by truth.—My Lord and Gentlemen, I have to intreat your indulgence, beset as I am with topics of so much difficulty. You may, indeed, conceive that having had the presumption to encounter those *difficulties*, I have no title to indulgence in contending with them. *I did not seek them*, but having *unexpectedly* fallen in with them, I will not now turn my back on them: here I found them, and here I will meet and engage them with every exertion of whatever power I possess. Acting on these principles, before an English Jury, I am sure that if my feelings shall, in any instance, betray me into any excessive warmth, my client will not suffer for my error. He *imposed on me* the trust of his defence, and I *could not decline it.* Still less can I betray it, having once undertaken to charge myself with it. He is entitled to a just, faithful, and fearless defence, and he shall have it, so far as it can be afforded by my humble talents, actuated by a warm and honest zeal in the discharge of my duty. *Intrepidity* has been so long used at the *English bar*, that it is unnecessary for me, at this moment, to descant upon it; still less can I claim any merit for acting up to it. I have only to say, that if the bar could have been silenced or overawed by any power whatsoever, no Jury would now be here. That pride and boast of our free constitution could not this day have existed. It is owing to the intrepidity of the bar; that you, gentlemen, are now here to try this cause. It was therefore, perhaps, too much for me to say, that my client should have a fearless defence, in a place, where fear never entered any bosom, but that of a criminal. Yet, surely, if, in any case, a timid feeling could invade a place so fortified against it, it must be in this, where the prosecutor is the master of a great empire, and the defendant a *poor proscribed French emigrant*, compelled to relinquish his country, in 1792, driven out by the daggers of his countrymen. Gentlemen, you recollect that eventful and calamitous period, when our shores were covered with helpless women, and children still more helpless, with priests, strangers to the world, flying from their country, as from a tract overrun with tigers, and seeking in ours a shelter which they did not fail to find. Such of these unhappy fugitives as escaped the scaffold, as survived the trying changes of climates unknown to them, and the multiplied distresses and vexations they had to endure, were recently permitted to revisit their native country. They were *indulged* in the gratification, and a very high gratification it must be, worn out and exhausted with calamity as they were; they were indulged with permission to die at home. I do not meanto undervalue this indulgence; on the contrary, *I am disposed to rate it high*; but my client, and a few others, conceived themselves bound, from a feeling of *loyalty*, which I *neither make the subject of commendation or of blame*, to refuse to profit by this permission. I do not, as I said, make this refusal a matter of *praise or of censure*; I only hope, that you will not judge *too severely* of my client, for what *he conceives* to be a just and honourable *devotion to the allegiance under which he was born.* Consider, gentlemen, that if we ourselves were, by any unforeseen revolution, I trust, and hope, such an event will never happen; but, if such an event were to place us in a state of dependence and *destitution* in a foreign land, we should not wish to be judged *too unfavourably* —— This man, having from his youth devoted himself to literary employments, exerted his talents in the same line here, and produced a variety of works. After the peace, he abstained from all serious politics, and contented himself with the publication of this *obscure* journal before you, which, if the jealousy of power could ever be at rest, appeared under circumstances the least calculated to give disquiet. It could not be read here, for it was not in the language of the country. It could not be read in France, for we do not understand that the police is supine or negligent in the execution of the prohibition against the admission of periodical papers from England. Under these circumstances, this work was issued for the purpose of amusing and consoling the *fellow-sufferers* of Mr. Peltier by occasional reflections on the factions which divide, and the disturbances which agitate the land from which they are exiled. It was intended as a consolation and amusement to them to whom no consolation now remains, but in contemplating the instability of human affairs, and seeing that those by whom they were expelled were often the victims of fortune as well as they. This was the only journal that dared still to speak in favour of a family once the most august in Europe. This court affords an instance of the instability of human grandeur in that family, and it is not a little remarkable that the last instance of a prosecution by the French government, as cited by my learned friend, was for a libel on that Princess who has been since butchered and massacred by her own subjects. I say this not for the purpose of disputing the principle laid down by my learned friend, that no government recognised by our Sovereign is to be libelled with impunity. I agree with him, that in this respect all governments are on the same footing, whether they are governments of yesterday or governments confirmed by a succession of ages. I admit that if Lord Clarendon had published some parts of his history at Paris in the year 1656; if the Marquis of Montrose had published his sonnets there; if Butler had published his Hudibras; and Cowley those works in which he so ably maintained the cause of his King against the Usurper, the president Du Morlaix would have been bound on the complaint of the English Ambassador to prosecute them for libels against a government recognised by France. I mention this, that my client may feel the less repugnance at coming into this his *last asylum upon earth*; and it is, perhaps, *owing to his Majesty's Ministers, that he enjoys even this.* If it be so, I owe them my thanks, for their honourable and dignified conduct, in refusing to violate the hospitality due to an *unfortunate stranger*, who now appears in your presence, as the only place

in which his prosecutor and he can be on equal terms. Certainly, circumstanced as he is, the most *refreshing* prospect which his eye can rest upon, is, an English Jury, and he feels with me, gratitude to the Ruler of empires, that, after the wreck of every thing else, ancient and venerable in Europe; of all established forms and acknowledged principles; of all long subsisting laws and sacred institutions; we are met here, administering justice after the manner of our forefathers, in this her ancient sanctuary. Here then parties come to judgment; one the master of the greatest empire on the earth; and the other, a *weak defenceless fugitive*, who *waves his privilege of having half his Jury composed of foreigners, and puts himself, with confidence, upon a Jury entirely English.*—Gentlemen, there is another view in which this case is highly interesting, important, and momentous; and, I confess, I am animated to every exertion that I can make, not more by a sense of my duty to my client, than by a persuasion that this cause is the first of a series of contests with the freedom of the press. My learned friend, I am sure, will never disgrace his magistracy, by being instrumental to a measure so calamitous; but viewing this as I do, as the first of a series of contests between the greatest power on earth, and the *only* press that is now free, I cannot help calling on him and you to pause before the great earthquake swallow up all our freedom that remains among men, for though *no indication has yet been made of a disposition to attack the freedom of the press in this country*, yet the many other countries that have been deprived of this benefit, must forcibly impress us with the propriety of, looking vigilantly to ourselves. Holland, Switzerland, and the Imperial towns participated with us the benefit of a free press. Holland and Switzerland are now no more, and near fifty of the free Imperial towns of Germany have vanished, since the commencement of this prosecution."—Here Mr. Mackintosh drew an interesting picture of the former state of these free towns, exempted from the burthens of military establishments, and respected amidst the contentions of greater powers; they had leisure for observation, and reflection on what was passing around them.—They formed a respectable portion of that mass of public opinion, which was the law of powers, who acknowledge no other controul. He could not contemplate a more *interesting* spectacle than the *little Republic of Geneva*, cultivating literature and science at the gates of the immense empire of Louis XIV. *undisturbed and unthreatened.* All this, said he, is gone; what may be the new order of things, *it is not for me to say*, but, I declare it to be my firm persuasion, that the total absence of all schemes of oppression, ever since the days of Louis XIV. has been *owing to the freedom of discussion*, which has, till lately, prevailed in most countries of Europe. If silence was observed at home upon such projects, 100 presses in foreign countries circulated them, and rendered them detestable throughout Europe. Tyranny dreaded to make any arbitrary stretches as long as there existed a free press, because no power was above its censure. Now that all this is gone, there is no longer any controul but what this country affords. Every press on the continent, from Palermo to Hamburgh, is enslaved; one place only remains where discussion is free, protected by our government and our constitution. It is an awefully proud consideration that this noble fabric, raised by our ancestors, still stands undecayed amidst the ruins that surround us.———You are the advanced guard of liberty, permit me, therefore, to remind you of some of the principles on which our ancestors acted with respect to foreign powers in cases like the present. Here Mr. Mackintosh stated the law not to be defined exactly, so as to ascertain the limits that distinguished history and fair observation from libel. It was left to Juries to determine, in every single instance, by the malicious intention that may appear in the publication, and this confidence so reposed by the legislature, had never once been abused *since the revolution.* Political libel, he said, was different from all others; in cases of common libel, the severity of the punishment only struck terror into those who meditated guilt. But in cases of political libel, even a just punishment had the effect of deterring well-disposed men from discussion; as it was difficult for them to know how far discussion and history would permit them to go, and when they overstepped the limit. Thus, the best services that could be rendered to mankind were discouraged. It was on this principle that our ancestors were always tender in repressing discussions relative to foreign powers. Ever since our ancestors had the wisdom to abandon all notion of continental conquest, we had no views on the continent but such as arose out of a regard to our safety and the promotion of our commerce. The first and most important consideration of safety depended on the maintenance of justice and the preservation of nations in the enjoyment of their rights. When justice was thus violated, the safety that arose out of it and depended on it, was rendered insecure, and it was material to observe and discuss every violation in order to check and prevent all excessive and dangerous aggrandisement. The interest of our commerce was a secondary consideration, but a material one, as the object was highly beneficial, not only to us but to the nations with which we traded, and to the whole world, in as much as it brought *additional hands to labour*, brought *new lands into cultivation*, and supplied *fresh pleasures to man.* It was therefore, most material, that a spirit of free discussion should exist, and be encouraged, for the purpose of checking all violations of rights; and whatever the enemies of this country may say, the advantage of this attention to continental affairs had been attended with the most beneficial effects to the powers of the continent. This island had been foremost to resist every inordinate and unjust project, and, on all such occasions, had stood in the front of *battles not her own.* ——It was the happiness of this country, that the lowest individual had a right to discuss the public measures of his time, and though it may in some instances be conceived that this was injurious in times of domestic dissension, it could not be denied that it was always beneficial when applied to foreign affairs. Here Mr. Mackintosh went into the particulars of M. Peltier's publication, extending the liberty of historical discussion to the detail, not only of events, but of the probable causes and consequences of these events. Mr. Peltier was at liberty to detail the views of the factions into which the French republic was divided, and for this purpose to republish the writings of these factions. It was even justifiable in him to expose the principles of these factions, by writing in their spirit, and imputing to them expressions deducible from their principles. *It was very likely that Chenier did, in fact, write the ode given under his name*, and in that case, even though it should be severe and libellous on Buonaparté, could it be called a libel in Mr. Peltier, to republish it here? If it was, why were the English newspapers suffered every

day for ten years back to republish volumes of abuse and calumny vented against this nation and its government in the French journals, and lately, in a stile particularly malignant and atrocious, in the official journal, the Moniteur? No criminality was by any person supposed to attach to the newspapers, because there was no criminal intention in the republication, which was made only with a view to excite the detestation and horror necessarily consequent to such flagitious abuse of our national character and our government. Why pass over the republication of an article in which a most gallant officer was charged with exciting to assassination, and why suffer English newspapers to republish, without any imputation of a crime, the most infamous libels on a prince who had passed through a reign of 43 years, beloved and respected by his people, and without a single stain on his character? Why suffer the repetition of the most atrocious calumnies on a nation, whose history afforded the extraordinary phenomena of mutinies without murder, mobs without massacre, and civil wars and revolutions without assassination? Why suffer the republication of articles, in which the garter, the badge of the conquerors of Cresse and Poictiers, and of so many successive generations of heroes, was stated to be designed to reward an assassin for executing his horrible design? On the same principle, that the English newspapers were, in all these cases, innocent and unaccused, Peltier was equally innocent in this publication. If it was in fact only the republication of the work of another writer, the republication was certainly blameless; and if it was even written by Mr. Peltier, with a view to give a dramatic character of the faction, by putting its principles in their natural language in the mouths of its leaders, he was equally innocent; or if there was any crime, it was a libel against Chenier or Ginguenet, to whom the article was imputed, and not against the First Consul. It was natural to think that a remnant of the Jacobin faction still existed in France; it was known that it did exist, and it was the nature of that faction to seek a refuge from the maledictions of those whom it had formerly oppressed and tortured in the resumption of its former power. The faction was active, and such a piece as this ode might well be among the means it employed. Mr. M. having, in the course of this last argument used the *word republican* in a sense which may *appear to convey some censure*, explained; he did not use the term as meaning *Citizens of Republican Governments*, many of which he *respected*, and particularly *a new Republic of British growth*. Neither did he mean it as any imputation on those *whose political opinions favoured a republican form of government*, but as a just sarcasm on those pretended republicans of France who used the name to cover the worst and most fatal hostility *to freedom*. It could not be that M. Peltier wrote this seriously for the purpose of promoting the royal cause. It would be madness in him to call upon the French citizens of the present day to avenge the cause of Rewbell and Barras, the worst enemies of royalty. If he could seriously address such language to French citizens for such a purpose, he was a much fitter object for a commission of lunacy than of a prosecution for libel; and this madness was rendered still more outrageous by adding to the council the name of the most declared and decided enemy of the party to which it was addressed. It may indeed come within the policy of a royalist to excite republicans to insurrection, with a view to profit by their broils; but if such a royalist meant not to defeat his own purpose, he would conceal his name. It was however evident, from the context, that the Ode in question was not the work of M. Peltier. It appeared from the passage already cited, and of which a poetical translation had been read, that it was written by a fanatical republican, once hostile to England, now a little corrected in his judgment, but not yet perfectly reconciled: it speaks of the people resting on the law, resisting and setting at defiance the exertion of regal power; this certainly could not be mentioned with praise by the Royalist, Peltier. My learned friend, said Mr. M. cannot forget that Swift did not mean, by his arguments in defence of Atheism, really to support that doctrine; but, on the contrary, by that unrivalled specimen of irony, to ridicule and shame all such unprincipled tenets. Such were the motives of Butler for putting such odious sentiments in the mouths of Hudibras and his squire, and such were Peltier's for putting such sentiments as in some places he did put into the mouths of the jacobins. Not that even they, bad as they are, *can be suspected*, BY ME, *of any design so shocking to human nature as assassination*: and I own I am surprised to hear my Learned Friend say so seriously, that any allusion to the apotheosis of Romulus, or to the affair of Brutus and Cæsar, must necessarily have such a shocking and abominable object, as if these events, so much the themes of school-boy declamation, were not too familiar to excite any extraordinary propensity to imitation.—With respect to that part of the paper which alluded to the assassination of Cæsar, Mr. M. denied that when that event was spoken of, every man who used it, intended to recommend or justify assassination. He stated a variety of cases, in which that event had been alluded to in many authors who were never suspected of a wish to excite the commission of assassination. Nor could it be more safely inferred from the allusion to the apotheosis in use among the Romans. It might be that a man, disgusted with the numerous addresses which had been poured from all quarters, might fairly say, I even wish him the apotheosis as soon as he can have it; many of the Roman Emperors received the honours of a divinity, and yet lived; their apotheosis did not necessarily imply their death. He next adverted to the imputation of free discussion, and elucidated this part of his argument by precedents drawn from our own history. At the time when Queen Elizabeth, that wise and patriotic Princess, was beset around with formidable enemies, a powerful faction in the heart of her kingdom, and no resources but in her own mind, she, and it was a curious piece of history, *published the first newspaper*. Her Gazettes were still preserved, and by means of that dissemination of public opinion she *roused the feelings of her subjects to a pitch equal to withstand any attempts that could be made upon them*. Since that period newspapers had multiplied, and discussion had become more extended. During the reign of Louis XIV. who had formed the most gigantic plans of *guilty ambition*, he who attacked a free nation merely for his glory; he who had made subservient to his interests the GUILTY and INFAMOUS *Prince* who then *governed* England—yet his conduct was most freely canvassed. Nor did a venal court *dare* stop the inquiry and investigation of free minds, even when a Jefferies disgraced the bench which his Lordship adorns, nor even then did a venal judge and a corrupt court *dare* attack *the freedom of the press*. In latter times, to come to the partition of Poland: did that *infamous transaction* and *public robbery* pass without examination and

censure? We loudly spoke our indignation, though the *robbers* were our *great allies*; but our free presses spoke of them, not as according to the greatness of the characters, but according to the greatness of their crimes. He would put it to the Attorney General to say, what would have been his conduct if we had been at peace with France during part of the awful crisis which had convulsed her. When Robespierre presided over the Committee of Public Safety, was not an Englishman to canvass his measures? supposing we had then been at peace with France, would the Attorney General have filed an information against any one who had expressed due abhorrence of the furies of that sanguinary monster? When Marat demanded 250,000 heads in the convention, must we have contemplated that request without speaking of it in the terms it provoked? When Carrier placed 500 children in a square at Lyons to fall by the musquetry of the soldiery, and from their size the balls passed over them, the little innocents flew to the knees of the soldiery for protection, when they were butchered with the bayonet. In relating this event, must man restrain his just indignation, and stifle the expression of indignant horror which such a dreadful massacre must excite? Would the Attorney General in his information state, "when Maximilian Robespierre was first magistrate of France, as President of the Committee of Safety, that those who spoke of him as his crimes deserved, did it with a wicked and malignant intention to defame and vilify him." The only restraint upon great criminals was, the public opinion; and to weaken the expression of that opinion was, in a great degree, to let loose the passions of the great, to prey on the weak and defenceless. He would again put the case of that Swiss patriot, descended from the hero of Switzerland; he, whose ancestor supported the liberties of his country; who conquered that pile 300 years ago, he of late had endeavoured ineffectually to defend. If he were to come to this country, the only asylum now left upon earth; if he were here to weep over the ruins of his country, must he be told that he must deplore his fate in silence; that he might groan deep, but it must not be loud? Better by far would it be that we should at once revert to a state of absolute barbarism, than thus have our feelings paralysed to all moral distinctions. He hoped and trusted that a British Jury would never be a party to such purposes. They never had done it, and in former times, when *all other parts of the state* had been *corrupted*, juries yet maintained their virtue and their independence. In the days of Cromwell, he twice sent a satirist upon his government to be tried by a jury, who sat where the jury then did. The scaffold on which the blood of the Monarch was shed, was still in their view. The clashing of the bayonets which turned out the Parliament, were within heir hearing, yet they maintained their integrity, and twice did they send his Attorney General out of Court with disgrace and defeat."

The Attorney-General replied to the arguments of Mr. M'Intosh. Lord Ellenborough shortly addressed the Jury, who, after consulting together for the space of a minute, pronounced the defendant *Guilty*. The trial lasted seven hours.—*A Correct Report of this Trial, will be given, at length, in our Supplement to Vol. III.*

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Thursday, Feb. 17.—Lords.—Bank Restriction Bill read a first time.

Friday, Feb. 18.—Lords.—A second Report was made from the committee appointed to re-examine the Lists delivered in, of Peers to form the Board of East India Judicature.—Lord Pelham moved for the production of an account of the outstanding Exchequer Bills, &c. at certain periods about the beginning of the late war.

Saturday, Feb. 19.—Commons.—The Speaker took the chair at ½ past three; 106 members were present, and the House proceeded to a ballot for a committee to try the merit of certain contested elections, but only 43 qualified members were found. The House was then moved to adjourn to Monday, but previously to the adjournment, Mr. Addington said, that there was a necessity to have recourse to the power vested in the House, by the Act of the 36th of his present Majesty, to order an immediate call. After moving the reading of the proceedings of April 28, 1797, which were read accordingly, he then moved, that the House should be called on Monday, and the names of all those members who did not attend should be set aside for consideration on a future day, when on sufficient excuses not being given, the members so unexcused should be taken into custody by the Serjeant at Arms.

Monday, Feb. 22.—Lords.—Pursuant to the orders on a former day, the following accounts were laid before the House, viz. An account of the number of Bank notes in circulation on the 25th day of every month in the last year, ending the 25th of of Jan. 1803 inclusive; also the number in circulation on the 1st day of June, Aug. Oct. 1802, and 1st. of Feb. 1803, distinguishing those under 5 l.—An account of the standard prices of Bullion at different periods of the last year.—An account of the produce of the consolidated fund, with the sums chargeable thereon.

Commons.—A call of the House took place pursuant to notice. Mr. Addington made the usual motions in cases of a call of the House, for taking absent members into custody, &c.; and also moved that such members as were serving upon committees, should be exempted from the effects of non-attendance in consequence of the call of the House.—The Sheriffs of London presented a petition from the corporation of London, setting forth that Bethlem Hospital was in a ruinous state, and praying that it might be taken down and a new building erected in its stead. The House ballotted for a committee to try the petition against the election for Coventry, and also for Bridgewater.—Sir W. Elford moved "that a select committee be appointed to inquire into the causes of the dismission of Mr. Marshall, and into other circumstances connected with his removal."—As this motion was not seconded, the House proceeded to other business.—The Bill for disqualifying Revenue Officers in Ireland from voting at Elections was read a second time.—Petitions were presented from the merchants of Grenada praying for pecuniary aid; from the Corporation of Bristol, for the repair of the Harbour of that City; and from the Shoe-makers, Sadlers, and other Manufactures of leather, praying that the laws relative to the dressing of skins, should extend 15 miles round London.

Tuesday, Feb. 22.—Lords.—The Duke of Montrose moved an address to his Majesty on the occasion of his providential escape from the machination of designing traitors. The motion was seconded by Earl Camden; the address was then read, and passed *nem. diss.* (For the tenor of the address, see proceedings of the Commons.)—Certain accounts from the Bank, relative to the Bank

Restriction Bill were presented.—Bank-restriction Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—Bill for erecting a New Poor-house in the Parish of St. Pancras, read a first time.—Lord Euston moved, "That an humble Address "be presented to his Majesty, offering to his Ma- "jesty our most heart-felt congratulations upon "the detection and frustrating of one of the most "detestable Plots that the wickedness of mis- "guided individuals could conspire to imagine. "A conspiracy, that whilst it afforded additional "proofs of the mischiefs of those detestable prin- "ciples, was equally destructive of all practical, "moral, civil, and religious liberty: that his "Majesty's faithful Commons, feeling sincerely "the importance of this discovery, hasten to as- "sure his Majesty, as well in their own name as "in that of all the Commons of Great Britain, "that they are determined to support with their "lives and all that is dear to them, the Govern- "ment and Constitution, firm and unchanged, to "the latest posterity."—Lord Boyle seconded the motion.—Leave was given to bring in a Bill to regulate the process in the Irish Courts of Law, and assimilate them to those of England.—Mr. Alexander brought up the Report of the Committee of Expiring Laws.—The Militia Training Bill passed through a Committe.—Dublin Royal Canal Bill read a second time.

From the London Gazette, Feb. 19, 1803.—At the Court at St. James's, the 16th of Feb. 1803, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.—This day the Right Hon. John Hiley Addington, was, by his Majesty's command, sworn of his Majesty's most Hon. Privy Council, and took his place at the Board accordingly.—His Majesty in Council was this day pleased to appoint.—J. W. Commeren, of Strood, Esq. to be Sheriff of the County of Sussex, instead of W. Margesson, of Offington, Esq.—H. E. Boates, of Rose-Hill, Esq. to be Sheriff of the County of Denbigh, instead of Lord W. Beauclerk, of Bathafern Park.—J. Forbes, of Ofnbodig, Esq. to be Sheriff of the County of Merioneth, instead of H. O. Hatchet, of Carrygadell, Esq.

This day Mr. De Lima, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, had an audience of leave of his Majesty.—And the Chevalier De Soussa Coutinho, his successor in the same character, had a private audience of His Majesty, to deliver his credentials.

St. James's, Feb. 16, 1803.—*Ceremonial of the Knighthood and Investiture of Major General, John Francis Cradock, Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.*—The Knights, and the Officers of the Order, attended in the Privy Chamber in their Mantles, Collars, &c. and proceeded from thence, after the Levee, into the Sovereign's presence.—Then, by his Majesty's command, Major-General John Francis Cradock was introduced into the presence between Sir Hector Munro and Sir William Fawcett, preceded by the Register and Secretary.—The Sword of State was thereupon delivered to the Sovereign by Sir William Hamilton, and Major-General John Francis Cradock, kneeling, was knighted therewith. Then his Royal Highness the Duke of York, the senior Knight, presented the Ribbon and Badge to the Sovereign, and his Majesty put them over the new Knight's right shoulder, who, being thus invested, had the honour to kiss the Sovereign's hand.—This ceremony was performed in his Majesty's closet, several of the great officers of the court, and Foreign Ministers being present.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPER.

Sentence of the Court Royal of Jersey, against two Printers of that Island, for having copied Paragraphs from the London Papers, reflecting upon the French Government.

Actions having been commenced, by the King's Attorney-General, against Jean Stead and Ph. Mourant, and they being ordered to take their trial upon a representation of the said Attorney-General, stating, that the newspaper, printed weekly by the said Jean Stead, and entitled *Gazette de Jersey*, and the newspaper also printed weekly, entitled *La Gazette de l'Isle de Jersey*, by Ph. Mourant, had for some time past, contained observations and reflexions injurious to the French Government, and tending to disturb the peace and friendship subsisting between His Britannic Majesty and the French Republic:

And the said Jean Stead and Ph. Mourant having been heard, by their counsel, it does appear that the offensive articles, printed by the abovementioned persons, which gave rise to the prosecution, have been extracted from the newspapers printed at London, and that neither the defendants nor any persons employed by them, had written any of the objectionable paragraphs: Notwithstanding which, the Court conceive it to be their duty, to declare their entire disapprobation of every species of injury or insult against the constituted authorities of established and acknowledged governments; and, furthermore, they enjoin the said editors, for the future, to insert nothing in their Journals, in any degree tending to disturb the good understanding subsisting between the inhabitants of this island and the countries with which His Britannic Majesty is at peace.

JEAN DE VEULLE, *Clerk of the said Court.*

Given this 5th day of Feb. in the year 1803.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

In a week so abundant in important political occurrences, we must lament that *indisposition* should prevent us from contributing our mite of information. We cannot, however, refrain from saying a few words on two or three topics: and first, on the *execution of the traitors.* While the fate of these men was pending, while it was possible that any thing said by us might, though in the slightest and most distant manner, affect their lives, we uttered not a syllable with respect to them, even when we heard their pardon demanded, in no very inaudible and unintelligible terms, and in more than one of the daily papers. Now, however, we think it our right and our duty to express a sincere satisfaction, not that seven men have been put to death, not even that seven traitors have suffered the punishment due to their crime, but that, in this example, a rampart has been formed round the sacred person of our sovereign, whose precious life has been heretofore so often attempted with audacious impunity. —To all, and to every one, concerned in this most important transaction; to those who detected the crime, those who brought

the criminals to justice, those who condemned them, those who ordered their execution, and to those who fulfilled the dreadful behests of the law; to all, and particularly to the ministry, great and unqualified praise is due. To say that they have done no more than their duty, is, indeed, to say the truth; but, it was a most arduous duty; it was one, on the due performance of which, the very existence of the Monarch and the Monarchy depended; it was a duty that some men would not have performed; the ministers have performed it, and they are entitled to the lasting gratitude of the country.—It is worthy of remark, that *three* out of these seven traitors were of that mischievous plotting sect, denominated *Methodists*. Mr. Rowland Hill (brother of Sir Richard Hill) has, it seems, thought proper publicly to deny, that any of these traitors belonged to his flock, and, at the same time, to inform the world, that he is a regularly ordained clergyman, and *no methodist*. We cry the Rev. Gentleman's mercy, for we really took him to be that very same person, who is to be heard bawling, for hours, at a stretch, every Sunday night, in a large round-a-bout meeting-house, at the foot of Black Friar's Bridge. Be this fact as it may, the traitors were methodists, and had a "teacher" of that sect to attend them in their last moments. Despard appears to have been a settled atheist; so that, of those who had any sense of religion, of any sort, the methodists made exactly *one half*: no bad criterion of the *loyalty* of those dark and dangerous fanatics, who are, by means of a system of affiliation the most complete that ever was imagined, extending their principles into the bosom of every poor-man's family in the kingdom. At the very out-set of our labours, we thought it our duty (See Vol. I. p. 176) to caution the rich and the well-informed against inadvertantly lending their aid to the artful leaders of this sect, who, under the specious guise of humanity, were endeavouring to root out from amongst the common people, all those rural and athletic sports, which were so well calculated to instil into their minds honour, generosity, and a love of glory. We compared these puritans of the present day to those of the reign of Charles I. and we concluded by lamenting, that "too many of the rulers of "this land are now hunting the common "people from every scene of diversion, and "driving them to a club or a conventicle, at "the former of which they suck in the de-"licious rudiments of earthly equality, and, "at the latter, the no less delicious doctrine, "that there is no *lawful king but king Je-"sus*."—Mr. Polwhele, to whom the country is very much indebted, has, in his anecdotes of methodism, given some most shocking proofs of the bloody-mindedness of these people; and, if there be a subject, which, above all others, demands the immediate attention of Parliament, it is that of the methodistical affiliation, which, as we have just observed, is extending its baleful influence into every cottage in the kingdom, implanting, wherever it goes, a rooted enmity to the Church and the State.

Of MR. PELTIER'S trial we have much to say hereafter. In the mean time we beg leave to refer the reader to Mr. M'Intosh's speech (p. 277); and if he pays attention to the passages, which we have marked by Italick characters, he will readily conceive, that it will not pass without comment from us.

But our readers will find, by a reference to page 286, that Mr. Peltier is not the only gentleman who has, already, been prosecuted for libels, by order of Buonaparté. We this morning received, from our correspondent at Jersey, the sentence of the Court Royal of Jersey against two printers of that Island, for having copied paragraphs from the London papers, reflecting upon the French Government. We shall present our readers with some observations on this interesting subject in our next.

From the information, which we have received, within this day or two, we should not be at all surprized, if the "*safe* politicians" were upon the eve of making some other sacrifice to the preservation of peace; for, as to their going to war, the thing is absolutely out of the question. They know, that the country would not leave a war in their hands for a single hour; and, they are firmly resolved to keep their places.

NOTICES.

The Letter to LORD ST. VINCENT will appear next week.—A Long Article from "AN ENGLISHMAN" has not yet been read; but shall be attended to in a few days.

A Correspondent, who has been so good as to point out to us certain parts of what he happily enough calls Mr. M'Intosh's "*invincible* speech," may be assured that we shall not overlook them. We do, indeed, intend to take the liberty, next week, of addressing a letter to Mr. M'Intosh on this subject. In the mean time we would beg leave to caution the Morning Post to be moderate in its puffs; for, the higher a thing rises the lower it may possibly fall.

LONDON,

TO JAMES MAC INTOSH, ESQ.

SIR,—The trial of MR. PELTIER, on which public expectation has dwelt for so long a time, has, at last, terminated in a manner contrary to the wishes of every man, who entertains a just dread of the all-devouring influence of France. To say, that you could have prevented the conviction, would, perhaps, be going too far. It is, generally speaking, very unreasonable to blame an advocate for the loss of a cause; but, when that advocate is praised, when his defence is publicly extolled as the most able that a court and jury ever listened to, such praise, if suffered to pass unquestioned, operates as an additional accusation against the person whom it could not preserve, and as a strong presumptive proof of the fair and honourable motives of his prosecutor; to a juridical condemnation it does, in fact, add a condemnation by the voice of the world. With a hope of being able to afford MR. PELTIER some little shelter against this latter species of condemnation, I have now taken up the pen.

But, before I proceed to an examination of your defence, it is proper to cite some of the encomiastic publications, to which I have alluded. At the head of your speech, as given in the Morning Post, and as copied, verbatim, by me, were the following words: —"Mr. Mac Intosh made a speech of three "hours, which for eloquence, feeling, ex- "tent, and variety of information, inge- "nuity, and depth of argument, was equal "to any thing that the court has ever "witnessed. The following out-line con- "veys nearly all that was *material to Mr.* "*Peltier's case.*"—At the end of the speech were these words:—"The learned counsel "concluded his speech, which lasted for "three hours. We confess our *inability*" [modest people!] "even to give a *just* "*character* of it. For profound and exten- "sive political knowledge it was superior "to any we ever heard in Westminster "Hall. It was truly a torrent of eloquence, "which seized the hearers, and bore them "away with its impetuosity."—Then again, in the same print, of the 24th instant:— "The speech of Mr. Mac Intosh, on Mr. "Peltier's trial, is a theme of admiration "in all companies. So much information, "eloquence, and reasoning, have seldom "been displayed in a court of law."—The True Briton of the 25th instant has the following:—"The neat speech of Mr. Mac "Intosh was so distinguished by genius, "knowledge, and eloquence, that it will "be his own fault *if he does not rise to the* "*highest distinction at the English bar.*"—More is useless, or I could add half a score other of the most disgusting puffs that ever disgraced even the columns of the London newspapers.

Now, Sir, I have read this speech with very great attention; and, without having the presumption to attempt what the Morning Post (which has the advantage of belonging to a *near relation of yours*) has openly confessed its inability to do; without supposing myself able to describe, with suitable sublimity, that which is here represented as having blinded the world with its brilliancy, I shall, nevertheless, venture to approach it, to look into its several parts, and to determine for myself what it really and truly possesses, whether of merit or of defect. And here, I think it necessary to premise, that I do not hold myself bound to consider it as an historical sketch of the balance of power, nor as a treatise on trade and commerce, nor as a lecture on metaphysics, nor as a general eulogium on the typographical art, nor, in short, as any thing but that which it professes to be, and which it ought to have been, a defence of MR. PELTIER against the charges alleged in the information. Viewing it in this light, and in this light only, there are four distinct points, which present themselves for examination. The defence is to be considered relative, 1. To the general character of your cause and of your client; 2. To the precedents on which the prosecution was founded; 3. To the principle which gave rise to those precedents; and, 4. To the application of that principle to the present case.

1. As to the general character of your cause and of your client.—It appears to me, Sir, that the first object of an advocate ought to be, to give to the jury, if possible, a prepossession in favour, not only of his

cause, but also of the general character and conduct of his client. If the case be so desperate as to render the accomplishment of this object utterly impossible, it is, then, wise to refrain from attempting it; but, in no case, however palpably bad, and however heinous the crime, can it, in my opinion, be proper to make any admissions of a contrary tendency. Upon this principle, which I have never heard controverted, it is, that I cannot applaud the opening of your defence.

After a high eulogium on that intrepidity, by which the British Bar had been distinguished, and of which intrepidity you were, one would have hoped, about to give so striking and memorable an instance, you began your defence of MR. PELTIER with an ill-boding acknowledgment of the numerous *difficulties*, which you had to encounter, and, as a proof of your sincerity, in this respect, you added an explicit declaration, that if you could have avoided these difficulties, you would not have encountered them. The words ascribed to you by the Morning Post are these:—"You "may, indeed, conceive that having had "the presumption to encounter those *difficulties*, I have no title to indulgence in "contending with them. *I did not seek* "*them*, but having *unexpectedly fallen in with* "*them*, I will not now turn my back on "them: here I found them, and here I "will meet and engage them with every "exertion of whatever power I possess. "Acting on these principles, before an "English jury, I am sure that if my feelings shall, in any instance, betray me into "any excessive warmth, my client will not "suffer for my error. He *imposed* on me "the trust of his defence, and *I could not* "*decline it.*" Which was, certainly, as much as to say, that you would have declined it if you could. It is common, I believe, for advocates, who are, either *ex officio* or otherwise, charged with the defence of persons, who are accused of what the law justly calls infamous and horrid crimes, and whose guilt is manifest; it may be common, in such cases, which seem to communicate a sort of contamination to every one at all concerned in them, to apologize to the court and jury for having undertaken the cause. Even this, however, does not seem to be quite just; for, every man is, in a court of justice, to be presumed innocent, until he is legally found, and declared to be, guilty; and, if this presumption ought to exist, in full force, in the minds of others, nothing surely ought to be said to impair it by the sworn defender of the person accused. But, whatever excuse there may be for the timidity of advocates engaged in causes of this sort, it will not, I am certain, by any man of sense, be found applicable to that of MR. PELTIER; yet, it would be difficult to imagine, how you could have been more shy, how you could have disowned a cause more explicitly, how you could have testified greater anxiety to apologize for the defence you were about to make, if your client had stood charged, on the clearest evidence, of the blackest, the foulest, the most detestable and most horrid of crimes. The defender of Despard himself could not have exhibited stronger marks of conscious disgrace. You "did "not seek" the cause, it was "imposed" on you, and you "could not decline it." Suppose this to be true. It is the business of an advocate to defend causes which he does not seek; and, indeed, though I will not, with the ill natured Dean, compare a brief hunting lawyer to a street-walking beauty, I must avow my belief, that a lawyer of worth will be almost as reluctant as a woman of virtue to make the first advance. With regard to the liberty, which a practising advocate has of refusing to undertake a cause, there may be some difference of opinion; but, when once he has undertaken it, whether from friendship, from interest, or from a sense of the obligation imposed on him by his profession, he is by no means at liberty to injure it, in any manner, or for any purpose whatever, particularly for that of gratifying any feelings of his own. It is, indeed, possible to suppose a case of *absolute force*. We have all heard of an admiral, who, being in great need of a court of vice-admiralty, sent out his cruizers, actually captured a judge upon the high seas, brought him in, and set him instantly to the glorious work of adjudication. Compulsion like this might justify an apology on the part of the learned person here spoken of, just upon the same principle that a pressed-man always thinks himself at liberty to desert; but, I know of nothing short of the use compulsion, of actual physical force, or, at least, of a threat against life or limb, that can possibly justify an advocate in disowning a cause which he has once undertaken.—Very different, however, very different indeed, was the situation, in which you stood, with regard to the cause of MR. PELTIER. You will, doubtless, anticipate what I am now going to say, and I assure you I feel no other pleasure in saying it, than that which arises from an act of justice done towards an injured and oppressed individual.—You *could* have declined the defence of MR. PELTIER; it was *not* IMPOSED on you: nay,

Sir, you did *seek* this defence, you did actually *ask for it*, you did earnestly *solicit* to be employed by the very person whom you represented as having *imposed* his defence upon you in such a way that *you could not decline it!* Nor was this application made, on your part, in a manner easily to be forgotten. It was by letter, by a letter written with your own hand, and in your own name, that you asked for this cause; and, lest the application to MR. PELTIER (to whom you were an utter stranger), should fail of success, you backed it by another letter to MR. DULAU, of Soho Square, through whom you obtained an introduction to your intended client. MR. PELTIER had never known you; I do not believe that he had ever heard of you; you took him totally by surprize; you fastened on him in a way that rendered it next to impossible for him to disentangle himself: in short, the very reverse of your statement is true: you *sought* the defence of Mr. Peltier, you *imposed* yourself on him, and he could not, without absolute rudeness, decline your officious interference!

Having thought it right to begin your defence with an apology for undertaking it, the general character and leading principles of your client naturally enough presented themselves as the next objects of degradation. Accordingly you represent MR. PELTIER as the publisher of an "*obscure* journal." You call him "a *poor*, "*proscribed*, French emigrant;" a person in "a state of *dependence* and *destitution*;" an "*unfortunate stranger*;" a "*weak*, *defenceless* "*fugitive*."—Is this the way, Sir, for an advocate to maintain the character of his client? Was this a likely way to efface the imputations cast on MR. PELTIER by the charges of the information? Was this picture a true one? Was your client so poor, so mean, so wretched a caitiff as to have no hope but what was built on *compassion*, on that most weak and most short-lived of all the feelings of the human breast? MR. PELTIER, is no *stranger*, Sir, in England; no, nor in any other country where literature is known. MR. PELTIER is not so much a stranger in England as you are, Sir; and, as to the rest of the world, there is not a day, when he is not spoken of with admiration by thousands upon thousands, who never have heard, and never will hear, the name of Mac Intosh pronounced. Mr. Peltier was amongst the very first to oppose the destructive principles of the French revolution, and, had there been only a few such men, a very small number, those principles never would have prevailed. Brissot, in speaking of the *Actes des Apôtres* (one of the first of Mr. Peltier's works), declared that it had done more harm to the republican cause than all the armies of the allies. This gentleman had, at the moment when he honoured you with his defence, been fifteen years engaged, most earnestly engaged, without an hour's relaxation or repose, in the cause of royalty against republicanism, of social order against anarchy, of religion against blasphemy. In the progress of these his most laudable endeavours he had written, translated, and compiled, nearly a hundred octavo volumes, every part of which had had an immense circulation, and the whole must have produced in the world a considerable portion of that effect, which has obtained, for this country, a respite, at least, from destruction. He attacked the revolutionary monster with every species of weapon, reason, eloquence, and ridicule. That this last is not usually the least efficacious has been but too amply proved by Voltaire, who employed it as successfully for a bad purpose as Mr. Peltier has done for a good one. In the use of this weapon the latter has been particularly happy, and, in the midst of all his millions of pleasantries, he never has, notwithstanding the great haste in which many of his pieces must have passed from his pen to the public eye; he never has, in all his voluminous writings let fall one sentence calculated to encourage or to excuse vice of any sort: his wit has always been held in due subordination to virtue and religion. As a striking and most honourable proof of the great talents and sound principles of MR. PELTIER, I shall here cite the testimonial given, no longer ago than the 16th instant, under the hand and seal of His Royal Highness the Prince of Condé.—"The attachment which MR. PELTIER has "constantly shewn in his writings, to the "person of the unfortunate Lewis the "XVIth, as well as to the persons of his "legitimate successors; his zeal and his "energy in defending, from the commencement of the revolution, the cause of "kings, of social order, and the true constitution of France, do honour, in our "opinion, to his talents and his courage, "and entitle him to peculiar claims on the "gratitude of the House of Bourbon: for "this reason, we hereby grant him the "present testimonial of our special esteem, "and authorize him to produce it wherever it can be serviceable to him; desiring that those persons to whom it shall "be presented, will consider it as the expression of our personal regard for Mr. "Peltier, and a tribute of justice to his "fidelity to his legitimate sovereign, as

" well as to the ardour of his invariable " attachment to the most sacred of duties." —This testimonial, Sir, you had in your possession before you went into court; it was, perhaps, in your pocket at the very moment that you were representing your client as the most wretched of mortals. I do not know how you may value a testimonial like this: perhaps not very highly: but, I am persuaded, that every man unadulterated by the new-fangled doctrines, and particularly every sincere royalist, will regard it as an honour, which ought not to have been overlooked by MR. PELTIER's advocate.—It is not the Bourbons only, however, who owe a debt of gratitude to MR. PELTIER. He has laboured in the cause of the British as well as that of the French monarchy. During the last war he wrote and translated hundreds of pieces for the government here. He was the ablest as well as the most faithful writer which that government ever employed, and he rendered it the most effectual service. One of his last acts of this sort was, if I am not misinformed, a translation of that famous speech, wherein MR. PITT described the character of *the Child and Champion of Jacobinism*, and which speech, by the help of MR. PELTIER, was sent, in sprightly and elegant French, to every court in Europe! And, that Mr. Peltier did not render these services merely for emolument, and without regard to principle, you might have deduced a very satisfactory proof from the circumstances of his prosecution; for, if he had been a hireling, he would have followed the tergiversations of government: he would, with Lord Hawkesbury, have abused and libelled Buonaparté in 1800, and, with the same "*safe* politician," would have sung his praises in 1801. Had he been a hireling, he would, like the rest of the servile scribblers, of whom Mr. George Rose was paymaster-general, have escaped the fangs of the law. Had he been a downright, steady, thorough-paced hireling, a slave without a will, without a soul, without a thought of his own; had he been one of these dishonoured, these base, these prostituted mortals, he would never have been prosecuted by the British government, which, if it ever happens to be supported by a man of honour and independence, seems constantly to lie in wait for an opportunity to reward him with some special mark of its ingratitude and malice.—These, amongst other things, you should have told the court and jury.—You should have described your client as he really was, a gentleman of high reputation both public and private; of inexhaustible resources of mind, of incredible facility of execution, of unwearied industry, of inflexible perseverance, of unshaken integrity, and as having great claims of gratitude on the whole civilized world, but particularly on England. Instead of descanting on the writings of the Marquis of Montrose, of Cowley, and of God knows who besides, you might have occupied a small portion of the "three hours" in a description of the works of Mr. JEAN PELTIER. You might easily have shown, that, from the year 1792 to the close of the war, during nine of the most eventful years that this kingdom ever saw, Mr. PELTIER was constantly employed in combatting our enemies; that his pen was continually upon the watch to unveil the thousands of falsehoods and misrepresentations circulated against us, by means of the French press; that, in the West Indies, and in all foreign colonies and countries, he was our great, and almost our only, literary defender; that, with respect to this nation itself, he was ever the first to bring to light, and to expose to the people, the treacherous intentions and the horrid deeds of the republican tyrants; and, in short, you might safely have asserted, that to the efforts of your client, more than to those of any other individual, the very audience, to whom you were speaking, owed the existence of that liberty which they yet enjoyed. And was this gentleman, who has resided so many years in the kingdom, who, besides his having married an English lady, has bound us to him by so many such powerful and such honourable ties; was this gentleman, Sir, to be represented as a "poor defenceless fugitive," as an "unfortunate *stranger*," as the writer of an "*obscure* journal," as being in a "state of dependence and *destitution*," as something, in short, very little better than a pauper, whom it might, in fact, be a charity to remove from his miserable garret to a good warm rent-free room in the King's-bench prison? Was *this* the light, Sir, in which to exhibit Mr. PELTIER? Was it for the purpose of making this exhibition, that you sought his acquaintance and solicited his defence?

Leaving you, Sir, to answer these questions, I should now proceed to consider your speech as relative to the merits of the case itself; but, when you perceive the press of other important matter, with which I am surrounded, I make no doubt you will have the goodness to excuse me for postponing this part of the subject till next week. In the mean time, I remain your most obedient servant,

London, 26 *Feb.* 1803. WM. COBBETT.

TO THE RT. HON. LD. HAWKESBURY, &c.

My Lord,—In my last letter, (1) I gave your lordship an account of the measures, which have already taken place, with respect to the interests of the Anglo-Americans, as connected with the cession of Louisiana, and, at the same time, I endeavoured to describe the feelings excited by those measures, reserving, for the subject of the present letter, the remaining two points; to wit: the conduct which will hereafter be pursued by the French, together with the effect thereof on the Americans; and, the ultimate consequences, with respect to the commerce, the navigation, the power, and the independence of England.

To you, my lord, and your most worthy colleagues, whose minds seldom wander beyond the places which you occupy, and which you hope to occupy to the termination of your natural lives; to you, whose travels and whose topographical knowledge extend no farther than to Richmond Park, or thereabouts; to you, or to that wise man the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who thought that the United States might be annoyed as effectually by a military post in St. Domingo as by a similar post at New Orleans: to such near-sighted, slow-paced, caterpillar politicians, the task, here undertaken, must, of course, appear perfectly "quixotic;" but, to men of other minds, it falls within the ordinary efforts of diligent inquiry and sober reason.

Buonaparté, aided by the advice of the better informed and more politic men, by whom he is surrounded, will pay due attention to all the American Official Papers, to which I have referred your lordships (2); and being regularly, minutely and correctly informed, by his agents in America, of the feelings, the wishes, the intentions, and the means, of the different classes of the people as well as of the different parties in the legislature and in the executive government, will fashion his system accordingly. He will perceive, that the cool and dubious language of the government by no means comes up to the public feeling, as expressed in the newspapers (3). He will perceive, that, while the people are loud for *arming*, the President talks of nothing but *economy*, and expressly discourages the idea of any augmentation of the military force of the country (4). But, he will, at the same time, see the possibility of Jefferson and his party being secretly hostile to him, on account of his late assumption of regal powers, and particularly on account of his obvious contempt of them, of which Mr. Chancellor Livingston, the American Minister at Paris, has not, undoubtedly, failed to inform them. From this cause, aided by the resentment of the people of America, the Consul may be led to apprehend the adoption of such measures as might render the occupation of Louisiana an enterprize not entirely free from trouble, danger, and delay. To prevent this latter alternative, if, from his information, it appears likely to happen, the Corsican will instantly signify his disapprobation of the measures of the Spanish Intendant; he will order the prohibition at New Orleans to be taken off; and, will communicate to the Americans, this his gracious act of condescension, in terms which shall at once inspire the mass of the people with gratitude, with respect, and with that sort of fear which never fails to prepare the vulgar mind for implicit submission. Instantly the English traitors, and all his other typographical partizans, will begin to pour forth the praises of France. The odium of the prohibition will be thrown exclusively on the Spaniards; the people of the Western States, rejoiced at getting rid of these neighbours, more rejoiced at the restoration of their commerce, without the dangers and expenses of war, will hail Buonaparté as their deliverer: and, even the people of the Atlantic States, finding that the Swiss have been basely abandoned, finding that England has now clearly, though tacitly, acknowledged her incapacity ever again to draw the sword against France, will once more congratulate themselves, as they did when they first heard of the treaty of peace, that they no longer have any political connexion with this "disgraced and falling empire."—Scarcely will this impression, so favourable to the views of France, have been produced in the United States, when her army, her captains-general, her engineers, her commercial agents, her savans, her commissaries, her juges de paix, all her endless train of spies and inquisitors, of great and little tyrants, will land at New Orleans. For some months, perhaps for a year, all possible liberty of commerce will be given to the Americans; and, in the mean time, the country round the mouth of the Mississippi will be carefully explored: the best positions will be fortified; the friendship of the Indians, who are very numerous and very brave, will be cultivated; the States of Ohia, Tennessee, Kentucky, &c. &c. will

(1) See p. 226.
(2) See p. 226, 227, 228. See also p. 240 to 244.
(3) See p. 230, 231.
(4) See Mr. Jefferson's Speech, p. 139.

be examined, in all manner of ways, the interests of the inhabitants will be calculated, their inclinations sounded, and the means of their respective state governments will be ascertained. When all the preparations are made, the French will strike the first blow, not against America, but against England, and a mortal blow it will be. The exact time and shape of the first measure of hostility it is impossible to ascertain. The pretexts are so numerous, that it is next to impossible to know which France may choose. That, however, which I think she will choose is this. Our treaty with America expires on the 1st of October next. That no other will be formed is pretty clear; and, of course, the government of the United States will be under no obligation to permit the importation of British goods upon the present terms, that is upon paying the same duty as is paid by the same sort of goods from France and other countries. Suppose France, when she has made all her preparations at the mouth of the Mississippi, should propose to the United States to lay a higher duty upon British than upon French manufactures, and should make the free navigation of the Mississippi depend upon a compliance with this proposition? Such a step might be called overbearing, insolent, and unjust; but, it would be useless to load it with these epithets, perfectly useless, for we have seen that such qualities are by no means an obstacle to success. The demand of a surrender of Napper Tandy, the conduct of Lauriston and Lundberg, were overbearing, insolent, and unjust, but we have not found them, for that reason, to fail of answering their purpose. Besides, the proposition I am speaking of contains a fair *quid pro quo:* give us a preference in serving you with manufactures, grant us this favour, and, in return, we will grant you the favour of a free navigation of the Mississippi. If you accept of the terms, it is well; if not, you cannot blame us for proposing them, nor for appropriating to ourselves the exclusive use and advantage of our territories. Be this as it may, however, be the proposition reasonable or unreasonable, fair or foul, just or unjust, that is not the question; the question, and the only question, will be, has France the *power* to enforce her demands. The people of the Atlantic States will be told, that, in case of a compliance with a proposition like the one here spoken of, they would have to purchase their woollens, their linens, their cottons, and their hardware, much dearer than they now do, purely for the sake of gratifying the interest and the malice of France; but, to tell them this will be of little avail, unless you can tell them, my lord, how to resist this Gallican tyranny; unless you can point out to them, at the same time, some outlet, other than that of the Mississippi, by which they may convey one sixth part of their exportable produce to the sea; unless your Lordship can, from those inexhaustible resources which you possess, draw forth some such discovery as this, all railing against Buonaparté will be as the whistling of the wind.—If the United States government yield to the first demand, that will pave the way for another and another and another, till British commerce is completely banished from the American ports, or till, at least, it is reduced to a mere smuggling trade as it already is in the countries bordering on the Scheldt and the Rhine; and, if the government of the United States should refuse, then the Western States, comprizing all the country lying between the Alleghany and Apalachian mountains, and the river Mississippi, together with all their fertility and population, will instantly fall into the hands, and under the absolute dominion of France. Your Lordship is, I know, of a different opinion; you think, that, because the Americans, when they were colonists of England, were not subdued by the French, but carried on a successful war against them, they will be able still more effectually to resist them now, when the population of America has trebled: because the Americans, when aided by the fleet and army of England, were able to do this, you think they will be able to do it of themselves; because the French were not able to injure them on the banks of the Mississippi when they did not inhabit those banks, the French cannot injure them there now when they do inhabit those banks; because the Americans were invulnerable at the mouth of the Mississippi when they had nothing to send to the sea through that channel, they are invulnerable there now when that is the only outlet to the produce of three whole states; because we, by possessing Canada, through the rivers of which the Americans never pass, have no influence over the United States, the French are to have no influence over them by means of the possession of Louisiana, through which the Americans must pass to the sea, unless they abandon their most fruitful lands and most flourishing settlements. But, my Lord, I delight in simplifying every subject on which I write to your lordship. "To teach the young idea how to shoot," is always a pleasing task. It was with this sort of paternal feeling towards your lordship, that I caused to be engraved the little map of the mouth of the Missis-

sippi, which was inserted in page 445, of the first volume of the Register, and which, if you had paid attention to it, would have spared the House of Commons the mortification of listening to those infantine observations, to which I have here found it necessary to allude. In pursuance of the same propensity it is, my lord, that I am now about to avail myself of the mechanical aid of the printer, in order to present you with a view of this subject, reduced to the level of the meanest capacity. I shall quote the memorable opinions advanced by your right sapient colleague, by the gallant hero of St. Domingo, by the Master of the Rolls, and by yourself, opposite to which I shall place the opinions now declared by the Americans themselves.

Mr. Addington (5) said that his right hon. friend could not say, that, if the French had not this extent of territory [Louisiana] *there*, they could not, if St. Domingo were tranquil, and affairs were at rest with them in *that quarter*, become, by means of a large military force, *formidable to either North or South America!!!!!*

General Maitland (6) said, of Louisiana he had heard, that it would enable France to attack the United States; but, when Louisiana was *formerly* in possession of France, it was totally *imbécile*, and it had not increased in population since it came into the hands of Spain. But it was contended, that the possession of Louisiana would give the French eventually great influence over the councils and measures of the United States: here there was one observation, that naturally occurred to the mind of every man, which was this: *we possess Canada*, yet that possession *does not enable us to influence the United States*; and, if this be the case, with how much *more force* does the argument apply to Louisiana!!!!!

The Master of the Rolls (7) said, that with respect to the cession of Louisiana to France, the value and importance of that cession had been only *discovered within a few nights preceding*. It was *formerly* in possession of France, but she had not been able to draw from it those advantages, which, it was contended, she would derive from it now. With respect to *danger* arising from it, the only danger likely to result from it that he could discover, arose from bringing France in contact with the United States of America. It *might* happen, that, in the *course of* ages, some danger would result from this connexion, but it *could not be soon!!!!!*

Lord Hawkesbury (8) said, as to the political advantages which France will derive from the possession of Louisiana, *I doubt whether they can be of much importance.* Gentlemen have said a great deal about the influence, which this possession threatens to give France over the United States of America; but the possibility is, that the possession, *by placing the French upon the back of America*, every maxim of sound policy will incline the latter to cultivate a more intimate connexion with this country. The right hon. gentleman [Mr. Windham] *under-rated the population and power of the United States*, and forgot the successful exertions, which they, when colonies of this country, made against the French, in 1756, *though* the latter were *then* in possession of *both Louisiana and Canada!!!!!!*

Mr. Jefferson's Message. (9) The cession of Louisiana to France, which took place in the course of the last war, will, if carried into effect, *make a change in the aspect of our foreign relations*, which will, doubtless, have just weight in any deliberations of the Legislature connected with that subject.

Memorial of the Legislature of Kentucky. (10) Having, on a former occasion, when we represented the obstruction to the navigation of the Mississippi, experienced the attention and justice of the general government, in providing, by a treaty with the court of Spain, not only for the free navigation of that river, but for what, in our remote situation from the ocean, was *absolutely necessary to the enjoyment of it*, a place of *deposit* for our produce, we deem it necessary barely to state to you, &c. &c. &c. &c.

Letter of Governor Claiborne. (11) The late act of the Spanish government at New Orleans has excited considerable agitation at Natchez and its vicinity: *it has inflicted a severe wound on the agricultural and commercial interests of this territory, and will prove no less injurious to all the western country.*

Letter of Governor Garrard. (12) The citizens of this state are very much alarmed and agitated; as this measure of the Spanish government will (if not altered) *at one blow cut up the present and future prosperity of their best interests by the roots*

American Gazette (13). That France, instigating the imbecile and pusillanimous cabinet of Madrid, is, in reality the secret mover of the recent infringement of our rights there are irresistible reasons for believing. The inference from this act of French diplomacy is clear and unequivocal. Buonaparté may now make a new bargain and dictate his terms of a fresh grant of the same privileges of which he has recently deprived us by his coercion of Spain. If we believe in the cession of Louisiana to France, we can find no difficulty in viewing the late measure of the Spanish Intendant as a prelude to our being interdicted the free navigation of the Mississippi. France thus *holding at her disposal* the important rights of deposit and of free ingress and egress by sea, can then, and most assuredly will, *tamper and negotiate with the western country, and having an inestimable boon to offer, and, probably, the additional privilege of trading to her West-India and European ports, on the favourite footing of colonists, will thereby easily secure their good will*, and detach them from the Atlantic States. The dismemberment of our empire, and the *dissolution of our union* being thereby effected, the close of this tragical drama may be as easily imagined as described.

Now, my Lord, do you and your colleagues never think of these things? Do you never reflect on what you have said and done? Do you never blush at your shameful ignorance, your egregious folly? Do you never tremble at the tremendous mischiefs which you have brought upon your country? Or, do you really think, that it is all a

(5) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1211. (6) Vol. II. p. 1377. (7) Vol. II. p. 1344. (9) Register, Vol. III. p. 137. (10) Ibid. p. 241. (11) Ibid p. 243.

(8) Ibid. Vol. II. p. 1309. (12) Ibid. Vol. III p. 244. (13) Ibid. p. 230.

hobgobbling story, and that the clerkship of the Pells will live as long as the clerk? Do you really and sincerely believe, that the seat in Richmond Park will remain in the hands of the Addingtons for ten years to come?

The effect, which the measures of France will produce on the Americans is clearly enough pointed out by the writer whom I have last quoted. The "inestimable boon," or rather the *necessary of life*, the free navigation of the Mississippi with leave of deposit at its mouth, will at any time, and under any circumstances, purchase the allegiance of the Western people; but, as the Atlantic States, which form a sort of mother country, will, for pride's sake, and, indeed, for the sake of peace and safety, of which all shop-keeping nations are very fond, endeavour to preserve that allegiance as long as possible, it is reasonable to suppose, that the French, whose first object will be to injure Great Britain, will, for some years, at least, exchange her rights of navigation and deposit for restrictions imposed, by the Atlantic States, on the British commerce and manufactures. At first, these restrictions, or whatever other measure France may demand, will, probably, be but slightly and partially felt; but her hand will weigh heavier and heavier in proportion as her establishments are completed in Louisiana; and, unless she should, all at once, drop down in a fit, as England did in 1801, there will not be, this day four years, a single bale of British goods shipped to the United States, and Britain will not hold a single inch of land in the Western Archipelago.—And *this*, my Lord, is the way, in which, "*by placing the French at the back of* "*the Americans*," your Lordship will have "*attached the latter more closely to this coun-*" *try*!" As if the people, who have lands on the Mississippi, and who have nothing in the world but those lands, would abandon them and become beggars, merely for the sake of those honest and generous gentlemen, the manufactures of Yorkshire and Birmingham; and that too after your sagacious Lordship has boasted of the clever trick of *placing the French upon their back!* Your country, my Lord, will pay dearly for this expression. The shop-keeping nation will, and ought to be punished, for the follies of such a statesman, because it is their fault that he has the *power* to injure them. Yes, my lord, the base rabble of cotton-spinners and stock-jobbers joined you most heartily in the project of *placing the French upon the back of the Americans:* they thought with you, my lord, that wars would succeed between those two nations, and that we might lie snugly by and profit from their losses. Brilliant idea! noble-minded conception! No, no; both of them are well acquainted with our views and our means; and, be you well assured, my good lord, that instead of a war against one another, which shall leave us in the enjoyment of a monopolizing neutrality, they will, if it be necessary, *unite in a war against us.* This appears to me to be the inevitable result of the cession of Louisiana, and of such a war the consequences are not less evident than they will be terrible to this country. It is from this quarter that I expect the blow, which is destined to shake the British empire to its base. So long ago as the year 1800, I besought the then ministry to turn their attention towards the other hemisphere, which they appeared to me totally to neglect; and, I remember, that, finding them to despise my exhortations, I predicted, that the fate of this country would be like that of the one-eyed doe. Two frigates and four thousand men, properly employed, at any time between 1796 and 1801; nay, one thousand pounds (only a third part of a year's salary of the Clerk of the Pells) expended in powder and lead, sent to General Bowles the Indian Chief, would have effectually preserved this country from the dangers, of which I am now speaking, and which, in spite of your lordship's sneers, will, in a very little time, reach the hearts of the holders of the three per cents. Perish the man who pities them! They have, for the sake of their own private interests, basely applauded the men who have ruined and dishonoured their country. Their just reward is at no great distance. A misunderstanding with the United States of America, which France will very soon bring about for us, would give the Temple of Mammon a ruder shock than it ever yet received.—In the mean time, my lord, you and your colleagues will take care to keep your places, the nation will continue sinking from one degree of baseness to another, so that, when the hour of annihilation arrives, all mankind will agree, that annihilation is a mercy.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c. WM. COBBETT.

London, March 1, 1803.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Rome, Jan. 24.—The Dutch Admiral De Winter having arrived with his squadron in the Port of Cagliari demanded of the Governor permission to land his troops on account of the sickness which prevailed among them, and their want of refreshment; but the Governor after having conferred with the English Commandant, refused to accede to the demand.

Vienna, Feb. 13.—The report of the approaching cession of Sardinia to England is contradicted by several persons in spite of the affectation and the tone of assurance with which it has been spread

Doubtless France and Russia would oppose a sale, which would augment almost without measure, the maritime preponderance of Great Britain, besides adding to its territorial power. It is easy to conceive that the Court of London may have employed every means to engage the King of Sardinia to give up his island. Twenty millions are very little for a state, which no longer calculates, because the deficit in its finances will no longer admit of calculation.

Paris, Feb. 26.—Last Saturday, Citizens d'Affry, Glutz, Jauch, Monnet, Reinhart, Sprecher, Stapfer, Ustery, Watteville, and Von Flue, composing the two committees of five members, formed by the fifty-six Swiss deputies, in order to take cognizance of the Act of Mediation made by the First Consul between the parties which divide Switzerland, were admitted to an audience of the First Consul.—The Consuls, the Senators, the Ministers, the Counsellors of State, and the Inspectors-general of the army were present, and also Citizens Barthelemy, Roederer, Fouche, and Demeunier, senators, members of the committee charged to confer with the Swiss deputies assembled at Paris.—Citizen Barthelemy, president of the commission, having received from the hands of the First Consul the Act of Mediation, signed, countersigned, and sealed with the great seal of state, delivered the Act to Citizen Louis d'Affry, appointed Landamman of Switzerland.—The First Consul conversed some time with each of the members of the two committees of Swiss deputies, when the audience terminated.—On Monday the same persons assisted at the audience. Citizen Barthelemy, President of the Committee of Senators, presented to the First Consul the forty-seven Swiss deputies. The remainder of the fifty-six, who formed the whole deputation had previously set off for Paris.—Citizen Louis d'Affry, Landamman of Switzerland, delivered the following address:—"Citizen First Consul, "—Called by the meditation which you have "pronounced, to the important, but difficult si- "tuation of Landamman of Switzerland, it is "flattering to me, in becoming the organ of the "Deputation which my country has sent to you, "to have for my first function the duty of testi- "fying to you the gratitude with which it is pe- "netrated for the benevolent attention which "you have designed to give to that work which "confirms the independence of Switzerland.— "Your first benefit is to have restored to the "different people of Switzerland the federative go- "vernment which was alone congenial to them.— "The result of your mediation will recreate those "ties of policy which have united two nations "accustomed to confer reciprocal advantages, and "formed for mutual esteem. The troubles which "have agitated my country will cease—the pow- "ers which are friendly to Switzerland will ap- "plaud the means employed by the First Consul "to arrest the sad effects of a party spirit. I owe "it to my country to second your benevolent "views, and I owe it to myself to be perfectly im- "partial in the exercise of the functions which "are conferred upon me.—I pray the First Consul "to receive and to accept with goodness the ho- "mage of our profound respect."—The First Consul having answered Citizen Louis d'Affry, and conversed with the different Swiss deputies, the audience terminated.—Citizen Louis d'Affry, Landamman of Switzerland, set out the same day for Berne. *

* A full account of these proceedings will be given hereafter.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

View of the State of the Republic; presented to the Legislative Body by order of the Government. Paris, February 22, 1803.

Events have neither frustrated the wishes nor disappointed the expectations of government. The Legislative Body, on resuming its labours, has the satisfaction of finding the Republic strengthened by the union of its citizens, more active in its pursuits of industry, and more confident in its prospects of prosperity.—The execution of the concordat, from which the enemies of public order still ventured to conceive criminal hopes, has almost every where produced the most beneficial effects. The principles of an enlightened religion, the voice of the sovereign Pontiff, the firmness and perseverance of government have triumphed over every obstacle. Mutual sacrifices have reunited the ministers of religion; enlightened reason, and cordial unanimity have revived the Gallican church; and the happiest change has already manifested itself in the public morals. Every day produces a more perfect coincidence of opinion and of sentiment. Childhood is more docile to the instructions of parents, and youth more submissive to the authority of magistrates. The conscription goes on smoothly in those very places, where the mere name of conscription was sufficient to stimulate insurrection, and to serve the country is now become a duty of religion.—In those departments, which the First Consul visited, he every where received pledges, and observed proofs of a return to those principles which constitute the strength and the happiness of society.—In the departments of the Eure, the Lower Seine, the Oise, the inhabitants proudly exult in the national glory. They are sensible to their full extent of the advantages of equality. They hail with blessings the restoration of peace; they receive with blessings the re-establishment of public worship. These are the ties that bind down every heart to the state and the constitution.—It is the duty of government to cherish and direct these auspicious dispositions.—Other forms of worship have been regularly organized. Consistories are formed of enlightened citizens, tried and acknowledged defenders of public order, of civil and religious liberty.—Public instruction, that indispensible support of society, is every where sought after with eagerness and alacrity. Several Lyceums have already been opened; already, as government had well foreseen, a number of private schools aspire to the rank of the secondary schools. The whole body of citizens shew their conviction that their can be no happiness without the light of education; that, without talents and information, there can be no equality but that of misery and servitude.—A military school is opened to receive the young defenders of the country. Soldiers, they will learn to support the life of camps, and endure the fatigues of war. By long habits of obedience they will be trained up to the art of commanding, and they will bring to the armies courage and discipline, united with talents and with knowledge.—In the Lyceums, as well as in the military school, the youth of the departments, newly incorporated with the republic, will live mingled without any distinction with the youth of old France. From this confusion of minds and manners, from this communication of habits and of dispositions, from this commixture of interests, of projects, and of hopes, will spring up that fraternity, which of several nations will make but one people, destined by their position, by their

courage, and by their virtues, to form the centre of union, and the example of Europe.—The National Institute, which has its ascendancy over public instruction, has received a more useful direction, and henceforward will exert a more active influence over the national character, over the language of the country, and over the arts, sciences, and literature.—In order to ensure the stability of our infant institutions, in order to remove from the eyes of the public the spectre of discord which appeared to them in the periodical return of elections to the supreme magistracy, the friends of the country called for the Consulate for life to be granted to the First Magistrate. The people upon being consulted answered to their call, and the Senate proclaimed the will of the people. The system of lists of eligibility could not resist the test of experience, and the force of public opinion.—The organization of the senate was incomplete.—The national justice was left to be administered by tribunals without harmony, and without dependance on each other. There was no authority to protect or to reform them; no tie of restraint to subject them to one common discipline.—In fine, there was wanting to France a power to reclaim justice itself, the power of granting pardon.—How often these twelve years past has that power been implored! How many unfortunates have fallen the victims of an inflexible sternness, with which wise men reproached our laws! How many criminals have been acquitted through a false indulgence, because our punishments were too severe!—A *senatus consultum* has restored to the people the exercise of those rights which the constituent assembly had acknowledged; but it has restored them surrounded with precautions, which preserve the people from errors or precipitation in their choice; with precautions which guard the influence of property, and the preponderance of enlightened talents.—Should the first magistracy become vacant, the duties and the proceedings of the Senate are traced out for such an emergency—forms of certain operation guide the wisdom and liberty of their choice; and the quick decision of that choice deprives ambition of the means of conspiring, and anarchy of the means of destroying.—The cement of time will every day consolidate, more and more, this tutelary institution. It will be not only the term of all disquietudes, and the object of all hopes, but likewise the fairest recompences that can be held out to public services, and public virtues.—Justice embraces all the tribunals with one common bond. They have each their subordinate station, and their censor—they are always free in the exercise of their functions. Always independent of power, but never independent of the laws.—The privilege of granting pardon, when the interest of the republic requires it, or when circumstances prescribe indulgence, is entrusted to the hands of the First Magistrate; but it is only confided to him under the guard of justice itself; he is to exercise it only under the eyes of a council, and after having consulted the severest oracles of the law.—If institutions may be appreciated by their effects, never was any institution more important in its result than the organic *senatus consultum*. From that moment the French people began to confide in their destiny; property began to resume its former value, and speculations of distant views to be multiplied—until that moment every thing seemed to float in uncertainty. The present moment was cherished; the next was a subject of alarm, and the enemies of the country continued to cherish hopes. Since that moment they are reduced to impotence and to detestation.—The island of Elba has been ceded to France; that acquisition gives her a mild and industrious people; two fine ports, a productive and precious mine: but being separated from France, it could not be intimately united with any of her departments, or subjected to the regulations of a common administration. Principles have been made to bend to the necessity of circumstances; exceptions have been established for the island of Elba which its position, and the public interest prescribed.—The abdication of the sovereign, the will of the people, and the necessity of existing circumstances, had placed Piedmont under the power of France. Amidst the nations that surrounded it, with the elements that composed its population, Piedmont was unable to support either the weight of its own independence, or the expenses of a monarchy. United to France, it will reap the benefits of its security, and its greatness; its laborious and enlightened citizens will exert their industry and their talents in the bosom of the arts, and under the shade of peace.—Security and tranquility prevail in the interior of France. The vigilance of the magistracy, the severity of justice, and a gendarmerie vigorously appointed, and directed by a commander, grown grey in the career of honour, has every where impressed terror on the minds and the attempts of the brigands.—Private interest has raised itself to a sentiment of public interest. Citizens have not shrunk from attacking those whom they formerly dreaded, even when they were chained down at the foot of the tribunals of justice. Whole communes have taken up arms and destroyed the brigands. Foreigners envy the security of our public roads, and that public force, which though often invisible, is always present, attend on their footsteps, and watch for their protection, without any necessity of imploring its aid.—During the course of a difficult year, amidst the exigencies of a general scarcity, the poor looked with confidence to the care of government. They supported with courage the privations which necessity imposed; and they received with gratitude the succours which they were taught to expect.—The crime of forgery is no longer encouraged by the hope of impunity. The zeal of the tribunals appointed to prosecute and punish it, and the just severity of the laws, have at length checked the progress of an evil which threatened both the public treasure, and the fortunes of individuals.—Our cultivation daily improves, and defies the most boasted agricultural systems of Europe. In every department are to be found enlightened farmers, who afford both instruction and example.—Premiums have been held out for improving the breed of horses; and similar encouragements are proposed for the improvement of wool by the introduction of a foreign breed of sheep. Zealous administrators are every where occupied in tracing out and revealing the richness of our soil, and in disseminating the useful plans and the happy results which experience daily discovers.—Our manufactures multiply and receive new spirit and improvement. While they emulate each, they will soon, no doubt, become the rivals of the most renowned manufactures of foreign countries. Henceforth there will be nothing wanting to their prosperity but capitals less dearly purchased. But capitalists begin already to give up the hazardous speculations of stock-jobbing; and devote their attention to the improvement of land and the pursuit of useful enterprizes.—More than 20,000 workmen, who were dispersed throughout Europe, have been recalled by the attention and by the favours of govern-

ment, and will soon be restored to our manufactures.—Among our manufactures there is one which is almost peculiar to France, which Colbert kindled up by his genius. It was buried under the ruins of Lyons: government has exerted all its endeavours to extricate it. Lyons is again restored to splendour and opulence; already do its manufactures impose a tribute on the luxury of Europe. But the principle of their success is to be found in the luxury of France itself; it is in the changefulness of our taste, and the mutability of our fashions, that foreign luxury must look for its aliment, it is it that gives motion and life to an immense population, who, without that encouragement, must lose itself in corruption and misery. —There will soon be at Compiegne, there will soon arise on the confines of La Vendee, a number of Prytanees, where our youth will be brought up in habits of industry, and instructed in the mechanical arts. From that source our dock-yards and our manufactures will one day draw inspectors to direct their labours.—Fourteen millions arising out of the barrier tax, and ten millions out of the extraordinaries, have been employed during the year 10 in improving the public roads, in keeping up the old communications. New communications have also been opened. The Simplon, Mount-Cenis, and Mount-Genevre, will soon open a triple and easy access to Italy—a high road will lead from Genoa to Marseilles—a road is chalked out from Saint Esprit to Gap—another from Rennes to Brest, through Pontivy. At Pontivy establishments are to be raised which will have a powerful influence over the public mind of the departments of which ci-devant Britanny was composed—a canal will introduce into it new sources of commerce and prosperity.—On the banks of the Rhine from Bingen to Coblentz, a necessary road is cut through inaccessible rocks. The neighbouring Communes associate their labours to the sacrifices of the public treasury, and the people of the other bank, who ridiculed the folly of the enterprise, are astonished and confounded at the rapidity of the execution.—A great number of workmen are employed on the Canal of St. Quintin.—The Canal of Ourcq is opened, and soon will Paris enjoy the benefit of its waters, and the salubrity and the embellishments which they promise.—The canal intended to unite the navigation of the Seine and the Saone, of the Danube and the Rhine, is almost entirely finished as far as Dole, and the public treasury already receives in the increased price of wood, to which that canal opens the approach, a sum equal to that which it has furnished for the continuance of the work.

(To be continued.)

DOMESTIC.

GAZETTE.—His Majesty in Council on the 24th Feb. was pleased to re-appoint Thomas Hare, of Stow Hall, Esq. Sheriff for the County of Norfolk.

Dublin Castle, Feb. 11, 1803.—His Majesty has been pleased, by his Royal Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Ireland, to grant the following Dignities in the Peerage of Ireland, viz.—To Edmond Henry Viscount Limerick, and the Heirs Male of his Body, the Dignity of Earl of Limerick, of the County of Limerick:—To William Power Keating Viscount Dunlo, and the Heirs Male of his Body, the Dignity of Earl of Clancarty, of the County of Cork:—And to Charlotte Baroness Newcomen, Wife of Sir William Gleadowe Newcomen, Baronet, the Dignity of Viscountess Newcomen, of Moss Town, in the County of Longford; and the Dignity of Viscount Newcomen, of Moss Town aforesaid, to the Heirs Male of her Body by the said Sir Wm. Gleadowe Newcomen.

BANKRUPTS.—Corbett, J. Milk-street, Warehouseman.—Richardson, J. Manchester, cotton-spinner.—Spence, T. Blackburn, shopkeeper.—Thompson, W. jun. Wolverhampton, grocer.—Spence, W. Upper-Catton, Yorkshire, corn-factor. Boyles, J. Wellclose-square, wine-merchant.—Staples, L. Wapping, Staffordshire, warehouseman.—Le Souef, P. Great Winchester-street, merchant.—Reddish, J. Sutton, cotton-factor.—James, S. St. Philips Gloucestershire.

Births.—On Friday, the Hon. Mrs. Ryder of a daughter.

BR. ARMY *on the 1st Feb.* 1803.	Regulars Cav.	Regulars Inf.	Fe. Inf.	Tot Ba.	Inv. Co
England and Wales	20	27	1	48	
North Britain	2	4		6	
Ireland	7	25	2	34	
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.		5		5	
Gibraltar		5		6	
Egypt and Malta	1	7		8	
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.		4	1	5	
West-Indies		23		23	
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.		5		5	
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	20		25	
On Passage to England or Ire.		6		6	
Total. . . .	35	132	4	171	

The above statement is exclusive of artillery, engineers, artificers, and Militia.—We beg our readers to pay attention to the number of troops kept up in the *West Indies*.

BR. NAVY, 1st FEB.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot
In Port and fitting	10	3	35	53	101
Guard Ships	0	0	0	0	0
English and Irish Channels	0	0	6	9	15
Downs and North Sea	0	0	7	11	18
West-Indies and Passage	2	0	6	21	29
Jamaica station	10	0	6	6	22
America and Newfoundland	0	1	3	5	9
Cape of G. Hope, East-Indies,	5	7	12	17	41
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	2	0	2	3	7
Mediterranean and on Passage	8	2	20	10	40
Hospital and Prison Ships	1	0	0	0	1
Total in Commission	38	13	98	136	285
Receiving Ships	7	0	7	1	15
Serviceable and repairing	24	1	9	2	36
In Ordinary	104	11	97	70	282
Building	24	0	10	3	37
Total.	197	25	221	212	655
ORDINARY.					
Portsmouth	37	3	28	11	79
Plymouth	47	1	21	23	92
Chatham	44	7	21	2	74
Sheerness	4	1	10	9	24
River	3	0	33	28	64
Total. . . .	135	12	113	73	333

STOCKS.	FE. 18	19	21	25	26	28
Bank Stock	188¼	—	—	—	—	—
3 pr. C.R.An.	71⅞	71⅞	71¾	71⅝	71⅝	71¾
3 per C. Con.	71⅜	71⅜	71½	71⅜	71⅜	71¼
4 pr. C. Con.	86⅞	86¼	86⅞	88½	88½	88½
5 pr.Ct. Ann.	101½	101⅝	101¾	101¾	101⅝	101½
Bank L. Ann.	20½	20⅜	20⅜	20½	20½	20¼
D°S.1778&9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct.1797	103½	103½	103¾	104½	104½	104⅜
Omnium.. .	3¾ dis	3¾ dis	3⅞ dis	4 dis	4 dis	4 dis

French 3 per cent. consolidés 62 f.

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

AMSTER. C. F.	36 2	2 us.	LEGHORN	50¼
D°, at sight	35 9		NAPLES.....	40½
ROTTERDAM	36 3	2 us.	GENOA	46⅛
HAMBURGH	34 5	2½us.	VENICE, 55 livres piccole	
ALTONA....	34 6	2½us.	effective per £. ster.	
PARIS 1 day	24 8		LISBON	67¾
PARIS	24 12	2 us.	OPORTO	68¼
BOURDEAUX,	24 13		DUBLIN	13¼
CADIZ ...	35¼	eff.	BILBOA	36
MADRID ..	36	effective	AGIO, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat prq.	45s. to 59s	Hops per cwt.	00s to 00s
Rye.....	32..35	Hay per load....	72..140
Barley.....	20..24	Beef, per stone	4s.4d. to 6s.
Malt.....	40..45	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 4d.
Oats.....	14..19	Veal	6s. 0d. to 7s. 4d.
Pease (white)....	33..39	Pork....	4s. 8d. to 5s. 8d.
Beans (horse)....	30..34	Tallow	4s. 3½d.
Flour per sack ..	41..47	Av. of Sugar pr cw	40s. ½d.
Seconds.....	40..44	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal....	50..00	Bread 9d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

STATE OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.—Under this title, the public has, within these few days, been favoured with a long paper, signed by Buonaparté, the beginning of which will be found in p. 306, of this sheet. This statement will, of course, be received with great caution, particularly that part of it which relates to the revival of commerce and manufactures; but, while we totally discredit all that is said about the riches of France, we are very far from entertaining any hopes of her weakness arising from her poverty: it is the voice of Mars and not of Mammon that rules through her domains.—The Consul's observations with regard to the powers of the continent discover the same degree of contempt for truth and decency, with which he has but too often insulted the world, and which insult the world most righteously merits at his hands.—What he says, however, relative to this country, has a still higher colouring: his choicest tints are always reserved for us. After having stated, that he has an ambassador at Constantinople, engaged in renewing and fortifying the connexion between France and the Porte, he observes, that he should have a right to complain of English troops being still at Alexandria and Malta, but that he has learnt that vessels have arrived in the Mediterranean to bring those troops away. He proceeds:—"The go-"vernment pledges itself for the preserva-"tion of peace on the continent, and hopes "for the continuation of peace by sea; a "peace which every people wants and "wishes for, and to gratify this wish, the "government will do every thing compa-"tible with the national honour, which ho-"nour is essentially connected with the "*strict execution of treaties.* But, in England, "there are *two parties, which are disputing* "*for power:* one has made peace and ap-"pears *determined to maintain it*; the other "has sworn *an implacable hatred to France.* "Hence the fluctuation in the opinions and "councils of that country, and an attitude "at once pacific and menacing. WHILE "THIS STRUGGLE OF PARTIES SHALL LAST, "there are certain measures which pru-"dence compels the French Republic to "take: *five hundred thousand men ought to* "*be, and shall be, kept in readiness to defend or* "*to* AVENGE *her*.—Strange necessity, im-"posed by miserable passions, on two na-"tions who, from *common interest*, are equally "attached to peace.—But, whatever be the "success of intrigue at London, *it shall not* "*draw any other nations into new leagues*; and "the government says it with a laudable "pride, that, ENGLAND, SINGLE-HANDED, "IS NO LONGER ABLE TO CONTEND A-"GAINST FRANCE."—This fact, this humiliating fact, was acknowledged, ratified, signed and sealed, by the disgraceful treaty of Amiens, that treaty which, according to Mr. Sheridan, every man in England was "*glad* of," that treaty at which Mr. Fox rejoiced, because it was "glorious *to France* and *to the First Consul.*" The nation, says the Maidstone patriot, "*may* be subjugated, but the people *must eat.*" The same sentiment, the same acknowledgment of *inferiority to France*, of want of power to contend against her, has been made fifty times over, in the Houses of Lords and of Commons; the world now regards us as sunk into the crowd of second-rate powers; and, what is still worse, what puts the final seal to our doom, is, nine-tenths of the base people are ready to join in the confession, nay some of them even rejoice at it as the best, most effectual, and only infallible security for the durability of the "blessings of peace!"—Buonaparté has been well informed on this topic: he has traced this temper of mind through all the vehicles of public opinion, and he has, in this last address to us, made a very artful attempt to prevent the impair-

ing of sentiments so favourable to his views. He tells us, in substance, that two parties are disputing for political power amongst us; that he approves of one of them and disapproves of the other, and that until we have silenced the party which he does not like, France will keep five hundred thousand men ready to make war upon us. It is impossible to read the hints contained in this part of the statement, without reverting to the Proclamation addressed by Buonaparté to the Swiss, for whom he was then preparing a new constitution of government. "You have afforded," says he, "for two "years, *an afflicting spectacle. Opposite fac-* "*tions* have successively taken possession of "the sovereign authority." (1) He next reminded them of the "*miserable passions*," by which they were rendered continually wretched; and concluded by expressing his determination to interfere, to put an end, for ever, to this "struggle of parties," and to provide for the lasting peace and happiness of Switzerland. The rest is known. And, we again beg the English reader not to mock the poor Swiss; for the saying, though trivial is not less true, that *mocking is catching*. We do not say, that Buonaparté will order English deputies to repair to Paris, in order to receive his instructions; but, we will just take the liberty to ask, what would be the consequence if he were to insist upon the expulsion of Mr. Windham from the Parliament as the only condition of keeping peace with this country? We do not say he will make such a demand; we hope he will not; but we put the case, and should like to know the opinion of those who are the possessors of that precious *capital*, which is, in the last resort, to save us from the arms and the machinations of France: we should like to hear their candid answer to this question; whether they would not consent to, nay, whether they would not clamour for, such expulsion, rather than see the three per cents. reduced to 47? But, without having any such sudden and violent effect, the hint of Buonaparté will operate not less efficaciously. It has set the lovers of peace and plenty to thinking. They have already discovered that it is by no means so unreasonable as some people may imagine. And, indeed, what *use* are parties of? What *good* do they do? They are continually making *ill-will!* If it were not for them, there would be no war, no need of fleets, nor of armies, and, of course, no need of taxes, except just to pay the interest of the national debt; and, as a proof of this, does not Buonaparté say, that if it were not for these high-flying hot-headed fellows, he should now disband his five hundred thousand men? What a shame, that two nations, that forty or fifty millions of good sober, honest, and industrious citizens, should be kept in continual hot water, and be continually burdened with taxes, merely to humour the whim of a handful (not above two dozen) of "quixotic alarmists!" —This is the sort of sentiments, which are fast gaining ground, and that too through all ranks of life; and, we shall very soon hear it asserted, *within* as well as without doors, that it is time for all party divisions to be put an end to. In short, there will, ere long, be only one party, and that one will be composed of those persons, who may be honoured with the special good will of Buonaparté.—This is the second direct attack, which the government of France has, within these six weeks, made upon the liberty of the British Parliament. The former was more insolent, but the latter is in the *name* even of the Consul. Yet, not a word is said about this in either House. MR. SHERIDAN, who moved to have Reeves's pamphlet burnt by the hands of the common hangman, even MR. SHERIDAN, the great champion of the liberty of speech, says not a word of these publications from Paris, which circulate, in every shape that print can possibly assume, from one end of the United Kingdom to the other. Great and terrible was the outcry that he raised against the founder of the loyal associations; but, not a word does he utter against Buonaparté: no brilliant sallies: none of those borrowed jests that were wont to set the House in a roar: even the powers of plagiarism seem to have failed him: alas! poor Yorick! Quite chop-fallen!—As to the fact, respecting the evacuation of Egypt and Malta, we have no doubt of the correctness of Buonaparté's statement. Some little delay, some paltry shift, just to save appearances, will first be tried, and then the evacuation will take place, after having cost this country a million or two more than it would have cost, if the evacuation had taken place agreeably to the treaty of Amiens. Not that *we* ourselves regret this: we sincerely wish that a pole tax were laid upon the nation for the purpose of supporting the *dignity* of the Addingtons.—In answer to Buonaparté's assertion, that "*England, single handed, is* "*no longer able to contend against France*," the demi-official paper, of the 3d instant, observes, "*We trust it will not be necessary!!!*" There spoke the Addingtons! There breathed the soul of the noble high-spirited youth, who proposed the march to

(1) See Vol. II. p. 423.

Paris!—"*We trust it will not be necessary!!!*" And, do we yet call ourselves Englishmen? Have we the impudence to affect to be descended from those men, who held it as a maxim, that one Englishman was as good as three Frenchmen? "*We trust it will not be necessary!!!*" Poor whining creatures! And yet the hirelings of this ministry have the effrontery to represent the editor of *this* work as a person whose labours tend to lower the spirit, and to degrade the character, of the nation!

MR. PELTIER'S TRIAL, which was noticed in our last, and respecting which a letter will be found in another part of this sheet, is mentioned here only with a view of comparing some of the principles, laid down by the Attorney-General, with the practice, which, a few days before, received the sanction of the Royal Court of Jersey. The Attorney-General had been asked, why, if Mr. Peltier was prosecuted for libels against Buonaparté, the republishers of the infamous libels, in the Moniteur, against his Majesty and his late ministers, were not prosecuted. The Attorney-General replied, that he did not prosecute the London newsprinters for republishing the French libels against his Majesty and his ministers, because it was evident, that they did not *originate* with the publishers, and were given merely by way of conveying information. The proceedings in the Island of Jersey furnish a pretty comment upon this maxim, and show, at once, the rapid, the fearful progress, which we are making towards the goal of slavery.—For several months past, there has resided in Jersey, in contempt and defiance of the orders of government, one of those persons, whom the French have sent into the King's dominions, under the title of *Commissaires des Relations Commerciales*, and who, in general, are very expert *engineers*. The commissaire at Jersey, though acknowledged in no public capacity, had the insolence to prefer a complaint against the printers for inserting paragraphs from the London papers, offensive to Buonaparté, and to threaten, that, if the practice was not punished, Buonaparté would certainly revenge himself upon Jersey. This threat had the desired effect: two of the printers were brought before the Royal Court, on the 5th of February; and, though they were pardoned, for the first offence, seeing that they had done nothing but publish a faithful translation from the London papers; yet, a positive injunction was laid on them, not to publish, in future, any thing offensive to France, *even from the London papers!*—Has not Buonaparté got his hand in the country? Poor paltry mortals, who, while their knees knock together, affect to see no danger at hand, may amuse us with our wooden-walls and such common-place subjects of boasting; but, is there a man of sense, is there a man of truth, is there a man of honour, in the whole country who will seriously and sincerely deny that we are the slaves of this Corsican?—Mark the different doctrine in the two courts:—in Westminster Hall, it is held *lawful* to republish any articles from the Moniteur *against his Majesty*:—in the Royal Court of Jersey, it is held *unlawful* to republish any articles from the London papers *against Buonaparté!!!* The cases are exactly in point, but with this aggravation, that the injunction at Jersey goes to prohibit the circulation of what is written, printed, and tolerated, in the capital of that Empire to which Jersey belongs!!! And yet we call ourselves an *independent nation!* We may continue to do so; but, we shall not, by that trick, deceive the world: we cannot hide the disgraceful fact from ourselves, much less shall we be able to hide it from those, by whom we were formerly hated, and who have now exultingly changed their hatred into contempt.—But, in the midst of all these assaults, these new and hitherto unheard of, assaults upon what has been called the liberty of the press, where are the champions of that "*inestimable right*," that "*palladium of free men?*" Where is Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Grey, Mr. Tierney, Mr. Erskine? where is Mr. Fox, "the patriot "Fox," who is said to have lived once, during the whole of a long hard winter, upon nothing in the world but the liberty of the press? What! will he give up his meat, drink, and clothing in this way, without a struggle, without a grumble, without one single word of remonstrance! He has, indeed, learnt *la science de se taire!* Corsican, we thank thee for having humbled these men! How forward, how bold, how audacious were they, when they had to contend with a poor, feeble, faint-hearted British ministry; how resolutely did they maintain the right of Citizen Lee and thousands of others to defame their own Sovereign, his family and his sacred office! Where is now their resolution? Where is all that declamatory bombast, in favour of the press, which was wont to ring through St. Stephen's chapel from the year 1790 to 1799?

NAPPER TANDY'S LETTER TO LORD PELHAM.—This letter, which will be found, at length in our last sheet, p. 275, is worthy of our attention on account of one passage only. "With respect to my life," says the condemned traitor, "I never thought I "owed any gratitude to your government

" for it. I owe my life to *this* great and " generous people, to the *first of men*, to the " hero, the pacificator, *who said, that, if I " fell, I should fall with eternal lustre.*"— Now, it must be known to every one, that this publication would not have appeared, if it had been displeasing to the French government. It is little matter whether the traitor speaks truth or not: he will be believed by nine-tenths of his readers, particularly in Ireland; and, indeed, there is no reason for not believing him, since even the government papers have not ventured to contradict his statement.—What a lesson to the disaffected in Ireland! A traitor, who had borne arms against his country, who had even invaded it at the head of a French army, who had been taken, tried, and condemned, now publicly proclaims to the whole world, that he was set at liberty *in consequence of a threat of Buonaparté*! Never was there so direct, so forcible an encouragement as this traitor holds out to plots, conspiracies, and rebellion. Such an example would create treason almost under the very ribs of loyalty! Who knows what share the triumph of this villain may have had in stimulating DESPARD to the bloody deed, which he had planned, and which he was upon the point of executing? It was given in evidence against him, that he told his associates, that the attack on the Tower was postponed, because " he expected " *money* and *news* FROM FRANCE!" (2) No weight has been given to this circumstance. Great care was taken not to sift it, nay, not to touch upon it again. In this, as in all other instances, where our safety is concerned, we have discovered a fear to be informed of the truth, an anxiety not to see the horrible abyss into which we are falling. We seem to be actuated by exactly the same feeling as those unhappy wretches, who draw a cap or handkerchief over their eyes to hide from their sight the dismal apparatus of death.

ENGLISH MANUFACTURES.—In our last sheet, p. 271, we inserted an account of the proscription, if we may so express ourselves, which the Swiss, at the command of the French General, have issued against goods of English manufacture, and, indeed, against merchandize in general coming from England. In the mean time, such regulations, in consequence of the same influence, have been adopted in Holland, as must, we think, very soon shut our staple manufacture out of that country; while in Piedmont and in Spain measures have been taken to cut off from us the means of coming at the raw silk of the former, and the fine wool of the latter. As to Piedmont, it is now, thanks to the Richmond Park Ministry, the 27th military division of France, a quality which puts it, together with all its products and resources, under the absolute, and, indeed, the lawful, controul of Buonaparté, but, the ministers having affected to consider Spain as an *independent* power, the edict passed against us in that country would seem to have rather more of the nature of an act of hostility on the part of France, at whose demand it has been passed. It is well known, that the manufacture of the finest English cloths absolutely requires a certain proportion of Spanish wool. The vain attempts to supply the place of this commodity, or rather to obtain the commodity without having recourse to Spain, are fresh in every one's memory, and have only served to prove the absolute necessity of importations of wool from Spain. The French have been duly apprized of this circumstance, and, as it was foreseen and foretold at the time of making the peace, they have already taken effectual measures for obstructing, or, at least, imposing a burthen on that importation. Our dealers in Spanish wool, have, to their great surprize, found that there exists, in Spain, an edict prohibiting the exportation of wool, except it be *sold to a Frenchman*, and, we believe, unless it be also shipped first *to France*. The consequence of this measure is, not altogether a want of the commodity in our manufactures, but an enhancement of the price. Our capital, as the wise young Lord Hawkesbury told the planters of Demerara, will always (as long as it lasts) command the raw material; but it comes at a higher price than if we possessed our ancient political power; it comes loaded with a duty which it has paid at Havre de Grace; it comes charged with a tribute paid to France; paid to the nation which has more political influence than we. The trade is now carried on in this way: a partnership is formed between a house in France and a house in England. The former purchases the wool, brings it to France; and the latter receives it from France, paying, of course, a handsome profit to the French house. This is a curious mode of obtaining, at an easy rate, a share in the profits of English industry, a portion of the interest on English capital. France is a sort of sleeping partner in our national firm: she has her full portion of the benefits, without appearing in the drudgery and dirt of the business. If we complain, if we ask by what right she insists

(2) See report of the trial, True Briton, 10th ultimo.

upon this share, she will tell us: "by that "right which we have conquered from you, "*the right of the sword.*"—The lovers of "peace and *a large loaf*" will comfort themselves with observing, that it is no matter, for that the enhancement in the price of the wool will, by rendering the cloth dearer, only *take more money from our customers*, so that, in the end, the nation will lose nothing by this exertion of French power. This is not true; for, first, whatever France *gains* by our means is a loss to us; and, in the next place, a great part of "our *customers*" are *ourselves*. But, if *all* our finest cloths were actually exported, every penny of enhancement in their price, tends to give a preference to the cloths of other countries. This oppression may have no very striking effect for some time; but it will in the end, and, as the government of France becomes consolidated, capital will remove to within the sphere of its *all-protecting* power, and this removal will be greatly accelerated by the proofs, which are daily exhibited to the world, of the feebleness of our own government. Confidence in the French government is daily and hourly increasing, while the exactly opposite sentiment is growing into vogue with respect to our own. Millions of capital have already been removed, and, lamentable as is the fact, men begin to look forward to the time when the dominions of France will be *the only place of safety for property or person!* Base, infamously base indeed, must be the mind that can bear the idea of such a refuge; but, alas! it is useless to rail. We have confessed ourselves *inferior* to France; we have made a treaty with her upon the principle of *acknowledged inferiority*; it has been proclaimed to the world, and the whole world believes it, that we are *no longer able to contend against her*; and, who, then, shall blame the mass of the people for looking after security where alone it is to be found? Who shall blame them for seeking to appease before hand, the wrath of the enraged victor? With sorrow, with shame, we make the acknowledgment, but we do, from the bottom of our souls, believe, that this has been the *principal object* of a great majority of those, who have gone hence to prostrate themselves at the Court of St. Cloud! The fate, too, of the French Royalists, is a most persuasive monitor on this subject. A resistance against the French Revolutionists, whether in or out of France, has constantly been punished with ruin, and not unfrequently with death, while all their partizans have been protected, even when found at the foot of the gallows. Is it to be supposed, that this lesson has been lost upon the world, and particularly upon a people, who have been systematically taught, that nothing is of any value but *money?* That the wealthy fools will be deceived is certain: but that is no matter: they will perceive their error when it is too late to save either themselves or their country.

ST. DOMINGO.—To this very important object we find it frequently necessary to recur. The Island is not "evacuated" yet; and, if we are to believe the reports lately received, the work of reduction goes on with every prospect of success.—Many fresh troops had arrived when the last advices came away. Great numbers are upon the eve of going out. The commerce is an object of attention, as will be seen by the official dispatches in our last, p. 274. When the internal disorders of the Island are a little quieted, let Jamaica take care. The ministers seem to be duly apprized of the "*additional* security," which we have derived from the French war against the "Black Empire," and are giving a striking proof of it by keeping, on that station, just *double* the maritime force which they kept there previous to the signing of the preliminaries, though the fearful Black Empire was then in full prosperity, and though we were at war with the three principal maritime powers of Europe!—So much for Lord Castlereagh's plan of aiding in the destruction of the Black Empire for the sake of the security of our own colonies!—So much for "*safe* politicians!"

SWITZERLAND, with all its *constitutions*, will be noticed hereafter.

NOTICES.

OUR CORRESPONDENTS will have the goodness to excuse us till next week, when they shall be attended to, particularly on the affairs of the NAVY.—The Letter to LD. ST. VINCENT shall appear, without fail.

We have great pleasure in informing our readers, that the first part of the authentic and very interesting MÉMOIRES DU COMTE JOSEPH DE PUISAYE has just been published in London. This is, we believe, the most valuable work hitherto published on the French Revolution.

*** The 2d Number of the MERCURE ANGLOIS DE COBBETT was published on Wednesday last.—This work is sold by E. Harding, No. 18, Pall Mall, by DULAU and Co. Soho Square, and by Mr. Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden. The work of M. DE PUISAYE is sold by the same persons.—MR. COBBETT takes this opportunity to recommend, to his friends, MR. HARDING, who has succeeded him as a Bookseller in Pall Mall, and on whose punctuality the utmost reliance may be placed.—MR. COBBETT's address is, Duke Street, Westminster.

LONDON.

TO JAMES MAC INTOSH, ESQ.

SIR,—In resuming the subject of your defence of Mr. Peltier, I think it not unnecessary to re-state the motives, by which I am actuated in this discussion. Nothing is more common than to impute animadversions, such as I have entered on with respect to your speech, to some private and sinister motive; but, it is next to an impossibility, that I should be so actuated in the present instance. You have never had any dispute or concern with me; I never saw you above three times in my life; the sentiments I have heard you utter, as to public matters, were such as I could not dislike, and your revolutionary or other writings I have never read. My mind was, with regard to you, a sheet of blank paper, and happy should I have been to fill it up with commendations. Nor, if I have taken a different course, is my conduct to be ascribed to a desire to censure you, but to remove censure, accumulated and unmerited censure, from the conduct and the character of your client, who, as I before observed, incurs, from the unqualified praises of your defence, a new condemnation. This is, this must be, evident to every man, that, if your defence was *the best that ever was made*, Mr. Peltier's must have been *a most desperate cause*. Had not the news-papers joined in concert to extol your speech, had that speech not been publicly represented as the highest exertion of human talent, I might, nevertheless, have perceived its defects, and I certainly should have lamented its total inefficacy; but I should not have thought myself called upon for any observations upon it; I should have left my readers to form their own judgment, and should have contented myself with silent regret. The commendations, the systematic, the unbounded applause, bestowed on the speech, totally altered the case. From the moment it became a subject of praise, through the channel of the press, it became a legitimate subject of discussion; and, when it was considered that such praise must operate to the prejudice of Mr. Peltier, that discussion became, in my opinion, an imperious duty with every one who thought as I did, and who had similar means in his hands.—Such, Sir, are the motives which have induced me to take up the pen, and these motives will, I am persuaded, meet with the approbation of every sensible and honourable man.

2. The second point of view, in which I am about to consider your defence, is, as it relates to the *precedents* on which the prosecution was founded.—The doctrine of a libel, Sir, I take to be this: that any thing spoken or written, or even any ludicrous drawings or pictures, that tend to the ridicule or debasement of a person, and to the bringing of him into disrepute, may irritate such an one to commit a breach of the peace; and, that the truth of the matter, so spoken or written, does not diminish the guilt of the libel, because, true or false, it equally tends to a breach of the King's peace. But, when this law of libels (which, by the by, appears to have grown out of the "*blessed* art of printing") was promulgated, it never entered into the minds of our ancestors, that this rule, however politic and expedient amongst the subjects of the same country, should extend to men and things out of the jurisdiction and allegiance of the laws and sovereign of this realm. Buonaparté did not owe local allegiance here, and consequently was without the pale of the law of England, every maxim of which is built upon the ground of perfect equality and reciprocity; that is to say, every one that can sue or prosecute another, is liable to be sued or prosecuted by that other, for a similar damage or offence. But, Buonaparté cannot be prosecuted for a libel against Mr. Peltier: he may libel him, his Official Gazette has libelled him, the libels have been published in this realm, and the law cannot reach the offender, nor is it reasonable that it should, because one of the parties not being here, and not having the faculty of coming here, his libels cannot possibly tend to a breach of the peace. Nothing, therefore, is so clear, nothing so manifestly just, that, for no libel, or pretended libel, against Buonaparté, published in this realm, ought Mr. Peltier, or any other person, to be considered as liable to punishment by the English law. In opposition,

however, to these wise and just maxims, two *precedents* were cited: one the decision with respect to Lord George Gordon's attack on the late unfortunate and lamented Queen of France; and the other, the censure on the conduct and character of the late Emperor of Russia by Mr. Vi[illegible], the then editor of the Courier. I do not pretend to say, that these precedents were not fairly put forward; but, it appears to me, that you should have observed, that they were precedents of a very modern date, and of a very dangerous tendency. It was certainly worthy of remark, that, during the long and glorious annals of our country, during *twelve centuries* of jurisprudence, no similar case could be found till within *twenty years!* Precedents, though of some weight, are frequently to be admitted with great distrust, especially if they be recent, and more particularly if they be contrary to the spirit of the law; and, if they be found to form an innovation upon long and established maxims and practice, they are, and ought to be, almost always set aside. Their *novelty* does, indeed, in some instances, arise out of the necessary novelty of the case. A precedent, for instance, touching the forgery of Bank notes cannot be expected to be more ancient than the invention of that sort of currency, because the offence could not possibly have a previous existence. But, a similar apology could not have been set up, in the present case: the matter for libels, the means of libelling, and the law of libels, had all existed for upwards of twelve hundred years, in this country; and, therefore, the recent, the very recent date, of the precedents cited by the Attorney General, was a strong presumption against them; and, if it had been clearly and forcibly stated, must have had great weight in the minds of the jury. The *danger*, too, of implicitly admitting these precedents might have been dwelt on with singular propriety. The jury should, in my opinion, have been cautioned against giving encouragement to foreign powers to interfere in our domestic conduct. It should have been stated to them, that, if we should, unhappily, ever be governed by ministers, ready to sacrifice us to a foreign power, and, for their own interest's sake, to render us subject to that power; if ever this nation should be so situated, it should have been stated, that, to favour the nefarious views of such ministers, it was not in the mind of man to conceive any means so efficacious as the unqualified adoption of the precedents on which the prosecution of Mr. Peltier was founded: for, in such a state, menaced with such danger, the salvation of the country must entirely and absolutely depend upon an opposition on the part of the people; and, as that opposition must arise, in the first instance, from the suggestions of individuals, crying against the machinations of the power by whom their liberties and independence were threatened, the silencing of those individuals by the arm of law must of necessity lead to the intended subjugation. There are, indeed, different degrees in censure, as well as in most other things; but, having once generally acknowledged the broad unlimited precedent, having once dipped into the poison, there is no knowing were the effects will end. *Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coûte.*—But, supposing these precedents to have been founded in wisdom and in justice, as relating to the Queen of France and the Emperor of Russia, still, it remained to be shown, that they were in point with respect to Buonaparté and to the case of your client. And, here it was not only justifiable, but even necessary for you to show, the wide difference between the two former and the Corsican chief. The precedent of the Queen of France could not apply, because she was neither the *sovereign* nor the *chief magistrate* of a foreign country, and that of the Emperor of Russia could not apply because *he was not in what Buonaparté is.* The virtual distinction might be nice, but still there was a distinction, and the precedents were not, therefore, *in point.* You had further to contend, and on the best possible ground, that there was a very great difference indeed, between the cases cited, and that of your client, if considered with regard to the *provocation.* It has been said, that you had to try only the dry question of *guilty* or *not guilty*, and that, therefore, you had nothing to do with any part of the character or conduct of Buonaparté. This is new doctrine, doctrine never before heard of in an English court of justice. What is it that constitutes the libel? *Falsehood* and *malice.* The former has been of late years set aside; but *malice* is still an essential quality. No matter how libellous the thing may be in itself, it must, to make it criminal, be *malicious*; and, as the jury were the judges of the law as well as of the fact, it was your business to convince them, that your client stood, with respect to Buonaparté, in a predicament widely different from that in which the libellers of the Queen of France and the Emperor of Russia stood with respect to those personages. "It was a dry question of guilty "or not guilty." Very true, this was the *ultimate* question, but to come at a decision of it, there was a previous question: to wit: whether the writing was *malicious*, and published with a *mischievous intention.* If the

act of publishing, and the libellousness of the words (in themselves considered), had been all that was necessary to constitute the crime, then, indeed, the question would have been as dry as you please; but an inquiry into the *motive* would not have been so very dry. This enquiry would have led you, it must have led you, into an examination of the character and conduct of Buonaparté; for, that which may be extremely malicious when spoken of one man, may be not at all malicious when spoken of another man. If, for instance, I bestow the name of *tyger* on a man, who is well known to beat his wife, to dash his children on the floor, to half-starve and lacerate his apprentices, and if I am indicted for this as a libel, I am not allowed to urge the truth in justification, I cannot urge the truth, because a man cannot be a tyger; but, though what I have said, or written, be evidently false, would a jury say that it was *malicious* to call such a man a tyger? No; but, they would justly regard as malicious *the very same term* when applied to a quiet neighbour, an affectionate husband, a tender father, and a kind benevolent master. In speaking, or writing, of a wretch, notoriously guilty of all the most shocking and horrid crimes, my expressions, however harsh, my wishes, however hostile, my execrations, however bitter, ought not to be imputed to *malice*, to badness of design, to deliberate mischief, but to that natural, that involuntary, that virtuous hatred, which God, for the best purposes, has planted in the human breast; but, if I give way to the very same expressions, wishes, and execrations, against a man guilty of no such crimes, I am justly chargeable with that species of malice, which constitutes the principal and always an essential ingredient of criminal libel. For this reason, this sound and obvious reason, it is, that the general character and conduct of the party libelled have always been held to be fair and relevant topics in a defence against the charges of an information or indictment.—There was another light, too, in which the application of the precedents ought to have been considered. The libellers of the Queen of France and the Emperor of Russia had suffered *no injury* at the hands of the parties libelled, either in their own persons or character, or the persons or character of their relations, or those of their lawful sovereigns. Were these, then, precedents in point? Do not the injuries of Mr. Peltier, do not the wounds inflicted on him, his relations, his friends, and his native sovereign, do not these deep and mortal wounds sufficiently account for his expressions, without having recourse to the imputation of *malice*? Shall the martyr, writhing at the stake, be accused of *malice*, because he execrates the hand that feeds the inexorable flames? *Resentment*, open, undisguised resentment, is not malice; and, I repeat again and again, Sir, that if there be no malice, there is no libel. On this point, therefore, it appears to me, that you should have entered into a clear and detailed exposition of the divers injuries and acts of persecution, which your client, his relations, and his lawful sovereign, had experienced at the hands of the person, on whose behalf the prosecution was instituted. But, instead of this, you chose, for reasons best known to yourself, to represent the insulting and cruel offer of an amnesty, which was tendered to Mr. Peltier as well as others, as an act of *indulgence*; and, for having rejected this offer, which, amongst other degrading conditions, required of him to abjure his sovereign; for having had the firmness to reject an offer like this, for having given this proof of his loyalty, you do not venture even to *commend* him! This part of your speech is too curious not to be quoted. "I do not mean "to undervalue this *indulgence*; on the con- "trary, *I am disposed to rate it high*; but my "client and *a few* others, conceiving them- "selves bound, from a feeling of *loyalty*, "which I neither make the subject of *com-* "*mendation* or of *blame*, to refuse to profit "by this permission. I do not, as I said, "make this refusal a matter of *praise* or of "*censure*; I only hope, that you will not "judge *too severely* of my client for what *he* "*conceives* to be a just and honourable de- "votion to the allegiance, under which he "was born." Now, Sir, was this a specimen of that "*intrepidity*," which you were pleased to represent as the characteristic of the English bar? Was this the sort of language to hold in the Court of *King's* Bench; in a *royal* court of justice; in a court where his Majesty is ever supposed to preside in person? Was this the place, and was this the occasion, Sir, to make an *apology* for the *loyalty* of your client? Or was it not the place and the time to applaud Mr. Peltier, and to draw a comparison between his conduct and that of his prosecutor, who was fed and educated by the bounty of the King of France? Was it not the very place and the very time, above all others, to remind your audience, that the liberties of Englishmen were once destroyed by an hypocritical, perfidious, and sanguinary usurper? It was, and you did remind them of it; you did speak of Cromwell; but you took care to prefix the epithets "*guilty* and *infamous*," not to the name of that atrocious rebel, but to that of the lawful prince, by whose happy

RESTORATION the rebellion was terminated! What, Sir; give me leave to ask, what could induce you, in a defence of a French royalist against Buonaparté; what could possibly induce you to seize such an occasion to vilify an ancestor of your own sovereign, and to choose from the long and illustrious list, precisely that prince, who was once in the situation, in which the sovereign of your client now is? Would it not, if you had spoken at all of King Charles II. have been more natural to remind the jury of the unfeigned and unbounded joy, which the people felt and expressed at his return to the throne? To remind them, that the day of his restoration has ever since been kept as a festival in the church, as a day of public exultation, and of thanksgiving to Almighty God for having, by the means of this gracious prince, delivered our country from a low-bred, gloomy, jealous, black-hearted usurper, who, while he styled it a republic, exercised over it the most cruel and inexorable despotism? And might you not, Sir, in applying this to the case of your client, have justly observed, that those Englishmen, who, during the exile of King Charles, faithfully adhered, like Mr. Peltier, to the cause of their native sovereign, have ever been regarded as patterns of political excellence; and that, while their names are remembered with veneration and gratitude, those of the base wretches, who bowed at the feet of the usurper, are either lost in oblivion or preserved only to their infamy? Here too, you might have returned, as I now do, more immediately to the merits of your case, and might have put it to the consciences of the jury, whether they could have regarded, as proceeding from *malice*, any of the attacks made on Cromwell, through the channel of the press, by the injured and oppressed, the robbed and persecuted cavaliers?—"It was a dry question "of *guilty or not guilty!*" So it is on every such issue; but, as I observed before, there are many previous questions to be answered before we come at this dry question, and all these are full of matter. The general character, the previous conduct, the relative situation, of the parties, their crimes or their virtues, are all to be considered; they form the materials of the defence, because it is from them and from them alone, that a right judgment can be formed of the *motives* of the accused, and it is not the act *alone*, but the *act in conjunction with the motive*, which constitutes the crime. The charge in the information was, "That JEAN PEL-"TIER, being a *malicious* and *ill-disposed* "*person*, and unlawfully and *maliciously de-*"*vising* and *intending*, &c. &c." Who shall say, then, that it was "a dry question of "guilty or not guilty?" Who shall say, that the general character and conduct of the parties had nothing to do with this question? Who shall say, that it was not necessary to show, that, the character and conduct of Buonaparté were sufficient to call forth the indignant expressions and sentiments of Mr. Peltier without the aid of *malice* or *ill-disposition?* Who shall say, that it would not have been strictly regular and relevent for you to endeavour to convince the jury, that the words and the wishes of Mr. Peltier bore not the mark of "*maliciously devising* and *intending*," but were, on the contrary, the spontaneous ebullitions, the natural offspring, of virtuous indignation and abhorrence, called involuntarily forth by the character and the deeds of the prosecutor? Who, Sir, would have dared, who would have had the impudence and the baseness, to censure you for thus removing the charge of *malice*, and, thereby, destroying the very essence of the crime imputed to your client?

3. Having considered your defence as relative to the topics and arguments, which, in my opinion, naturally presented themselves as the means of repelling the force of the precedents on which, and on which alone, the prosecution was brought into court, I propose next to consider it (in rather an inverted order, perhaps) as relative to the *principle* which gave rise to those precedents.—The *novelty* of the precedents has been already pointed out; but, it is urged, that, if the precedents themselves are novel, the principle out of which they arose, is as ancient as the law of libels. This principle is, that all words and pictures, which are spoken or published with a malicious intention, and which expose a person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, are criminal, not because they do so expose him, but because, by producing in his mind irritation and a desire of revenge, they have an evident tendency to cause a breach of the peace; and this principle, though so obviously intended to be confined to persons and things *within* the realm, and within the pale of its law, has, in the precedents cited in this case, been extended to persons and things *out of* the pale of that law: it has, at the end of a long succession of ages, been discovered to be of a nature so pliable and plastic, as to be capable of assuming any form, and of being stretched to any extent. That which was devised for the sole purpose of preserving the King's peace, that is to say, for insuring the personal safety of his subjects against the violent assaults of each other, has now been applied

to the purpose, or the pretended purpose, of preserving the peace between nations, and insuring the safety of the country itself against foreign fleets and armies. This principle, thus applied, puts one in mind of Lord Peters's "pickle for houses, gardens, trees, men, women, children, and cattle; quite a thing of catholic use and emolument" It may be, in itself, ancient, but this application of it is entirely modern; and, indeed, it has undergone a change, a metamorphosis, such as, I believe, no principle ever before underwent.—This, Sir, in terms as much more happy and forcible as might be, it was, in my opinion, your business to point out, illustrating your position by such probable cases as would have discovered at once its intrinsic preposterousness, and the great danger of its tendency. The law, the ancient and established law of libels, proceeds upon a definite maxim, a maxim invariably true. It punishes a libel, because a libel tends to a breach of the King's peace; and it punishes a breach of the King's peace, because such a breach is *always a crime*. But, how does this principle apply to the peace of England with relation to foreign powers, to disturb which, for years together, is *no crime at all*. To break the King's peace is *necessarily criminal;* but to break the peace between this country and another *may be an act highly meritorious*. It will not do to say, that the latter may be sometimes criminal, and sometimes not criminal; the principle, to be worth any thing, must be uniform and impartial in its operation; and, therefore, if it be criminal at one time, it is so at another time; if it be criminal in Mr. Peltier, it was criminal in Mr. Pitt. To say that Mr. Pitt acted in the name of his Majesty, who was himself the guardian of the country, makes nothing against my argument; for, a magistrate acts in the name of his Majesty, who is the guardian of the peace also; and, we all know, that a magistrate may be prosecuted for any libel that tends to a breach of that peace.—But, preposterous as this principle is, the *danger* of its tendency is a consideration of much greater weight. By opening an unbounded latitude of *construction*, it exposes to the decision of caprice, of self-interest, of corruption, or of mere chance, not only the property, but the personal freedom, and eventually the life, of every man who, though actuated by the purest, most innocent and most honourable motives, shall venture to write on the subject of foreign affairs. We all know what tends to a breach of the King's peace: when a man is called a thief, or represented as an ass, amongst his neighbours, and that by a person living in the same country, we know that he must be angry, and must entertain such a desire of revenge as naturally tends to a breach of the King's peace, which breach it is *always within his power to make*. But, who can say, what jury can possibly determine the degree of this species of provocation likely to produce war with a foreign country? Peace or war must always depend upon interest, upon means, and, indeed, upon a multitude of considerations, which are totally unconnected with the private feelings of the sovereign or chief of the nation, who therefore, however grossly libelled, has not always *the power of breaking the peace* with another nation; whereas, as I before observed, an enraged individual has always the power of breaking the King's peace. This principle extends, too, to *a whole nation* as well as to its chief; for, it is well known that wars, though factious republicans and levellers have ascribed them exclusively to the passions of princes, have frequently arisen out of the passions of the people: and, therefore, any publication which tends to expose *a whole people* to the hatred, contempt, or ridicule of other nations, may, according to this principle, be the subject of a criminal prosecution; because, whether true or false, and for whatever purpose intended, whether for the gratification of malice, or for the prevention of an introduction of foreign manners and foreign vices, it equally tends to irritate and inflame the said people, and, of course, to disturb the peace existing between them and this realm. Silence, therefore, must be strictly observed with regard to the robberies, the murders, the apostacies, the blasphemies, of the French republicans; a veil must be drawn over their follies and all their crimes; and our Sovereign and his people must forego every advantage, every motive to content, every means of security, furnished by that awful lesson the revolution of France. I am aware, that the Attorney-General attempted to draw a line between an *historical fact* and a *fanciful description*; but, to say nothing about the mortal blow which this gives to the principle on which the justification of *truth* is rejected in such cases, where did the Attorney-General find this distinction *in law?* and, had you not here, Sir, a most auspicious opportunity of shewing the versatility of the principle altogether, by pointing out to the court and jury, that the passage for which Mr. Vint was prosecuted, as being a libel on the Emperor of Russia, was *a relation of an historical fact!* The words were these: "The

" Emperor of Russia is rendering himself " obnoxious to his own subjects by various " acts of tyranny, and ridiculous to the rest " of Europe by his inconsistency. He has " lately published an edict to prohibit the " exportation of deals and other naval " stores, in consequence of which hundreds " of sails of vessels are returning to this " country without freight."—I am really astonished, Sir, that this inconsistency, which exhibits in so strong a light the accommodating quality of the principle on which your client was prosecuted, should have escaped your animadversion. This affected distinction was, indeed, evidently absurd, when considered as to the ultimate object professed by the information, to wit: to prevent a libeller from disturbing the peace between the two countries; for, who could possibly believe, that the epigrams, the fanciful descriptions, of Mr. Peltier were half so likely to produce a rupture of the peace, as were the historical facts related by Sir Robert Wilson? Do not these historical facts tend to vilify Buonaparté, and to bring him into disrepute and disgrace, amongst those over whom he exercises dominion? Does not Sir Robert's plain unvarnished detail of facts tend more immediately to expose the first magistrate of France to the hatred, detestation and contempt, not only of his own countrymen, but of every individual in Europe? does not such a detail tend more directly and more powerfully to irritate Buonaparte, and, of course, to cause a breaking of the peace on his part, than any fanciful satire by either poet or proser? And, if this be so, what becomes of the Attorney-General's affected distinction?—So that, if we admit the principle on which the precedents in this case were founded, there is an end at once to all publications, of whatever sort, levelled against any foreign potentate or people, with whom we are at peace; and we are for ever debarred, in this respect, from all the advantages, whether in morals, religion, or politics, to be derived from the genius of the poet or the labours of the historian. The speculating politician must be totally silent; for nothing, not a word, can he say to caution his country against the machinations of any foreign power; he cannot even state that such power is hostilely inclined; he cannot, though he should be fully persuaded, though he himself should know, that such power is actually preparing to attack his country; whatever may be his opinion or his knowledge of facts, he cannot state either without exposing himself, according to this principle, to a criminal prosecution for publications calculated to irritate the potentate in question, and thereby to provoke him to a breach of the peace.—Here, then, the danger of this pernicious principle reaches its acme: it not only silences the voice of the poet, the moralist, and the historian, as to all the useful lessons to be drawn from the follies, the vices, and the crimes of other nations, but it seals up the lips of every man who has the sagacity to perceive the dangers with which his country is threatened, and the courage to endeavour to animate the people with that spirit, by which alone their independence and their happiness can possibly be preserved.

4. But, Sir, if you had failed, which I hardly think you would, in convincing the court and jury, of the utter absurdity of this principle, and of the great danger of admitting it, as a ground of prosecution, in any case whatever; still it remained for you to show, and, I hope you might easily have shown, that even this principle, pliable as it is, would not, with any show of justice, admit of *an application to the case of your client*.—That which is principally to be considered, that which must finally be considered, as constituting the crime imputed to your client, is, the *consequence* likely to be produced by his publications, which consequence is *a rupture of the peace*, existing between this country and the person against whom the publications were made.—Before, however, I enter on the arguments relating to this part of the subject, it seems necessary to make a few remarks as to the meaning and object of the words published by Mr. Peltier. He had called Buonaparté a tyger and a tyrant, whether with propriety or not, it was, as I before stated, your business to shew, in your examination of the precedents cited by the Attorney General; but, the heaviest charge, that which referred to what was allowed to be the principal cause of irritation in the mind of the Corsican, and that which certainly had the greatest weight in the decision of the jury, was, that the words of your client were *intended to excite the oppressed people of France to* ASSASSINATE *their ruler*. And, here, before I proceed to shew the absurdity of this charge, I must particularly notice one of the passages, on which this odious construction was put, merely from *a misinterpretation*. In the French it runs thus:

" Pour moi, loin qu'à son sort je porte quelqu'-
" envie,
" Qu'il nomme, j'y consens, son digne successeur,
" Sur le pavois porté, qu'on l'élise empereur!
" Enfin, et Romulus nous rappelle la chose,
" Je fais vœu . . . dès demain qu'il ait *l'apothéose*!"

These words were, by Mr. Broughton,

the sworn interpreter, translated in the following manner:—"As for me, far from "envying his lot, let him name, I consent "to it, his worthy successor. Carried on "the shield, let him be elected emperor! "Finally, and (Romulus recalls the thing "to mind), I wish that on the morrow he "may have *his* apotheosis." That Mr. Broughton's misinterpretation proceeded from a want of knowledge on the subject is evident from the illustration, which, in print, he has since given of the rule, on which his translation was made; but still it was a *misinterpretation*, and, as the charge of exciting to assassination was made to rest principally upon this passage, you might have made something more than a very feeble attempt to have put the court and jury right with respect to it; especially, as you are, I am told, considered as a proficient in French literature and philology.*—The pronoun *his*, relating evidently to Romulus, the meaning is, that Mr. Peltier wished Buonaparté to experience his (Romulus's) fate, which was, according to the opinions of historians, that of being placed in the list of the gods, after having been *assassinated* by the Romans. But "*his* apotheosis" is not a fair translation of "*l'*apotheose." *Le*, in this case, is the definite article, and that article can never be translated into English by the possessive pronoun, except when it is found before the name of *the whole or some part of the body*, (human or not) *or that of some quality, faculty, or property of the body or mind.* For instance: *il a* LE *bras court*—HIS *hand is short*:—*il a* LE *pas lent*—HIS *step is slow*:—*il a* LA *voix très-belle*—HIS *voice is very fine*:—*il a* L'*esprit très éclairé*—HIS *mind is very much enlightened.*—In all these examples, and in every other of the kind that can possibly be given, the noun, before which the article is placed, represents something which *belongs to*, and which is *inseparable from* the *body or mind of the person or animal spoken of*; and, in no other possible case, can the French definite article be rendered in English by the possessive pronoun. You cannot say, *il a* LE CHAPEAU *noir*—HIS HAT *is black*; but you may that *il a* LES CHEVEUX *noirs*—HIS HAIR *is black*; because the *hat* is not a part of the body, and because the *hair* is a part of it. Therefore, "L'*apothéose*," never can be rendered in English by "HIS "*apotheosis*," and, of course, the word *his*, which made the word apotheosis apply to Romulus, which gave the invidious and malignant meaning to the sentence in question, and which probably produced the conviction of Mr. Peltier, was a misinterpretation; and thus, *an instigation to assassinate* the Corsican was gathered from a verse, in which the poet simply expresses a wish, that the said Corsican *may be deified*, and which verse, if it had expressed a desire to send him *to the devil*, would have been regarded as perfectly harmless!—But, the charge of exciting to assassination, particularly in *poetry*, might, by a reference to almost any of our satirical poets, have been rendered so completely ridiculous, as to make the prosecutor blush for having seriously advanced it. SWIFT, in his description of the Irish Parliament, says,

"Could I from the building's top
"Hear the rattling thunder drop,
"While the devil upon the roof
"(If the devil be thunder proof)
"Should, with poker fiery red,
"Crack the stones, and melt the lead;
"Drive them down on every skull;
"While the den of thieves is full;
"*Quite destroy that harpies nest*,
"How might then our isle be blest!"

Is not this a wish full as wicked as that of Mr. Peltier, who only desires to see Buonaparté *deified?*—There is another passage or two, of the same writer, in a poem entitled "*Wood an Insect*," and by which Wood, was well known to be meant William Wood, who had a contract from government for supplying Ireland with copper coin, and who had, in consequence of that contract, and of the writings of Swift, become extremely odious amongst the common people in particular.

"The Louse of the Wood for a med'cine is us'd,
"Or swallow'd alive or skilfully bruis'd.
"And let, then, our mother Hibernia contrive
"To *swallow* Will Wood, either *bruis'd* or *alive*.
* * * * * *
"But now since the Drapier hath heartily mauld him,
"I think the best thing we can do is to *scald him*.
"For which operation here's nothing more proper
"Than the liquor he deals in, his own melted copper.
"Unless, like the Dutch, you rather would *boil*
"This coiner of raps *in a cauldron of oil*.
"Then chuse which you please, and *let each bring*
"*a faggot*,
"For our fear's at an end with the *death of the*
"*maggot*."

Now, though these verses were distributed about amongst the mob of Dublin, who, in their rage, were certainly as likely to *bruise* a man and put him under ground, or

* In order to give to my assertions, on this point, that weight to which they are duly and fairly entitled, I think it necessary to state, for the satisfaction of those of my readers who may not understand French themselves, my pretensions to decide on the meaning of any passage in that language. I am the author of a work, entitled LE MAITRE ANGLOIS, intended to teach Frenchmen English, and written, of course, in French. The work was first published in America; but, it has since been re-published in France, has been adopted by the *Prytanée François*, and has, under their sanction, been received in all the schools of France.

to *scald* him or *boil* him, as any set of people in the world, who ever accused Swift of exciting them to *assassinate* this maker of half-pence? Who ever had the folly to suppose that the Dean had any such excitement in view, or that this poem had any other object than that of keeping alive a spirit of watchfulness, and, perhaps, of public indignation, against a man, whom the writer regarded as a peculator, and as an enemy of the country? And would not a lawyer have been hooted out of court, if he had attempted to impute a satire like this to an intention such as that imputed to Mr. Peltier? Yet, it must be evident to every one, who has eyes to see, ears to hear, and who possesses the very humble faculty of making a comparison between the two writings, that the poem of Swift was much more likely to lead to assassination than were the fragments and epigrams of your client, which, besides their being published in a country where the Corsican Consul did not reside, could not, as the publisher well knew, be admitted into that country where he did reside, and where, if assassination had been intended, the assassins were only to be found.—After all, however, and to come to the close of this wearisome discussion, it was not the expressions cited in the information, it was not the sentiments conveyed by those expressions, it was not the motive by which the defendant had been actuated, nor was it the degree of irritation probably produced in the mind of the Corsican, that formed the principal points of inquiry; these were all leading points, indeed, but the ultimate question was, *were the publications likely to cause a rupture of the peace existing between England and France?* For, whatever might be nature of them, however bad in themselves, and from whatever wicked motive arising, still, unless they had a tendency, and even an evident tendency, to bring, in some way or other, injury upon His Majesty or his subjects, they were, in the eye of the law, perfectly innocent. To make out this injury, therefore, it was alledged, that they tended "to *interrupt*, *disturb*, and *destroy* the FRIENDSHIP and "PEACE, subsisting between our said Lord "the King and his subjects, and the said "Napoleon Buonaparté, &c. &c." And, the Attorney General clearly stated this to be the *only* ground on which he came into court. "Because," said he, "I think, "that this libel tends to *endanger the tranquillity between this country and a nation with "whom we are at peace*, I prosecute the author. *That charge* brings me, and it brings "the defendant, this day before you." Thus, then, the whole question was, at last, brought into a very narrow compass; here was the pivot, on which the fate of your client was to turn. And, Sir, astonished, astonished was I to see, that you made use of no one argument, that you cited no one fact out of the thousand that presented themselves, in order to convince the jury, that no libel or any other species of provocation, could possibly render Buonaparté more the enemy of our king and country than he already was, or could induce him to hasten by the space of only one single moment, those plans which he has conceived for our impoverishment and destruction. Here, Sir, it was, that I would have entered into a history, not of the ambition of Louis XIV, not of that "*infamous* "*transaction* and *public robbery*," the partition of Poland, not, in short, of the crimes of kings and the virtues of republics, "particularly a new republic of British growth;" this is not the sort of history I would have entered into, but a history of the conduct of Napoleon Buonaparté with respect to Europe in general and to England in particular, since the conclusion of the peace of Amiens; and, I think, I could have shown, Sir, that, from the signature of that ruinous and disgraceful compact to the moment in which you were speaking, this abused and deluded country *never had been really and truely at peace*; and, that the person, in whose behalf the prosecution was commenced, instead of living in *friendship* with us, had constantly been loading our Sovereign and his people with every species of injury and insult that the mind of the bitterest enemy could possibly devise. I would have cited some few, at least, of the numerous and infamous libels, which had been circulated against us, in every country in Europe, through the channel of his official gazette; but, in particular, I would have shown, that the strongest of the publications, which were imputed to Mr. Peltier as a crime, were published *subsequent* to the arrival of that atrocious libel, in which the Corsican's official gazette styles His Majesty the *rewarder of assassins*, and which might well have justified words ten thousand times as harsh, wishes ten thousand times as bitter, as those ascribed to your client. "The "*friendship* subsisting between His Majesty "and Buonaparte!" *Friendship* and *peace* subsisting between us and the Corsican! What a glorious field for the display of oratorical talents! I would have rung these words in the ears of the Attorney General, until, soft and sweet as they are to a "*safe* "politician," they should have sounded to him more dismal than the knell of his father;

and, as to the jury, I will not believe, that any twelve honest men upon the face of the earth, hearing what might have been said in defence of your client, would have hesitated one moment to pronounce him *not guilty*.*

Here, Sir, I conclude my remarks. I have discharged a duty, imposed on me by the laws of honour and hospitality; and, though you may, perhaps, remind me, that I should have done well to keep this defence *for my own use*, I shall not thereby be put out of humour, or led to view my present effort with regret. Seeing the disgraceful situation of my country, I cannot feel much anxiety as to its favour or its frowns, its justice or its injustice: if we are to be slaves, it is of little consequence whether we are surrounded by the walls of a jail or by the waves of the sea.—I am, Sir, your most obedient servant, W. COBBETT.

London, 9th March, 1803.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Jan. 10.—On the 26th of Dec. in the evening, an adjutant of General Stuart, had a conference with the Reis Effendi, and proposed, in the name of the English government, that the Porte should grant a pardon to the Egyptian Beys, and assign them a distant place in Upper Egypt for their residence, where they should engage to live peaceably, and conduct themselves as faithful subjects of the Porte.—The Reis Effendi, who had expected very different proposals from the English adjutant, answered, that the Porte would communicate its determination on this subject to the English Ambassador, Lord Elgin. The latter accordingly had several conferences with the Reis Effendi, and the negotiation was yesterday evening brought to a conclusion, as Lord Elgin took his leave of the Grand Vizier. The Porte has, in fact, contrary to general expectation, granted a pardon to the Beys, under the following conditions:—1. The cavalry of the Mamelukes shall enter immediately into the service of the Pacha of Cairo.—2. The Porte will assign to the six insurgent Beys, the little town of Awan, in Upper Egypt, where they shall reside in peace, and subject to the Porte, without interfering, in any manner, in the public affairs and government of Egypt.—As soon as this convention was concluded, Lord Elgin declared officially to the Grand Vizier, that Egypt should be immediately evacuated by the English troops, which would be conveyed from thence to Malta.—On the 6th, the French Ambassador, General Brune, arrived here with the squadron from Toulon, consisting of a ship of the line, a frigate, 2 brigs and 2 corvettes. This squadron likewise brought the French agents of legation and commerce destined for the different ports of the Levant.

Rome, Feb. 17.—His Holiness, by virtue of the right conferred upon him by the great powers of Europe, of appointing the Grand Master of the order of Malta, has chosen M. le Bailly de Thomasi, a Neapolitan Knight. The Commander De Busy has set out from Rome for Sicily to carry to the new GrandMaster the brief of election, conferring upon him that dignity.

Ratisbon, Feb. 18.—The extraordinary Deputation of the Empire held this day the 46th sitting. The Directorial Minister, on that occasion, announced the receipt of a decree on the evening before, from the Imperial Minister, by which he accedes to the decision relative to the Indemnities to be granted to the courts of the Empire, and intimates that he has made a communication to this effect to the ministers of the mediating powers.—*Feb.* 19. The Deputation of the Empire yesterday held their 45th sitting, in which the Directorial Minister announced that the Elector Arch-Chancellor was ready to undertake the payment of the subsidies destined for the support of the higher clergy.—The city of Passau was not evacuated, pursuant to a decree on the 12th of this month.

Brest, Feb. 23.—General Decaen has arrived there.—This general, appointed captain-general of our settlements in India, reviewed the same day the troops that are to be sent there. He was received in the road with all the honours due to his rank. The expedition to India will soon be in a condition to sail.

Berne, Feb. 23. Gen. Serras arrived here yesterday from Paris. There is to be established in each canton a commission of seven members, in order to put into activity the new cantonal constitution. Six of these members are appointed by our deputies at Paris, and the seventh by the First Consul. As soon as the cantonal commissions shall have entered upon their functions, the present government will dissolve itself. The epoch of that dissolution is fixed for the 10th of March.

Hague, March 1.—The government has officially announced, that all the West-India Colonies taken by the British during the war, have been finally given up, in consequence of the peace, to the Batavian Republic.—Last Tuesday arrived from Paris, one of the aids-de-camp of General Victor, with an order from the First Consul that General Cæsar Berthier should remain in his appointment of chief officer of the staff for the expedition to Louisiana, and should not obtain that new employment, which was some time intended for him by the First Consul. The naval minister writes to General Victor, that he has given the necessary orders for the departure of the expedition in the end of March.

Paris, March 2.—They write from Rouen, that Lebourgeois and Pigot, former leaders of the Chouans, accompanied by many others, had returned from England to France, where they kept themselves a month concealed. The Police, apprised of their return, made efforts to discover their motives, and soon found that they were forming new plots against the public safety. They have been arrested, and by their answers a proof has been discovered of the criminal designs which induced them to go back.—The camp, which is to be formed between Brussels and Louvain, at the epoch of the journey of the First Consul into the Belgic departments, will be established in the plain of Cortemberg. The number of troops of which it will be composed, appears to be definitively fixed at 15,000 men, who, as soon as the season permits, will be marched to their destination.

* Since the above was written, it has been explicitly declared, in the Ministerial Gazette, and in both Houses of Parliament, that ever since the signing of the peace, *Buonaparté has been in a state of* HOSTILITY *to this country*.

DOMESTIC.

In consequence of the arrival of dispatches at Windsor, on Monday morning at 7 o'clock, his Majesty gave immediate directions for preparations to be made for going to London with all possible speed. About one o'clock their Majesties arrived at Buckingham House. At 3 o'clock a Council was held at Buckingham House, which his Majesty attended; and at which were present the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Earl of Westmoreland, Lord Hobart, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Bragge, &c.

On Tuesday night, press warrants were issued and backed by the Lord Mayor. The press was very hot all that night and Wednesday. About 2000 seamen were picked up on the river and in the streets. They were seized in every part of the town, particularly in the city, in open day. The Admiralty Board has been sitting to a late hour every night since Saturday.—Orders have been dispatched to Chatham to get ready for sea, as quickly as possible, every ship that can be equipped for service. Orders have also been issued for the artificers in his Majesty's Dock Yards to work as much extra time as they possibly can, in completing the repairs of the ships of war now in dock, and of those ordered into dock, when there may be room for them. Orders have been issued at Portsmouth for the Captains of every ship in the harbour to repair to Spithead with all possible dispatch. Similar orders have also been sent to Plymouth. Several naval officers have been sent for to town. The first men impressed have been ordered to be sent to man such ships as are at Deptford and Woolwich, to expedite their getting to the Nore. The Hound sloop of war has come up to Deptford to the Tower, to receive the impressed. The army is to be recruited. To facilitate this object, H. R. H. the Duke of York has intimated to the proper officers, his Majesty's command that the standard for the recruits shall be reduced to 5 feet 5 inches, and that the levy money shall be raised to 6 guineas. Orders have been dispatched to all foreign stations.

On Wednesday another Cabinet Council was held upon the present alarming state of affairs.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Wednesday, Feb. 23.—COMMONS.—An account of different sums of money disbursed for the year 1802, was brought up.—Mr. Addington presented at the bar, an account of the money received, and to be received by the commissioners appointed under the Act of the 35th Geo. III. Ordered to be referred to the committee appointed to consider his Majesty's most gracious message.—Mr. Alexander presented a Report of the Mutiny Bill.—The Report of the Committee appointed to consider the Address to his Majesty, which was agreed to by the whole House.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the order of the day for taking into consideration his Majesty's most gracious Message, (see p. 248) relative to the affairs of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales be now read: upon which a debate ensued; the speakers were Colonel Stanley, Mr. Addington, the Solicitor-General, Mr. Harrison, Lord Castlereagh, Mr. Sheridan, and Mr. Fox. Mr. Addington concluded with moving, "That it is the opinion of this "committee, that his Majesty be enabled to grant "yearly any sum or sums of money out of the "Consolidated Fund of Great Britain, not exceeding in the whole £60,000; being to take "place from the 5th Jan. 1803, and to continue "until the 5th Jan. 1806, towards providing for "the better support and dignity of his Royal "Highness the Prince of Wales."—Motion agreed to. *(A correct report of this debate will be given in the Supplement to Vol. 3.)*

Thursday, Feb. 24.—LORDS.—Report of Bank Restriction Bill received and agreed to.—Lord Grenville acquainted their Lordships, it was his Majesty's pleasure to receive the Address of the House at 2 o'clock this day.—The House accordingly proceeded to St. James's, with their Address. See p. 285.

COMMONS.—Lord Stopford reported to the House, that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to receive the Address of the House this day at 3 o'clock.—Report of the Address was then brought up, read, and agreed to.—The House proceeded to St. James's, to present the Address voted by the House to his Majesty.

Friday, Feb. 25.—LORDS.—Counsel were heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Finlayson, *v.* Innes and others.—Bank Restriction Bill read a third time and passed.—Lord Pelham moved the order of the day, for taking his Majesty's Royal Message into consideration, relative to the affairs of his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales; which being read, his Lordship rose to move an Address to his Majesty on the occasion; which, as usual, was a general re-echo of the Message.—Address voted *nem. dis.*—Lord Auckland moved for sundry accounts, previous to his discussion of the financial state of the country. A short, but interesting conversation ensued, which will be preserved in our *Supplement to Vol.* 3. The speakers were Lord Auckland Moira, and Grenville.

COMMONS.—Mr. Addington moved, that the House be called over on Thursday next. Agreed to.—Militia Training Bill read a third time and passed.

Monday, Feb. 28.—LORDS.—The royal assent given, by commission, to the Bank Restriction Bill.—Counsel finally heard relative to the Scotch appeal, Finlayson, *v.* Innes. After which the Lord Chancellor stated the case, and concluded by moving, "That the Decree of the Scotch "court be affirmed by their Lordships, and that "the Appellant do pay £100 costs." Ordered.—Militia Exercise Bill, three Naturalization Bills, and two private bills were presented, and read a first time.

COMMONS.—On a motion by Lord Euston, James Trotter was ordered to be taken into custody of the Serjeant at Arms, for non-attendance as a witness on the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Dumfermlin election.—Lord Euston also moved, "That the deputy clerk of the "crown be ordered to produce the books of the "Dumfermlin district, in order that the name "of John Anderson, and all that relates to him, "be erased from the said books." Ordered.—Mr. Tyrwhitt made the following

Official Communication from his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales.

"That the Prince has felt, with the most sin-"cere and affectionate gratitude, the gracious "purpose of his Majesty, in recommending his "present situation to the consideration of Par-"liament. That having seen by the votes of "the House of Commons the manner in which "they have received his Majesty's recommenda-"tion, the Prince deems it incumbent on him "to express his warmest acknowledgment of "their liberality; at the same time the Prince, "though fully convinced of the propriety of re-"suming his state, and greatly regretting any cir-

" cumstance which tends to disappoint the wishes " of his Majesty, or of the House upon that sub- " ject, yet feels himself bound explicitly to de- " clare, that there are still claims remaining upon " his honour and his justice, for the discharge of " which he must continue to set apart, in trust, a " large sinking fund, and consequently postpone, " until the period of their liquidation, the resump- " tion of that state and dignity, which, however " essential to his rank and station, he knows " from dear-bought experience, could not, under " his present circumstances, be resumed without " the risk of incurring new difficulties.—The " Prince thinks that he owes it to himself, and to " Parliament, to make this declaration to them, " with the same distinctness as he stated it to his " Majesty's government, upon the first communi- " cation made to him of his Majesty's benign in- " tentions.—With respect to the Prince's claim to " an account of the revenues which accrued from " the Duchy of Cornwall from the year 1760 to " 1783, however strong his confidence in the va- " lidity of his claim, a confidence fortified by the " strongest legal authorities, yet as he trusts that " through the gracious interposition of his Ma- " jesty, and the liberality of Parliament, he shall " be enabled otherwise to provide for those de- " mands on his justice, which alone induced him " to assert his right, he now cheerfully re in- " quishes his suit, and has directed his law offi- " cers to forego all further proceedings."

Mr. Calcraft said, he had not heard any suffi- cient reason assigned for his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales not immediately resuming his state and dignity, and should on Friday bring for- ward a motion on that subject.—Mr. Erskine said, that such a motion was without the authority of his Royal Highness.—Mr. Sheridan moved, that the Prince's gracious communication be entered on the Journals. Ordered.—Pancras Workhouse Bill read a first and second time. Sir F. Burdett presented a petition against the bill.

Tuesday, March 1.—COMMONS.—The Attorney-General of Ireland moved for leave to bring in a bill to prevent the forging of bank notes of Ire- land.—Report of the Expiring Laws Bill brought up.—Mr. Addington brought up a bill for allow- ing his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales an annuity of £60,000 a year, during the period of three years, and for repealing so much of an Act as authorised the appointment of commissioners, to expend the sum of £13,000 out of the Duchy of Cornwall, for the discharge of the debts incurred by his Royal Highness.—Bill read a first time.

Wednesday, March 2.—Bill for assimilating the Proceedings in the Law Courts of Ireland to those in the correspondent Courts of Great Britain, read a first time.—In a committee of the House on the Irish Revenue Acts, Mr. Corry moved, "That the duties, commonly called customs, be rendered permanent in Ireland: that the duties on stamps be made permanent: that the revenues of the Post-Office be rendered permanent. Resolutions agreed to.—Leave given to bring in a bill to pre- vent malicious cutting of cattle, and for punish- ing chalkers in Ireland: also another for the more effectual prevention of forging bills of exchange and Bank of Ireland bills.—Prince of Wales' An- nuity Bill read a second time.—Mutiny Act read a third time and passed.—In a Committee of Sup- ply, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "That the sum of £1,032,151 4s. 8d. be granted, for the purpose of defraying the charge of extraor- dinary expenses of the Army from Dec. 25, 1801, to Dec. 25, 1802, not provided for by Parliament. —Agreed to.

Thursday, March 3.—LORDS.—Militia Training Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—Mr. Fox presented a petition from the druggists of Westminster, against the Medi- cine Act.—Report of the Committee of Supply on the Irish Duty Bills brought up and agreed to.— Irish Revenue-Officers Disqualifying Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Vansittart moved for accounts of the number of ships entered in and cleared out of the different ports of Great Britain for three years; also an account of the amount of the bounties on flax, hemp, &c.—Ordered.

[*The Parliamentary Minutes will be brought up in our next.*]

From the London Gazette, March 5, 1803.—St. James's, the 2d of March, his Majesty in Council was this day pleased to appoint—J. Johnes, Esq. of Dolecothy, to be Sheriff of the County of Caer- marthen, instead of J. Llewellyn of Castle Piggin, Esq.—E. Kendall, of Beaufort, Esq. to be Sheriff of the County of Brecon, instead of S. Gwynne, of Twimawr, Esq.

Whitehall, March 4.—The King has been pleased to grant to George Harrison, Esq. (Norroy King of Arms), the Office of Clarenceux King of Arms, and Principal Herald of the South, East, and West Parts of that Part of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland called England, in the room of Thomas Lock, Esq. late Clarenceux, deceased.

Dublin Castle, Feb. 22.—His Majesty, by his Royal Letters, having appointed the Most Noble George Augustus Marquis of Donegall to be of his Most Hon. Privy Council of Ireland, his Lord- ship this day in Council took the usual oaths and his place at the Board accordingly.

Crown-Office, March 5.—*Member returned to serve in this present Parliament.—Borough of Yarmouth.*—Chas. Mac Donnell, of the City of Westminster, Esq. in the room of James Patrick Murray, Esq. who hath accepted the Office of Steward of his Majesty's Manor of East Hundred, in the County of Berks.

Whitehall, March 8.—The King has been pleased to appoint the Reverend Peter M'Master to the Church and Parish of New Luce, in the Presby- tery of Stranraer, and County of Wigtown.—The King has also been pleased to present the Rev. Andrew Jameson to the Church and Parish of St. Mungo, in the Presbytery of Lochmaben, and County of Dumfries, vacant by the death of the Rev. D. Dickson, late Minister there.

Berlin, Feb. 26.—The Queen of Prussia was safely delivered of a Princess on Wednesday last the 23d inst. Her Majesty and the young Princess continue as well as can be expected.

BANKRUPTS.—Joggatt, W. Bridgewater-square, merchant.—Hord, W. York, merchant.—Green, J. Reading, mealman.—Malone, P. Manchester, shoe- maker.—Finigan, J. Bishopsgate, muslin dyer.— Cooper, J. Sen. and Jun. Sevenoaks, coopers.— Leigh, A. Shoe-lane, smith.—Dow, J. Bush-lane, Cannon-street, merchant.—Tench, J. Jun. Token- house-yard, merchant.—Clements, R. New Buc- kenham, Norfolk, shop-keeper.—Baylis, J. Croome Dabitot, builder.—Whitby, R. Manchester, cot- ton-spinner.—Shallcross, S. and R. Barnes, Man- chester, cotton manufacturers.—Drayton, J. Car- shalton, victualler.

Births.—On Tuesday, the 1st, Lady Paget, of a son.—On Friday, the 4th, the Lady of Lord Mid- dleton, of a daughter.

Marriage.—On the 5th inst. at Bath, Lt. Col. A. Colston to Miss Warrington.

Deaths.—On Thursday, the 3d inst. Lt. Gen D'Oyley, of Half Moon-street.—On Tuesday, the 8th inst. at his house in Cleveland Row, his Grace the Duke of Bridgwater.—At Walworth, Rear-Admiral Hudson.—On Sunday, at his house in Gloucester Place, Vice-Admiral Sir James Wallace.

PRICE OF STOCKS.—MARCH.

Omnium . .	5 per Ct. 1797.	5 pr. Ct. Ann.	4 pr. C. Con.	3 per C. Con.	3 pr. C. R. An.	Bank Stock	Day of Month
2¾ di	104½	101⅝	88¼	71½	72	189½	1
3¾	104½	101⅝	88⅜	71⅜	—	—	2
4	104¼	101¼	88¼	71⅜	—	190	3
3½	101⅛	101⅜	—	71⅜	—	—	4
3½	—	101½	—	71⅝	—	—	5
4½	—	101⅜	—	70½	—	—	7
7½	—	101⅝	—	69¾	—	—	8
15	—	96	—	62	—	—	9
13½	—	—	—	63	—	182	10

French 5 per cent. on the 3d inst. 64 f. 60 c.

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36	2	2 us.	Leghorn	50¼
D°, at sight	35	9		Naples.....	40¾
Rotterdam	36	3	2 us.	Genoa	46⅛
Hamburgh	34	5	2½us.	Venice, 55 livres piccole	
Altona....	34	6	2½us.	effective per £. ster.	
Paris 1 day	24	8		Lisbon	67¾
Paris	24	12	2 us.	Oporto	68¼
Bourdeaux,	24	13		Dublin	13¼
Cadiz . . .	35¼		eff.	Bilboa	36
Madrid . .	36		effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	44s. to 58s	Hops per cwt.	110s to 140s
Rye.....	32 .. 34	Hay per load....	83 .. 140
Barley.....	20 .. 25	Beef, per stone	4s.6d. to 6s.
Malt.....	40 .. 44	Mutton	4s. 8d. to 5s 4d.
Oats.....	13 .. 19	Veal	5s. 0d. to 7s. 0d.
Pease (white)....	31 .. 38	Pork....	4s. 8d. to 6s. 0d.
Beans (horse)....	31 .. 35	Tallow	4s. 2d.
Flour per sack ..	44 .. 47	Av. of Sugar pr cw	39s. 4d.
Seconds.....	40 .. 44	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal....	50 .. 00	Bread 9d the Quar. Loaf.	

TO THE RT. HON. LORD HAWKESBURY.

"They shall seek *peace*, and there shall "be none. Mischief shall come upon "mischief, and rumour shall be upon "rumour. The law shall perish from "the priest, and the council from the "ancients. The king shall mourn, and "the prince shall be clothed with de- "solation, and the hands of the people "of the land shall be troubled."—Ezekiel, c. vii. v. 25.

My Lord—This was the motto which I prefixed to the volume of letters, addressed to your lordship, in October, 1801, just after the signature of those preliminaries, that led to the disgraceful and ignominious peace of Amiens. The former part of this prediction has now been most amply fulfilled: the deluded people of this country have sought *peace*, and there has been none; mischief has come upon mischief, and rumour has been upon rumour; and, my lord, let those who are concerned be well assured, that, unless you and your colleagues are instantly removed from the councils of the King, and unless a new system of policy be adopted by your successors, the latter part also of this awful prediction will meet with a speedy accomplishment.

I have taken, on this occasion, the form of a letter, my lord, not for the purpose of troubling your troubled mind with any new remarks, but merely as a vehicle for certain extracts, intended to remind you and your colleagues of your errors, and to give my readers another proof of your ignorance and your obstinacy.—The first which I shall take is from my Letters on the Preliminaries of Peace, written in October, 1801.—"Me- "thinks I hear you make a triumphant "comparison between these infant undisci- "plined fleets and those of Great Britain. "But, my lord, if we were certain (which I "am far from being) that we shall ever be "again able to send fleets to sea, let us not "forget, that our enemies will have nothing "to do *but to cross the narrow channel which* "*separates our shores from theirs.* Naval tac- "tics are not necessary in an enterprize, "the success of which requires but a few "hours of favourable wind. The French "having no enemy to dread on their land- "board, may easily maintain, and *they will* "*maintain, a numerous army along the coast* "*from Brest to the Texel.* This army they "may double at any moment they please, "by those sudden and efficacious means, "which are become familiar to the people; "and, my lord, however you may be dis- "posed to sneer, one and the same southerly "wind may bring four armies on our coasts. "It is not necessary to name the points of "embarkation or disembarkation, the enemy "is perfectly acquainted with the subject. "—Great Britain will, as the least possible "evil, be *obliged to maintain a numerous army,* "*to repel an invasion, and numerous fleets to* "*prevent the invaders from approaching her* "*shores.* We shall never know when an "aggression is about to take place; for the "great and mighty republic will be *always* "*preparing*; and, be well assured, my lord, "that *she will not suffer impertinent neighbours* "*to ask questions.* While our dock-yards "and fleets are in a state of inactivity, we "shall see vessels of all countries sailing to "the ports of France, with all the materials "necessary to establish her navy; and it is "not going too far to say, that she will re- "ceive thirty thousand mariners from this "country, some of whom, as your lordship "may recollect, are not a little infected "with jacobinism. In the mean time Buo- "naparté will *dispatch troops and warlike* "*stores to the West-Indies, the Cape of Good*

" *Hope, and to India.* We shall not, as I " observed before, dare to enquire into the " extent, destination, and object, of these " armaments. We must observe their ope- " rations in silence, and *our first notice of* " *hostility will be a preparation for resistance*; " for France will not suffer *us* to embark a " single regiment, without rendering her a " full and satisfactory account. The mi- " litary and naval establishment for such a " peace cannot be much less expensive than " what would have been necessary for the " continuance of the war, or else it will be " totally insufficient. It will not even be " attended with the advantage of forcing " the enemy to incur a proportionate ex- " pense; for the French government, cer- " tain of having land forces at its command, " whenever it shall have occasion for them, " will always be able to diminish them " with facility; and, consequently, to ap- " propriate to the navy a great part of the " funds, now employed for the support of " the army.—The consequences of *this state* " *of uneasiness, mistrust, expense, and danger* " *on the one part*; *and of threats, intrigues* " *and hostile preparations on the other*, which is " honoured with the name of peace, will " enable the French, suddenly, and with " the greatest advantage, to renew a war, " which will be pregnant with the great- " est danger to England, inasmuch as the " French will have had time to collect their " forces and their means of attack, so as " to bear upon those points which they have " in view; and as they will, moreover, " have it in their power to choose both their " time and their point of attack.—But, " the noisy partisans of *peace, of any peace* " *whatever*, even of *the name of peace*, will " exclaim—*Is England, then, condemned to* " *wage perpetual war with France?* Yes, " my lord, she is, and it is your peace " which has reduced her to this lamentable " necessity. It has suddenly transported to " France a part of our force and of our riches; " and in a few years it will give her a naval " superiority. In all quarters, and with " inconceivable rapidity, it multiplies her " means of attack and diminishes our " means of defence. It leaves our enemy " armed and prepared; it compels us also " to remain under arms. *This peace, then,* " *my lord, is a real state of war.*" *(Letters on the Peace, p. 98).*—These letters, my lord, were first published, during the very height of that " *tumult of exultation and delirium* " *of joy*," which your preliminaries excited; and, I was actually engaged in writing the letter, from which this extract is made, at the very moment when the infamous peace-loving rabble came to demolish my house, because I refused to illuminate it, in approbation of the compact by which you and your colleagues had ruined and dishonoured the country. You laughed, or rather, you grinned, on that occasion; you made my injuries a subject of mockery; backed by the shouts of the base million, you thought yourself secure from the vengeance of reason and of truth. I reminded you then, that the hour of retribution would come, and that " a weak foundation, slippery and un- " sure, had he who built upon the vulgar " heart." This hour, my lord, is now fast approaching; and, if I had a mind as low as that of your lordship, I should prepare for exercising on you a severe retaliation.—But, my lord, objects widely different engage my thoughts. I think of the dangers to which my country is exposed, dangers which can no longer be hidden, and which must be met and overcome by our virtue and valour, or we must be the slaves, the abject, the toiling slaves, of the most cruel and impious tyranny that God, in his just indignation, ever sent as a scourge to a base and degenerate people.

In this situation, my lord, I could have earnestly wished to hear, in the parliament, language more bold and decisive. To Lord Moira and Mr. Sheridan " *spirited* and *animating*" speeches have been ascribed, in the public papers. The former spoke like a man worthy of his name and his rank, and to the speech of the latter I have no objection, except that the reporter makes it attribute to Mr. Windham a sentiment which that gentleman never uttered, to wit; that *this country, single-handed, is unable to contend against France.* I rejoice to hear these speeches of Lord Moira and Mr. Sheridan applauded in the public papers; I rejoice that they think our country capable of such noble exertions; but, when the tardy expression of these sentiments is brought forward in order to throw an odium on those of the gentlemen, who, from the first moment, reprobated the fatal measure, which has produced our present embarrassment, I must not, and will not be silent. From this consideration it is, that I remind my readers that Lord Moira, in defending the Peace, explicitly declared, that this country, single handed, was *not* able to contend against France. " To negociate," said his lordship, " a peace, with any prospect of success, " ministers must necessarily accommodate " the terms according to the relative situa- " tions of the two countries, and a precise " reciprocity of cession on a pertinacious " contest, for the *uti possidetis*, was out of " the question *where a* WEAKER *power had*

" *to treat with a* STRONGER.*" As to Mr. Sheridan, he also approved of the peace, upon the sole ground of *necessity*, and styled it " *a peace that every man must be* GLAD *of*, " *but that no man could be* PROUD *of*." A peace, " *involving a degradation of the nation-* " *al dignity, which no truly English heart can* " *feel with indifference.* †" Are we then, my lord, become *more strong*, and is France become *more weak* since the time when these declarations were made? Has the respective power of the two nations been brought nearer to an equality by the surrender of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Surinam, Berbice, Essequibo, Tobago, St. Lucie, Martinico, Elba, Minorca, and the Cape of Good Hope, on our side, and by the possession of those places on the side of France? Or has this equality been produced by the reduction of our army and the dismantling of our fleet, while the army of Buonaparté has been augmented, while he has filled his naval arsenals, received an accession of 20,000 French sailors, ten thousand Dutch, and *seven thousand English*, together with a great number of those artisans, which previous to the peace, were employed in our dock yards? Finally, not to grate your lordship's soul with too long and painful an enumeration, has this equality of means and of strength been produced by a separation, on our part, from all our continental allies, by the total distrust and contempt of us upon the continent, and by the acquisition, on the part of France, of a complete predominance in Germany, by her virtual possession of Holland, Switzerland, and Italy, and by the actual annexation of Piedmont? — Is this the change, my lord, which has rendered us able to cope, single handed, with France? Is it on this change that the noble earl and the honourable gentleman build their change of opinion? Or do these their new hopes arise from the " husbanding of our resour- " ces," from the vast mass of treasure, which your right sapient colleague has been able to save during these ten months of feverish repose?—Lord Moira censured no one's opinion; I believe, and hope, that he has changed his own, not upon any favourable change in our circumstances, but upon a conviction that he was in an error. This, however, I shall not hastily allow with respect to Mr. Sheridan, who appears to me to have sought a pretext for condemning the opinion of Mr. Windham, because, to have acknowledged that gentleman in the right, to have acknowledged that the peace had placed us *in a worse situation than we were previous to that measure*, would have been to acknowledge that that peace was *not* " a peace of *neces-* *sity*," that it was *not* a peace that every man ought " to be *glad* of," though " *involving* " *a degradation of the national dignity*" He had advanced these opinions in order to justify his *reprobation of the war*, and his new set of opinions is intended to justify his *joy at the peace!* CONSISTENCY is a very good thing, but, when purchased at a price like this, it is somewhat too dear.

I was much pleased, my lord, to hear Lord Auckland give it as his opinion, that we were able, single handed, to contend against the monstrously augmented force of our enemy; but, I could have wished, that his lordship's confidence had been built on a foundation more solid than that of mere *pecuniary means*. I noticed, in my letters to Mr. Addington, on the preliminaries of peace, that his lordship had long entertained a high opinion of the virtue of this species of force. "War," says he*, " is now become " *a science of* MONEY. That side must first " quit the field, *whose exchequer first fails.*" One might have hoped, that the result of our two last wars, in both which, with unshaken credit, we quitted the field before a bankrupt enemy, would have cured his lordship of this error. But, men are apt to attach most importance to the science which they best understand; and, as his lordship has some little knowledge in calculation, he is naturally inclined to oppose money, or rather figures, to men and arms. After, however, the total inutility of the noble, and almost incredible exploits, of Sir Francis d'Ivernois, whom the French call *le chevalier d'arithmétique*, we should, I think, be very cautious how we place confidence in the effects of this science.—Your lordship, too, was pleased, to lay great stress on " *credit, capital*, and *confidence*," which words were, by some persons, taken to have a cabalistic meaning, and to possess, when properly applied, the nature and powers of what the vulgar call a spell or charm. But, taking them in their literal sense, it was rather an unfortunate moment for his lordship to make use of them, when the stocks, which form the criterion of the things expressed by these words, had just experienced a tumble, or rather a jump, from 71 to 62 per cent, and when the paper of that excellent loan negociated by your worthy colleague was at a discount of 14 per cent. This was, my lord, rather an unlucky moment to oppose " credit, capital, and confidence" to the five hundred thousand soldiers of

* See Debates on the Treaty, Register, Vol. II. p. 1107.

† Ibid, p. 1096.

* In his letter to Lord Carlisle, published in 1779.

France, in which country, since the peace of Amiens, the funds have been *constantly rising*, while ours have been almost *constantly falling*. This latter is a curious fact, and it is a proof, that *power* will always create *credit*, while credit will *not* always create power. Where the confidence is there will the real solid capital go; and confidence arises much more from the *military* and *political*, than from the pecuniary or mercantile, means of a country, especially in times of commotion or convulsion; because all men know, that, in such times, when there is the greatest degree of physical force, there is the greatest degree of security from violence. While the nations of Europe preserved their political and military balance, confidence, in pecuniary matters, depended upon the state of the finances, upon the character for honesty and punctuality, of each nation respectively; but now, when the existence of governments, when the independence of nations, are daily brought into jeopardy, this confidence depends upon the opinion which men have of the *power*, the military and political power, of the several nations. Till since the peace of Amiens no one doubted of the capability of Great Britain to maintain her independence; but, can this be said now? Can we hope that men, and particularly monied men, will not doubt of it? After all the humiliations, all the insults, all the disgrace and ignominy, to which we have submitted, can we possibly flatter ourselves, that the sons of wealth will not fear, that we shall not long have the power to protect them and their property, against the rapacity and rage of a nation, which has overturned state upon state, and which has sworn our destruction? And, fearing thus, will they not endeavour to have a stake, at least, under the safeguard of this all-commanding and protecting power? Does not the fate, too, of the French, the Dutch, and the Italian loyalists, strongly admonish all other men, not to neglect this salutary precaution? Does it not, in the skeleton form of hunger and with the voice issuing from the lips of death, warn them to shun the miseries attached to loyalty and patriotism? Millions of pounds, my lord, have from these considerations, already been transferred from England to France; and, if our present state of *uncertainty* continues but yet a little longer, there will not be many of our rich men, who will not have deposited, in some shape or other, a part of their capital in that country; and thus, will the very thing that was to supply the place of courage and of honour, be taken from us, precisely because we have, by our national acts, renounced our pretensions to those ennobling and commanding qualities. Therefore, my lord, we must inevitably lose our pecuniary means, and a national bankruptcy must inevitably ensue, unless we regain the confidence of ourselves and of the world, which can only be done by another war, a *successful war against France*, because such success alone can recover our lost reputation.

As to our *capability* of doing this, that is another question; and, however the time-serving herd may execrate me, I venture to express my thorough persuasion that we *are not capable*, unless we are willing to make such exertions and such sacrifices as this nation never yet made, nor even dreamt of making. Able we were, and well able, to have *continued* the war, and to have finished it with glory; but, it does not, for that reason follow, that we are able to *renew* the war, after our enemy has *doubled his strength*, and after we have been *deprived of three-fourths of ours*. It is the peace, the improvident, the disgraceful, the heart-chilling, the courage-killing peace of Amiens, that has wrought this fearful change in the relative situation of the two countries. Where is our fleet, my Lord? The ships are in the several ports; but can they *go to sea?* What is now become of the empty Munchausen-like boast of your modest and disinterested colleague, "that *fifty* "ships of the line could, at any time, be "sent out to sea in the course of *a month*." You must, one would think, have had some notion of your present danger for a fortnight back, at least; and, are there, then, *twenty-five* ships ready to put to sea? Are there *two*, my Lord? And does your Lordship think that the proclamations of his Majesty will bring home the seven thousand British sailors and the hundreds of naval artizans, whom the peace and its *economical* regulations have driven into the service of the enemy?—And, as to the land force? You are a colonel, or something of that sort I believe, in the same corps, which has the advantage of possessing that ingenious and enterprizing knight, Mr. John Hiley Addington; I therefore put it to your Lordship, whether you think, that the militia can possibly be rendered of any use for this twelvemonth to come? In most of the counties they are not yet *balloted for*; three weeks is allowed, by law, for an appeal against the ballot; men who have served before are not obliged to serve now; so that, in about three months time, the *drilling* will commence, and if the corps are formed and fit to meet an enemy in less than nine months after that, then will I say that miracles have not

ceased.—An addition to the militia *in Ireland* is proposed Will that measure be soon and easily effected, my Lord? And will Mr. Ogle still say, that "every *loyal* man in that "country *rejoices* at the peace, while every "*rebel* views it with *disapprobation and re-* "*gret?*" * And will your modest and candid colleague still quote this as a proof that Mr. *Windham's sentiments* "*are in unison* "*with those of the United Irishmen?*" †—In short, I greatly fear, that, while it is indispensably necessary to send ten thousand men to the West Indies, we have not, on foot, a force nearly sufficient to protect our home dominions, if the enemy should seriously think of an invasion, with all their ports open, and with all the numerous facilities, furnished them by the peace of Amiens; by that peace which Mr. Sheridan was "*glad of*," though it was "degrading to the national dignity;" by that peace which Mr. Fox rejoiced at, "because it was *glorious to France and to the First Consul*;" by that peace on the signing of which Mr. Addington "reflected with *inward satisfaction*;" ‡ by that peace the advising of which Lord St. Vincent considered as the "*pride of his life*;" § by that peace of which your lordship, like another EROSTRATUS, wished "to be known to *posterity* as the author;" || by that peace, and by that peace alone, my lord, it is, that we have been stripped of our character, our consequence and our power, and that we are now exposed to the inroads of a rapacious, an enraged, and a merciless enemy.—I should now, my lord, endeavour to point out the *ultimate consequences*, the calamitous, the dreadful consequences of this peace, unless instantly prevented *by war*; but want of room compels me to defer this painful, though necessary duty, till my next.

In the mean time, my lord, dine, "with what appetite you may," upon that *porcelaine de Sevre*, with which Buonaparté presented you as a pledge of that *friendship* and *peace*, for endeavouring to *interrupt and disturb* which, Mr. Peltier was prosecuted! and let the people reflect, with what pleasure they may, on the blessings of being governed by "*safe* politicians," taken, according to the recommendation of Mr. Wilberforce, from "the *middling classes* of society."—— I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

London, March 11, 1803. WM. COBBETT.

* See debates on the Preliminaries, Register, Vol. II. p. 1192.
† Ibid. p. 1191.
‡ See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1669.
§ Ibid. 11 1. || Register, p. 457.

NOTICES.

The remarks, which we had room for under our regular head of *Summary of Politics*, have been made in the form of a letter.—We had something to say relative to the election of the BALLI THOMASSI to the Grand Mastership of Malta, which we intimated to our readers on the 29th of January (see p. 125), long before *the Ministers* were acquainted with it through any other channel.—A fortnight ago also, we intimated (see p. 288), that our information enabled us to say, that the "*safe* politicians" were about "to make *some other sacrifice* to "the preservation of peace." We were, indeed, even then, pretty fully acquainted of the causes which have led to the present bustle, and which we thought, and still think, will finally produce new sacrifices and additional disgrace. —Of the confirmation of all our opinions, respecting the conduct of Mr. Jefferson the American President, we had a convincing proof at hand in the appointment of Mr. Munro to *negotiate* with Spain and France.—The proceedings of the Whig Club, where an assembly of noblemen and gentlemen, sanctioned by the presence of a doctor of divinity, have given a public mark of their applause to the memory of *a man executed for high treason*, would also demand our animadversion.—But, want of room compels us to content ourselves for the present, at least, with merely pointing out these topics to our readers.—French papers, to the 7th instant, have been received. They contain nothing of importance; but from the variation in the price of the funds, it appears, that some knowledge of the dispute with England had got abroad, for the *tiers consolidés*, which, on the 6th were at 66 f. 60 c. fell, on the 7th, to 64 f. 75 c.

*** The 2d Number of the MERCURE ANGLOIS DE COBBETT was published on Wednesday the 2d. —This work is sold by E. Harding, No. 18, Pall Mall, by DULAU and Co. Soho Square, and by Mr. Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden. The work of M. DE PUISAYE is sold by the same persons.—MR. COBBETT takes this opportunity to recommend, to his friends, MR. HARDING, who has succeeded him as a Bookseller in Pall Mall, and on whose punctuality the utmust reliance may be placed.—MR. COBBETT's address is, Duke Street, Westminster.

ON THE PRESENT STATE OF THE NAVY.

SIR, The report of the dismission of the present Board of Admiralty has gained so much credit, that I had laid my pen aside, in the hope that truth had, at last, pierced through the mist of falsehood, ignorance and weakness which surround almost every action of our present Prime Minister's conduct; and that, at length, even *his* apathy was aroused, at finding himself the tool of the most intriguing and wrong-headed man that ever filled the high office of First Lord of the Admiralty of these realms. But, tired of the false and fulsome panegyrics, which are constantly tacked to this article of intelligence in the Morning Papers, I am induced, once more, to step forward in order to convince my countrymen (if they will be convinced), *that the dismissal of the present Admiralty is the best preliminary step which can be taken to save the British Navy from total destruction.*

In a former letter I pointed out, in general terms, those particulars, from which, if the public mind had been awakened to enquiry, it would have judged of the incapacity of Earl St. Vincent for so responsible a situation, and of the imbecility of the two *Phocæ* he has selected from the list of Post Captains, to receive and register his fiats in the naval department. But, as this has not had its due effect upon the palsied frame of this devoted country, and as the hirelings of the day continue to trumpet forth the praises of the Admiralty, and the loss we shall probably sustain by a change, let us fairly examine what benefits have accrued to the nation from its present naval administration, and what improvements have been made in the civil and military arrangements, as well as what chance there is of our being able to oppose any naval force to that gigantic power, which is every hour, and in every shape, placing itself in a more hostile and menacing attitude towards this country. As for the gross and impudent assertion of being able to have *fifty* sail of the line ready in a month, our credulous Minister has, by this time, discovered its falsehood; and, although I shall never suspect him of magnanimity enough to avow having been duped, I must suppose it is one of the principal reasons why he wishes to banish from his Majesty's councils, the author of such a statement.

Without digressing, however, any farther, it will be sufficient for me to state the simple facts as they stand; as I am perfectly certain that the bare statement, witout a single comment upon it, or without leading the mind one step by logical deductions, will be sufficient to shew the effects of such wild mismanagement; and those effects will be felt so strongly, that the cause cannot be mistaken for one instant. These facts I shall divide under the following heads:

First, as to the arrangement of the peace establishment of the military part of the Navy.

Secondly, ditto, of the civil departments and of the dock-yards.

Thirdly, as to the general treatment of the officers and seamen, and of the mutinies which have been, and may probably be, the event of that treatment.

Under the first head I can only state, that at the conclusion of every former war, a regular number of the best ships of the line were kept as guard-ships, and a sufficient number of frigates for the suppression of smuggling, and for the various other duties required at home; by which means, a fleet of 20 sail of the line were ready to put to sea at three days notice; and, to such a perfection of discipline were they trained in the last peace, that when ordered to make up a squadron of evolution for a particular occasion, the guard-ships were at Spithead and ready for sea in eight hours after they had received their orders from the Admiralty. This sort of peace establishment took its date from the very hour in which the definitive treaty was signed, and its effective force was complete and ready to act, by the time the last ships of the war establishment were paid off. Is there any thing of this sort *at present?* and can *five* ships of the line be sent out? I shall be told, that the conclusion of this war, and the way of making this peace, are not similar to any other in history. With all that humiliation which it is meant that Englishmen should feel; with every sentiment of degradation and abject vassalage, I confess it. But, is that any reason why those ministers who were weak enough to barter away the honour, the interest, the power, and the fair fame of this country, should not take even the common precautions which former occasions had handed down to them, to place this country in a situation, so as not to be absolutely blotted out by the consular pen from the powers of Europe; but to be able to shew those courts, who now so justly hold us in contempt and distrust, that we could, upon a proper occasion, stretch forth our hand, and, perhaps, lend them some little assistance to get out of the labyrinth of ruin, with which they are surrounded? Let us see if we have even ventured to try

the experiment. It is now two years since the arrangements of peace were concluded; even before which period a frantic haste was discovered, to pay off, dismantle and lay up, with uncommon speed, all those ships which could have commanded and enforced the fair fulfilment of the definitive treaty. Not a pendant, however, was left flying in our ports, nor a single precaution used, or encouragement held out for seamen to enter for the peace establishment; the ships which were kept out on foreign stations to watch the ambiguous motions of Buonaparté's released fleet, were not selected by any rule; but it so happened that they consisted of those very ships which any other Admiralty, guided by custom and common sense, would perhaps have paid off the first; and, on the other hand, those of a contrary description were sent home, instantly paid off, and dismantled. That this proceeding might answer the views of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, I have no doubt, as it helped to make up the dazzling picture of that saving which was held out to be the effect of the peace, and which such a reduction would naturally occasion. But, if the naval minister felt himself at all responsible for the consequences, his head or his heart could not be very much at ease, unless the views of the one was directed to other purposes, or that his head was so turned by the unexpected situation he was placed in, that from its giddy height he lost sight of the cautious, prudent politics of Shelburne-House, and only saw the humble friend of Paddy Barré vaulting into the car of Neptune, and brandishing the trident of the world: an elevation too great, indeed, for any common mind to bear, and which nothing but the puddle which fills the cranium of the Right Honourable Hely Addington could endure, without boiling even to madness. And, in charity, let me ascribe it to that cause, for otherwise, such undigested plans, such violent contradictions, such bare-faced attacks upon all order and regularity, so complete an attempt to overthrow all rules and regulations of the service, could never have existed.

The consequence is, that at home we have scarcely a single ship ready to put to sea; and out of a list of one hundred and thirty-four Admirals, not one man of common fame or reputation has yet been prevailed upon to offer his service for any command; such is their opinion of the treatment, and such is their abhorrence of the rude and oppressive conduct of the Admiralty towards the service in general! And it is actually now in contemplation, whether the offers of some persons, whose names ought never to have disgraced that list, shall be accepted, or if the commands shall not be given to Captains, with broad pendants as Commodores; and I have reason to believe that this last measure is preferred, although fraught with false economy and ruin to the service, as Captains Hood and Stopford have received their appointments in the West Indies, and Commodore Domett in the Channel; and, though last not least, is the proof of a 50 gun ship having been ready and fitted for some months, waiting the double event of Lord St. Vincent quitting the Admiralty, or the failure or success of that curious and memorable attempt to drive the present Comptroller of the Navy from his seat. If this last plan had been accomplished, Sir Thomas Trowbridge would have been spared the fatigue of visiting a warmer climate; he would have occupied Somerset-House, and some other favourite would have kissed the First Lord's toe for the East-India station. As it is, it will be a cheap purchase for the nation, to lose its present Admiralty Board, even if Sir Thomas should go to the East-Indies with double pay and the emoluments of Colonel of Marines, in addition to his broad pendant as Commodore.

At our home ports, the same want of officers stares us in the face. At Portsmouth, a gallant veteran is lingering on, in hopes of some officer relieving him from the burthen, which was promised to be taken from his shoulders last September. But, alas! such is the contempt or horror of being employed under the present system, that no officer will accept it, although in point of comfort and honour, one of the best appointments in their gift. The present admiral at this port has every emolument as a commander in chief, with a house to reside in, and every comfort which an officer in that high station ought to enjoy. Mark the reverse. At Plymouth, a junior admiral, kept upon the bare pay of his rank as rear-admiral, without table money, with a house or any other appointments, but subject to every expense of a commander in chief of a port, is obliged to undergo all the fatigue of a commander in chief, to incur all his expenses, in entertaining the officers, &c. who may be in that port, and, consequently, must starve or be ruined! What is the inference from these two appointments so opposite to each other? One *must* be wrong, as, although the duties are exactly similar, the appointments differ as widely as riches and beggary. Or, are we to suppose, which I really believe is the fact, that, as yet, two years having elapsed,

that no arrangement whatever has been thought of, or is likely to take place, because they cannot get any man of character who will trust himself under the dominion of so capricious a sway. Take it, however, in what light you please, it plainly betrays an imbecility, a want of method to arrange business, a savage ignorance, which having once broke through the regular mode of transacting the naval code, has neither ability, energy, or knowledge, sufficient to set the machine a-going in any other way.

Let us now turn our eyes abroad. After what had happened, would it not have been wise, if the seamen could not have been instantly paid and relieved, to have said less about that peace, which was so pompously detailed to them in public orders? It is in vain that the Mediterranean fleet is ordered to be kept in an unfrequented bay in the island of Sardinia, in which they are secluded from the habitable world, for fear they should know what is passing in it. If dire necessity should call them into active service, can the blame attach to any but the admiralty, if their conduct should produce the most dreadful, the most fatal calamities to this country! Even at this moment, we hear of ships on other stations bursting into all the horrors of mutiny, nor can the zeal of their officers, nor the love of the men for those officers, surmount the criminal habit, which, under such circumstances, a wise admiralty would have completely eradicated.* Such is the real state of the case, and when the hour of remorse and retribution comes, what excuse will it be to this country, with its favourite service annihilated, with its boasted bulwarks level with the dust, to have some silky-tongued minister get up and say, "Why, truly, "this looks very aukward, it may be ascribed to imbecility, to want of knowledge, to treachery, or whatever else "you please, but it is really not so; for we "pledge the whole medical knowledge of "the Addington family, that it arises only "from our worthy colleague having made "a slight mistake in his mansion, and being "set down at the Admiralty, instead of another public building of great celebrity." But, to be serious: can any satisfactory answer be given to the questions which must follow?

First. Have we not been at peace long enough to have paid off all the ships upon the war establishment, and how comes it to pass, that upwards of twenty sail of the line, yet remain abroad, under that description?

Second. If it is necessary to keep such a fleet abroad, why have not ships been commissioned and manned since the peace to relieve them?

Third. Can a single line of battle ship be sent to sea at this moment? And if the common practice of commissioning guard ships had been adopted, would there not have been, at this moment, a sufficient force to have answered every purpose of relief abroad and defence at home?

Fourth. What is the reason, that neither the stations abroad, nor the ports at home, are relieved by flag, or commanding officers?

I am so thoroughly persuaded that no satisfactory answers can be given, that I think the questions themselves are sufficient to prove, how shamefully this nation has been deluded by its present naval administration; for as the present peace establishment now stands, there is scarcely a single guard ship manned or getting ready, and the reluctant manner in which the seamen enter for even their favourite class of ships, the frigates, proves that there exists some deeper rooted reason, than the common dislike to the discipline of men of war. The fact is, the officers are as backward as the men, and the real reason is, the caprice exercised over both. The vain-glorious boast, therefore, of being able to send *fifty* sail of the line to sea in a month, sinks into its original bed of hyperbole, when we have seen with our own eyes, that in the space of two years, this admiralty have not been able to send out more than *four* ships of the line. I cannot, however, quit this article, without congratulating the First Lord, upon the dexterity he manifested in the selection of a speaking-trumpet to convey this correct and modest statement to the public ear. The stupendous fabric of Mr. Addington's head was certainly the only proper formed vehicle to bawl out to the million, how egregiously they were deceived; and by this time, I imagine, that ingenious and noble-minded minister has found out, that although he has shut the temple of Janus, there exists some resemblance of the double-faced god, in that cabinet, which he would fain have the world to believe to be the sanctum sanctorum of harmony and peace.

I have now taken up so much of your time with my observations on this first head, that I shall delay my second until next week; and am, Sir, Your's, &c.

London, Feb. 12th. A. R.

* Some curious facts will be related, under the third head, upon this subject.

ON THE CONDUCT OF THE ADMIRALTY-BOARD.

SIR,—An expression, in the Parliamentary Reports some time ago, said to have been used by Captain Markham, one of the Lords of the Admiralty, which has been the subject of much private conversation, ought not to be passed over in silence, viz. "That "the Admiralty-Board never assigned any "reasons for what they did, although the "reasons were known to themselves."—In this, as in many other things, the Captain can only be considered as the instrument of his most illustrious patron; and the expression was used on the occasion when so many officers and men were discharged from the Dock-Yards, who had been brought up in them, and had served his Majesty in various capacities from their youth. That the Admiralty-Board is, in many respects, an arbitrary board, *though never so much so* as since under the controul of the present motley group who compose it, will, I am sure, be readily allowed by all naval men of experience, even by the First Lord's greatest friends; but while it proceeds upon arbitrary principles, I humbly conceive that the greatest care ought to be taken, that such principles and such proceeding are founded upon justice. With regard to the discharge of the Master-Builder from Plymouth yard (whose conduct, as stated in Parliament by Captain Markham, must be extremely reprehensible, if the statement is correct) certainly it would have been but just and equitable to have said to this man, that he had shamefully neglected his duty, and betrayed the important trust reposed in him; and have patiently heard what he could advance in his defence, "*audi alteram partem*," being a fundamental and established principle in British jurisprudence. We find, however, that this was not the case. Is the world then to suppose the very acute and refined sensibility of the noble lord and his worthy colleagues, on this visitation, could not allow them to hurt the tender and delicate feelings of a man represented by them as a base betrayer of the trust reposed in him? "No," say they, "we will hear nothing he has to say, let him be instantly discharged; we will fill up his vacancy with another Master-Builder of our own choosing." This man, then, with a large family unprovided for, is thus discharged; let us now enquire what has been the established practice, in appointing a successor in such cases, and what has been the mode adopted in this. The same situation, in every different Dock-Yard in this kingdom, differs in point of emolument; therefore the officer, holding a situation in one yard, has a more lucrative employment than the officer holding the same situation in another yard, in a regular gradation. I believe I am correct in taking Plymouth among the first in this point of view. The custom has ever been, when a vacancy happens, from whatever cause, at a superior yard, to remove the proper officer from the next inferior yard to fill this vacancy (suppose, as in this case, the Master-Builder); and then the Master-Builder, from the next inferior yard, is raised to the vacancy occasioned by the last removal; and so on in rotation, till a change takes place of all the Master Builders at the inferior yards. Thus the office of Master-Builder at the yard, most inferior in emolument, becomes vacant, which vacancy has been generally filled by the promotion of the Master-Builder's *first assistant*, from the yard considered superior to all the others, and so on. Has Earl St. Vincent followed this plan in filling up the vacancy he has been pleased to make? Certainly not. He has thought proper in the plenitude of power, to appoint a young man, over the heads of all his Majesty's Master-Builders, from a merchant's yard; a young man, who, previous to this appointment, had never served his Majesty a single hour; and a young man, of whom Earl St. Vincent could have no knowledge whatever, except from the report of this man's brother, who had been a purser and the Noble Earl's Private Secretary, and whom he raised, contrary to all former precedent, to be a Commissioner of the Navy, removing a gentleman who had long been in office, to make room for this upstart Commissioner, in the same unusual manner that he turned out the Master-Builder of Plymouth, to make room for this Commissioner's brother, and the same novel principles were, though in vain, exerted, to turn from the Navy-Board two gentlemen, distinguished for every manly virtue, to make room for two of his creatures.

There were many men in inferior situations, discharged from the Dock Yards, without any crime being imputed to them, except old age, and without any previous notice given them, to provide for themselves and families, now reduced to want; some of these men, have, I understand, in a paroxysm of despair, hanged and others drowned themselves, when they found, that turned adrift in this most cruel manner, they were unable to provide for the necessities of those who solely depended upon them. All those who were able have emigrated to France, where they have been very graciously received, and thousands of English

artificers are now employed in the different Dock Yards of that Republic; and thousands of seamen rather than re-enter into the British navy to dance, as they call it, "*Jervis's Jig*," notwithstanding the antipathy, which that class bear the French, are now actually employed in fitting out the French navy. A sum, infinitely less than what his lordship so *modestly* required of the country to satisfy the just demands of the adjudicated Americans, in the West-Indies, would have been sufficient to pay those persons discharged for no crime, a quarter's wages, and would have been much better bestowed, as it would, while it lasted, have given them an opportunity of looking for other employment or supported them till their country, on which from their services they have just claims, could have made provision for them. "Oh! says Captain M. a plan is "*now* in great forwardness for the relief of "those men, and will be got ready as soon "as the pressure of other business will admit." Let me ask what is to become of these people in the mean time, who had no other subsistence, but their daily labour? The little wages they had to receive at the time of their discharge was, probably, all spent at the time they received it, and they have wives and children looking up to them for support. Turned off, in the ungracious manner they were, from a service in which they had spent their whole life, and expected to end their days, none would suppose that any thing was intended to be done for them, nor could they suppose so themselves; their only alternative was to starve or emigrate, to the incalculable loss of their country. *Observer.*

General Napper Tandy to Mr. Elliot, Member of the English Parliament.

Sir,—On the 12th of December last I wrote to you by the medium of the Post-Office. Having had no answer, I have resolved to address you through the channel of the Argus. Though not the favourite newspaper in England, it is, however, a paper publickly read there. I shall begin with copying the letter which I have already sent you.—Sir, your attack upon me, in your speech in the House of Commons, on the 2 th of November last, obliges me thus to address you. My ignorance and insignificance, which you paint in colours so dark, ought to be my protection against abuse from any man of good sense. But you have shewn yourself as destitute of good sense, as you are a stranger to politeness and good manners —You cannot but know, you who pretend to so much intelligence and information, that I hold a rank in the army of this great and generous nation, which sets me on an equality with the proudest Peer in Great Britain. You know that a soldier's honour is dearer to him than life. Yet with a knowledge of these facts, you presumed to tarnish my character, you have attempted to fix stains of infamy on my name which must be washed away in either your blood or mine.—A French officer is not to be insulted with impunity. You, the country which gave me birth, the country in whose bosom I have been adopted, cannot but expect that I am not to betray the honour of the rank to which I have been exalted. I therefore request you to name any City on the Continent, in which you may be willing, in company with some of your friends, to give me a meeting. I shall expect you to allow me time to reach the place which you may chuse for your rencounter.

NAPPER TANDY.

Bourdeaux, Dec. 12, 1802.

COPY OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST MR. PELTIER.

In the King's Bench.

Middlesex.—The King, upon the Information of the Attorney-General, against Jean Peltier.—Michaelmas Term, 43d George III.

INFORMATION,—STATES—That before, and at the times of the printing and publication of the scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libels, and libellous matters and things, after mentioned, there subsisted, and now subsists, friendship and peace between our Sovereign Lord the King and the French Republic, and the subjects of our said Lord the King and the citizens of the said Republic; and that before and at those times, citizen Napoleon Buonaparté was, and yet is, First Consul of the said French Republic, and, as such, the chief magistrate of the same: to wit, at the parish of Saint Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex.—That Jean Peltier, late of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, gentleman, well knowing the premises aforesaid, but being a malicious and ill-disposed person, and unlawfully and maliciously devising and intending to traduce, defame, and vilify the said Napoleon Buonaparté, and to bring him into great hatred and contempt, as well among the liege subjects of our said Lord the King, as among the citizens of the said Republic; and to excite and provoke the citizens of the said Republic, by force of arms, to deprive the said Napoleon Buonaparté of his consular office and magistracy in said Republic, and to kill and destroy said Napoleon Buonaparté; and also unlawfully and maliciously devising, as much as in him, the said Jean Peltier, lay, to interrupt, disturb, and destroy the friendship and peace subsisting between our said Lord the King and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the same Republic; and to excite animosity, jealousy, and hatred in said Napoleon Buonaparté, against our said Lord the King, and his subjects, on the 16th of August, in the forty-second year of the reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Third, by the grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith; at the parish of Saint Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, unlawfully and maliciously did print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a most scandalous and malicious libel, in the French language, of and concerning the said Napoleon Buonaparté; that is to say, one part thereof, to the tenor following, to wit:—

Le 18 *Brumaire, an* 8.—*Ode, attribuée à Chénier.*

" Quelles tempêtes effroyables
" Grondent sur les flots déchaînés?

" Dieux ! quels torrents épouvantables
" Roulent ces rocs déracinés ?
" Les fleuves n'ont plus de rivages ;
" Couvert d'écume et de naufrages,
" L'océan mugit dans les airs ;
" Sur ses fondements ébranlée,
" La terre va-t-elle, écroulée,
" Se détacher de l'univers ?
" Ah ! plutôt pour se faire absoudre
" D'une trop longue impunité,
" Les cieux peut-être avec la foudre,
" Vont protéger la Liberté.
" Dieux du peuple que l'on opprime,
" Vengez cette auguste victime
" De l'audacieux attentat,
" Qu'aux jours malheureux de Brumaire,
" Les lois ont, dans leur sanctuaire,
" Vu consommer par un soldat.
" Trop vain espoir de la vengeance !
" Peuples, livrés aux oppresseurs,
" N'auriez-vous, dans votre souffrance,
" Que vos bras pour libérateurs ?
" Le ciel est aveugle ou barbare,
" Et lorsque sa foudre s'égare,
" Portée au hasard sur les vents,
" Qu'elle dévaste les campagnes,
" Ou frappe d'arides montagnes,
" Elle respecte les tirans.
" Jouets des flots et des orages,
" Voyez ces utiles vaisseaux
" De leurs débris couvrir vos plages,
" Ou s'abymer au fond des eaux :
" Tandis que la nef criminelle
" Qui porte ce Corse rebelle,
" Déserteur des champs Africains,
" Tranquillement vogue sur l'onde,
" Et de César annonce au monde,
" Et la fortune et les desseins.
" De la France, ô honte éternelle !
" César, au bord du Rubicon,
" A contre lui, dans sa querelle,
" Le Sénat, Pompée et Caton ;
" Et, dans les plaines de Pharsale,
" Si la fortune est inégale,
" S'il te faut céder aux destins ;
" Rome, dans ce revers funeste,
" Pour te venger, au moins il reste
" Un poignard aux derniers Romains.
" Mais sous quelles viles entraves
" A succombé notre vertu !
" Quoi ! l'univers nous voit esclaves
" Sans que nous ayons combattu !
" Au sein d'un sénat parricide,
" La noire trahison préside,
" Fiere encore de nos revers ;
" Le pouvoir sans appui, sans force,
" Tombe à sa voix, et c'est d'un Corse
" Que le Français reçoit des fers !"

And in another part thereof to the tenor following, that is to say :

" Déjà, dans sa rage insolente,
" Le despote ose menacer. . . . .
" Tel des flots la vague écumante
" Se brise contre le rocher.
" Est-ce pour vous donner un maître,
" Est-ce pour couronner un traître,
" Que la France a puni ses Rois ?
" Non, non ; l'ambition coupable
" Saura qu'il n'est d'inviolable
" Que les droits du peuple et ses lois."

And in another part thereof to the tenor following, that is to say :

" *Vœu d'un bon Patriote au* 14 *Juillet*, 1802.
" Quelle fortune a fait le fils de Létitie !
" Corse, il devient Français ! Sa nouvelle patrie
" L'adopte, le nourrit au rang de ses enfants,
" Et déjà lui promet les destins les plus grands !
" Un orage survient ; sous l'effort des tempêtes
" L'état est renversé ; les plus augustes têtes
" Tombent, tout est brisé : le Français malheureux
" Regrette, en soupirant, son erreur et ses vœux !
" Napoléon paraît ! de victoire en victoire
" Il atteint *en volant* au faîte de la gloire !
" L'Orient, l'Occident, témoins de ses exploits,
" Par lui sont terrassés et reçoivent ses loix !
" Le Nil avait frémi ; mais le sort qui l'entraîne
" Rappelle son vainqueur aux rives de la Seine.
" Cinq chefs, ou cinq tyrans partageaient le pou-
" voir,
" Il arrache à leurs mains le sceptre et l'encensoir.
" Le voilà donc assis où s'élevait le trône !
" Que faut-il à ses vœux ? un sceptre ? une cou-
" ronne ?
" Consul, il regle tout, il fait, défait des rois,
" Peu soigneux d'être aimé, la terreur fait ses droits !
" Sur un peuple avili, jusqu'au rang des esclaves,
" Il regne, il est despote, on baise ses entraves,
" Qu'a-t-il à redouter ? Il a dicté la paix,
" Des rois sont à ses pieds, mendiants ses bienfaits !
" D'assurer en ses mains l'autorité suprême
" On lui porte les vœux ! Les Français, des rois
" même
" A le féliciter s'empressent humblement,
" Et voudraient en sujets lui prêter le serment ! . . .
" Il est proclamé chef et consul pour la vie ! . . .
" Pour moi, loin qu'à son sort je porte quel-
" qu'envie,
" Qu'il nomme, j'y consens, son digne *successeur*,
" Sur le pavois porté, qu'on l'élise *empereur !*
" Enfin, et Romulus nous rappelle la chose,
" Je fais vœu. . . dès demain qu'il ait l'apothéose !
" Amen."

Which said scandalous and malicious words, in the French language, first above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning as these English words following, that is to say :—" What frightful tempests growl on the unchained waves ? Gods ! what dreadful torrents roll these uprooted rocks ? The rivers have no longer any banks ; the ocean, covered with foam and shipwrecks, bellows in the air ; shaken at its foundation, is the earth fallen, going to detach itself from the universe. Ah ! rather to obtain their acquittal for too long impunity, the heavens, perhaps, are going to protect liberty with the thunder. Gods of an oppressed people ! Avenge this august victim of the audacious attempt, which, on the unhappy days of Brumaire, the laws, in their sanctuary, saw compleated by a soldier ! (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) Too vain hope of vengeance ! Nations given up to oppressors, have you, in your sufferings, only your arms for deliverers ? The heaven is blind or cruel, and when its thunder flies, carried by chance upon the winds, whether it lays waste the plains or strike the arid mountains, it respects tyrants. Behold those useful vessels, the sport of the waves and storms, cover your coasts with their wrecks, or sink to the bottom of the waters ; while the guilty ship that carries that rebel Corsican, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté), deserter of the plains of Africa, sails tranquilly on the wave, and announces to the world the fortune and the designs of Cæsar. Oh ! eternal disgrace of France ! Cæsar, on the bank of the Rubicon, has against him, in his quarrel, the senate, Pompey and Cato ; and, in the plains of Pharsalia, if fortune is unequal—if you must yield to the destinies, Rome, in this sad reverse,

at least, there remains to avenge you a poignard among the last Romans. But under what vile fetters has our valour fallen! What! the universe beholds us slaves, without our having combatted! In the bosom of a parricide senate, black treason presides, still fierce at our misfortunes; power, without support and without force, falls at its voice, and it is from a Corsican (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) that the Frenchman receives his chains."—And which said scandalous and malicious words, in the French language, secondly above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning as these English words following, that is to say:—"Already, in his insolent rage, the despot (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) dares to menace; but the foaming wave of the sea breaks itself against the rock. Is it to give you a master—is it to crown a traitor, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) that France has punished her kings? No, no, guilty ambition shall know, that there is nothing inviolable but the rights of the people and their laws."—And which said scandalous and malicious matters, in the French language, last above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into English, are as follows, that is to say:—

"*Wish of a good Patriot, on the fourteenth day of July, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two.*"

"What fortune has the son of Lætitia (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) arrived at! A Corsican, he becomes a Frenchman; his new country adopts him, nourishes him in the rank of its children, and already promises him the greatest destinies. A storm arises. By the force of the tempests the state is overturned; the most noble persons fall; every thing is broken. The unhappy Frenchman regrets, with sighs, his error and his wishes! Napoleon appears; flying from victory to victory, he reaches the summit of glory; the east, the west, witnesses of his exploits, are vanquished by him, and receive his laws. The Nile had shuddered, but the lot that forces him on recalls its vanquisher to the banks of the Seine. Five chiefs, or five tyrants, shared the power. He forces from their hands the sceptre and the censer. Behold him, then, seated where the throne was raised! What is wanting to his wishes? A sceptre, a crown? Consul, he governs all; he makes and unmakes kings. Little careful to be beloved, terror establishes his rights over a people degraded even to the rank of slaves: he reigns; he is despotic; they kiss their chains. What has he to dread? He has dictated peace: Kings are at his feet begging his favours. He is desired to secure the supreme authority in his hands! The French, nay kings themselves, hasten to congratulate him, and would take the oath to him, like subjects. He is proclaimed chief and consul for life. As for me, far from envying his lot, let him name, I consent to it, his worthy successor. Carried on the shield, let him be elected emperor! Finally, (and Romulus recalls the thing to mind), I wish that on the morrow he may have his apotheosis. Amen."—To the great scandal, disgrace, and danger of the said Napoleon Buonaparté; to the great danger of creating discord between our said Lord the King, and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the said Republic; in contempt of our said Lord the King and his law; to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Second Count.—That said Jean Peltier, so beinsuch person as aforesaid, and unlawfully and maliciously devising and intending as aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, on the 26th of August, in the forty-second year of the reign aforesaid, at the parish of Saint Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, unlawfully and maliciously did print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a certain other scandalous and malicious libel, containing therein, among other things, divers other scandalous and malicious matters, in the French language, of and concerning said Napoleon Buonaparté, in the form of an address to the French people, according to the tenor following, that is to say:—

"Citoyens, la douceur de caractere et la probité qui vous distinguent entre toutes les nations, me causent une inquiétude extrême au moment où je viens vous entretenir de la tyrannie de notre dictateur.—J'appréhende de ne pouvoir parvenir à vous faire croire qu'il y ait des hommes capables d'actions que vous jugez criminelles:—D'autant que celui que je vous dénonce a fondé tout son espoir sur le crime et la perfidie;—Et qu'il ne se croit en sûreté, qu'en se mettant par sa malice tellement au-dessus de vos craintes, que l'excès de la misere dans laquelle il retient ses esclaves, leur ôte jusqu'à l'idée de recouvrer leur liberté.—J'appréhende encore que vous ne croyiez qu'il vaut mieux pour vous de vivre au milieu de ces périls, en agissant avec prudence, que d'obéir au sentiment qui vous prescrit de vous venger.—En effet, les satellites de ce monstre, les agens de sa tyrannie, sont ou des hommes qui s'étaient fait autrefois un beau nom, ou ceux dont les ancêtres leur ont laissé de nobles exemples à suivre; les Liancourt, les Choiseul-Praslin, les Dormesson, les Duroc d'Adhémar, les Lameth, les Noailles, les Ségur, les Deluynes, les Mouniers, les Fleurieu, les Portalis, les Barthelemy, etc. Ces hommes, chose étonnante! ont fait le sacrifice de leur propre liberté pour vous asservir: ils aiment mieux nuire à leurs concitoyens que de réclamer leurs droits les plus sacrés et agir en hommes libres.—Ainsi ces belles races des Rohan, des Montmorency, des Larochefoucault, des Daguesseau, des Duras, des La Vauguyon, des Boisgelin, offrent aujourd'hui des rejettons que l'on dirait être nés pour la subversion du gouvernement établi et défendu par leurs aveux, et des titres que leur vertu leur avait acquis.—Et pourquoi avons-nous combattu contre la Prusse, l'Autriche, l'Italie, l'Angleterre, toute l'Allemagne et la Russie, si ce n'est pour conserver notre liberté et nos propriétés; et afin de n'obéir à personne, mais seulement aux lois?—Eh bien, ce tigre qui ose se dire le fondateur ou le régénérateur de la la France, jouit du fruit de vos travaux, comme d'une dépouille enlevée aux ennemis. Il n'est pas rassasié de la destruction du Roi, ni de tant de braves, ni de tant de princes que la guerre a moissonnés; il devient et plus avide et plus cruel dans des circonstances où la prospérité change chez la plupart des hommes la fureur en pitié.—Cet homme, seul maître au milieu de ceux qui l'entourent, a décrété des listes de proscription, et fait exécuter des déportations sans jugement, au moyen desquelles il existe des suppli[illegible] ces pour des Français qui n'ont pas encore vu le jour. Des familles proscrites, au-dehors de la France, donnent le jour à des enfans opprimés avant de naître: leur misere a commencé avant la vie.—Sa méchanceté s'accroît chaque jour; chaque jour, malgré la sécurité dont il jouit, il entre dans de nouvelles fureurs; et vous, loin d'oser réclamer votre liberté, la crainte d'aggraver votre esclavage vous glace; et vous êtes soumis à la plus profonde terreur.—Il faut agir, citoyens, il faut marcher, il faut s'opposer à ce

qui se passe, si vous voulez qu'il ne s'empare pas de toutes vos dépouilles: surtout point de délais, point de vœux inutiles, ne comptez que sur vous; a moins que vous n'ayez la stupidité de croire qu'il se mettra en danger de gaîté de cœur, en abdiquant par ennui ou par honte de la tyrannie, ce qu'il possede à force de crimes.—Mais il s'est avancé au point qu'il ne regarde plus à la gloire, mais à sa propre sécurité, et qu'il n'estime honorable que ce qui lui sert à conserver sa puissance. C'est ainsi qu'il a organisé récemment une compagnie dite de Mamelouks, composée de Grecs, de Maltais, d'Arabes et de Cophtes; ramas de bandits étrangers, dont le nom et l'uniforme rappelant l'expédition insensée et désastreuse d'Egypte, servent à le couvrir de honte: mais qui ne parlant point notre langue, et n'ayant aucun point de contact avec l'armée, seront toujours les satellites du tyran, ses muets, ses sicaires et ses bourreaux.—Cette tranquillité, et ce loisir embelli par la liberté, que plusieurs gens de bien préféraient à une résistance honorable, n'existent donc point.—Français, c'est en ce moment qu'il faut se résoudre à servir, ou à commander: à recevoir la terreur, ou à l'inspirer.—Ne sommes-nous pas réduits à l'extrémité? Quelles institutions humaines peuvent arrêter le tyran? et les institutions divines ne sont-elles pas toutes corrompues? Le peuple Français qui était naguere l'arbitre des nations, aujourd'hui dépouillé de sa souveraineté, de sa gloire, de ses droits, incapable de remuer, objet du mépris universel, ne jouit pas même de la condition des esclaves, et n'a pas comme eux ses alimens assurés.—Un seul homme a anéanti par un simple arrêté cette belle fédération de gardes nationales, qui avait rendu de si nombreux et de si grands services à la patrie, et qui était toute formée de citoyens Français. Quelques satellites et agens favoris, tels que Siéyès et certains généraux, ont reçu, pour prix de leurs forfaits, le patrimoine dont l'innocent a été dépouillé.—Les lois, la justice, les finances, l'administration, les souverains de l'Europe, enfin la liberté et la vie des citoyens, tout est au pouvoir d'un seul homme. Vous voyez à chaque moment des arrestations arbitraires, des juges punis pour avoir acquitté des citoyens, des individus mis à mort après avoir été déjà acquittés par un jugement légal, et des condamnations à mort arrachées aux juges par la menace.—Reste-t-il à des hommes qui veulent être dignes de ce nom, autre chose à faire qu'à venger leur injure, ou à périr avec gloire? La nature a marqué le terme de notre vie à tous, même aux plus puissants? Nul ne doit attendre la derniere extrémité, sans avoir tenté quelque chose pour la liberté, s'il ne veut passer pour une femmelette timide et pusillanime.—Mais je suis un factieux, dit Buonaparté; je regrette les richesses que j'amassais dans les temps de troubles; on dit que je désire la guerre, parce que je réclame les droits dont nous devons jouir en temps de paix.—C'est-a-dire que vous ne pouvez vivre, ni être en sûreté sous son gouvernement, qu'en applaudissant aux prodigalités de Lucien et aux sophismes du scribe Rœderer: en approuvant la proscription des innocens, les emprisonnemens et les déportations des meilleurs citoyens, et la répartition des biens nationaux aux cohortes d'honneur, comme si c'était un butin conquis sur les Allemands.—Mais le tyran m'objecte que j'ai acheté des biens de proscrits; et c'est là justement le plus grand de ses crimes, que ni moi, ni quelque citoyen que ce soit, n'ayons jamais pu nous croire en sûreté qu'en faisant le mal.—Eh bien! ces terres que la terreur m'a fait acheter, et dont j'ai payé le prix, je les restitue à ceux à qui elles appartiennent légitimement. Je ne puis souffrir qu'il soit dit que des citoyens aient fourni une proie à d'autres citoyens.—Nous avons bien assez de ce que nous avons souffert dans nos fureurs, lorsque les Français se battaient entr'eux, à Lyon, dans la Vendée et dans la Bretagne, et que l'on tirait nos légions des frontieres pour les faire marcher contre nous. Qu'il soit mis un terme aux crimes et aux injures.—Ces malheurs font si peu d'impression sur Buonaparté, qu'il se fait encore des titres de gloire des massacres de Toulon, et de la journée du 13 Vendémiaire, et que, s'il était contrarié, il ferait encore pis, s'il le pouvait.—Je ne suis pas inquiet de l'opinion que vous avez de lui. Je sais qu'il est généralement détesté. Mais je crains votre plus ou moins d'énergie. Je redoute que n'étant point d'accord sur le chef que vous voudrez après lui, vous ne vous laissiez surprendre, non par ses promesses et ses dons qui ne sont rien, et que vous méprisez, mais par votre apathie; et qu'alors cet homme qui se repose toujours sur sa fortune, ne paraisse réussir sans cesse dans tout ce qu'il entrepend.—Car a l'exception de quelques satellites affidés qui ont partagé la honte de sa fuite d'Egypte, qui est-ce qui veut la même chose? quel est au contraire l'homme qui ne désire un changement total, excepté dans l'étendue de nos frontieres, fruit de nos victoires? Je parle ici de l'armée, dont le sang a été répandu pour enrichir un Berthier, un Murat, un Lucien, un Joseph, un Junot, un Duroc, un Lannes, un Bourienne, ou bien pour faire avoir un archevêché au prélat Boisgelin, vieille salope, qui a toujours déshonoré les honneurs qu'on lui a conférés.—C'est pourquoi j'ai la plus grande confiance dans nos armées toujours victorieuses, qui, après tant de fatigues, et pour prix de tant de blessures, ont fini par ne rien trouver qu'un tyran.—Il est vrai qu'on les a fait marcher à St.-Cloud pour renverser de vive force le système de représentation nationale établi par la Convention. Elles croyaient alors tout attirer à elles, et recevoir enfin le milliard qui leur a si souvent été promis: mais aujourd'hui, qu'elles sont reléguées dans de tristes et insipides garnisons au fond des bois et des marais; aujourd'hui qu'on les envoie périr comme des mouches à Cayenne, à la Guadeloupe, et à St. Domingue, et qu'elles ne voient qu'un petit nombre de favoris accaparer toutes les récompenses, elles brûlent de jalousie et du désir de venger leur injure.—Et pourquoi marche-t-il en public avec autant de gardes a sa suite et avec tant d'orgueil? C'est que souvent la fortune seconde admirablement les grands criminels: mais que son bonheur chancele un instant, autant il était redouté la veille, autant il sera méprisé le lendemain, à moins qu'on ne soit la dupe des noms de concorde et de paix qu'il a donnés à son crime et au parricide qu'il a commis sur sa patrie.—Il a grand soin de dire que la tranquillité n'aura jamais lieu en France, à moins que les proscrits ne restent dépouillés de leurs propriétés; que les acquéreurs de domaines nationaux ne jouissent en sûreté de leur horrible proie; que la justice ne soit à sa disposition, et qu'il ne possede seul tous les droits qui jadis étaient l'apanage du peuple souverain.—Si vous voulez jouir de la paix et de la concorde, approuvez toutes les révolutions et tous les meurtres qui ont eu lieu dans la République: sanctionnez les lois qui vous ont été imposées; recevez la tranquillité avec l'esclavage, et faites voir par votre exemple à la postérité qu'on peut se rendre maître du peuple Romain, en lui faisant répandre son propre sang.—Pour moi, si j'ai jamais cherché à être quelque chose, c'était pour défendre la liberté et la dignité du peuple, et les droits sacrés que nous ont laissés nos peres; je n'ai jamais cherché à faire une fortune honteuse, et j'ai préféré les orages d'une liberté difficile à obtenir, à la tranquillité mortelle de l'esclavage.—Si vous êtes de mon avis, Français, présentez-vous, et après avoir invoqué l'assistance des Dieux, nommez Camille votre consul et votre chef dans l'entreprise hardie du recouvrement de votre liberté."

Which said scandalous and malicious words, in

the French language, last before mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning as these English words following, that is to say:—"Citizens, the mildness of character, and probity, that distinguish you among all nations, occasion me the greatest uneasiness at the moment when I come to address you on the tyranny of our Dictator, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). I am fearful that I shall not be able to convince you that there are men capable of actions which you think criminal, because the person (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) whom I denounce to you, has founded all his hope on guilt and perfidy, and does not think himself safe, but by placing himself, through his malice, so much above your fears, that the excess of misery in which he keeps his slaves, may take from them even the idea of recovering their liberty. I am fearful, also, that you may think it better to live in the midst of these dangers, by conducting yourselves with prudence, than to obey the sentiment that directs you to avenge yourselves. In reality, satellites of this monster, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté), the agents of his tyranny, are either men who had, heretofore, gained themselves a good reputation, or those whose ancestors have left them noble examples to follow: the Liancourts, the Choiseul-Praslins, the Dormessons, the Durocs D'Adhemar, the Lameths, the Noailles, the Segurs, the Deluynes, the Mouniers, the Fleurieus, the Portalis's, the Barthelemys, &c. These men, astonishing circumstance! have made a sacrifice of their own liberty to enslave you: they chuse rather to hurt their fellow citizens, than to reclaim their most sacred rights, and act like freemen. So the illustrious families of the Rohans, of the Montmorencys, of the Larochefoucaults, of the Daguesseaus, of the Duras, of the Vauguyons, of the Boisgelins, present, at this day, descendants who may be said to be born for the subversion of the government established and defended by their ancestors, and of the titles which their virtue had gained them. And wherefore have we fought against Prussia, Austria, Italy, England, the whole of Germany and Russia, if it be not to preserve our liberty and our properties; and to the end that we might obey no one but the laws alone. And now this tiger, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) who dares to call himself the founder, or the regenerator of France, enjoys the fruit of your labours, as of spoil taken from the enemy. He is not satisfied with the destruction of the King, nor of so many brave men, nor of so many Princes, whom the war has mown down: he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) becomes more covetous and more cruel, in circumstances under which prosperity changes fury into pity among the greater part of mankind. This man, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) sole master in the midst of those who surround him, has ordained lists of proscriptions, and put in execution banishments, without sentence; by means of which there exist punishments for French who have not yet seen the light. Proscribed families give birth, out of France, to children oppressed before they are born; their misery has commenced before their life. His wickedness, (meaning the wickedness of the said Napoleon Buonaparté) increases every day: in spite of the security he enjoys, he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) enters into new passions; and as to you, far from daring to reclaim your liberty, the fear of aggravating your slavery freezes you, and you are subjected to the deepest terror. You must act, citizens, you must march, you must oppose what is passing, if you wish that he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) should not seize upon all that you have. Above all, no delay, no useless wishes, reckon only upon yourselves: unless, indeed, you have the stupidity to suppose that he will wantonly expose himself to danger, by abdicating, by weariness, or shame of tyranny, that which he holds by force of crimes. But he is advanced to the point that he looks no more towards glory, but to his own security; and that he esteems nothing honourable but what conduces to the preservation of his power. It is thus that he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) has organized a company of Mamelouks, as they are called, composed of Greeks, Maltese, Arabians, and Copts; a collection of foreign banditti, whose name and dress recalling the mad and disastrous Egyptian expedition, serve to cover him with shame; but who not speaking our language, nor having any point of contact with the army, will always be the satellites of the tyrant, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) his mutes, his cut-throats, and his hangmen. That tranquillity, then, and that leisure adorned with liberty, which many good men prefer to an honourable existence, exist not. Frenchmen, it is at this moment that you must resolve to serve or to command; to receive terror, or to inspire it. Are we not reduced to extremity? What human institutions can stop the tyrant? (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). And are not all the divine institutions corrupted? The French people, that was lately the arbiter of nations, at this day despoiled of its sovereignty, of its glory, and its rights; incapable of rousing itself, the object of universal contempt, enjoys not even the condition of slaves, and is not, like them, assured of its victuals. A single man (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) has annihilated, by one decree, that noble federation of national guards, that had rendered so many and such great services to its country, and was entirely formed of French citizens. Some satellites and favored agents, such as Sieyes, and certain generals, have received for the price of their crimes, the patrimony of which the innocent has been despoiled. The laws, justice, the finances, the administration, the Sovereigns of Europe; in fine, the liberty and the life of the citizens, are all in the power of one man (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). You see at every moment arbitrary arrests, judges punished for having acquitted citizens, individuals put to death, after having been already acquitted by a lawful sentence, and sentences of death extorted from judges by threats. Remains there for men who would deserve that name, any thing else to do, but to avenge their wrongs or to perish with glory? Nature has set the bounds of life to all, even the most powerful. No one ought to wait the last extremity, without having attempted something for liberty, if he would not pass for a timid and pusillanimous woman. But Buonaparté says, I am factious, I regret the wealth that I amassed in the time of the troubles. It is said, that I desire war, because I reclaim the rights that we ought to enjoy in time of peace. That is to say, that you cannot live, nor be in safety under his (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté's) government, but by applauding the prodigalities of Lucien, and the sophisms of the scribe Rœderer; by approving the proscription of the innocent, the imprisonment and banishment of the best citizens, and the division of the national property among cohorts of honour, as if it were plunder taken from

the Germans. But the tyrant (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) objects to me, because I have bought the property of the proscribed; and that is precisely the greatest of his crimes; that neither I, nor any other citizen, have ever been able to think ourselves in safety, but by doing wrong. And, well! these lands, that fear has made me buy, and of which I have paid the price, I restore them to those to whom they lawfully belong. I cannot bear to have it said, that citizens have furnished a prey to citizens. We have full enough of what we have suffered in our madness, when the French fought against each other, at Lyons, in La Vendée, and in Brittany, and when our legions were drawn from the frontiers to be marched against ourselves. Let an end be put to crimes and injuries. These evils make so little impression upon Buonaparté, that he makes himself titles of honour from the massacres of Toulon, and the day of the thirteenth Vendémiaire, and that, if opposed, he would do still worse if he could. I am not uneasy with regard to the opinion that you have of him (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). I know that he is generally detested; but I am fearful as to the degree of your energy. I am afraid, that not being agreed upon the chief whom you wou'd chuse after him, you may suffer yourselves to be misled, not by his promises and his gifts, which are nothing, and which you despise, but by your own apathy; and that this man, who always relies upon his fortune, may appear to succeed incessantly in every thing that he undertakes. For, with the exception of some confidential satellites, that have shared the disgrace of his flight, who is there that desires the same thing? Who, on the contrary, is the man, that does not wish for a total change? except in the extent of our frontiers, the fruit of our victories. I speak here of the army, whose blood has been shed to enrich a Berthier, a Murat, a Lucien, a Joseph, a Junot, a Duroc, a Lannes, a Bourienne; or to procure an archbishoprick for the prelate Boisgelin, a filthy old woman, who has always disgraced the honours that have been conferred upon him. For this reason, I have the greatest confidence in our armies, always victorious, who, after so many fatigues, and for the price of so many wounds, have ended by finding nothing but a tyrant (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). It is true, they were made to march to Saint Cloud, to overthrow by main force the system of national representation established by the Convention. They thought then to draw all to themselves, and to receive at last the milliard that has been so often promised them: but, at this day, when they are banished into dull and insipid garrisons, at the bottom of woods and marshes; at this day, when they are sent to perish, like flies, at Cayenne, at Guadaloupe, and at Saint Domingo, and when they see only a small number of favourites engross all the rewards, they burn with jealousy, and with the desire to avenge their wrongs. And wherefore marches he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) in public, with so many guards in his suite, and so much pride! It is because fortune often wonderfully seconds great criminals: but let his good fortune totter an instant, as much as he was dreaded in the evening, so much will he be despised on the morrow; unless we are duped by the names of concord and peace, that he has given to his crime, and to the parricide that he has committed on his country. He (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) takes great care to say, that tranquillity will never have place in France, unless the proscribed remain deprived of their property; unless the acquirers of the national domains enjoy their horrible prey in safety; unless justice be at his disposal, and he alone possess all the rights, that heretofore were the portion of the sovereign people. If you would enjoy peace and concord, approve of all the revolutions and all the murders that have taken place in the Republic; sanction the laws that have been imposed upon you; receive tranquillity with slavery, and shew to posterity, by your example, that a man may make himself master of the Roman people, by causing them to spill their own blood. As for me, if I have ever sought to be any thing, it is in order to defend the liberty and the dignity of the people, and the sacred rights that our fathers have left us. I have never sought to make a disgraceful fortune, and I have preferred the storms of a liberty, difficult of attainment, to the deadly tranquillity of slavery. If you are of my opinion, Frenchmen, present yourselves; and after having invoked the assistance of the gods, name Camille your Consul and your Chief, in the bold enterprize of the recovery of your liberty."—To the great scandal, disgrace, and danger of the said Napoleon Buonaparté; to the great danger of creating discord between our said Lord the King and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the said Republic; to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, in contempt of our said Lord the King and his laws, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Third Count.—That said Jean Peltier, so being such person as aforesaid, afterwards (to wit) on the 26th of August, in the forty-second year of the reign aforesaid, at the parish of Saint Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, unlawfully and maliciously did print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a certain other scandalous and malicious libel, containing therein, among other things, divers other scandalous and malicious matters, in the French language, of and concerning said Napoleon Buonaparté, according to the tenor following, that is to say:—"Eh bien, ce tigre qui ose se dire le fondateur ou le régénérateur de la France, jouit du fruit de vos travaux comme d'une dépouille enlevée aux ennemis. Il n'est pas rassasié de la destruction du Roi ni de tant de braves, ni de tant de Princes, que la guerre a moissonnés; il devient et plus avide et plus cruel dans des circonstances où la prospérité change chez la plupart des hommes la fureur en pitié."—Which said scandalous and malicious words, in the French language, last above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning, as these English words, following, that is to say:—"And now this tiger, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) who dares to call himself the founder or regenerator of France, enjoys the fruit of your labours, as of spoil taken from the enemy. He is not satisfied with the destruction of the King, nor of so many brave men, nor of so many Princes, whom the war has mown down: he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) becomes more covetous and more cruel, in circumstances under which prosperity changes fury into pity among the greater part of mankind." To the great scandal, disgrace, and danger of the said Napoleon Buonaparté; to the great danger of creating discord between our said Lord the King and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the said Republic, in contempt of our

said Lord the King and his laws; to the evil example of all others, in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Fourth Count.—That said Jean Peltier, so being such person as aforesaid, and unlawfully and maliciously devising and intending as aforesaid, afterwards, (to wit) on the 26th of August, in the forty-second year of the reign aforesaid, at the parish of St. Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, unlawfully and maliciously did print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a certain other scandalous and malicious libel, containing therein, among other things, divers other scandalous and malicious matters in the French language, of and concerning the said Napoleon Buonaparté, according to the tenor following, that is to say:—" Il faut agir, citoyens; il faut marcher, il faut s'opposer à ce qui se passe, si vous voulez qu'il ne s'empare pas de toutes vos dépouilles; surtout point de délais, point de vœux inutiles; ne comptez que sur vous, à moins que vous n'ayez la stupidité de croire qu'il se mettra en danger de gâté de cœur, en abdiquant par ennui ou par honte de la tyrannie ce qu'il possede à force de crimes. Mais il s'est avancé au point qu'il ne regarde plus à la gloire, mais à sa propre sécurité; et qu'il n'estime honorable que ce qui lui sert à conserver sa puissance. C'est ainsi qu'il a organisé récemment une compagnie dite de Mamelouks, composée de Grecs, de Maltais, d'Arabes, et de Conhtes, ramas de bandits étrangers dont le nom et l'uniforme rappellant l'expédition insensée et désastreuse d'Egypte, servent à le couvrir de honte; mais qui ne parlant point notre langue, et n'ayant aucun point de contact avec l'armée, seront toujours les satellites du tyran, ses muets, ses sicaires, et ses bourreaux."—Which said scandalous and malicious words, in the French language, last above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning as these English words following, that is to say:—" You must act, citizens, you must march, you must oppose what is passing, if you wish that he, (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) should not seize upon all that you have. Above all, no delay, no useless wishes, reckon only upon yourselves; unless, indeed, you have the stupidity to suppose, that he will wantonly expose himself to danger, by abdicating, through weariness, or shame of tyranny, that which he holds by force of crimes. But he is advanced to the point that he looks no more towards the glory, but to his own security, and that he esteems nothing honourable, but what conduces to the preservation of his power. It is thus that he (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) has organized a company of Mamelouks, as they are called, composed of Greeks, Maltese, Arabians, and Copts, a collection of foreign banditti, whose name and dress, recalling the mad and disastrous Egyptian expedition, serve to cover him with shame, but who, not speaking our language, nor having any point of contact with the army, will always be the satellites of the tyrant (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté) his mutes, his cut-throats, and his hangmen."—To the great scandal, disgrace, and danger of the said Napoleon Buonaparté, to the great danger of creating discord between our said Lord the King and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the said Republic; in contempt of our said Lord the King, and his laws, to the evil example of all others, in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity.

Fifth Count.—That the said Jean Peltier, so being such person as aforesaid, and unlawfully and maliciously devising and intending, as aforesaid, afterwards (to wit) on the 26th of August, in the forty-second year of the reign aforesaid, at the parish of Saint Anne, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of Middlesex, unlawfully and maliciously did print and publish, and cause and procure to be printed and published, a certain other scandalous and malicious libel, containing therein, among other things, divers other scandalous and malicious matters in the French language, of and concerning the said Napoleon Buonaparté, according to the tenor following, that is to say:—" Quelques satellites et agens favoris, tels que Siéyès et certains généraux, ont reçu, pour prix de leurs forfaits, le patrimoine dont l'innocent a été dépouillé. Les lois, la justice, les finances, l'administration, les souverains de l'Europe, enfin la liberté et la vie des citoyens, tout est au pouvoir d'un seul homme. Vous voyez à chaque moment des arrestations arbitraires, des juges punis pour avoir acquitté des citoyens, des individus mis à mort après avoir été déjà acquittés par un jugement légal, et des condamnations à mort arrachées aux juges par la menace. Reste-t-il à des hommes qui veulent être dignes de ce nom autre chose à faire qu'à venger leur injure ou à périr avec gloire?"—Which said scandalous and malicious words, in the French language, last above-mentioned and set forth, being translated into the English language, were and are of the same signification and meaning as these English words following, that is to say:—" Some satellites and favoured agents, such as Sieyes, and certain generals, have received for the price of their crimes, the patrimony of which the innocent has been despoiled. The laws, justice, the finances, the administration, the sovereigns of Europe, in fine, the liberty and the life of the citizens, are all in the power of one man (meaning the said Napoleon Buonaparté). You see at every moment arbitrary arrests, judges punished for having acquitted citizens, individuals put to death, after having been already acquitted by a lawful sentence, and sentences of death extorted from judges by threats. Remains there for men, who would deserve that name, any thing else to do, but to avenge their wrongs or to perish with glory?"—To the great scandal, disgrace, and danger of the said Napoleon Buonaparté; to the great danger of creating discord between our said Lord the King and his subjects, and the said Napoleon Buonaparté, the French Republic, and the citizens of the said Republic; in contempt of our said Lord the King and his laws, to the evil example of all others in the like case offending, and against the peace of our said Lord the King, his crown and dignity.—Whereupon the said Attorney-General of our said Lord the King, who, for our said Lord the King, in this behalf prosecuteth for our said Lord the King, prayeth the consideration of the Court here in the premises, and that due process of law may be awarded against him, the said Jean Peltier, in this behalf, to make him answer to our said Lord the King, touching and concerning the premises aforesaid.

Observations on Mr. Peltier's Trial, from the Monitteur.—Paris, March 2, 1803.

A person of the name of Peltier has been found

guilty, before a court of justice, at London, of printing and publishing some wretched libels against the First Consul. It is not easy to imagine why the English ministry should affect to make this a matter of so much eclat.—As it has been said in the English newspapers, that the trial was instituted at the demand of the French government, and that the French ambassador was even in the court when the Jury gave in their verdict; we have authority to deny *(démentir)* that any such things ever took place. The First Consul was even ignorant of the existence of Peltier's libels, till they came to his knowledge in the public accounts of the proceedings at this trial.—All the civilised nations of Europe, have, in the system of their mutual relations and dependencies, certain reciprocal duties to fulfil, which they ought to respect so much the more, because a different conduct, which fails not to have in every country, its partisans, could tend only to restore the reign of barbarism and anarchy.—It is, therefore, not easy to imagine, what interest England can have to encourage, and authorise all those scurrilities of infamy, which the libellers of that country are incessantly propagating; as little easy is it to imagine, why it should afford protection to the French libellers who settled there during the war, as to conceive what useful purpose could be answered by a proceeding of such pomp and ostentation.—The *Alien Bill* gives power to the English ministry to send strangers out of that country at pleasure. That power the ministry largely avails itself of. Above twenty Frenchmen, who lived in settled residence, and were well known in England, have been, without any formality, sent out of that country. Within these few days Citizen Bonnecarrere, a chief of battalion of the national guard at Paris, being at London, to prosecute a suit at law, and having his wife there sick, received orders to quit the country in forty-eight hours. * * *—We know others who, after a residence of thirty years in London, have been sent out of the country with equal abruptness and rigour. To what purpose, then, drag, with ostentation, before respectable courts, foreign libellers who are only such as naturally arise in the end of any great political commotion. If Lord Pelham's Under Secretaries should only hint to them to cease to write, they must, per force, obey. Should they not, they might, under the *Alien Bill*, be sent out of the kingdom.—The King of England owes it to his own personal dignity, and to the honour of the nation, to put an end to the outrages of his subjects against a neighbouring government and nation with which he is at peace, and to which he gives the presence of an Ambassador not less exalted in rank than amiable and respectable in his personal qualities.—Yet it is to be acknowledged, that these proceedings, however useless in other respects, have afforded an occasion to the Judges who presided at the trial, to evince, by their wisdom and impartiality, that they are truly worthy to administer justice in a nation so enlightened, and estimable in so many respects.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

View of the State of the Republic; presented to the Legislative Body by order of the Government. Paris, February 22, 1803.—(Continued from page 309.)

The canals of Argues, Mortes, and the Rhone, the draining of the marshes of the Lower Charente are begun, and will open new channels to commerce, and afford new lands for cultivation. Works are going forward for the reparation of the dykes of the isle of Cadsand, of Ostend, of the Côtes du Nord, and the re-establishment of the navigation of our rivers. This navigation is no longer given up solely to the labours and the cares of Government. The owners of boats plying on these rivers have already felt that it was their patrimony, and they fix on themselves the taxes by which the works are to be kept in proper repair. On the ocean forts are erecting to cover the roads of the isle of Aix, and to protect the vessels of the Republic. Every where funds are raised for the reparation and improvement of our ports. A new bason and locked sluices will terminate the harbour of Havre, and will form an excellent port for the commerce of La Manche. A company of pilots is formed to secure the safe navigation of L'Escaut, and to free foreign pilots from the danger to which an unknown navigation must expose them. —At Antwerp labours are begun, which will have the effect of restoring to its commerce its ancient celebrity, and the Government has in contemplation a plan for forming canals to unite the navigation of the Escaut, the Meuse, and the Rhine, to give to our docks those materials of wood which grows in our own soil, and to our manufactures a perfection which the manufacturers of other countries dispute with us on our own territory.—The Islands of Martinique, Tobago, and St. Lucie have been restored to us, with all the elements of prosperity. Guadaloupe, re-conquered and pacified, returns to cultivation. Guiana rises from a long protracted infancy, and assumes a flourishing appearance.—St. Domingo had submitted, and the author of its troubles was in France. Every thing announced the return of prosperity, but a cruel malady delivered it up to new miseries. At length the scourge which desolated our army has ceased its ravages. The forces which now are on the island, and those which will speedily arrive from our different ports, guarantee the prospect of its speedy return to peace and to commercial pursuits.—Vessels are setting sail for the Isles of France and Re-union, and for India.—Our maritime commerce is seeking to renew its ancient connexions, to form new relations, and by these efforts it gains new strength. Already happy experience and wise encouragements have reanimated a spirit for engaging in the fishery which was long the patrimony of France. Commercial expeditions still more important are formed or projected for the West-India Colonies, the Isle of France, and the East-Indies.—Marseilles resumes in the Mediterranean its ancient ascendancy.—Chambers of Commerce have been restored in the cities where they formerly existed. New ones have been established in those places, which by the extent of their operations and the importance of their manufactures, have appeared to deserve them. In these associations, formed by persons whose situation entitles them to the honour of choosing the members, the spirit, as well as the science of commerce will revive. There its interests will be developed, inseparable from the interests of the State. The merchant will there learn to place, in preference to riches, the consideration which honours them, and before the enjoyments of a vain luxury, that wise economy which fixes the esteem of his fellow-citizens and the confidence of strangers.—Deputies, chosen from the different chambers, will discuss, in the presence of Government, the interests of commerce and manufactures, and the laws and regulations which circumstances may require.—In our forces, by sea and land, instruction and

the love of discipline are sedulously inculcated. Responsibility becomes more rigid in our military corps. An economical Administration has succeeded to the dilapidating system of contracts. The soldier, better fed and better clothed, understands economy, and his savings, which he throws into the common stock, attach him to his standard as well as to his family.—Every branch of our finances becomes more productive. The collection of direct contribution is less rigorous with regard to the contributors. In the year six it was reckoned that about 50 millions were in the hands of the collectors of taxes, and payments were 3 or 4 years in arrears. At this moment the sum in the hands of the collectors is not above 3 millions, and the contributions are paid even before they are due.—All the rules which have been made, and all the plans of Administration which have been formed, give a produce still increasing. The rules applicable to the registering of commercial transactions is productive to a degree, which attests the rapid movements of capital and the multiplicity of business which is transacted.—In the midst of so many signs of prosperity, the excess of the direct contributions is still made a ground of complaint.—The Government has learnt from every one versed in the principles of taxation, that the surcharge consisted chiefly in the inequality of the mode in which the taxes were imposed. Measures have been taken, and are carrying into effect, to ascertain the real inequalities which exist in the different departments. In the course of the year 12, regular and simultaneous operations will have ascertained what is the relation which ought to exist betwixt the contributions of the different departments, and what in each department is the just rate of the land tax. The moment that a certain result has been fixed, the Government will give orders for those alterations which justice requires. But in the course of this year, and without waiting for those results, it will propose an important diminution in the land tax.—Innovations are still proposed in our financial system; but every change is an evil, if it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated that certain advantage would result from it. The Government will seek from time and from discussions, weighed with all possible care, the maturity of these projects which inexperience often hazards; which they support by those past examples, the memory of which has been almost effaced from the public mind, and on the financial doctrines of a nation which, by unnatural and exaggerated efforts, has broke through every measure of public contribution and expenditure.—With an increase of revenue which no one ventured to calculate, extraordinary circumstances have led to wants which it was impossible to foresee.—It was necessary to reconquer two of our colonies, and to re-establish in all, the power and the government of the mother country.—It was necessary, by means sudden and too extended to admit of rigid economy, to procure subsistence for the capital and several of the departments. At least, however, the success of the Government has been equal to its efforts, and after these vast exertions, resources remain henceforth to guarantee the capital against the return of want, and to disconcert the projects of monopoly.—In the methodized statement of the Minister of Finance will be found a general view of the annual contributions and the different branches of the public revenue, what was their amount during the last year, what prospect of amelioration existed; whether, from the mode of administration or the progress of public prosperity, what have been in the different departments of the ministry, the elements of expenditure during the year ten; what are the sums still remaining to be paid for that and former years; what resources exist to cover them, whether arising from outstanding arrears of taxes, or from the extraordinary funds appropriated to pay off the debts contracted in these years, and which have not yet been exhausted; what is the actual amount of the public debt; what has been its increase, how it has been diminished by natural causes, and how its extinction has been affected by the sinking fund.—In the account of the Minister of the Public Treasury will be seen a statement of the receipts, the payments of the year ten, what belongs to the different branches of the revenue, what is chargeable in each year and on each part of the Administration.—The united accounts of the two Ministers will form a complete table of our financial situation. The Government hold up with equal satisfaction the picture which it presents to its friends and its detractors, to citizens and to foreigners.—After authorizing the foreseen expense of the year 12, and appropriating the necessary revenues, objects of the greatest interest will occupy the attention of the Legislative Body. It is necessary to introduce a change into our system of coinage. The Custom-house duties must be reorganized, so as more effectually to check the progress of contraband trade. It is at length essential to give to France that civil code so long promised and so long expected.—Above all, projets of laws have been formed under the observation of Government, and matured in conferences where commissions from the Council of State and the Tribunate were animated only by the love of truth and regard for the public interest. The same sentiments, the same principles will guide the deliberation of the Legislators, and secure to the Republic the wisdom, and the impartiality of the laws which are adopted.—On the Continent, every thing offers us pledges of repose and tranquillity.—The Italian Republic, since the proceedings at Lyons, has been daily strengthening itself by the more intimate union of the people of whom it is composed. The happy harmony among the authorities by which it is governed, its internal administration, its military force already give it the character, and the attitude of a state long established, and if wisdom preserve them they guarantee to it a destiny of uninterrupted prosperity.—Liguria, placed under a mixed constitution, sees at its head, and in the bosom of its authorities, all those of its citizens, the most estimable for their virtues, by their illumination and their fortune.—New shocks have convulsed the Helvetic Republic. The government owed its support to neighbours, whose repose was essential to the repose of France, and it will use every exertion to ensure the success of its mediation, and with it the happiness of a people whose position, whose habits, and whose interests make it the necessary ally of France.—Batavia successively takes possession of the colonies which the peace restored to her.—She will ever remember that France must ever be her most useful friend or her most destructive foe.—In Germany the last stipulations of the treaty of Luneville are carrying into effect.—Prussia, Bavaria, all the Secular Princes who had possessions on the left bank of the Rhine will obtain on the right bank suitable indemnities.—The House of Austria finds in the bishopricks of Salzburgh, Aischtett, Trent, and Brixen, and the greatest part of Pau, more than

it had lost in Tuscany. Thus, by the happy co-operation of France and Russia, all permanent interests are conciliated, and from the bosom of that tempest which seemed ready to overwhelm it, the Germanic Empire, that empire so necessary to the equilibrium and the repose of Europe, rises more powerful, composed of elements more homogeneous, better combined and more adapted to the circumstances and opinions of the present age.—A French Ambassador is at Constantinople, charged with renewing and fortifying the ties which attach us to a power which seems to be threatened with destruction, but which it is our interest to sustain and to support the foundations by which it is upheld..—The British forces are still in Alexandria and Malta. The government had a fair right of complaint, but it has received intelligence that the vessels which are to convey them to Europe are already in the Mediterranean. The government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it is permitted to entertain a hope of the continuance of maritime peace. This peace is the want, as well as the desire of all nations. For its preservation, the government will do every thing compatible with national honour, essentially connected with the strict execution of the treaties.—But in England, two parties maintain a contest for power. One of those parties has concluded peace, and appears desirous of maintaining it. The other has taken an oath of eternal hatred to France. Hence that fluctuation of opinion and of counsels which prevails.—Hence that attitude, at the same time pacific and menacing.—While this contest of parties continues, measures of precaution are what the government is called upon to adopt. 500,000 men ought to be, and shall be ready to undertake its defence, and avenge its injuries. Strange necessity which miserable passions impose on two nations, whom interest and inclination mutually prompt to the cultivation of peace.—Whatever success intrigues may experience in London, no other people will be involved in new combinations —the government says, with conscious pride, that *England alone cannot maintain a struggle against France.* —But we have better hopes, and we believe that in the British cabinet, nothing will be listened to, but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity.—Yes, doubtless, the peace will daily be more consolidated. The relation of the two governments, will assume that character of goodwill which is suitable to their mutual interests. A happy repose will bury the recollection of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, rendering their happiness reciprocal, will deserve the gratitude of the whole world. —The First Consul. (Signed) *Buonaparte.*—By order of the First Consul, the secretary of state, *H. B. Maret.*

Report of the Committee of Commerce and Manufactures, to whom was referred that Part of the President's Message which relates to discriminating and countervailing Duties, and to the Act of the British Parliament on that Subject.—New York, January 21, 1803.—That a duty of 6 cents per ton is by law imposed on all American ships entering any of the ports of the U. States, from a foreign port, and on any ship or vessel, not of the U. States, 50 cents per ton; and that an additional duty of 10 per cent. on the duties payable on goods, wares or merchandize, imported in American bottoms, has invariably been imposed on such goods, wares, and merchandize, when imported in foreign ships or vessels.—That those discriminating duties have tended greatly to increase the navigation of the U. States, have given to the Shipowners an advantage over foreigners in the carriage to the U. States of salt, wine, brandy, sugar, coffee, blankets and other coarse woollens, coarse linens, hemp, earthen-ware, and other bulky articles, and have enabled them to be almost exclusively the carriers of all the fine articles of importation necessary to the consumption of the country. This policy, combined with the advantages resulting from the late war in Europe, had increased the American tonnage to an amount (it is believed) not inferior to that of any nation in Europe, except G. Britain.

The effects of these discriminating duties did not escape the observations of those foreign nations with whom we have had the greatest commercial intercourse.

By the 15th art. of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation, dated London 19th Nov. 1794.—"The Brit. Government has reserved the right of countervailing those discriminating duties—and the U. States bound themselves not to impose any new or additional duty on the tonnage of Brit. ships or vessels, or to increase the then subsisting difference between the duties payable on the importation of any article in Brit. or American ships."—It is believed by your Committee, that the Parliament of G. Brit. by a statute passed the 4th July, 1797, (in the exercise of that reserved right) have exceeded the fair intent and meaning of the treaty of amity, &c. &c. and thereby have secured to the Shipowners of that nation the exclusive carriage to G. Brit. (in time of peace) of some of our most important objects of exportation.—They have selected fish-oil and tobacco (articles of great bulk) as objects on which the highest countervailing duties have been imposed. The countervailing duty on fish-oil being 36s. 3d. 12-20 sterling per ton of 252 gallons, and upon tobacco 1s. 6d. per 100 lbs.—In consequence of which a Brit. ship of 250 tons, carrying 250 tons of oil to G. Brit. from the U. States, will pay 453l. 15s. st. less duty thereon than the same oil would pay imported into G. Brit. in an American ship; the whole freight on such quantity of oil would have been prior to the late war only 625l. st.—the nett freight to an American ship (after deducting the countervailing duty of 452l. 15s.) would of course be only 171l. 5s. st.—By the same operation, a Brit. ship of 250 tons, carrying 400 hhds. of tobacco, of 1200lbs. each, to G. Brit. from the U. States, would pay 360l. st. less duty than would be payable on the same quantity of tobacco imported in an American ship—the whole freight at 35s. st. per hhd. would only amount to 700l. st. which (after deducting the countervailing duty of 360l.) would leave to the American a nett freight of only 344l. 1s. st.—Rice, when imported into G. Brit. in an American ship, is charged with a duty of eight pence 8-10 st. per cwt. more than when imported in a Brit. ship; this extra duty amounts on a tierce of rice to 3s. 9d. st.; the freight of a tierce of rice may be estimated at 12s. st. No persons will give 15s. 9d. freight in an American ship, when

he can have the same carried for 12s in a Brit. ship.—Pot and pearl-ashes pay a countervailing duty of 2. 14. 15d. the cwt. A cask of ashes contains about 3 cwt.: the extra duty on that by an American ship will be 9d. per barrel; the freight of such barrel is presumed to be 5s. or 5s. 6d.st. in times of peace; a difference of 9d.st. per barrel, will effectually give the carriage to Brit. ships, of all the ashes exported from the U. States to G. Brit.—The Committee take leave to refer the House to a Table of Duties imposed by G. Brit. on goods imported in American and Brit. ships, which was printed the last Session of Congress, and is herewith exhibited (No. 3. *see v. 1. p.* 419.) On recurring thereto, an important countervail in the articles of wood of all kinds, a small one in tar, turpentine, pitch, and other articles, will be discovered.—The Committee take leave to state, that the Parl. of G. Brit., by a statute bearing date the 7th of May, 1802, has imposed the following new additional duties on articles the produce and manufacture of the U. States, viz.

Ashes, pot and pearl	1s. 6d.	the cwt.
Ginseng - - -	6s.	the 100 bls.
Indigo (American)	12s.	the 100 bls.
Bar Iron - - -	4s. 6d.	the ton.
Pig Iron - - -	4s. 6d.	the ton.
Pitch - - - -	3s. 8d.	the last of twelve [barrels.
Tar - - - -	2s. 11d.	
Rosin - - -	4d.	the 100 bls.
Rice - - - -	8d.	the cwt.
Tobacco - -	3s.	the 100 bls.
Turpentine -	2s.	the ton.
Bees-wax - -	5s. 9d.	the cwt.
Cotton (American)	7s. 10d.	the 100 bls.

The countervailing duty of 10 per cent. being also levied on all those new duties (except that on tobacco), adds farther to the injury already sustained by the American ships carrying such articles, and secures to Brit. ships the exclusive carriage of the following articles, in addition to the objects already mentioned, viz. indigo, iron, ginseng, bees-wax, and the important and bulky article of cotton. Prior to the passing of the Brit. statute of May last, Amer. cot. and indigo were free of duty on importation into G. Brit. the countervailing duty on indigo will (in consequence of the duty above stated) be 1s. 2d. 4-10 per 100lbs. That on cotton nine pence 4 10th the 100 lbs. The freight of 100 lbs. of cotton may be estimated, in times of peace, at about 8s. 4d. st.; the difference of 9d on 8s. 4d. will give a decided preference to Brit. over American ships.—Thus, then, it appears, that G. Brit. by her countervailing act, has secured effectually the carrying (for her own wants and her foreign commerce) of our fish-oil, tobacco, pot and pearl-ashes, rice, indigo, and cotton, and having the carriage of those bulky articles, the minor objects (except naval stores) not being sufficiently important to form entire cargoes, will also be carried in Brit. ships.—The Committee take leave farther to state, that by the same satute of G. Brit., of the 7th of May last, a duty of ½ per cent. is imposed on all goods, wares and merchandize, (of the growth or manufacture of G. Brit.) on their exportation to any port in Europe, or within the Streights of Gibraltar, and of one per cent. on similar goods, when exported to any place, not being in Europe, or within the Streights of Gibraltar; thus subjecting the U. States to a duty on exports double that which is paid by the nations of Europe. This discrimination your Committee believe to be in contradiction to the spirit of the Treaties existing between the U. States and G. Brit.—By the statute of G. Brit., passed the 4th July, 1797, a duty of tonnage was imposed on American ships entering her ports, of 2s. st. per ton, which is admitted as a fair countervail of the discriminating duty of 44 cents. per ton, on their ships entering the ports of the U. States.—From the preceding view of the subject, it appears to your Committee, that American vessels will be preferred to Brit. for the carrying of all the fine manufactures of G. Brit.; but that the decided advantages that Brit. ships *now have* over Americans, in the carriage of all the bulky and important articles of the U. States, necessary for the consumption of foreign commerce of G. Brit., will enable their Owners to enter into an advantageous competition with the Americans in the carrying from G. Brit. to the U. States, of Brit. salt, and of all the coarse and bulky articles of the produce and manufacture of G. Brit. for instance: Malt is charged with only 2 cents. per bushel more when imported in a foreign ship, than when imported in an American ship; this small extra duty has never prevented its importation in Brit. ships.—Earthenware—a crate thereof will cost about 5 l. st. The usual peace freight of such a crate presumed to be about 20 or 25 s. st.; the extra duty thereon, being only 1s. 6d. st., would be paid by the Owner of a Brit. ship rather than not obtain the freight.—Blankets—a bale of ten pieces will cost about 40l. st. The usual peace freight about 35s. st.; the extra duty payable, if imported on a Brit. ship, will be 10s. st.—Wool Hats, Osnaburgs, sail, canvas, kerseys, negro cottons, flannel, baize, half-thicks, and in truth, all woollen cloths under 2s. st. per yard; beer, porter, and a variety of other bulky articles, pay an extra duty, so small when compared with the freight of such goods, that the Owners of Brit. ships, when assured of a full return freight from the U. States to G. Brit. will find it their interest to agree to pay the extra duty payable on such goods when imported into the U. States in foreign ships or vessels.—France also has taken measures to meet the operation of our discriminating duties. In the 2d year of the Fr. Rep. *a Decree* (*relative to the Act of Navigation of that Nation*) was passed, by which a duty of tonnage of 50 sols per ton was imposed on foreign vessels entering the ports of France, and of 6 sols per ton on French vessels.—In the 3d year of the Fr. Repub., a law was passed, imposing a duty of 18 liv. 15 sols per quintal on tobacco imported in Fr. vessels, and of 25 liv. on tobacco imported into the ports of France in foreign vessels; which duty has since been increased to 30 liv. per quintal, when imported in foreign ships, and to 20 liv. when in Fr. ships; making a difference of 120 liv. or 22 dollars and 90 cents. per hhd. of 1200 lbs. against the importation of tobacco into France in American vessels. This discriminating duty amounts, in fact, to the prohibiting of the importation of tobacco in Ame-

rican vessels into France.—Your Committee further state, that, by a late law, France has imposed a discriminating duty of 50 per cent. on the duties payable on sugar, coffee, cocoa, and other W. India goods, when imported in Fr. ships, or similar goods when imported in foreign ships into her ports.—The Committee take leave to exhibit herewith [No. 1.] statement of exports, imports, and tonnage, as they relate to France, G. Brit. and the U. States. And a statement [No. 2.] shewing the exports from the U. States to the European ports of G. Brit. and France, of the following articles, to wit :—Pot and pearl-ashes, ginseng, iron, pitch, rosin, rice, tobacco, tar, fish-oil, turpentine, bees-wax and cotton, and the total value of exports to those nations for the year 1802.—Sweden and Denmark have laws imposing discriminating duties highly favourable to their carrying trade. Spain also, by its navigation laws, gives important advantages to its own shipping over those of foreign nations trading to her ports. Holland also has her discriminating duties, which in their consequences are injurious to the commercial interest of the U. States.—Two modes have presented themselves to your Committee, to obviate the disadvantages resulting to the carrying trade of the U. States, from the countervailing and discriminating duties already recited. The one to increase our discriminating duties, so as to meet the injuries now experienced from the operation of those and the countervailing duties of other nations. The other to relinquish our discriminating duties, so far as they relate to goods, wares and merchandize, the growth, produce, or manufacture of the nation to which the ship by whom the same are imported may belong, in favour of such foreign nation, as will agree to abolish such of their discriminating or countervailing duties as are in their operation injurious to the interest of the U. States.—The first mode would, in its consequences lead, to a commercial warfare between the U. States and foreign nations. Admit, for instance, that the U. States should increase her discriminating duties, will not foreign nations also increase theirs in every instance, and at every time that the U. States shall pursue their plan of increase ? If so, your Committee are at a loss to conceive what benefit could arise to the interest of the U. States from such a system.—The 2nd mode appears to your Committee more consistent with the true interest, as well as with the peaceful disposition of the U. States. They, therefore, submit the following resolutions :—Res., That so much of the several Acts, imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels, and on goods, wares and merchandize, imported into the U. States, as imposes a discriminating duty on tonnage, between foreign vessels and vessels of the U. States, and between goods imported into the U. States in foreign vessels and vessels of the U. States, ought to be repealed ; so far as the same respects the produce or manufacture of the nation to which such foreign ships or vessels may belong—such repeal to take effect in favour of any foreign nations, whenever the President shall be satisfied that the discriminating or countervailing duties of such foreign nations, so far as they operate to the disadvantage of the U. States, have been abolished.

No. 1.—*Statement of the Exports of the United States, from the 1st of Oct. 1798, to the 30th of Sept. 99.*

Great Britain	26,546,987
France	2,780,504

From the 1st of Oct. 1799, to 30th Sept. 1800.

Great Britain	27,310,289
France	5,163,033

From the 1st of Oct. 1800, to 30th Sept. 1801.

Great Britain	42,132,032
France	11,261,751

Statement of Imports of Goods subject to Duties ad valorem, from the 1st Oct. 1799, to the 30th Sept. 1800.

Great Britain (American vessels)	28,656,738
Ditto, (Foreign vessels)	2,451,096
	31,107,834
France, (American vessels)	74,153
Ditto, (Foreign vessels)	12,954
	87,130
For. No. of bushels of Salt 323,156	
American, ditto 860,902	
American Tonnage for 1799	626,495
Foreign, for the same year	109,599
	736,094

No. 2.—*Exports to the European States of Great Britain and France, for the Year preceding the 30th Sept. 1802.*

	Great Britain.	*France.*
Ashes, Pot	1828 Tons.	819 Tons
Ashes, Pearl	1496 —	57 —
Genseng	57,485 lbs.	
Indigo	167,450 —	161,471 lbs.
Iron, Bar	16 Tons	
—— Pig	493 —	
Fish Oil	19,903 Galls.	127,128 Gals.
Pitch	519 Barr.	268 Bar.
Rosin	1,944 —	49 —
Rice	29,703 Tier.	7,186 Tier.
Tobacco	31,478 Hhds.	16,216 Hhds
Tar	13,131 Barr.	797 Bar.
Turpentine	36,332 —	173 —
Bees Wax	88,630 lbs.	27,182 lbs.
Cotton, Domestic	21,015,000 —	1,156,924 —
——Foreign	2,458,919 —	750,945 —
	Dollars.	*Dollars.*
Total Value of the Exports to each country.	16,467,238	7,611,237

No. 3.—*A Table, shewing the comparative Duties paid in the Ports of Great Britain, on Goods imported into Great Britain, in American, Foreign, and British bottoms since the 5th of Feb. 1798, so far as the same respect the commerce of the United States.* This valuable document will be found in our Register, Vol. I. p. 419.

LONDON

TO R. B. SHERIDAN, ESQ.

SIR,—I am one of those who think that the publishing of parliamentary debates is a violation of the spirit of the English government; but, as long as the publication of these debates is tolerated, they appear to be a fair subject of *comment*, through the same channel that conveys them to the world; otherwise, matter calculated to do infinite injury, not only to the character of persons both in and out of the Legislature, but to the public weal, may, under the title of debates, be circulated, and if so circulated, must necessarily obtain belief.—Upon this principle it is, Sir, that I take the liberty to trouble you with a few remarks on a publication, which appeared in the *Morning Post* of the 10th instant, purporting to be a speech delivered by you, on the preceding day, in the House of Commons, on a motion for an address to his Majesty in consequence of his gracious message relative to preparations for war. Of this speech, or pretended speech, the passage to which I more particularly allude is this:—"We that opposed the peace, "said the Right Honourable Gentleman "(Mr. Windham), must be presumed to "be the persons most reluctant to renew "the war, because our strongest motive "and argument for condemning the peace "was, that it left us no means of resenting "future injuries, or, on whatever provo-"cation, of renewing future hostility. But "he went further still, for he declared, "that EVEN IF OUR EXISTENCE AS A "NATION WAS THE QUESTION, THE "PEACE HAD LEFT US WITHOUT ABI-"LITY TO MEET THE CONTEST. This "pusillanimous doctrine Mr. Sheridan re-"probated in terms of animated indigna-"tion *(accompanied by applauding cheers from "all parts of the House.)*—What, Sir, he said, "is this the language to hold at such a mo-"ment as the present? I have heard, indeed, "that the First Consul of France has mo-"destly proclaimed to the vassal Thrones "of Europe, that England is no longer "able to contend single-handed with "France—but I did not expect to hear "this sentiment re-echoed and acquiesced "in by a Member of the British Parlia-"ment (LOUD *and* INDIGNANT *cry of "hear! hear!*)—Mr. Sheridan proceeded to "say, that whatever were the motives of "that *new* reluctance to war, which seemed "so suddenly to have seized the Right "Honourable Gentleman, his reluctance "could not be more earnest and sincere "than his own was.—He deprecated war "from every feeling of his heart, and every "suggestion of his reason. He adjured "Ministers to try to their extent, what "temper, what conciliation, what even "concession, without forfeiture of honour, "could do;—but if all these sincerely at-"tempted should fail, and the dire neces-"sity of renewing the war should be forced "on us, *he would not endure* for a moment to "be told, that the energies of the country "were so exhausted, that we had no course "left but submission. No; he trusted, that "in spite of the audacious boast of the "First Consul, that it would be mani-"fested to him, and even to the Right Hon. "Gentleman, that there were still left "spirit and resources in British hearts, not "merely to protect the *existence* of their "country, but to avenge the *slightest insult "upon its honour*."—Now, Sir, I first assert, that Mr. Windham uttered no such sentiment as is here imputed to him. He did not say, that this country was, even in its present ruined and disheartened state, *unable, singly, to contend against France*; and, it follows of course, that your speech, as reported in this news-paper, is *a gross misrepresentation* of the sentiments of the Right Hon. Gentleman; which misrepresentation has been, I perceive, circulated through all the numerous channels of the press, and that, too, with uncommon pains and malignity.

But, Sir, upon the supposition that you did, on this occasion, speak the words ascribed to you, it seems to me not improper for any one to compare the opinion which they convey, with opinions before delivered by you, relative to the same subject. And here I beg leave to remind you of certain circumstances, in which I myself have some little concern.—After the

conclusion of the preliminaries of peace, and previous to the meeting of Parliament, you did me the favour to call at the shop, which I then kept, to enquire for a complete series of the letters which I had published on the peace. The series was not to be had, but I promised to send it when re-printed. I seized this opportunity to enforce, by some few remarks, the fearful truths which I had endeavoured to impress on the minds of the public, and to conjure you, by the love that you bore your country, to throw aside, in this her hour of distress, all party considerations, and to bend the whole force of your talents towards the prevention, while yet there was time, of the great and imminent dangers, to which not only her commercial and political interests, but also her independence and her very existence, were exposed. When my letters were re-printed, with the addition of those addressed to Mr. Addington, I did myself the honour to send you a copy, accompanied with a note, begging you to read them with attention, and expressing my hope that, whether I was right or wrong, you would be satisfied that I had, at any rate, some degree of reason, whereon to urge the soundness of my opinions, and the sincerity of my alarm.

I was not, indeed, vain enough to imagine, that what I had said, or what I had written, would produce any very great effect on you; but, I must confess, that, after your memorable declaration, your famous effusion of "*English feeling*," as the news-paper people phrase it, at the time when the country was called upon to resist the Northern Confederacy; I must confess that, when I recollected your having, on that occasion, declared that the *national flag ought to be nailed to the mast, and that we should triumph, or sink in the attempt*; I must confess that, when I adverted to that noble instance of your devotion to the honour of your country, I was astonished, utterly astonished and confounded, to hear your voice amongst those of the defenders of the preliminary treaty; to hear you say, that you were *glad* of a treaty that you could *not be proud of*; *glad* of a treaty "involving a *de-* "*gradation* of the national dignity, which "no *truly English heart* could feel with in- "difference*," a species of joy very little compatible, I thought, with that nice sense of honour, that lofty spirit, which would have counselled the sinking of the nation, rather than yield the right of rummaging the holds of neutral vessels, a right which the present ministers have, in reality, since surrendered, *without extorting from you one single word of censure!*

Having heard you express your *joy* at a measure, which you very explicitly and very justly described as "involving a *de-* "*gradation* of the *national dignity*," I was somewhat better prepared for your justification of the definitive treaty. Yet, as that compact contained so many and such striking deviations from the basis of the preliminaries, as its new concessions were so great and so shockingly disgraceful, and as France had, in the interim, made such fearful strides of ambition, I was still in hopes that, when the treaty came to be discussed, your "*English feeling*" would finally break forth. But, I was again disappointed. You still were glad. You styled the treaty, "a *degrading treaty*," a "*perilous* "*and hollow truce**;" and yet you concluded with a motion for an address to the King, expressing an opinion, that the "state of "affairs rendered peace so *necessary*, as to "*justify* the *important* and *painful sacrifices* "which his Majesty had been advised to "make for the attainment thereof†"—Thus, Sir, you declared most unequivocally, that a compact, which was *degrading*, *perilous*, and *hollow*, was, nevertheless, *necessary*.—From what, then, I pray you, Sir, did this imperious, this dire necessity arise? From the territorial aggrandisement of France, from the vast increase of her military means and power? or did it arise from the *decrease* experienced by us in these respects; or, from the falling off in our commerce, our credit, or our pecuniary resources? If not from these causes, it will, I imagine, be impossible for you to pretend, that from any other causes, the dreadful necessity, the *necessity of a disgraceful peace*, arose; and, not to trouble you with the detail of the question ‡, is there any one, having the least pretention to common sense, common observation, and common sincerity, who will deny, that all these causes are, in their several degrees, now more powerful than ever in their operation against our ability to wage war with France? How then, Sir, will you reconcile to reason, to duty, and, above all, to that consistency of which you profess to be so tenacious? how will you thus reconcile your *joy* at a *disgraceful peace*, then, with your lofty opinion of our *ability* now? You, who would have sunk the nation, rather than yield the right of searching neutrals; you, who would, in a contest for that object, have *nailed the flag*

* See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1096.

* Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1360.
† Ibid, p. 1367.
‡ See Register, p. 347, for this detail.

to the mast, could not have *rejoiced* at a treaty by which *the honour of that very flag*, an honour handed down to us amongst the most precious and most sacred legacies of our forefathers, was *basely surrendered*; you could not possibly have rejoiced at a peace like this, unless you believed your country to be totally unable to continue the war; and, if you thought her *unable* to continue the war, "with all appliances and means to "boot," on what ground do you think her *able* to renew it, when stripped of the far greater part of those means?

Leaving you to answer these questions, Sir, I shall now proceed to make a few remarks on the remainder of the speech ascribed to you. You are made to say: "I deprecate war from every feeling of "my heart, and every suggestion of my "reason. I adjure the minister to try, to "their extent, what temper, what conci-"liation, what even *concession*, without for-"feiture of honour, can do." It does, then, strike you, Sir, that *concession* can still be made, "without forfeiture of honour?" And yet you "will not *endure* to be told, "that the energies of the country are ex-"hausted, and that there is no course left "but submission!" Mr. Windham did not say, or insinuate, that there was no other course left: he contradicted your construction of his meaning, though the news-papers did not insert his contradiction. But, supposing he had, with what degree of consistency could his assertion have been reprobated by him who had publicly declared his *joy* at a peace, "in-"volving a *degradation of the national dignity*," and who was willing to make *further concessions*, who was even now willing *to add to that degradation*, rather than go to war? Is it for such a man to rail against "*pusillani-*"*mous* doctrine?" Is it for such a man to impute pusillanimity to those who would have continued the war rather than have made the treaty of Amiens? The House, too, we are told, joined in a "*loud and in-*"*dignant cry of hear! hear!*" I rejoice at this mark of spirit, but I cannot forget, that the same cheering applause, the same "*loud cry of hear! hear!*" was bestowed on you, when you declared, that the peace was "what every man must be *glad* of, "but what no man could be *proud of*, as "being a peace involving a *degradation* of "the *national dignity*, which no truly Eng-"lish heart could feel with indifference." I cannot forget this, Sir, and, therefore, I am less disposed to envy you the honour of these animating cheers.—"Mr. Sheridan "trusted, that, in spite of the *audacious* "boast of the First Consul, it would be "manifested to him, and even to the Right "Hon. Gentleman, that there were still "left spirit and resources in British hearts, "not merely to protect the existence of "the country, but to avenge the SLIGHT-"EST *insult upon its honour*."

"Fine words! I wonder where you *stole* 'em!"

Not, surely, from those who *rejoiced* at a peace "involving *a degradation of the na-*"*tional dignity*;" but, probably, from those who reprobated that disgraceful feeling, which was most happily done by Mr. Grenville, in his speech on the preliminary treaty*. These fine words were not stolen from Mr. Addington, who said, that "ano-"ther campaign would have cost *forty* mil-"lions, and that even *certain success* would "not have been worth such a price;" who also told the House, that "the duty of ne-"gotiation begun when all hopes of *conti-*"*nental aid*, in checking the power of "France, *were at an end*†," and who has since explicitly declared, on several occasions, that England alone *cannot maintain a contest against France*. Nor did the voice of the people furnish these fine words; the deluded and debased people, who voluntarily became the cattle of Lauriston, and who insulted their Sovereign by drawing the republican emissary in triumph under the very windows of the palace of St. James; the grovelling, the selfish, the swinish multitude, who, in answer to the warnings of those who foresaw the present dangers, insultingly grunted in their ears, "*peace* and a *large loaf!*" Is it amongst these, Sir, that you expect to find those "*British hearts* to avenge the *slightest* "*insult* upon the honour of the country?"—Yes, Sir, these are fine words, but words, without corresponding actions, never, except the adversary be very contemptible, tend to any useful purpose. The Indians, who are great adepts in the hostile use of the voice, always reserve their war-whoop till they are ready to rush upon the foe. Bluster is as far from spirit as hypocrisy is from piety. The barking cur seldom gives more than a cowardly snap; whereas the silent, modest, brave and faithful race, which were once the symbol of Englishmen, and against which you and Mr. Wilberforce have sworn eternal hatred, attack without a menace, quit their hold but with their lives, and die without a groan. They want no *cheering*, Sir; no *halloo*; nothing to blind and intoxicate, nothing to lessen the magnitude of their

* Register, Vol. II. p. 1139.
† Ibid, p. 1149.

danger. They want no caressing, no coaxing, no flattering: they are not to be urged on by these low arts: the threat of their antagonist creates the combat, on which they enter with sober resolution, and from which they are not to be driven by blows, by hunger, or by loss of limbs. Here, Sir, is a picture of *real*, and mock, "*English* "*spirit*;" and most sincerely do I wish, that this first of national qualities may be found, at the present awful crisis, in the hearts of our countrymen. But, Sir, if it be not, if, contrary to my prayers, they should be found wanting in this their last means of protection against the ambition, the rapacity, and the tyranny of France, let not the evil be attributed to that handful of statesmen and of true patriots, who protested against that "*degrading treaty*" of which you were "*glad*."

Having trespassed so long on your time, Sir, I will venture a little further, in order to make an observation or two on the subject of *unanimity*, which you are represented as strongly recommending in the close of your speech. And here, let me ask, if you could possibly think your treatment of Mr. Windham's speech likely to contribute towards this most desirable object? There is a sort of unanimity, which some men produce by forcing all others to adopt their own opinions, and to acknowledge themselves their inferiors; but, as I imagine, you could scarcely hope to effect this object with regard to those noblemen and gentlemen, who compose what is called the New Opposition, it appears to me, that your unanimity must mean, an union of all others, to the exclusion of that Opposition. This union may possibly take place, and it may last for a little while. Nay, if the country can be saved by it, I wish it may last for ever; for I should be ashamed to think with men, who do not set the good of their country far above all other considerations. There are, too, some strong motives to such an exclusion. Both the Parliament and the people now clearly perceive the superior penetration, or the superior virtue, of the New Opposition, whose apprehensions and whose predictions have all been fulfilled; but, both the Parliament and the people recollect, that they rejected the counsel and derided the forebodings of these gentlemen, whose elevation to power would operate as an almost unbearable reproach on ninety-nine hundredths of the nation, who would instantly take the counsels, if they could, with any probability of success, be divided from the men. The New Opposition may, therefore, remain, as to views on the government, perfectly at their ease. When the hour of distress, of dire necessity, arrives, the reins of power will fall into their hands, and not one moment sooner; and, that this hour may never arrive must be the wish of every man, who had the courage to meet and to bear the odium of opposing the peace of Amiens. The conduct of these noblemen and gentlemen has, during the whole of their opposition, been such as every sensible and honest man must view with admiration. As, in their reprobation of the peace, they totally disregarded the popular clamour that was artfully and basely raised against them; as they were undepressed by the defeat of their great and memorable exertions, so have they discovered no elevation at the accomplishment of all they foretold. They have betrayed no marks of triumph, have repaid the reproachful with no reproaches, the insolent with no insults. They have, from the signing of the preliminaries to the present day, made no attempt to embarrass the ministers; and, if the public affairs suffer from any fault of theirs, it will be from that of their forbearance, which has, in my opinion, been, in several instances, carried much too far. I do not call upon you, Sir, to acknowledge the contrast which this conduct forms with that of the Old Opposition; but, I do trust, that it is perceived, and acknowledged with gratitude, by all those who yet retain a due sense of right and wrong, and a due regard for the welfare and honour of the country.—I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

London, 15 *March*, 1803. W. COBBETT.

ON LORD ST. VINCENT AND THE NAVY.

SIR,—What Lord St. Vincent's conduct has been when commanding a fleet at sea, forms no part of my present enquiry: but his conduct as First Lord of the Admiralty, and the conduct of those naval commissioners he has placed at that Board, I propose to inquire into. They were but a short time fixed in office when they began to *hint* at abuses existing in the different naval departments; the newspapers warmly took up the subject, and though mostly differing from each other in all other points, they were *unanimous* in the praise (some in the most fulsome terms) of this untried Admiralty. All stated the existing abuses as enormous; but congratulated the public on the prospect of their being speedily eradicated, as from the honour, integrity, and ability, of the *present* Board of Admiralty, every wise and just measure would be adopted to remove the evil. Finding this language become popular, the Admiralty spoke out more strongly, and these abuses became the constant subject of their conversation, and of their correspondence with the subordinate boards, always adhering to general terms and never specifying any thing. In short, a person unacquainted with the real state of this country and hearing this general cry of abuses in the navy, from those persons just placed at the head of it, must naturally have concluded, that through the

whole of the long war just terminated, our navy had been disgraced and beaten in all parts of the world. That our ships had been sent out in a state unfit to keep the sea, and destitute of all description of stores, &c. that on investigation these melancholy events were to be attributed to the misconduct and corruption of the civil department of the navy, and the total negligence of the two former Boards of Admiralty, who had suffered such abuses to exist without taking the trouble to inquire into them. It was, therefore, left for the abilities of the present Board to discover the origin of our disasters, and for their integrity to find the remedy. But what is the real and notorious fact? Is there a dissentient voice in the country, when I assert that our fleets have been victorious in every part of the world, and have been enabled to keep the sea in all climes and in all seasons, and why? From the excellent state in which they were sent out from our Dock Yards, and from the regular supplies of stores and provisions furnished them from hence in all the various parts of the globe in which they have been serving. Does not the country know that we have had nearly 700 ships of war, and nearly 140,000 seamen! And can that system be radically bad which has enabled us to make such exertions? and is it possible there can have been great negligences where such exertions have been made? What then, it may be questioned, is the object of the present Admiralty in acting as they do? Why, by affecting to root out abuses, to gain popularity, to reflect upon their predecessors in office, and to obtain the sanction of the public to great changes they are desirous of making in the civil departments, by which they may get rid of persons obnoxious to themselves, and bring forward their own friends and dependents. These changes the First Lord did not wish to propose of himself, the job would be too glaring, and possibly his Majesty to whom such plans must be submitted in council might have objected, as his dislike of change and innovation (except upon strong grounds) is well known. The plan was, therefore, so soon as the alarum of abuses had been sounded long enough to take the public voice with him, to apply to Parliament to appoint commissioners to inquire into all the departments of the navy, who are directed not only to examine into the *abuses*, but also to propose *any changes* to *any* extent, in *any* of the *departments*, even to the length of abolishing or creating offices. These commissioners are sent into the department of the greatest extent and magnitude in the country, of which none of them have the smallest previous knowledge, for the two naval commissioners can have no acquaintance with the *civil branch* of the service, and it would take a long time to give them the degree of knowledge necessary to carry on the business, and more than the longest time that can be possibly supposed for the duration of their commission to enable them to understand the system sufficiently to make it proper for them to propose measures for radically altering and amending it; a system established by James the Second, when Duke of York, with the assistance of that able man Pepys, his secretary, a system under which our navy has grown to its present magnitude and celebrity, and has been, and is, the admiration and envy of the world. These commissioners have been, mostly, nominated by the First Lord, their secretary is a *protégé* of Mr. Tucker, who is secretary to the First Lord, and their instructions are to be given from the King and Council, which is, in fact, from the First Lord, as he is to propose to the King and Council the instructions proper to be given to them. Thus circumstanced, appointed, and instructed, what report *can* be given by them, but such as is favourable to the views of the First Lord? But to return to the conduct of the Admiralty. They appear to have entered into office with the idea, that there is no such thing in existence as an honest man, and as their ignorance of the department over which they were appointed to preside, led them to believe every man in it had the *means* of defrauding the public, they took it for granted he made advantage of it. Therefore the whole tenor of their conduct, language, and correspondence to every board and individual under them was of the coarsest and strongest nature, and evidently calculated to shew their more than suspicions. At the same time it was understood, that all informations, anonymous or otherwise, from any source whatever, which could go to the accusation of any officer or person in trust, would be received with avidity by the Admiralty; this was of course taken advantage of by the lowest description of people, many of whom having been discharged from the different Dock Yards, had consequently borne enmity to the persons they conceived to have been instrumental to their discharge. Their information was immediately attended to, and committees of the commissioners of the navy sent down to inquire into the abuses stated. In most instances they appeared to have originated in malice, and to have little or no foundation; however, Lord St. Vincent was still so desirous of encouraging this mode of intelligence, that he directed a paper to be put up in Chatham Dock Yard, returning his thanks to an anonymous correspondent for his information. In some instances his lordship thought sufficient misconduct was brought home to some of the officers in the different yards to enable him to order their discharge. Mr. Marshall, the master shipwright at Plymouth, was one of the first victims to these informations. The charges against him did not, in any instance, impeach his integrity, and went only to attribute to him negligence, in particular points of which, his general conduct acquitted him. In his defence, he declared the weight of business in his department in time of war, was such as made it totally impracticable for any man to attend strictly to all the checks required by his office in his own person; he was necessitated therefore, in some instances, and in those which were now brought against him, to depend on his clerks, who, it appeared, had been guilty of misconduct. It was conceived, that Lord St. Vincent, who had, when in command of the western squadron borne the strongest testimony of approbation to Mr. Marshall's conduct, for his great exertions in supplying the fleet at Torbay, would on this occasion have attended to the representations made by some of Mr. Marshall's superior officers, who stated he was a most able and active servant of the public, and that his conduct had, for many years, been most praiseworthy; but, no; Lord St. Vincent's answer was (and it deserves to be recorded) that "*general* "good conduct was never to be set against *indi-* "*vidual misconduct.*" Thus fell Mr. Marshall. How his place has been supplied has already been noticed by you Mr. Cobbett in your Register, but may as well, perhaps, be shortly stated here Mr. Joseph Tucker (the brother to Lord St. Vincent's late purser, but now secretary and commissioner of the navy) who a few months before had been in a most unconstitutional and unprecedented

manner, brought from the situation of a shipwright in a merchant's yard, and made *assistant* to *Mr. Marshall*, was appointed to succeed him, in preference to seventeen persons, who, at that time held the office of assistants to the master shipwrights, all of whom had been regularly educated and promoted in the King's Dock-Yards, and from which body it had been the invariable custom to select any new master shipwright to be appointed. The conduct of the First Lord on this appointment is worthy of notice; he called (as I have been informed) upon the Commissioners of the Navy, as the persons best acquainted with the characters and conduct of the Dock-Yard officers, to make a return of the names of those persons they considered best qualified to supply Mr. Marshall's place. These gentlemen returned him lists of names selected from the seventeen assistants above-mentioned. Mr. Tucker's name did not appear in any of them, as his character, both as an artificer and a man, was wholly unknown to them. It may be presumed his lordship *hoped* the Commissioners of the Navy would have inserted Mr. T.'s name in their lists, which would have justified him in selecting him, but his *hopes* were not answered. He was therefore obliged to appoint Mr. Tucker, in defiance of the recommendations he had himself desired. If I have been misinformed upon this subject, which I trust I have not, refutation can be easily given, but I believe I am not *materially wrong*. Mr. T.'s ignorance of his business, you Mr. Cobbett have already given an example of, in his conduct respecting the ship Mars. In his conduct respecting a quantity of timber he found in the Dock-Yard at Plymouth, which he proposed to the Navy-Board to have applied to inferior purposes, being, as he stated, wholly unfit for those it was laid in for; he attempted to fix a most heavy charge against his predecessor, Mr. Marshall, but the Board would not comply with the proposition, without ordering a strict survey of the timber to be held by certain officers (of whom Mr. Tucker was ONE); the result has been that *upwards* of four-fifths of that timber is reported fit for the uses for which Mr. Marshall received it! I have thought it right to go through the whole of one transaction, that you may form some idea of the conduct of the present Admiralty, and I can assure you, this is the character of every change they have made. The rigid severity with which every individual is persecuted on the slightest suspicion of blame, is such, that the whole of the Dock-Yards are panic-struck and paralysed: all those officers who have any means of subsistence independent of their situation, are retiring, preferring the smallest pittance to the being daily subject to this system of terror; amongst those that remain, all confidence is destroyed. No officer will venture to execute any order that is not defined in the clearest manner; instead of that zeal hitherto shewn for forwarding the public service, the object is now to do their duty in so exact a manner as shall save them from punishment; nor would any service, however pressing, be now forwarded till the most scrupulous attention had been paid to every minute form, that could preclude them from a future charge of inattention. The inconvenience arising from this is already experienced: the supplies of *timber* are stopped, and the respectable merchants, who have hitherto contracted with the Navy-Board for that article, declare they can do so no longer, while the present rigid system of receipt is continued. But should any unfortunate circumstance arise which shall require this country to make any sudden exertion, and to arm for its defence, then will it prove most fatal, and the full extent of the evil will be found, alas! too late; and we shall have nothing left us but to execrate the names of those persons, who, by their arbitrary conduct, violence, and partiality have deprived the country of her greatest and most glorious defence *.

Let us look back to the period when the late war broke out, and consider what the situation of the country was at that moment, and we shall see what may be done in bringing forward a fleet, when there is a man at the head of the naval department who has only the welfare of his country at heart, and whose wish is to protect and support those who are entrusted with the executive part of the service placed under his charge. The Earl of Chatham was then at the head of the naval department, and had been so for three or four years before. At that period, none of the various innovations and changes had taken place, which have since been carried to such an extent as has nearly changed the whole constitution of the civil department of the navy, and it is much to be feared will end in its destruction. His lordship saw the wisdom of the old institutions, and though strongly and most perseveringly solicited and pressed to sanction changes and innovations, steadily refused assent to them, and shewed, by the whole of his conduct, that he considered the establishments as he found them, perfectly competent to carry on the service, provided the different officers did their duty, and that they might have every encouragement to do so, he supported their consequence in their different departments, and held out every encouragement, by uniformly promoting the officers in the Dock-Yards, according to their character and length of service, without regard to interest or recommendation, and *in no instance* bringing in any person to a situation in the Dock-Yards, to the detriment of those already established there. Thus situated was our naval establishment when the war broke out, and the consequences were such as might be expected from so happy a state of things. The rapidity with which our fleet was equipped and sent to sea was *unprecedented*, and could not possibly have taken place, but for the zeal with which every officer, entrusted with any part of the service, exerted themselves. A very short enumeration of facts will prove this better than any laboured statement. On the 1st of December 1792, the number of men *actually* borne, including marines, did not amount to 12,000 men, with 17 sail of the line, and 25 frigates in commission; this was our situation, when the war broke out. In so short a space of time as *one month* our forces were increased to such a degree, that we find on the 1st of January 1793, the number of our seamen and marines borne, to be 18,000, without having recourse to press-warrants, which were not issued, till the month of February. At this period, we find 30 sail of the line and 51 frigates commissioned, the war not being then declared, and the preparations for armament having gone on but one month.

On the 1st of Jan. 1794, (thirteen months after these preparations began,) we find our naval force to consist of 96 sail of the line, and 106 frigates in commission, and nearly 77,000 seamen and marines borne. On the 1st of June in the same year our force was 99 sail of the line and 114 frigates in commission, and nearly 83,000 seamen and marines, and on that glorious day, Lord Howe, with

* Observe, this letter was written a *month ago*.

36 sail of the line, so effectually beat the French, that to this hour they have never met us in a fleet again. In fact our naval contest with France was that day decided and terminated. We might also look back to the exertions made by the naval department under this noble Lord prior to this war breaking out, and any person that will revert to the time of the Russian and Spanish armaments, will find as much cause for admiration in the manner our fleet was brought forward at those periods (and which most probably saved us from a war with those countries), as in the time just now alluded to.

Had the officers in the different departments of the navy been satisfied with the mere performance of their duty, what would have become of us? Fortunately it was far otherwise, and the zeal that was shewn by every individual in the service was in proportion to their confidence in the administration under which they acted; they knew they should be protected, they also knew that if faults of omission happened through the press of business, an allowance would be made for it; therefore, their first object was to forward the service with as much attention to every check that was necessary for their responsibility as possible, but at all events to forward the service.

What a different prospect is now before us, should the circumstances of the times call upon us for exertions in our naval department, may be collected from the picture I have given of the present state of our Dock Yards, and all the subordinate naval establishments; of the truth of which, if any person doubts, and will take the trouble to make enquiry, he will have too soon, alas! those doubts removed.

Fortunate would it have been for this country had the system of that noble Lord who directed our naval affairs at the commencement of the war been persevered in. His successor in office, certainly with the best intentions, but with a want of experience, listened too readily to the partizans of innovation who *immediately assailed* him, before it was possible for him to have formed an adequate idea of the nature and extent of that department over which he was placed, and unfortunately the changes he was induced by those persons to make were not of a trivial nature, but went to a total alteration of the constitution of the naval depattment, which he never could have designed, and which, if they had allowed him time for reflection, his good sense and abilities would have readily perceived. I allude in the first instance, to the appointment of a most expensive establishment under General Bentham, a man, perhaps, of some ingenuity, but certainly and notoriously of no science, a man who had past great part of his life in the military service of the Empress of Russia; why he quitted that service I cannot say certainly, not (I should suppose) with a view to his present situation, as it is beyond what his most sanguine hopes could have imagined. It is true, he had served his apprenticeship as a shipwright in one of the King's yards, before he set out to seek his fortune in Russia; but he could hardly expect the knowledge he had obtained in that time, would qualify him for the office of "*Inspector General* of all naval works," an office which was created for him with a large salary; what the extent of his powers are with his subordinate offices of *mechanist, chemist, builder,* &c. I cannot precisely state, as they seem to increase every day, thus much is certain, that on their establishment they superseded all the legitimate powers exercised in the Dock Yards by the Navy Board, the Surveyors of the Navy, and all the Dock Yard offices on the subject of building, maintaining, and repairing all docks, slips, warehouses, and every description of *civil architecture*. The plan of improvement which had some years before been formed by the ablest engineers, civil and military, that the country produced, which had been sanctioned by the Privy Council, and was in regular yearly progress towards completion, was set aside, as it were by *acclamation*, and why? Not for the purpose of bringing forward another well digested plan, but to make a clear coast for this enterprizing, speculating General, whose genius must not be cramped, as any restriction might marr a plan expected to be infinitely superior to what the united efforts of all our scientific men had been able to produce. Unfortunate is it for the country, when the heads of departments consider *all change* as *improvement*, it is, alas! too much the spirit of these times. To shew the innumerable bad effects which have been the consequence of this unnecessary and ill advised innovation, would far exceed the limits of a letter already much too long. Suffice it to say, that though the noble Lord's intentions were good who introduced it, and he intended to stop when he had accomplished what he thought desirable, not reflecting that he had by breaking in so essentially upon old establishments, without any imperious necessity for so doing, made a precedent, which those who succeeded him might carry to any extent they desired, and his successors have taken advantage of it. What the whole of their plans are, has not yet been divulged. but from what they have done, and what they appear to be now doing, it is my decided opinion, that if the present Admiralty is not speedily removed, the sun of the British Navy is set for ever.——I am, Sir, AN ENGLISHMAN.

Plymouth, 11 *Feb.* 1803.

BOB AND THE DOCTOR.

A New Song to an Old Tune.

I sing not of conquests by Britons obtain'd,
The battles they fought, and the honours they gain'd;
Their conquests by land, and their conquests by sea,
Though subjects for fame—are no subjects for me.
Derry down, &c.

I sing not of peace to our country restor'd;
For the dove brought no olive, though sheath'd was the sword:
Yet BOB and THE DOCTOR, in positive tone,
To Israel cry'd peace—when peace there was none.

Our pacific hostility's blessings I sing,
That anomalous, non-descript, negative thing;
That truce full of terror, of doubt, and submission,
That fraternal embrace, in a hostile position.

Cornwallis, great *service* to render the state,
To Amiens was sent with a *service* of plate:
There he feasted, and slept, and the Consul, so civil!
To amuse the good Lord, sent his punch and the Devil.

There they treated his Lordship with all sorts of fun,
Taught some new Christmas games to the peer and his son:

Thus the winter went off—and no business went on,
For my Lord took'd in vain for *Mynheer* and the *Don*.

But at length, the definitive treaty was clos'd,
New concessions demanded—new terms were impos'd,
New insults were offer'd—redress was deny'd,
And the state reciprocity—all on one side.

You've heard that that "safe politician," the Devil,
Prefers darkness to light, 'cause "his actions are evil."
But Bob and the DOCTOR, those politic wights,
Though dark lanthorns themselves, made us put up our lights.

Pharsalia was fatal to freedom and Rome,
Pultowa to Charles prov'd the seal of his doom;
Little York * robb'd *Great* Britain of part of her state,
But the treaty of Amiens decided her fate.

In vain o'er the waves did her thunder-bolts roll,
Her glory in vain reach'd from Ind to the Pole.
Those tones of "bold thunder" were chang'd to submissions,
And her heroes disarm'd—by our "safe politicians."

Honest ROBIN, we know, in a grand gasconade,
Talk'd of marching to Paris—by way of crusade;
Then, reluctant, his march he was fain to forego,
Now he trembles—because Buonaparté cries—*Boh!*

And the DOCTOR, alarm'd at this *fee*, *faw*, and *fum*,
Though "all things to all men," looks confoundedly glum;
For he sees—whilst his hungry *relations* are fed,
The *relations* of peace and of amity fled.

Now in safety they bid us no longer repose,
And would rouse the old lion again from his doze;
They have pared down his nails, and dismantled his jaws,
Yet they now bid him shew both his teeth and his claws.

But should that old lion, grown tir'd of submission,
Be rouz'd to a sense of his wretched condition,
Both the DOCTOR and BOB would be hurl'd to that station,
From whence they were rais'd—for the sins of the nation.

Reading, March 13, 1803. CANDIDUS.

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* The town of *York* in Virginia, which, to distinguish it from the other Yorks in America, is called *Little York*, was the place where LORD (now MARQUIS) CORNWALLIS surrendered himself and his army prisoners of war, and, by that capitulation, severed, from Great Britain, thirteen flourishing colonies, and put the finishing stroke to the success of a revolution, which was the precursor of the revolution of France, and which will, I greatly fear, finally produce the destruction of Britain herself. The negotiation of the treaty of Amiens could not, most assuredly, have been committed to a person more worthy of the task. "I am wrong," said Mr. Pitt, in his defence of the preliminaries, "I am wrong in particularizing India, as the theatre of the noble "marquis's exertions, for there is scarce a *quarter* "*of the globe*, in which this country has not derived *important services* from the exalted *talents* "and virtues of that noble person, who is now "about to receive his reward, in putting the "finishing hand to a treaty, which will *give* "PEACE *to the world*, after a war in which he "had so *large a share* in *averting* from this country "the dangers that threatened the most vulnerable "part of our possessions!!!!" (*See Debates*, REGISTER, *Vol. II.* p. 1139.)

NOTICES OF NEW BOOKS, from p. 268.

3. *A Journal of the Forces which sailed from the Downs, in April* 1800, *on a Secret Expedition under the Command of Lieutenant-General Pigot, till their Arrival in Minorca; and continued through all the subsequent Transactions of the Army under the Command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, in the Mediterranean and Egypt; and the latter Operations under the Command of Lord Hutchinson, to the Surrender of Alexandria. With a particular Account of Malta, during the Time it was subject to the British Government. By Æneas Anderson, Lieutenant of the 40th Regiment. Illustrated by a Variety of Maps, Plans, Views, &c. &c.* 4to. pp. 532. Debrett.—After giving the title of this volume at length, little more remains for us to say, than that we have carefully examined its contents, and have risen from a perusal of it, with a conviction that it is an authentic narrative of the operations it professes to relate. The account of Malta will be found particularly interesting; it is unquestionably the best description of that island, its cities, towns, fortifications, public buildings, harbours, climate, language, physical circumstances, produce, trade, &c. &c. that has yet appeared in this country. We warmly recommend a perusal of it to our readers at the present moment: after which, we are persuaded they will be of Mr. Dundas's opinion—that "*the minister who should give* "*up Malta would deserve to forfeit his head.*" The engravings are numerous and well executed.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Feb. 15.—The retinue of the French Ambassador, General Brune, who has arrived here, and had a conference with the Reis Effendi, after which he had a formal audience of entry of the Grand Seignior, consists of sixty persons, among whom are several interpreters. In the same squadron with this suite have likewise arrived twelve persons, whom the government has sent as commercial commissioners to the different provinces of Turkey, and who have been already acknowledged by the Porte in that capacity, and will immediately set out for the several places of their destination.—Lord Elgin has gone on board an English frigate, in which he will return to

London. Though he has given official notice of the withdrawing of the English troops from Egypt, the Turks do not expect that this will take place for three or four months; that is to say, not till the Convention with the Beys has been carried into effect.—When Lord Elgin sailed from this harbour, which was in the night, he fired a salute of seventeen guns, which occasioned a general alarm here, as cannon are never fired here in the night, except in the case of some great calamity or insurrection. The Reis Effendi had previously requested Lord Elgin to omit the ceremony of a salute at his departure, and has now delivered to Mr. Stratton a note of complaint and remonstrance on the subject.—The Porte has this day appointed Haleb Effendi, a man of prepossessing manners, its ambassador to Paris.

Genoa, Feb. 12.—Accounts from Rome, of the 5th instant, say that an English courier from London had passed through that city on his way to Naples.—We also learn from Bologna, of the date of the 13th, that a French commissary, preceded by a courier, had passed in great haste through that city for Florence. The latter accounts likewise add, that a French half brigade from Modena had arrived at Bologna, and that, as it was said, several corps of French troops in Italy were in motion, and about to march for different ports on the Mediterranean.—Besides the Polish corps, troops from the Italian Republic are embarking at Genoa for St. Domingo.

Paris, March 8.—Gen. Brune, Ambassador of the French Republic to the Sublime Porte, arrived at Constantinople the 21st of January.—His squadron was composed of 6 ships, large and small, one of which was a ship of the line. He has been received by the Capitan Pacha. The Vizier and the Divan have sent him presents, and his reception has been attended with the utmost solemnities. The news of his arrival has spread joy throughout the whole empire.—The Commissaries for Foreign Affairs in all the trading towns of the Levant, have obtained firmans, and have departed for their destination on board the different small vessels of the squadron.—All the commercial relations of the French have resumed in the trading towns of the Levant their ordinary course. They have reason to flatter themselves at the support they have received from the Turks. On the demand of General Stuart, the Porte has granted to the Mamalukes that part of Upper Egypt composed of Sevan and Sennc.—The Capitan Pacha daily expects news of the evacuation of Alexandria.—*Moniteur.*

March 10.—Letters from Brest, of the 2d March, state, that the expedition for the East-Indies was to sail in a few days: it is composed of the Marengo, of 74 guns, the frigates Atalante, la Belle Poule, la Semillante, le Côte d'Or, and the transport la Marie Françoise. The troops embarked consist of one battalion of the 109th demi-brigade of the line, of one of the 18th light infantry, a company of light artillery, and a company of Swedes, some artizans, and the corps of officers of two battalions of Seapoys, who are to be formed in India.

French tiers consolidés, March 10th, 61 f. 25 c. —11th, 61 f. 60 c.—12th, 60 f. 30 c.

DOMESTIC.

On the 7th inst. W. Lee and W. Roukesley, both of Sheffield, were tried at the York Assizes before Judge Rooke, for having feloniously administered an oath to W. Simmet of Chesterfield, to engage in a conspiracy, formed for the purpose of disturbing the public mind. The first witness proved that Roukesley solicited him to become a member of their society; he was told that those who would not go would be made to go; that if any fell in the contest, there was a provision made for their wives and families; that they were to fight against any that came against them; that there were more than 1000 in Sheffield; that R. was what was called a conductor, that Lee was a chief; that the witness, his brother, and R. went to Lee's house, when an oath was administered to the witness and his brother by Lee; that they were sworn to keep the secrets of the society; that R. told him the object was to overthrow Parliament, to make this a free nation, and to rule themselves; that in August, R. gave orders to a man to make some pikes; that he had heard R. say, that a letter had been intercepted at the Post-Office from London, which had led to a discovery; that, therefore, it was necessary to secrete the arms; that R. and another went to a wood near Sheffield, after having previously put the arms in a chest, and buried the chest in the ground; that he afterwards went with the constable to the place where this box had been secreted, and that it was there found, &c. The above evidence was corroborated by several other witnesses. The box, containing the instruments, was produced; they were about three times the size of a carving knife blade, and edged on both sides like a dagger.

The jury immediately found the prisoners *guilty*. The sentence of seven years transportation was then passed upon them.

(A correct report of this Trial will be given in the Supplement to Vol. 1.)

A mutiny lately broke out on board his Majesty's ship the Excellent, at Barbadoes. By the active exertions of the Hon. Capt. Stopford, and his officers, with the prompt assistance of the royal marines, it was soon quelled. Four of the ringleaders were tried and executed; and the boatswain was tried and dismissed the service.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Friday, March, 4.—COMMONS.—Sir W. Elliot presented a petition from the ship owners of Newcastle.—The chairman of the committee for trying the merits of the petition on the contested election for Penryhn, reported that the sitting member was duly elected.—Mr. Calcraft moved "that "this house, anxiously desirous to give full effect "to the important recommendation contained in "his Majesty's most gracious message of the 16th "of February, do appoint a select committee to "request and demand information concerning "those incumbrances that impede His Royal High-"ness the Prince of Wales from complying with "the object of his Majesty's message by resuming "immediately that state, dignity, splendour, and "rank, to which he is entitled."—A debate of considerable length ensued. The speakers were Messrs. Calcraft, Erskine, Fuller, Cartwright, Buxton, Curwen, Hilliard, Johnstone, Lascelles, Geary, Dent, Burdon, Tierney, Addington, Fox, Grosvenor, Lord Stanley, Mr. Canning, Mr. Golding, Mr. Sheridan, Lord Hawkesbury, Sir J. Wrottesley, Mr. W. Smith, and Lord Castlereagh.—A division took place: for the motion 139.—Against it 184. —Majority against the motion 45.—*The Debate, together with a correct list of the minority, will be preserved in our Supplement to Vol.* 3.

Monday, March 7.—LORDS.—The Irish appeal cause of Lloyd *v.* Grady was argued at considerable length.—Irish Revenue Officers' Bill, and Bill

for preventing vexatious arrests read a second time.

COMMONS.—Scotch Cotton Manufacturers' Bill. and Bill for preventing forgeries on the Bank of Ireland, read a first time.—Irish Law Court Assimilation Bill, and Irish Revenue Perpetuation Bill read a second time.—Mr. Fox brought up the Report from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Petition, complaining of an undue Election for Stanraer, &c. in Scotland. The Report stated, that J. S. Gordon, Esq. was duly elected, and R. S. Agnew not duly elected; but that the petition was not frivolous or vexatious.—Irish Stamp Duty, Hat Duty, Game Certificates, Postage, and City of Dublin Watch Bills, were read a second time.—Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill read a third time and passed.—Marine Mutiny Bill read a first time.

Tuesday, March 8th.—LORDS.—Lord Hobart presented a message from the King, for which see Commons.—Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—Mr. Dan. Houston presented a petition from certain master-manufacturers in Scotland against the Scotch Cotton Manufacturers' Bill. —Mr. Owen, from the India House, presented at the Bar an account of the nett produce of the Revenue of India, &c.—Lord W. Russel brought in a Bill for paving, widening, extending &c. certain streets in Southwark and Surrey.—Read a first time.—Sir R. Milbank brought up a report of the Committee appointed to try the merits of a petition, complaining of an undue election for Bridgewater. It stated, that the Committee had declared that G. Pocock, Esq. and Jeffery Allen, Esq. the sitting members, were duly elected; but that the petition was not frivolous or vexatious.—Mr. H. Browne reported from the Nottingham Election Committee, that Frederic Shuttleworth had been guilty of prevarication and contradiction in giving his evidence before that Committee.—Ordered into custody of Serjeant at Arms.—Mr. Addington brought down the following

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

"George R.—His Majesty thinks it necessary "to acquaint the House of Commons, that as "very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he "has judged it expedient to adopt additional "measures of precaution for the security of his "dominions. Though the preparations to which "his Majesty refers are avowedly directed to colonial service, yet as discussions of great importance are now subsisting between his Majesty and the French government, the result of "which must at present be uncertain, his Majesty "is induced to make this communication to his "faithful Commons, in the full persuasion, that "whilst they partake of his Majesty's earnest and "unvarying solicitude for the continuance of "peace, he may rely with perfect confidence on "their public spirit and liberality, to enable his "Majesty to adopt such measures as circumstances may appear to require, for supporting "the honour of his crown, and the essential interests of his people."

Mr. Addington moved, that his Majesty's Message be taken into consideration to-morrow. Ordered —Irish Maiming and Cutting Bill read a second time.

Wednesday, March 9.—LORDS.—Counsel were heard on the Irish appeal, Lloyd *v.* Grady.—On the order of the day, for taking into consideration his Majesty's Message, being read, Lord Hobart rose to move an Address to his Majesty on the occasion, which, after a short debate, was voted *nem. con.* The speakers were Lords Hobart, Spencer, Grenville, Moira, Westmoreland, and Auckland.

COMMONS.—Mr. Erskine informed the House, that he had authority from his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, to request the noble Lord Porchester, not to pursue the notice he had given, with respect to an additional grant to the Prince of Wales; in consequence of which Lord P. consented to withdraw his motion for the present. On the order of the day for taking into consideration his Majesty's Message being read, Mr. Addington rose to move the Address. A debate ensued, in which the speakers were, Mr. Addington, Mr. Fox, Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Windham, Mr. Sheridan, Mr Canning, Mr. T. Grenville, the Attorney-General. *(This debate, together with that of the Lords, will be preserved in our Supplement.)* The question was put and carried *nem. con.*—Mr. Addington gave notice, that on Friday next, he should move for an increase of 10,000 seamen and marines.

From the London Gazette.—St. James's, March 10, 1803.—This day M. de. Lima, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, had an audience of leave of her Majesty; and the Chevalier de Souza Couttinho, his successor in the same character, had his first private audience of his Majesty.

BANKRUPTS. — Richardson, J. Pocklington, sheep-jobber.—Macaulay, J Liverpool, merchant. —Sales, J. Liverpool, broker.—Ayres, R. Liverpool, dealer in earthen-ware.—Goring, J. and E. Johnstone, St. Mary Axe, merchants.—White, T. the younger, Strood, coal-merchant.—Spalding H. Melfield, grocer. — Martin, G. Suffolk-street, watchmaker.—Harris, T. Waltham, Holy Cross, pin-maker.—Edwards, S. Manchester, cotton-spinner.—Hanker, D. Winchcomb, soap-boiler.—Morphew, W. Rotherfield, dealer in corn.—Barker, J. Cumberland, wood-monger.—Hunt, T. Leather-lane, hardwareman.—Simpson, W. Clements-lane, merchant.—Nicoll, J. G. Hackney-road, bricklayer.—Ballanger, T. Tiverton, innholder.—Shepard, J. Bristol, hosier.—Bourne, H. St. James's-street, silk mercer.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

A Proclamation, for encouraging Seamen and Landmen to enter themselves on Board his Majesty's Ships of War.

G. R.—Whereas, it is Our Royal intention to give all due encouragement to all such seamen and landmen who shall voluntarily enter themselves in our service: we have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our Royal Proclamation: and we do hereby promise and declare, that all such able seamen not above the age of 50, nor under the age of 20 years, fit for our service, who shall, on or before the 30th of April next, voluntarily enter themselves to serve in our Royal Navy, either with the Captains or Lieutenants of our ships, or officers employed in tenders or at rendezvous on shore, for raising men for the service of our Navy, shall receive, as our royal bounty, the sum of £3 each man; and all such ordinary seamen fit for our service, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of £2 each man; and all such able-bodied landmen, not above the age of 35, nor under the age of 20 years, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of £1 each man, as our royal bounty; such respective sums to be

paid them by the respective clerks of the check residing at the ports or places where the ships into which they shall be entered, shall be, immediately after the third muster of such seamen and landmen:—And we do declare, that the qualifications of the seamen and landmen so entering themselves as aforesaid, shall be certified by the Captain, Master, and Boatswain of the ship or vessel where they shall enter. And for preventing any abuses by any persons leaving the vessels to which they shall belong, and entering themselves on board any other our ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty money; we do hereby declare and command, that such seamen and landmen belonging to any of our ships or vessels as shall absent themselves from any of the said ships or vessels to which they shall belong, and shall enter themselves on board any other of our said ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty, shall not only lose the wages due to them in the ships or vessels they shall leave, but also be severely punished according to their demerits.—Given at our Court, at the Queen's House, the 7th day of March, 1803, and in the 43d year of our reign.—God save the King.

A Proclamation, for recalling and prohibiting Seamen from serving Foreign Princes and States; and for granting rewards for discovering such Seamen as shall conceal themselves.

G. R.—Whereas we are informed, that great numbers of mariners, and seafaring men, our natural-born subjects, are in the service of divers Foreign Princes and States, to the prejudice of our kingdom; we have thought it necessary, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our royal proclamation; and do hereby strictly charge and command all masters of ships, pilots, mariners, seamen, shipwrights, and other seafaring men whatsoever and wheresoever (being our natural-born subjects), who are in the pay or service of any foreign Prince or State, or do serve in any foreign ship or vessel, that forthwith they, and every of them, do (according to their known and bounden duty and allegiance) withdraw themselves, depart from, and quit such foreign services, and return home to their native countries: and further, we do hereby strictly prohibit and forbid all masters of ships, pilots, mariners, seamen, shipwrights, and other seafaring men whatsoever (being our natural-born subjects), from entering, and do charge and command them, and every of them, from henceforth to forbear to enter themselves into the pay or service of any foreign Prince or State, or to serve in any foreign ship or vessel whatsoever, without our special licence first had and obtained in that behalf; to all which we expect due obedience and exact conformity; and we do hereby publish and declare, that the offenders to the contrary shall not only incur our just displeasure, but be proceeded against for their contempt according to the utmost severities of the law: and we do hereby declare, that if any such masters of ships, pilots, mariners, seamen, shipwrights, or other seafaring men, (being our subjects,) shall be taken in any foreign service by the Turks, Algerines, or any others, they shall not be reclaimed by us as subjects of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland: and we do hereby further promise and declare, that a reward of twenty shillings for every able and ordinary seaman fit to serve on board our ships shall be paid any person who shall discover any seaman or seamen who may conceal him or themselves, so that such seaman or seamen shall be taken for our said service by any of our sea officers employed for raising men, on or before the 30th of day April next; the said rewards, to be paid for any seaman or seamen so discovered and taken in or about London, by the principal officers and commissioners of our navy; and at the out-ports by the naval officers, (where there are any), and (where there are no naval officers), by the collectors of our customs, immediately upon a certificate being produced to the said principal officers and commissioners of our navy, naval officers, or collectors respectively, by the person who may make discovery of any seaman or seamen as aforesaid, certifying his name, and the name or names, and number of seamen procured in consequence of his discovery; the said certificate to be given by such officer as may take such seaman or seamen for our service.—Given at our Court at the Queen's House, the 7th day of March, 1803, and in the 43d year of our reign.—God save the King.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

FINANCE AND THE FUNDS.—In our last, p. 343, we alluded to the financial display of Lord Auckland, and expressed our distrust of the efficacy of that species of force, on which his Lordship seemed to place his whole reliance. In our opinion, no error is so dangerous, as this, which has, during the last twenty years, been gradually possessing itself of the minds of the nation, and which, at last, led to the treaty of Amiens. Every one could see that that ignominious compact involved, as Mr. Sheridan truly observed, "a *degradation* of the *national dignity*," but yet most people, like Mr. Sheridan, were "*glad of*" it, because they thought that it would contribute to swell the size of that "pyramid of gold," which they vainly imagined would, at all times, and under all circumstances, be a sufficient protection. In order, therefore, to destroy this deadly error, we have frequently endeavoured to show the fallacy of those statements, by which it was kept alive and propagated through the country; and, we feel ourselves much obliged to Lord Auckland, who (though without intending perhaps), has enabled us to set the state of the revenue in its true light, by the accounts he has procured to be laid before the House of Lords. These accounts, which were, it would appear, intended to vindicate the credit of the nation against the assertions of the French calculators, have, in the opinion of every sensible observer, answered no other purpose than that of completely exposing the mistatements and fallacies, and, of course, the ignorance or the duplicity, of the budget speech, by which Mr. Addington hoped to reconcile the public to his shadowy and evanescent peace, a hope, in which the credulous stockholders know, to their sorrow, was not entirely disappointed.—Lord Auck-

land's papers contain an account of the *actual receipts* of the year, up to the 5th of January last, together with estimates of what ought to be the produce of the taxes laid last year, and only received for the two last quarters. The result is as follows:

Nett permanent revenue including corn bounties	£28,246,677
Land Tax unredeemed	1,380,271
Annual Malt Tax	624,350
Estimate of further produce Taxes, 1802	2,827,783
Profit on the Lottery, 1802	373,000
	33,449,081
Deduct 827,783, because Lord A. cannot fairly calculate the produce of the Taxes of 1803 at more than 4,000,000, seeing that, in the half year to January last, they produced only 1,900,437	827,783
	32,621,298
Deduct permanent charge on Consolidated fund	24,631,931
Remains actual surplus	7,989,367

We refrain, at present, to take any notice of the other items in Lord Auckland's accounts, because they do not consist of items of *receipts*, but of such as are the creatures of a fond imagination, and are merely intended to bolster up a defective statement, upon exactly the same principle that an American debtor places, upon the list of his property, lands, rivers, and trees, which have no existence, except it be in the moon.—The real surplus, therefore, of the revenue to January last (according to actual receipts) applicable to national purposes, appears to be £7,989,367, which when compared with the statements made by Mr. Addington in that celebrated speech *, which his modest assurance led him to publish in a pamphlet, and which, according to the opinion of the wiseacres of the old opposition, gave him an eighteen years lease of the Treasury Bench, presents a very considerable deficiency. Our readers will recollect, that he calculated the produce of the revenue upon the average produce to October last, and that he took the applicable surplus for the year 1803 as follows †:

Land and Malt	£2,750,000
Surplus consolidated fund	6,500,000
Lottery	500,000
	9,750,000
Deduct actual receipts to Jan. last	7,989,367
Deficiency for 1803	1,760,633

For the year 1804 we shall find the deficiency still greater. In Mr. Addington's statements, respecting the revenue for that year, the modest man says, "his opinion is not lightly formed, for that he has "thought it his duty to investigate the "grounds of it, with all the minuteness "and attention in his power," and, the result of this *minute investigation* was thus stated: *

Land and Malt	2,750,000
Surplus Consolidated Fund,	7,845,000
Lottery	500,000
	11,095,000
Deduct actual receipts to Jan. last	7,989,367
Deficiency for 1804	3,105,633

The produce of the taxes for the year to January last was the greatest ever known; and, we have heretofore given our reasons for believing, that there is no prospect of its ever being exceeded in amount. At any rate, it is never fair to make a calculation of any future permanent produce upon the year of the *greatest* receipt *alone*, but upon an average of several years. We will, however, take, as the criterion, this greatest year of produce, and give Mr. Addington the advantage of it; yet, even this greatest year falls short of his calculations, for the current year, £1,700,633; and, for the next year £3,105,633!—This statement it was, on which Mr. Addington had the modest assurance to demand the *confidence* of the public, and his right to general popularity and support! And this is the minister, to whom the guardianship of the interests and honour of Great Britain is confided in a crisis the most arduous ever experienced by any nation upon earth!——The items of Lord Auckland's statement, which we have excluded from the credit side, are, first, £133,105, increase of bills and balances, which ought not to have been included, because it is an increase naturally derivable from an increase of revenue. 2d. £232,097 beer duties *postponed*. This is a repetition of the species of financial legerdemain, detected and exposed by us on a former occasion. † In taking the produce of revenue, the only rule to be safely followed is that of *actual receipt within the year*; for, when once this practice is deviated from, there is no end to litigation as to what items should be accounted for in one period, and what in another. 3d. £883,461, increase of charge for bounties and drawbacks, which arise from an increase of trade, and, as increase of trade produces increase of revenue, if you deduct the increase of drawbacks, you ought also to deduct the increase of the trade and revenue by which the for-

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 778. † Ibid. p. 780.

* See Reg. Vol. II. p. 782. † See Vol. III. p. 86.

mer increase was produced. 4th. £142,711, increase of *bonded* sugars, which item might be allowed, if the consumption of sugar had decreased in the year to January last; but, as the consumption has increased, the increase of the bonds is attributable to an over importation alone, and not to a reduced consumption.——The fact is, that Lord Auckland, though he may have very good intentions, does not understand finance, on which subject, if he wishes not to injure the credit of the country, we would, with all becoming humility, advise him, in future, to be perfectly silent. We refrain from those observations, which might be made on his comparison of our *present* with our *former* resources; but, we do hope and trust, that the House of Commons, instead of giving the Richmond-Park Minister an "eighteen years lease of the Treasury-Bench," will institute an enquiry into the matter. The minister has laid before them an estimate for two years, exceeding the result deducible from the actual produce of the existing taxes by near *five millions*; and, immediate steps ought to be taken, either to confirm the solidity of this estimate, or to show its fallacy, and thereby let the people see what they really and truly have to expect.—It has been, as our readers can witness, our constant maxim, that, as to this point as well as every other, the people should be, at all times, *fairly and fully informed of their situation:* we have uniformly reprobated all attempts to lead them blindfolded, to hide their danger from them, and to "keep up their spirits," as it is called, by *bluster* or by *deception*; for, it is our sincere and well-weighed opinion, that such a system, which, by the by, the ministry are at this moment practising upon the Parliament and the Nation, must, if persevered in, end, at no very distant period, in utter dismay, confusion, and destruction. When, on a former occasion, we thought it, upon this our fixed principle, a duty incumbent on us, to controvert the minister's statements, there were not wanting persons to accuse "the Grenvilles" of inconsistency, in representing the country as being nearly a bankrupt after having asserted that she was able to continue the war. In the first place we know not whether those noblemen and gentlemen, designated by "the Grenvilles," honoured our opinions with their concurrence; 2dly, if they did, they did not thereby agree in representing the nation as nearly a bankrupt, because our opinions led to no such conclusion; 3dly, supposing them to agree in this representation upon the prospects presented by a peace which was, in fact, an everlasting war, it did not follow that the same opinion would have applied to a war which might have been *put an end to*; and, 4thly, if it had even necessarily followed, from the representation attributed to them, that the war must have produced a national bankruptcy, still they might, as we now do, maintain, that a war which would have produced a national bankruptcy, was preferable to a peace which, if persevered in, will produce a national bankruptcy and subjugation into the bargain.—On the occasion, to which we allude, and in which our sentiments were thus grossly and basely misrepresented, we cautioned the patriots of 'Change Alley not to rely on the minister's word; and, are they not already sorry that they did not follow our advice? The minister, too, we cautioned against the effects of his magnified and vapouring statement. We advised him to restrain his propensity to pompous display. We asked, in speaking of the *safe* politicians, "are they quite sure that it "was prudent to indulge (on the subject of "the increase of their resources) in their "*proud exultation*, and to '*hope their state-*"*ments would be published in France?*' Are "they quite sure, that they shall not have "cause to repent of their shop-keeper-like "wit, their purse-proud exultation? The "coward," we added, "never should cry "roast-meat. The goose with the golden "eggs should steal silently from her nest *." —On the subject of the last flaming budget, we said: "Mr. Addington may be well "assured, that the statement which has "charmed the patriots of 'Change Alley, "will make a good deal of *mauvais sang* at "St. Cloud †." Accordingly, we see, that the French official gazette has *resented* the boastings of which we complained; and, it is by no means improbable, that the mere indulgence of the vanity and pomposity of this man may, at bottom, be the principal cause of that panic and that expense, which have now come upon us, and which will, as the least possible evil, produce a considerable and lasting depreciation in the national credit. *Uncertainty* is the bane of credit, and that this feeling now prevails, to a degree never before experienced in this country, will be denied by no one, who has not some sinister motive for lulling the public asleep, or seeks not for temporary fame by dealing out blustering, rabble-rousing speeches. No stock-holder has scarcely any thing worthy of the name of

* Register, Vol. II. p. 378.
† Ibid, p. 795.

confidence left in his mind: the dealing in that species of property is fast becoming a mere game at hazard, the pregnant source of disappointment, mortification, ruin, beggary, disaffection, disloyalty, and sedition.

" There is a gulph, where thousands fell,
" Here all the bold adventurers came,
" A narrow sound, though deep as hell;
" 'Change-Alley is the dreadful name.

" Nine times a day it ebbs and flows;
" Yet he that on the surface lies,
" Without a pilot seldom knows
" The time it falls, or when 'twill rise.

" Now bury'd in the depth below,
" Now mounted up to heaven again,
" They reel and stagger to and fro,
" At their wits end, like drunken men *."

Dreadful as is this picture, it will soon be verified in every part, unless prevented by war, by another war, *a successful war against France*, which, we repeat it again and again, is the only possible means of recovering that military and political confidence, with which pecuniary confidence is inseparably connected.

Army and Navy.—The ability of waging this war we have, though in a degree greatly diminished since the peace. Besides the strong places which we have given up, and that to France, too, we have sent adrift a numerous and well-disciplined militia, for the express purpose, it would appear (for there is no other that can be imagined) of taking, in their stead, as many as we can get together, of raw and undisciplined men, to the disturbance, distress, and misery of private families, as well as to the great injury of agriculture and manufactures. This is so evident, that, in any other time, we should think an explanation of our meaning unnecessary; but, the reproach of disheartening the people, which the "*safe* politicians" pour out on every one, who attempts to show the evil consequence of their ignorance and selfishness, induces us to say, that it is not the calling out of the militia, which we represent as a hardship; it is not what the people ought to bear of which we complain, but we complain, and we have a right to complain, of every thing which they and which the service suffer merely from the blindness or the perverseness of those who hold the reins of government, and who assumed those reins upon the condition of *responsibility*. Twenty thousand men are instantly wanted for foreign service; not for hostile expeditions, but for the *defence* of our colonies, the very best of which (Jamaica) will, if war should be the result, be attacked in less than two months from this day. These twenty thousand men could have been spared, if our militia had not been disembodied. Now we cannot spare a man, to say nothing of our want of more than we have for the defence of our home dominions, especially in Ireland, where there does not yet even exist a law for raising a militia.—As to the fleet, the improvident and disorganizing measures of the "*safe* politicians" are still more fatally manifest. The minister assured the Parliament, that *fifty* ships of the line could be got ready for sea in a month! *Six*, at the utmost, is all that could, in any possible emergency, at this moment, go out of harbour! And, of the 50,000 seamen, voted in November, not one half are yet raised, to say nothing of the 10,000, voted the other day, and who will never, we fear, have an existence, in his Majesty's service, except upon paper. * The "*safe* politicians" have, in no inconsiderable degree, annihilated the materials, of which this glorious navy was composed. We last week stated, that *seven* thousand of our seamen had gone into the service of France, but, from accounts which we have since received, we are much afraid, that they amount to *double* that number. The naval artizans are now sought after and caressed by the Admiralty, by that same Admiralty, whose haughty and insolent satellites spurned them from their presence, and who sent them to beg or to starve. Some of the people who received this brutal treatment, have been regained, and they are hurried down to the distant Dock-Yards *by the coach*; but, great numbers of them have gone to France, where they are now employed, preparing the future means of their country's destruction. While men like these have the management of public affairs, what hope can be entertained by any reasonable man?—In spite, however, of all these disadvantages, a war, in proper hands, if instantly begun, upon a good system, and having a determinate object, might be waged against France with success. There is yet a sufficiency of means, but there wants the soul and the talents to call them forth, to put them in motion, and to direct them to their proper ends. We have heard, indeed, and we have heard it with inexpressible satisfaction, that the first Lord of the Admiralty and "his two Phocæ" are about to be removed;

* Swift.

* For a contrast to the conduct of the present Board of Admiralty, we beg leave to refer our readers to p. 396, where they will see what exertions the naval department was capable of at the commencement of the last war. From the same article they may also perceive the amazing difference between the naval establishments of the last and the present peace.

but, if they are to be replaced by other "*safe* politicians," the public will gain but little by the change. *Something*, however, it must gain; for, it is absolutely impossible, that three other such Naval Lords should be found in any part of the ship, from the poop to the bowsprit.

WAR OR PEACE?—This is the question now, as it was in October last, and we will still answer *peace*, if the present ministry exist. They know the country would not trust them with a war: it would deserve to be burnt up if it did; and, they are resolved to keep their places to the latest moment that they can hang on, with any chance of safety to themselves. They have put up with injury upon injury, insult upon insult, ignominy upon ignominy, till they have made their country a by word and a reproach amongst the nations; and, our readers may be well assured, that they did not make the present shew of resistance, upon any other consideration than that of their *own safety*. They must long have known the intentions of Buonaparté; they would have made any further sacrifices to pacify him; but, they, at last, were persuaded that he was actually about to make an attack, and then they became alarmed for *themselves*, fearing, that, if his Majesty should awake some morning and find himself no longer the sovereign of Ireland, ministerial *responsibility* might become something more than a mere pompous sound. It is possible, therefore, that their fears may have magnified the danger of invasion. When a coward turns his head towards his enemy, he always either shuts his eyes or sees double; two most admirable properties in a statesman, for the former of which we have already paid most dearly, and we are now, perhaps, to suffer for the latter.

—As to the object of the negotiation, or pretended negotiation, it is impossible for us to say precisely what it is; but this we well know, that, if it be any remnant of the treaty of Amiens, it is of far less importance than many of the sacrifices already made and completed by that treaty. Malta is, too, of infinitely less importance than Louisiana, and the ministers are ready and willing to suffer the French to depart for that colony, even before the point with respect to Malta and Egypt is settled! Nay, it would appear from the message, that they would regard as a proof of a *pacific* disposition the departure of the French troops to the neighbourhood of Jamaica, which is much more vulnerable than Ireland itself. Such is the state to which this peace has reduced us, that we think about nothing but our own domestic, nay, almost, our *personal* safety. We were formerly sensible to the slightest blow in the limbs, and even in the extremities of the empire; but, having been kicked and bruised, having become "a most vile and "beaten thing," we seem to have no wish remaining but that of preserving our lives. We have seen it stated, and in print too, that Buonaparté *yielded* in the affair of the *indemnities* and of *Switzerland*; and, if that really was yielding, we are fully persuaded he will yield now. *Reculer pour mieux sauter* is, too, an art which the Corsican perfectly understands. "The tiger," said Mr. Pickering to the Americans, "always "*crouches* before he leaps upon his prey;" and, we beg our readers to be assured, that if Buonaparté draws back at present so far as to furnish the "*safe* politicians" with a plausible pretext for keeping their places a little longer, he will, at no great distance of time, fall upon this country with a force which she will not be able to resist.—The *Moniteur*, copies of which we have received to the 15th instant, seems also to strengthen the opinion we have formed on this subject. It contains the King's message, without any remark upon it; and this state paper, which operated like a thunder-stroke on the funds of this country, had, when the last advices came away, produced, as will be seen by our stock-table, very little depression in those of France. The cause of this, however, we cannot, without more information, fully ascertain.

THE MECHANICAL MINISTRY.—But, besides many other forcible reasons for Buonaparté's patching up the present dispute, there is one, which alone, we think, must decide him so to do; and that is, he must know, that the present ministry would, in case of actual war, be instantly driven out of place, and he must also know, that, if the whole British dominions, in every quarter of the world, were ransacked, another set of men, of whatever country or colour, could not be found so exactly fitted to the purpose of maintaining with him "*the relations of peace and* "*of amity*." Negroes would have mutinied fifty times under the treatment, which they have patiently and silently received at his hands. If war, or any other cause, should ever bring their precious diplomatic transactions to the light, the people of this country, if they have any sense or feeling left, will die with shame at having been governed by such men. Lord Carlisle, to whom the nation is indebted for the first

warning it received, respecting the dangers to be apprehended from these "*new* and "*untried* ministers," has lately most happily described them as being a *machine*, formed by Mr. Pitt. "I will not," said his lordship, "call them an *infernal machine*, but I "will say, that they have proved infinitely "more destructive to their country, than "that machine was to the buildings and "the people of Paris." Shamefully, indeed, was the nation insulted in the construction of this machine, which is hardly worthy the hand of even a journeyman politician. One of the wheels was soon taken out and replaced by another. What further repairs will take place, what further mending and patching, what further nails, and pegs, and bolts, and cleets, and braces will be used to hold together this feeble and rickety frame, it would be presumption in us to predict; but, the public must, by this time, be well convinced, that, unless it be knocked to pieces, in a very short time, it will work the complete destruction of the British monarchy.—The Corsican is said to have grossly insulted Lord Whitworth. We deeply lament that our Sovereign should be exposed to insult, in the person of his representative; but, what else was to be expected, when the tame and degrading conduct of the ministers was taken into consideration? It is to their pusillanimity, their propensity to crouch at his feet, that we are to attribute the insolence of Buonaparté! "He were "no wolf, but that he finds them to be "sheep." As Lord Temple observed, "they attract danger and disgrace, as con-"ductors attract lightning; as blunt con-"ductors, which attract most strongly, and "spread the mischief most widely."* They are always in a state of uncertainty: not one of them can even guess, now at this moment, whether we shall have war, or not: their councils are full of doubt and of indecision: they are continually balancing between the fear of losing their places and that of incurring the *responsibility* attached to those places:

..... "Whate'er their doubtful hands
"Attempt, confusion straight appears behind,
"And troubles all their work. Through many a
"maze,
"Perplex'd they struggle, changing every part,
"O'erturning every purpose; then, at last,
"Sit down dismay'd, and leave the entangled scene
"For scorn to sport with....."†

* See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1690.
† Akenside.

The Dey of Algiers has, it would seem, fallen out with his brother of Paris, whether upon points of *faith* or of *morality* we know not, but two French frigates have been sent to protect the ships of that nation against the corsairs of the Dey.—It is stated that, by the consent of the Emperor of Russia, the Bavarian *langue is suppressed*, in the Order of Malta. What, then, becomes of our treaty?—Intelligence from Constantinople states, that the suite of General Brune consists of *sixty* persons, who, like the commercial agents here, are destined for different parts of the Turkish empire.——The French expedition to the East Indies sailed from Brest on the 6th instant. *Linois* is the Vice-Admiral commanding the ships, and DECAEN the Captain-General. The squadron consisted of 1 ship of the line and 3 frigates. Transport-vessels were to join them from Bourdeaux and L'Orient. The number of troops is not stated in the French papers; but, we have good authority to state, that they are upwards of seven thousand in number, and are to *touch* at that "free-port," the Cape of Good Hope, where we strongly suspect they will never suffer an English ship to touch again. But, this sailing of expeditions from France can be no cause of umbrage to our ministers. Those "*safe* politicians," on the contrary, must, according to the words of the message, regard such expeditions as a ground for putting a stop to our warlike preparations. So that, if the enraged Buonaparte, will best leave us in the quiet possession of this "nice little tight little Island," he may ravage all the world besides; for, as to *colonies*, Dr. Beeke has clearly proved, that the trade between Manchester and London is of much more *quick return* as well as more *safe* and more *profitable*, than the trade *between London and Jamaica!!!!!!* And this, this is one of the men, whose opinions are the guide of the British minister!—From Petersburg it is intimated, that Buonaparté has consented to certain propositions, which the Emperor had made relative to Malta and to a provision for the king of Sardinia. Should this be so, here is an additional reason for believing that our dispute with France will be *patched up*; because we well know, that the concessions, which the Emperor required from the Consul, formed one of the grounds, on which the "*safe* politicians" built their hopes of success from the present shew of vigour. As to Malta, too, the fate of that island seems to have been taken entirely *out of our hands*. The Emperor of Russia is the arbiter. What he consents to we cannot, without war, refuse to sanction.

We particularly call the attention of our readers to the article in our present Number "*On Lord St. Vincent and the Navy.*" From its extreme length, we were under the necessity of printing it in a smaller character than usual, which, we trust, its author will kindly excuse.

Our Correspondent X. will see that, it was not in our power to insert his valuable *observations occasioned by his Majesty's late Message to Parliament* this week, but he may rest assured that they shall speedily be attended to.

POLITICS OF FRANCE.

SIR,—If you think the fragments herewith inclosed worth the notice of the Public, you will much oblige one of your readers to insert them, or any part of them, in your Register. They are transcribed from the journal of a gentleman now travelling in France. The work itself is under the press, but not yet ready. Yours, &c. SWENSKA.*

France has the forests of Germany for the use of her dock-yards; with Holland, she acquires an extent of coast and a chain of sea-ports, which may enable her to raise a numerous navy in a few years.

It has been said, that the Consulate intends to raise an enormous navy, and to distribute it as follows: in the Mediterranean,

France shall maintain	30	65 sail of the line of battle ships.
Spain	20	
The Italian states, including Naples	15	

From Cadiz to the Texel,

France shall maintain	100	160 sail of the line of battle ships.
Spain	40	
Holland	20	

Should the French compose a navy in this manner, and oblige their allies to keep up 95 sail of the line for the service of the republic, the Dutch and Spanish officers and men will be under the immediate orders of their masters, the *French*. The inconvenience of separate commanders, which has so often frustrated the best combined plans of confederate forces, will thereby be avoided.

The heavy navies of France will not, however, soon be in a state to give much uneasiness to her rival neighbour. Should Buonaparté seriously set about building line of battle ships, Great-Britain may congratulate herself and let him go on. Lucky gamesters play boldly; but, when they meet with a few successive checks, they lose their clue, and become more disconcerted than others. The Consul has hitherto staked high, and with remarkable success; should he attempt to pursue his fortune upon the ocean, his preparations will be analogous to his usual measures; skirmishing is not in his tactics; if he send a fleet to sea, it will be such a fleet, as France never could boast of before; but if the spirit of the British nation do not entirely subside in the interval, that fleet will be beaten; every effort, which revenge can devise, will be made to augment its force, and it will be beaten again; its creator may then lose his temper, and France will lose her stake in the game.

The light *flotillas*, which the republic is preparing, may, perhaps, merit the attention of the British government, more than all the heavy navies of Europe and America together. *It is certain*, that at this moment, arrangements are making to form and repair such *depôts* and convenient harbours, between Brest and the Ems, where 1500 to 2000 light vessels may be kept in safety and constant readiness; to act either offensively, or to defend their own coast, as occasion may point out, or require: it is equally certain, that immense quantities of materials and stores, for the construction and equipment of these vessels, are already collecting from all quarters: and, there is no doubt, that *the Consulate intends to extend this naval system of light squadrons to America and the West-Indies*.

This statement of the natural and moral sources of France, are by no means exaggerated; the estimates we have given, are far under what an intelligent government might derive from the inexhaustible treasures of that overgrown empire. Fortunate, perhaps, it may be for the yet independent nations of Europe, that those sources of irresistible force are in the hands of Frenchmen!

Except when the personal characters of leading men, may, now and then influence the measures of a government, the politics of every state is, to secure its independence, augment its power, and elevate its rank. These objects cannot be pursued singly, they are interwoven with one another. The independence of a state can only be secured by an unremitted progression in power, of which rank is a consequence. Almost all

* For the interesting communications of our correspondent Swenska, we refer our readers to Vol. II. p. 129, 355, 548, 609. They will all be found highly important at the present juncture.

states have begun to decline, as soon as they ceased to rise. The ambition, avarice, and ignorance of individuals, allow nations no interval of stationary quiet and security.

In modern times, the only governments that seem to have acted upon any digested system, are the French since the commencement of the reign of Louis XIV. and the Russian since that of Peter I. These two monarchs felt the internal strength of their respective empires, and measured the powers of their neighbours.

When Louis assumed the direction of affairs, he found himself hemmed in, on the side of Germany, Italy and Spain, by Austria; and on all other sides, by Great-Britain and Holland. To break through that circumvallation, was an enterprize worthy of a young aspiring monarch; and enterprizing princes generally do, he succeeded. By the valour of his arms, seconded by the infatuation and treachery of his neighbours, he levelled down all the bulwarks of his opponents; and laid Europe open to the inroads of France. He broke the power of Austria, and thereby destroyed the union and force of the German empire; he made Spain a province of his dominions; annihilated the arrogant and independent spirit of the Dutch *; and deprived Great-Britain of all her useful connexions on the continent of Europe †. His successors made but a poor use of the means he left at their disposal, it is true, but they adhered to the leading principle of his system; they kept fast hold of Spain; took all the measures, which a court like that of Versailles could be expected to devise, to weaken the House of Austria; to attach Holland to France, and undermine and divide the British empire. To direct the government of Spain, to subdue the Low countries, and to attach and secure Holland in the interests of France, were considered as the most effectual means to ruin the maritime trade and destroy the power of Great-Britain. These three objects were the principal articles in the political creed of the French monarchy. They are now accomplished! How far their effects may ultimately justify the calculations that have been made upon them, will depend upon the British cabinet. The result will, in all likelihood, be shortly seen.

The revolution has, in no wise altered the politics of France; it has changed the actors and they have adopted new measures. *But they are measures much more dangerous to the peace of the civilised world than those of their predecessors.* Instead of grovelling, in obscure intrigue, deceit and circumvention, the champions of the Republic have substituted a bold system of treachery, violence and military despotism. During the few years, that they have exercised the supreme authority, *the Republic has achieved all that Louis XIV. perhaps, ever intended;* France is raised to an eminence of power, which in that prince's time, would have made him as completely master of Europe, as he was of Alsace and Navarre. *The treaties of Luneville and* AMIENS, *have made the First Consul a more formidable potentate, than those of Utrecht and Rastadt made the chief of the House of Bourbon.*

However, although the Republic may certainly be considered, as completely mistress of the south-west-half of continental Europe, there is another power, of equal force, and perhaps of superior strength, that claims a similar dominion over the north and eastern-parts. We have before said, the political powers and military force of continental Europe, are divided between the governments of France and Russia. These two mighty empires, are come in contact: Berlin, Vienna and Constantinople, can only be considered as three neutral posts, situate in their line

* The Dutch struggled long and bravely to consolidate the independence and political rank of their country; from 1709 to 1712, they believed they had succeeded; but one of those unforeseen fatalities, which, in a moment destroys the work of ages, blasted all their hopes. The change of system in the British Cabinet, or rather the change of men, (for it is not known to us, that ever a system was adopted there) produced the infamous treaty of Utrecht. The Dutch having spent immense treasures during the war, and obliged to abandon all the advantages they had acquired by it, their proud spirit of independence and ambition for military and naval glory, sunk into a sullen hatred towards Great-Britain. That hatred never diminished; on the contrary, the connexions between the houses of Brunswick and Nassau Orange, and our interference, sometimes by intrigue and sometimes by force, in favour of the Stadtholderate, made every Dutchman our inveterate enemy; and has, in the end, made Holland a department of France.

† Since the peace of Utrecht, Great-Britain has had for allies, Portugal, the Stadtholder, Hanover and the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel. In every continental war, these powers have been conquered by the arms of France, and have been ransomed either by British money, or by British conquests; or retaken by other powers subsidised for that purpose: witness the surrender of our colonies at every peace, and our subsidies to Prussia, &c.

of demarcation. By the reduction of other states, the politics of Europe are much simplified; but that very circumstance renders the respective positions of the two dictatorial powers more critical. The intermediate field of their usual machinations is cleared, the slightest motion of the one, must now directly affect the other.

A free, independent and secure communication between the southern provinces of Russia and the Mediterranean, was an essential article in the fundamental system of the Czar Peter; it has been pursued, with more, or less energy, by all his successors; and, it is of such importance to the Russian empire that it can never be abandoned.

The navigation of the Black Sea, was a standing project in the politics of the French monarchy; it is now obtained, and to preserve it, is a consideration of the utmost consequence to the Republic. The Turkish government, sunk as it is, into a lethargic effeminacy, an open passage through the Archipelago and the Dardanelles, give to France, not only the direction of the trade and that empire, but what, to the consulate, is an object of infinitely greater importance, it lays open the only vulnerable part of the frontiers of Russia.

In the present state of things, can Russia and republican France go mutual sharers in the trade and government of the Turkish empire? This is by no means likely; nay, we may venture to say, it is impossible. Which of the parties then is to give up its pretension? The cabinet of Petersburgh must certainly know, that should the Consulate be allowed to assume an ascendancy at Constantinople, or, to intermeddle in the affairs of Turkey, the fate of Moscow may again be disputed at Pultava! Will the present government of France retract and leave the Seraglio and St. Sophia to the desecration of Russians? In that case, a Cossack and Highland army, seconded by a Russian and British fleet, might yet confine the empire of Buonaparté to the government of his Gauls of the West. Or, can the ambition of Russia and the avarice of France be satisfied with a partial partition of Turkey? It is a known fact, that the Consul did propose to the court of Petersburgh, to leave Moldavia, Walachia, Bessarabia, Bosnia and Servia, to the disposal of Russia and Austria, on condition that France might possess Candia, Negropont and other Greek islands in the Archipelago. But Russia, would as soon see France in possession of the canal of Constantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to fix her feet on posts that might soon command the communication between the Black and Mediterranean seas. Had the British ambassador arrived at Paris a few months sooner than he did, his Excellency could have informed Buonaparté, that Russia would not connive with France for the Turkish provinces north of the Danube. His lordship himself had the honour, as an agent, to sign away the property of those countries to the empress Catherine II. This monument of British shame was subscribed to by Sir Charles Whitworth, at Petersburgh, on the 22d July, 1791. We hope it will not prove ominous!

Oczakow was not only the key to the northern provinces of Turkey, it was to Constantinople, what Bergen-op-Zoom and Maestricht formerly were to Amsterdam; and what the Pyrennees might yet be to Madrid. That post in the hands of Russia, to offer her the sovereignty of Moldavia, Wallachia, and Bessarabia, was ridiculous enough.

The Russians at Akkirmann and Soroko, and the French, or their auxiliaries in Malta, the Sultan with his Seraglio have the comfortable prospect of very soon passing, either *au fil de l'épée, ou sous le knudt*, into the kingdom of Mahomet. It is remarkable, that when the Emperor of Turkey was obliged to surrender Oczakow, the King of England was mediator with 36 line of battleships armed, in his favour; and when Malta was ceded to be possessed by France, Great Britain was also an ally in co operation with Turkey. To propose an entire partition of the European dominions of the Turks, to whom give Thrace and Constantinople? Besides, Russia will never agree to a division that shall leave the Grecian islands to France. * Nor can it be expected that the Consulate will leave the Bosphorus to Russia.

Thus between these two governments matters seem to become nearly to a crisis. Considering the characters of each respec-

* Were the Chief Consul to admit, amongst the fractional parts of his political calculations, the value of the characters and abilities of the men he finds, here and there, at the head of the public affairs of other states, he might, perhaps, at this moment, be induced to possess himself of such posts and strong holds in the Levant, as would insure to the Republic at once, the dominion which she will otherwise have to fight for. Who knows but such is his design? We cannot however, presume, that those governments which are most immediately interested, can be so immersed in ignorance and lost to all sense of public duty and personal safety, as not to see through the perfidious manœuvres of the Consulate.

tively, and the powers and attitude of the two empires, if the Consul possess only half of those transcendent talents which his panegyrists are willing to allow him, he must certainly see, that their present cordiality cannot be of long duration. * And he is no doubt likewise aware that while Great Britain can powerfully interfere, to risk a quarrel with Russia would be imprudent and dangerous.

In this situation it appears to us, and indeed daily occurrences seem to confirm our opinion, that the plan of the Chief Consul is, to manage the Court of Petersburgh until he disengage his rear; that is, *until he shall tie down the British Government to passive inactivity*.

To point out the measures by which the rulers of France intend to reduce the British Government to inaction, is here unnecessary; they are already plainly exhibited to the world. When the rest of Europe was beaten off the field, Buonaparté saw, that to fight with Great Britain alone, was an unprofitable trade; the archives of Versailles, furnished him with several striking examples: but in that same library, the General learned, that in a campaign of diplomatic negotiations, victory was certain; this was tried, and, *the Consulate make it no secret, that, the success far exceeded the most sanguine expectations*. Since our continental alliances have been reduced to a few needy subsidiaries, the only means which we have had to check the ambitious projects of France, were, to keep the French colonies and trade under the guns of a preponderating navy. This check the Consul has not only removed, but he has also inverted the position. *The peace of Amiens has left the British colonies under the Guns of France;* every passage to and from our possessions abroad is now flanked by posts already garrisoned, or to be garrisoned by the republic and her auxiliaries; and *England herself is half encircled by the naval depôts and rising flotillas of her enemies*. Buonaparté considers Great Britain, as being *reduced* to the necessity of hereafter confining all her military and naval operations to the defence of her own dominions. * Abroad he has now no vulnerable point for us to attack; and our communication with the continent of Europe and Africa, depends immediately upon his will. These circumstances open to the republic, another advantage of a more serious nature, and which, the Consul believes, will lay open and expose to his tactics, *the very soul of the state;* namely, the financial sources of the nation.

(The remainder of this interesting article, containing Buonaparté's opinion on the finances of England, will be given in our next.)

* It is truly pitiful, to see public ministers and men charged with the defence of nations cajoling themselves in the hope, that Russia and France will quarrel and fight! Quarrel they certainly will; but when that event takes place, woe to their neighbours! While at peace, their mutual preponderance requires only dependency and obedience: at war their hostilities will impose upon the eastern continent, submission and slavery.

When the Czar and the Consul draw forth their legions in hostile array, mediation, armed coalitions, neutral conventions and *demarcation-lines*, will be of little avail. Those powers have long been unused to cabinet warfare, and to courtier *étiquette* in the field. The intervention of other states, may hasten their own subjection, but cannot ward off their fate. The chieftains of Russia and France will meet nearly on the centre of the world: the object of their quarrel will not be a bishoprick, a sugar island, nor who shall read their mass in Latin, or say their prayers in Greek: they will fight, for the possession of the *Hellespont* and *Bosphorus*, two posts on which hangs *now* suspended, the empire of our eastern hemisphere. Such contending parties will not come out to skirmish and then mutually retire; nor will they fight for conquests to give away; the one will keep the field,—and with it the dictatorship of the world.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Rome, Feb. 24.—There is talk here of a new French expedition against Algiers. In the treaty of the 17th Dec. 1801, the Dey promised to restore to France all the establishments on that coast, in the same condition in which they were previous to the year 1792; but he now refuses to give them back, unless he receives the old tribute.—The Republic of the Seven United Islands has sent a Minister Plenipotentiary to St. Petersburgh (who has already arrived at Vienna). In these Islands a National Assembly *(Nazionale Comsesso)* has been convoked to settle the internal regulations, relative to which Count Moncenigo and the President Teotochi have issued Proclamations.

Brest, March 5.—The effects of General Decaen, and of the officers belonging to the expedition to India, were yesterday embarked. They were themselves to go on board, and the fine weather will no doubt expedite their departure. The Captain-General Decaen, and Vice-Adm. Linois, embark in the Marengo. The ships employed in this expedition are crowded with a vast number of passengers. Transport vessels are expected

* No state, once reduced to fight in its own defence ever fought long. It is now about a century, that the military operations of Holland, Austria and Turkey have been confined to the defensive; and the warfare as well as the independence of these states, may be considered as having nearly ceased.

from Bourdeaux and L'Orient, which are to sail soon after on the same destination.—*March* 8.—The expedition for India, which sailed in the afternoon of the day before yesterday, must have made a rapid progress in its voyage: for the wind, which was favourable, blew very fresh during that night and the whole of yesterday. The vessels that compose the expedition are, the Marengo of the line, the frigates La Sémillante, L'Atalante, La Belle Poule, and the transport La Côte d'Or. General Vander Mac Sen, Adjutant-General Binot, and the officers of the Etat Major, departed with General Decaen.

Basle, March 9.—The new Constitution of this country begins to be carried into execution. The Helvetic Senate dissolved itself on the 5th instant, and the dissolution of the Executive Council is fixed for this day.—Before it dissolved itself, the Senate passed a Decree, in which, after expressing generally their thanks to the First Consul, they declare, that they receive the Act of Mediation with gratitude; that all the Citizens of the Helvetic Republic are invited to conform to its dispositions, and to rally round Citizen D'Affry, the newly appointed Landamman of Switzerland; and that the Landamman Dolder is charged to communicate this Decree to Citizen D'Affry.

Hague, March 18.—A Courier from the First Consul, has brought dispatches, upon the receipt of which the sailing of the expedition for Louisiana was countermanded. The troops had already left their respective quarters to be embarked; they are now returning to them. Several battalions will be cantoned at Helvoet, and in the environs, where they will wait the ulterior dispositions of the French Government.—Frequent State Conferences are held; several couriers have been dispatched to different destinations; and orders have been sent to the Marine Council, and the War and Finance Departments. We hear that Admiral Hartsinck, who was to have relieved Admiral De Winter in the Mediterranean, will not sail with his squadron from our ports till it be decided whether peace will be preserved or not.—An English Messenger has brought dispatches for Mr. Liston, the British Minister, and is gone with important Dispatches to the Northern Courts.

Paris, March 14.—They write from Toulon, that the frigates Le Rhin and La Cornelie, were equipped on the 18th of February, to cruize before Algiers, and prevent the Corsairs of those Pirates from injuring our commerce. The frigate La Mairon is preparing to proceed to the same destination. It is known that the Dey of Algiers has given two months to the Agent of the Republic to quit the States. We are ignorant of the motives of such an insult.—By letters from Munich, dated the 5th of March, we learn, that the Emperor of Russia, having consented to the suppression of the Bavarian Langue, of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, its goods and possessions will be united to the domains of the Elector, by way of compensation for the loss of the Bishopric of Eichstett. The value of these goods is estimated at 5,700,000 florins, and the revenues at 171,000 florins.—The Government of the Republic decree, that the exportation of specie is prohibited till further orders.—The Consuls have issued a Decree, forbidding the exportation of any articles composed of gold or silver.—On the 5th inst. General Lasnes, Ambassador to Portugal, sailed from Rochelle for Lisbon, on board the frigate La Themis.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Proclamation addressed by Louis D'Affry, Landamman of Switzerland, to the Inhabitants of the Nineteen Confederated Cantons.

The First Consul of the French Republic has given an act of mediation which ought to terminate the dissentions, and fix the destiny of Switzerland. That important act, the result of long conferences with men of sagacity, and friends of civil order, is adapted to the wants and the dearest interests of a people, whom every thing invites to the pacific enjoyment of a stable and independent state of things.—Five years of broils and convulsions evinced the inconvenience of a Government exclusively central. The ancient federal system, modified by changes suited to the changes of our circumstances, and to the example of two neighbouring powers, could alone answer the wishes and situations of all the people of Switzerland.—Providence, the only support of just and virtuous Government, seems to have chosen, at this period, to terminate the ills afflicting our country, and to promise us felicity for the time to come. The new social compact must be executed; political divisions must, of course, cease; the passions must be constrained to silence. Only a wise unanimity of wills, a constant tendency to hinder private interests from interfering with that of the public, can give sure success to our new institutions; and only their success can confirm our independence.—It will belong to the Government of each Canton to form for itself laws suitable to the peculiarity of its local circumstances, and fitted to advance its prosperity. It is therefore of the greatest importance that, at the next elections, men should be chosen who are of tried probity, possessed of enlightened intelligence and experience, and thus capable of commanding that confidence which can alone give stability and vigour to the Government. Every man who loves his country will consult only the voice of his conscience, when he gives his suffrage, and will reject all advice contrary to that voice.—Such are the means which will enable us to restore to the Swiss nation that consideration which it once deservedly enjoyed, and to renew those days of peace and tranquillity of which we have so sensibly felt, and so long lamented the loss.—Given at Friburgh, March 10, 1803.—*Louis D'Affry.*

Landamman of Switzerland.

Proclamation of the Government of the Batavian Republic, relative to Trade and Navigation.

The Government of the Batavian Republic declares,—That having taken into consideration that the expiration of the charter of the Dutch East-India Company, and the changes occurred concerning the same, as also the restoration of almost all the possessions and establishments of this country in the East-Indies, had rendered it necessary to adopt new measures and regulations with regard to the trade and navigation to those ports; and the interests of the commercial world not admitting them to be deferred until the whole plan for the direction of the East-India possessions shall have been organized, it has been decreed and ordered to be made known:—That the navigation and trade from the ports of this Republic to Batavia, as also to the west of India, is free and open for all the inhabitants of the Batavian Republic, under the following stipulations:—That by the west of India is understood the Western Coast of the Island of Sumatra, together

with Melacca, and all countries and places situated to the westward of the said island, and as far south as the Cape of Good Hope.—That every description of goods and merchandize may be from hence sent thither, with the exception only of warlike stores, ammunition, and opium.—That the importation direct from India of all goods and merchandize coming from the westward of India, including Java sugar, and the article of tea only excepted, is permitted by the Dutch and foreign vessels, on paying the duties customary on importation.—That for the present the importation hither of goods from Batavia, by private Dutch individuals, shall be confined to sugar; yet the right is retained by the India Government, in case of necessity, to sell to them some other articles of India traffic, out of their stores, as also to charter their ships for the benefit of the country, either to cruize or make voyages in India, or to carry produce to this Republic, according to what said Government may deem most beneficial and advisable for the good of the country, and the agreements they may be able to make with the individual traders.—That the inhabitants of this Republic shall be allowed to carry on the same local commerce and navigation within the limits aforesaid as are or will be allowed to the inhabitants of the possessions of the Republic settled there, subject always to the laws and regulations existing there, and more especially to the duties on import and export.—That, in order to encourage trade, no duties whatever of export shall be levied on such ships as shall clear out for this Republic direct, from any of its possessions in Bengal, and on the Coast of Coromandel and Malabar.—That the ships shall be obliged to return to the ports of this Republic, and not be perceived to carry or to sell their cargoes, nor to break bulk elsewhere, on forfeiture of ship and cargo, or the value thereof to be recovered here from the owners.—That, in proportion to the tonnage, the ships shall be obliged to carry out to the settlements of this Republic a certain number of troops destined for the land and sea service in those quarters, the amount of passage money remaining to be determined.—The Government orders that the present shall be made public, and enjoins all those whom it concerns to conform strictly to the contents.—Hague, March 1, 1803.—By order of the Government, *J. Spoors*, President.—*C. G. Haltman.*

DOMESTIC.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES.

Thursday, March 10.—Lords.—Lord Hobart brought down a Message from his Majesty relative to embodying the militia, for which see Commons.

Commons.—Report from the Committee on the Irish Duty Bill read and agreed to.—Irish Stamp, Hat, Postage, and Game Bills, read a third time and passed.—Mr. Addington brought down the following

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

G. R. In consequence of the preparations carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, whilst important discussions are subsisting between his Majesty and the French Government, his Majesty thinks it due to the care and concern which he feels for his faithful people, to omit no means in his power which may contribute to their security.—In pursuance therefore of the Acts of Parliament enabling his Majesty to call out and assemble the militia of the United Kingdom, his Majesty has thought it right to make this communication to the House of Commons, to the end that his Majesty may cause the said militia, or such part thereof as his Majesty shall think necessary, to be forthwith drawn out and embodied, and to march as occasion shall require.—*G. R.*

Friday, March 11.—Lords.—Mutiny Bill went through a Committee of the whole House.—Vexatious Arrests Bill read a second time.—Accounts of the Irish Bank Notes in circulation in the years 1798, 1801, and 2, were presented.

Commons.—A petition was presented from Lord Gwydir and others against the Surrey Iron Railway.—Irish Chalking Bill read a third time and passed.—On the motion "that 10,000 seamen be added to the number now existing a debate of considerable length ensued, which will be preserved in *Sup. to Vol.* 3. The speakers were Messrs. Serjeant, Francis, Addington, Dent, Fox, Burroughs, Lord Hawkesbury, Messrs. Elliot, Canning, Pulteney, Trench, and Thornton. The question was then put and passed *nem. con.*—The Committee appointed to try the merits of petitions complaining of an undue election for the city of Coventry reported "that they had judged F. W. Barlow duly elected, and that N. Jefferys was disqualified by virtue of an act to secure the freedom of elections; but that neither the petitions nor the opposition to them were frivolous and vexatious."—Mr. Tierney then moved, "that the Speaker do issue a new writ for Coventry."

Monday, March 14.—Lords.—On the second reading of the Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill, a short debate ensued between Lords Pelham, Moira, Carlisle, Darnley, Suffolk, Carnarvon, and the Duke of Norfolk, which will be found in our *Supplement*.

Commons.—Kensington Paving Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Byng brought in a Bill for the augmentation of the salary of Coroners, read a first time.—Mr. Honocks moved, "that an account be laid before the House of the quantity of cotton wool and cotton twist exported from this country between 1790 and 1802." Ordered.—Mr. York moved, "that there be laid before the House an estimate of the charges attending the pay and clothing of the militia." Ordered.—On the motion of Mr. Sheridan, the lists of the freeholders, the validity of whose votes was questioned in the election for the county of Middlesex, were ordered to be served by the 1st of May.—Surrey Iron Railway read a second time.—Mr. Vansittart presented certain accounts relative to the lottery.—Lord Castlereagh moved the order of the day for going into a Committee on the accounts presented relative to the affairs of the East-India Company. The debate which ensued, together with a correct statement of the present situation of the finances of the Company, will be given in our *Supplement* to the present volume. The speakers were Lord Castlereagh, Messrs. Johnson, Addington, Francis, W. Dundas, Baring, and Metcalf. Question put and carried.—Report of Irish Customs Bill and Irish Law Suits Bill read and agreed to.—A new writ ordered for the shire of Ayr, in the room of W. Fullarton, Esq. now one of the Commissioners for settling the Affairs of the Island of Trinidad.—Expiring Laws Bill passed through a Committee.

Tuesday, March 15.—Lords.—On the order of the day being moved, for going into a Committee on the Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill, a short debate ensued between Lords Carlisle, Pelham, and the Lord Chancellor. Lord Carlisle's excellent speech upon this occasion, together with those of

the other two speakers will be given in our *Supplement*.—Bill passed the Committee.

From the London Gazette.—St. James's, March 16.—The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of Knighthood on S. Wathen, Esq. High Sheriff for the County of Gloucester.

Whitehall, March 19.—The King has been pleased to grant to the Rev. M. Surtees, Clerk, Master of Arts, the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Metropolitical Church of Canterbury, void by the death of the Rev. J. Barton, late Canon thereof.

The King has also been pleased to present the Rev. Caleb Rockett, Clerk, Bachelor of Arts, to the Vicarage of Stockingham, otherwise Stokenham, in the County of Devon, and Diocese of Exeter.

Downing-Street, March 22.—By Dispatches received this morning from the Earl of Elgin, his Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary at Constantinople, dated January 15, 1803, it appears, that the differences which had subsisted between the Sublime Porte and the Beys of Egypt, have been satisfactorily arranged through the mediation of his Majesty's Ambassador.

Whitehall, March 22.—The King has been pleased to present the Rev. J. Hawtrey, Clerk, Master of Arts, to the place and dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Cathedral Church of Winchester, void by the Promotion of Dr. G. Pelham, late Prebendary thereof, to the See of Bristol.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

WEST-INDIES.—ST. DOMINGO.—From the signature of the preliminaries of peace to the present hour, we have not ceased to represent to our readers the great and imminent danger which must inevitably arise to our West India colonies from the establishment of a considerable French force in the island of St. Domingo. The last intelligence from this grand deposit of troops pretty fully confirms our opinions, as to the result of the contest between the blacks and the whites. We will give this intelligence in the words of the ministerial paper, the *True Briton*, of the 22d instant.—"Accounts of a recent date were yesterday "received from St. Domingo by the Jamaica mail. These represent the state "of that colony as much more favourable "than it has ever been since the first landing of the French. For the violence, injustice, and folly of Leclerc, General "Rochambeau has substituted conciliatory "conduct, moderation and good faith, and "the consequence is, that though bands of "brigands still exist, *the rancorous spirit "which prevailed has entirely subsided.* He "had issued a proclamation, inviting the "negroes to return to the estates of their "proprietors, and promising an amnesty, "in consequence of which *many had actually "returned.*—There can be *no doubt*, but that, "if General Rochambeau had at first been "sent with the chief command, *the recovery "of St. Domingo would have been easy.*—When "these accounts left St. Domingo for Jamaica, a three-decker, and some other "vessels had hove in sight, supposed to be "a squadron with reinforcements from "France."——So! away go, then, all the thousand and one tales, heretofore received through Jamaica and the United States; and, if the ministers had any sense of shame remaining, how could they hold up their heads after the accounts, which were said to be almost official, and which, in the month of December last, represented that the French army had, in part, *gone over to the blacks*, and that the rest, consisting of 1,500 men, who, together with their general, had *actually evacuated and abandoned St. Domingo!** Let it be observed, too, that they have constantly magnified the *danger* of the French enterprize in that island. They took delight in regarding it as one of those Herculean labours, which would occupy the Consul and divert his attention from England and her possessions; but now, behold, they have discovered the truth of what we always asserted, that the task was a very *easy* one. "There can be *no doubt*, but that, "if General Rochambeau had at first been "sent with the chief command, the recovery of St. Domingo would have been "*very easy!*" And, how did we know, or how did *they* know, that General Rochambeau would *not* be sent with the chief command? When they gave their consent, or rather when the Consul extorted that consent; when they, long before the treaty of peace was signed, recalled our gallant fleet, and opened a free passage for our enemies to sail out with an armament almost unexampled in magnitude; when they did this, how did they know that General Rochambeau would not be the commander in chief, or that Leclerc would act with that violence, injustice, and folly, which they now (falsely we believe) impute to him? What could possibly encourage them to hope, that the French would send out such generals as our humane Williamson, and our more humane Maitland, to expend twenty millions of money merely for the philanthropic purpose of preventing the effusion of blood?—Troops had been constantly arriving at St. Domingo for some months before the last intelligence came away; and, from the best

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 765 and 766.—True Briton, 3d and 4th of December, 1802, where it will be seen, that the accounts here spoken of were stated to have been received through the channel of government.—Never was a system of deception so unremittingly pursued as by these *modest* and *conscientious* ministers.—There is no one trick which has not been played off for the purpose of deceiving the people, and of reconciling them to the disgraceful peace of Amiens.

means which we have of ascertaining the present strength of the French army there, we are persuaded it must consist of about 40,000 Europeans, including the troops who lately sailed from Italy and France. When the blacks are subdued, and ten or fifteen thousand of them are added to this European army, we would be glad to learn from Mr. Addington or Lord Hobart, what there is, except the interference of Divine Providence, to prevent our enemy *from seizing on Jamaica*; and, if Jamaica falls, the fate of the whole Western Archipelago is at once decided. The dread of this event has haunted our minds ever since the French expedition first sailed, and it certainly requires a head and a heart like Mr. Addington's to keep a man happy in spite of such danger.—How very different would our situation have been at this moment, had not the "*safe* politicians" permitted the French force to sail, *till after the ratification of the definitive treaty*, in which case the landing would have taken place in June instead of January, 1802; in the sickly season instead of the healthy one; Toussaint would have had six months to prepare, instead of being taken totally by surprize; it would have required 200,000 troops, instead of 50,000, to recover the colony; the war would have lasted years instead of months; it would have been, indeed, an Herculean labour for the French, it would have formed a most important diversion, and would, most assuredly, have prevented, or, at least, considerably retarded, the alarming crisis which has now arrived, and which has plunged this country into every species of embarrassment. To *preserve Jamaica*, however, is now the principal object in that quarter of the world; and, to do this, 10,000 troops should instantly be sent out, under an active, a brave, and zealous commander. This force, together with what there already is, and what may be collected, in the island, might defend that precious gem of the British crown; but that, without such a force, it will be rifled and destroyed, we most sincerely believe. Our fleet alone, however faithful, vigilant, and powerful, is not, alone, sufficient for the protection of Jamaica. Six hours fair wind brings the enemy to land; and the point of landing is entirely at his choice. If, therefore, war is the result of the present armament, *immediate* defence must be provided; and, if this non-descript state of things continue for awhile longer, an addition to the forces on the island should be made as soon as possible. The object of France will not be to *preserve*, but to *destroy*. The moment she is ready, Jamaica will, for that diabolical purpose, be invaded; and, therefore, the country must make up its mind to lose this invaluable colony, or to defend it by a military and naval force *nearly equal to the whole of our last peace establishment!* Such is the "*security* to our colonies," which Lord Castlereagh* promised us from the peace of Amiens generally, and especially from the wise measure of permitting the French armament to sail previous to the conclusion of the definitive treaty. During the last peace, one fifty gun ship and a few frigates composed the whole of our naval force on the Jamaica station; we have now, on that same station, 10 ships of the line, six frigates, and 6 sloops of war, making in the whole 22 vessels of war; whereas, *previous to the signing of the preliminaries*, we had, on this station, only 6 ships of the line, 4 frigates, and 5 sloops of war! And yet this was to be a "peace of *security*;" a peace for the "*husbanding* of our *resources!*"

Louisiana.—Of this colony, and of the danger which will inevitably arise to this country from its occupation by France, we have said so much, that any further endeavours in that way, will, we fear, be totally useless. It is, however, our duty to continue to submit to the public what we know and think upon the subject. The American government has pursued precisely the course, which we said it would pursue. It has not yielded to the momentary feelings of the people. New Orleans has not been attacked, as some persons expected it would, by the western settlers, who, though their flour has fallen in value from *five dollars and a half per barrel* to *one dollar per barrel*, are patiently waiting for the result of the mission of Mr. Munro, a person famous for his love of France and his hatred of England, who has been dispatched by the President, to *negotiate* on the subject with the court of Spain in the first instance, and, if he fail there, with the Consul of France. How such a negotiation, conducted by such a person, is likely to terminate, it is by no means difficult to foresee, especially when we recollect, that the French armament destined for Louisiana *is now embarked*†, and will, in all likelihood have taken possession of New Orleans, before Mr. Munro will have delivered his credentials at Madrid.—The measures, which the French will be likely to adopt, with regard to this colony, as well as the fearful consequences which must arise therefrom to England, are fully pointed out in a letter to Lord Hawkesbury, to which we beg leave to refer our readers ‡.

* See Parl. Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1335.

† Since the above was written, it seems the troops have disembarked.—‡ Vol. III. p. 297.

and by which we think they will be convinced, that immediate steps ought to be taken to frustrate the views of France in this respect. The armament should *be prevented from sailing*. "But this is war!" War! aye; and what are we arming for, if not for war? Besides, are we not, or *were* we not, holding the Cape of Good Hope, even when the provocation or danger, was not sufficient to produce, or, at least, *did not produce*, an armament in our ports; and, shall we, now that an armament has been thought necessary, not be justified in preventing the departure of the fleets and armies of our enemy? But, "the Message?" Yes, the Message does, indeed, intimate, that, if the thousands upon thousands of troops, with which Buonaparté has lined the opposite coast, are destined for "colonial service," then all is right; then there is no hostility to be apprehended; and, of course, it would be a flagrant act of aggression, on our part, to prevent *the sailing* of those troops; for, until we can ascertain their destination, which we cannot while they are in port, it is absolutely impossible for us to ascertain, that they are *not* intended for colonial service. So that, according to this notion, we must either send a squadron to accompany each detachment to the French colonies, and see it safely landed, or run the risk of seeing the whole of them land in our own dominions, at home or abroad! Such an idea never before entered the mind even of a maniac. It is a symptom of idiotism such as was never yet heard of.—If this armament is suffered to sail for Louisiana, it may chance to land in Ireland, and we have no hesitation to say, that it would, in that case, be much less dangerous to the interests of the kingdom. In Ireland, it might, and, we trust, it would, be defeated; but, if it obtains a fast footing in Louisiana, and six months of peace, or of nominal peace, follow, it strikes a blow, which this country cannot long survive.—This prediction we have repeated over and over so often, that we have no apology to offer but the magnitude of the evil which we dread, and which we again call upon the ministers to avert, while yet it is in their power, or to prepare themselves for the execrations of a ruined and enslaved people.

THE TURKISH EMPIRE appears to be, in some sort, taken possession of by the French. French Engineers, *alias* Commercial Agents, have been stationed in all the sea ports, and, indeed, in all other places of defence. Divers rumours are afloat as to the particular acts of encroachment, which the Consul has in view; but none of these acts seem to be decidedly fixed, and we will venture to say, that they cannot, without the concurrence of Russia. The most probable conjecture is, that France will make use of all her power and her policy to obtain the re-possession of Egypt, in which object, maugre the arrangement, made through the mediation of Lord Elgin, we are fully persuaded she will succeed, upon condition of winking at an equivalent acquirement, on the part of Russia. The fate, then, of Turkey, and, eventually of India, will depend, as far, at least, as present appearances allow us to calculate, on the disposition of Russia. If that power is, as we formerly observed, under the guidance of ambition, if her projects with respect to Persia and India are revived, our Empire in the East must be placed in an uncertain, not to say a dangerous situation, especially when we recollect that Cochin and the Cape of Good Hope are at the command of the French, to which latter place the armament under Decaen and Linois is certainly gone.

CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.—From every thing we have been able to learn, on the subject, and we can venture to state, that our information is tolerably correct, this most important of the outworks of India is, at this moment, completely surrendered and evacuated by us, in consequence of orders sent out since the date of those by which General Dundas was authorized to retain it. The capitulation by which this retention was effected is without a precedent in the history of the world *. Nothing like it, or bearing any resemblance to it, was ever before known, thought of, or dreamt of.—As to our *right* to retain the Cape, beyond the time stipulated for its delivery to the Dutch, or even for ever, no doubt can possibly exist in the mind of any one, who does not, with the honest Talleyrand and his master, regard the treaty of Amiens as having abrogated, with respect to this country, all the maxims of the law of nature as well as of nations. That the ministers of Great-Britain have tacitly acknowledged this unjust, this degrading, this monstrous principle, we, with shame, confess; but, it does not follow, that it has been, or that it will be, acknowledged by the nation, which cannot, in this unlimited sense, renounce its natural rights, rights necessary to its existence as a nation, without violating its duty to the world, a duty paramount to all those which it can possibly owe to any particular nation. The doctrine, therefore, which has been inculcated by those London editors who are supposed to speak the sentiments of Mr.

* *Capitulation* in our next.

Fox and Mr. Sheridan, is not less unfounded in itself than it is pernicious in its tendency. Mr. Fox has, indeed, spoken for himself: he has declared, that, "*whatever* "*may have happened* since the signing of the "treaty of Amiens, it is our duty to fulfil, "on our part, every stipulation of that "treaty; but, *after* having done that," says he, "if our *honour* demands it, let us go to "war." Without stopping to ask how long it is since the honourable gentleman took up these "quixotic" notions, we shall endeavour to show, that they are quite inapplicable to the present case. All the writers on public law, reprobate, in the strongest terms, a wilful and unjust breach of a treaty of peace; but, they do not say, that there is *no cause* which can *justify* such breach. Not to take up the readers' time with authorities, to which we could here appeal, let us suppose, that France had invaded Jersey ten days after the treaty of Amiens was concluded, would any one, in that case, have had the assurance to insist, that, we were, notwithstanding this act of violence, still bound in good faith, to restore Martinico? This is certainly a strong case, but it serves to show, that the principle, in its unlimited unqualified sense, is a perfect absurdity. The true doctrine is, that, if, *between the conclusion and the fulfilment* of a treaty of peace, one of the contracting parties does any act which would *fully justify the other party in renewing the war*, that same act justifies the latter party in doing all things short of war, and, amongst these, is the retention of territories stipulated to be restored. This being admitted, as we think it must, who is there that will deny the fact of France having, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, done act upon act, which would have fully justified us in taking up arms against her? But, "we have overlooked these acts," says the Morning Post, "and, therefore, we cannot "*now* plead them." This also is new doctrine. Exactly the contrary is true. Our having made the treaty of Amiens with the knowledge that our enemy had already obtained the possession of, or the mastery over, Elba, Louisiana, Piedmont, and the Italian Republic, does, indeed, preclude all complaint on those accounts, because, knowing of these encroachments at the time of making the treaty, we, by that treaty, gave our tacit consent to them. They would have formed a good ground for refusing to conclude the definitive treaty upon the basis of the preliminaries, but they form no justification for non-fulfilment of the definitive treaty. Not so, however, with regard to the subjugation of Switzerland and the new division of Germany, either of which formed a good and lawful plea for non-fulfilment, though not upon the principles of our "*safe* politicians," who, at every step, become more and more involved in inconsistency. "These acts of aggression, too, were overlooked." They were so; but, if there be now, or if there have been, any other act, sufficient to justify us in taking up arms, the acts abovementioned and other hostile acts, committed since the conclusion of the peace, *revive*, and are fairly and forcibly enumerated in justification of a war on our part, or in the retention of any thing ceded to France by the treaty.—— With regard to the Cape of Good Hope, however, another difficulty is started. "It "was *to Holland* and not to France that we "were to restore the Cape, and we *cannot* "*accuse Holland of any act of hostility*." No; but we have as good a plea against the restitution of the Cape as we should have had if Holland had committed all the acts, of which France has been guilty. A treaty is an act of reciprocity, if there are three parties on one side, and one on the other, the *whole* of the three are, as to every thing connected with the fulfilment of the treaty, responsible for each, and each is responsible for the whole. It might have happened, that at the end of three months, one restoration was to be made by England to Holland; and, at the end of two months, one was to be made by France to England. If France refused to fulfil her part of the engagement, will any one contend that England ought nevertheless to fulfil hers, merely because the restoration was not to be made to France? But, there is another ground for retaining any one, or all of, the Dutch possessions; a ground, which existed from the hour the treaty was signed, which has become more and more solid from that hour to this, and which never ought to have been abandoned for one single moment. When a treaty is made, the parties are always understood to take into view not only their situation relative to each other, but the situation of each other relative to other powers. Any thing, therefore, which has an existence at the time of making the treaty, and which adds to the power of one of the parties, may, if unknown to the other party, be afterwards a just ground for non-fulfilment of the treaty on his part. Suppose that the French had, previous to the treaty of Amiens, obtained a cession of the island of Sardinia, and this had not been known to us till after the treaty was ratified, should we still have been obliged, in good faith, to evacuate Minorca and Elba? We imagine, that no one, except Mr. Fox, will attempt

to maintain the affirmative of this question. If, then, the disguising from a party a circumstance of this nature would justify the non-fulfilment of his share of the contract, and would, in fact, if he chose it, nullify the contract altogether, a less effect cannot be attributed to a failure, in one of the parties, to execute engagements which he is well known to have entered into with some other power, particularly if that power be a party to the treaty, and *if the fulfilment of those engagements is entirely to depend upon the conclusion of that treaty.* Now this is precisely the case before us. The French, in the year 1795, invaded Holland, and became masters of the country, to the annoyance and danger of Great Britain. The people became, in reality, the slaves of France; their pecuniary, military, and naval means became hers; but, as self-preservation was the pretext of the invader, it was agreed, in a public treaty, concluded between the Dutch and the French, that the latter should keep troops in the territories of Holland, "during the *present war only*."—The words are these: "ARTICLE XVII. The French "Republic shall continue to occupy such "places and positions as are necessary for "the *defence of the country*, but with a fixed "number of troops, to be agreed on, and "*during the present war only*." * There are several other stipulations of this treaty, which were to be executed at the general peace, and which, if they had been so executed, would have contributed materially to change the situation of Holland, with respect to France and to England; but, not to confuse the question, we confine ourselves to that which we have here cited. When the treaty of Amiens came to be negotiated, England, of course, reckoned amongst its advantages that of delivering Holland from French troops, that of restoring to her some degreee of independence, that of leaving her somewhat more free to follow her own will, that of returning, perhaps, in time, to her ancient relations with this kingdom, and, above all, that of withdrawing her sailors and her ships from the service of France, and of removing from ourselves the continual danger of a French invasion from her coasts. But, this stipulation not having been executed by France, the French troops still remaining in Holland, none of these great and important advantages, which were reckoned upon by England, in concluding the treaty of Amiens, and for which she made such immense sacrifices, have been, or are likely to be, obtained: on the contrary, Holland is more than ever under the power of Buonaparté; he lays her under contribution at his pleasure, makes her ships and sailors serve him as if they were his own, fits out his expeditions in her ports and at her expense, and has lined her coasts with troops evidently for the purpose of menacing or invading this country. With respect to Holland, therefore, he has violated a *positive*, and, with respect to us, a *tacit* convention, which, though not actually making a part of the treaty of Amiens, is nevertheless, in point of execution, to be considered as inseparable from it; and, as it ought to have been executed *immediately* after the treaty was concluded, the failure to execute it was the *first infraction* of that treaty, and, of course, fully justified not only the retention of the Cape, but of every other possession, which we had stipulated to restore.——Here, then, was clear, solid, and honourable ground, whereon for the ministers to make a stand against the assaults of the honest Talleyrand and the no less honest Mr. Fox. Nor is this ground at all impaired by lapse of time, or by the miserable ignorance, indecision, and pusillanimity of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies; for whatever be their faults, whatever their offences against the interest and honour of their royal master and their country (and, God knows, they are great enough!) none of these can be pleaded in justification of a breach of faith committed by France. We are aware, that these arguments, as applicable to the Cape of Good Hope, may have been rendered useless by the ministers, whose saying and unsaying, in this as well as in all other cases, bear no very feeble resemblance, whether in matter or in manner, to the faultering accents of an illiterate culprit; but, lest they should attempt to eke out their political existence by another disgraceful compromise, we think it right to deprive them beforehand of every pretence grounded upon *a want of matter to justify hostilities.*

MALTA.—As the infraction of a treaty, by one of the parties, may, if the other party chooses, render the whole compact null and void, England would, on this ground, be fully justified in the retention of Malta. But, she has other ground, whereon to justify that retention; and, with all due deference to Mr. Fox and the Morning Chronicle, we think it no difficult matter to prove, that, without pleading any of the other numerous infractions of the treaty of Amiens by France, *England is not, even according to*

* XVII. La République Française continuera d'occuper militairement, mais par un nombre de troupes déterminé et convenu entre les deux nations, pendant la présente guerre seulement, les places et positions qu'il sera utile de garder pour la défense du pays.

that treaty, bound, under the present circumstances, to evacuate the island of Malta; that, the ministers in keeping possession of it, are guilty of no breach of public faith, but that, on the contrary, in giving it up, they would commit a crime against their country; and that, the retention is not to be regarded as "an *indemnity* for the unjust encroachments of the French government," as it has been represented by those men of "*English feeling*," who one minute cry out against the injustice, insolence, and tyranny of Buonaparté, and the next declare their readiness to make *new concessions* rather than resist this injustice, insolence, and tyranny by arms; we flatter ourselves, that we shall be able to prove, that the retention of Malta is not to be considered as an indemnity of this or of any sort, nor even as the first act of hostilities in the new and just war into which we are about to be driven, but purely and simply as the preservation of a thing which lawfully belongs to us.—By the treaty of Amiens, article X, it is agreed, as a basis, that "the islands of Malta, Gezo, and "Comio, shall be restored to the Order of "St. John of Jerusalem, to be held on the "same conditions, on which it possessed "them *before the war*, and under the following stipulations."—These stipulations, which provide for a modification of the Order are contained in the clauses 1, 2, and 3*. They state, in substance, that the French Langues shall be suppressed, that a Maltese Langue shall be established, and that the Order shall be composed of the Langues which "shall continue to subsist "after the exchange of the ratifications of "the present treaty;" that is to say, of the same Langues that subsisted before the war, with the exception of these two alterations.—The Order, such as it ought to be for the purpose of receiving the sovereignty of Malta, Gezo, and Comio, is here, then, accurately described. It was not to the Order of St. John, generally, but to that Order constituted conformably to the treaty of Amiens, that we were bound to surrender the sovereignty and the territory of Malta. Whether the Order thus constituted would, or would not, be capable of maintaining its independence, is a question which has nothing to do with that now before us. We have no right to plead the ignorance and selfishness of our ministers as a ground for the non-fulfilment of a treaty that they have made; but, if the Order, such as it is described and specified in the treaty, has undergone any material change, and, particularly if that change tends to weaken it, and has, moreover, been produced by any power or powers, other than ourselves, who were parties to the treaty, it is evident that we are not bound to surrender the island, of which we possess both the dominion and the sovereignty, into the hands of the Order thus mutilated; because, in so doing, we should surrender it to a sovereign, who is not the sovereign designated by the treaty to receive it.—If the reader allows these premises to be just, a simple narrative of facts is all that is wanted to make out our position.—Before the epoch fixed on for the surrender of the island (see Art. X. clause 4,) the Order of Malta, which, according to the terms of the treaty was to consist of the Langues of Italy, Castille, Arragon, Germany, and Bavaria, was materially curtailed and enfeebled by the suppression of the Langues of Castille and Arragon, and this suppression was made by the King of Spain, the ally of France, one of the parties to the treaty. More recently the Langue of Bavaria has been suppressed, and also that part of the Italian Langue comprised in Piedmont and the Duchy of Parma, now united to France (another of the parties to the treaty of Amiens), thus reducing the Order to a skeleton, rendering its sovereignty and independence a mere mockery, and preserving its name only for the purpose of enforcing the stipulation by which we have agreed to evacuate the island. That such must have been the effect of these suppressions no one will deny, and, it follows of course, that we are absolved from our obligation relative to the surrender; for, the object of the two principal contracting parties respecting Malta is, in the 2d clause of Art. X. clearly declared to be, "to place the "*Order and Island of Malta* in a state of *entire* "*independence* with regard to themselves." The subsequent stipulations turn almost wholly and entirely upon the manner of effectually providing for this independence, in speaking of which the *Order* and the *Island* are never separated. Every thing indicates, that the Order was, in itself, even previous to the amputations it has undergone since the treaty, considered as insufficient for this purpose, and, for that reason, a foreign garrison is provided together with the guarantee of the six principal powers of Europe. Any change, therefore, tending further to enfeeble the Order, and absolutely to destroy the means already looked upon as insufficient, must, unless England has occasioned such change, fully acquit her of a breach of faith in retaining the island, and, we hardly think that Mr. Barrere, or even Mr. Fox, will attempt to prove, that this country has forced Spain, Bavaria, and France to make those suppressions, by which the Order is reduced to a hundred

* See the treaty, Register, Vol. I. p. 323.

knights, almost destitute of revenues, and no more able to defend Malta than they are to conquer the Empire of Russia. Since, therefore, the Sovereign, to whom Malta was to be surrendered, not only no longer exists, but has been mutilated and destroyed by the opposite parties to the treaty of Amiens, England has not only a *right* to retain the dominion and sovereignty of the island, but such retention is a *duty* which she owes to Europe in general, and to the people of Malta in particular, whom she is bound, by obligations the most sacred, not to surrender to, or leave at the mercy of, any foreign power whatever.

PUBLIC CREDIT.—While the retention of the places, of which we have spoken above, is fully justified by the conduct of the enemy, we imagine it will be very difficult for the ministers to justify themselves to the nation for the contradictory orders they have given in this respect, and for the blow which their selfishness has finally given to the credit of the country. The Imogen, which took out the orders for the retention of the Cape, must have sailed from England late in October. On the 10th of December Mr. Addington came to the parliament with his grand financial display, in which he presented an estimate explicitly founded upon *a reduction of our establishments during the present year* *. Just before the Christmas recess, in the debate upon the Navy Commissioners Bill, to which Lord Folkestone objected, as unhinging the naval service at a moment when war might be expected, the *candid* Chancellor of the Exchequer replied, with his usual modesty, that "whatever *ill-boding opinions* his lord-"ship might entertain, he was sure *the* "*House would not adopt them.*" And, no longer ago than the 18th of February, only four days previous to the delivery of the King's Message, he offered, as a reason for voting the money to the Prince of Wales, that *we were now in a state of peace.* If, therefore, orders had not, between the sailing of the Imogen and the 10th of December, been sent to evacuate the Cape, on what did Mr. Addington found those hopes, which he held out to the country on the latter day, of a reduction of our establishments? And, if the Cape be now delivered up, how will he answer to his country for having surrendered that important place, when we had an undoubted right to retain it, and for having thus, on the eve of a war, put one of the keys of India into the enemy's hands? But, his subsequent conduct it will be still more difficult to justify. Did he know nothing of the hostile disposition and preparations of France on the 18th of February? Was the present armament resolved on and the Message delivered to Parliament in fourteen days from the first moment of his having obtained any knowledge of the circumstances that led to that important measure? No longer ago than the 18th of February, he must have been totally ignorant of all the grounds of alarm, or, his declaration of that day, must have been intended to deceive the holders of stock. Let him, therefore, take his choice between the *profoundest ignorance* or the *profoundest duplicity*.—Whatever may have been the motive of his conduct, the effect is certain; he has depreciated, not the *funds*, but the *credit* of the country. However men may differ in other respects, they all agree, that he will never be able to make another loan under *twenty* per cent. No monied man will ever again place confidence in his assertions or his estimates, both of which have proved to be shamefully fallacious; and, which is still worse, his bad faith will be entailed upon his successors, as the bankruptcy of a partner never fails to bring lasting discredit upon the firm. For this reason, if for no other, the *candid* minister must yield his place in "*the machine.*" It will require no intrigue, no force, to put him out; out he must come, or the machine will first stop, then crumble into dust.

SIR THOMAS TROUBRIDGE.—Connected with the foregoing subject is the conduct of a certain person *in office* with regard to *the stocks*. The imputation has been publickly made, and has not been removed, that persons have profited from the information, derived from their official situation, and have dealt in the funds to a very great amount. Certain it is, that there never was known so material an anticipation. To what cause it was to be ascribed we cannot say, but we know that the suspicions of the people in the city are not to be done away, without something more satisfactory than the whining nonsense, which the news-papers have published on the subject.——On the *Richmond-Park ministry*, no blame can certainly attach; those three words must always awaken ideas of purity, sanctity, and, particularly, of fair-dealing; and, it was with no less astonishment than regret, that we saw Capt. Markham bring forward the story relative to Sir Thomas Troubridge, who, besides his being of the Shelburne school, and belonging to the Richmond-Park ministry, has a character for bravery quite sufficient to shelter him from the malignant insinuations of the losers in 'Change Alley.—We have read the letter of Sir Thomas's agent, and have heard Captain Markham read the affidavit of the same person, to both which documents we,

* See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 781.

of course, give implicit credit, and we must, therefore, regard Sir Thomas as completely cleared; but yet, for this brave gentleman's own sake, as well as for that of the service, to which he has the honour to belong, we could have wished, that the *power of attorney*, in virtue of which the stock was sold, had been produced. This instrument, we are told, still exists, and, as its *date* will, at once, put the matter to rest, we do wish that Sir Thomas, or some one of his friends, would move for its production. It was extremely unfortunate, too, that Captain Markham did not provide some one to *second his motion for an inquiry*. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, worthy soul! did, indeed, most ably support all that Captain Markham had advanced, but the good man, in giving way to the warmth of his friendship, forgot the routine part of the business, and actually sat down after having seconded every thing but the motion! This omission was, too, the more untoward, when the fate of Sir William Elford's motion and the Admiralty comments thereon were recollected. Sir William's motion, which was for an inquiry into the conduct of Mr. Marshall of Plymouth, *was not seconded*; and this was regarded by the Admiralty and the newspapers as *a proof of his guilt*. Far be it from us to to apply this mode of judging to Sir Thomas Troubridge; but, we cannot help lamenting, that the motion was not seconded.——We shall return to this subject another time, for we are extremely anxious, that not a shadow of suspicion should remain. For our own parts we are perfectly satisfied; but we again beg leave to recommend, that the public may be informed of the *date* of the *power of attorney*. If it shall appear, as we doubt not it will, that this instrument was signed, *before* the armament was resolved on in Council, or even before the Lords of the Admiralty had any intimation of it, then will the base calumniators be silenced, which we are much afraid they will not by any other means.

MILITIA.—A bill is now laid before the House of Commons for the purpose of "more speedily and effectually completing "the establishment of officers in the militia "of Great Britain."—As the debates on this bill have given rise to some very malignant insinuations in the Morning Post of Thursday last, as well as to some *gallery clap-traps* elsewhere, we think ourselves called upon to make a few remarks on the subject; not so much, however, for the purpose of showing the evil tendency of the measure as for that of exposing the inconsistency of those who are endeavouring to throw an unmerited odium on the gentlemen, by whom it has been opposed, and through whose means a considerable modification of it has been obtained.—The ministers, conscious of deserving the severe reproaches of the country, for the whole of their conduct at, and since, the peace, but particularly for that part of it, which relates to their disarming, disembodying, disbanding, and dismantling system, by which they thought to have secured the never-ending applauses of the ignorant multitude, are now seeking for occasions to stifle those reproaches in their birth, by accusing their opponents of a desire to retard the restoration of the army and the navy. The measures they have brought forward relative to the militia both in Great Britain and in Ireland, are, to say the least of them, of a tendency extremely injurious to the military service of the kingdom; but, every objection made to these measures, every fear or doubt with regard to their effect, and, indeed, every suggestion, however, mildly and amicably offered, not implicitly coinciding with the projects of men, whose ignorance is universally admitted, is met by the imputation of a wish to *dishearten* the people and to *obstruct* the measures *necessary for national defence*.—This excellent mode of obviating the inconveniencies of discussion has been tried to its utmost, on the present occasion, with what degree of truth and of justice we shall, in a few words, endeavour to enable our readers to judge.—The bill in question enables persons, not having qualifications of landed or pecuniary property, to be officers of militia. There are various modifications as to the rank, manner of admission, &c &c. but this is the regulation simply stated, *it does enable unqualified persons to be officers in the militia service of England*. Lord Folkestone objected to it, principally upon the ground, that it tended to keep the nobility and gentry out of the militia, and, at the same time, to injure, in various ways, the regular service. This was immediately laid hold of by the Secretary at War, who expressed his *astonishment* at what had fallen from the noble Lord, and also by Mr. Sheridan, who observed, that the young nobility and gentry would do better to go into the militia than to *follow their hounds*. This brilliant sally, which caught "*a loud cry of hear! hear!*" was not, to say the truth, much to the point, and his Lordship might certainly have observed, that the sports of the field were full as wholesome and as honourable, full as likely to strengthen the frame and ennoble the mind, as the various pleasures of the theatre or the gaming-house. To the astonishment of the Secretary at War, who brought in the bill, his Lordship had still a better reply; to wit; that the bill, then before the House, was, as far as it went, in direct contradic-

tion to the complete code of militia law, which was passed by the parliament no longer ago than the 26th of June last, and which was framed and brought forward by the Secretary at War himself! That code, which fills up nearly *a hundred pages* of the statute-book, begins with these words: "Whereas a respectable military force, un-"der the *command of officers* POSSESSING "LANDED PROPERTY, within Great Bri-"tain, is *essential to the constitution.*" It then proceeds to state, that great disorder and innovation have crept into the militia system; after which it enumerates the several militia acts in existence, and repeals them all, for the purpose of substituting a well-digested permanent code, the very basis of which is, that *every commissioned officer shall have a qualification in property.* What gentleman, then, especially a gentleman who had assisted in passing this "well-digested per-"manent code," could be expected to give, without hesitation, his consent to a bill, which struck at the very foundation of it? And, with what degree of consistency, of common respect, or of common decency, could he be reproached for that hesitation, by the very person, who, only eight months ago, had digested, drawn up, and procured to be passed, that permanent code? "But, "the necessity of the times!" The necessity of the times may be great, but, with regard to the militia, it merely *calls them out*, and, if the "well-digested permanent code" be insufficient for that purpose, what is the use of it? Why does it swell out the statute book? Why were some hundreds of pounds expended in the printing of it? And why were the two Houses of the last Parliament compelled to waste upon it so many of those hours, which might otherwise have been devoted to the diverting speeches of Mr. Sheridan or to the bills about "pigeons' "and rabbits' dung *?" This code makes a fine figure in the rolls of Parliament, and in the printing-office of Mr. Strahan; but the moment it is to be acted upon, away it goes, and all the "landed property," and "the "constitution" along with it. It was, it seems, a thing merely for show, like feathers, or grenadier caps, or any other of those baubles, which the soldiers describe as being "all for *sight* and none for *fight*," and which are always thrown aside preparatory to a battle.—The Secretary of War, aware of the force of these arguments, attempted to meet them by a *precedent.* He reminded Lord Folkestone, that the very same measure was adopted *during the last war.* "Yes," his Lordship might have said, "and "this very same measure it was, which "your code was principally intended *to pre-"vent in future!*" But, besides this, the precedent was by no means in point. During the war, the men of the militia were suddenly *doubled in number*, which created an absolute necessity of admitting unqualified officers; whereas no augmentation of the militia has now taken place; its strength is as it was fixed by the "well-digested per-"manent code." The precedent was, therefore, totally inapplicable to the case, and the objections of Lord Folkestone still remain to be answered by something better than a cry of "*disheartening* the people," by which cry, we trust, his Lordship is not to be deterred from a discharge of that duty, which demands a strict examination into every measure proposed by those men, whose inconsistent and wavering conduct has, even according to their own acknowledgment, already brought their country into imminent danger, and who have the modesty to plead that very danger as a title to unlimited confidence.

CREATING DESPONDENCY.—This is the charge, which the ministry now prefer against all those, who attempt to awaken the country to a sense of its danger. Their object is evident enough; for, if the danger of the country be so great as we, for instance, affirm it is, the fault must be in the ministers, and, therefore, it is very natural for them to decry every thing tending to establish our position. The nation, too, has a feeling of somewhat the same sort: it is conscious of having, in some degree, participated in the measure, which has so speedily brought it to the brink of destruction, and to the dreadful effects of which it would fain shut its eyes. Thus both the ministry and the people have adopted the sentiments and the language of the perverse and degenerate Israelites: "they say to the "seers, see not; and to the prophets, "prophesy not unto us right things; speak "unto us *smooth* things, prophesy *deceits.*" This folly and timidity are represented by the prophet Isaiah as a symptom of that baseness, which was to produce, and which finally did produce, first the captivity and afterwards the dispersion of the Jewish nation; and, in spite of the cuckoo cry of "*creating despondency,*" we give it as our settled opinion, that, unless a very important and speedy change takes place in this kingdom, the Jews will not be the only people without a country.——"If the blind lead the blind, both "shall fall into the ditch." It has always been our maxim, that the country cannot be saved, without being fully apprized of all the dangers of its situation, and of all the difficulties it has to encounter. This maxim

* For sweeping the House of Parliament of some of these documents of peddling and dirty legislation, the country is indebted to Lord Holland.

we laid down at the very outset of those labours which, since the signature of the preliminaries, we have so unremittingly pursued:—" It requires no very great degree " of penetration to discover, that your Lord- " ship would gladly *draw a veil over* these " scandalous occurrences; nor should I " have much objection to follow your ex- " ample, were I not well persuaded, that " *every attempt to disguise our situation will* " *only tend to accelerate the consummation of* " *our ruin.*" *—Despondency, indeed!—Are *we* the people that despond? We, who would have *continued* the war, and who weekly repeat our opinion that it ought *immediately to be renewed*, as the only means of regaining the confidence of the world? We do not doubt of the *means* but of the *will* of the nation. Our apprehensions are not positive but conditional: if the government and the people will do what they are able, we triumph; if they will not, we sink, we become the slaves of France, and our very *name* is blotted out. Do we create despondency, then, or do we animate to exertion and to patriotic sacrifices? " Aye, there's the rub!" We call for *exertion and for sacrifices*; and, therefore, it is that we create despondency in the minds of all those, who, to the making of that exertion and those sacrifices, prefer the " sounding brass and tinkling cymbal" of Mr. Sheridan's speeches.——But we " expose the *weakness* of the country." On the contrary, we say it is yet strong; that it yet possesses the means not of paltry cowardly *defensive*, but of *offensive* war. We cease not to urge, that " *another war, a successful war against France*," is the means, and the only means, of recovering our lost reputation, and of reviving that confidence in our military and naval strength, which is absolutely necessary to our pecuniary credit. This charge of " exposing the *weakness* of the country" is a most convenient subterfuge for the ministers and their timid followers. It is not the weakness of the *country*, but *their* weakness, or wickedness, which we expose. We have said, and we say even now, that there are not *six* ships of the line *fit for sea*; but, do we thereby say, or insinuate, that the country is *unable* to put out more, and that there might not have been *fifty* ready for sea, under Lords Chatham or Spencer? We accuse Mr. Addington of deceiving, grossly and shamefully deceiving the nation, in promising to have " *fifty* ships of the line ready, in a month, in case of emergency," when he cannot now say, after a month of preparation, that he has *six* ready for sea. That this *emergency exists* no one can doubt, because the militia is called out, and the law says, that it shall not be called out, except in case of *internal commotion*, or of *invasion*, or *imminent danger of invasion*. There is no internal commotion, therefore his Majesty's ministers tell the country that there is imminent danger of invasion: this is a case of emergency; and, shall we, because we expose the ignorance, or the duplicity of the minister, be accused of exposing the weakness of the country? If so, the silence and forbearance of a political writer must ever bear a direct proportion to the magnitude of the mischief to be apprehended from the measures of the government! A doctrine too monstrously absurd to be maintained even by the *candid* tribe, who are attempting to support the present crazy and destructive " machine." " The Morning Post of Thursday last says:

" The *disheartening* picture Mr. Wind- " ham daily draws of the situation of this " country, may *encourage the French to make* " *war.*" As if the French did not *know* the situation of the country! But, let us now hear the " consolatory language of " this same paper:"—" If the time for " such a struggle [a struggle between " France and England] should arrive, Eng- " land must defend herself by REVOLU- " TIONARY MEANS, *like those to which* " *France resorted when she was attacked by* " *all Europe.* The purse and the person of " every man in France are within the grasp " of the present French Government, and " it is only by the *uncontrouled use of them* " that Buonaparté can effect his purposes. " Should England be seriously threatened " with invasion, our own government *must* " *be invested with the same powers!!!!!*"—And this is the language of *consolation!* This is the opinion of that paper, which reviles Mr. Windham for " *disheartening*" *the country!*—We must close.—We leave the reader to make a comparison between our sentiments and those of this high-spirited print.

* Letters to Lord Hawkesbury, p. 4.

NOTICES.

*** We have just received, from the QUEEN'S GERMAN REGIMENT an OFFICIAL DOCUMENT, which, when published, as it will be in the Register of next week, will completely remove the insinuations thrown out by the commentators on the statements of the 42d Regiment, and will, also, we think, fully prove, that the INVINCIBLE STANDARD was, never, *for one moment*, in the possession of the Highlanders.—X. in our next.

INVINCIBLE STANDARD.

Those persons, who, from motives too evident to need exposure, reproached me for having made the taking of this Standard a subject of public discussion, will, undoubtedly lament to see that discussion revived, just when they began to conceive hopes, that their numerous misrepresentations and falsehoods had so confused and bewildered the public mind, as to afford them a *chance*, at least, of seeing the question sink for ever out of sight, covered with contradiction, doubt, and uncertainty. But, the anonymous partizans of the Sinclairs and the 42d Regiment, will, I trust be found to have formed an erroneous judgment of the perseverance of him, with whom they have chosen to contend, and against whom they have, through the innumerable prostituted channels, with which the British press has supplied them, poured forth torrents of the foulest and most infamous calumny. Not in my cause, however, but in the cause which I first espoused, the cause of truth, of justice, and of honour, have I resumed the pen, with a perfect assurance that no apology for so doing will be thought necessary by any person whose good opinion I wish to preserve.

It will be recollected, that, in the Register, Vol. III. p. 164, I published a statement, signed by Lieutenant-Colonels A. STEWART and JAMES STIRLING, Field Officers of the 42d, or Highland Regiment. This statement was first published in the St. James's Chronicle of the 5th of February last; and, in the same print, of the 8th of February, there appeared a string of remarks obviously intended to elucidate, amplify, and apply the facts of the official statement. This statement of the 42d Regiment, thus amplified and explained, having reached the Queen's German Regiment, the officers of that corps have thought it their duty to publish a brief account of its movements on the 21st of March, which account completely overturns the only inference, of any importance, which has been drawn, or which can be drawn, from the statement of Colonels Stewart and Stirling. But, before I submit this document to the reader, it seems necessary to take a cursory view of the circumstances as well as the publications by which it has been preceded.

From the hour that the news of the battle of Alexandria arrived, great pains were taken, by the London news-editors, to inculcate a belief, that the 42d, or Royal Highland Regiment, were entitled to almost the exclusive honour of the victory; and, for several months, there appeared to be no doubt, that the Invincible Standard was taken by that corps. On the 25th of February, 1802, there appeared in the True Briton, a newspaper belonging to a Scotch Man, named Heriott, an account of the proceedings at a meeting of the Highland Society, which meeting had been attended by a considerable number of Scottish noblemen and gentlemen. This account, which was published by authority of the Highland Society, or, at least by a member of that body, tended to confirm the opinion, that the Highlanders alone gained the battle. A serjeant of that regiment, named SINCLAIR, who was introduced to the Society by SIR JOHN SINCLAIR, gave a narrative of the occurrences of the battle of Alexandria, which narrative, it was expressly stated, was given for the sole purpose of *proving* the fact as to the 42d Regiment having taken the Invincible Standard. The serjeant was, by the account here mentioned, said to have stated, that the standard was taken from the French officer by Major Stirling of the 42d:—but the very words of the account will be best here.—"Major Stirling, "followed by Serjeant Sinclair, went up to "the French officer, bearing the Invincible "Standard, and desired him instantly to "deliver it up with his sword. On his re-"fusal the Major struck him across the "head with the flat of his sword, and "snatching the Standard forcibly from "him*." It is then stated, that the serjeant received the Standard from Major Stirling, with an order "*to take care of it*;" but that, being afterwards "*cut down*" by the French cavalry, he lost it; and, after

* See the whole proceedings, Register, Vol. II. p. 803.

having got up from the place where he was cut down, he found a musquet, fired *fifteen rounds* with it, and took *six French dismounted horsemen prisoners!!!!!* "While "conducting in these prisoners, he perceived *a soldier of General Stuart's corps*" [the Queen's German Regiment], "*carrying into the rear the* INVINCIBLE STANDARD, *which he had* PICKED UP, *while the Serjeant lay as already described.*" That is to say, according to his own words, "in a state of *insensibility*." How a man could, while he himself was in a state of *insensibility*, know and see what was passing by his side, neither the Serjeant nor his historians thought proper to explain. The fact is, that, previous to the meeting of the Highland Society, the true story had partially got abroad; people had said, that it was a soldier of the German Regiment who took the Standard which was *brought home*, in proof of which divers public orders and certificates were appealed to, and, as there was but *one* Standard brought home, it was necessary for those who were resolved that nobody but the Highlanders should have the honour of taking it, to find out some way or other of making the world believe, that, though the Standard was *brought in to head quarters by* ANTHONY LUTZ, a soldier of the German Regiment, yet that the said LUTZ did not take it from the enemy, but PICKED IT UP, that is to say, *found it*, or *stole it* from the 42d Regiment. Hence the story of Serjeant Sinclair, or of the Highland Society; for I pretend not to say which of them had the honour of inventing it.

The matter remained very quiet 'till the month of December last. The Highland Society were preparing *a medal* to immortalize the achievement; a cup of great value was ordered to be made, as a present to the 42d Regiment, ornamented with appropriate devices, one of which was, *a Highlander taking the Standard*—Ker Porter's Panorama, the Print-shops, the Play-houses, the Circus, Sadler's-wells, with almost every other place of exhibition or amusement, lent their most powerful aid; while the Scotch newspaper editors, of whom London has to boast of no scanty provision, bent the whole force of their "infernal machines" against every gleam of truth that threatened hostility to the deception. Notwithstanding, however, the watchfulness of these numerous and zealous supporters, means were silently preparing for wresting the laurel from the brow of the Highlanders, and restoring it to its rightful owners. I had, during the summer, discovered the real state of the case; and, when the proper time came, I published my Narrative, which, with all its interesting documents, will be found in the Register, Vol. II. p. 801. The taking of the Standard by LUTZ was thus made out. 1. LUTZ, who was sent for to London, wore (and still wears) upon the breast of his coat, a representation of the Invincible Standard. 2. This badge is worn in consequence of a public order, issued by General Stuart, on the 4th of April, 1801, as a mark of honour conferred on him for having "*taken* the standard FROM THE "ENEMY, in the battle of the 21st of "March." 3. That this badge of honour was not given without just pretensions, is proved by the certificate of the Assistant Adjutant-General, which proves the bringing in of the Standard to head-quarters by LUTZ, and which states, that LUTZ "*took* "the said Standard FROM THE ENE-"MY." 4. I next relate the evidence of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, of the Queen's German Regiment, to whom LUTZ first presented the Standard, when he brought it to the ranks of his regiment, in the heat of the battle. 5. The proof is closed and completed by the evidence (taken upon oath) of Corporal Schmid and Private Wohlwend, who state, that they saw the Standard in the hands of the flying enemy, that they saw LUTZ fire at the person who carried it, that they saw him rush into the smoke after his fire, and return again, almost immediately, with the Standard in his hand *.—Thus the Standard was traced from the hands of the enemy to those of the English Commander in Chief; and thus was it clearly and incontestibly proved, that this symbol of victory was taken, carried in, and delivered at head-quarters by LUTZ, and by nobody but LUTZ.

Now, what has been produced in opposition to this proof? Much declamation, much calumny; but no evidence, and no argument. My Narrative with its accompanying documents were published on the 25th of December; a "*complete refutation*" was instantly promised by the Scotch editors; day after day this promise was renewed, always accompanied with most violent abuse on me and on my poor friend LUTZ, who might, we would think, have been spared, were it only for his having had the presence of mind to "*pick up*" and to *keep* the famous standard. † At last, after six weeks consideration, out came the "Narrative, by authority," of the Field Officers of the 42d regiment, signed by A. STEW-

* See all these documents, Register, Vol. II. p. 814, 815, and 816.

† See Vol. II. p. 853 to 870.

ART and JAMES STIRLING, Majors and Lieutenant-Colonels. This Narrative, which will be found at full length in page 164 of Vol. III. of the Register, says nothing, *positively*, to invalidate the claim of LUTZ, but, on the contrary, it does, as far as negative evidence can go, establish and confirm the justice of that claim. "The "42d regiment," say the narrators, "it "this time, closed in with them" [the enemy], "and *their standard* was taken from "the bearer by Major Stirling, who con- "signed it in charge to a non-commissioned "officer."—"The non-commissioned offi- "cer (Serjeant Sinclair) to whom *the stand- "ard* was given in charge, was wounded "in the *rear* of the regiment, and *by him the "standard was* LOST!" This is all. Here is nothing controversial; but the simple statement of two facts; to wit, that Major Stirling took a standard, and that Serjeant Sinclair lost it again. Facts, which, as I said before, I have never called in question, and which I have not the least inclination to deny. Repeating what I said, at the time when this "Narrative by authority" was published, I shall here just point out the disagreement between the narrative of Serjeant Sinclair, as published by the Highland Society, and that which Colonels Stewart and Stirling submitted to the public.—Serjeant Sinclair said (or was made to say), that the standard which Major Stirling took, was the *Invincible* Standard. The Narrative, signed by the field officers, affixes to it no such epithet. Colonels Stewart and Stirling do, indeed, refrain from stating, that the standard, taken by the 42d regiment, was *not* the Invincible Standard; and, though Major Stirling himself took it, it is possible, that, at the time of drawing up the narrative, he might not *recollect*, or might never have been able to distinguish, whether it was, or was not, the Invincible Standard finally brought to England; but if Major STIRLING was not, from want of recollection, or from whatever other cause, able to say, that the standard he took was *not* the Invincible Standard, it inevitably follows, that he was not, and that he is not, able to say that it *was* the Invincible Standard.—Then again, Serjeant Sinclair asserted (or he was made to assert), that the standard, committed to his charge, was "PICKED UP," by his side, "while he lay in a state of *insensibility*." But, Colonels STEWART and STIRLING say nothing about the standard's being *picked up* from the side of the serjeant. They say he *lost* it, and that is all. The circumstance of *picking up*, was the most material of his whole narrative, as its evident tendency was to rob LUTZ and his regiment of the honour of having taken the standard *from the enemy*. This circumstance was dropped in the narrative, though be it observed, Serjeant Sinclair must, of course, *have been examined, previous to the drawing up of the regimental statement*.—Thus it appears, then, that, according to the narrative, there was not only no ground for stating that LUTZ *picked up* and brought in a standard, which was the prize of the 42d regiment, but that Colonels Stewart and Stirling were quite uncertain whether the standard brought in by LUTZ was the same standard that was lost by Sinclair. That there is, in England, but *one* French standard, which was taken in the battle of Alexandria, is well known; it is equally well known, that that standard was taken from the enemy by LUTZ; and, all that is made appear by the narrative, is, that the 42d regiment themselves do not know, that they ever had this standard, even for one moment, in their possession, though the justly indignant Public will not fail to recollect, that it was openly proposed, by the Scotch editors in London, to send it to be kept in the city of *Edinburgh!*

But, though Colonels Stewart and Stirling *said* nothing, *positively*, to weaken the claim of LUTZ and the Queen's German Regiment, their narrative was, by the supporters of the claim of the 42d regiment, made to *infer* a destruction of that claim altogether! And, here, it is necessary to show the *connexion* between the "Narrative by Authority" and the remarks thereon. The narrative appeared in the St. James's Chronicle of 5th of February, the remarks in the next number of the *same paper*. That *both came from Edinburgh* there is sufficient internal evidence; and, as it was absolutely impossible, that the St. James's Chronicle of the 5th of February could have reached that city time enough to enable the writer of the remarks to send them to London for publication on the 8th of February, it follows, of course, that he must, at least, have *seen* the narrative previous to its appearance in print.—The part of Colonels Stewart and Stirling's narrative, from which an inference has been drawn unfavourable to the claim of LUTZ and the German Regiment, is as follows:—"Or- "ders were at that moment given by Lt. "Col. A. Stewart to charge, which was "instantly done, and the French infan- "try were driven down the declivity to a "considerable distance in front, and left "of the position of the reserve. They re- "treated through the intervals of their "cavalry, who were now observed, as the "smoak cleared away, close to the left of

"the 42d.—The exertions of this charge "had disordered the line, and Lt. Col. A. "Stewart judging that the enemy's ca- "valry were preparing to charge in turn, "ordered the 42d to form quickly on the "grenadiers and prepare to receive them. "This moment was selected by the enemy "for a desperate charge. It was doubt- "less a moment in which a regiment, "pressing close on a retreating enemy, "cannot be supposed to be correctly in "line. The charge of the cavalry was "made *en masse*, and in some places pene- "trated the intervals which had been oc- "casioned by the movements to form on "the grenadiers, an order which in the "continued fire of musquetry could not "be distinctly heard by the whole batta- "lion. The right were protected by the "fire of the 28th on the redoubt, and "*Brigadier General Stewart bringing up his* "*brigade* AT THIS CRITICAL MOMENT, "his own regiment gave the enemy a close "and well-directed fire, which allowed "time to the 42d to join their efforts to "those of the rest of the reserve, and of "the foreign brigade, in *repelling the cavalry*. "This service was speedily accomplished "with the effect stated in the dispatches "of the commander in chief. The rest of "the action consisted in sharp shooting "and cannonading as stated in the same "dispatches."—The inference drawn from this statement (in the remarks above alluded to) is as follows:—"From this nar- "rative it *distinctly appears*, that one bat- "talion of the French infantry were de- "feated by the 42d regiment; that their "standard was taken by Major Stirling "with his own hands, and consigned by "him in charge to Serjeant Sinclair; that "the 42d regiment afterwards engaged "the other columns of the French infan- "try, successively defeated them, and "forced them to seek shelter among their "cavalry; that the cavalry then made a "desperate charge *en masse* on the 42d "regiment, and yet were able to penetrate "it only in the intervals left between the "different bodies of that corps in forming "to receive the charge; that all this was "done *before the Queen's German Regiment* "*came into action*; that the first fire from "the latter corps was after the 42d had "received the desperate charge of the ca- "valry; that consequently THE GER- "MAN REGIMENT HAD NEVER "BEEN ENGAGED WITH THE "FRENCH INFANTRY." * — Thus, then, according to this writer, according to the supporter of the 42d regiment, it "dis- "tinctly appear from their narrative," that the French infantry corps, engaged in that part of the field, were all successively de- feated, "*before* the Queen's German Re- "giment *came into action*," that the *first* fire from that corps was even "*after* the "42d regiment had received the des- "perate charge of the *cavalry*," and that the German Regiment "*had* NEVER *been* "*engaged with the French* INFANTRY," the object of all which is to show, that the claim of LUTZ and his regiment is totally unfounded; because, if that regiment was never engaged with *infantry*, they could not take the Invincible Standard *from the enemy*, that standard being an *infantry* standard.— This brings us to the statement of the offi- cers of the Queen's German Regiment.

"*Queen's German Regiment.— Cork, 15th* "*March*, 1803.

"Before we trespass on the attention of "the Public, we beg leave to premise, that, "however repeatedly we may have been "the subject of discussion, it never was our "wish so to be, much less was it, either di- "rectly or indirectly, our request; and, "that, it is with a degree of reluctance to be "overcome only by a sense of *duty* to our "corps, that we now trouble the public "with a short statement of facts, for the "purpose of removing an error circulated "through the St. James's Chronicle of the "8th of February last.

"With this motive it is, that we, the un- "dersigned field-officers of the regiment, "at the express desire of the corps, declare, "that the Queen's German regiment was, "on the 21st of March, 1801, in column, "when the alarm, on the right of the Bri- "tish line was given, and that our move- "ment, particularly that of the left wing, "which was ordered to support the reserve, "was as prompt as the immediate power "of formation from column into line could "admit of; so that we arrived, not only "most critically in time to assist in repul- "sing the French CAVALRY, but like- "wise to unite our efforts with those of "that part of the British army that day en- "gaged, in *receiving, resisting*, and *repulsing*, "the French line of INFANTRY. In "proof of this, we have to state, that "Lieutenants DEJEAN, and DU VERGIER, "with many men, were killed, and that "Captains MAHONY, and RICHARDSON, "Lieutenants MAC CARTHY, SUTTON, "LANG, and ZEHUEDER, Adjutant OFFER- "MAN, together with a number of non- "commissioned officers and privates, were "wounded, *prior to the charge of the French* "*cavalry*. During that charge, Lieutenant

* St. James's Chronicle, Feb. 8, 1803.

" Colonel Du Tens, who had been previously wounded by a musket ball, fell by " the stroke of a sabre. Captain Missett, " Lieutenant Hutton, and seventy two " rank and file were also wounded by the " sabre. The number of non-commissioned " officers and privates killed and wounded " by the musquetry is, as near as possible, " 148. Wounded by the cavalry, and now " present with the regiment, 72. Of com- " missioned officers there were 14 killed " and wounded. Total killed and wound- " ed, 234.

" We do not state these facts for the pur- " pose of arrogating to ourselves more me- " rit than is due to every other corps en- " gaged. We ask only for an equal por- " tion, and that not at the hands of any par- " ticular regiment.

" (Signed) James Lyon, Lieut. Colonel.
" Charles Gormocan, Major."

This statement, then, a statement which I venture to assert will never be contradicted by any one who, if he has a *name*, will put that name to what he writes; this statement completely does away the last poor pitiful subterfuge of the Sinclairs and their partizans. Here is nothing said about the *standard*: it was not necessary: the official documents; the general, the brigade, the regimental orders and proceedings were already before the public: the field officers of the 42d had *not*, in their narrative, *put in any positive claim to the Standard that was brought home*; but, they had published something, from which their own partizans inferred, and proclaimed to the world, that the Queen's German regiment was not, in the battle of Alexandria, " ever engaged with *infantry*:" indeed, this seems to be an inference fairly drawn from the statement of the 42d regiment, and to this inference, the Queen's German regiment have here given a clear and *positive contradiction*. Let the writer of the remarks no longer say, then, " that the charge of *falsehood* now lies " between Mr. Cobbett on the one side, and " the officers of the 42d regiment on the " other, and that the public have to choose " which of *these two* they will believe;" for, though, were it on any point coming within my own knowledge, I should have no objection to let my word stand its chance against that of the whole corps of the 42d regiment, the public will, at once, perceive, that the charge of *falsehood* now lies, not between *me* and the officers of the 42d regiment, but between the narrative of those officers (as explained and inferred from by their partizans,) and that of the officers of the Queen's German regiment; and, I am very much deceived, if the public will hesitate one single moment in making their choice. The narrative of the 42d regiment has been drawn up with more than diplomatic precaution. It can hardly be said to affirm, or to deny, any thing. It does not say that Major Stirling *did* take the Invincible Standard, neither does it say that he did *not* take it: it does not say that the standard was *picked up*, neither does it say that it was *not* picked up: it does not say that the regiment was, according to Sir Robert Wilson's account, *broken and overwhelmed*, neither does it say that it was *not* broken and overwhelmed: it leaves every thing to inference, and, with characteristic propriety, secures a retreat in every direction. With respect to the Queen's German regiment never being engaged with *infantry*, however, the inference is somewhat too plain. The narrative makes the 42d regiment repulse the infantry, body after body, and, when the battle is *quite over* with the infantry, it introduces the Queen's German regiment to assist in repulsing the cavalry. In short, it is impossible that any person, unacquainted with the true history of the engagement, should not believe, from reading this narrative, that the German regiment never was, at any one time, engaged with the French infantry. This is too, the meaning attached to the narrative by the supporters of the 42d regiment; and it is to this part of the narrative, conveying this meaning, that the officers of the Queen's German Regiment have now given a *contradiction* not guarded by equivocal terms and ambiguous phrases, but clearly and positively expressed, and supported by a detail of killed and wounded. " We *were* " engaged with infantry," say they, " and " the proof that we were so engaged is, " we had 2 officers killed and 7 wounded, " and 148 non-commissioned officers and " privates killed and wounded *by that infan-* " *try*."—This assertion, then, the field officers of the 42d regiment must disprove, or they must disclaim the meaning, which their partizans have attached to their own narrative, and which meaning has been circulated through the very same vehicle chosen by them for the publication of that narrative. That their narrative, thus construed, tends to rob another corps of its due share of honour, is evident, and, indeed, is now so declared by the officers of that other corps: if, therefore, their narrative has, by their own partisans, been *misconstrued*, let them disavow the construction; if it has *not* been misconstrued, let them refute the statement of the officers of the Queen's German Regiment.

As to the standard, I mean the

standard, which was brought to England, and which is to be placed on the tomb of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, it must now be evident to every man, that it was taken *from the enemy* by LUTZ; and, it only remains for me to show the utter improbability, not to say impossibility, of its ever having, even for a single moment, been in the hands of the 42d regiment.—Major Stirling, who took the standard which Sinclair lost, states, and certifies under his own hand, that Sinclair went into the *rear* with that standard, and both he and Sinclair agree in stating, that it was in the *rear* that Sinclair lost it. But, the narrative of LUTZ, confirmed by the word of honour of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, and by the oaths of SCHMID and WOHLWEND, prove, that the standard which we now have, was taken from the enemy in the *front* and not in the rear. As to time, too, the facts make directly against the supposition of pre-occupancy by the 42d regiment. Sinclair lost his standard *after* the attack of the cavalry began; but our standard was taken *before* that attack began, and that too from a corps of infantry, which the German Regiment had repulsed and was in pursuit of. The whole of the evidence, therefore, of LUTZ, of Lieutenant MONCRIEFF, of SCHMID, and of WOHLWEND, must be completely overset by *positive proof*, nothing like which has yet been attempted to be advanced, before there can be the slightest foundation, whereon to build the claim of pre-occupancy.—How Sir Robert Wilson has been able to satisfy himself, that the Invincible Standard was, as is stated in the second edition of his work, "*first* taken by the 42d regiment, then lost, and afterwards retaken by LUTZ," I am totally at a loss to account for upon any other supposition than that he must still have laboured under the same sort of error, which led to the statement in his first edition, where he says:—"In "this battle the French Standard was "taken. Serjeant Sinclair of the 42d regiment, and a private of the Minorca, "whose name, unfortunately, cannot now "be acquired, claimed equally the trophy, "and it appears, that each merited the "honour. Serjeant Sinclair first *took* it, but "being ordered *forwards* by an officer, he "gave it to a *private*, who was *killed*. "When the Minorca advanced the French "had *recovered* the colours, but the private "wrested them from the man who had possession, and then bayonetted him."—Now, let us see, how this agrees with the statement of the parties concerned?

SIR ROBERT says,	M. STIRLING and S. SINCLAIR says,
That the standard was taken by the *Serjeant*.	That the standard was taken by the *Major*.
That the Serjeant was ordered *forwards*.	That the Serjeant was ordered *backwards*.
That the Serjeant gave the standard to a *private*.	That the Major gave the standard to the *Serjeant*.
That the private who had the care of the standard, was *killed*.	That the Serjeant, who had the care of the standard, is *now alive*.
That the standard was *recovered by the French*.	That the Serjeant lost the standard, and that LUTZ *picked it up by his side*.

Captain WALSH, in his Journal of the late Campaign in Egypt gives what we regard as a statement perfectly correct:—"A stan-"dard," says he, page 101, "covered with "the military exploits of the corps to which "it belonged (according to General Reg-"nier, a battalion of the 21st demi-brigade), "fell into the hands of the Queen's German "Regiment. It was *taken* by a private, named "ANTHONY LUTZ, for which he received "a certificate from the Adjutant-General, "and the sum of twenty dollars. In the "early part of the action, a standard had "been wrested from the French by the "42d regiment, which was, however, un-"fortunately, *retaken from them*."——This strictly agrees with the evidence produced; for it is childish to suppose, that the standard, taken by the 42d was "*lost*" by any other means than that of *re-capture*. The Serjeant and his officers say that he was wounded; he himself says he was cut down by a body of the enemy; and, can any one suppose, that that same body, who cut him down, would fail to take up the standard that he had in his hand? Besides, if they had not so taken it, it would have remained on the field, on the ground of the 42d regiment, and then comes the question, which never can be satisfactorily answered, *where is it now?*

Having now refuted every objection that has, at any time, been urged against my former statements on this subject; having fixed, upon immutable foundations, the claim of LUTZ to the *taking* of the Invincible Standard, I have only to add a few observations respecting the *merit* of that achievement, and the *reward* which it ought to have met with.

Since it has been discovered, or rather, since the public has been informed, that the standard was taken by a *French*, and not by a *Scotch* man, considerable pains have been taken to represent, in an underhand way, the *manner of the capture* as exhibiting no very striking marks of personal courage, and even to decry the *value* of the prize it-

self. The Scotch editor, Heriot, who was put in possession of the True Briton by Mr. George Rose, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, now speaks of the Standard, as of "what *has been called* the INVINCIBLE *Standard*;" and, the Edinburgh and Glasgow commentators, anticipating the final award of the public, have, even while endeavouring to support the claim of the 42d regiment, *candidly* acknowledged, that "the *thing* claimed was of no very great importance!!!"—The manner and circumstances of the capture exhibit, perhaps, as striking proofs of good soldiership and of personal courage as ever were exhibited on any occasion. It has been stated, by one base traducer, in an Edinburgh paper, that "it" [the capture of the standard] "was no *vo-* "*luntary* act on the part of LUTZ; that he "was *led*, or, if you please, *forced*, on by his "regiment: and the colour happened to "*fall* into his hands." So that, LUTZ was *forced* on by his regiment, the regiment was *forced* on by the brigade, the brigdade was *forced* on by the army, and the army was *forced* on by the Commander in Chief; and thus the Invincible Standard comes back to Scotland again! But, unfortunately, this ingenious mode of reasoning does not apply to the present case; for, LUTZ did not take the standard while he was in the ranks. It has been proved upon oath, that he had pushed *voluntarily* on, far beyond the ranks of his regiment, in pursuit of the enemy; that he advanced further than the boldest of his comrades; that he *alone* approached close to the rear of the fleeing French, and that he, in consequence thereof, in consequence of his own personal valour, obtained possession of the Standard. When he had got it, too, he did not *lose* it. Though, in his way back to his corps, he was attacked by two horsemen, he did not, in order to save himself, surrender his trophy, but, on the contrary, resisted and overcame the assailants, one of whom he led prisoner to the regiment. In short, the great and imminent dangers, with which he was surrounded, the courage and the presence of mind which he discovered, and the dexterity with which he executed every part of his enterprize, places his name amongst those of the bravest of the brave. *

As to the *value* of the standard, looking merely at the staff and the tattered silk, of which it is composed, I must, indeed, acknowledge, with the *candid* Scotch editors, that "the *thing* claimed is of no very great "importance." I dare say it would not, exclusively of the silver tassels, sell at rag fair for above six pence, or seven pence at most; and, as it cost us twenty dollars, we made, in this respect, rather a bad bargain. But, taking it in a military and national point of view, the Highland Society, the Parliament, and his Majesty himself, have furnished us with a tolerable criterion whereby to judge of its value and its importance. By the former, a *medal* was to be struck to commemorate the valour shown by the 42d regiment, in the battle of Alexandria, which medal was to bear on it the Invincible Standard as a trophy won by that valour. The same society, agreeably to the propositions of several noblemen and gentlemen of great distinction, resolved to cause to be made a costly cup, to be presented to the mess of the 42d regiment; and this cup, which was to amount to a hundred guineas, at least, was to have, amongst its "appropriate devices" the representation of a Highlander in the act of taking the standard, that very standard, which the partizans of the 42d regiment *now* tell us, is "*a thing of no very* "*great importance!*"—But, there is still a higher authority whereunto to appeal: that of the Parliament, and of his Majesty himself. On the 18th of May, 1801, the Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward a motion for erecting, at the public expense, a monument, in the Cathedral of St. Paul, to the memory of Sir Ralph Abercrombie, who was commander in chief at the battle of Alexandria, and who lost his life, in consequence of a wound he received in that battle. On the 20th of May, his Majesty sent a message to Parliament, signifying his intention to bestow on Lady Abercrombie the dignity of a Barony of Great Britain, with remainder to the heirs male of Sir Ralph, together with an annual pension of 2000l. to descend to the two next succeeding heirs, this pension to be accounted to commence from the day on which the battle of Alexandria was fought. In what degree the *standard* was connected with all this, what value his Majesty and the Parliament attached to that trophy, which the Scotch editors *now* tell us, "is a *thing of no very great* "*importance*," will appear from the following extract of Mr. Addington's speech:— "I am inclined to rate Sir Ralph Aber- "crombie among the first military charac- "ters that ever adorned the country. His "end bore a striking resemblance to that "of General Wolfe. I will only add, that "his Majesty, with that gracious disposi- "tion which he has ever manifested to do "honour to those who have served him "faithfully, and by their exertions, have "benefitted the country, has directed that

* See the interesting particulars, in Register, Vol. II. p. 801 *et seq.* or in the number sold separately.

" THE STANDARD, which has *fallen into* " *our power*, [not that which was *lost*] " should *adorn the monument to be erected to* " *Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to preserve the me-* " *mory of his services.* It is a striking cir- " cumstance, that THIS STANDARD *will* " *remain to the latest posterity, at least as long* " *as a fragment of it can be preserved, as a* " *testimony of the bravery of a man, who never* " *drew his sword to subvert and destroy, but to* " *save as well as to conquer.*—.....The " conquerors of Italy fled before our army, " and THEIR STANDARD remained *the* " *prize of the victors:* ENGLISHMEN *will* " *weep when they shall behold it; it is a prize* " *that has cost us dear.* TO OBTAIN IT, " *we have lost our brave general.*"—And was this standard, then, " a thing of no very great " importance?" Or has it lost that importance since the 18th of May, 1801; since it has been discovered not to have been taken by the 42d regiment? And will it not now be placed upon the tomb? Is it possible, that the Scotch or English nation will relinquish this honour; is it possible that they will burn the standard, rather than do justice to LUTZ? Will they be inveigled into this act of folly and of baseness, merely to gratify the spleen, arising from disappointed assurance and intrigue?—That the standard should " adorn the monument of " Sir Ralph Abercrombie, to *preserve the me-* " *mory of his services*," is most just; but, does not justice call also for something to preserve the memory of the deed, by which that standard was obtained? That the standard may " remain, to the latest posterity, as a tes- " timony of *the bravery of Sir Ralph*," must be the wish of every grateful heart; but, does not national gratitude also demand something, as a testimony of *the bravery of Lutz*, that bravery, to which, and to which alone, we are immediately indebted for this trophy of immortal honour? And will not the servants of that Sovereign, " whose " gracious disposition has ever been mani- " fested *to do honour to those who have served* " *him faithfully, and, by their exertions, have* " *benefited the country*;" will not the servants of that gracious Sovereign counsel him to bestow some small mark of his royal favour on the brave, the faithful, and the zealous captor of that symbol of victory, at the sight of which " *Englishmen will weep*" with exultation; the symbol of that victory, too, on which we justly ground our claims to military valour superior to that of our rival in arms? " It is a prize that *has cost us dear.*" Yes, it has cost us *twenty dollars!* Twenty whole dollars! *four pounds ten shillings* British sterling! And, shall it be said of Britain, that this was the price she paid for a trophy, of which she is justly proud, and which has been an object of gracious dispensation in the hands of her Sovereign! If this be so, all honourable Englishmen will, indeed, " *weep*," when they behold the fragments of the Invincible Standard, not with exultation, but with shame; shame and remorse, to reflect, that while this trophy adorns the tomb of our hero and the temple of our God, the gallant LUTZ is left to waste in obscurity and penury, and to end, perhaps, in wretchedness and want, that life, at the hazard of which, this proud and immortal trophy was obtained.

What I have been able to collect, from the sale of the portrait of this gallant and loyal Frenchman, shall hereafter be faithfully accounted for; but, if those whose *duty* it is to bestow on him suitable honour and reward, neglect that duty, he shall not, by my instrumentality, have recourse to *public subscription*. The French, at the battle of Alexandria, previous to their attack on the Foreign Brigade, cried out: " down " with your arms, Germans, we are not " *your* enemies; we'll give you plenty of " *bread!*" Of which it was well known our army had long been greatly in want. " No, no," replied the German Regiment, " we fight for the King of England; you " may keep your bread!"—And, LUTZ shall not, through me at least, in England, have recourse to *mendicant* means, to obtain that bread, which, in her service, and in the field of battle, he refused at the hands of the enemies of England.

As to the part I have taken in this affair, I am certain it will meet with the approbation of all just and honourable men, of whatever nation they may be; and, to those, who are of a contrary description, I scorn to offer any thing that might be construed into an apology. WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westminster,
March 31, 1803.

THE TREATY OF AMIENS NOT BINDING ON THE COUNTRY.

SIR,—I shall not trouble your readers with a dissertation on the law of nations, on the obligations of treaties, on the circumstances which render them nugatory; on the lawful grounds of war, on the balance of power, &c.—These are points which have long since been settled, and large volumes have been written on these subjects, separately and collectively.—I shall only state a few facts to elucidate the question as it now exists between the contracting parties respecting the treaty of Amiens.

As it appears that Malta is the principal point in dispute at this moment, its impor-

tance ought to be clearly ascertained.—By the length of the article in the treaty which regards this island, it would seem that the evacuation of it by Great Britain was the principal object which France had in view; and the securing its neutrality and independence the only concession required of the First Consul —We are willing to allow that Malta is of very great importance, and that ministers should not have consented, in November last, to evacuate it. But how comes it to pass, that only four months ago ministers were ignorant of its importance? Did they then not know that the possession of it would secure to us the command of the Mediterranean, as the evacuation of it would give to France the sovereignty of that sea, and exclude us from it for ever? Did they not know that its occupation would give to this country the means of protecting in a great measure Italy, Turkey, and Egypt, which otherwise must lie prostrate at the mercy of France. — Buonaparté seemed anxious to place it in feeble hands.—Our negotiators were satisfied by being promised a guarantee, as if that could save it from the claws of France. Taking it however for granted that Buonaparté had no intention of wresting from the hands of the knights, he still had obtained his object by excluding us from the only port in the Mediterranean, which could be a check on his ambition, and stop the progress of his aggrandizement in those parts.—The necessity that France should occupy Malta, in order to effect all its government has in view, does not appear. She has Elba.—She can command the ports of Sicily,—and probably will, when we have quitted Malta, make a conquest of the whole island, in spite of the knights of the order, and in spite of our ministry.—By the treaty of Amiens, certain possessions, or acquisitions made during the war, were disposed of.—France and Great-Britain were placed, thereby, in a positive relative situation, in regard to their respective power or force, or, in other words, a balance of power (whether just or unjust matters not) was understood to have been established.—Had neither of the countries changed their relative situation in other respects, the honour of Great Britain, as well as that of France was concerned in the fulfilling of the treaty of Amiens in every point, and a breach of the treaty would have been a breach of national faith on either part.—It has been a maxim in all ages, and particularly in latter times, where the preservation of the balance of power has been the great subject of wars and treaties, that no state can make acquisitions of any kind, or by any means, so as to derange its antecedent relative situation to other countries; and every acquisition, made without the consent of its neighbours, gives to them a right of interference, and, if things be not restored to their former situation, affords them just grounds for war, and consequently annihilates all treaties.—A greater insult cannot be offered to the British nation than the pretension of Buonaparté, that this country should consider the treaty of Amiens as still existing; nor can a greater proof of the imbecility of ministers be produced than that of admitting his pretension.—In October last, the acquisitions of France since the peace, were become so alarming to the safety of other countries, in whose preservation we have the strongest interest, and to the safety and independence of our own country, that ministers were seriously alarmed. —They determined not to evacuate the possessions that were then in our hands, and in this resolution, it is confidently reported, *they had the firm support of Mr. Pitt—which they lost on altering their conduct.*—Instead of courageously declaring to Buonaparté that the principle was violated, and the treaty of Amiens itself ceased to exist; that consequently, either the war would be renewed, or that another treaty must be formed, which would replace the two countries in a state of the same proportion of relative strength as was established by the treaty of Amiens, (when France had not made the acquisitions complained of.)—Instead of following this manly conduct, which the nation called for, they pusillanimously negotiated, allowing the treaty to be binding to this country, and agreed to cede every thing as his Consular Majesty should be pleased to dictate.—Here occurs a question, which shall be the subject of future discussion; *how far this exercise of the executive power is constitutional.*—In consequence of which Buonaparté, while he was actually subjugating a part of the world, and laying plans for subjugating the remainder, imperiously demanded the immediate fulfilling of the conditions of the treaty; denied that we had any right to interfere in other matters, and was highly offended that we had presumed though in the most humble manner, to ask his Consular Majesty, why he was pleased to do all this?—Instead of having obtained any concession from Buonaparté, by the stand ministers made in October, they evidently ceded more to him. In the treaty it was established that the grand master should be elected at Malta in a general chapter of the order, according to its ancient statutes; but in November they consented that the Pope should name the grand-master, which is actually leaving the choice

to Buonaparté, for the Pope is so totally dependent that he must appoint whom the Consul preters.

In this present month of March (a year since the *definitive!*—treaty of *peace!* was signed,) ministry have discovered, something they did not see before, nobody knows what—and they won't tell.—It is said, by some of their friends, that they surmise, that the occupying of Louisiana will be attended with direful consequences:—that all South America will fall into the hands of France;—that her power in the West-Indies may be dangerous to Jamaica, and our other islands;—that France will have a great navy;—that she will exclude us from commercial intercourse with all the world. —That she will cause to be ceded to her all the colonies of her allies, by a *consular mediation*.—That she will acquire possession of all Italy;—that by a similar *consular mediation*, Naples and Sicily, will be put under her protection, and the Republic of the Seven Islands be freed from all civil discord, and, to preserve their liberty and independence, will be garrisoned by French troops; —that Candia and some of the Greek islands are to enjoy the blessings of a French government, and become a part of the great republic one and indivisible;—that the Beys of Egypt will be pardoned for their disaffection to the prophet of God, the true believer, the faithful Musselman, and zealous son and protector of the holy Catholic religion.—That Sebastiani's report indicates this and more too—That his imperial Consular Majesty, has in view to concert measures with his brother his Imperial Czarian Majesty to drive the Ottomans out of Europe, and to divide their country; though they have had some difference on the question of who shall have the Morea.—That Malta is of importance to this country, and that no guarantee, nor all the *heroic exertions* of the knights can save it from France:—that the island of Elba is a most dangerous post:—that France will have great advantages by being sole mistress of the Mediterranean, and that her fleets united with those of her sister *independent* republics, and tributary monarchies, may become an object of alarm. —That intrigues are carried on in Ireland, and the disaffected are encouraged by Napper Tandy and others, and that he is also suffered to be encouraged.—That armaments are preparing to invade either that country, or Great Britain itself, or both; and a long chapter of *et cæteras* besides.

In consequence of ministers having at last taken alarm, or rather been panic-struck, the country is now arming at a great expence, and every one is ready to draw his sword, or untie the strings of his purse.—After all this, is the country to-morrow to be told that the treaty of Amiens is binding to Great Britain, but that by the firmness, wisdom, and magnanimity of ministry, who have dared, (*by a side glance,*) to look Buonaparté in the face, the relations of amity are re-established (*at least for two months,*) and that they have obtained all the satisfaction for the country which they desired; and that, lest we should again offend the Consul, we must not ask a single question about what has passed? No. This country has both the means and the courage to repel every attack.—It will not be insulted by any foreign power on earth; or suffer its honour and dignity to be traduced by any set of men, who may prefer the possession of their offices to the welfare of their country.

In this lamentable state of things, will not those absent men of transcendent talents, who possess the confidence of the nation, and to whom the monied as well as the landed interest look up, incur as much blame as those who hold their places, if they do not stand forward and manfully avow their sentiments in the present momentous crisis? Whatever excuse they may make for their conduct, they cannot deny, that *they were absent from their post in the hour of danger; that they abandoned their country when they might, perhaps, have saved it.*—If they will not come forward, is there no other set of men to be found? Is there no integrity remaining—no talent in this frivolous time of dissipation? Is the genius of Britain sleeping? Or is her genius departed? J. B.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

United States of America.—The most interesting object, in the affairs of the United States, is the discussion with regard to the navigation of the Mississippi, or rather, at present, the *right of deposit at New Orleans*, of which the Spanish Intendant appears resolved to deprive the Americans. Besides regular files of different news papers, we have lately received two pamphlets from America, on this important topic, which seems to have absorbed the whole attention of the people of that country. One of the pamphlets contains the translation of a Memoir, said to have been presented, a little while previous to the peace of Amiens, to the chief Consul of France; which Memoir exposes most amply the ambitious, not to say hostile, views of the French, with regard to the North American continent, and which has, of course, added not a little to the apprehensions already excited in the minds of the people of the United States.—The Intendant of New Orleans had, in the mean time, rigorously adhered to the terms of his

proclamation *. Great quantities of American produce, brought down the Mississippi in slight built boats, had arrived at New Orleans, and a considerable portion of it had been lost in the river, in consequence of their being no place to deposit it. One boat, loaded with cotton, had, by accident, been sunk in the river. The cotton was taken up, and landed on one of the wharfs, until it could be put on board an American ship; but, the Intendant on hearing thereof, ordered it to be instantly removed, on pain of its being thrown into the dock. But, the tenor of the Royal Order of Spain for the surrender of Louisiana to France, has created, amongst the Americans, more resentment than all their other injuries and insults put together. This order states, in substance, that his Catholic Majesty has agreed to cede the province, *as it was held by the French when ceded to his Majesty*; that is, unencumbered with the stipulations of the American treaty.—In consequence of all these signs of approaching danger, several of the Atlantic state legislatures have come to resolutions expressive of their determination to support the general government of the union in resisting all acts of aggression and injustice, which have taken place, or may take place, relative to the Mississippi; and, the people on the Western side of the Alleghany mountains have addressed themselves to the President and two Houses of Congress, in a tone, which shew, at once, the magnitude of the injury they suffer, their impatience at the forbearance of the general government, and the total want of power, in that government, to retain their allegiance, one hour longer than they are disposed to yield it.—But we must hear themselves speak:—"We, the "undersigned inhabitants of the Western "Country, respectfully represent—That the "Port of New Orleans is closed against us, "by a decree of the Spanish Intendant.—"That we owe the United States arrears "of excise, and other debts and taxes, and "have no means to discharge those de-"mands, but the produce of our farms. "That shut out, as we are, from a market "for our produce in the East, it must rot "on our hands, unless the government re-"ceive it from us at a reasonable price, "or protect us in the prosecution of a law-"ful trade: that in our humble opinion, "prompt and decisive measures are ne-"cessary; for the maxim is peculiarly ap-"plicable to our situation, that "*protection* "and *allegiance* are reciprocal." We take "leave further to represent, that we rely "with confidence on the immediate inter-"position of the United States; but while "we state our trust in the government of "the Union, and give assurance of our "co-operation in any decisive measure in "behalf of the just right of any part of "our country, we must declare that we "have a right to demand, and we do de-"mand, that the government either adopt "such measures as will secure us in the "prosecution of a lawful commerce, take "our produce from us at a reasonable "price, or otherwise *relieve us from contri-"butions of any kind whatever.* We wish "not unnecessarily to embarrass the com-"munication between the United States, "and the Spanish government, nor wan-"tonly to break in upon an amicable ad-"justment of a difference, which has arisen "from an unprovoked violation on their "part, of a solemn treaty; but we wish "the United States, explicitly to understand, "that our situation is critical, *that delay* "EVEN FOR ONE SEASON *would prove* "RUINOUS *to our country*; and that impe-"rious necessity may therefore compel us, "unless relief is afforded, to resort to mea-"sures which we may deem calculated to "insure protection to our trade, though "they may result in consequences *unfa-"vourable to the harmony of the Union.*"—That is to say, that unless the general government can open for them the mouth of the Mississippi and its ports, they may be compelled to separate themselves from the union.—Lord Hawkesbury will say, that this looks well; that "putting the French "*upon the back* of the Americans will attach "the latter more closely to Great Britain." Yes; if you are ready to go *to war* for the purpose of aiding the Americans, this is true enough; but, then, what becomes of that long, secure, and thriving *peace*; that "peace and a large loaf," that "husbanding "of our resources," which were the objects of the treaty of Amiens, and for which objects such immense sacrifices were made? This address of the western people does not, however, discover any hostility *to France*, their hostility is to whoever shuts the mouth of the Mississippi against them, and their address clearly shows, that they, at any time, can, and will, *transfer their allegiance to whomsoever will secure to them the free navigation and the use of the ports of that river.* If, then, France be permitted to enter on the territory ceded to her by the Spaniards, she instantly becomes, if she chooses it, the sovereign of these people, and has at her command the means of destroying our West-India Colonies, and the American Union too. This is not, however, the course she will be likely to pursue. She

* See this proclamation and the other documents on the subject, Vol. III. p. 240. See also letters to Ld Hawkesbury, Vol. III. p. 226 and 297.

will, as we have remarked over and over again *, make use of this new acquisition for the purpose of furthering her great, and, indeed, her sole object, that object to which she renders all others subservient,—the destruction of the commerce and credit of Great Britain, and, finally, the subjugation of Great Britain herself.—We reminded the ministers, before the definitive treaty was concluded, that if they made that treaty, tacitly acknowledging as valid, the cession of Louisiana to France, that the commercial relationships of the United States must inevitably fall under the controul of Buonaparté or his successor; and, the public, who, as well as the ministers, then turned a deaf ear to us, will now probably pay more attention to the Americans themselves, amongst whom this opinion is become universal. We shall, out of hundreds of articles which lie before us, in the American papers, take the following from a Charlestown print, called THE TIMES, of the 15th of February last.—"If we once begin to "*negotiate* with Buonaparté, we are un- "done. He knows how to mingle, to the "greatest degree of nicety and precision, "all the materials of his universal nostrum, "*treaty*: he, better than any one, under- "stands his man, and knows how to ap- "propriate to his patient's nerves the "quantity of menace and concession, that "will best answer his purpose of bringing "down the fever of national pride. To "use the words of one of the greatest "statesmen living.—'*The game will not be* "*fairly played. Buonaparté is a player, who,* "*if the game is going against him, will be apt to* "*pick a quarrel, and ask us, if* WE CAN "DRAW *our swords.*'" † In short, some "concession will be extorted, some com- "pensation demanded, which it would be "ignominious in us to grant. What will "be the consequence of refusal? The "Western States will be seduced by "France, and gradually melt into her arms. "Once a neighbour, and in the habit of "laying claims and making objections, of "treating and of threatening, of frater- "nizing with us or of cutting our throats, "every day will produce some new trivial "demand, with which, because it is trivial, "and the evils of war great, we shall be "disposed to comply. *Our commerce will* "*gradually get under the direction of the Chief* "*Consul: our commercial relations with all the* "*other states of Europe will be made to give way* "*to the designs of France*, and we and ours "shall be *as much under the controul of St.* "*Cloud, as Spain and Holland are at this mo-* "*ment.*"—Here, then, is the comment on the speeches of our ministers; here is the test of the knowledge and foresight of the sapient Mr. Addington, who thought it *as easy to attack the United States from St. Domingo as from Louisiana*; * of the gallant and watchful General Maitland, who thought that Louisiana would give the French *no influence over the United States*; † of the *solid* and *steady*, and *safe* Lord Hawkesbury, who thought that placing the French upon the back of the Americans would *attach the latter more closely to Great Britain*; ‡ of the Master of the Rolls, who said that the importance of Louisiana had been *discovered only a few nights before*, and that, as to any danger to this country, from the cession of that province to France, such danger might happen, *in the course of ages*, but it *could not be soon!* ||—And these, these are the men, that make our treaties! These are the men who have at their mercy the interests, the honour, the safety, and the very existence of the nation!

VIEWS OF FRANCE.—Of the millions of rumours, which reach us from France, none, except those which speak of preparations and a disposition for destroying this country are to be relied on. This day fortnight, the last division of troops sailed from Dunkirk for St. Domingo (or for some other quarter); that was the professed destination of it, and it consisted of about 3,000

* See Register, Vol. I. p. 44, 119, 266, 353, 398, 427, 443, 469, 515.

† This "one of the greatest statesmen living" is not *Lord Hawkesbury*; no, nor *Mr. Addington* either. The words quoted by this American writer, are taken from *Mr. Windham's* speech of the 4th of November, 1801.—See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1161.—The reader will remember, that Lord Hawkesbury, in order to catch a little popularity with the Americans, said, that Mr. Windham had *under-rated* the population and power of the United States. (See Vol. II. p. 1309.) This has failed. The Americans despise him most heartily; and, this country may rest assured, that, while *he* is amongst the King's ministers, no confidence will be placed in British faith, by the people of America.—This "*safe* politician's" idea of "placing the *French upon the back* of America, in order to *attach the latter more closely to Great Britain*," has something in it, at once so silly, so selfish, so mischievous, and so malignant, that the people who should trust him afterwards, would deserve to be betrayed and destroyed.—Mr. Windham very justly reprobated this grovelling notion, this trait of low cunning: *he* said, "You "are placing *a serpent in the bosom of America*, "which, ere long, will destroy her." These sentiments have not been overlooked, nor will they soon be forgotten by the Americans, who, if Britain were under the guidance of high and honourable councils like those of Mr. Windham, might easily be animated to such a resistance of the Gallic power, as would not only provide lasting security for themselves, but would, at the same time, give a decided turn to the affairs of the world.

* See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1211. † Ibid. p. 1317.
‡ Ibid. p. 1309.
|| See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1344.

men, the remainder of the 89th demi-brigade. Our ministers must, however, know, by this time, that these "colonial services" and enterprizes, which, even by the King's message, they teach us to regard as *the means of our security*, do not retard those preparations, which are intended for the invasion of this kingdom, and which may, perhaps, be regarded, by Buonaparté at least, as being also destined for *colonial* service. In the bason of Dunkirk, and in the Canal, leading from that place to Gravelines, there are upwards of 150 flat-bottomed boats, measuring 60 feet keel, carrying each a 24-pounder in her bow, and having stocks all round wheron to fix swivels. Of these boats, which carry from 100 to 120 men each, a great number are kept in the canals all the way between Dunkirk and Ostend; so that, in two or three tides, boats sufficient to receive from 30,000 to 40,000 men, can be assembled, at either Ostend, Dunkirk, Gravelines, or Calais. The same sort of boats are prepared, in great abundance, at Boulogne and Havre de Grace, In the Interior, the military conscription is going on in all its rigour. The conscripts, tied two and two, and escorted by dragoons, are marching to the army, from every village in France. The state, temper, and conduct of these people always put us in mind of Don Quixote's galley-slaves. Woe be unto him who attempts to set them free!—Not that we are *alarmed* at these preparations; we state the facts merely as proofs of the *disposition*, not of the *power*, which France has to invade and plunder this country. We speak, however, conditionally here; because it depends, not on France, BUT ON US, whether we are to be subdued, or not.—Buonaparté and his comrades are resolved on war with England. Such a war is, for the reasons stated by our correspondent SWENSKA, * absolutely necessary to the duration of their authority, and, perhaps, of their very lives. That they do not *wish* for war, just at this moment, we believe; yet, they will not make any sacrifices or concessions to *us*, for the purpose of avoiding it. To Russia they will yield so far as may be found necessary to insure her *neutrality*, which, with the aid of the Hawkesburian convention, will serve them more effectually, perhaps, than a co-operation, on the part of Russia, in the war. If our poor drivelling ministers have been supported, in their present fit of vigour, by any misunderstanding between Russia and our enemies, they will soon find that prop withdrawn from beneath them; for, the politicians of St. Petersburgh, will have the address to make *our* armament the means of obtaining their ends with the Consul, who, in his turn, will endeavour to squeeze a compensation, of some sort or other, from us.—The system of the French, for the destruction of this country, is purely *a system of terror*, by which they hope, and not without some foundation, to break up our national credit *. For this purpose, they will make us arm twice or three times a year; and, they do, indeed, at this moment, absolutely "hold our funds in their hands," a phrase which, in describing their fatal influence, we made use of several months ago. When was it ever heard of till now, that the holders of stock looked to the *French* Houses for a signal for selling or purchasing? —It is truly pitiable, it is disgusting, to hear people expressing a hope, "that ministers "will not disarm, till they have *settled* all "the points in dispute, and have given us a "real, and not an imaginary peace." It is not in their power so to settle matters with Buonaparté and his comrades, whose trade is war, and whose *system* it is to keep us in a constant state of uncertainty and alarm,—a system never to be frustrated except by a war, a serious and resolute war, terminating in a reduction of the territory and the power, if not in a total change in the affairs of France. This remedy may, to some persons, appear worse than the disease; but, let them consider, that the disease brings *certain* political death, whereas the remedy *may* not only prevent death, but may preserve life, and even restore us to health. Nor let the selfish votaries of wealth and frivolity flatter themselves with the hope that the disease will be a *lingering* one. It will not be many years; perhaps not many months, in producing a catastrophe the most dreadful that ever was exhibited on earth. Let them remember, that the question is not, whether we shall have war, or live in peace, with Buonaparté; but, whether we shall have war with him now, or stop 'till the moment when it perfectly suits him.—— Against one thing, above all others, we beg leave to caution our readers, and this is, the delusive notion of security to be derived from the *poverty* of France. The statements of the French financiers may be very fallacious, as far as we know; but the falsehood of those statements do not diminish the means of the vast empire, which the Corsican and his comrades have formed, nor do they weaken those bonds, by the means of which the commerce and colonies of Holland and the mines of Spain are made tributary to France, and are, in effect, rendered her property.—Upon this subject, we cannot help adverting to a passage in the ministerial paper, the True Briton, of Thursday last, a passage which is well worthy of the pen of our own able financier.—"In the report of

* See SWENSKA, p. 450, et seq.

" the minister of the French finances, there " is, for the year nine, a trifling sum of " 32,000,000 francs, *pour faire des négocia-* " *tions*; and for the year ten, the bagatelle " of 15,505,000 francs for the same expenses " of negotiations, besides ten millions, called " unforeseen expenses. It is impossible, in " a more *concise* and *clear* manner to inform " the *free* French nation how nearly 60 " millions are employed."—This really smells strong of the Treasury. But, are there not two edges to this Addingtonian wit? In the *year nine* France had to pay for negotiating *the preliminary treaty*, and, in the *year ten*, the *definitive treaty!* If, therefore, she gained, by the three millions sterling expended on those negotiations, a conquest which cost us three hundred millions sterling, she did not make so very bad a bargain. Her treasurer may not, indeed, have his conscience quite so clear as the Richmond Park Minister, the prosecutor of the tin-man of Plymouth; but, we think the 60 millions of *ten-penny* livres are, if we look at the effects they have produced, infinitely better accounted for than the last 60 millions of *twenty shilling* livres, which Mr. Addington has expended.

Savings of Peace!—To "husband our " resources" was one of the motives for making the numerous and important sacrifices of the treaty of Amiens. What, then, will be *the amount* of those savings? This should be an object of immediate enquiry, did we not think it a mark of respect due to Lord Auckland, to wait the result of those deep researches, which, his Lordship is now making for the benefit of his country. We cannot, however, be expected long to restrain our desire to enter on this subject, especially when the reader is informed, that we actually have, at this moment, spread out upon the table all Mr. Addington's apparatus. Indeed, we do intend to make, next week, a complete exposure of this gentleman's financial quackery, from the conclusion of the peace to the present day; and, not to insult the understandings of our readers, we shall address it to the minister himself.

Fifty ships of the line.—Our readers will recollect, that, in the debate, on the 2d of December last, Mr. Addington stated to the House of Commons, that, such was the excellent situation of the navy, that "*fifty* " ships of the line, could, in case of emer- " gency, be got ready for sea in the course " of *a month*." That month is now nearly expired; for, though the King's messages, do not contain the word "*emergency*," yet an emergency must certainly be understood to exist now, and to have existed, ever since, at least, the message to Parliament, notifying his Majesty's intention to call out the Militia, and since the issuing of the proclamation, by which that Message was immediately followed; for, the Militia law, 42 Geo. III. Cap. 90. § iii, authorises his Majesty to issue such proclamation, only " in cases of *actual* " *invasion*, or upon *imminent danger* thereof, " and in all cases of *rebellion* and *insurrec-* " *tion*." Thank God, we all know that there is neither rebellion nor insurrection in the kingdom! nor has there yet any actual invasion taken place; *imminent danger of invasion* must therefore exist, else the issuing of the proclamation was improper, nay it was absolutely *unlawful*; and, if imminent danger of invasion be not "a case of emergency," we should be greatly obliged to Mr. Addington to tell us what he considers as the evidence of such a case.——A case of emergency has, then, if we suppose the cabinet to have known the secret only eight days before the public, already existed for *a month*, and, instead of "*fifty* ships of the line ready for sea," will the modest assurance of Mr. Addington enable him to tell the Parliament, that he has *six* ships of that description ready for sea? No; even he will not, he dare not say he has: for, there are not yet *five*, and we defy any one to disprove what we say. *In commission!* Yes, there are enough in commission. There are many in commission, without men, or sails, and even without masts. There are plenty of hulks in commission. How many ships are there *fit for sea?* That's the question. Week after week, we have said that we have not *six* ships of the line, in Europe, fit for sea; and can any one believe, that the ministers would not have disproved our statement, if it had been in their power? The newspapers make a great parade of ships put in commission and officers appointed. It is very easy to draw out fleets upon paper; but not so easy to draw them out of the deadening clutches of Lord St. Vincent. The public has been told, that Lord Nelson is to hoist his flag on board the Victory: if he does, he must hang it upon his walking-stick, or something else other than a mast; for, we are well assured, that the Victory cannot be got out to sea in six months.—At Chatham there were, last week, 190 shipwrights short of the peace establishment, though the men of 35 years were admitted. During the dreadful visitation, which the Admiralty Lords made to the Dock-yards, they turned off a great number of men, who had served 20 years, without superannuating them, as it had always before been the custom; and they are now actually endeavouring to find out these very men to bring them back to the yards.—Since that visitation, the apprentices, in all the yards, whose time has expired, have generally quitted the

king's service, a circumstance unprecedented in the history of our navy. In short, such has been, and such is the distrust, the ill blood, the disgust, that pervades every department under these ignorant, capricious, and unfeeling men, that the whole machine is at a stand; and, if they continue where they now are, that machine will be completely destroyed *.

Well must the public remember, and with no small degree of displeasure, the answer made to Mr. Elliot, on this subject, by Mr. Yorke, who, most assuredly, knew very little of what he said. The former gentleman had asked, on the 23d of November:—"Is Ireland in a state of safety? "Where is our channel fleet, the bulwark "of our coasts? Your savings have been "made out of the very vital security of the "country."—† To this the Secretary of War replied: "We have not, to be sure, "thirty or forty sail of the line lying at "Spithead; but, we have a fleet greater "than ever it was in peace, or even during "part of the late war; not stationed in one "port, I allow, but scattered over the "world. With the *aid* of the noble Lord "at the head of the Admiralty, and the "*regulations which he has introduced*, a system "is formed, which would enable us, *at any* "*time*, to put a force to sea *fully adequate for* "*our defence*; and, therefore, there is no "cause of dismay ‡ on account of our "navy."—It is charity to suppose, that the Secretary's constant attention to his own office, rendered him totally ignorant of the situation of the navy; for, bad as this excuse may be, it is the only one that can possibly be offered for such a declaration, made at such a time, and under such circumstances. That Lord St. Vincent and his two sapient Phocæ persuaded the other ministers, and even themselves, that they were able to send out a fleet at a few weeks notice, we can readily conceive; but that they *never* will get one *to sea* we believe most sincerely. The system, to which the Secretary at War alludes, is, we presume, the new system of guarding this island by *blocks* and *hulks!* "We are "happy," says the ministerial paper, "to "state, from authority, that the blocks, "which are to protect the mouth of the "Thames, will be ready in a few days." What a source of *happiness!* what a subject for exultation!—By referring to our account of the present distribution of the navy, p. 512, the reader will perceive, that there are now in commission, in Europe, 26 sail of the line; and, by turning back to pp. 143 and 310, of the present volume, he will find, that, on the 1st of February there were 9 in commission, and, on the 1st of March, 10. Since the 1st of March, then, that is to say, *a month* since the ministry must have known of the existence of that *imminent danger of invasion*, and, consequently, that case of emergency, which they communicated to Parliament on the 9th of March; in this month, the space of time in which Mr. Addington promised the Parliament and the nation to get *fifty* ships of the line ready for sea, in this whole month only 16 ships have been added to the number in commission, the whole of which, even according to the swelled-out account of the Admiralty themselves, amount to no more than 26. But, let not the country deceive itself by this phrase, "ships *in commission*." Ships may be for years in commission, without ever being, for one hour, fit for service. Mr. Addington's promise related to ships *fit for sea*. The whole 200 ships of the line may be put in commission in five minutes; but to get them out to sea, and that too in a condition to meet an enemy, is quite another thing. We have now 26 ships of the line in commission, in Europe; and, of the whole 26, there are not yet *six* fit for sea. We repeat this assertion with confidence; we pledge our veracity and the reputation of our work for the truth of it, and we call upon those editors, who are daily publishing such pompous accounts of warlike preparations, to contradict us, not by abuse and base calumny, but by facts. We are not bound to prove a negative; it is, indeed, in this, as in many other instances, next to impossible to do it; but, if Mr. Addington had his *fifty* ships, or even *five* of them, actually ready for sea, how easy would it be just to publish their *names*, with those of their commanders, and to state, opposite each, the number of men on board? How easy would it be to do this? Aye, and how eagerly would it be done!—There is, it seems, *one* ship of the line got out, at last, and (see the distribution) she is on the Downs and North Sea stations. She has room enough at any rate. In the English and Irish Channels, there is not even a 50 gun ship. Suppose the French were to run out three or four ships of the line, with a few frigates, well loaded with troops, and were to make for some port of Ireland. What would be the consequence? And who shall say, that they will not do this, even while they seem to recede from some important point in ne-

* The two lawyers belonging to what has been very significantly called "the Navy *abuse* Board," lately instituted, have, we are told, resigned their places; so that, a new act must pass, we believe, or this board is at an end.—May not the resignation be a mere excuse for putting the disgusting and mischievous institution to a silent death?

† See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1687.

‡ Ibid. p. 1691.

gotiation? The ministers have talked of their *responsibility*: let them beware lest it prove, at last, something more than a mere pretext for withholding a knowledge of the divers acts, by which they sacrificed the interest and honour of their country.—At the breaking out of the last war, the ships of the line in commission were, in the space of one month, increased from 17 to 30, not *merely* in commission, but *fit for sea*; and, the sailors were, in the same space of time, increased from 12,000 to 18,000, *without having recourse to press-warrants*; whereas, with the aid of press-warrants, the last month has not, we are well informed, added more than 4000 seamen to the fleet!—And these are the facts which we are to draw a veil over, lest we should dishearten the people, and lest we should expose our weakness to the enemy. As if that enemy did not know the state of our navy as well as Lord St. Vincent and Captain Markham! As if he had not, in all our ports, better-informed and more diligent men than they have! To the charge, the foolish, canting, and false charge, of "disheartening the peo-"ple," we replied in our last, p. 446, and have only to add here, that if the people are to be disheartened by a description of probably approaching danger, how vain is it to hope, that they will have the public spirit and the courage to resist and overcome that danger, when it actually arrives! when it comes upon them like a thief in the night!—It is, too, somewhat strange to hear this charge from men who are *happy* to inform their "fellow citizens," that *blocks* are preparing to guard the mouth of the Thames! There is little chance, we should think, of adding to the fears of people like these. The mouth of the Thames guarded by blocks! How are the mighty fallen! How rapid has been our decline, how tremendously swift has the work of degradation gone on, since the 1st of October, the accursed 1st of October, 1801! But, the truth is, that a people, who yield themselves to such men as those who made the treaty of peace; a people who silently, and even willingly, yield themselves to the disposal of such men, merely for the sake of indulging their selfishness and ease, merely for the sake of avoiding the exertion of those pecuniary and personal means, which the Almighty has liberally bestowed on them; a people so degenerate not only must, but they *ought*, to be subdued; having basely yielded the honours won by their forefathers, they ought also to be bereft of their name; having misused, despised, and trodden under foot, the manifold blessings of Providence, they ought no longer to enjoy its protection.—"They shall cast their silver in the streets, "and their gold shall be removed: *their* "*silver and their gold shall not be able to deliver* "*them.*—I will bring *the worst of the heathen*, "and they shall possess their houses: I will "also make the pomp of the strong to "cease; and their holy places shall be de-"filed. Destruction cometh: they shall *seek* "*peace*, and there shall be *none*."—As it is impossible not to perceive a most striking resemblance between the character and conduct of the Jewish nation, previous to the Babylonish captivity, and that of the British nation at the present day, so are we most seriously and most fearfully persuaded, that there will be a resemblance not less striking in their punishment, unless we instantly resolve to tread back the steps we have trodden, to pursue a new line of conduct, to adopt notions and principles far different from those which have, for the last ten years, prevailed in our councils; to appeal to the sense and honour, and not to the ignorance and baseness of the nation, to rely upon our valour, and not upon our purse.

POLITICS OF FRANCE.

(*Continued from Page* 424.)

Buonaparté's opinion on the finances of England has been repeatedly expressed to the following effect:

1. That the annual expenditure amounting to such an immense sum, the ministry dared not augment it; and therefore they made peace.

2. That the peace, having enabled the Republic to secure all the valuable possessions of France, Holland, Spain and Portugal, and to exclude Great Britain from the continent of Europe, when occasion may require, the British merchants and men of property, seeing the nation deprived of every possibility of making new conquests and of extending their commerce and manufactures, will not come forward with their money to enable the government to recommence a war, which can produce nothing but public danger.

3. That, should a ministry obtain the confidence of the public, so as to be able to raise the funds, to re-equip the navy and organize the army, with the other expenses attendant on warlike preparations, would, in the course of the first two years, absorb a capital, the interest of which, would require ten millions sterling to be raised annually

nually upon the public: a sum, that, added to the present expenditure, would either revolutionize the country, or make a national bankruptcy inevitable.

So that, although the ministry in parliament declared the resources of the nation to be still abundant to continue the war, it was perfectly evident, that the danger which they apprehended from the pressure of the public burdens, was the real cause that made them sue for peace.

It is rather unmannerly of Buonaparté, to say, that old England sued for peace! However, if it be true, as the world really believes it is, that the terms of the peace have broken down those bulwarks, which centuries of warfare, "heaps of treasure "and streams of British blood had raised "around the British empire," and that the soul and body of the empire itself, are thereby exposed to the uplifted daggers of a Jacobin Republic, we cannot, should we dislike the Consul's Philippies, with any sort of plausibility deny the fact.—At no period of the war was the situation of France so critical, as just when the preliminaries of London were signed. To have lost the battle of Marengo, might have lost the progress of the campaign, but the consequence would have been nothing more. At the juncture we refer to, the existence of the Republic, the destiny of France, hung upon the will of an irritated and all powerful enemy. The British navy was completely mistress of the Ocean, of the Gulph of Mexico, the Baltic, Mediterranean and Indian seas; from the Point of Florida to Cape Horn, and from Madagascar to Japan, every island, port and place, were under our command, and at our disposal; as were also the continent of Africa, Egypt, Syria, Natolia, Cyprus, Candia, the Morea and Grecian islands, Malta, Sicily, and Lisbon. No nation ever stood in such a posture. And sue for peace! A frank declaration to the world, and a liberal proposition to the court of Petersburgh and to the United States, would have instantaneously rallied all the sovereigns of Europe and America (the king of Spain not excepted) around the British standard. Then we might have consolidated our maritime empire, every state that bordered on the sea would have become our natural ally, and all civilized nations our cordial and constant friends. And France, republic or monarchy, no matter which, might have been finally remanded within the limits of her own legal dominions. These Buonaparté saw, and by an address, (or, perhaps, from our want of address), he snatched away the fruit of all our toils. The very means we then possessed, to have interwoven the interests of Europe and America with our own, the Consul is now dealing out to unite the world in enmity against us.

It cannot fail to be highly gratifying to the present rulers of France, to hear maintained in the British senate, a doctrine, in itself preposterous, and in its effects the most dangerous that ever was introduced into the councils of a king—to wit; that, "to retain in peace conquests made in war, marks ambition, rouses the jealousy of other powers, and creates enemies to the state: whereas, to give up conquests bought with our blood, manifests magnanimity and moderation, and quiets the anxiety of our neighbours: the latter is therefore, in sound policy, to be preferred." We shall not comment on this dangerous and cowardly precept; but merely observe, that if it be persisted in, Great Britain will not long be the envy of her neighbours. She is now, no more their dread!

Jealousy arises from rivality, which implies a pretension to equal power; as Great Britain lately stood, no such pretension could have been set up; or if it had, to what purpose? In possession of the object, and able to defend it, the jealousy of rivals soon dies in its own impotence. If, to avoid the jealousy of those whose rivality we always despised, we have (as it is said) given up the object, viz.—the sources and securities of our maritime preponderance, we have no great chance to meet with a similar modesty on the part of our neighbours. While Buonaparté can command their obedience, all the powers of Europe may burn with jealousy as long as they please, for what he cares.

To return from this digression.—The British ministers, deprived of every prospect of gaining by war, now talk of getting money to enable them to *recommence* hostilities. For, if they could still add to the national debt and public imposts, that very circumstance would ruin the government. The British ministry must, therefore, to preserve the state, maintain the peace; and that proud nation must be a passive spectator of the rising glories of France.

Such is the opinion of the Chief Consul; and, we are sorry to add, that it is more, or less, the opinion of all the governments of continental Europe.

To justify his calculation and insure the pacific neutrality of Great Britain, Buonaparté will keep the government in a continual state of suspense. To oblige the ministry to carry the annual expenditure, more and more above the receipt of the public revenue, the Consulate will order,

or pretend to have ordered, squadrons of gun-boats and light vessels, to be built and armed on the Missi-sippi, on the Rio-grande de la Madalena, and on the Oronoco. The republic will form, or talk of forming settlements, on the Red and Winnipeg lakes, in Tupinamb and Cap-del-rey. Orders will likewise be given, to build squadrons on the Euphrates, at Bassora, Gombaroon, on the Indus, and on the lakes in Siba; to take possession and fortify the islands of Salsetta, Ormus and Kismish; the posts of Aden, Zeila, the islands and ports of Camarana, Erquiko and Monbaza, will be ceded to France; * and the republic will make settlements in Sindi, Guzerat, Aracan and Pegu. † A treaty with the emperor Alexander to reinstate the Mogul and hereditary princes of Indostan in their former rank and possessions, will be approved of by the Sophi of Persia, consecrated by the Grand Lama and cried through the streets of London, Calcutta, Madrass and Delhi. A senatus-consultus, prohibiting the importation of British manufactures and the consumption of British cured fish in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Turkey, and forbidding the transit of British produce through Holland and up the Rhine, will be talked of, perhaps really issued: and a convention to recover and maintain the liberty of the sea, under the auspices of France and Russia, will be acceded to by all the maritime states of Europe. ‡

Besides these menaces abroad, we shall be amused with the Consul's preparations at home; dozens of line-of battle ships will be launching monthly in the ports of Holland, France and Spain; gunboats will rise in the channel like mushrooms; and St. Valery, Boulogne, Mardik, Dunkirk and Flushing will be converted into spacious impregnable naval harbours. * Naval manœuvres, † military encampments, sham fights and reviews, will be exhibited, to astonish and terrify the swarms of our gaping countrymen, who, to the disgrace of the British name, are daily flocking to cringe and bow before their sovereign's tumid foe!

Britons have for many ages been considered as the people possessing the most laudable and dignified national pride: they are the only people in Europe who have neither been beaten, nor in any wise humiliated during the course of the late revolution war; and it is remarkable, that after the peace, they are the only people who, in a contemptible admiration for a rebel chief, have lost sight of their own and their country's worth. Other nations have been despoiled and conquered, they have bowed to the tyrant's sceptre by compulsion; but peers of England, British senators, and Englishmen of all descriptions seem to regret the valor of their defenders; they are proud to be noticed in the ring of Buonaparté's gallic slaves; and hurry in crowds to offer their oblations to the foul priestess of that polluted temple of treason (the Tuilleries), still rancid with a sovereign's blood! We cannot here avoid mentioning a circumstance that lately happened on the continent: one of the first monarchs in Europe, desired a nobleman at his court to prepare to go as his Ambassador, or rather Plenipotentiary, to Buonaparté; the other replied, "for the first time that ever "a ———— demurred to execute the "orders of his master, I am, upon this oc-"casion, proud to disobey your Majesty's "commands. As an officer, I cannot be "the instrument to compromise the dignity

* To possess and secure the command of the gulph of Ormus and straits of Babelmandel, is not a new speculation; if the late Empress Catherine II. would have countenanced the views of France, that project would have been attempted in 1785 and 1786. Perhaps Buonaparté may have more influence in the councils of the present emperor than Vergennes had in those of Catherine.

† With respect to the Dutch settlements abroad, as they were given up at Amiens, they will be garrisoned and stored without any unnecessary parade or pompous demonstration. It is inconceivable how the people of England can be so far deluded, as not to see, that the ci-devant Dutch colonies in Asia, Africa and America, are, and must necessarily be, subject to the Consulate. Every body knows, that, the Batavian Republic is a department of France; and it requires no very deep sagacity to see, that Buonaparté will make the appurtenances of his departments subservient to the execution of his future projects.

‡ To these demonstrations, will no doubt be added some diplomatic altercation; for instance, the French minister may tread upon the British Ambassador's toes at Peterburgh, or at Constantinople; a Danish ballad-singer may be paid to draw another resemblance of the king's minister at Copenhagen, a French jew buying, or pretending to buy muskets there, may again attempt to purchase a passport at his excellency's office; the vice president of Italy will arrest, or cause to be deported some dozens of our English beaux from Rome or Naples; and the Prefect of Switzerland will, by mistake, hang an English secretary there for a spy, &c.

* We believe it is intended to make St. Valery the grand naval depôt for the flotillas and light squadrons of the republic, in the channel.

† In case of another war, these manœuvres will be so managed, as to make it appear to the people of England, that no serious invasion is intended; and squadrons will no doubt be sacrificed to shew, that if such really was intended, to land would be impossible. To disarm, or turn our opponent off his guard is always an advantage; no matter by what means.

" of my sovereign's crown; and as a gen-
" tleman, I dare not dishonour a nobleman
" who wears my name and your Majesty's
" uniform."

The late king of Prussia said to an English gentleman of our acquaintance—"you " (meaning the British nation) are now " making a last effort to subsidize Europe " to fight with France, until you secure to " yourselves, a monopoly of the trade of " the world; should you succeed, you will " then soon make us repay your subsidies " with usury."—Whatever the people of England may be told to the contrary, we can, from a personal knowledge of facts, affirm, that this doctrine is believed in every cabinet and by every political economist on the continent of Europe. The present dependent state and *certain* subjugation of Portugal, the ruin and conquest of Holland, and the degradation of Spain, with a thousand circumstances of a similar nature, are artfully laid to our charge; and all the little scurrilous predictions, of our decline, that issues from the numerous presses now in all countries devoted to the cause of our enemies, are read and heard with avidity and pleasure by the people of all ranks and professions. " Let those fools read them," say our English politicians, " what is that to us." Did we not know the end purposed, and see the effects daily produced, by the newspaper-statements and comparative views circulated by the secretaries, clerks, and emissaries of the Consulate, we might perhaps join in the chorus with our *dotard* countrymen. But we see in those productions, the advertisements and *programme* of the most formidable combination that ever was planned against an empire. And, although we know that it will not be believed, conviction compels us to affirm, that Buonaparté's pamphlets and pensions, have more effect in confirming the several states of Europe in their enmity towards Great Britain, than all the subsidies the British treasury can ever pay, will have in conciliating their friendship. Subsidies are, no doubt, considerations to the agents and commissaries employed in paying and receiving them, and they may have a certain momentary value with the mistress of a prince, or a minister; but they never were, nor will they ever be, a national consideration to any state. The spoils of the British empire are, on the contrary, objects of the most seducing nature; scattered as they are, they suit the interests and ambition of many speculators; and the Consul's liberality will, perhaps, increase, as he augments his means.—We do not mean to infer, that Great Britain has any imminent danger to apprehend from the organized enmity of Europe; but as that enmity can in no wise, promote the interests of England, but, on the contrary, may prove more or less detrimental to them, we think it might be as well to prevent its organization; especially as that could yet be done with much facility, and to the great and permanent advantages of the British empire.

Dissertations will be periodically circulated on the continent to shew, that the trade and manufactures of Great Britain are ruinous to all other countries; that for these hundred years past, the maritime preponderance of England has hung like a mill stone upon the neck of Europe and America; and that her politics have ruined all those states with whom she has been connected.

Other essays will be distributed amongst the people of England, setting forth, that the national debt is a burden laid on the poor, merely to augment the wealth of the rich; that is the cause of all the taxes and of the high price of provisions; that if it were abolished, porter would be sold at twopence the pot, and bread at three pence the quarter-loaf; and it will be demonstrated, by metaphysical sophistry, that to pay the debts of generations past, and to fulfil the engagements of transient ministers, is no part of the duty of freemen. *To this will be added, a parallel drawn between the present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France:* wherein will be set forth,—the one, as having in 1762 passed the meridian of her power; in 1782 lost one half of the sources of her maritime trade; and as having in 1802 given up, or exposed the other half to the discretion of France; as possessing but a precarious revenue, to be pressed out of an equally precarious commerce; subject to an enormous expenditure, which may be augmented, or doubled by a single gesture of the first Consul; in fine, as a state now reduced, despised, by the greater powers and hated by the lesser. Whereas,—France will be represented, as having by the revolution increased her European territory by one-4th; abolished her debt, doubled her revenue, tripled her power; and as having acquired more real sources of maritime trade than all Europe possesses besides; as being now at the head of the political world, dictating to the most powerful states and protecting the weaker. In short, Great Britain will be, we may say is already, and with but too much truth, held up as being on a rapid decline; with her remaining powers resting merely upon paper, ships, wet-docks, and canals; while the republic is cried up as having built her growing prosperity and fu-

ture grandeur upon solid acquisitions of territory, produce, and population *.

Such are, and will continue to be, the means, by which the rulers of France will endeavour to embarrass the finances, fatigue the government, and depress the spirit of the British nation. *The inveterate enmity of those rulers can never be removed*; for unless Great Britain be reduced to *a passive inferiority, they cannot consider their republic as consolidated or secure.*

It is said, and industriously propagated, that Buonaparté having established his authority in France, it is become *his personal interest* to cultivate *a pacific understanding with all his neighbours.* And that, as he is now capable of maintaining ties of political relationship with other powers, it is *their interests to support his authority.*

This reasoning has no doubt originated with the Consul's confessor, bishop Talleyrand. That it should have gained admittance and approbation in the councils of Europe and America, seems to be owing to the baneful influence, of that hideous genius, which jacobinism and rebellion have set loose upon mankind. The fact is,—when Buonaparté signified his desire for peace, his authority *was not established*; his situation, as well as that of the republic, was, as we have mentioned, extremely critical; he sought peace with his neighbours, that he might have time to establish his authority, and to save the republic from what he considered, and what might have easily been brought about, its almost certain destruction. The Consul foresaw the effects which the conquest of Egypt was to produce both in England and France; he saw the still greater effects, which, Great Britain holding the destiny of the Turkish empire in her hand, might then have produced at Petersburgh; and he knew that in America, a single word to the purpose would have obliged president Jefferson to change his system, or his place, and might have barred France, for ever, from that side of the Atlantic; nor could he consider Portugal an equivalent for Brasil. Besides, the arms of both Portugal and Spain might have been turned against him *. Under these circumstances was peace obtained, and it is no wonder Buonaparté should wish to preserve it; at least until he acquire the means to command peace, or to defy war. When he believes himself in that situation, we shall see how far, and upon what terms, he is disposed to maintain his pacific relationship with his neighbours. Buonaparté has great advantages over his contemporaries. He was brought up in the world, and in active life. Beginning his career as a subaltern, his profession obliged him to think; and the habit of thinking no doubt taught him to calculate. The revolution enabled him to see men of all descriptions exposed without disguise; and now consul, he easily sees through the masks of those who have the vanity or folly to attempt to deceive him. This adventurer is in possession of absolute power, has the means to make that power irresistible, and has experience at an early period of life. He is the patron and protector of all sorts of principles, professions and prejudices; and is himself bound by none.—Amongst the absurdities of the times, it is not one of the least, to hear the legislators of Great Britain propping up the power of the British empire by the discontent and broils which they foresee generating in France, and with the jealousy which the politics of the republic is said to be raising amongst other continental governments. The obstinacy of infatuation is astonishing! Should the people of France be angry with the man who snatched their country from the precipice of inevitable

* The present state and future prospects of Great Britain and France compared, is, according to Parisian news, to be exposed to the public by a well known disciple of Abbé Sieyes. This arch emissary, had some of his materials arranged and presented to the K—— of —— by colonel C—— at Berlin already in 1798. Having seen the manuscripts, we recollect, that to deliver the industry of Europe from the oppression of our *chapter laws*, as they were termed, was strongly recommended to the humanity of that young monarch. No doubt the heavy debts of our Jamaica planters, and the restrictions under which European settlers labour in Bengal, have by this time moved the compassion of this philanthropic Jacobin; and we shall very soon see, a plan drawn up, according to which, the former may pay off their burdens by an act of the assembly of the island, and the latter by a similar deed, may re-assume their natural freedom of trading with whom they please. It is not unlikely, that the First Consul may think proper to disapprove of this plan; but he will certainly permit its being made public; and Mr. ———— is a supple negotiator; he has his secretaries *in more hands than one.*

* In this position, the Consul knew, that to have adopted a certain system of politics (which may yet be necessary when it will be more difficult to carry it into practice) the British government, might, in the space of six months after the surrender of Alexandria, have drawn forth into action, all the power of Austria, Russia, America, and Spain, against the republic: not to fight for subsidy, nor for the commercial interests of Great Britain, but to fight for their own interests.

It may be said, that had Buonaparté felt himself in the predicament we have mentioned, he would not have been so haughty and imperious during the negotiation. The contempt with which the Consul seemed to treat the negotiation, and his arrogance upon that occasion, might be accounted for, by several reasons; but, that to mask his anxiety was one leading motive, is certain.

ruin, and who raised *them* to the dictatorship of the world? And will they oppose his endeavours to consolidate their situation? But they are oppressed, says John Bull! If we ask with what?—the whole of John's *corps diplomatique* cannot tell. In politics and in public society, oppression is relative. To attempt to scare Buonaparté with the jealousy of other powers, is, perhaps, still more ridiculous! Those who have any power, are his associates in despoiling those who have none. What benefit could the change of the name of a chief produce to Great Britain, or to Europe? Would a General Moreau or a Masena be less a Frenchman than Buonaparté? No,—but we say they may be less *habile!* When the ability of enemies becomes a consideration with Britons, then alas! our legislators may go home and plant potatoes.

It must be evident to the world, that the present rulers of the republic, from whatever point of view they are taken, can only be considered as rebel chiefs. They were born subjects of their king, most of them held offices in his service, and at mature age, swore allegiance to his government; he is alive, and at this time is morally, as well entitled to sit on the throne of France, as any hereditary monarch can be to sit on the throne of his ancestors. These usurpers know, that, however pliable and passive the politics of other governments may have, now and then, appeared, it cannot be presumed that legitimate sovereigns should prostitute the dignity of their stations, and expose the safety of their persons and families in so palpable a manner, as voluntarily to sanction the rebellion, robberies, pillage, and plunder of the republic; and associate in treaties of friendship and mutual support, with the irreconcileable enemies of all legal government. The chief consul knows, that the treaties, which he has imposed upon other states, are extorted bonds, and will never bind the conscience. He is well aware, that when his authority in France has occasion for help from abroad, his part of the drama will be nearly out. Nor can he suppose that his neighbours are less sensible, that the support of France implies her dominion. In short, he knows that his authority can only be legalized by ultimate success; and that *while any legal government possesses the means of opposition and resistance, the success of the French Republic cannot be considered as secure.* The consul may profess peace and friendship with all states; and he may offer alliances to the great, and protection to the weak; but every legitimate sovereign should know, that when the missionaries of Buonaparté approach his throne, they come either to spoil, crush, or undermine it. The destruction, or subjugation of all independent nations, especially of all rival powers, is with the rulers of France, *a principle of self-preservation*, and is, therefore, *interwoven with the very existence of their military community.*

We would not be understood to say, that the present government of France intends to conquer, and incorporate with the Republic, all other European states. On the contrary, we do not suppose that the consulate would wish Holland, Spain, nor perhaps Italy, more immediately under the police of France than those countries now are: nor, do we believe, that while Great Britain and Russia continue in their present posture, Buonaparté would countenance a farther reduction of Austria, nor the expulsion of the Turkish government from Europe. We consider the real system of the French Republic, to be neither more nor less, than, *an universal ascendency raised upon natural sources sufficient to maintain a preponderant power.* Such an ascendency is essential to the existence of the Republic, and it will be pursued as long, as that fabric does exist. The obstacles which stands most directly in the way of that pursuit, is *the naval empire of Great Britain*; its reduction is therefore the object, upon which the hero of the nineteenth century must first employ his natural and moral faculties, and all his supernatural talents.

OBSERVATIONS ON HIS MAJESTY'S LATE MESSAGE TO PARLIAMENT.

SIR,—However indubitable is the right of ministers in certain cases, to with-hold information on the treaty with France *pending the negotiation*; there is nevertheless, one point that admits of great doubt, and that is, whether the men who compose the present ministry are worthy of being trusted by Parliament with its confidence, and with that supply they ask to give weight to their negotiations. The minister not trusting merely to his master's prerogative to negotiate and to arm, comes to Parliament and asks the two Houses to make themselves *parties to the present armament and to the consequences of it.* But is the minister a man whose abilities will not commit the safety, and whose firmness will not compromise the honour of the Parliament and the nation?—To this, the only answer I find made by Mr. Addington is, "that he is responsible, deeply responsible to the country, but that if Parliament will trust him he will bring us out with honour at least of every difficulty."

When I read this in the newspaper, Sir, I involuntarily turn to the first page of the

paper, to the advertisements of Doctors Brodum and Solomon, and many others, whose claims to confidence are full as good as the premier's.—Namely, the assurance with which they promise and the responsibility they incur. But if my constitution be ruined by their quackeries, will it be restored by an action for damages?—Had I not better preserve it at present, by denying these men my confidence and consulting some regular physician?—How far ministers deserve the confidence they claim is still a question, therefore, and can only be determined by a reference to their past conduct.

Now, Sir, immediately after the signature of the preliminaries of peace, Buonaparté as in the present instance, fitted out "*a vast armament while the most important negotiations were depending.*"—While our swords yet reeked with the best blood of France, while the wounds she had received in Egypt still smarted,—but ministers were not alarmed; though then not at peace they suffered the French fleets to sail. It is true, Buonaparté's armament did not prove hostile, but it does not follow, for that reason, that ministers were justified in trusting that to chance.—Perhaps, Sir, the Consul expected more from the docility of our administration, than to the rigour of his own armies; and the politician who looks to Alexandria and to Amiens, will probably applaud his judgment.—If this conjecture be well founded, (and the subsequent *present* hostile temper of the pacificator renders it highly probable,) Mr. Addington cannot plead the event as a justification of his confidence, for it is a maxim of reason as well as of law, that no man shall plead his own wrong.—But if, Sir, we condemn his tameness in 1801, let us look to his *vigour* in 1802; and I think, though the subjects are different we shall still recognize the hand of the same master.

The French diplomatists have dated the æra of their new system of European public law from the treaty of Luneville, but unfortunately this simple code which silences the contention of so many rights, by annihilating the powers that laid claim to them, was not exempt from some intricacies at which the simplicity of French justice was so much shocked in the former system; it acknowledged the independence of Switzerland, though in the near neighbourhood of the great nation. The warmest admirers of the new system must allow this to be a blemish. France, however, had herself formally recognized this independence, and Switzerland had not since then committed any act of hostility against France. But the Swiss people changed the form of government which was agreeable to the chief Consul, and substituted another, an act they had surely a right to do if they were independent, at least if that word has any meaning in French Dictionaries. Buonaparté however, in undisguised violation (not only of the rights of others, but of those *he himself* had acknowledged, and of that treaty to which he exacted Austria's implicit adherence) marched a French army into the country, and has there established a motley administration of his own making, which he calls a constitution. This part of his own code of public law was intricate and entangled: the military legislator unravelled it, as Alexander did the Gordian knot.

Our ministers thought they saw *something* more warlike and jacobinical than they had expected. Disappointed in not seeing Buonaparté's nature softened by the allurements of reviving commerce, and his brow smoothed into sleek complaisance *behind a counter* *, they again discovered "that gigantic and hideous ambition which would revolutionize all nations, and render all people tributary to France, †" "they thought the cause of Switzerland, the common cause of every power that is not a voluntary slave to the influence of France," † they boldly *resolved* to assert the independence of Europe by defending that of Switzerland, and with the shield of Britannia to protect the cradle of liberty.—And what did they *do?*—they sent Mr. Moore post haste to Constance, and he returned by easy journeys.—Notwithstanding this, however, Switzerland was subdued.

Now, Sir, is Mr. Moore about to make another trip to the Continent?—What new exploits are we to look for from the vigour of ministerial councils?—It is impossible to foresee, but we may perhaps guess, *ex pede Herculem*.

Having discussed their vigour, let us proceed to the next ground of confidence, the abilities they have hitherto displayed.

But these men concluded the peace of Amiens, the cause of our present embarrassed situation, that treaty, which, to borrow the beautiful language of Mr. Canning, has left the country in a slumber, that does not recruit her strength, but harasses her imagination with terrific dreams; that treaty which its authors themselves have now found to be fraught only with war, and which by the present message they have virtually avowed to be destitute of the only merit it ever claimed to procure repose.—

* See Mr. Sheridan's Speech on the Peace.

† True Briton, Oct. 14, 1802.

Mr. Fox indeed, denied this, and any argument supported by so great a name acquires a lustre not its own.—"Are we to "be told," he exclaimed, "that ministers "dared make no peace, because the unseasonable ambition of France may now "drive us to hostilities? Are we to be told "that we must wage war till we had obtained a satisfactory assurance on the part "of the enemy of a sincere desire to cultivate the blessings of tranquillity in the "true spirit of peace?"—In the *full* extent of this principle, certainly not. But though the want of this satisfactory assurance does not *altogether preclude* peace, yet does it very much reduce the value of it, and ought equally to lower the price we are willing to give. This sincere disposition to peace on the part of the enemy, is indeed, by far the most important point to be considered; it is of greater value than a colony more, or a sugar island less, because a *free nation* like this seeks only honourable security at the end of war, and the amicable temper of our rival is a better pledge for this than his humiliation. It was lacking *this*, that made the cessions under the late treaty doubly mischievous to the country. The peace of Amiens wanted this wholesome complexion which might promise its long life, and its late admirers already feel that if it is a beauty, it is but a candle-light beauty, whose artificial charms, though they might please while contemplated only by the taper of Mr. Addington's abilities, must fade away before the broad day of experience.

This general principle needs only to be fully stated, I should think, to be acknowledged.—When treating with a man whose enmity was founded on the interests of his ambition, aggravated by the satanic pride of his nature, and embittered by recent defeat;—whose friendship was as fatal to some, even as his enmity, whose abilities, unrestrained by conscience, were surpassed only by his boundless ambition, whose perfidy had ere now stained the olive branch with blood, and mixed poison in the cup of peace. —In treating with such a man, no able minister would make great sacrifices for peace. He would see what little difference there was between the enmity and friendship of such a man, and however anxious for tranquillity, yet wisely setting but little value on the hollowness of such a peace, he would pay but a small price for it, *at least he would not purchase it at an exorbitant price.*

Now, Sir, this general principle being admitted, we proceed to the application. And I will ask any candid man, the ministers themselves, whether there were *any* traits in the physiognomy of Buonaparté's character resembling the enemy above supposed?—Whether in proportion to the predominance of those features, the security, and thereby, the value of peace were not reduced?—And consequently, whether we should not have been justified in offering but few cessions to obtain it?—But *in fact*, whether we did not make more and greater sacrifices, than we had ever done for any peace since the existence of the monarchy? —When they have answered these questions, let ministers tell us, whether having paid this high price, we are not bereft of the advantages of our contract, of the security which peace ought to bring, perhaps, plunged in a renewal of the war?—Then let them say, if they dare insult common sense so much, that the treaty of Amiens is not defective, which paid so high a consideration for such a paltry truce; or that they, who concluded that treaty, are not to blame, are not unworthy of confidence, are not guilty of the calamities that now threaten us.

The general character of the late peace is ample proof of the imbecility of its framers; but there is one article that even beggars the rest, I mean that respecting Malta, which was probably the germ of our present embarrassment. I grant we have no right to assume for certain, that Malta is the point in dispute at present: yet when we consider that the article which professed to restore the order, depended for its execution on the guarantee of a power not a party to the treaty, that that power has refused its guarantee, and that we have kept possession long after the time fixed by the late treaty for the evacuation of Malta had expired; we must naturally conclude, that Malta is at least one of the questions in discussion.— Nor ought we to wonder at this; for never was any thing stipulated in every part so contradictory and impracticable as the restoration and the patch-work government of the order.

The nugatory nature of that article was proved long ago *à priori*, and experience has since confirmed it. But for a ministry whose motto was present safety, and who claimed as their chief merit the restoration of peace, to leave an important point which was virtually undecided, which must require ulterior negotiation, and might therefore renew the war; and that too when treating with an ambitious conqueror who would never fear appealing to the sword, and when *we paid down* so vast a price for peace, seems little short of madness. If Buonaparté be hostilely inclined, as ministers fear, what better opportunity can he have to colour over a violation of the treaty

than Malta affords? And to whom does he owe this opportunity? If the Consul made peace only to prepare for war, no article was ever better contrived, on which to renew hostilities, and were it not known of what mild elements our ministry is composed, it would be natural to conclude, that they made peace with the same perfidious intention.—Of this however, all Europe will acquit them, and, even should they renew the war, very justly conclude, that they did it by accident.

Sir, these arguments against the treaty in general, and the article respecting Malta are not new. Mr. Addington and his colleagues have repeatedly heard them urged both in and out of Parliament, at the time they concluded this peace. They cannot plead ignorance, they sinned against the country with the truth before them.—And now they come to ask for confidence on the very occasion that proves them unworthy of it.

We cannot expect that those who sacrificed so much, and obtained only a precarious truce, will now conclude an arrangement that may hush all disputes without degradation; or that the projectors of Mr. Moore's expedition will not commit the honour of the nation by menaces made only to be abandoned, and by armaments fitted out with much noise and bluster, only to publish more completely our subsequent submission. This last, I own Sir, is what I dread. Ministers I see assume a threatening attitude, and strut the militia through the kingdom; but I fear, if they remain in office, they will soon be *planet struck* and submit. Our premier, may perhaps, attempt the part of the "bold thunder," while his noble colleague may perform the "brisk lightning;" but neither, I believe, will surpass Mr. Bayes's actors in the Rehearsal; nor much intimidate the hero of Jaffa, who, once cradled the rocking elements of civil discord, now "rides on the whirlwind and directs the storm."—The authors of the late peace will soon relapse into timidity under the name of confidence; and discover the virtues of Buonaparté where they first found them, in their own weakness. For, had they judged of the reliance to be placed on the treaty of Amiens, by the character of the other contracting party, had they estimated his character by his actions, and his future conduct by his past, they would not have committed this country to his faith or his moderation. If the nation tries them by the same standard, it will not repose the trust they claim; it will support the King against his enemies, but it will beseech him to call another to the field, nor entrust the banner of national honour to a hand, which, too feeble to wield the sword, will unfurl the ensign, only to lay it prostrate at the feet of a haughty rival.

I am Sir, &c. X.

ON ENGLAND.

From the Paris Journal, called the "Journal du Commerce," of March 18, 1803.

The peace of Europe is the act of the French Government. After so dreadful a war it was, no doubt, the most splendid favour which could ever be conferred on long suffering humanity; and cotemporaries will indubitably, in this respect, anticipate the judgment both of the historian and posterity at large—it required a considerable degree of ability to divert Paul I. from his cruel and long existing prejudices, and to detach him from a coalition to which he must have been the more devoted, as he was peculiarly influenced by romantic sentiments of honour and glory; this was the first measure adopted for carrying into execution a system not less bold than great, namely, of urging, (as it were, between France and Russia) the belligerent powers, and compelling them to make peace, and expedite the execution of former treaties—that conception, which has already proved so beneficial in its consequences, was the most powerful guarantee which had ever been given to Europe of a solid and permanent peace.—England had twice imposed upon us—Lord Cornwallis would have perhaps given us a repetition of the part which Malmesbury had played—the circle of Popilius was drawn, and the Treaty was concluded.—A message from the King of England to the House of Commons throws a dark shade over the Peace, which was so much wished for, over this Peace, which is as necessary for his own subjects, as for the other nations of Europe.—Now what does this same Message contain? What relates to heads of nations is to be spoken of with great circumspection and respect—supposing even that ridicule were to attach to their decrees, a different conduct would be attended with serious consequences; on such occasions, jesting must be out of the question.—The King of Great Britain thinks it necessary to inform the House of Commons that, on account of the great preparations carrying on in the Ports of France and Holland, he deems it expedient to resort to measures of precaution for the safety of his dominions.—We can neither deny nor dissemble the state in which our Navy and that of Holland stood at the conclusion of the war—a Nation should possess a military power in proportion to the extent of its territory, and of its commercial relations, as well as to the force which may eventually be brought against it—the first care, therefore, of our Government should have been to restore our navy. The British Government did not, to be sure, consider it was implied in the treaty that it could, at will, set limits to the number of our ships, and send over a Commissary to the port of Dunkirk!—Those days are gone by. Why then this uneasiness with regard to a Government which aimed so cordially at peace, which negotiated it with all its means, which commanded it with all its power, a peace which became so necessary for

all Europe, perishing by a war, as inveterate as it was unreasonable?—For the better understanding of this message, we think it will be sufficient to translate it into other words. What would be said of the French Government, if it transmitted the following message to the Legislative Body?—Government deems it necessary to inform the Legislative Body that, as the British Government does not burn at least one half of its navy; that as a certain degree of bustle prevails in the British ports, arsenals and dock yards;—and because it does not execute the treaties, &c. it judges it to be prudent to adopt measures of precaution for the safety of the State, &c.—There is certainly no difference between calling for the reduction of an existing force, or pretending to prevent the creation of a necessary force; but there would be a difference with respect to the Governments which would hold such language, and France might allege motives, which would not, perhaps, meet the approbation of the British Government, for we might repeat, it was the French who wished for, and who actually made and commanded peace; it was you, British Government, that wished for war—it is you then who are to be suspected, and who are calculated to awaken alarm.—England is borne down by an enormous debt, and she wishes to make us pay the interest of it, as well as the capital, by the means of a treaty of commerce, drawn up in a certain way—It is very good natured of her to make dupes of us! We think, however, that if Europe has no right to consider us as cowards, she can aduce no reasons to prove us to be fools. After having conquered with our arms; after having negotiated with equal ability, foresight, magnanimity, and resolution, it must be supposed that a Government which was capable of such achievements, would have greatly degenerated, if it consented at once to pay, indirectly, the expenses of the war which was waged against us, and to furnish the means of renewing it!—The period must come when Governments, as well as individuals, will do each other justice, and consent, through their own exertions, to extricate themselves from their embarrassment, however great, and into which their own imprudence plunged them, under pain of falling into a worse and more unenviable predicament.

On England.

From the Paris Journal, called the "Journal des Débats," of March 19, 1803.

England has created two singular privileges for itself: the first, in considering the commerce of the whole world as its exclusive property; the second, in indulging itself in the boldest discussions on the conduct of all governments, and in treating them with an insolence of language often insufferable. All the nations of Europe have been grossly insulted in the debates of the English Parliament since the treaty of Amiens. No person can deny this assertion, which is proved by the public journals. By virtue of the first privilege, England never patiently suffers any nation to extend its commerce; by the second, it considers the slightest observations of other governments on their privileges, as an attack upon its dignity; its pride is even offended when its own declarations are repeated by any other nation. It is in these two assumed privileges, and in their consequences, that the cause of the present extraordinary conduct of the British Minister must be sought; for it is impossible that any thing new could have occurred in the negotiations.—Let us take a review, in a few words, of what has passed since the meeting of Parliament. In his speech, on opening the session, the King did not affirm that his conduct towards France should be regulated according to the treaty of Amiens, but by the situation of Europe. This was to announce clearly, that the treaty (of which his Majesty took no notice) either should or should not be executed, according to circumstances.—The party, which disapproved of the peace, in the midst of the most indecorous charges on France, loudly demanded the non-execution of the treaty, in censuring the ministers for having concluded it. Have the ministers denied the possibility of a renewal of hostilities, and the disgraceful idea of a violation of the faith of treaties? No; they justified the peace with timidity; they claimed thanks for having concluded it; and they positively declared, that they would take the first favourable opportunity of renewing the war. Lord Hawkesbury urged no objection against war, but the danger of undertaking it without continental alliances; no member of administration objected that the national honour was pledged to the fulfilment of treaties; and the minister himself, at length avowing that he hesitated between peace and war, has demanded an establishment bordering upon both; that is to say double the peace establishment. Such has been the conduct of England since the treaty of Amiens; and it may be asserted upon good grounds, that the part in that country most inclined to peace, was that, which wished to gain time to sound the dispositions of the powers of Europe before they appealed to arms.—The French government has not uttered a complaint, but, leaving wholly to the English the liberty of discussing a treaty, which all parties had originally approved of, has confined itself to the cordial execution of the articles agreed on.—Three months after the opening of the English Parliament, the session of the Legislative Body commenced in France: the government presented a review of the situation of the Republic; and, according to custom, published to the nation the state of its relations. As the whole world saw and was acquainted with it, it was unavoidable to say, that the contending parties of England left the question of peace or war in the same uncertainty; and that Malta had not been evacuated, though it ought three months after the signing of the treaty. This public fact was mentioned with all the decorum which nations owe each other, even in their differences; and all that regarded England in the review of the situation of France, was so far from any hostile disposition, that it concluded with the following sentence: "Yes, no doubt, peace will "every day be more consolidated; the relations of "the two governments will assume that character "of benevolence which accords with their recipro-"cal interests. A happy repose will obliterate the "long calamities of a disastrous war; and both "France and England, in promoting their mutual "happiness, will deserve the gratitude of the whole "world."—The French, who all remember how many prospects of peace and happiness the review of the situation of France presented by the government gave rise to, will scarcely believe that it could become, with respect to England, an appeal to oppression, to invasion, and to arms.—We well know that the state of our finances has struck the English with astonishment: they have not known France since they regarded it but with animosity, whilst

we know England better than ever, because we view it without jealousy, as well as without admiration. We know also, that the revival of our commerce, the activity which the First Magistrate imparts to the nation, our mutual confidence, the prodigious effects of a single year of peace, must be displeasing to the English nation; but the sentiments of envy so natural to every people, exclusively commercial, cannot sufficiently explain the conduct of the English minister. "What is it then in the review of the situation of our country that could give him so much annoyance?" Could it be this expression—"The maritime peace is the want and desire of all nations; to preserve that, the government will do every thing compatible with the national honour essentially connected with the rigid execution of treaties?"—To demand the rigid execution of treaties, and to make that the foundation of national honour, is this to be guilty of blasphemy? Is this to threaten war? Is it not rather according to the consent of all nations to speak in favour of morality, of true policy, and of peace? and must not England have seriously determined beforehand to fail in the execution of treaties, thus livelily to be alarmed at a demand of the rigid execution of them? In case even that political motives should induce the French government to modify with good will the articles of any treaty whatsoever, so far as it saw no necessity for them, so far as it had not accepted any compensation; in a word, so far as it had come to no positive or publicly declared resolution; is it not its duty in addressing itself to France to make the rigid execution of known treaties the basis of national honour? In fact, it is only in the English Parliament, that the safety of the state and the national honour can be supported on contrary principles; but it was chiefly within the last year, that the falsest principles of politics became so prevalent in England, that a minister was heard to affirm, in a full house, even at the time he acknowledged the want of continental alliances—"It is true, war on the Continent is often unsuccessful to our allies, but it is always advantageous to us."—The English minister, who had till then been content to apologise for the peace, which he concluded with the approbation of the whole nation, takes advantage of a very innocent phrase, addressed by the head of the French government to the French people. Every thing is carried on with such rapidity, that the King is scarcely allowed time to return to London to subscribe the message, on a project of invasion, which existed only in the heads of those who desired to excite an alarm in England, which they felt not themselves. The English must have very soon lost the practice of watching the ports of France, to be ignorant that there was neither completed, nor preparing, any hostile armament in them.—This message, succeeded by a demand of 10,000 seamen, in addition to the 50,000 already granted by Parliament, was produced with such precipitancy, that the public funds fell 15 per cent.; a circumstance unexampled in England, without parallel in any country under an able minister, because, the art of government consists in avoiding the shock, whenever so great an alarm as the formidable possibility of war is given; it apprises the holders of stock; it avails itself, in support of the public credit, of the numberless means that are always in its power, and it succeeds in regulating the motions of the public funds. In a country, where, as in England, the finances depend entirely on opinion, it does much more injury to lower the funds 15 per cent. than the certainty of the pretended armaments in the ports of France and Holland could. What will be the issue of such inexplicable conduct? It would be difficult to decide.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Cape of Good Hope.—Articles of Agreement—Concluded this 31st Day of December, 1802, between Colonel Hamilton, Deputy Quarter Master General, and John Pringle, Esq. Commissary-General, duly authorized for that purpose by their Excellencies Lieutenant-General Dundas, and Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Curtis, Bart. on the part of his Britannic Majesty; and Rear-Admiral S. Dekker, Commander in Chief of the Batavian Fleet for the East Indies, and Colonel Henry, Commander of the Cape Garrison, also duly authorized by his Excellency the Commissary-General De Mist, on the part of the Batavian Republic.

Article I. Every thing shall be considered as remaining on the same footing that was stipulated by mutual assent this morning, before the arrival of the orders of his Britannic Majesty.—Remark. The Lieutenant-Governor agrees to this proposition, without any prejudice, however, to the full exercise of his authority in all points whatever, agreeable to the orders he has recived.—Art. II. The Commissary-General de Mist shall be at liberty to encamp or canton the Batavian troops in the neighbourhood of Cape Town, and to select for that purpose the most convenient position for the health, safety, and accommodation of these troops.—Remark. They shall encamp or canton in the neighbourhood of Wynberg, and it is to be understood that they are not to move from thence beyond the usual distance allowed in a camp, without the knowledge and concurrence of the Lieutenant-governor.—Art. III. Their Excellencies shall not hinder the free transport of baggage, arms, and every thing else necessary for encamping or cantoning the troops.—Remark. Agreed to, provided that not more than 8 field pieces (6 pounders) shall be carried to camp.—Art. IV. A free communication shall be allowed with the Batavian ships, whether of war or transport, now in the Bay, or which may arrive hereafter; and no impediment shall be made to the disembarkation of any troops that may still arrive, or to their arms, ammunition, and baggage.—Remark. Agreed to, in consequence of the orders received from his Britannic Majesty to avoid any possible step which could lead to even the apprehension of an hostile motive, but only in so far as relates to the troops intended for the garrison of the Cape.—Art. V. All Batavian ships, whether of war, transport, or commerce, shall have permission to prosecute their voyages, or to return to Europe, according to the orders they may have on this subject, and which the Commissary-General shall deem necessary to give them.—Remark. Agreed to.—Art. VI. In case his Excellency, Lieutenant-General Dundas, shall receive any orders from Europe relative to the present state of affairs, he shall communicate them to the Commissary-General; and in the event of these orders leading to acts of hostility, he engages to give the Commissary-General eight days previous notice, in order that he may take such measures, either for remaining in, or leaving this colony, with every person and thing under his orders, as be necessary, engaging himself to act reciprocally in this respect towards his excellency.—Remark. Agreed to, it being clearly understood, that the privilege of either staying in, or leaving, the colony, with every thing belonging to his Majesty or individuals, is equally left to the option of their Excellencies.—Art. VII. The only object of the present agreement being the maintenance of good order, the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic promises to do every

thing that depends on him to prevent disturbances, or any act which might disturb the public peace in the district where the troops may be stationed.—Remark. Their Excellencies will most cordially concur in carrying into effect the object of this article.—Art. VIII. To ensure the subsistence of the troops of the two nations, the Lieutenant-Governor shall in no manner hinder the supply of the Batavian troops, as the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic, on his part, will in no way interfere or prevent supplies from the interior going into Cape Town.—Remark. Agreed to in the terms of the preceding article.—Art. IX. None of these arrangements shall be interpreted at any time against the Batavian Republic, or against the Commissary-General, as abandoning in any shape the clear right that the peace of Amiens has given them to the cession of this colony.—Remark. Certainly not. —Art. X. Sending detachments to hinder any disturbances in the neighbourhood of the camp, or to constrain the Hottentots, as well as for the escort of provisions, either to the Batavian Camp or to Cape Town, shall not be considered as moving the troops from the position fixed upon. The Batavian troops shall not return to Cape Town during this agreement, neither shall the English troops take up any position out of the castle or forts, which can molest the Batavian camp in any manner.—Remark. Agreed to, provided such disturbances either threaten or have actually taken place, and that the safe-guards for waggons, &c. do not exceed what is usual for such purposes.—Art. XI. In case of any doubts or difficulties arising concerning the true meaning of the present agreement, they shall be explained in the most advantageous manner for carrying into effect the salutary motives which have induced their Excellencies and the Commissary-General of the Batavian Republic to enter into it; and more especially for ensuring to the Commissary-General, the Governor and General in Chief, and the officers civil and military, the greatest security, liberty and independence. The whole in order to cement more strongly the good intelligence so happily established between their Excellencies and the Commissary General of the Batavian Republic.—Remark. Fully agreed to.

Government Proclamation.—By his Honour Lieutenant-General Francis Dundas, Colonel of his Majesty's Scotch Brigade, Governor, Acting Governor, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Castle, Town, and Settlement of the Cape of Good Hope, in South Africa, and of the Territories and Dependencies thereof, and Ordinary and Vice-Admiral of the same.

Whereas the circumstances that have lately occurred might excite in the breasts of the ill-disposed part of the community, opinions and designs prejudicial to the public welfare and repose; and whereas any attempts originating from such opinions and designs to interrupt the public peace, can have no other effect than to produce disorder and confusion, misery and ruin; the destruction of families, and a general desolation in the country: in order to prevent, as far as possible, such direful consequences, I do hereby prohibit, in the most positive manner, on pain of prompt execution of military law, which by virtue of powers in me vested, I do hereby proclaim, all assemblages of armed peasants, or other inhabitants of any description whatsoever, unless by my authority and commands, conveyed in the usual manner to the Landrosts or other officers properly qualified to issue the same. And all the inhabitants of this settlement, bound by the oath of allegiance they have taken to his Britannic Majesty, are hereby warned of the fatal consequences that must inevitably ensue to themselves, their families, and property, by any deviation from this public order; it being my positive resolution to enforce a strict and literal obedience to the same. —And whereas it is expedient, during the present state of the settlement, that the inhabitants in general, both of Cape Town and the country districts, should not be permitted to quit their habitations, I do further forbid all persons residing in this town from leaving the same with their families, for the purpose of changing their places of abode, without my special leave and authority; and those of the country districts without the knowledge and approbation of the respective Landrosts and Heemraaden.—Given under my hand and seal at the castle of Good Hope, this 2d day of January, 1803.—(Signed) *Francis Dundas.*

By command of his Honour the Lieutenant and acting Governor.—*A. Barnard, Sec.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

*Napper Tandy's Second Letter to Mr. Elliot.—**For the First see p. 361.*

Sir—Eight weeks have passed since I wrote to you. My request has been neither accepted nor even acknowledged. I now appeal to the public for my revenge against your attack. Had the condition of my unfortunate country been the subject of the debate, there might have been room perhaps for allusions to my name; but that was not the case. The debate was respecting a tax to be imposed on Great Britain, in which, I as citizen of France, could be, upon no fair pretence, brought in. The baseness of such conduct must be striking to the whole world. A brave man would never attack the defenceless nor the absent. In my letter I scrupulously avoided all retort against you. I used no expression that could hurt the feelings of a man of honour, though in so doing I might have been justified by your example. I simply made that appeal, to which every man has a right, when his honour is injured. But since you take your stand behind certain indefinite privileges, behind the extravagant idea, that a member of the British Parliament.————I am now forced to declare, after this explanation of your conduct, that Mr. Elliot is —— (The words here made use of we shall not insert.)

(Signed) NAPPER TANDY.

Decree of the Captain-General and Colonial Prefect of Martinico, relative to the Duties on French and Foreign Merchandize, issued the 1st Jan. 1803.

French merchandize shall pay no import nor export duty.—Foreign vessels shall pay an import duty of two per cent. on the value of their cargo. —Foreign vessels clearing outwards with a lading of rum and molasses shall pay a duty of two per cent. *ad valorem.*—Foreign vessels entering with a cargo, and departing in ballast shall pay 9 per cent. on the value of their imports.—Such of the said vessels as sail without a complete cargo, or with one not equal in value to the cargo imported, shall pay 9 per cent. on such part of the proceeds as shall not be laid out in the purchase of colonial produce.—Spanish vessels are exempted from all import and export duties.

Decree of the Batavian Legislature, relative to the mode of the Repayment of the Batavian Rescriptions, payable after the Peace.

The Legislative Body of the Batavian Republic having deliberated on the Message of the Government, dated 11th Feb. 1803, has thought proper, in conformity with the proposition contained in the said Message, to authorise the Government, 1st, to consider as void, the 5th article of the law of the 14th of Jan. last, according to which the Batavian rescriptions, payable after the peace, which should not have been negotiated away before the 22d of Sept. this year, should be converted into national debt not payable; 2d, to offer the holders of these rescriptions, who wish to vest them in the voluntary loan, the same terms which are offered to the holders of India Stock, comprising the following advantages, viz. for 1000 florins in Rescriptions or India Stock, and 800 florins in cash, 3000 florins in National Obligations, producing 3 per cent. perpetual interest. Also a receipt for 50 florins, in addition to which 150 florins in cash will procure a share of 400 florins in the loan to be raised by lottery according to the plan annexed to the voluntary loan of 1802; these shares to be converted into a national debt, bearing interest of 2½ per cent.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Copy of a Letter addressed by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, to the Lord Lieutenants of the Maritime Counties in Great Britain.—Whitehall, 9th March, 1803.

My Lord,—As there is reason to think that aliens landing in this kingdom from the continent, neglect in many instances to make their declarations to the magistrates of the places where they reside, as required by the provisions of the 9th and 10th clauses of the Alien Act, a copy of which I inclose, I am to request that your Lordship will be so good as to call the particular attention of the magistrates in the county of to this circumstace, and to desire them to enforce the provisions of the above-mentioned clauses, with respect to such aliens within their several jurisdictions, as have neglected to comply therewith, and at the same time to return to me a list of such aliens.—I am, &c.—*Pelham.*

The Lord Lieutenant of the county of

(Circular.)—Downing-Street, March 1803.—I have the honour to herewith his Majesty's warrant, directing to draw out and embody the Militia of the county of and I have received his Majesty's commands, to desire that will take the necessary steps for carrying this measure into execution with the least possible delay.—I am further to desire that will cause the earliest communication of the day and place which may be appointed for the assembling of the Militia of the county of to be made to the Secretary at War, in order that directions may be given for the issue of the pay of the men, and that such other arrangements may be made, on this occasion, as more immediately belong to his department.—I conclude that the intimation conveyed in the Secretary of War's circular letter, of the 6th of November last, to the several commanding officers of Militia, respecting the arms and accoutrements for the different corps, has been duly attended to; but, in case the number necessary for the Militia should be incomplete, immediate application must be made to the Board of Ordnance for the quantity of arms, and to the War-Office respecting the accoutrements that are still deficient.—In the event of the Militia of the county of not being complete, I am directed by his Majesty to recommend, that the most decisive measures should be taken for supplying the deficiencies, and for enforcing the several provisions of the Act.—I have the honour to be, &c.—*Hobart.*

To his Majesty's Lieutenant of the County of

To Officers on Half-Pay.—War-Office, March 12, 1803.—All officers on the half-pay of the land forces, resident in Great Britain and Ireland, who are not serving in the militia, or who do not hold offices under Government, are hereby required immediately to transmit to the inspecting field officers of the recruiting districts, within which they respectively reside, an account in writing of their age, past services, and present place of abode, in order that their services may be called for as circumstances shall render it expedient: And such as think themselves, from age or infirmities, unfit for further service, even in this country, are to accompany their reports with sufficient vouchers of their inability, and the causes thereof Such officers on half-pay as are serving in the militia, or are otherwise employed under Government, (officers of the yeomanry and volunteer corps excepted, whose reports are to be made to the inspecting field officers of districts as abovementioned), are to transmit similar accounts to the Secretary at War, specifying also the nature of the public situations which they possess.—The inspecting field officers of districts will make returns to the Secretary at War of the names of the officers who shall report themselves in pursuance of the above notice. And every officer who shall neglect to make his report, either to a district field officer, or to the Secretary at War, according to the circumstances of his situation, within one month from the date hereof, will be considered as otherwise provided for, or dead, and his name will be struck off the half-pay list accordingly.—By his Majesty's command,—*C. York.*

General Orders.—Horse-Guards, March 12, 1803.—It is the King's pleasure that, notwithstanding any leave of absence granted by his Majesty, or by the Commander in Chief, all officers belonging to regiments in Great Britain, or on foreign stations, do join their respective corps without delay, except such officers as are employed on the recruiting service, or upon any public duty.—By order of H. R. H. the Commander in Chief,

Harry Calvert, Adj. Gen. of the Forces.

General Orders.—Horse Guards, March 18, 1803.—It is the Commander in Chief's pleasure, that the enclosed copy of a letter to the colonel of the 83d regiment shall be read at the head of every regiment in the service, and entered in the regimental orderly books.—By his Royal Highness's command.—Harry Calvert, Adjutant-General.

(Copy.)—Horse Guards, March 18, 1803.—Sir,—I am directed by the Commander in Chief to express to you, the extreme concern with which his Royal Highness received the representations made by certain magistrates of the county of Essex, of the enormities which have been lately committed in the vicinity of Chelmsford, by the regiment under your command. Though his Royal Highness entertained, in his own mind, little doubt as to the cause to which these disgraceful instances of indiscipline were to be attributed, he avoided giving any opinion on the subject, till

all the circumstances relative thereto were investigated, and had been reported on by a general officer, on whose judgment, discretion, and impartiality, his Royal Highness could place the most perfect reliance. After these previous steps, his Royal Highness judged it proper to make a detailed report of every circumstance which had come to his knowledge, to the King; the result of which I am now to communicate to you by his Royal Highness's command.—His Majesty is pleased to direct, that it shall be expressed to the 83d regiment, that the conduct of certain individuals of the corps has been such, as has brought disgrace on the regiment; and, both in a civil and military point of view, has incurred his Majesty's highest displeasure. His Majesty particularly laments, that certain officers of the regiment have been most scandalously deficient in that zeal, energy and activity, in the discharge of their duty, which the circumstances complained of so strongly demanded; and that instead of co-operating with the Commanding Officer, and assisting him in his endeavours to curb the licentiousness of the soldiers, they have rather endeavoured to prevent the discovery of the offenders, and by the remissness of their own conduct, have set an example of indiscipline, which has produced the exact effect which might be expected on the men.—His Majesty will not allow officers, so destitute of those feelings, which a due sense of what they owe to themselves, and a proper regard for the honour of their profession, ought to have inspired, to occupy situations of important command and respectability in the service, while others of approved talents and zeal are removed from the active duties of it. On this principle, his Majesty is pleased to direct, that Lieutenant-Colonel John Byrne Skerrett, and the Captains William Armstrong and Lewis Grant, of the 83d regiment, shall be immediately placed on half-pay.—The Commander in Chief directs, that you declare at the head of the 83d regiment, which is to be under arms on the occasion, these, his Majesty's commands; and you will take that opportunity of impressing the necessity of each individual exerting himself, in order to wipe off the stigma which the misconduct (it is to be hoped) of a few, has brought on the regiment. To the officers, it is particularly necessary, that you should address yourself; for it is by their endeavours, that the discipline of the regiment must be restored. In their station, each individual must be a benefit or a detriment to the service, and the Commander in Chief desires they may be most solemnly assured, that his Royal Highness considers it as much his indispensable duty, to recommend to his Majesty the removal from his service, of any (whatever their rank may be), who fall under the latter description, as it is his inclination to promote the interests and welfare of those, whose conduct is calculated to support the discipline of the regiment, and to entitle them to the favour and protection of their sovereign.—It is his Royal Highness's command, that Lieutenant-Colonel Skerrett, and the Captains Armstrong and Grant, shall immediately quit the quarters of the 83d regiment.—I have the honour to be, &c.—(Signed)—Harry Calvert, Adjutant General.

Lieutenant-General James Balfour, or Officer commanding the 83d regiment.

SIR THOMAS TROUBRIDGE.——*(To the Editor of the Morning Chronicle.)*—Sir,—A most malicious and unfounded report having been propagated that Sir Thomas Troubridge, availing himself of the knowledge derived from his official situation, had directed the sale of his stock from the funds on Monday and Tuesday last, I deem it incumbent upon me, as the actor in the business transacted, to put the public in possession of the whole fact.—Having had the honour of managing all his concerns for these twelve years past, he, about two months ago, informed me he should, in all probability, want his money in March or April, as he had in view the purchase of an estate, and he therefore desired me to watch the progress of the funds, and to sell his stock if I saw them falling, that he might not be put to inconvenience and loss at the time it might be wanted; and I was not to wait for further, or particular directions, but to use my own discretion.—Under these circumstances, I observed the funds drooping on the Saturday preceding, and on the Monday following having attended at the Bank, and seeing them still falling, and very large sums selling out, I deemed it a duty I owed my employer to order my broker to sell out Sir Thomas Troubridge's stock, and which was accordingly done without my having had any communication with him, either directly or indirectly, until the transaction was over.—I have made oath to the truth of the above declaration, which is struck up at the Stock Exchange.—I am, Sir, &c.—*William Ely Cooke.*

Hart-Street, Bloomsbury, March 14.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p.* 429.

Tuesday, March 15.—COMMONS.—Mr. Dickenson, jun. brought up a report from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Herefordshire election, stating that J. G. Cotterell, Esq. was not duly elected, but that Sir J. Cornwall was duly elected, and that the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious. A new writ was then ordered to be issued for the election of a member in the room of the former.—Report of the Grand Junction Canal was brought up and agreed to.—Irish Customs Bill read a third time and passed.—Bill for making a provision for the wives and children of militia men of Ireland called out upon actual service, read a first time.

Wednesday, March 16.—LORDS.—Prince of Wales' Annuity Bill read a third time and passed.—Irish Post-Office Duty Bill read a third time and ordered back to the Committee.

COMMONS.—Sir M. Ridley moved the order of the day for calling John Hall, guilty of prevarication and perjury in his evidence before the Great Grimsby Committee, to the bar of the House. He was brought to the bar accordingly, and after being reprimanded by the Speaker, ordered to be discharged on paying his fees.—Mr. H. Browne reported, from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the petitions complaining of an undue election for the town and county of the town of Nottingham, that the said Committee had determined that Joseph Birch, Esq. was not duly elected to serve in Parliament for the said town; also that D. P. Coke, Esq. was not duly elected; also that last election was void with respect to one of the burgesses; also that not any, nor either of the petitions were frivolous nor vexatious; and that the opposition of Joseph Birch, Esq. was not frivolous nor vexatious. Mr. H. Browne reported likewise the several resolutions agreed to by that Committee. The report was ordered for further consideration on the 20th of April. Mr. H. Browne then moved, that no writ be issued for the election of a burgess for Nottingham, until after the consideration of the re-

port. Agreed to.—Captain Markham moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the conduct of Sir Thomas Trowbridge, relative to certain transactions which were reported to have taken place on the Stock Exchange." A short debate ensued, which will be preserved in our *Supplement*; but as the motion was not seconded, the business, of course, fell to the ground. —The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the nature and extent of the charges on the Civil List, and to consider of the best means of preventing the accumulation of debt on it."—On the motion for the first reading of the Irish Militia Bill, a debate ensued, which will be given in our *Supplement*. Bill read a first time.—Militia Law Consolidating Bill read a second time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill and Irish Militia Families Provision Bill read a first time.

Thursday, March 17.—LORDS.—Insolvent Debtor's Bill, and Irish Chalking Act read a second time.

COMMONS.—The House proceeded to ballot for a Committee to try the merits of the election for the borough of Ilchester, and also for East Grinstead.—Irish Militia Bill read a second time.—The Grenada and St. Vincent Loan Bill read a second time.—Fred. Shuttleworth was brought in and reprimanded by the Speaker, for having prevaricated in his evidence before the Nottingham Committee. Mr. Addington moved, that the Speaker's address be entered on the Journals of the House. Agreed *nem. con.*—Bank Restriction Bill read a second time.—Dublin Watch Bill read a third time.

Friday, March 18.—LORDS.—Counsel were heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crauford and others, *v.* Coutts.—The report of the Committee of Privileges, relative to the promotion of Lord Viscount Limerick to an earldom was taken into consideration, and the patent creating his lordship an earl of that part of the United Kingdom was read; after which his lordship was conducted to the Earl's Bench, where he took his seat.—The Earl of Carlisle gave notice, that it was his intention to bring forward a motion on an early day, respecting the artificers of his Majesty's Dock Yards. His Lordship's speech on the occasion will be preserved in our *Supplement*.

COMMONS.—Sir M. W. Ridley reported from the Great Grimsby Committee, that J. H. Loft was not duly elected, and that W. Mellish ought to have been elected, and, therefore, he is duly elected. The Deputy Clerk of the Crown was then called in, and the return for Great Grimsby altered in conformity to the report.—Sir M. W. Ridley brought up another report from the same Committee, stating that John Simpson, Mayor of Great Grimsby, had, on the day before the election, held a full Court, and had unlawfully, and of his own authority, admitted persons as Freemen, who ought not to have been admitted, &c. Report ordered to be taken into consideration on the 29th inst.—Bill for suspending the Act of Henry VIII. relative to Clergymen read a first time.—Militia Officers Bill read a second time. The debate which took place on this occasion, will be given in our *Supplement*.—Mr. Johnstone moved, "that the receipts and disbursements relative to the Island of Ceylon, be laid before the house." Ordered.—Post-Office Bill read a first and second time.—Expiring Laws Bill, and Irish Lawsuit Bill read a third time and passed.

Monday, March 21.—LORDS.—Counsel were further heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—The Earl of Carlisle moved, "that the proper officers do lay before this House, a monthly return of all the artificers employed in his Majesty's Dock Yards, from the month of May 1802, to the present period." After a debate of some length, which will be given in our *Supplement*, the motion was withdrawn.

COMMONS.—Mr. Burdon moved, "that a Committee be appointed to inquire into so much of the Election Trial Bill, as relates to the employment of persons skilled in the art of writing Short Hand, to take the evidence adduced before such Committees; that they do consider of the expense occasioned thereby, and the means by which they shall be paid; and that they do report the same to the House." Ordered.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a second time.—Report of the Committee on East-India Accounts was taken into further consideration, and, after a short debate, for which see our *Supplement*, the resolutions were all read and agreed to.—Irish Postage Bill read a third time and passed.

Tuesday, March 22.—LORDS.—Bill to prevent vexatious Suits in Ireland read a second time.—Irish Postage Duty Bill brought up from the Committee.

COMMONS.—Lord Euston informed the House, that James Trotter, who had been ordered into custody, in consequence of a report from the Dumfirmline Select Committee, and after whom the Serjeant at Arms had been desired to make further enquiry, had yesterday surrendered himself, and was now in the custody of the Serjeant at Arms, to await the decision of that House.—The Bill for allowing Vessels employed in the Greenland Trade to take in their full complement of men at certain ports, during the present season, was read a first time.—In a Committee on the Militia Officer's Bill, the resolutions were agreed to, and the report ordered to be brought up, (see *Supplement*).—Mr. Tierney moved, "that there be laid before the House an account of the Increase and Decrease in the Salaries of all Public Officers for 1802." Ordered.—Grenada Loan Bill read a second time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill read a third time and passed.

Wednesday, March 23 —LORDS.. —Paddington Canal Bill read a third time.—Irish Bank Restriction Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—A new writ was ordered for Brackley, in the room of General Egerton, who has succeeded to the title of Earl of Bridgewater.—Alderman Anderson moved for leave to bring in a Bill for constructing a new Burying Ground in the parish of St. Giles's. Leave granted.—Greenland Whale Fishery Bill read a second time.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the House should resolve itself into a Committee of Supply; and that the account of grants for Great Britain, presented to the House on the 23d of February, should be referred to the said Committee.—Ordered.—He then stated, that the sums which he proposed to move should be granted to his Majesty, would amount, altogether, to 920,000l. of which 868,000l. would be for the discharge of Exchequer Bills, issued in pursuance of the acts of the 39th, 40th, 41st, and 42d, of his present Majesty.—The following Resolutions were then moved and agreed to:—868,923l. 8s. 1d. for the discharge of the Exchequer Bills above described.—1910l. 10s. to make good money advanced to the Commissioners for reducing the National Debt, for the payment of salaries to their officers, and other incidental expences.—500l. for extra trouble to the officers employed in making out Exchequer Bills.

—25,564l. 13s. 6d. to the Bank of England, for discount on the Loan of 1802; and 22,538l. 2s. 2d. to ditto, for receiving the contribution to ditto.—371l. 17s. to John Wilmott, Esq. for examination of certain American claims.—3600l. for certain incidental expenses for the last year.

The Master of the Rolls moved for leave to bring in a Bill to remove certain inconveniencies and disabilities to which the Catholics of Great Britain are at present subject, in consequence of two oaths prescribed by the Acts of the 18th and 31st. of his present Majesty.—Leave granted, and the Bill read a first time.—Irish Militia Bounty Bill read a third time and passed.—The Attorney General moved, "that leave be given to bring in a Bill for appointing commissioners to ascertain the individuals who had claims upon a certain fund of 600,000l. which, according to a convention of the year 1800, the American government had agreed to pay by installments; and to distribute the fund accordingly." Leave granted.—Report of the Militia Officers Bill brought up.—Upon the motion for the amendments being read, a short debate ensued, for which see Supplement. Amendments read and agreed to.

Thursday, March 24.—LORDS.—Royal Assent given by commission to about forty public and private Bills.—Irish postage Bill read a third time and passed.

COMMONS.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented the following

MESSAGE FROM HIS MAJESTY.

"G. R. His Majesty having taken into his serious consideration the many eminent services of Sir James Saumarez, Bart. K.B. Rear Admiral of the Blue, and particularly his engagement with the Spaniards in the Streights of Gibraltar, on the 12th July, 1801, has deemed it proper to communicate this his most gracious consideration to this House, in order that his most faithful Commons may take such steps as will enable his Majesty to reward such signal services, by the settlement of an annuity of 1200l. upon the said Sir James Saumarez for the term of his natural life. G. R."—The Chancellor of the Exchequer then moved that the above most gracious message be taken into consideration in a committee of the whole House to-morrow. Ordered.—St. Giles's Burying Ground Bill, Duke of Athol's Bridge Bill, and Southampton Water Works Bill read a first time.—Woolwich Trustee Bill read a second time.—Clergy Non Residence Bill read a third time and passed.

Friday, March 25.—LORDS.—Lord Pelham brought down a message from his Majesty similar to that delivered to the Commons yesterday, which, on his Lordship's motion, was ordered to be taken into consideration on Monday.—Royal assent given by commission, to the Irish Office-Duty Bill, and to some other public and private Bills.

COMMONS.—Mr. Mac Dowall moved for leave to bring in a Bill for erecting a Theatre in the town of Glasgow. Granted.—The petition of James Trotter, who had been summoned as a witness on the Dumfermline committee, was presented by Lord Euston. On the motion of the noble Lord, "that James Trotter be on Monday next brought to the Bar of that House and discharged," a conversation of considerable length succeeded, which turned upon a point of form by which the House might, with the greatest propriety, regulate their proceedings in this case. It will be preserved in our *Supplement*. It was then ordered, that James Trotter should be brought to the Bar of that House on Monday next.—In a committee of the whole House on his Majesty's most gracious message respecting Sir James Saumarez, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that it is the opinion of this committee, that the sum of 1200l. per annum, be granted out of the consolidated fund of Great Britain, to be settled on Rear Admiral Sir James Saumarez, for the term of his natural life." The question was then put, and carried unanimously.—In a committee of the whole House, to consider further of ways and means for raising the supply granted to his Majesty, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that it is the opinion of this committee, that towards raising a supply granted to his Majesty, the further sum of four millions be raised by loan in Exchequer Bills." Granted.—American Compensation Commissioners Bill read a second time, and committed for Monday.—Surveyor General of the Forests Office Bill read a third time and passed.—Report of Greenland Fishery Bill brought up and agreed to.

Monday, March 28.—LORDS.—Counsel were further heard relative to the important Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—Irish Chalking Bill read a first time.—Irish Militia Bounty Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—A report was brought up from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Chippenham election, stating that Mr. Brooks was not duly elected, and that Mr. Maitland was duly elected. The Clerk of the Crown was then ordered to amend the return accordingly.—Glasgow Theatre Bill read a first time.—Stephen Brooks, who was guilty of prevarication before the Nottingham Committee, was brought to the bar of the House, and after a reprimand from the Speaker, discharged.—Greenland Whale Fishery Bill read a third time and passed.—Catholic Oath Bill read a second time.—On the order of the day being read for bringing James Trotter to the bar of the House, who had wilfully absented himself from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Dumfermline election; and the question being put "that James Trotter be now discharged on paying his fees," a debate of considerable length took place, which will be given in our *Supplement*. The motion was negatived, and the question was then put, "that so much of the minutes of the evidence given before the Dumfermline Committee as relates to James Trotter, be laid before the House." Ordered.—Mr. Addington moved, "that a Committee be appointed to enquire into the joint expenditure of the United Kingdom, from the 1st of Jan. 1801, to the 1st of Jan. 1803, and the sums contributed to the state of Great Britain and Ireland respectively." Ordered.—General Gascoyne moved, "that leave be given to bring in a bill to equalize by weight the bushel of all salt imported to Ireland." Motion withdrawn.—Militia Officer's Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Vansittart moved for an account of all rock and white salt exported from Great Britain for the three years ending the 5th Jan. 1793, and for the three years ending the 5th Jan. 1803. Ordered.

Tuesday, March 29.—LORDS.—Counsel heard on behalf of the claim of the Rev. E. Timewell Brydges, to the Barony of Chandos.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—Mr. J. Smyth brought up the report of the Committee appointed to try the merits of the election for the borough of Ilchester. It stated that W. Hunter, Esq. and T. Plummer, Esq. were not duly elected; that the petitioners, Sir

W. Manners, and J. Graham, Esq. were not duly elected; and that the election for the said borough was void. Mr. Smyth stated, that he was further directed by the Committee, to report, that such a system of corruption had been formed, and so many instances of individual bribery had been discovered previous to the election, that the Committee thought it necessary to communicate the same to the House: he concluded by moving, "that the minutes of the evidence taken before the Committee should be laid before the House." Ordered.—A new writ for Ilchester was ordered to be issued out.—Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and Exchequer Loan Bill read a first time.—Clergy Non-residence Bill, and Woolwich Ordnance Bill read a third time and passed.

Wednesday, March 30.—LORDS.—Counsel finally heard relative to the Scotch Appeal, Crawfurd *v.* Coutts.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a second time. The debate which took place on this occasion will be given in our *Supplement*.—A copy of the relevant proceedings in the Consistory Court of York being duly laid before the House, the bill to dissolve the marriage between the Rev. George Markham, and Susan his wife, was read a first time.

COMMONS.—The Speaker read a letter from Vice-Admiral Rainier, acknowledging the thanks of the House to him, and the officers under his command, and expressing his high gratification of the polite manner the Speaker had communicated the same.—A report was brought up from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Renfrew election, stating that Alexander Houston was not duly elected, and that Boyle Alexander was duly elected, and that none of the petitions were frivolous or vexatious. The Deputy Clerk was ordered to amend the return accordingly.—In a Committee of the whole House, on the Grenada Loan Bill, the blanks in the bill were filled up, and the period for paying the money is to extend from the 4th of October, to the 5th of March, 1804.—Roman Catholic Oath Bill read a second time.—A message from the Lords stated, that they had agreed to the Irish Militia Bill, without any amendment.—Sir James Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and Exchequer Loan Bill read a second time.

General Distribution of the British Army, APRIL 1, 1803.	Regulars. Cav.	Inf.	Tot Ba.
England and Wales	20	29	49
North Britain	2	4	6
Ireland	7	23	30
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	5	5
Gibraltar	—	6	6
Egypt and Malta	—	8	8
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	4	4
West-Indies	—	23	23
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	5	5
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	19	24
On Passage to England or Ireland	1	6	7
Total	33	132	167

The above statement is exclusive of artillery, engineers, artificers, and Militia.

FRENCH FUNDS.—March 16th, 58 fr. 50.—18th, 60 fr. 60.—19th, 59 fr.—21st, 56 fr.—23d, 57 fr.—24th, 55 fr. 90.—25th, 55 fr.—26th, 54 fr. 40.

BR. NAVY, 1st APRIL.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot.
In Port and fitting, and with sealed orders	25	3	20	49	97
English and Irish Channels	0	0	21	10	31
Downs and North Sea	1	2	15	16	34
West-Indies and Passage	2	0	6	21	29
Jamaica station	10	0	6	8	24
America and Newfoundland	0	1	3	4	8
Cape of G. Hope, East-Indies,	5	6	9	15	35
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	0	0	1	2	3
Mediterranean and on Passage	11	2	21	12	46
Hospital and Prison Ships	1	0	0	0	1
Total in Commission	55	14	103	138	310
Receiving Ships	5	1	8	1	15
Serviceable and repairing	29	4	17	4	54
In Ordinary	83	5	77	66	231
Building	24	1	12	9	46
Total	196	25	217	218	656
ORDINARY.					
Portsmouth	37	2	24	13	76
Plymouth	39	1	21	23	84
Chatham	38	6	20	3	67
Sheerness	1	1	8	7	17
River	2	0	29	25	56
Total	117	10	102	71	300

PRICE OF STOCKS.—MARCH.

Day of Month	Omnium	5 per Ct. 1797.	5 per Ct. Ann.	4 per C. Con.	3 per C. Con.	3 per C. R. An.	Bank Stock
11	14 di	—	96⅝	—	63⅞	—	182
12	15	—	96½	—	63¾	—	180
14	14½	—	97	—	63	—	—
15	14¼	—	96¾	—	62⅞	—	—
16	14½	—	98	—	65¼	—	178
17	12½	—	99¼	—	65⅜	—	—
18	13½	—	99	—	65⅞	—	178
19	13	—	100	—	65½	—	181
21	11½	—	99¾	—	65⅛	—	—
22	12⅝	—	99½	—	64¾	—	—
23	12¾	—	99½	—	64½	—	—
24	12¼	—	99	—	64⅜	—	—
25	12½	—	—	—	64⅝	—	—
26	13¼	—	98¼	—	64⅝	—	—
28	11¼	—	99⅛	—	66	—	—
29	13½	—	98¼	—	62	—	177
30	15½	—	96¼	—	61¼	—	—
31	16	—	97½	—	61	—	177

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

☞ As several articles which have been left for the purpose of insertion in our Register, but which we have not deemed suitable for publication, have afterwards been sent for; we beg it to be generally understood by our Correspondents, that all anonymous articles of the above description will, henceforth, be immediately committed to the flames, unless directions, specifying where they are to be returned are sent with them.

ERRATUM.—Page 391, line 8, for *and mock* read *and not mock*.

LONDON,

TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

SIR,—The peace of Amiens was, by you and your colleagues, defended, principally, upon the ground of *œconomy*. You have, indeed, at different times, styled it a peace of honour, a peace of security, a peace of experiment, and, finally, a peace of the people; but, the standing defence, the reply to every argument, the opiate for every apprehension, the compensation for every sacrifice whether of interest or of honour, has been, *the œconomy of peace*. All mankind dislike paying taxes, of any and of every sort. Men of reflexion and of elevated minds, will, indeed, prefer the bearing of taxation, and will even support poverty and misery, rather than see the safety of their country endangered, or its honour tarnished; but, with the mass of every people, to get rid of pecuniary burdens is, at all times, a positive good; and, in a country where a great portion of the wealth of individuals consists of a species of property, the value of which is enhanced by every diminution in the expenses of the state, a measure, be it wise or unwise, be it virtuous or wicked, which promises *a reduction of public expenditure*, will seldom fail to be received with general applause. Aware of this selfish propensity, you, Sir, seem to have availed yourself, to the full extent, of the temporary advantage which it gave you over your opponents, who appealed to the better, but, unfortunately, less prevalent feelings of the people.—Had you, however, in pursuance of this your art of acquiring and preserving popularity, confined your statements within the bounds of *truth*, though I should still have condemned the principle, I should have had no disposition to bestow any particular censure on the practice; had the œconomy of the peace of Amiens been *fairly* laid before the public, I should still have despised the people, who could look upon œconomy, whatever its magnitude, as a compensation for the loss of permanent security and of honour; but, I should have been ready to acquit you of an intention to abuse those despicable people; had you, in order to preserve your place, your power, and your profits; had you, in order to gratify your own vanity and covetousness, and to quiet the cravings of your numerous and greedy relations and dependents; had you, for those, or for any other purposes, availed yourself of the selfishness of the people, without practising upon their *ignorance*, I should have condemned your conduct, but should have acknowledged its effect to be a just punishment on those by whom that effect was experienced. But, Sir, your financial statements do not leave you even this title to forbearance. Those statements, from the moment the peace was concluded to the present time, have, from some cause or other, been such as tend to *deceive* the nation, to create and maintain opinions, relative to the œconomy of the peace of Amiens, totally false in themselves, and extremely dangerous in their consequences. To counteract, in some degree, at least, the tendency of these statements is the object of the present letter to you, an object which I shall endeavour to accomplish by a detail of facts and a mode of arguing, reduced, for reasons too delicate to mention, to the level of the meanest capacity.

In the execution of this task, I propose, 1. To compare the peace expenditure, as set forth in the estimate, sanctioned by the House of Commons, in June last, with the peace expenditure, estimated in your speech of the 10th of December last; 2. To compare your estimate of the receipts, as set forth in your speech of the 10th of December, with the actual receipts of the last, and the probable receipts of the present year; and, 3. To compare the receipts and expenditure of peace with the receipts and expenditure of war, if war had been continued.—Before I enter on these comparisons, I must make one observation, for the purpose of fending off the misrepresentations, which might otherwise, by ignorant cavillers, be levelled at my consistency. I already hear the cowardly charge of "disheartening the people at this *alarming* crisis," and the more serious charge of "encouraging the enemy by exposing our weakness:" to obviate these charges, I most explicitly declare, as I have done on many occasions heretofore, that I

do not regard money as the principal source of national strength; and that, so far from desponding on account of the present depreciation of what is called public credit, in itself considered, I am thoroughly convinced, that a total stoppage of the payment of the interest on the funded debt, or, in other words, *a national bankruptcy*, would not, if the state were under the guidance of wise men, disable us from maintaining all our present dominions, and recovering all the honours, of which we have been stripped by your degrading and ignominious peace. Coupled with this declaration, therefore, no statement, no conclusion, of mine, however disadvantageous to the financial affairs of the country, can possibly be attributed to a desire to create despondency in the hearts of the people, whom, on the contrary, I wish to convince, that they cannot if they would, and that they ought not if they could, rely, for their safety, on the pecuniary credit of the state; and, moreover, that that credit whatever may be its utility, has been considerably depreciated by the peace, and can never be perfectly restord but by the means of war, "*a successful war against France.*"

1. In order to draw a comparison between the peace expenditure as set forth in the estimate, sanctioned by the House of Commons in June last, and the peace expenditure estimated in your speech of the 10th of December last, it will be necessary first, correctly to state the former of those estimates, which, in your own words, was as follows: *

" 19. That it appears, by a report of a committee of this house, in 1791, that the actual " expenditure (including the annual million for " the reduction of the public debt) on an average " of five years peace, ending the 5th of January, " 1791, and including sundry extraordinary expenses for the armament of 1787, and for payments to American loyalists, and other articles " of a temporary nature, amounted to 16,816,985.
" But the peace establishment was
" estimated by the said committee at £15,969,178
" [With which estimate the actual expense of the year 1792 nearly
" agreed.]
" In the above sum was included the
" charge of the public debt, amounting to 10,325,000l. from which is
" to be deducted the charge of
" stock extinguished by the redemption of land-tax, on the 5th of January, 1802 ..... £540,000

15,429,178

" That the additional permanent charge incurred by the debt created since 1793, exclusive of interest payable by Ireland, is 13,597,594
" That the additional charge to be incurred for increased amount of exchequer bills outstanding, is about 140,000
" Interest of money for satisfying increased navy debt, at 5l. per cent. is about 270,000
" That the additional charge incurred on the consolidated fund, is 390,000
" That the additional charge incurred for a sum appropriated for the redemption of the public debt, is .. 200,000
" And that the increased expenses of the peace establishment (exclusive of any charges to be incurred by interest on further sums, to be paid on winding up the expenses of the war; and of any augmentation which may take place in the naval or military establishments, but allowing for increase or pay and other expenses) may be estimated at 700,000

" And also exclusive of 497,000l. interest on loans, due by the Emperor of Germany, and guaranteed by parliament, may be estimated at £30,726,772

This statement, Sir, is founded upon *the expenditure of the last peace.* Why such foundation was taken, except for the purpose of deception, it will, I am afraid, be difficult for you to explain. Having made a most disgraceful peace, it was, for the reasons before mentioned, necessary for you to make the country believe, that the *œconomy* of it would be very great. To give a specification of the different articles of the expense of your permanent peace establishment, to fix the amount of the several sums necessary for the support of the army, the navy, and the ordnance, respectively, would, however, have been to expose yourself to immediate refutation, or, at least, to furnish a powerful weapon, to be used against you at no very distant period. To shield yourself, therefore, as securely as possible, against all assaults of this nature, you affect, in this statement, not to have any other standard, whereby to judge of the probable magnitude of the future peace expenditure, than the expenditure of the *last peace.*—As if you had said to the parliament: 'Gentlemen, the 'war, the "*extended, bloody, and expensive* '"*war,*" being now happily put an end to, 'we must, in order to ascertain our future 'expenses, look back, and see what were 'our expenses previous to that war; for,

* See Register, Vol. I. p. 1413, *et seq.* which contain twenty resolutions, on the financial state of the country, moved by Mr. Addington, on the 21st of June, 1802, and adopted by the House, without either opposition or remark. The above extract contains the last but one of these resolutions, which is, indeed, the only one applicable to the present discussion.

'the war being now over, we shall, of 'course, *revert to the state which we were in* 'before it began.'—Upon this most fallacious notion you proceeded to make your estimate, taking first the expenditure of 1791, and adding thereto the additional annual charges on account of the national debt and civil list, and allowing £700,000 a year, additional expenses for the army, navy, and ordnance, making, together, £30,726,772 as the total of the expenditure of that blessed peace, in obtaining which for your country, you had been "the humble instrument in "the hands of Divine Providence."(2) Stripping this estimate of its treasury jargon and verbosity, it will stand thus:

Annual expenditure of last peace....	£15,429,178
Additional annual expenses incurred since the beginning of the war, exclusive of army, navy, and ordnance	14,597,594
Amount of what the army, navy, and ordnance will cost, during the present peace, *more than what they cost during the last peace*.....	700,000
	£30,926,772

This was the estimate, on which the nation was to rely, as on the most authentic information that could possibly be obtained relative to its future expenses; and, as you, at the same time, estimated the revenue at £32,208,833, leaving a balance of £1,282,061 in favour of the revenue, the prospect was, altogether, very flattering to the lovers of peace and the haters of taxes.—But, Sir, before I proceed further in the examination of this estimate, let me ask, how you came to adopt such a strange mode of making it out? Would it not have been much more natural to take the year 1801, instead of 1791, as a basis, and to proceed by subtraction in place of addition? Would not this have been more consonant with that *candour*, for which you are so famous? The total expenditure of 1801, the last and most expensive year of war, was £63,054,978 (3) and, was not the natural mode of estimating, to state what part of this expenditure could, in consequence of peace, be dispensed with? Yes, this was the fair and only rational course of proceeding; but this course would not have suited the object, which you had in view. The specific deductions you could have ventured to make from the expenditure of 1801 would, upon the whole, have produced no very considerable diminution, whereas, a comparison between the expenditure of 1801 and that of 1791 was striking; it was calculated to produce instant effect upon the gaping, greedy gamblers in the funds. To add £700,000 to the last peace establishment, was much easier than to subtract £40,000,000 or even £25,000,000 from the establishment of the war. (4)

The two first heads of your estimate, as new-arranged by me, I must allow to be correct, because, though I have not the materials whereby to verify them, they are of a nature not to be materially mistated. It is the third head that furnishes the object of detection and exposure. Under this head you state, that the army, navy, and ordnance will, during the present peace, cost only 700,000 a year more than those departments of service cost during the last peace. You do, indeed, provide for an evasion by saying, parenthetically, that this calculation is exclusive of any augmentations that may take place; but, the evident tendency of all your statements and declarations, is, to discourage the idea of any such augmentation. Let us, then, first inquire what was the annual expense of maintaining the army, navy, and ordnance, at the time which you have chosen to refer to. In the same report which you cite (the report of the Committee of the House of Commons in 1791) the said annual expense was stated at £4,123,842, of which £2,000,000 for the navy, £1,748,842 for the army, and £375,000 for the ordnance. Adding to this expense the £700,000, which you, in your estimate, allow for increase of expense in these branches of the public service, our present peace establishment, would be, £4,823,842 according to the following more arithmetical exhibition:

Expenditure *last peace*	Navy	£2,000,000
	Army	1,748,842
	Ordnance.....	375,000
		4,123,842
Add your increase		700,000
Your estimate of the *present peace* establishment		£4,823,842

Such, Sir, was your estimate on the 21st of June, 1802; such was the estimate which the last most negligent, and infatuated Parliament sanctioned by their vote of that day; and such were the grounds, on which the more infatuated people were called on to applaud the peace of Amiens, and to repose unlimited confidence, in your wisdom, integrity, and candour! On the 10th of December, 1802, in less than six

(2) See that specimen of most disgusting vanity, folly, and arrogance, Mr. Addington's speech at the *Reading Ball*; Register, Vol. II. p. 1036.

(3) See Register, Vol. II. p. 911.

(4) See Register, Vol. II. p. 1140 and 1705, where it will be seen, that Mr. Addington calculated the savings of peace, at one time, at 40 millions, and, at another time, at 25 millions.

months after this estimate went forth to the world, you came to Parliament with another, founded upon the experience which that space of time had afforded you. In this second estimate of the establishment of the present peace, you rise from £4,823,842 to £10,533,000 (5). But, this is still short of the *real* expenditure; for, in the very same speech, in which you made this estimate, you ask for supplies, for the year 1803, to the amount of £14,957,325 which supplies have since been voted by the Parliament, as follows: (6)

Navy, ordinaries, extraordinaries, and buildings	£6,669,348
Army and extraordinaries	7,500,000
Ordnance	787,947
	14,957,325
Subtract the amount of estimate of 21st June, 1802	4,823,842
Difference between the estimate of 21st June, and that of the 10th of Dec.	£10,133,483

Thus, then, here is the trifling sum of *ten millions* added to your first estimate of the annual expenditure of the present peace! And, pray, Sir, let it not be said, that circumstances had changed, that France was become more powerful or more hostile; for, this last mentioned estimate was laid before the parliament just *after* you had resolved, a second time, *to surrender the Cape of Good Hope*, and at a time when you talked of nothing but peace and œconomy. Let it not be insinuated, that you could not foresee the *present* crisis; for, I make no allusion to it. The *armament* is laid totally out of my calculations and my reasoning: I am merely comparing the estimate, which you made upon a prospect of peace, on the 21st of June, with that which you made, upon the same prospect of peace, on the 10th of December: I am speaking of the *savings of peace*, and not of the *expenses of a new war*. Your peace was made and justified upon the principle of *œconomy*: it is upon that principle that I am now trying it, without any reference to the expenses, which will be brought on the country by the present armament, and which have already arisen out of the disbanding and dismantling system of you and your colleagues: these will enter into another view of the subject: at present, my object is to expose the fallacy of your estimates, as applicable to *a state of peace*, to a continuation of that peace, by the means of which you were to "husband our resources;" those estimates, by which the people have been deluded, and by which you have prolonged your ill-gotten and worse-employed power.

Ten millions! A sum nearly equal to the whole of our expenditure some years ago: and this sum now constitutes the *difference* only in your different estimates of the same peace establishment! Buonaparté had extended his power, it is true; but, he had seized on Elba, Italy, and Piedmont, previous to the signature of the treaty; and, as to Germany and Switzerland, those were points which you had yielded previous to your second estimate. If you were apprehensive of approaching war, in the month of December, to what are we to attribute your second order to surrender the Cape? And, if you were not, if you had returned to your former confidence in the pacific disposition of France, how will you account for the more than tripling of your estimate of the naval and military expenditure of peace? Either you believed your estimate of June to be correct, or you did not. If the latter, what becomes of your candour; if the former, where is your understanding? But, it is not *your* character; that were a trifle; it is the character of the parliament and of the nation that is herein committed. Your estimate of June went forth, not only to the people of this country, but to the whole monied and commercial world, sanctioned by a vote of the House of Commons, on the votes of whose proceedings it is recorded. If a statement thus solemnly made, passed, and promulgated, be found totally destitute of truth, on what are men to place their reliance? Where are they to look for authentic information? Where are they to seek for the grounds of public confidence? The House of Commons suffered itself in this, as it has done in too many other instances, to be the ladder of ministerial ambition; and, when the aspiring individual is a Walpole, a Chatham, or a Pitt, one may find something to palliate, though nothing to justify, such blind acquiescence; but, that an assembly, chosen by the people to watch over all their public interests, and more especially those of a pecuniary nature; that six hundred noblemen and gentlemen, selected for their wisdom, their integrity, and their diligence, and calling themselves the constitutional guardians of the national purse; that, amongst these persons, no one should have been found to say NO to an estimate so glaringly fallacious; that they should all, all have become tame, passive instruments in *your* hands, the tools wherewith to work your way into the wealth and honours of the country, is a fact that stings one to the soul. Thousands of whigs bawling for parliamentary reform, tens of thou-

(5) See Register, Vol. II. p. 782.
(6) Ibid. p. 779.

sands of republicans raving for liberty and equality, millions of canting miscreants praying for the reign of the saints, are not, with all their united exertions, half so dangerous to the government of England as one fact like this; the natural and inevitably tendency of which is, first to disgust, and finally to alienate, every man, able and willing to render service to the state.

I should now enter on the remaining part of my task; but, as I perceive, that the comparison which I purpose to draw between the receipts and expenses of peace and those of war, if war had been continued, would require more room than I have at present to spare, I shall defer the two last topics of my proposed discussion to my next.—I have the honour to be, Sir, yours, &c. &c. WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westminster,
April 5, 1803.

APOTHECARIES' HALL.—FIRST OF APRIL.

Celebration of Mr. Hiley Addington's Birth-day; and Anniversary of the arrival of the Treaty of Amiens (1).

The attendance of Friday did credit to the nation.

The company began to assemble at an early hour. The friends of the Family were in great numbers, and in high spirits. The preparations were splendid in the extreme, and would have been amply sufficient for the whole number of guests, had not the Reading Long Coach suddenly driven up to the door just as the company were sitting down to dinner, with a reinforcement not the less welcome for being unexpected. The passengers consisted of persons who had distinguished themselves at the Reading Ball, on the First of October in last year (2), and who came in the expectation of hearing another Speech on Peace, similar to the one which was addressed to them on that occasion, just two days previous to the remonstrance against the subjugation of Switzerland.

As soon as the arrangements of politeness between the London guests and their rural invaders were satisfactorily adjusted, the company sat down to dinner.

The decorations of the table were in a style highly creditable to the taste of the officer of the Hall, entrusted with the care of that department.

The centre ornaments consisted of models of ships of the line, in pastry-work, to the exact number of fifty, each bearing on its flag the date of its preparation for sea, all of them within the space of one lunar month; in allusion to Mr. Addington's famous pledge in the House of Commons.

As soon as the cloth was removed, and after the usual preliminary toasts, the Chairman gave—

"The Peace of Amiens: the conciliation which governed, and the firmness which maintains it;"

which was drank with rapturous applause. This was followed by the well-known favourite song of "*The Pilot that Moored us in Peace* (3)," composed in praise of the elder Mr. Addington, as it is supposed by the younger. The following stanza in this justly popular and well-timed ballad:—

O! take then, *for honour with spirit maintained,*
For councils, by judgment and prudence matured;
O! take, for the Peace, which thy Wisdom has gained,
The thanks of an Empire whose rights are *secured*—

was received with a thunder of applause and exultation, and loudly and repeatedly encored. Its happy application to existing circumstances, seemed to make a forcible impression on the feelings of all who were present.

The next toast was very appropriate, being suggested in great part by the ornaments on the table already described.

"The Premier's three promises—Profound peace, fifty sail of the line in a month, and a million surplus at the end of the year."

We must leave to the sensibility of our readers to imagine the delirium of pleasure which this toast occasioned.

Then followed—

"The French Commercial Commissioners at the different Ports of Great Britain and Ireland."—Three times three.

"The First Consul of France! Peace and good understanding with him; and may we never displace an Administration which he protects, to make room for a faction which he fears!"—Nine times nine.

"The Family."

It is impossible to describe the enthusiasm with which this toast was received. It gave place only to the more tender emotions which were excited by the following beautiful Anacreontic, with which the company were favoured by three capital voices, said to be composed for the occasion by the Clerk of the Pells.

ANACREONTIC.

How blest, how firm the statesman stands,
(Him no low intrigue shall move)
Circled by faithful *kindred* bands,
And propp'd by fond *fraternal* love!

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(1) A circumstantial account of the celebration of the Minister's Birth-day on Michaelmas day last, will be found in Vol. II. p. 1034.

(2) See Vol. II. p. 1035.

(3) See Vol. II. p. 1037.

When his speeches hobble vilely,
What "*hear him!*" burst from Brother Hiley;
When his faultering periods lag,
Hark to the cheers of Brother Brag!

When the faultering periods lag,
Or his yawning audience flag;
When his speeches hobble vilely,
Or the House receives them drily;
Cheer, O! cheer him, Brother Brag!
Cheer, O! cheer him, Brother Hiley!

Each a gentleman at large,
Lodged and fed at public charge;
Paying (with a grace to charm ye);
This the FLEET, and that the ARMY.

Brother Brag and Brother Hiley,
Cheer him, when he speaks so vilely;
Cheer him, when his audience flag,
Brother Hiley, Brother Brag!

Nothing could exceed the effect of this exquisite little piece of poetry.

The toast which succeeded, and which concluded the festivity of the day, was adapted to the particular day and occasion of meeting; and was in some sort a question put for the decision of the company.

"May the Peace of Amiens be annually commemorated on the *first* of April!"

If we may judge from the reception which it met with, this sentiment was congenial to the wishes and feelings of all those to whom it was addressed; and we have little doubt that, for years to come, (should it please Buonaparté to continue to us the present advantageous peace, and to countenance the present "respectable" administration, so long), we shall have to announce to our readers that this *first* of treaties, concluded under the auspices of the *first* of ministers, has been appropriately celebrated on the *first* of the month in which we are now writing; and we are persuaded, that long after the treaty of Amiens shall have been not only annulled, but utterly disbelieved, and the name of Addington irretrievably forgotten, there will remain attached to the *first* of April a certain peculiar character of simple sacredness and holiday gaiety, for which future ages will, perhaps, be at a loss to account, but which will, in fact, have originated from the double celebration of Friday.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

OFFICIAL PAPERS RELATIVE TO GOREE.

The Commandant and Administrator-General of Senegal and its Dependencies, to the Minister for Naval and Colonial Affairs.—Senegal, Jan. 5, 1803.

Citizen Minister,—I have the honour to address to you the subjoined correspondence between myself and Colonel Frazer, Governor of Goree, since my arrival at Senegal, in order that you may thereby understand in what manner that Governor, for the King of Great Britain, appears to evade the restitution of the Isle of Goree, even after having assured me, that he would very soon specify the very day upon which he should be ready actually to cede it.—Not knowing what might be his true motives for an evasive conduct so extraordinary, I have thought it my duty to inform you of the fact, as soon as it appeared to me to be attended with suspicious circumstances. I have the honour to inform you, that I have, for this end, dispatched the gilliot La Légère to Rochfort, as the most certain and expeditious means that I could on this occasion employ.—*Blanchot.*

Jan 26.—Since the date of the above letter, I have received another letter from Goree, which I likewise submit.

The Commandant and Administrator-General of Senegal and its Dependencies, to Col. Frazer, Governor for his Britannic Majesty of the Isle of Goree.—Senegal, Oct. 30, 1802.

Governor,—I have the honour to address to you the subjoined orders from his Majesty, the King of Great Britain, respecting the restitution of Goree. Having orders to take possession of that Isle and the factories dependent upon it, as Commissary for the French Republic, I request you to inform me on what day it may be most agreeable to you, that we should carry into effect the orders of our respective Governments; and that the French garrison should go to relieve the garrison of his Britannic Majesty now in the Isle. —I have given orders to Citizen Montfort, *Enseigne de vaisseau*, the bearer of this letter, and of the dispatches from his Britannic Majesty, to inquire, at the same time, whether you have orders to return the salute of our artillery with an equal number of guns? He will also signify to you, that I have the greatest pleasure in the prospect of seeing you personally, and of passing some short time in your company, which this occasion affords.—Permit me, Sir, to recommend to your civilities, during his stay at Goree, this officer, who is known to me for honourable conduct, and who, on this occasion, offered himself to be the bearer of these dispatches, instead of my Aid-de-Camp.—*Blanchot.*

To his Excellency General Blanchot, Commandant and Administrator-General of Senegal, &c.—Goree, November 9, 1802.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 26th of last month, by which, I am informed that you have authority, as Commissary of the French Republic, to take possession of this Isle, and are also the bearer of orders from his Britannic Majesty to me, relative to the same object.—I am ready to deliver up this place to you as soon as a transport, which I expect, shall furnish me with the means of evacuation, and of carrying away the garrison, provisions, &c.—The arrival of this transport may be speedily expected from the measures I have taken for that purpose. —As soon as the transport arrives, I shall have the honour to write to you in order to settle the day for restoring to you this isle, conformably to the orders of our respective Governments.—I rely also upon the obliging offer you have communicated to me verbally by your Aid de-Camp, M. Montfort, that assistance will serve to convey part of my provisions to Sierra Leone, the quantity being rather large.—Your salute shall be returned gun for gun.—Permit me to congratulate you upon your return to a colony which you have been able to preserve during so long a war, and to assure you of the pleasure I shall have in culti-

vating a particular acquaintance with you.—I have the honour to be, &c.—*John Frazer.*

The Commandant and Administrator-General of Senegal and its Dependencies, to Colonel Frazer, Governor for his Britannic Majesty, of the Isle of Goree.—Senegal, 27 Brumaire.

M. Governor,—Citizen Montfort has delivered to me the letter you did me the honour to write to me, under date of the 9th Nov. 1802 (18th Brumaire).—The uncertainty in which it places the day upon which we shall be able to carry into execution the orders of our respective Governments, has determined me to dispatch immediately the corvette Impatient, charged with a mission posterior to the resuming the possession of the Isle of Goree, and to make use for that object of a sloop and a cutter of the Republic, which are to remain here under my orders.—I join with Citizen Arnous, Lieutenant-Commander of the Impatient, in intreating you to procure him the succours which he may want during his stay in Goree Harbour, where he is going to wood and water.—As the arrival of the transport which you expect may cause a delay in the execution of our respective orders, which might, perhaps, bring upon us the reproach of dilatoriness, which certainly neither of us would wish to deserve, I have the honour to observe to you, that we may effect the resuming the possession of the Isle of Goree, before the arrival of your transport, by taking all the precautions which you may think necessary to ensure the preservation of the articles which the transport may afterwards carry away. One of the vessels which I shall carry with me, may be employed in the conveyance of your garrison to Sierra Leone, and another in the conveyance of your person and some effects. I beg you to take into consideration, what I have the honour to propose to you, and to inform me of your dispositions. Receive, Sir, the assurances of my sensibility, and extreme gratitude, for the obliging and flattering expressions at the conclusion of your letter, and be persuaded, that I am impatient to have the honour of seeing you, and thanking you in person. Health, esteem, and consideration.—*Blanchot.*

To his Excellency General Blanchot, Commandant and Administrator-General of Senegal, &c. &c.—Goree, Nov. 22.

Sir,—Your letter of the 27th Brumaire, I received the day before yesterday, and I avail myself of the opportunity of a ship, on the point of setting sail for Senegal, to acknowledge the receipt of it.—You have stated to me that you were ready to receive this place. I regret extremely that there should be any delay in delivering it up to you; but to my great astonishment, no transport has yet arrived to carry away the garrison. Yet I do not know of any example of an English garrison having evacuated an island restored by a treaty of peace, under any flag but its own; and as (unless the conveyance of the troops elsewhere was immediately necessary) I might be severely reprimanded for quitting the place in such a manner; an effect to which, I am convinced, you would not have me expose myself. I beg you not to be displeased at my deferring a final answer to your proposal to procure French ships to carry away the present garrison of Goree, until the return of a ship which I have dispatched to Sierra Leone, and which I expect very shortly, as the wind has been very favourable since she sailed.—I will not fail, in case of the arrival of any transport whatever, to give you immediate notice of it. This circumstance will be the more desirable, because it appears to me that the vessels at your disposal at Senegal would not be sufficient, without farther assistance, to carry away the garrison and the provisions. I have the honour to be, &c. &c.—*John Frazer.*

P. S. Captain Mallard having informed me of his intention of going to Senegal, I have begged him to deliver this letter to you, and to assure you of my impatience to surrender the isle to you as soon as I shall have sufficient means for conveying the garrison and the provisions.

This letter is followed by two from the French Commandant, in the first of which he thanks Colonel Frazer for having informed him that he had taken up four French sailors who had deserted, and whom he had sent on board two French ships.—In the second letter, he acquaints the Colonel, that, in order to avoid expense and delay, he had sent on board an American ship, provisions for the use of the French, after the surrender of Goree. He requests the Colonel to give the requisite assistance to the officers sent to place them in magazines, and to take care of them.—In a subsequent letter, dated December 19, Colonel Frazer informs General Blanchot, that he had received his letter by M. Dainville, and had allowed that gentleman to bring on land certain quantities of provisions intended for the future use of the French; and that the galliot he had dispatched to Sierra Leone, had returned with letters from the Governor; that a transport to carry away the British from Goree would sail on the 4th or 5th of December.—In another letter of the 26th of Dec. Colonel Frazer writes, that since his last, Commodore Hollowell, in the Argo, had, in the course of a voyage for the annual inspection of the British establishment, on the coast of Africa, touched at Goree, and informed Colonel Frazer, that a part of the stores and provisions which Colonel Frazer meant to have taken to Sierra Leone were intended to be used in a different service; in consequence it became necessary to await the arrival of a vessel dispatched from England with particular orders respecting those stores, before it be possible for the British to evacuate Goree.—An answer to those two letters, dated January 4th, signifies to Colonel Frazer, that General Blanchot, being willing to take charge of whatever stores the British should find it convenient to leave, for a time, at Goree, would expect, that the day previously fixed for the cession of the isle, should not be altered on account of any change in the destination of those stores, and would therefore come to take possession of the isle on the day agreed upon, unless he should again hear from Colonel Frazer, with a more decisive refusal of the cession, upon weightier reasons. To this letter Colonel Frazer sent the following answer:

Goree, Jan. 14, 1803.

Sir,—In answer to your letter of the 4th instant, which I had the honour to receive on the 11th, I must beg leave to refer you to my letter of the 26th of Dec. 1802; and to observe, that, in consequence of the information which I announced to you, that I had received from Commodore Hollowell, subsequent to the date of my letter of Dec. 19th; it appears necessary for me to wait here at least some time, for the arrival of a vessel from England instead of proceeding, as I had proposed, to embark the troops and all other things whatsoever, on board the transport from Sierra Leone. This is so much the more necessary, because, as the Commodore sailed nearly in the end

of October, it is highly probable that the vessel which I expect may arrive one of these days. I should, therefore, have wished to delay writing to you till I might have been able to announce that vessel's arrival, if I had not feared that such a delay might appear to imply a want of due regard for yourself personally, to whom it is my earnest desire to testify all possible respect upon this occasion.—Permit me to add, that as you expressed in your letter of the 18th of November, an apprehension lest any delay in the restitution of Goree should bring upon us the blame of our respective governments, I shall be ready to do you justice, and to become personally responsible for any blame that may arise on account of a delay which has been occasioned by unavoidable accidents as to time.—*John Fraser.*

To this letter, the following is the answer of General Blanchot.

Senegal, Jan. 15.

SIR,—I yesterday received your letter of the 14th January, 1803, in which you do me the honour to say, that you refer me to your letter of the 26th December last, by which I had been informed, that though the transport you expected from Sierra Leone had arrived, it appeared to you necessary, since the arrival of the Argo, to await the arrival of another vessel before you could effectuate the restitution of Goree. In consequence of this, I shall not repair to Goree till you do me the honour of informing me, that nothing remains to retard the execution of our respective orders.—I am infinitely grateful for what you say in your last letter, obliging to myself personally in regard to the delays of the restitution of Goree. But, I hope, that the precautions I have taken, will preserve me from all blame.—I, however, intreat you, Sir, to accept my thanks, with the assurance of my esteem and consideration.—*Blanchot.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

FRENCH MANIFESTO *inserted in the* Hamburgh Correspondenten, *of the 1st of April, 1803, at the Desire of the First Consul, and dated Paris, March* 15.

For several months past, a paper war has been carried on between the French and English journalists and pamphleteers. This was in a manner the last dying ember of an extinguished conflagration; the last comfort of a despairing faction; the nourishment of pitiful passions, or of hungry scribblers. The French Government was, therefore, not disposed to consider it as a matter of importance. Although some difficulties prevailed, with respect to the complete execution of the treaty of Amiens, yet France relied on the justice of Britain, and employed herself exclusively with the restoration of her colonies. Trusting to the sanctity of treaties, she dispersed the remnant of her maritime power, which had been sacrificed to the English fleets.—Suddenly appears a solemn message from the Cabinet of St. James's, and informs all Europe, that France is making immense preparations in her harbours and in those of Holland; a proposal is made in Parliament, to grant extraordinary means of defence to the King of England, such as are consistent with the security of the British Empire, and with the honour of the three crowns. The sudden appearance of such a Message, renders it doubtful, whether it is the *effect of treason, or insanity, or of imbecility.* If, on the one hand, we cast a view on the ports of France and Holland, where we discover naval armaments consisting only of a few ships of the line and some frigates, destined for different colonies; and on the other, contemplate the harbours of England filled with a formidable naval power, we are tempted to believe, that the Message of the King of England implies merely a coarse irony, if this farce were not unworthy of the majesty of government. On considering the influence of factions, in a country boasting of its liberty, it may be supposed, the King of England has only yielded to weakness, if weakness were compatible with the principal qualification of a King ———, consequently there remain no other rational motives than those of dishonesty; of avowed enmity to the French nation; of perjury, and a desire of publicly violating a solemn treaty, in order to retain advantages, the renunciation of which is demanded by the honour of France, and by the faith of treaties.—On reading this Message, we believe we exist in the times of those treaties which the Vandals concluded with the degenerated Romans; when power supplied the place of public faith; when the enemy to be assailed was previously calumniated with armed precipitation. In this modern state of civilization, there is a certain respect which a great monarch, a polished people, owe to each other; even though it consisted only in finding a reasonable pretext for an unjust war. But here every thing is fictitious, clumsy, unjust; eternal warfare will follow a shocking war: the more unjust the attack, the more irreconcilable must be the hatred.—Such a piece of news will doubtless excite the indignation of Europe. While Englishmen themselves, who are not completely dazzled by national pride, sigh on this occasion; the Times calls the peace of Amiens an armistice, and has published the most bloody satire on the government which it defends: the sudden fall of the public funds is the first omen of those calamities, which may follow the violation of all the social rights.—The French are rendered indignant, rather than terrified, by English menace. Their defeats have not reduced their spirit, nor have their victories contributed to their effeminacy: in a war apparently endless, they have seen all Europe conspiring against them. Their perseverance, their bravery, and the dextrous activity of their government, have terminated that contest. This war would have a different object. France will fight for the liberty of the nations of Europe, and for the sanctity of their treaties: and if the English government wishes to render it a national war, it may easily happen that their naval power, now so formidable, might be unable to decide alone (single-handed) the fate of England, and to insure her victory.—The French, supported by their just cause, and being powerful from the confidence which they repose in their government, are not deterred by new expences, and new sacrifices, which this war will necessarily occasion: their system of finances, more simple and less pompous than that of London, is the more secure: all their strength lies in their soil and in their courage.—On the first publication of the English message, the views of the world were directed to the cabinet of the Thuilleries; the least movements of it obtained a character of importance; the most indefinite expressions were caught with avidity. Each expected with impatience the assembly appointed for the presentation of strangers, which occurs on one of the Sundays every month, at the drawing-room of Mad. Buonaparté; each was prepared to draw from it conclusions in his own way. It was as splendid as usual. The First Consul who appeared on this occasion, said, on entering the room to the English ambassador, who stood at the side of Count De Markoff: 'Now we have

'been fighting for twelve years, a storm appears 'to rise in London, and they are inclined to fight 'twelve years longer. The King of England says, 'that France is making immense naval prepara-'tions; he has been led into error. In the French 'ports, there is not a single armament of any con-'sequence; the whole fleet has sailed for St. Do-'mingo and the colonies. With respect to the 'ports of Holland, which are likewise quoted in 'the message, there is only one armament under 'the command of General Victor; and all Europe 'knows its destination to be Louisiana. The 'King farther observes, that differences prevail 'between the cabinets of Paris and London. I 'know of none. It is true, England ought to 'evacuate Malta; and Malta has not been eva-'cuated; and as his Britannic Majesty is bound 'to that effect by the most solemn treaty ever 'concluded, there can be no doubt respecting the 'speedy evacuation of this island. It is intended 'to intimidate the French people by warlike pre-'paration? It is possible to kill, but not to intri-'midate them!'—In the course of the assembly, when the First Consul again approached Count de Markoff, he said to him in a semi-audible voice, 'The English ministry wish to retain Malta for 'five years longer: such a proposal was insult-'ing, and no treaties ought to be concluded, 'which it was not intended to fulfil.' At the conclusion of the assembly, when the English Ambassador was about to retire, the First Consul said to him, "Madame the Duchess of Dorset, has spent the unpleasant part of the year at Paris. It is my sincere wish that she may also spend the agreeable season. But if it should happen that we really must go to war, the respon sibility is exclusively with those who deny the validity of their own contracts, since they refuse to observe treaties which they had concluded."—These words of the First Consul require no comment. They explain completely his present opinions, his past conduct, and his resolution for the future. It is sufficient to compare them with the tergiversations, the duplicity, the evasions, and the Message of the English Government, in order to be enabled to decide on the justice of the dispute.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Feb. 19.—The arrival of the French Ambassador at Constantinople has been for this capital a signal of joy. At the disembarkation of General Brune, announced on the 24th Jan. by a discharge of 17 pieces of cannon, a numerous crowd collected, and spread themselves throughout every quarter that he was to traverse.—The Grand Signior repaired to his Kiosk to see the Ambassador and his procession pass. The Reis Effendi, and the Capitan Pacha, complimented him, and all the French residing at Constantinople respectfully received him at the entrance of the Palace of France. They saw in the arrival of the Ambassador of the republic, and in that of the Commissaries of commercial relations of the republic, destined for the different ports of the Black Sea and the Levant, the pledge of the accomplishment of all their hopes.—On the 9th of Feb. the Ambassador ordered the celebration of a *Te Deum*, and at the moment when they chaunted *Domine salvum fac Consules* the French squadron apprized of it by a flag, elevated on the top of the palace of France, fired a salute of 21 pieces of cannon, to which all the crews answered by the most lively acclamations of joy.—The first interview between the French Ambassador and the Ottoman Ministers sufficed to re-establish France in that honourable position which she ought to hold in the Levant. The churches of the Latin worship have returned under the protection of the republic, which had been deprived during the war of the exercise of its ancient rights. The sequestration placed upon the establishments which belong to it, is removed. Confidence is re-established between the inhabitants and the French, and the residence of the Ambassador will soon produce those advantages which the peace gave reason to hope for. *(Moniteur.)*

Berne, March 15.—On the 10th of this month the firing of cannon announced the fate of this country. The Landamman, after attending divine service, went to the Town-Hall to install the committee of organization, of which he is president. At nine o'clock a message was sent to the commander of the troops, with a decree of the committee for resuming the ancient cockade, which is blue and black. The Landamman was dressed in a costume of black, and wore a sword.

Hague, March 16.—A courier from the British government disembarked the day before yesterday at Helvoetsluys, with dispatches, which are said to be of the greatest importance, for the British Envoy at Petersburgh. He also brought dispatches for Mr. Liston, the English Minister at the Hague. —The new measures of the British Government have reduced the business of our Bank to a kind of stagnation. There prevails a general stupor throughout the country, arising from the contemplation of the unfortunate situation in which we shall be placed, if war should again destroy those prospects which peace had began to realize.—At the very moment almost that the expedition was about to sail for Louisiana, an order arrived from Paris to prevent its sailing.

Bourdeaux, March 21.—To the eagerness with which sugars, coffees, and cottons, have been bought up for three days past, have succeeded the most perfect calm; the exchange the day before yesterday was remarkable for the inactivity of the demand for produce which, 24 hours before, was an object of the greatest avidity. It appears that the ardour of speculation is cooled, and every thing now proves that it was our political situation with respect to England that caused here those orders of which so few people knew the motives.

Hamburgh, March 29.—This day was called an extraordinary meeting of the senate, which has given occasion to a thousand reports, and renewed the opinion of an immediate rupture between France and England. It was occasioned by a violent note, it appears, of M. Reinhard, the French minister, occasioned by a refusal to print, in the gazette of this city, some declaration against England. He has not only insisted on this, but as is generally believed, demanded, that in case of war our port shall be shut against the English and their allies, and all English property confiscated. Whatever demands he may have made will surely be granted, unless the King of Prussia interferes to prevent it. This declaration, whatever it be, is, we understand, to be printed to-morrow.

March 29—½ *past* 9 *at night.*—Last night, and during the whole of this day, the inhabitants of this city were in the greatest agitation and alarm, occasioned by a variety of reports, which had a powerful influence in depressing the course of exchange on London.—In consequence of the arrival of a courier from France late last night, the senate was convened, and held an extraordinary meeting, which lasted four hours. The subject of consider-

ation was a threatening note from the French minister Reinhard, relative to the following affair:—A few weeks ago Reinhard applied to the magistrates to procure the insertion, in the Correspondenten, of a manifesto *from the pen of Buonaparté* himself, full of the most indecent invectives against England. This production was referred to the syndic and censor of the press, Mr. Doorman, who permitted it to be inserted, after striking out the most objectionable passages. The manifesto, thus modified, appeared in the Correspondenten of the 25th inst. under the head of Paris, March 15, as an extract from the "*Bulletin de Paris.*" This, however, instead of satisfying the French minister, has provoked his utmost indignation, which is not to be appeased but by publishing it in its entire state. The re-publication in an official shape is accordingly to take place to-morrow in all the Hamburgh papers, which, in consequence of an order from the government, are not to be put to press until after ten o'clock.

Milan, March 14.—The Consulta having written officially to the First Consul, to express their gratitude to him for having caused the flag of their republic to be acknowledged by the Barbary powers, and also to testify their concern for the death of General Leclerc, received the following answer from Buonaparte, dated 21st February:—"*Citizens members of the consulta.* I have received your letters, and am obliged to you for the obliging expressions contained in them. Death is common to all, but the memory of good actions never perishes. The Minister Marescalchi sends you the act of mediation which I have made for the Swiss. The order and tranquillity of that country is closely connected with the order and tranquillity of the Italian republic.

(Signed) "BUONAPARTE."

March 29.—Respecting peace or war we waver still in uncertainty; but as soon as it is known that the English have seized upon a vessel, 80,000 French troops will march to Italy, 60,000 to Holland, 20,000 towards Naples, and General Murat has already departed for that place, in order to require of the King the opening of his ports in Naples and Sicily to the French army. Buonaparté is said to have declared, that should it come to a war, he would acknowledge no neutrality—but allies or enemies.

Basle, March 25.—It is now certain, that the Helvetic troops are to pass into the service of France. The Landamman has issued a proclamation upon this subject, addressed to the troops, in which he says—"Your lot is fixed. The First Consul receives you into his armies, and his *paternal care* will make you forget all that you have suffered."

Paris, March 31.—Reports have been spread respecting Martinique, which are unfounded. According to the latest intelligence received by Government, that colony is in the best state; the sickness had entirely ceased, and the loss of men which had been experienced, was repaired by the arrival of a battalion of the 84th demi-brigade of the line, 650 strong, all in the best state of health. —*Moniteur*

Brussels, March 21.—Letters from the Hague state, that French couriers are continually arriving here, charged with dispatches relative to the present situation of affairs, as also to the dispositions which are to be made on the coasts of Holland, from the Maese to the Texel. In case of a rupture with England, there will be assembled on the coasts of the Batavian republic a respectable force, which may be employed for a disembarkation on the northern coasts of England, or in Scotland. General Victor, Captain-General of Louisiana, has sent an officer of his staff to Paris for instructions. It is much feared in Holland, especially at Amsterdam and Rotterdam, that war will be renewed. Military preparations are making with the greatest activity from Dunkirk to the mouth of the Seine.—*March* 24.—They write from Dunkirk, that there, at Havre, and Boulogne, several marine officers are arrived, to superintend the preparations in the Dock-yards, where the men work by candle-light. All the gun-boats and light vessels will be again fitted out. The troops which were to be embarked at Dunkirk for the colonies, remain till further orders. Along the coasts of Flanders, and what was formerly Picardy, several camps will be formed in the beginning of April.

Mentz, March 22.—In the departments of the Sarte, Meuse, Rhine, &c. orders have been received for divisions of troops to march for the coasts.

Hague, March 26.—The French troops which were to sail from Helvoetsluys to Louisiana, have hitherto remained embarked. To-morrow they will be all on board, to the amount of 2,500 men, and their earlier or later sailing will depend on the termination of the differences between France and England, concerning which negotiations are now pending. About 2000 troops, to be employed in the Louisiana expedition, arrived yesterday at Helvoetsluys in forty vessels, from Hirzogenbutsch.—*March* 29. The Batavian Government has received official intelligence from its Ambassador in London, that although a Cabinet order of the 14th of October was dispatched to the commanding officer at the Cape, to suspend the evacuation of that place till further orders, and which had had the consequence already known, another order of the Cabinet had been made up to the 16th of November succeeding, containing definitive orders for the evacuation of the Cape, which order went from England on the 29th; so that the Cape has now been for some time in the hands of the Batavian Government.

DOMESTIC.

From the London Gazette.—St. James's, March 16. —The King was this day pleased to confer the Honour of Knighthood on William Paxton, Esq. William Blizzard, Esq. and Charles Blicke, Esq.

Whitehall, March 26.—The King has been pleased to appoint Mr. Patrick Fotheringham, to the Office of Commissary of the Commissariot of Orkney and Zetland, in the room of Mr. James Stewart, deceased.

Whitehall, March 29.—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland has been pleased to appoint the Reverend Peter Hawker, Jun. of Woodchester, in the County of Gloucester, to be one of his Royal Highness's Chaplains, in the room of the Reverend Samuel Peach, deceased.

St. James's, March 30.—The King was this day pleased to confer the honour of knighthood on James Duberly, of Gains-Hall, Huntingdonshire, Esq. Francis Searle, of Kingston-upon-Thames, Esq. and John Dumaresq, Esq.

Crown-Office, April 2, 1803.—*Members returned to serve in this present Parliament.* Borough of Brackley, Anthony Henderson, of Kensington, Middlesex, Esq. in the room of J. W. Egerton, Esq. now Earl of Bridgwater.—*City of Coventry.* Peter Moore, Esq. in the room of N. Jefferys, Esq whose election has been declared void.

Whitehall, April 4.—The King has been pleased to grant unto Ralph Bigland, Esq. (Richmond Herald), the office of Norroy King of Arms, and principal Herald of the North parts of England, in the room of George Harrison, Esq. promoted to the office of Clarenceux King of Arms.—This Gazette contains two Orders in Council, the first prohibiting, till the 30th of April, the exportation of corn of all kinds, as also to admit the importation, duty free, with the exception of rice and malt; the other prohibiting the exportation of various articles of fresh and salted provisions, butter, onions, &c. till the 12th of June.

On Wednesday the Right Honourable Lord Hutchinson, K. B. was made free of the Worshipful Company of Salters, and proceeded to Guildhall, attended by Sir John Eamer, and the Master, Wardens, and Court of Assistants of the Company, to be admitted into the Freedom of the City, voted to him by the court of Common Council for his eminent services.—The Chamberlain communicated to his Lordship, the thanks and resolution of the Court of Common Council. He was sworn into the Freedom of the City, and afterwards a sword of 100 guineas value was presented to him, as a token of the sense this Court entertain of the gallant and meritorious conduct he has so frequently displayed in support of the honour and dignity of his country.—His Lordship then addressed the Chamberlain as follows, viz.—"Mr. Chamberlain,—I have received many honours from my sovereign and my country, but I prize none more highly than the respect which I have, through you, received this day from the first commercial city in the world.—I still entertain hopes that a peace may continue; but should the ambition of a proud enemy again cause us to take up arms to protect every thing that is dear to us, I trust I shall ever be ready to discharge the duties of any situation I may be entrusted with, and prove myself not entirely unworthy the favours conferred on me by my sovereign, and particularly from this great city."

Bankrupts.—Hance, W. Tooley-street, Southwark, merchant.—Stokes, W. Old Broad-street, merchant.—Sly, G. Wanstead, stock-broker.—George, F. Panteague, Monmouth, coal merchant.—Hutchon, T. Coleman-street, merchant.—Rome, R. Penryn, merchant.—Richmond, J. Skerton, Lancaster, gardener.—Acocks, B. Red Lion-square, coal merchant.—Norton, P. Whitchurch, Salop, inn-holder.—Bestow, F. Milk-street, hosier.—Bishop, T. Little East Cheap, carpenter.—Barkly, J. N. Tower Royal, merchant.—Powney, D. the younger, Sherborne, Dorset, victualler.—Brook, E. Wakefield, money-scrivener.

Deaths.—On Sunday last, at her seat at Burton Pynsent, Somersetshire, in the 83d year of her age, the Right Hon. the Countess Dowager of Chatham, relict of the late Lord Chatham, and mother to the present Earl, and the Right Hon. William Pitt.—In Sackville Street, Dublin, Lord Walscourt.—On Wednesday, at his house in Piccadilly, in the 74th year of his age, the Right Hon. Sir W. Hamilton, K. B.

STOC. *April.*	1	2	4	5	6	7
Bank Stock.	96¾	—	—	—	—	166½
3 pr C R. An	—	—	—	—	61½	61⅝
3 per C. Con.	62⅛	63¼	61¾	61¼	62⅛	62⅜
4 pr. C. Con	—	—	—	—	78½	77¾
5 pr. Ct.Ann	—	93¼	94	92	92	—
Bank L. Ann.	—	—	—	—	16⅝	18 7/16
D° S.1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct.1797	—	—	—	—	96¾	96¾
Omnium ...	15¼	14¾	15½	—	15	15½

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36 2	2 us.	Leghorn	49½
D°, at sight	35 8		Naples.....	40¼
Rotterdam	36 3	2 us.	Genoa	45½
Hamburgh	31 5	2 us.	Venice, 55 livres piccole	
Altona....	31 6	2 us.	effective per £. ster.	
Paris 1 day	24 16		Lisbon	66½
Paris	25	2 us.	Oporto	67½
Bourdeaux,	25 1		Dublin	14½
Cadiz ...	35	eff.	Bilboa	36
Madrid ..	35½	effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

The Hamburgh Manifesto, which will be found in p. 527 of the present sheet, was, as appears from its date, written at Paris, and it is a fact, now well established, that it was inserted in the Hamburgh paper by the *command* of the French government. The editor, it appears, refused to insert it; but, the senate of that *free* city, in consequence of a threatening note from M. Reinhard, the French minister, compelled him to obey the command. We state, too, upon good authority, that Reinhard, in the name of his government, has declared to the senate of Hamburgh, that, if war breaks out between England and France, Hamburgh must take part with the latter. Our readers will perceive how this accords with the provisions contained in the declaration of France and Russia, relative to the new-modelling of the German empire, which provisions expressly state, that the free and imperial cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, &c. &c. shall, in case of future wars, "remain *neuter*, "and that their neutrality shall be assured "by the empire, and recognized by the "other belligerent powers." (1)—As to the manifesto itself, it contains nothing new; nothing which has not, in spirit at least, been repeated, once a month, or thereabouts, in the Moniteur, ever since the conclusion of the peace of Amiens. The object of it is, to throw upon England the odium of the rupture, in which object, as far as relates to the continent of Europe, France will completely succeed. The base abandonment of our allies, has created against us such universal jealousy and hatred, that there is no charge against us, however false and absurd, that will not obtain implicit belief.—With respect to the *insolence* of this manifesto, and of the language of Buonaparté to Lord Whitworth, we question the propriety of the term. Language, like most other things, must often be considered as relative to something else. What is *insolence* when made use of towards one description of persons, is not insolence when addressed to another description of persons: the very

(1) See Register, Vol. II. p. 265.

compliments which a man bestows on his slave, would be the height of insolence if offered to his equal. Previous, therefore, to our seriously fixing the charge of insolence on Buonaparté, we should take care to ascertain his real relative situation with respect to the persons, towards whom he has exercised what we are pleased to call insolence; and, we, for our parts, are clearly of opinion, that it is absolutely impossible for Buonaparté to be insolent to either the ministry who made, or the people who applauded, that disgraceful treaty, the fulfilment of which he now demands.—Viewing the Consul's language to Lord Whitworth as to its effect with regard to the interest and honour of France, we are very far indeed, from thinking that it proceeded from "*passion*, or from *madness*, and that Buona-"parté *forgot the dignity of his station*." This opinion does, indeed, seem to be worn out with our contemporaries, who have now discovered, not only that there was "method in the madness," but that the whole scene was "*premeditated*," and even *agreed on in council*, the day before it took place! And, what could have been better imagined to strike terror to the hearts of the timid herd, by whom the Consul was surrounded, and who instantly retired to their hotels to draw up and dispatch to their several courts an account of the humiliation of England; to communicate the glad tidings, that England, haughty England, was reduced to a level with themselves?—"Lord Whitworth "behaved with great *dignity* and *firmness*!" Yes; firm as a post, and almost as silent. There was a time when, under such circumstances, an English Ambassador would instantly have left, not only the drawing room, but the country, and when his own country would have replied, not by a cringing state-paper, but by the mouths of her cannon. But, that time is gone, never, we fear, never to return.

The affair of Goree, an account of which will be found in p. 523, exhibits another proof of the indecision and imbecility of the ministers. If they meant to hold this conquest, in consequence of the previous violations of the treaty of Amiens, on the part of France, how came they to give up a dozen places, each of which was of fifty times the importance? And, if they meant to restore it, why were there not vessels to bring the garrison away?—During the debates on the definitive treaty, Mr. Addington, in reply to Mr. Windham, made use of the following words:—"If the Right Hon. "Gentleman has any specific object be-"sides that of a general censure upon the "treaty, let him state it. Does he mean "*to prevent restitution being made according* "*to the provisions of the treaty?* If he does, "let him state it. But, it is an object, in "the prosecution of which, I believe, *he will* "*not be countenanced by this House.*" (2) What will now be said to this cowardly crowing of pompous chanticleer upon his own dunghill? Does it now want any motion of Mr. Windham "to prevent restitu-"tion being made according to the provi-"sions of the treaty?" That gentleman does not now stand in need of any vote of the House to "*countenance*" him in his opposition to the disgraceful and foolish compact, which, if it has not been rendered null and void by the French, has already been, in numerous instances, grossly and shamefully violated by the English ministry.

American States and Louisiana.—Recent advices from the United States inform us, that the Congress have, at last, agreed to *talk about* measures of *preparation* with regard to the Mississippi navigation. Certain resolutions were, in the month of February, proposed, and passed in the senate, relative to the building boats and calling out a portion of the militia; but, from any thing which has reached us, it does not appear, that preparations were actually determined on. The French, as soon as they hear of the anger which has been excited in America, will, as we before observed, take care to adopt such measures as shall effectually do it away. (3) Indeed, we have good reason to believe, that these measures have been already adopted; for, there appeared in the Paris papers of about fifteen days ago, a short paragraph, stating, that *Spain* had countermanded the orders, which had been given to the intendant of New Orleans, and in consequence of which the Americans had been deprived of a place of deposit.—Should circumstances, however, make the Americans resolve on a seizure of New Orleans, on driving out the Spaniards, and on keeping out the French, they will, if they begin instantly, have only one serious difficulty in the way; to wit, that of *getting out of the mouth of the river* in spite of the maritime force of France and her allies.—We shall treat of this subject more at large another time. At present it is impossible to say, with any tolerable degree of correctness, what are the views and intentions of the American President and his Party.

The Addingtonian Navy.—The re-

(2) See debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1214.

(3) See Register, Vol. III. p. 297, where the line of conduct, which France will be likely to pursue, in this respect is pointed out.

marks, which we made, on this subject, last week, have drawn from the ministry a statement of their naval preparations, which statement is as follows :

PLYMOUTH.	SHIPS.	GUNS.
In Cawsand Bay	NEPTUNE.....	98
	VENERABLE.....	74
	CULLODEN.....	74
	COURAGEUX.....	74
Expected there from Spithead	HECTOR.....	74
From the Nore.....	ALBION.....	74
Ready for sea, only waiting for a fair wind to go into Cawsand Bay	TONNANT.....	80
	MALTA.....	80
	SPARTIATE.....	74
	PLANTAGENET..	74
	MARS.....	74
Will be ready in a few days	CONQUEROR.....	74
PORTSMOUTH.		
At Spithead, ready.....	DREADNOUGHT..	98
	RUSSELL.....	74
NORE.		
Ready for Spithead.....	ARDENT.....	64
WOOLWICH.		
Ready for sea, having *only* her guns to take on board.....	SCEPTRE.....	74
SHEERNESS.		
Will be ready in a few days..	MINOTAUR.....	74
	THUNDERER....	74
	RAISONABLE....	64

These, we are told, in the same statement, are "all the line of battle ships in commission at home," though Mr. Addington's "*lunar* month" expires this very day; for, the King's message was delivered to parliament on the 9th of March. Where, then, are the *fifty* ships of the line? Here are but nineteen; and, even according to the express acknowledgment of this statement, *five* out of these nineteen are not yet fit for sea. But, we asserted, that there were not, last Saturday, *six* ships of the line, at home, fit for sea, and, from the following statement, which *is* not, and which *cannot* be contradicted, our assertion is completely established.

NEPTUNE, 100 men short of her complement.
VENERABLE, ditto.
CULLODEN, ditto.
COURAGEUX, ditto.
HECTOR, repairing.
ALBION, *fit for sea.*
TONNANT, no men.
MALTA, no men.
SPARTIATE, no men.
PLANTAGANET, *fit for sea.*
MARS, no men.
CONQUEROR, not rigged.
DREADNOUGHT, *fit for sea.*
RUSSELL, only 300 men.
ARDENT, only 200 men.
SCEPTRE, only 20 men and boys.
MINOTAUR, only 125 men.
THUNDERER, only 200 men.
RAISONABLE, *fit for sea.*

This, then, is the true state of the British navy! Well may the wise, zealous, and provident heads of that department, station *blocks* and *hulks* to guard the mouth of the Thames! This is the happy and honourable result of those "*excellent regulations*," introduced by Lord St. Vincent, and applauded by the sapient Mr. Addington! And, is there nobody; is there no one member of parliament, who will call upon the minister for the fulfilment of his promise, relative to the *fifty ships of the line?* The month of emergency is now expired: where are the ships? If "imminent danger of invasion" did not exist a month ago, and if it has not existed from that time to this, the proclamation for calling out the militia was and is *unlawful*. If such "imminent danger" did exist, it was a case of great emergency; and where, then, we repeat, are the *fifty* ships, which were, in that case, to be got ready for sea in the space of a lunar month?—On an occasion like this, it may not be improper to refer to the opinions of Lord St. Vincent, at the close of the American war.—"SIR JOHN JERVIS desired the House to take a view of "the fleets of other powers, and extolled "the wisdom of keeping up *a formidable* "*and respectable navy*. The peace might not "last long, and if a new war should "speedily break out, it would then be too "late to complain of the reduction of our "maritime force. We could only be considerable by attending to it, and *nothing* "*could be more impolitic than to yield inconsiderately to idle and unsubstantial reasoning about* "*parsimony, proper and wise expenses were the* "*best and happiest œconomy*. And in this "country no money could be wasted that "was applied to preserve the naval "strength, for upon that strength our security depended in the most effectual "manner." (4) This was a very wise and manly way of thinking. Who would, in the year 1783, have imagined, that Sir John Jervis would ever have lent his hand to reduce the British navy to that state in which we now find it? Who would have imagined, that he was destined to be the instrument of the system of parsimony which he here so forcibly condemns; and that, the time was to come, when he himself should conceive the notion of defending his country by *blocks* and *hulks!*—But, parsimony was the basis of that treaty, to have counselled which Lord St. Vincent regards as "the pride of his life."—Our former article, on this subject, (5) has brought forth most dreadful abuse, through the channel of some of the daily papers, which abuse we should, from

(4) Parl. Debates, Annual Register for 1783.
(5) See Register, Vol. III. p. 475.

the ignorance and vulgarity it exhibits, be led to attribute to the Lords of the Admiralty themselves. In one breath they accuse us of treason in *exposing the weakness* of the country to the enemy, and, in the next, of falsehood in greatly *under-rating the strength* of the fleet fit for sea. Now, either our statements are true, or they are false; if true, we have not under-rated the strength of the fleet fit for sea; if false, we have not been exposing the weakness of the country to the enemy, whom, on the contrary, our statements tend to deceive and mislead. We now assert, that there are only *four* ships of the line fit for sea; if this assertion be false, it can certainly be of no use to the enemy, and if it be true, the country certainly ought to know it. But, if we, who have neither commercial agents nor spies in the sea-ports, can obtain intelligence as to the state of the fleet, shall it be believed that Buonaparté finds it difficult to obtain such intelligence? For our parts, we sincerely believe, that he has intelligence of this sort infinitely more correct and minute than any that the Admiralty can boast of; and, it is by no means carrying suspicion too far, to suppose that he may have an agent, of some sort or other, in, or about, every ship in commission.———That an attempt at an invasion of England or Ireland will speedily take place, it would be too much to say; but, when we consider, that French French troops, in great numbers, have lately been marched into Holland, where they can possibly have no other object; that 60,000 men are stationed within a day's march of Brest; that Rochefort, St. Maloes, Caen, Havre de Grace, Boulogne, Calais, Gravelines, Dunkirk, Ostend, and Flushing, are all full of troops, and that camps are actually forming on three or four parts of the coast of France and Belgium; when we consider this, and are acquainted with the vast numbers of flat-bottom boats, which are constantly held in a state of preparation, we may, one would think, be permitted just to ask, how a French army covered by four or five ships of the line, could be prevented from landing at a point, where there might be no English army to repel it. What, in our present dismantled state, is to prevent an invasion of Ireland? There are 18,000 men in that country, 10,000 of whom are wanted, and are absolutely necessary for the garrison duty; and, as to the militia, a single regiment will not be collected, and brought out, for these nine months, at the very soonest. What, then, would be the consequence, if a well-appointed army of 15,000 men, escorted by four or five ships of the line, were to sail out of Brest, for Ireland? We have not four or five ships of the line, at any one place, fit for sea; and, consequently, could not send out a force to meet them. And, in this state it is, that we are bidden to hold our tongues, and to repose implicit confidence in the very men, who have brought us into this dangerous and disgraceful situation!

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—For several weeks past, rumours have prevailed, on this subject; more, perhaps, from the obvious *necessity* of such a change, than from any real grounds for believing it to be in the contemplation of the persons concerned. That the present ministers cannot go on alone is certain. The thing is absolutely impossible. The state would fall to pieces in their hands in the space of six months; and, as to money, the men, who would make a loan to Mr. Addington, would deserve to spend the remainder of their lives in a work-house.—Of contemplated changes, or, according to some, changes that have *already* taken place, we know nothing more than what we have seen in the ministerial paper, the True Briton, from which we make the following extract:—"The war "which we shall have to wage will be *for* "*existence*, and it will chiefly depend, under "the favour of Providence, upon our own "*unanimity* and exertions, whether the "issue shall be glorious to us or not. It is "that we may possess that *unanimity* and "success, that we court the Union, in the "executive government, of those talents "and principles which, during unparalleled "domestic perils and ten years dreadful "warfare, preserved us at once from the "horrors of revolution, and raised our re-"sources and our glory together, to a pitch "unequalled in our annals. In this wish, "we believe, we are supported, not only "by a great majority of the nation, but by "a great majority likewise of the present "ministers. The uprightness of their in-"tentions (the *majority* of the present mi-"nisters we mean), the real love they bear "their country, the principles which they "have uniformly practised, and a simila-"rity of mind and sentiment, identify them "with the man to whom the eyes of the "nation are at this moment anxiously turn-"ed. The measures of the present minis-"try, as far as that great man's sentiments "are publicly known, have received his "warm and unqualified approbation and "support. He approved of the peace "which the ministers made, because he

" thought that peace was *necessary to*, and " *anxiously desired by, the country*, and be " cause that, even with such a government " as existed in France, *the experiment of* " *peace was worth the trial.* That peace " was made, we rejoiced at the time, and " we now as sincerely rejoice. Short as it " has been, the nation has had *a breathing* " *time*, and we shall now enter upon the " war, if war we must have, upon ground " which the most inveterate and malignant " oppositionist will find *it impossible to mis-* " *represent or condemn.* Unlike an *ex-war* " *minister, and his little band of* BLOOD- " HOUNDS, we are not the advocates for " war, much less for eternal war—*bellum* " *usque ad internecionem*—but we are pre- " pared to *defend*, to the last drop of our " blood, the rights and independence of our " country. If we are thus, then, *to fight for* " *our all*, we surely may be allowed to express " a wish to be conducted in the field by those " leaders whom we love —Let *Mr. Pitt*, " *Mr. Addington*, *Lord Hawkesbury*, *Lord Mel-* " *ville*, and a *few others whom we could name*, " direct the affairs of the nation, and we " shall think, not only our safety insured, " but our victory certain." (6)— The wis- dom and uprightness of men, who have re- duced us to the necessity of waging war " for our *existence*;"—the peace being " *ne-* *cessary* to the country" while it is denied to be a peace of necessity; the wisdom of trying "the *experiment* of peace" at all, especially with a dismantled fleet;—" the *breathing time*" which peace has given the nation; the "*impossibility* of the grounds of a new war being condemned by the most malignant oppositionist;"—the "*unanimity*" likely to be produced by *excepting* from the praise of uprightness a part of the admini- stration, and by styling part of the parlia- ment "*blood-hounds*;"—these are points which, perhaps, we may hereafter have an oppor- tunity of discussing with Mr. John Hiley Addington, who, we are well assured, is the author of the article, from which we have made the above extract; but, we shall, at present, confine ourselves to a few short remarks, as to the nature of the *change*, which is said to be about to take place, as far as that change relates to Mr. Pitt. If he comes in, it is upon some *principle*, con- nected with the present state of affairs. It is declared, in the Manifesto of Buonaparté, that there were, at the date of the King's Message, no points of discussion between this country and France, except Malta, which place, he says, the English ministry wished *to keep for five years longer*. (7) These assertions have been publickly and solemnly made; and, they yet remain uncontradicted by those vehicles, which ministers employ for such purposes. If the statement of Buonaparté be true (and there seems to be no good reason to suppose that it is not), it is incredible that Mr. Pitt should join the ministers; because, agreeably to his sentiments respecting Malta, it is im- possible that he should not disapprove of the measures, which they are pursuing, and which he is called in to support. In his speech on the preliminaries of peace, after stating, that, " compared with the East " and West Indies, the Mediterranean " was but *a secondary consideration*," he ob- served, that, " in case of a *confederacy on the* " *continent*, indeed, much, undoubtedly " would be done by the co-operation of " a British fleet in the Mediterranean. " But, in the present moment," said he, " and *situated as Europe now is*, we ought not, " upon any one principle of wisdom or " policy, *to prefer acquisitions in the Mediter-* " *ranean* to the attainment of the means of " giving *additional security to our possessions in* " *the East and West Indies*."—Is it possible, therefore, that, after having, within these few months, restored the Cape of Good Hope, the ministers can think of going to war for the temporary possession of Malta? And, that Mr. Pitt will join them for such a purpose?—Mr. Pitt proceeded:—" Upon " this principle" [of not wounding the feelings of the enemy] "he hoped the " House would concur with him in think- " ing, that we ought not to insist upon re- " taining the Island of Malta. It appeared " to him more consistent with wisdom and " sound policy, rather to put Malta under " the protection of a third power, than, " *by retaining it ourselves, to mortify the pride* " *and attract the jealousy of the enemy*." (8) —Yet, this is the very object, which, according to the declarations of the French Government, our ministers have in view, and to effect which they are now pre- paring to make war.—Is it, then, we ask, likely; is it possible, that this can be the principle of a coalition between them and Mr. Pitt? We hope not; we trust not. We love to believe, that, in returning to office, Mr. Pitt will return to those prin- ciples of policy which formerly beamed from his enlightened mind:—" Our simple " object" (said he, when defending the pro- secution of the last war,) " *Our object is se-* " *curity, just security, with a little mixture of* " *indemnification.* These are the legitimate " objects of war at all times, and when we

(6) True Briton, March 7, 1803.

(7) See Manifesto, present sheet, p 523.

(8) See Debates, Vol. II. pp. 1137 and 1138.

" have attained that end, we are in a con-
" dition to derive from peace its beneficent
" advantages; but until then, our duty and
" our interest require that we should per-
" severe unappalled in the struggle to which
" we were provoked. *We shall not be satis-*
" *fied with a false security. War, with all its*
" *evils, is better than a peace in which there is*
" *nothing to be seen but usurpation and injus-*
" *tice, dwelling with savage delight on the*
" *humbled prostrate condition of some timid*
" *suppliant people.* * * * * I do not con-
" fine my views to the territorial limits of
" France. I contemplate the principles,
" character, and conduct of France; I con-
" sider what these are; I see in them the
" issues of *distraction, of infamy and ruin to*
" *every state in her alliance*, and therefore, I
" say, that until the aspect of that mighty
" mass of iniquity and folly is *entirely*
" *changed*, until the character of the go-
" vernment is totally reversed; *until by the*
" *common consent of the general voice of all*
" *men, I can with truth tell Parliament,*
" *France is no longer terrible for her contempt*
" *of the rights of every other nation; she no*
" *longer avows schemes of universal empire,*
" *she has settled into a state whose government*
" *can maintain those relations in their integrity*
" in which alone civilized communities are
" to find their security, from which they
" are to derive *their distinction and their glory*;
" until in the situation of France we have
" exhibited to us those features of *a wise, a*
" *just, and a liberal policy, I cannot treat with*
" *her.* The time to come to the discussion
" of a peace can only be the time *when you*
" *can look with confidence to an honourable*
" *issue*; *to such a peace as shall at once restore*
" *to Europe* HER SETTLED AND BALANCED
" CONSTITUTION OF GENERAL POLITY,
" *and to every negotiating power in particular,*
" THAT WEIGHT IN THE SCALE OF GENE-
" RAL EMPIRE *which has ever been found the*
" *best guarantee and pledge of local indepen-*
" *dence and general security.* SUCH ARE MY
" SENTIMENTS. I AM NOT AFRAID TO
" AVOW THEM. I COMMIT THEM TO THE
" THINKING AMONG MANKIND, and if they
" have not been poisoned by the stream of
" French sophistry, and prejudiced by her
" falsehoods, I am sure they will approve
" of the determination I have avowed,
" for those grave and mature reasons on
" which I found it." (9) Such was the policy,

(9) See his speech in the committee of supply on the 7th of June, 1799, when he also stated,

and such were the principles, which, in one of those moments when the humbler virtue of private friendship triumphs over that of public duty, Mr. Pitt abandoned, by his defence of the treaty of Amiens; but to which, we hope, he is now about to return. In what degree this hope is discouraged by his joining with men, who have persevered in a system of perpetual concession, we, at present, forbear to state; but, as we never have, in one single instance deviated from the principles on which we formerly lent him all the little support in our power, so his returning to those principles, clearly expressed by actions as well as by words, is the only ground on which we can promise ourselves the honour of being numbered amongst the friends of his new administration.

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that we were in circumstances which forbade us to stop short of "*an adequate, full, and rational secu-*
" *rity*," that the war might be carried on for any length of time, without the erection of new debt, and that "*it would not be difficult to provide taxes for*
" *eight years.*"

NOTICES.

Our Correspondent B. is informed that the Abuses in the GENERAL POST-OFFICE have not been forgotten, but will be resumed in the course of a week or two. Several articles on the Navy, &c. have been deferred for want of room. The SONG from Reading entitled THE DOCTOR AND THE APOTHECARY came safe to hand.

*** MR. COBBETT takes this opportunity to recommend, to his friends, MR. HARDING, who has succeeded him as Bookseller, in Pall Mall, and on whose punctuality the utmost reliance may be placed.—MR. COBBETT's address is Duke Street, Westminster.

A New Edition of the First Volume of COBBETT'S ANNUAL REGISTER is in the press, and will be ready for delivery on the 20th instant.

*** No. 3 of the MERCURE ANGLOIS DE COBBETT, price One Shilling, was published on Wednesday last, and may be had of the publishers of this paper, and of Messrs. Dulau and Co. Soho Square.

LONDON,

TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

SIR,—In continuation of the subject, begun in my former letter (p. 513), I purpose, 2. To compare your estimate of receipts, as set forth in your speech of the 10th of December, with the actual receipts of the last, and the probable receipts of the present year.

The speech of the 10th of December, if it was not intended to deceive the nation, had, at least, that effect. It raised the funds from 69⅞ to 74¼, and it gave rise to that memorable opinion of a considerable portion of the House of Commons, that you had obtained, by your financial abilities and resources, "an eighteen years' lease of the "Treasury Bench." That I was not, however, deceived by this brilliant display will be seen by a reference to my remarks on it, page 794, of Vol. II.—On the 22d of January, I entered into as full an examination of the statements of the speech of the 10th of December as the materials I was possessed of would enable me, of which examination the result was, that, "unless a *great* "*diminution* took place in the peace establish-"ment, the interest of the public debt could "not be discharged without annual *loans*, "or without *new taxes* to a considerable "amount." (See Register, Vol. III. p. 82.)

Such, were my opinions, founded upon the partial information, to which I had access previous to the publication of those accounts which the Public have been furnished with through the obliging zeal of Lord Auckland. Now, thanks to his lordship, I have all the materials necessary to a fair and ample discussion of this most important subject.

By adverting to your speech, it will be perceived, that, in estimating the resources of the country, you took into view the *surplus* only. This is, indeed, the customary mode of making such estimates, when a minister is showing the ways and means which he has to balance against the supplies; but, on the present occasion, it will, I conceive, be more clear, as well as more satisfactory, to embrace the whole of the income of the nation, especially as this is the course pursued by Lord Auckland. The object, which his lordship professed to have in view, was, to convince the world, that our pecuniary resources were *immense*, and that they were *increasing*. As to their being upon the increase I shall speak by and by: at present I shall confine myself to their magnitude, as compared with your estimates of the 10th of December. The abstract of the official accounts moved for by Lord Auckland, and dated 3d March, 1803, is as follows:

In the Years ending 5th January....	1801.	1802.	1803.	
No. I. & II. NET PRODUCE of PERMANENT REVENUE, including Corn Bounties	22,318,452	23,829,325	28,246,677	
INCREASE of Balance and Bills in the Hands of the Receiver-General of Customs	— —	— —	133,105	
III. BEER DUTIES postponed £314,927, Deduct Duties 1802 82830	— —	— —	232,097	
IV. & V. LAND TAX UNREDEEMED	1,524,931	1,454,343	1,380,271	
ANNUAL MALT TAX	317,858	378,056	624,359	
VI. ESTIMATE of the further Produce of Taxes	— —	— —	2,827,783	
			£	33,444,292
VII. PERMANENT CHARGE on account of DEBT UNREDEEMED	£17,674,794			
——— on account of SINKING FUND	5,806,121			24,631,931
——— ditto, CIVIL LIST, and Parliamentary Annuities	1,151,016			
				£8,812,361

By the Account No. II. it appears that the Charges of BOUNTIES and DRAWBACKS (exclusive of Corn Bounties), in the Year ending 5th January, 1803, exceeded the Average of the Two preceding Years, by £883,461

By Account No. VIII. that the Amount of SUGAR remaining under Bond on 5th January 1803, exceeded their Amount on 5th January 1802, by 142,711

By Account No. IX. that the Profit on the LOTTERIES for the Year 1802, amounted to £555,000, of which the Proportion reserved for Gt. Britain was 370,000

This abstract, Sir, though called for by a Peer of the Realm, and signed by a Secretary of the Treasury, is, I have no scruple to say, as confused and fallacious a representation as ever was exhibited upon paper, whether considered as a comparative view of the revenue of last year with that of each of the two former years, or, as an enumeration and addition of the several heads of receipt during the last year only. It is in the latter light which I am now about to consider it.

And, first, I should be glad to know, for what reason it is, that Lord Auckland and Mr. Vansittart include the *corn bounties* in the net produce of the permanent revenue? The bounties on the importation of corn are, it is true, paid out of the receipts at the custom house, and, of course, the sum brought to the Exchequer from the custom house, is less, by the amount of those bounties, than it would be if no bounties were paid. In comparing, therefore, the Exchequer receipts of customs in one year with those of another year, it is proper to include corn bounties in both; but, the third column of this abstract exhibits the receipts of the last year in order to show what will be the receipts of the present year, and of every future year; and, therefore, unless Lord Auckland has got a promise from Providence, unless he has "taken a bond "of fate," that no corn bounties shall be wanted this year, or in any future year, he has done wrong to include, in his estimate of Exchequer receipt, the corn bounties paid last year. Corn bounties have been wanted in 1800, 1801, and 1802; and, why are we to suppose, how can we hope, that they will not be wanted in future? But, unfortunately for his lordship's statements, you, Sir, whose estimates of the 10th of December he meant to strengthen and confirm, did, in that very speech, reckon amongst the expenses of this year, £524,573 for corn bounties (1). If, indeed, the corn bounties of the last year had been uncommonly great in amount, an average of several years might have been sought, and the residue beyond that average, might have been reasonably included in the Exchequer receipt of customs of last year; but this was not the case; the corn bounties, paid in 1800, amounted to £44,836, those of 1801, to £1,420,355, those of 1802, to £715,323, the average of which sums is £726,838. The corn bounties of 1802, can, therefore, on no principle of fair calculation, possibly be admitted into the present estimate.

(1) See Register, vol. II. p. 779.

Increase of balances and bills, in the hands of the Receiver-General of Customs, naturally arises from an increase of receipts at the custom-house, and, as those receipts will be found to arise from newly created causes, it would not be fair to include this increase even in a comparative view between the produce of last year and that of former years; but, what earthly reason, let me ask you, can there be for including it in, or rather, adding it to, the net produce of last year, unless you count upon a decrease of trade in the present year? If your trade continues the same that it now is, the balances and bills in hand will, in all probability, continue to be as great in amount as they were at the close of the last year; so, that, without an assurance, that the bills and balances of the present year shall be less than those of the last, this sum also must be deducted from the estimate.

Beer duties postponed: that is to say, beer duties which became due before the expiration of last year, but not being received, will, of course, be received in the present year, and are, therefore, added to the receipts of last year in making out an estimate of the receipts of this. The sum is £232,097, being the difference between postponed beer duties at the end of 1801 and those postponed at the end of last year; but, this addition to the postponed duties arises from a new cause; it arises from the additional duty on beer, estimated, according to these accounts, at £731,952 a year, a cause that will continue, and that will render the postponement this year as great as it was last; or, if it does not, the *succeeding* year must, in that respect, experience a defalcation; and, therefore, the adding of the above-mentioned postponed duties to the receipts of the last year, in order to come at an estimate of future permanent annual receipts is reducible to no principle of arithmetic or of reason. If your house and land in Richmond Park, for instance, were let for £1,000 a year, and your tenant had paid you only £900 of his rent last year, would you, from that circumstance conclude, that your estate would in future be worth, £1,100 a year? That this is a fair illustration will be perceived in a moment. The whole of the new duties, amongst which is the beer duty, out of which the postponement arises, are, in the accounts estimated at, £4 785,123. The duties actually received amount to £1,957,340, and, in order to make out an estimate for the present and future years, the residue, being £2,827 783, is added, as will be seen by the abstract in page 545. Here, then, is a most dextrous tour de main; first the actual re-

ceipts of £1,957,340 are included in Lord Auckland's leading head of net produce of revenue in the year ending the 5th Jan. 1803; under his last head he includes the remainder of the estimate for the whole year, £2,827,783, making together £4,785,123. And, in the middle of his abstract, he inserts £232,097 for beer duties postponed; that is to say, he squeezes in so much *more than the total amount* of the beer duties, even as estimated by the Treasury! That Lord Auckland or you should bring forward a statement like this ought not, perhaps, to be wondered at; but, that Mr. Vansittart should put his name to it, does, I must confess, astonish me.

The next head of Lord Auckland's additions to the actual receipts of the last year is, "*further produce of taxes* 1802;" that is to say, certain taxes having been imposed during last year, they did not, during that year, produce so much as they will produce this year, and the difference is reckoned at £2,827,783. And, why is this addition made? Because the new taxes fall so much short of the Treasury estimates of these taxes, which estimates were made previous to the laying on of the taxes! But, Sir, after the taxes had been half a year under collection, would it not have been safer for Lord Auckland to ground his estimate upon the result of that collection, rather than upon estimates which experience had proved to be too sanguine? The produce of these taxes, from the 5th of July to the 5th of January, was £1,900,437. Allowing, therefore, that the beer duties postponed ought to be added to this sum, in order to complete the half year, which would then produce £2,132,524, the produce of the whole year would be only £4,265,048, and the sum to be added, on this account, to the net receipts of last year, would be £2,364,621 instead of £2,827,783.

As to the *increase of bounties and drawbacks* (exclusive of corn bounties), and of *sugar remaining under bond*, though it should be allowed to enter into a comparative estimate of the last with preceding years, it can have nothing to do with the present or future years; for, if the trade should continue undiminished, what reason is there to suppose, that there will be a decrease of drawbacks and bounties, and why should any thing be allowed for increase of sugar under bond, when that increase was owing merely to an over importation? Lord Auckland himself, indeed, does not seem to place much reliance on these items, which he places beneath his estimate, as something thrown out for the amusement of the lighter moments of the august assembly, to whom that ingenious performance was submitted.

After pruning away these exuberant branches of his lordship's pommier d'or, the statement of the real revenue of the year ending on the 5th of January, 1803, will stand thus:

Net produce of permanent revenue ..	£27,531,353
Land Tax unredeemed and Annual Malt Tax	2,004,630
Further taxes imposed in 1802	2,364,621
Lottery	370,000
Total net revenue last year.....	32,270,604
Permanent charge on account of National Debt, Civil List, and Parliamentary Grants.....	24,631,931
Real Surplus, applicable to the maintenance of the Army, Navy, Ordnance, and for other national purposes	7,538,673

Now, Sir, I approach the accomplishment of this part of my object; I come to the point of comparison between your estimates, laid before the House of Commons on the 10th of December last, and that which I have here drawn up from the accounts submitted to the House of Lords.—In your estimates, you proceeded, as I before observed, upon the total surplus only, which surplus, you stated as follows, for the present year: (2)

Land and Malt	2,750,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund	6,500,000
Lottery	500,000
Total	9,750,000
Deduct real surplus of revenue as above stated	7,538,673
Deficiency upon your estimate for the present year, ending 5th Jan. 1804.	2,211,327

For the next year you were still more sanguine in your expectation, and still further from the truth. (3)

Land and Malt	2,750,000
Surplus of Consolidated Fund	7,845,000
Lottery	500,000
Total	11,095,000
Deduct real surplus of revenue as above stated	7,538,673
Deficiency upon your estimate for next year, ending 5th Jan. 1805.	3,556,327

Thus, then, Sir, taking your own and Lord Auckland's mode of estimating, the receipt of the present year will fall more than *two millions* short of your estimate of the 10th of December, and the receipt of

(2) Register, Vol. II. p. 780. (3) Ibid. 782.

next year, more than *three millions and a half.* —And, let not this error, or mistatement, be ascribed to haste, or inadvertency. These would, indeed, be very poor grounds of apology; but, insufficient as they might be, you have deprived yourself of them; for, in the same speech which communicated your estimates to the House of Commons, you said, that your "opinion had not been "lightly formed, for that you had thought "it your duty to investigate the grounds "of it, with all the minuteness and atten-"tion in your power." (4) As it were, too, for the purpose of rendering the act still more deliberate, you afterwards published this speech from your own and Mr. Vansittart's manuscript; and, in this edition of it, all your estimates are repeated, as well as all the confident assertions, as to the correctness of those estimates. The fact is, that the praises which your exhibition had drawn from the shallow-brained part of your spectators (I allude to the *gallery*, of course), together with the rise that it produced in the funds, and the long lease, which, in consequence thereof, Messrs. Fox and Wilberforce promised you of the Treasury Bench; all these together had absolutely intoxicated your mind; and so, like the crow in the fable, you opened your mouth, and down dropped the pamphlet, which will remain an incontestible and a lasting proof of your want of knowledge, or of your intention to deceive.

In stating the *deficiency*, upon your estimates, of £2,211,327 for the present year, and of £3,556,327 for next year, you will please to observe, that I do not mean the deficiency of the receipts, *as compared with the expenditure*, of the country, which will be found to be *ten millions*, at least, instead of two or three. I have here been speaking of *receipts only*. Preparatory to my comparison between the receipts and expenditure of the country, with which comparison I intend to close the present enquiry, I have been endeavouring to show what the receipts will be, and how much their amount will sink beneath that of the estimates, on which you and Lord Auckland have taught the people to rely, as on a security, not only against additional pecuniary burdens, but also against the intrigues and the arms of France. Previous to my comparison between the receipts and the expenditures of the country, I shall, agreeably to my plan, show the difference between the receipts and expenditures of peace, if it continue, with those of war, if it had continued; and, if I do no not greatly deceive myself, I shall prove, to the satisfaction of every man, not blinded by ignorance or by baseness, that, *even in a pecuniary point of view*, war, another war, a resolutely-prosecuted and a successful war, against Buonaparté, is the means, and the only possible means, short of the immediate inetrposition of Divine Providence, of saving this country from destruction.—But these topicks must be deferred till my next.——I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, 12th April, 1803.

(4) See Speech, Register, Vol. II. p. 782.

ON MALTA.

SIR,—I beg leave to transmit to you some reflexions on the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, and I shall be highly flattered by your giving them a place in your Weekly Register, provided you think them worthy. —"The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Co-"mino, shall be restored to the Order of "St. John, to be held on the same condi-"tions on which it possessed them before "the war," that is, the order is to be restored with all its abuses, and the government of the island is to resume its former tyranny. This confirms the abolition of all the civil rights which the Maltese formerly enjoyed (which rights the Grand Masters have constantly endeavoured to destroy), and reduces that unhappy people to abject slavery. They have, at different times, formed plans to make an effort to recover their lost rights, and are now, more than ever, disposed to do so, from the independent ideas which they have imbibed by their intercourse with the English. Is this article calculated to preserve peace in the island, and to make the government independent? Certainly not. The Maltese would rebel against the Order, and Buonaparté embrace the opportunity to seize upon the island. By the first section of this article, "the Grand Master is to be elected in "a general chapter." But in October *, ministers made a further concession, and consented that the Pope, the creature of Buonaparté, should, and he has, nominated a Grand Master. And who? Tomasi. A man held in execration by the Maltese! In the third section of it, we find that "there "shall be established a Maltese Langue "which shall be supported by the territorial "revenues and commercial duties of the "island;" which is neither more nor less, than laying a new burthen upon the Maltese by way of boon, in the shape of a benefit. The territorial revenues and commercial duties are already absorbed by the civil go-

* See present Summary, p. 566.

vernment; the Maltese will reap no advantage under heaven from having a Langue, for the Order has nothing to do with the government of the island: the Grand Master is prince of the island, and he alone governs. This Langue is a French project formed some years since, (and is now to be seen in print), *as a means of acquiring to France additional influence in the island.* "Proofs of nobility shall *not* be necessary "for admission of Knights of this Langue."—Why? The Maltese nobility is chiefly of the 12th, 13th, and 14th centuries. This will be the effect: the Grand Master will have no restraint, and will put in his own mean tools as knights, and the Maltese will never have a Grand Master from this Langue, as the Langue will not be composed of nobles.—"At least *half* of the municipal, "administrative, civil, judicial, and other "employments depending on the govern-"ment shall be filled by inhabitants of the "islands of Malta, Gezo, and Comino."—Before, they were all Maltese; now they are nearly *half*.—It is a mockery, to confer upon them a favour which deprives them of half what they had.—In the 5th section we find that one half of the garrison at least, shall be composed of Maltese, formerly *all* the troops were Maltese, officered by knights, besides a militia little short of 20,000 men.—In section 8, "The ports of "Malta shall be opened to the commerce "of all nations, who shall there pay equal "and moderate duties."—Great Britain had made Malta a free port. If duties are again to be paid, Messina, Leghorn, and other free ports will deprive Malta, as heretofore, of all trade; under the government of England it was beginning to rival them. This again tends to make the Maltese disaffected towards the government of the Grand Masters, (for they always oppressed trade, to keep the Maltese poor and dependent,) this is just what France wishes.—As to the 9th section, the only use of the Order of St. John was to preserve Sicily from the incursions of the Barbary cruisers, and they did this but imperfectly. In 10th section, it states that "the Order shall be governed, both with "respect to spirituals and temporals, by the "same statutes which were in force when the "knights left the island, as far as the present "treaty does not abrogate them." This confirms the internal government of the Order in all its abuses, which abuses gave France the means, and will again give it, of making a party in the knights.—I must just, *en passant*, make one observation on the 11th art. of the treaty, which stipulates that the English troops shall evacuate Porto Ferraro.—They did evacuate it, and, in a few days the French troops marched in.—Was this understood when the treaty was signed? I shall conclude what I had to trouble you with, by contending that the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens was dictated by France, who well knew what she was about; the effect of it will inevitably be to make the Maltese desperate, and to excite them to rebellion, by which France will profit; and it manifestly appears, that our government when they agreed to this article did not know that the Grand Master was Prince of Malta, and that the Knights and Langues had nothing to do with the principality.

Yours, &c. J. B.

HILEY ADDINGTON'S BIRTH-DAY.

Reading, April 6, 1803.

SIR,—In your account of the festivity of Apothecaries' Hall, on the first of April (Mr. Hiley's birth-day, and anniversary of the Amiens treaty) in your last week's Register, (p. 521.) I am sorry to observe an omission, which this letter is intended to supply. I allude to the inclosed song, composed by a Reverend Divine of this town, a great admirer of Mr. Addington senior. He rehearsed it to the passengers in the Long Coach, on our journey to town; and afterwards sung it with infinite applause, towards the end of the evening, when the company were got a little merry. The insertion will oblige the whole of the *rural party*—(as you are pleased to call us)—and among them, Sir, your obedient servant,

TIMOTHY GOSLING.

Moderate Men and moderate Measures.

Praise to placeless, proud ability,
Let the prudent muse disclaim;
And sing the statesman—all civility—
Whom *moderate talents* raise to fame.
He, no random projects urging,
Makes us wild alarms to feel;
With *moderate measures* gently *purging*
Ills that prey on Britain's weal.

CHORUS.

Gently *purging*,
Gently *purging*,
Gently *purging* Britain's weal. (1)

Addington, with measured *motion*,
Keep the tenour of thy way;
To glory yield no rash devotion,
Led by luring lights astray:
Splendid talents are deceiving,
Tend to councils much too bold;
Moderate men we prize, believing
All that glitters is not gold.

GRAND CHORUS.

All that *glisters*,
All that *glisters*,
All that *glisters* is not gold. (2)

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(1) "*Ere human statute purged the general weal.*" SHAKESPEARE.

(2) "*Nor all that glisters gold.*" GRAY.

EPIGRAM.—*On the Addingtonian Navy.*

Fifty ships in a month, fit to ride on the ocean,
He vow'd should be ready these Frenchmen to meet!
The Doctor may know how to make up a potion,
But "*fiat mixtura*" won't make up a fleet.

THE BLOCKS!

"*We are happy to assure our readers, that the "Blocks intended to guard the Thames are "nearly ready. True Briton, April* 1."

This assurance has been received in all parts of the country with the most lively satisfaction.—That within so short a space of time as three weeks, or a month, after the minister had announced imminent danger of invasion, any part of our system of defence should be "nearly ready," is certainly a most charming consideration, and reflects the highest honour on the spirit and alacrity of the government.—The only thing wanting to complete the public contentment is to be distinctly informed, WHAT or WHO these same blocks are, whose forward state of readiness is so loudly vaunted.—Several inquiries have reached us from correspondents in distant parts of the kingdom on this subject: and as we are really at a loss ourselves for a satisfactory explanation, we subjoin the communications that have come to us just as we have received them.—They have, for the most part, taken the turn of epigrams.—The following is the first that set us really thinking upon the subject.

EPIGRAMS.—No. I.

If Blocks can from danger deliver,
Two places are safe from the French;
The first is the mouth of the river;
The second the Treasury Bench.

No. II. appears in the form of a charade, of which we shall be obliged to any of our readers for a solution. It is dated from University College, Oxford.

My first protects Thames' sacred stream;
My second, antient authors deem,
Is much improved by brains;
But when my first and second join'd
Are in one Ministry combin'd,
Alas! what hope remains!

No. III.

While some, impatient, call for Pitt;
And some, in terror, would submit
E'en to be saved by Fox—
Sage Addington, with candid smile,
And pure intention free from guile,
Still bids us trust in *Blocks*.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

MALTA.—*Letter from M. de Busy to the English Minister at Malta.—Dated Malta, March* 1, 1803.

Mons. the English Minister.—I had the honour this morning of stating to your Exc. the object of the mission with which I am charged; to which you replied, that you had no orders to evacuate Malta, and that gave me to understand that the Grand Master had better not repair thither. After having reflected upon this answer, which was not so satisfactory as His Highness expected, it seemed to me that it required further explanation. As your Excellency's answer appeared to contain a refusal to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, conformably to the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens, and as such a violation of the treaty might lead to the most important consequences, and even the most fatal to the repose of Europe; I cannot remain satisfied with the verbal answer you have given me, and I therefore request you to state in a public and authentic manner, the motives of this unexpected refusal.—I have the honour to recall to the recollection of your Exc. that conformably to the 4th paragraph of the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens, the forces of his Brit. Majesty were to evacuate that island and its dependencies within 3 months from the exchange of the ratification of the treaty, or sooner if possible. That period has expired some time. The treaty adds, that "the island shall be given up to the Order in its present state, provided the Grand Master, or Commissaries fully authorized according to the statutes of the Order, shall be in the island to take possession, and provided the troops which his Sicilian Majesty is to furnish shall have arrived." Those troops have arrived a long time, and the only condition remaining to be fulfilled, was the arrival of the G. Master, or his Commissaries, to take possession. This condition is now accomplished by my arrival.—The G. Master has deigned to appoint me his Ambassador Ext. and Plenip. "to treat, conclude, accomplish, and concert with the English and French Ministers Plenip. and with the actual English gov. in the island, upon all the articles relative to the restoration of religion to the island of Malta, as well as upon the restoration of the place." Such are the terms of the full powers with which I am vested, and of which I have sent you a copy. According to the tenor of these full powers, and the different stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, being accomplished for the restoration of the island of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, I demand formally the execution of the 10th art. parag. 4, of the said treaty, and I beg that I may receive a categorical answer.—Accept the assurance, &c. (Signed) BUSSY.

The answer of M. the English Minister to M. the commander Busy.

Malta, March 2, 1803.

SIR,—I have received the letter which your Excellency did me the honour to write to me yesterday, in which some dissatisfaction is expressed at my verbal communication respecting the object of your mission: and in which it is demanded that I should detail, in writing, my reasons for refusing to deliver up the Gov. of these isles, on the arrival of his Eminence the Grand Master of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.—In reply, I beg leave to observe, that as some of the powers invited by the terms of the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens to guarantee the independence of Malta, have not yet acceded to that measure, I do not think myself authorized to put an end to the Gov. of his Britannic Majesty here, until I receive special instructions from my court.—Your Exc. will observe, that I wish to dissuade the G. Master from coming to reside here. Your Exc. may recollect that I spoke to you on that subject, to the following purport:—On your observations, that the G. Master reckoned on having immediate possession of the palace of gov. at the Fort of Vallette, I informed you, that under the present circumstances, I could

not accede to the desire of his Eminence, it being absolutely necessary that his Exc. Gen. Villette and myself should continue in the palace for the purpose of transacting the official business of our respective departments.—I request, however, to recall to your Excellency's remembrance, that I offered at the same time the palace of Boschetta for the residence of the G. Master, a situation which I conceived to be in every respect suitable to his Eminence, until the period when he might take upon him the direction of the govt.—But as the palace of Boschetta is not at present furnished, I took the liberty to suggest that it would be more suitable to remain some time in Sicily, and so much the more so, as the then residence of his Eminence would be but a day's voyage from this island.—As to any thing further, his Eminence may be assured that the moment I think myself authorized to deliver up the Govt. I will inform him of it.—I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) ALEXANDER J. BAIL.

GUERNSEY.

Proclamation, by the Hon Major-General John Doyle, Colonel of his Majesty's 87th Reg. of Foot, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Forces in the Island of Guernsey, &c.

Whereas, his Majesty's orders have been received to adopt every measure of precaution and preparation for the better defence and security of the Island of Guernsey: This is to give notice, That in the event of an attack, martial law will of course take place; in which case, upon the alarm guns being fired, the master and crews of the different vessels, subjects to his Majesty, and who may be then in the Pier, or in any of the roads of this island, likewise all such other seafaring persons who may not be particularly attached to the militia, do repair to the South Pier, where they will be armed and embodied under the command of Capt. Dobree, of the royal navy, who will thereupon rank as Lt.-Col. in the army from the date of his commission. They are implicitly to obey all orders they may receive from him, or such other officers as may be appointed to act under him, and are in every respect to be subject to military discipline.—By an ordinance of the royal court, bearing date the 15th of May, 1779, it is enacted, "That on martial law taking "place, all subjects of his Majesty who shall be "refractory or disobedient to the orders of the "Lt.-Gov. or of any other officer, or who shall "be wanting in their duty, shall be judged and "punished by and according to the laws of war. "And it is expressly forbidden to all tavern or "inn-keepers, or others lodging of strangers, to "keep, conceal, or entertain at their houses, or "otherwise, any of his Majesty's subjects, after "signal of an alarm shall be given, upon pain of "being punished to the rigour of the law, which "martial law shall remain and continue in full "force, during any apprehension of the enemy, "and until it shall be repealed by beat of drum. "And it is farther expressly ordered, for all fo-"reigners, upon the first sound of an alarm, to re-"tire to their lodging, and all Foreign Masters of "Vessels and their crews, which shall be in the harbour or roads of this island, to repair on board "their respective vessels, and there remain during "the whole time of such alarm, without going there-"from, except in any case of necessity to apply "to the officer commanding the Pier Guard, who "shall give such directions as he shall think "meet; upon pain of their being punished to "the rigour of the laws. And it is also forbid-"den to all tavern and inn-keepers, or other "retailers of spirituous liquors, after the alarm "shall be given, to give any spirituous liquor to "any soldier or militia men, without leave from "their officers."—The High Bailiff being in possession of a commission, is to have the command of the town and those placed in it for the preservation of tranquillity; and should any person be found disturbing the peace, or in the act of rioting or pillaging, they will be subject, to instant military execution.—Given at Head-Quarters, Guernsey, this 16th of March, 1803.—By Order of the Commander in Chief.—*Thomas Saumarez*,—Acting Q.-Master General.

General Order,

By Major-Gen. John Doyle, Col. of his Majesty's 87th reg. of foot, and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's forces in the island of Guernsey.—Notice is hereby given to all strangers, subjects of his Majesty now in this island, or who may hereafter arrive in it, and who are not enrolled in the militia, or whose duty in case of alarm is not already clearly defined in former regulations, that, upon the alarm guns being fired from Fort George, Castle Cornet and Vale Castle, (by which the island is placed under martial law) they are immediately to be formed into a staff corps, under the command of Capt. Ralph Davison, of St. Peter's-Port; and to repair to the Esplanade of Fort George, there to follow such directions as they may receive from the Commanding Royal Engineer, or the officer under his orders, for the purpose of their being employed in the manner best suited to the power and abilities of each in forwarding the public service. Whoever shall neglect most exactly to obey this order will be exposed to the consequence, which must inevitably ensue to all those who shall not be found at the moment of danger zealously exerting themselves at the post assigned them for the defence of the island, in conformity to its known laws and constitution.—Given at Head-Quarters, Guernsey, the 16th March, 1803.—By order of the Commander in Chief,—*Thomas Saumarez*, Acting Q.-Master General.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, Feb. 25.—His Brit. Majesty has appointed the merchant, Fr. Sommer, at Bucharest, his Consul for Moldavia and Wallachia, an office which did not before exist, but which has been established after the example of Russia, Austria, and France, which latter has also sent commercial Commissioners to Moldavia and Wallachia.—They write from Alexandria, in Egypt, of the date the 19th of January, that the English were making preparations to evacuate Egypt.

Venice, March 18.—By an edict of his Imperial Majesty, published here the day before yesterday, the Austro-Venetian country is to be divided into seven provinces, viz. Venice and Dogado, the Friule, Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Verona and Belluno: they will all retain their present limits: each will be governed by a provincial Captain, who is to execute the orders of the Gov. Gen. of Venice.

Milan, March 20.—The Minister of religion has written a circular letter to the Archbishops and Bishops of the Republic, to explain to them the necessity of the military conscription, and to induce them to use their influence in the execution of this measure.

Berlin, March 24.—A certain degree of coolness is still remarked between our Court and that of Vienna. The successor of the Count de Stadion

is not yet arrived in this city, nor is there any Prussian Envoy at Vienna. Austria sees, with some jealousy, the preponderating influence which Prussia has acquired, in the German Empire, in consequence of the late changes.

Vienna, March 25.—The marriage of the Archduke Palatine with the Princess of Baden, who is now at Petersburgh, will be celebrated at Cracow, where the Emperors of Germany and Russia will meet upon the occasion.—A deficit to the amount of two millions, has been discovered in the Imperial treasury. Some persons, who are strongly suspected, have been arrested.—The Emperor has published a proclamation at Venice, ordering that the Austro-Venetian territories shall be divided into seven provinces, viz. Venice and its territory, the Frioul, Treviso, Padua, Vicenza, Verona and Belluno, each of which is to be governed by an officer, entitled a Provincial Captain Royal, who is to be subordinate to the government at Venice.

Berlin, March 26.—A report has been circulated, that our Court has entered into a defensive treaty with France, according to which the party attacked, is to be assisted by the other with 20,000 men. But there is no solid foundation for this report. In the mean time, however, the fate of Hanover continues in dispute between Prussia, Russia, and France. Colonial products have risen since news was received of the hostile attitude of England and France.—His Majesty received General Duroc with particular marks of distinction; and has invited him several times to dinner. After he had an audience of his Majesty, and a conversation with the Minister of State, Count Von Haugwitz, the French Col. Colberg and Major Ferry set off for Petersburgh.

Brussels, April 2.—According to the new orders which have arrived from Paris, the march of troops to the frontiers of Holland is now in full activity. Several corps of cavalry and infantry which it was thought were destined to make part of the camp at Brussels, are amongst those which march towards Holland, and we are assured that they will be replaced by others drawn from the interior. Those which went from Malines and Louvain have made forced marches, in order to arrive at their destination: they were followed by others who marched towards Nimeguen and other frontier places of the Batavian Republic. The greater part of the English who were at the Hague, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, have set out either for Hamburgh or Calais, some of them have embarked at Helvoetsluys.—It is said that a line of telegraphs will be formed between Holland and Paris, by Brussels; to this is attributed the arrival in this city of Cit. Chappe, engineer of the telegraphs.

Nantes, April 4.—We learn by the frigate l'Egyptienne, which left Port-au-Prince on the 9th of Feb. that some Mulattoes, at the head of a number of Blacks, having surprized the quarter of l'Anse à-Veau, they burnt several houses, and committed many cruelties. Gen. Rochambeau, with 1800 men arrived from France, and Gen. Laplume with 1200 men marched thither, and dispersed the Blacks with great slaughter. The Mulattoes were taken. Gen. Rochambeau having fixed his head-quarters at Port-au-Prince, has re-established tranquillity.

Rotterdam, April 5.—Common report, if not actual circumstances, seems at present to preponderate on the side of war; preparatory to which, a beginning has been made with the marching of French troops into this country, two battalions of whom are already arrived at Breda; and for Italy they are proceeding from all quarters, where, in case of a rupture, their presence will be more immediately necessary.

Hague, April 5.—Our govt. has sent out certain fast sailing vessels, with dispatches and secret orders to the Governors of the Colonies in the East and West Indies. Within these few days, too, Grypvegee and Circe have been put into active service; but their destination is unknown.—From Flushing we have information, that there were never so many French troops in that town as just now. The prices of provisions have risen to such a degree as to excite the murmurs of the people.—Yesterday morning a courier ext. brought dispatches to the F. Ambas. of which he has notified the contents to the Batavian govt. It is a requisition to the govt. of this country, to take into its pay and service, 4 other battalions of infantry, and 3 squadrons of cavalry, which, with the other corps already in the Batavian service, will raise the whole number of the French troops, in this country, to 15 or 16,000 men.

Flushing, April 5.—This morning arrived from Cadsand a battalion of French infantry of the 8th ½ brigade, which immediately proceeded on its march for Middelburg. In the afternoon arrived another battalion of the same brigade, which likewise proceeded for Middelburg. A battalion of the 95th ½ brigade lying here in garrison, set out at noon for Veere, and a few hours after was replaced by another battalion of the same brigade. Our garrison consisted hitherto of two battalions of the 95th ½ brigade.—This evening, at 6, the whole garrison came under arms in the Great Market, and Gen. Monnet, Commander of the troops in the town of Flushing and the Isle of Walcheren, accompanied by Gen. Osten and some other officers, appeared in the front, and delivered to the Commandant of the place a writing, which was read by the same Commandant, and contained as follows:—*(See Public Papers, p. 562).*—We expect to-day or to-morrow three hundred and eighty cavalry, and two companies of artillery, which, it is said, will be distributed in the towns of Flushing, Middelburg, and Veere. —*(Flushing Courant Extraor.)*

Helvoetsluys, April 9.—The French troops destined for the Louisiana expedition, were debarked here this day from their transports: one division, consisting of about 700 men, have taken post at Goree, another, of nearly the same force, have marched into Brill, and a third have possessed themselves of this garrison. The Dutch troops were previously directed by the French General to withdraw from those places, the Batavian Commandants being assured by him, that he had it in express charge to take upon himself the sole responsibility of those garrisons.

Hamburgh, April 1.—A paragraph, said to be by command of the First Consul, has been inserted in the Correspondenten, declaring, that should a war between England and France actually break out, *Buonaparté will recognize no power otherwise than an ally or an enemy.*—The libel upon his Britannic Majesty, which appeared at full length in the Hamburgh papers of the 30th ult. and which was before that wisely modified by the Syndic and Censor of the press, was, it is said, previously communicated to Sir George Rumbold, the British Chargé d'Affaires, who is reported to have answered, that if the Senate was forced to consent to the insertion of such communications from the Fr. Govt. they must of course do the same justice

to such articles as he, Sir George, might receive from his Govt. and publish them accordingly. This wretched lampoon had the effect of raising the present prices of insurance from 5 to 10 per cent. as well as the prices of coffee and sugar.

Paris, April 3.—The number of troops that are already on their march, or that are in readiness to march, to reinforce the army of Italy, amounts from 20 to 25,000 men. Gen. Murat, is destined to have the command of all the Fr. troops which are to be distributed for the most part along the coasts of the extremity of the kingdom of Naples to the Genoese territory. Several generals celebrated for their military skill and valour, are appointed to serve under Gen. Murat. Orders have been also given to reinforce the garrison of the Island of Elba; and there is a great talk of sending a corps of 3000 men to Ancona, to augment the garrison of that place, in order to secure a military point on the Adriatic Sea.—In general a war with England is considered as unavoidable; and we every moment expect news of the commencement of hostilities. The warlike preparations in our sea-ports are going forward with an ardour beyond example. The Admirals and other officers who are to have the command of our fleets, squadrons, and numerous flotillas, are already selected, although their appointments are not yet publicly announced. Thus is it also as to the generals and superior officers who are appointed to command the troops assembling from Brest to the North Sea. We already count about 200 gun-sloops, flat-bottomed vessels, and others of that nature, which are perfectly armed and equipped.

April 7.—By virtue of an agreement made between the powers interested in the fate of the Order of Malta, and consented to by his Britannic Majesty on the 8th of June, 1802, the nomination of the Grand Master of the Order was referred this time to the Holy See, upon the representations of the Priors of the Order. The Pope and the Priors acceeded to this arrangement. In consequence of which, his Holiness named, on the 9th of Jan. 1803, the Bailly De Thomasi as Grand Master of the Order, who accepted his nomination. The new Grand Master thought it necessary to send to Malta M. De Busy, his Lieut. furnished with full powers. He arrived on the Island on the 28th of Feb. The following Letters (*See Public Papers, p. 556*) will shew what has hitherto been the result of his mission.—The Emperor of Germany and the Emperor of Russia, have for a long time guaranteed the Independence of the Island and Order of Malta. The only power which had not given a decided answer to the request that was made upon that subject, was the King of Prussia. But his Prussian Majesty has thought it proper, under the present circumstances, to hasten to guarantee the independence of the Island and Order of Malta.—(*Moniteur*).—We are assured that the Government of Spain have sent orders to re-establish the relations of its American Colonies with the United States, on the footing on which they were before the peace.

April 10.—A letter has been published at St. Malo's, signed Rottier, respecting an article which appeared in one of the London papers, stating that letters had been received from St. Malo, announcing that 80 gun-boats were assembled in that port. The Letter of Citizen Rottier is as follows:—"The boats to which the pretended letter alludes, are undoubtedly those which were here at the close of the last war, to the number of 60, and which were completely disarmed at the peace. Within a month a few have been fitted out for the purpose of conveying the materials necessary for improving the Port of Cherbourg. As to the activity employed in our armaments, it is certainly astonishing, and more than 50 vessels will shortly sail to make war upon—*Codfish.*"

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Liberty.—Equality.—Decree of the French Government relative to the Town of Flushing.—Paris, March 31, 1803.

Buonaparté, First Consul of the Republic, decrees:—Art. I. The town of Flushing is placed in a state of siege, under the command of the Gen. of Brigade, Monnet, who, for this purpose, is invested with all the necessary powers, and who will correspond directly with the minister at war.—Art. II. The minister at war is charged with the execution of the present decree.—The First Consul,—(Signed)—*Buonparté.*—The Sec. of State,—(Signed)—*H. B. Maret.*—The Minister at War,—(Signed)—*Alex. Berthier.*—A true copy, the Commandant-General of the town of Flushing and Isle of Walcheren.—(Signed)—*Monnet.*

DOMESTIC.

Particulars of a Forgery attempted to be practised on the Bank of Lisbon.

The contriver is a Brazilian, Joze Borges de Burros. Having for former mal-practices felt the scourge of the law, Borges aimed at the total subversion of all order and subordination. Fortunately he failed, and then turned his thoughts to forgery, and was detected; but, owing to the misjudged precipitation of injudicious inexperience, he escaped with the trifling punishment of being sent out of the country as an alien. Despising danger, he returned, and renewed his depredations in the association of Sylvester Godlia, a Portuguese; and John Farrell, a delegate from Manchester, an intimate ally of the traitor Despard, and whose name is to be found on the printed cards as one of Sir F. Burdett's committee, during the Middlesex Election. The other associate was a man named Gillington, who has been an United Irishman, and who turned King's Evidence. In May last, Gillington, and one John Fennell, were brought from Liverpool, on a charge of forging and circulating small bank notes; when, at the instance of the gentlemen of the Bank, Gillington was, from necessity, again admitted as King's Evidence against his companion, Fennell, who was in consequence executed at Newgate on the 23d of June last. These four dangerous men proceeded in their operations, till they were detected by the following providential occurrence:—On the 2d of Jan. last, his Exc. M. de Lima, (the then Portuguese ambassador,) called at the house of Mr. Bond, the magistrate, in Sloane-Street, accompanied by a respectable tradesman at the west end of the town, who stated, that by accident he had seen a printer casting off an immense quantity of notes, which he knew were forged notes upon the Bank of Lisbon, but of which the printer was completely ignorant. M. de Lima then requested Mr. Bond's advice in the affair. Mr. B. advised, that no alarm should be given; and the greatest care taken to avoid apprehending the parties too hastily, until the whole was mature.—M. de Lima expressed his concurrence; and the unwary printer was privately sent for, who discovered that Farrell was the only active agent; in consequence of which Farrell was

watched, and every proceeding minutely and daily reported to M. de Lima and Mr. Bond for upwards of two months. By this report it appeared, that some Portuguese in this country were the principal agents in carrying on the forgery, which amounted to £40,000 in Lisbon notes of £5 each, all which were first intended to be carried by the packet to Lisbon for circulation; but it was finally agreed that Farrell and Gillington should convey the notes to Lisbon, on board of the Antwerp schooner, of London, George Dickenson, commander, in which vessel they had taken their passage, and had each paid 12 guineas. In consequence of this important communication, M. de Lima and Mr. Bond consulted together, and a letter was dispatched to Lisbon by the Ambassador, immediately upon the Antwerp leaving the River Thames, in consequence of which, on the vessel entering the port of Lisbon, on the 16th of March last, the police officers went on board, and Farrell and Gillington were secured, and forged notes, to the amount of £40,000 found on the person of the latter, and in a private drawer at the bottom of one of their trunks. M. de Lima being at this period succeeded in the embassy to this court by the Chev. de Souza Couttinho, his Ex. received, on the 30th of March, advices of the proceedings of his gov. at Lisbon, which fully corroborated the before-mentioned particulars.—Mr. Bond, in consequence, gave directions for the apprehension of Joze Borges de Barros, and Silvester Godlia; and in the possession of Godlia the remainder of the forged notes were found, together with 1000 others, which had proved defective.—A man named Alexander Assupard de Barros has been apprehended at Lisbon, of whose connexion in this transaction there can be no doubt, from letters with his signature found in the possession of Borges. Among some snuff in a paper, which Gillington had, were traces of a plan of the dimensions of the city of Lisbon, representing Ribeira Nova (or wharfs) as far as the arsenal and the streets, by which plan (the dispatch states) it is wonderful how easily Gillington, who had never been in Lisbon before, marked in writing the streets, squares, public buildings, and houses for which he was to enquire, and confessed that this plan was given him by Borges de Barros, that it might not be known he was in alliance with Assupard de Barros, for whom he was principally to search.—Both M. de Lima and Mr. Bond are entitled to the grateful thanks of their respective countries.

From the London Gazette, Whitehall, April 9, 1803. —The King has been pleased to constitute and appoint the Right Hon. Francis Lord Napier to be his Majesty's High Commissioner to the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland.

Crown-Office, April 12, 1803.—*Members returned to serve in the present Parliament.*—Borough of Ivelchester.—C. Brooke, Esq. and Sir W. Manners, Bart. in the room of T. Plummer, and W. Hunter, Esqrs. whose election for the said Borough has been adjudged to be void.—County of Hereford.—J. Matthews, of Belmont, in the parish of Clehonger, in the county of Hereford, Esq. in the room of J. G. Cotterell, Esq. whose election for the said Borough has been adjudged to be void.—Shire of Ayr.—Sir H. Dalrymple Hamilton, of Bargeny and North Berwick, Bart. in the room of Col. W. Fullarton, who hath accepted the office of one of his Majesty's Commissioners for the government of the Island of Trinidad.

Bankrupts.—Avason, H. and S. Manchester, corn-dealers. — Anderson, R. Guildford-street, merchant.—Glover, J. Great Lever works, oil of vitriol manufacturer. — Smith, H. Blackfriars-road, coach-maker.—Green, J. Liverpool, woollen-draper.—Calvert, N. Lancaster, merchant.—M'Connell, E. Liverpool, linen-merchant.—Dearing, T. Wood-street, victualler.—Wilson, F. Great Clacton, linen-draper.—Westbrook, T. J. City-road, builder.—Myles, J. Onston, Chester, corn-factor.—Brown, W. Lincoln, sadler.—Beaumont, W. Shrewsbury, draper.

Birth.—On Saturday, the 2d inst. the lady of Sir F. Vincent, Bart. of a son.

Married.—On Saturday, at Lydhead, St. Lawrence, near Taunton, Sir. J. Lester, to Miss Russell.

Deaths.—On the 29th ult. in the 79th year of her age, Mrs. Hammond, relict of Lieut. Hammond of the royal navy, and mother of Mr. Hammond, High-Street, Portsmouth.—On the 6th instant, at Sonning, Admiral Sir Thomas Rich, Bart.—On the 2d inst. Sir James Montgomery, late Lord Chief Baron of Scotland.—On the 9th inst. in Jermyn-Street, General De Bauermeister, Resident Minister from the court of Hesse-Cassel, in the 63d year of his age.—At Edinburgh, on the 7th inst. the Right Hon. the Earl of Dumfries, in the 77th year of his age.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Circular Letter addressed to the Commanding Officers of the respective Corps of Irish Yeomanry.—Dublin Castle, March 26, 1803.

I am directed by the Lord Lieutenant to acquaint you that, in the present posture of affairs, it is particularly desirable the Yeomanry of Ireland should be prepared for any emergency.—His Exc. is fully convinced, from the loyalty and public spirit which have been already so generally manifested by the Yeomanry, that they will again most cheerfully come forward, if their services should be required, with the same zeal by which they were actuated during the late war.—The corps under your command may be assured, that if it should be necessary to equip them completely for service, no exertion will be wanting on the part of govt. for that puspose. I have the honour to be, &c.—*E. B. Littlehales.*

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

MALTA.—By a reference to p. 555 of the present sheet, our readers will perceive, that Buonaparté has had the goodness to communicate a part, at least, of that information, for which we have in vain called upon our ministers. The correspondence between Sir Alex. Ball and the Commander Busy (not a bad name for such an agent) will, we believe, discover to our readers the immediate cause of the present armament. It was on the 9th of February, that the Bailli Thomasi was appointed; so that there was just about time enough for an account of his appointment to have reached Paris, and for a demand and menace of the Consul to have been communicated to the ministers, by the 9th of March, the day on which they brought down the Message from the King.—This, then, being the cause of their armament, and of *their* war, if they are

to carry on a war (for the pretext of *new* and extraordinary *hostile preparations* in the ports of France and Holland really appears to have been unfounded), now would be the time to remind them of the principle upon which they and their partizans defended the peace, and, according to which, *every single thing*, surrendered by us, ought, if peace had not been made, to be considered as the *sole object* of the continuation of the war, and, as no single thing was worth a continuation of the war, they were justified in yielding *every thing* for the sake of peace. But, to sting, to goad, to lash them and their ignorant, selfish, peace-loving partizans, opportunities enough will be offered us: at present, we shall confine ourselves to a few remarks as to the *justice of our cause*, if we should go to war for the retention of Malta, that being, as it is alleged by the enemy, the only point in dispute between England and France, an allegation hitherto uncontradicted by either the ministers or their slaves.—In the present volume, p. 433, et seq. we defended the retention of Malta upon the ground, that the Order, to which the Island was to be restored, had, in fact, *ceased to exist*, previous to the time stipulated for the restoration; and, that it had been destroyed, not by Great Britain, but by Spain, one of the parties to the treaty of Amiens. If further justification had been necessary, we should have urged, that the Order, (such as it was to be according to the treaty) having been annihilated, a due election of a Grand Master could not possibly take place, seeing that, by the terms of the treaty, the Knights of the Order were to be the electors. Here, then, we stood upon ground as firm and impregnable as Valetta itself; but, upon reading the state papers of Mr. Busy and Sir Alexander Ball, together with the information now communicated therewith through the obliging Moniteur, (1) we find this ground sink from beneath us. That "*safe*," mole-like politician, Lord Hawkesbury, has been at work, and has completely undermined us: for, it now appears, that a new arrangement has been made, by which arrangement the Pope, and not the Knights, is to elect the Grand Master, and that, this arrangement was, on the 8th of June, 1802, only about six weeks after the exchange of the ratifications, "*consented to* by "his Britannic Majesty!!!" On what conditions, or with what reservations, this consent was given, the mole-like Hawkesbury will, in time, perhaps, inform the Parliament and the nation; but, from the note of Sir A. Ball, we are naturally to conclude, that there were no conditions or reservations at all; for the only justification that he puts forward, is, the *want of a guarantee*, (which, by the by, is now said to be obtained) (2) on the part of some of the powers, *invited* thereto by the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. This ground alone is very weak indeed; and, unless something stronger can be urged by the ministers, they ought instantly to be put upon that responsibility, which they have hitherto held up as a shield against every call for information. It is a fact too evident, too notorious, too universally acknowledged, to be for one moment doubted of, that the Pope is the creature and the instrument of Buonaparté; that he is, to all intents and purposes, as much under his command as is any one of the Prefects of France. To consent, therefore, that the Pope should appoint the Chief Magistrate of Malta, was, in reality, to consent that Malta should be placed in the hands of France. In corroboration of this opinion, the ministerial paper, the True Briton, of the 14th instant, says: "Thomasi is said to be perfectly in his "dotage, and *a complete tool of Buonaparté*; "and, indeed, there is a moral certainty "of this island *falling into the hands of the* "*French whenever we evacuate it*, if it be given "up either to the Order, or to the Neapolitans to defend; and *our government* "*cannot be ignorant of this.*"—Very true; but why, then, did the ministers consent to leave the appointment of the Grand Master in the hands of the Pope? If Lord Hawkesbury can prove, that this consent was clogged with any conditions, which have not been fulfilled, or, that the suppression of the langues took place at a time and in a way to render this consent nugatory, (3) he will thereby obtain, perhaps, some little palliation; but, nothing he can devise will possibly justify the having given this consent, which, under whatever restrictions, must finally have had an obvious tendency to place this invaluable possession, this means of dreadful annoyance to us, this key to Egypt, to Turkey, and to India, in the hands of our formidable and inveterate foe.

(1) See p. 555, of the present sheet.

(2) See p 562, of the present sheet.

(3) The passage in the Moniteur is rather equivocal. It may mean, that the new arrangement was *made* on the 8th of June, 1802, and *consented to* by England at some epoch since, which would agree with the statement of our correspondent J. B. in the present sheet, p. 552.—If this be the case, and if the consent was given so late as in October last, the conduct of ministers admits of no possible defence.

To possess the entire mastership of the Mediterranean; to seize hold of Sicily, Candia, and to repossess Egypt; to open a way overland to India; to have Turkey at her absolute command; to secure, by force and for ever, the friendship of Russia; to expel us, in short, from the Levant, from Asia, and from Africa; to effect all these objects of aggrandisement to herself and of degradation and ruin to us, France has only to get and to maintain the Island of Malta. And, is the base surrender of a place like this, or the expenses of a war to preserve it; is an object like either of these to be sacrificed merely to gratify the vanity and selfishness of the Hawkesburies and Addingtons? Will the Parliament, whose duty it is to render weak, or wicked, ministers responsible; will they longer be silent on this subject? Will they, can they so shamefully neglect their duty, their sworn duty, the sacred trust reposed in them by their country and their Sovereign? We hope not. We confide in them for an ample enquiry into this dark transaction, and for strict justice on all and every one of the parties therein concerned; and, if we could believe, that this our confidence were misplaced, we should, then, indeed, despair of the British constitution.

Flushing and Holland.—The declaring of Flushing *in a state of siege* has excited a good deal of indignation, real or affected, in almost all the London Journalists. But these mongrel writers, who, unlike your true "blood-hound," or bull-dog, unthinkly fly at all sorts of game, do, in their random assaults, frequently exemplify the vulgar saying, and "get the wrong sow by the ear." So has it happened in the present instance; for, it may not only be excusable in the French to declare Flushing in a state of siege, but she has, in the strictest sense of the word, a *right* so to do, according to the treaty of peace and alliance between her and the Batavian Republic, of which treaty England gave her tacit recognition by her conclusion of the treaty, the poisonous, the all-coroding and all-destroying treaty of Amiens.—The Morning Post says: "Such an outrage upon state decorum has "not occurred during the French revolution. If Flushing can be put in a state "of siege by a decree from Paris, so may "Hamburgh, Copenhagen and Lisbon. "How the powers of the Continent will "view this *violation of good faith*, this insult "to public decency, this step which, *more "than any other*, extends and establishes "Buonaparté's power, we know not; but "every man of common sense and *impartial "feeling*, must execrate it as the *most tyranni-"cal and alarming* that has stained the "history of Buonaparté's reign. To place "a town in a state of siege is the most se-"vere act of a government, the greatest "exercise of power it can practice over "the subjects it has in charge."—The True Briton, in an article of the 13th inst. evidently inserted by order of the ministers, after declaiming in the same way with the Morning Post, complains of the act in question, as being, on the part of France, a violation of the "*neutrality* and *indepen-"dence* of the Batavian Republic." To expose the barbarous, the more than Hottentot ignorance, of these people, we have only to quote three of the articles of a compact which they themselves have, as we just now observed, tacitly recognised and sanctioned. "Art. III.—There shall be "between the two Republics, to the end "of the war, an alliance offensive and de-"fensive against *all* their enemies, without "distinction.—Art. IV. This alliance, of-"fensive and defensive, shall *always* exist "*against England*, in every case when one "of the two Republics shall be at war "with her." (4)—So much for the "*neu-"trality*" of the Batavian Republic; that neutrality, which, in our letters to Lord Hawkesbury, *previous* to the conclusion of the definitive treaty, we besought him to provide for, not by crouching to Mr. Otto, but by placing in the entire possession of the Dutch, "Ruremonde, Juliers, Guel-"dres, Cleves, together with the fortresses "on the left bank of the Scheldt, those of "*Flushing* and Maestricht." (5) This was the pledge of Dutch neutrality, which we demanded; but his lordship preferred that of the friendship of the Consul, which we now find to be as brittle as his tawdry, his well-bestowed porcelaine de Seve. As to the *independence* of the Batavian republic, the following article of the same treaty, will show that the measure under the consideration is not, in the least, a violation.—"Art. XIII. There shall be *in the town and port of "Flushing a French garrison exclusively, whe-"ther in peace or in war*, until it shall be "otherwise stipulated between the two na-

(4) Il y aura entre les deux Républiques, jusqu'à la fin de la guerre, alliance offensive et défensive contre *tous* leurs ennemis, sans distinction.—Cette alliance offensive et défensive aura *toujours* lieu *contre l'Angleterre*, dans tous les cas où l'une des deux Républiques sera en guerre avec elle.

(5) See Letters on the Preliminaries of peace, 2d edition, p. 89 et seq.—These letters should *now* be read.

" tions."(6)—Now, it has *not* been otherwise stipulated between the two nations: at least, our ministers have no proof that it has, nor have they any reason to suppose it. Why, therefore, are they surprised? What ground have they for complaint on this head? And to what can their astonishment and their whining be attributed, if not to that unparalleled and almost inconceivable ignorance, which, in conjunction with their other qualities, have brought this kingdom into its present state of embarrassment and disgrace? It is not a want of talents that they here stand accused of, but a want of mere common information. They appear to know nothing at all of what has passed in the world for the last seven years, and still less of what is passing in it now. The fact is, that, from the moment they took possession of their ill-gotten places, all their attention, all their efforts, all their measures, both domestic and foreign, appear to have been directed to the sole object of retaining those places and of turning them to the emolument of themselves, their families, and their dependents.—But, while we allow France to have a perfect right to declare Flushing in a state of seige (for this right is necessarily included in the rights of *exclusive garrison*), we by no means admit, that she has any right whatever to keep troops in the dominions *belonging to* the Batavian Republic, which Flushing does not. We have before proved, (7) that France, by keeping troops in the Dutch territories, even for one week after the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, was guilty of a flagrant, and, to us, a most injurious breach of that treaty, a breach which will, at all times, be a full justification for the non-fulfilment, on our part, of any of the stipulations of the treaty; and, if keeping troops there were such a breach, the marching of more troops into Holland in time of peace, is a further, a greater, and more outrageous breach. The reason why the ministers never touch upon this subject is evident enough: they know, that their complaints would instantly produce the question: " why did you restore any thing, " and particularly the Dutch colonies, until " the French troops had evacuated Holland;" which they could not possibly answer, except by urging the absolute necessity of keeping their places.—All considerations of treaty, however, France now boldly and openly sets at defiance; she has already exercised her despotism at Hamburgh, in direct violation of her joint declaration with Russia, and she is resolved that there shall be no neutrality, a resolution which she will adhere to as far as it relates to any of the numerous feeble maritime states, which are, in any wise, under her controul, and the hostility of which is likely to injure the commerce or cramp the naval enterprizes of England.—Yet is she not without some little uneasiness as to the possible turn of affairs which may arise out of the wishes, the secret hatred, of the powers upon the continent. Her Stutgard Gazette gives sufficient proof of this. She does not wish for war just at this moment. She is not ready. Her preparations, whether diplomatic or warlike, are not quite finished; and, we should not be at all surprized, if, in order to gain time, she adopts some measure that will renew, for a short space, Mr. Addington's lease of the Treasury Bench. Should this be the result, swift destruction comes upon us. Should this artifice succeed, we shall be the slaves, literally the slaves of Frenchmen, in a very short space of time, but not one moment sooner than we deserve it.

LOUISIANA EXPEDITION.—The troops destined to take possession of Louisiana, (see p. 560), are, it appears, disembarked, and, we have it from good authority, that the materials for the purposes of colonization, which were immense, have actually been *sold* at Helvoetsluys. First they were extorted from the Dutch, and then sold for the account of the French. What a shame, what disgusting cowardice on our part, to affect to regard Holland as an independent power!—This account, as to the expedition having been laid aside for the present, is corroborated by a paragraph in the Moniteur, (see p. 561), stating, that Spain has replaced every thing, at New Orleans, in its former situation. This is, so far, exactly the line of conduct which we told Lord Hawkesbury, France would pursue. (8) France will take to herself all the merit of this conciliatory measure. She will lull the Americans till the present dispute with us is adjusted, or till after another war is at an end; that is, if English and American statesmen are not wiser and more magnanimous than they have hitherto been. To divide these two countries, and to devour them one at a time, is her object, an object which she will most assuredly accomplish, and by their own instrumentality too, unless they at once lay aside their pitiful ungene-

(6) Il y aura *dans la place et le port de Flessingue garnison Française exclusivement, soit en paix, soit en guerre*, jusqu'à ce qu'il en soit stipulé autrement entre les deux nations.

(7) See Register, Vol. III. p. 434 et seq. which we request our readers to refer to for an ample discussion of this subject.

(8) See letter, Vol. III. Register, p. 298.

rous policy towards each other, and heartily unite for their mutual interest, honour and happiness. Such an union might yet, not only secure the independence of America and England, but might, and would, restore freedom to all the states of the civilized world; but, who can hope for so desirable an event, who would not despise the Americans if they took any step towards it, with a minister who, like the "*safe* politician" Lord Hawkesbury, could boast of having "placed the French *upon their back*, in order "to bind them more closely to Great Bri-"tain?" No, no; these tricks of low cunning; these little, narrow, selfish notions, must be abandoned on both sides, and must be succeeded by an open, liberal, generous system of intercourse, political as well as commercial, or both countries will successively fall a prey to their artful, rapacious, and relentless enemy. As a first step towards a system like this, on our part, we should pay to America what was long ago her due, whether we consider her consequence in itself or her conduct towards us; that is, we should send, as our minister to the president of that country, a person of high public consideration in this. Mr. Merry, we are told, is destined to fill this most important post. "*Who* is Mr. Merry?" the Americans will ask; and, indeed, most persons in this country, will put the same question, and that, too, without much chance of obtaining an answer. Mr. Merry may be a mighty good sort of a man, or, in the cant of the offices, "a good creature;" but, is he the man to go to America, as the representative of his Majesty, at the present time, or at any time? Will the Americans regard him as a suitable return for Mr. King, a gentleman always of great public consequence in his country, and, at the time he was appointed to this mission, a senator of the United States? The first minister sent hither from America was Mr. Adams, who was recalled to fill the post of vice president, and who succeeded General Washington in the presidency; the second was Mr. Thomas Pinckney, who had been for about fifteen years in the legislator of his own state, and in that of the general government, and who has, since his return home, been a candidate for the presidency; the last was Mr. King, a senator of the United States, as we have just observed, and a person who is now looked up to as the successor of the president. To say nothing of the policy, is it decorous, is it just, we ask, to repay these marks of high respect by sending as ministers to America, consuls, secretaries, *chargés des affaires*, the mere stop-gaps and journeymen of the corps diplomatic, men who have been trained up to the trade, who follow diplomacy for bread, who (to pass over their incapacity) have not the means to give a dinner, and, if they had, have not the manners wherewith to receive and entertain their guests? Is this, we ask, the sort of persons to send as plenipotentiaries, as conservators of his Majesty's honour and of the interests of his people, in a country, with which we have a greater and closer connexion than with any other upon earth, and which is, too, situated at such a distance as, in case of emergency, absolutely precludes the possibility of our minister's receiving instructions from home? We have heard it suggested, that, because the Americans have no aristocracy themselves, it is rather a compliment than otherwise, not to send noblemen amongst them. Never was there so weak, so utterly foolish a notion! They have, indeed, no *titles*, but they have their *great men*; their senators, their members of Congress, their governors of States, their chief justices, and their chancellors; these, and *these only*, they send on diplomatic missions, expecting, and having a right to expect, a suitable return for this mark of respect to foreign powers. What would, what could, Mr. Merry, or any such person, do in America? He would be overawed, he would be borne down by the French minister. He would be almost totally unknown amongst the great, and unheard of amongst the mass of the people. Can a person so situated serve his country? No; but, Mr. Merry must be *provided for*; there's the answer! there's the joint answer from Downing Street and the Treasury! Let him, let him be provided for; give him a pension, give him a sinecure, give him any thing in the shape of money, let him share, largely share, in the good things of "*the* "*family*;" but, in God's name, let him not go to the country, in which, above all others, we stand in need of a great, and enlightened, and high-minded statesman!

LINOIS'S SQUADRON.—If this squadron, which, as our readers will remember, sailed from Brest, with seven thousand men, just after the promulgation of the king's message, should stop *at the Brazils*, Buonaparté will certainly say, it was intended for "colonial service," and the ministers, should they, unhappily for the country, continue in their places, may cite it as a proof of the Consul's pacific intentions.—The Brazils were the only pledge we had for the remnant of independence in Portugal; if those colonies are now gone (and the fact is strongly suspected) we may, in a very short

time, even though war should not take place, expect to see Portugal united to Spain, in exchange for provinces bordering on France. This plan, we are well assured, has been long in agitation; and, we believe, that it is now upon the point of accomplishment, though a word of it is not to be found in the archives of Lord Hawkesbury's office.—If Linois and Decaen do not make a stay at Brazil, they will, doubtless, call in at that "*tavern*," the Cape of Good Hope, which they will be able to render an excellent "free-port," and will, in so much at least, strictly fulfil the treaty of Amiens!

SAINT DOMINGO.—The intelligence from this colony continues to be favourable to the French, and, therefore, unfavourable to us. The troops that lately sailed from Dunkirk, will, indeed, arrive in a very bad season, and, we hope, they will be soon unfit for any expedition against Jamaica. The Spanish part of the island is perfectly tranquil; and, in case of war, our privateers will no longer find shelter in the Bay of Samana, heretofore a most convenient rendezvous for them.—If France finds herself embarrassed with the West-India Colonies, in war, she will instantly let loose her negroes and ours too; and thus, the peace of Amiens, may produce the accomplishment of Mr. Wilberforce's wishes, in a way and in a degree which he could scarcely have hoped, just at the time, too, that that terrestrial paradise, Sierra Leona, after an expenditure of the public money to the amount of £100,000, is about to be abandoned!—Should war really be the result of the present dispute (if there be *any dispute*), it will be, according to Lord Castlereagh's principle, a moot point with the ministry, whether they shall assist the blacks to kill the French, or the French to kill the blacks. Their object, their great, and, indeed, their only object (next to that of keeping their places), in permitting the French armament to sail into the neighbourhood of Jamaica, previous to the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, was, "to destroy *the black empire*;" to attack the French, therefore, in St. Domingo, would be to revive, and confirm for ever, this frightful black empire; to block the French up in the island, or to prevent them from receiving supplies of men and arms, would have the same effect; for, still the blacks would, in that case, again become masters. What, therefore, will his lordship do? We should be glad if some one would discover and communicate to us his intentions as to this point, which we find to be one of the most knotty that we ever met with.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—Before we enter on the few remarks we have room to make on this subject, it seems necessary to notice a paragraph, which has appeared in the True Briton, by way of contradiction to the assurance, on which we stated, that Mr. J. Hiley Addington was the author of the article, in which the New Opposition are styled "*blood-hounds*." The True Briton thinks itself bound to "declare so-"lemnly," that Mr. J. H. Addington was *not* the author of the article in question, a declaration, which, especially when we consider its *solemnity*, it is fair to attribute to the said Mr. Addington himself, and which, though it cannot possibly change our opinion as to the fact, we are willing to receive as a virtual acknowledgment of past offences, and a tacit promise of future good behaviour.—In a subsequent paragraph, published a day later than the former, the offensive expression is pared down, in its application, so as to extend only to *ourselves*. Surprizing! How long has the writer of this work been a "little band?" We can remember when the ministerial hirelings, in order to excite the ignorant mob to demolish his house, called him a "*solitary* "*American*, opposed to the peace through "*envy of British prosperity*."—The truth is, that the expression *blood-hounds*, as applied to the noblemen and gentlemen, who opposed the disgraceful and fatal peace of Amiens, besides its intrinsic insolence and brutality, was peculiarly ill-timed: it was soon found to have produced, on the public, an effect, exactly the contrary to what was intended; and, therefore, poor Heriot was made the scape-goat to carry off the sins of "the Family."—As to the *change of ministry*, about which so much has been said, we know nothing more than we did last week, which is nothing at all. The paragraphs which have appeared, on this subject, in the True Briton, we regard as no more than an indication of the *wishes* of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies, whose object, doubtless, is to shelter themselves, under the shield of Mr. Pitt, not only from ejectment, but also from that "deep re-"sponsibility," which they begin to perceive may be actually called for at their hands. Lord St. Vincent they wish to get rid of, in order to pacify the nation with respect to the *fleet*; for, while he is supported, the minister can never hold up his head against the cry for his *fifty ships of the line*. Hence all the paragraphs, which have been circulated through the True Briton, for this month past, expressing the *public wish* for a change at the Admiralty, and for an accession of Mr. Pitt to the ministry:—"A

" change at the Admiralty is, we believe, " *anxiously desired by the whole naval service*, " and we hope there may be an *accession to* " *the ministry* of the active exertion of those " pre-eminent talents, which have, in so " many former instances, been the salvation " of the country. When we speak thus *we* " *only echo the public wish*." (True Briton, 2d April). " Several more ships of the line " have, within these two days, been com- " missioned; but there is a great com- " plaint of want of men. The *reign of ter-* " *ror at the Admiralty must cease*, before " either officers or men will come forward " with alacrity." (True Briton, 8th of April). In the passage which we quoted last week, p. 540, a part of the ministry, Lord St. Vincent, without doubt, is *excepted* from the praise of *uprightness*, and it is again stated to be " *the wish of the whole* " *nation* to be governed by Mr. Pitt, Mr. " Addington, Lord Hawkesbury, Lord Mel- " ville, and a few others," whom the writer says he could name, and who are, undoubt- edly, the rest of " the Family."—The ob- ject of all this is, as we before stated, to get Lord St. Vincent out, and Mr. Pitt and Lord Melville in; but Mr. Pitt in particu- lar. Mr. Pitt is wanted to get them mo- ney, and somebody to get them a fleet. For this latter object they would prefer Lord Spencer, but they have a misgiving that his lordship could not very easily be brought to enlist at the drum-head of the Jenkinsons and Addingtons, a sort of re- luctance, which, for reasons best known to themselves, they seem not to expect in Lord Melville. The " *public wish*," therefore, " the wish of the *whole nation*," is the wish of Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Addington, and of their brothers, brothers-in-law, sons, un- cles, aunts, and cousins to the third or fourth generation. This is the *public*, this is the *whole nation*, who are crying day and night for Mr. Pitt to join the present administra- tion. And will he yield to this " echo of " the public voice?" Will he degrade him- self by this connection, and that, too, under circumstances so peculiarly aggravating, so directly tending to the destruction of his country and of his own fair fame?—No. Positively we say, no.—That a change of ministry is necessary every man in the king- dom will allow; but, that such a paltry patching up, as the Addingtons propose, can have no other rational object than that of prolonging their emoluments, and shel- tering them, for a while, from the result of parliamentary inquiry, is a position too ob- vious to need either facts or arguments in support of it. By a junction with these men, Mr. Pitt would instantly take upon himself, not a share, but *the whole*, of the responsibility which they have incurred, from the time they first began to negotiate to the present hour. All their faults, all their ignorance, all their selfishness, would immediately become his; their financial de- ceptions, their diplomatic indecision, their breaking up of the army, their crippling of the fleet, all the embarrassments, the con- tempt, the danger, the disgrace and the in- famy, which they have brought upon this once great and glorious country, would be regarded, and fairly regarded, as the work of his hands. This is the charge of which they wish him to relieve them; and, by way of compensation, they generously make him an offer of his full share of all the honour, of all that vast mass of reputation for inte- grity and disinterestedness, derived, and to be derived, from the prosecution of the Tin- man of Plymouth!

STOC. *April.*	9	11	12	13	14	15
Bank Stock.	—	—	—	—	—	167
3 pr C R An	—	—	—	61⅞	62⅛	63
3 per C. Con.	—	—	—	63¾	64	64⅛
4 pr. C. Con.	—	—	—	78⅛	78⅜	—
5 pr. Ct. Ann.	—	—	—	97½	98½	—
Bank L. Ann.	—	—	—	16	16½	—
D° S. 1778 & 9	—	—	—	—	—	—
5 per Ct. 1797	—	—	—	—	—	—
Omnium ...	—	—	—	15	13¾	13¼

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36 1	2 us.	Leghorn	49½
D°, at sight	35 6		Naples	40¼
Rotterdam	36 2	2 us.	Genoa	45½
Hamburgh	34 2	2 us.	Venice, 55 livres piccole
Altona	34 3	2 us.	effective per £. ster.
Paris 1 day	24 9		Lisbon	66¾
Paris	24 14	2 us.	Oporto	66¼
Bourdeaux,	24 13		Dublin	14
Cadiz	35½	eff.	Bilboa	36¼
Madrid	35¼	effective	Agio, bank on Hol. p.

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	44s. to 59s	Hops per cwt.	160s to 180s
Rye	32s..35	Hay per load	80..136
Barley	20..25	Beef, per st.	4s.4d. to 5s.6d.
Malt	40..45	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	14..19	Veal	5s. 0d. to 6s. 8d.
Pease (white)	37..44	Pork	4s. 8d. to 5s. 4d.
Beans (horse)	30..35	Tallow	4s. 4d.
Flour per sack	41..47	Av. of Sugar pr cw	42s. 0d.
Seconds	40..41	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d.
Coals per chal	53..00	Bread 9½d the Quar. Loaf.	

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

Misocosmopolis shall have a place in our next. An Englishman's second letter on Lord St. Vin- cent and the Navy came too late to hand for in- sertion this week.

LONDON,

TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

SIR,—Before I enter on the 3d division of my subject, to wit, a comparison between the receipts and expenditure of war, if it had continued, and the receipts and expenditure of your peace, if it continue, I think it peculiarly proper to remind you of the opinions, as to this point, given by Mr. Windham, in his speech on the Preliminary Treaty, delivered in the House of Commons, on the 4th of November, 1801. My extract will be rather long, but not longer than useful, if you, and your colleagues, give that attention to it, which it merits, and which, at the time when the speech met your ear, you were too lofty to bestow.—"The evils of war are, generally speaking, "to be comprised under three heads: the "loss of lives and the consequent affliction "brought upon friends and families; the "loss of money, meaning, by that, money "expended in a way not to be beneficial "to the country that raises it; and the loss "of money in another sense, that is to say, "money not got; by which I mean the "interruption given to national industry, "and the diminution of the productions "thence arising, either by the number of "hands withdrawn from useful labour, "(which is probably however but little "material), or by the embarrassments and "restraints which in a state of war impede "and clog the operations of commerce.—"With this enumeration in our hands, let "us consider, in what so very violent a degree, the present armed truce, or peace, "if you choose to call it so, differs from "what might have been our state, in the "case so much dreaded and deprecated, of "a continuation of the war.—To take the "last first,—the loss of national wealth by "the interruption given to commerce and "industry; such is the singular nature of "this war, such the unexampled consequences with which it has been attended, "that it becomes a question, and one in "itself of the most anxious and critical importance, on which side of the account "the consequences of peace in this respect "are to be placed: whether, instead of "balancing the dangers of peace, if such "there are, by accessions which it will "bring to our wealth and commerce, we "are not rather called upon to prove some "great *advantages* which peace will give "us *in respect of security*, in order to balance "the diminution likely to be produced by "it in our commercial opulence. That our "commerce will suffer at the long run, admits, I fear, of no doubt. If my apprehensions are just, it is in the diminution "of our manufactures and commerce, that "the approaches of our ruin will first be "felt: but is any one prepared to say that "this may not happen in the first instance? "We have at present, subject to the inconveniencies which war produces, nothing "less than the commerce of the whole "world. There is no part of the world to "which our goods do not pass freely in "our own ships; while not a single merchant ship, with the enemy's flag on "board, does at this moment swim the "ocean. Is this a state of things to be "lightly hazarded? Does the hope of bettering this condition, even in the minds "of those most sanguine, so much outweigh the fear of injuring it, that these "opposite chances can upon the whole be "stated otherwise than as destroying each "other: and that of consequence, in the "comparison of war and peace, the prospect of increased industry and commerce, "which in general tells so much in favour "of peace, must not here be struck out of "the account? On this head the question "between peace and war stands, to say the "least of it, evenly balanced.—The next of "these heads, the first, indeed, in point of "consequence, but the next in the order "in which it is here convenient to consider "them, is the loss of lives, and the effect "which war is likely to have on private "and individual happiness. No man can "pretend to say, that war can continue "upon any footing, however restricted the "circle of hostilities, without the lives of "men being liable to be sacrificed; and "no such sacrifice can be justified, or reconciled to the feelings of any one, but "by that which must justify every such "sacrifice, however great the extent—the "safety and essential interests of the state.

" But if ever there was a war in which " such sacrifices seemed likely to be few, " not as an effect of any choice of ours, but " by the necessary course of events, it was " that which we should have had to carry " on in future with the republic of France. " —The great and destructive operations " of war, the conflict of fleets or armies, " or the consumption of men in unwhole- " some climates and distant expeditions, " had ceased of themselves. I know not " what expeditions we should have had to " prosecute, unless new cases should have " arisen, similar to that of the ever-memo- " rable one of Egypt; where, the same " motives existing, we should be sorry in- " deed not to have the means of acting " upon them. But in general, our fleets " would have remained quietly at their " stations, and our armies have lived at " home: the whole question reduces itself " to a mere question of expense; and that " again pretty much to a mere question of " establishment.—The great heads of war " expenditure, the army extraordinaries, " would, in most parts, have ceased; and " in the rest, have been greatly reduced. " The chief question will be, not between " an ordinary peace establishment and a " war, such as, from circumstances, ours " has hitherto been, involving expeditions " to all parts of the globe; but between a " peace establishment, such as that which " is now declared to be necessary, and a " war, which had become, and was likely " to continue, merely defensive; in which " we should have had nothing to do, but " to maintain a competent force, with little " prospect of being obliged to make use of " it. The advocates for the present peace " must find themselves always in an awk- " ward dilemma, between economy and " safety. *We make peace in order to save our* " *money: if we reduce our establishments,* " *what becomes of our security? if we keep up* " *our establishments, what becomes of our sav-* " *ings?* Whatever you give to one object, " is unavoidably taken from the other. " The savings of the present peace, there- " fore, can be looked for only *between the* " *narrow limits of a high peace and a low war* " *establishment*; or, to state the case more " correctly, between a high peace establish- " ment and a war, reduced in the manner " that I have described. I wish that a correct " estimate were formed of the difference, in " point of expense, between these two " states; recollecting always that among " the expenses of peace are to be counted " *the provisions necessary against the new dan-* " *gers brought by the peace itself*; the new " dangers for example, with which *Jamaica,* " *and all our West-India islands are threat-* " *ened by the establishment of the French in St.* " *Domingo, and other parts in that quarter of* " *the world:* the new dangers to which our " Empire in the East is exposed, by the re- " entry of the French into the peninsula of " India, and the cession to them, for such " in effect it is, of the Cape and Cochin: " in general, by the free passage now given " to their ships and armies into every part " of the world, and the establishment of " them every where in the neighbourhood " of our most valuable possessions.—Against " all these dangers war provided, as it were, " by its own single act. The existence of " our fleets upon the ocean, with an admi- " ralty order 'to burn, sink, and destroy,' " shut up at once, as under lock and key, " all those attempts, which are now let " loose, and require as many separate de- " fences as there are parts liable to be at- " tacked. A fleet cruising before Brest, " therefore, was not to be considered as so " much clear expense, to be charged to the " account of the war; *without deducting the* " *expense of additional troops and additional* " *ships, which the absence of the fleet might re-* " *quire to be kept, for instance in the West-In-* " *dies.*—With respect to home defence. " Considering the little reliance to be placed " upon the government in France, now sub- " sisting; the still greater uncertainty with " respect to any future government (such " as may arise at any moment); and the in- " creased defence necessary on land, in pro- " portion to the diminution of our force by " sea; *I know not, how we can remain secure* " *with a military establishment much less* " *considerable, than that which we should have* " *had to maintain here in the case of war.*— " Should it so happen, (and who shall say, " that it will not?) that our commerce, in- " stead of increasing, or remaining where " it is, should fall off; that our manufac- " tures should decline; that, from these and " other causes,—such as a great emigra- " tion, and considerable transfer of com- " mercial property;—and above all from " the great loss of territorial revenue, the " income of the state should be lessened, to " a degree equal only to this proposed saving, " then we shall have incurred all the dread- " ful difference to be found in our situation " in case of the renewal of war, and all the " no less serious dangers during the con- " tinuance of peace, absolutely for nothing. " —I select this only as the case which may " be considered as the most probable.—At " all events, however, and whatever be the " extent of these expected savings, and the " improvement to be made in consequence " in our finances, we are to estimate the

" evils and dangers which are to be placed " in the opposite scale, the chief of which I " have endeavoured to point out, though in " a very hasty and summary manner, in the " observations, with which I have already " troubled the House. They may be class- " ed, generally, under three heads:—*The* " *ascendency, which it is feared, France may in* " *time acquire, even in those sources of great-* " *ness, which we seem inclined to consider as a* " *substitute for all others, our manufactures* " *and commerce*; supposing, as I am here " doing, that peace continues without in- " terruption, and even without any great " advantage being taken, of the threat " of a renewal of hostilities. Secondly, " *the effect to be produced, in a peace so con-* " *stituted, by the continued use of this menace,* " —an engine of which it is difficult to cal- " culate the force, applied, as it may be, to " every point on which the interests of the " countries are opposed, and for the ac- " complishment of every object, which " France may wish to attain. Thirdly and " lastly, *war itself*; *begun of course at such* " *moment, as France shall judge most advan-* " *tageous to her*, and when by a due improve- " ment of the preceding period of peace, " Great Britain shall have been placed in a " situation to be least capable of resisting its " effects."

Such, Sir, were the opinions, to which you ought to have listened, at a time, when it was not too late to profit from them. The preliminary treaty was, indeed, signed; but, previous to the conclusion of the definitive treaty, France had furnished you with ample grounds, whereon to break off the negotiation; and therefore, you have no justification for having neglected the advice, conveyed in these opinions. The evils of peace, as to the aggrandizement of France, the influence of her menaces, and the recommencement of war, are now become conspicuous even to the blindest and most besotted of the people: it only remains to be shown, that, to counterbalance these evils, nothing is to be found in the pecuniary effects, hitherto produced, or likely hereafter to be produced, by the peace, if it should continue. This is the object of the comparison, on which I am now about to enter, between the receipts and expenditure of war, and those of peace.

The receipts naturally demand the preference; and, under this head I shall take a view, first, of the net produce of the permanent taxes during the last year of war, and the first year of peace; and, next, of the net produce of the same taxes, during the last quarter of war and the last quarter of peace; after which I shall show the effects of peace on our manufactures and navigation, as far as this can be done from the accounts hitherto laid before the House of Commons.—My comparison between the receipts of the permanent taxes of the last year of war and the first year of peace will be founded on the authority of the account of those receipts laid before parliament, and ordered to be printed on the 6th of December, 1802, and which account is made up to the 10th of October, 1802, the close of the first year of peace.—The total amount of the permanent taxes in the year ending on the 10th of October, 1801, is £22,986,309, while that amount in the year ending on the 10th of October, 1802, is £25,199,088; so that, were I, like those who were so ready to give you an eighteen years' lease of the Treasury Bench, to look at nothing but these totals, I should, with them, believe, perhaps, that the addition of £2,212,779 is to be regarded amongst " the blessings of " peace." But, a no very sedulous application of the humble quality of industry, has taught me to perceive, and, of course, to detect, this attempt at deception. In the account, to which I am now referring, the produce of those taxes *only*, which are *now in existence*, is included. Of course, the taxes laid so recently as to be received in the first year of peace, and not to be received in the last year of war, must be excluded from the effects of peace; for, if, as soon as peace was made, a pole tax, for instance, of a guinea a head, had been laid upon the people, no one would be mad enough to regard the addition thereby made to the revenue as an effect of peace, and as an item to be put into the scale against the produce of the revenue in war. The produce, therefore, of the new taxes, which were not imposed, or which did not come into operation, in the last year of war, and which did come into operation in the first year of peace, must be excluded from this comparison altogether; for, if you say, that it was peace which enabled you to impose and collect these new taxes, my answer is, that war enabled your predecessor to impose and collect the *convoy duty* and the *income tax*, both of which are excluded from the account laid before Parliament. Turn, then, Sir, to the taxes pro anno (why is this pedantry persevered in?), 1800, and you will find, that only a *part* of those taxes were collected in the last year of war. Here, therefore, we must begin to exclude; we must take from the proceeds of both the years, between which we are to draw our comparison, that of all the taxes, laid on since 1800, inclusive. All the taxes, imposed before that time, were come into full operation in the

last year of war, and the net produce of them, in the two years respectively, according to your own account, was as follows:

In the year ending 10th Oct. 1801, being the *last year of war*	£22,035,109
In the year ending 10th Oct. 1802, being the *first year of peace*	21,933,449
Less in the first year of peace than in the last year of war.....	101,660

Now, Sir, I do not stop here to say, that your account up to the 10th of October last was false, still less do I charge *you* with falsehood; but, I insist, that the account, as a comparative view of the produce of peace and that of war, tended to produce a false impression in the minds of those, to whom it was presented; and, that it really did produce such an impression is evident from the praises bestowed on your brilliant financial display.

You will say, perhaps, that peace had not, on the 10th of October, 1802, arrived at its full operation in favour of finance; and, indeed, you stated, in your speech of the 10th of December, that we had a growing revenue, to which we might look with comfort and confidence. Let us, then, take the net produce of the same taxes during the last quarter of war, and compare it with that of the last quarter of peace, ending on the 5th January, 1803; (1) for, as to the quarter ending on the 5th of the present month, you will, I am sure, have too much modesty to suffer any account of that to get out of the Treasury, until some one calls for it in the House of Commons.

In the quarter ending 10th Oct. 1801, being the *last quarter of war*	£6,154,421
In the quarter ending 5th Jan. 1803, being the *last quarter of peace*	6,005,704
Less in last quarter of peace than in last quarter of war	148,717

The next point of comparison, which I shall take, is that which relates to British produce and manufactures exported, as the same are stated in the account laid before the House of Commons, ordered to be printed on the 5th of the present month of April. And here I shall be compelled to give another striking instance of your profound ignorance, or of your adventurous duplicity.—First, however, it is necessary to observe, that, in drawing a comparison as to exports, as well as imports, we must not proceed upon the principle of positive increase, but upon that of relative increase. If we have been increasing, year after year, during war, we must not content ourselves with a comparison between the last year of war and the first year of peace; but must go further back, in order to see, whether we have increased more or less, during peace than we increased during war. The depreciation of money, and various other causes, render an increase necessary to make our situation, in this respect, as good as it has been; notwithstanding, therefore, the exports of the first year of peace may be greater than those of the last year of war, yet, if the increase be not as great as it was, upon an average, during war, peace has produced a diminution in this part of our trade. Let us, then, take your account for the last five years, because it was not till then that the real, or declared, value was ever stated, in this sort of accounts.

Years.	Offic. Value.	Real or declared Value.
1798	19,672,503	33,148,682
1799	24,084,213	38,942,498
1800	24,304,283	39,471,203
1801	25,699,809	41,770,354
1802	27,012,108	48,500,683

Now, Sir, before I state my comparison of the increase of war with that of peace, I must beg you to accompany me in a few remarks on the statement here given of the exports of last year, as compared with your estimate thereof, in your speech of the 10th of December, where you stated that the total amount of the real or declared value of the British produce and manufactures, exported in 1802, "would not fall short of "£50,000,000 sterling, being an increase "of £8,000,000 above the year preceding; "and compared with any former year, the "increase would be still more *extraordi-* "*nary!*" (2) Not so extraordinary as the increase of your folly, or something worse, of which no words that I can command are capable of furnishing an adequate description! —In the first place, the real, or declared, value, even or according to this account, is only £48,500,683, which falls a million and a half short of your estimate of the 10th of December. But, this is a trifle, when compared to the deception, which the account itself is calculated to convey, and which it has conveyed, to the minds of the Parliament and the people. The *official value* is a mode of rating, in the offices, intended to show the quantity rather than the real worth of goods exported; because, till the

(1) See Accounts laid before the House of Lords, ordered to be printed 3d March, 1803, which will be inserted in the Supplement to this volume.

(2) See Register, Vol. II. p. 782. See also, the same speech in a twelve-penny pamphlet, p. 23.

convoy duty was imposed, there was no way of coming at any thing approaching a certainty as to the real value of such goods as paid no duty on exportation, which formed the far greater part of the whole of the exports. When the convoy duty was imposed, the shipper was taxed according to the real value of his goods; and, in order to come at that value, the offices exacted a declaration of it from him, reserving, the power, if they suspected deception, of taking the goods for the account of government, and paying the shipper agreeably to the value stated in his declaration. Thus originated the statement, in these parliamentary accounts, of what is called the real, or declared, value, as well as of the official value, the statement of which was very properly continued.—Now, then, Sir, look at the five years, which I have here taken from your account, and explain to me, if you can, how it happens, that the real or declared value, which, during the four first years, bear a regular proportion of about *two-thirds* above the official value, rises, all of a sudden, in the fifth and last year, to more than *three-fourths* above the official value! The cause, Sir, is this: The convoy duty was taken off after the ratification of the preliminary articles of peace, while the declaration of the real value was continued for the information of Parliament; but the shippers of goods, who had, during the collection of that duty, always declared the value as low as they could venture to do it, and (no oath being required of them) sometimes a great deal lower than the real value, had, after the convoy duty was taken off, no motive whatever to declare the value a farthing lower than it was, and, in most instances, they would, and did, from the desire to appear of consequence, declare the value as much above, as they had before declared it under, the reality. The export-duty, by which the convoy duty was re-instated, did not commence its operation till the 12th of May, 1802, (3) so that, there were, during 1802, the first year of peace, four months and a half, during which there was no way of coming at the real value of the British produce and manufactures exported. If you tell me, that there were October, November, and December, of 1801, liable to the same objection, because the convoy duty ceased, with the ratification of the preliminaries, I reply, that the duty was *collected* long after that event took place, and was afterwards returned to those who had paid it, and that, in December, there is, hardly any manfactured goods shipped; so that, no obstacle, of any moment, as to the ascertaining of the real value in 1801, ever existed, while that obstacle did exist, in full force, during one half of the shipping season of 1802. (4)—Returning, therefore, to the official value, as to the only criterion whereon any dependence can be placed, and giving the real or declared value of 1802 the same proportion above the official value, which it has in the preceding years, we shall find your £50,000,000 fall down to about £45,000,000, which, though it gives an increase to this your first year of peace, does not render peace, in this respect, equal to war.——Referring to the account for the years above particularized, we perceive, that the average annual increase, from 1798 to 1801, was £2,009,102, and if we add this sum to the amount of 1801, we shall find the total to surpass the amount of 1802; thus:

Official Value of Exports in 1801 (5)	£25,699,809
Add average annual increase, during the war	2,009,102
	27,708,911
Deduct Official Value of Exports in 1802	27,012,108
Annual increase of peace *less* than annual increase of war	696,803

Let us now, Sir, see what effect peace has had upon the navigation of the country.

(3) See Act 42 Geo. III. Cap. 43.

(4) There has been another co-operating cause: I mean the tax on imports and exports, which has been collected since the 12th of May, 1802, and which has, in various ways, raised the *price* of the goods exported. The rise in the price of cotton and of Spanish wool, owing to the prospective loss of the conquered colonies, and also owing to the vexatious restrictions which France has imposed on Spain, has also contributed to swell out the amount of the declared value. The *price* of the exported manufactures being raised is an alarming circumstance, because it must tend to create manufactures in other countries; but, that which is matter of deep regret with other men, is a source of consolation and the subject of boast with Mr. Addington.

(5) It is worthy of remark, that this sum of £25,699,809, falls short of what it ought to be by £20,170. The account, laid before Parliament, last year, stated the official value of the exported produce and manufactures of 1801, at £25,719,979, of course, the present statement falls short by the sum just mentioned. How is this? Was there an error committed last year? Or is there a little trick played this year, in order to produce deception? At any rate, one of the accounts is wrong, *absolutely false*, which is the less excusable, though not, perhaps, the more surprising, as the latter account, to which we are inclined to attribute the falsehood, was moved for by the celebrated Mr. George Rose, sometime Secretary of the Treasury. —And these are financiers! These are the accounts, on which we are told to place implicit reliance!

And here I have to regret, that my materials are not more ample. In your ever-memorable speech of the 10th of December last, you talked much about an increase of navigation, produced by the peace, but confessed, at the same time, that your estimate would only be partial, as the accounts were made up for none of the ports, except that of London. *Why* they were not, you did not think it necessary to state, and the persons to whom you addressed yourself, were too delicate to put the question to you; so that, upon a subject involving the vital interests of the country, the House of Commons, have, from that day to this, received no regular, official and authentic information, except as far as relates to the ships built and registered, during the three last years of the last peace, the three last years of the war, and the first year of peace. The House has, indeed, somewhere, on, or under, its table, petitions from the ship-owners in the several ports of Gt. Britain, stating amongst other things well worth the attention of a Member of Parliament, that, since the peace, "the shipping "of Great Britain *has fallen in value* from "*thirty* pounds to *forty* pounds per cent.;" but, as far as rests with you and your colleagues, the only document before the House and the Public, is, the account which I have above described, and which was ordered to be printed on the 8th of March last. This account contains the following statement:

Years.	Vessels	Tons.
1799	689	83,658
1800	845	115,349
1801	918	110,206
1802	967	104,789 (4)

The number of vessels is of little consequence. It is the number of tons which must form the criterion; and, here we perceive, at once, that, in a positive comparison, the first year of peace falls more than 5,000 tons below the last year of war. But, we must not stop there. By the account, to which I am now referring you, it appears, that the ships built and registered in 1799, contained no more than 57,157 tons, so that, in the space of twelve years, the annual construction of shipping has been almost doubled. Confining ourselves, however, to the last three years of the war, we find an average annual increase, since 1799, of 29,119 tons, and, of course, the year 1802, the first year of peace, falls below what it ought to be as follows:

	Tons.
British vessels built and registered in 1801,	110,206
Add average annual increase, during last years of war	29,119
	139,325
Deduct vessels built and registered in 1802	104,789
Annual increase of peace *less* than annual increase of war	34,536

An account of the number of men and tons of shipping, in the merchant service, sailing inwards and outwards, during the aforementioned years, would have been more satisfactory, particularly if made up with a due regard to the spirit of truth; but, as no such account has yet been presented, we must, for the present at least, look upon that which we have just examined as containing a proof of a small positive decline, and of a very considerable comparative decline, in the mercantile marine of the country.

Thus, Sir, in whatever light I consider the subject, wherever I seek, and in whatever way I turn the materials of comparison, I find the first year of peace to have produced a diminution in the revenue, as well as in the means by which that revenue is fed and protected. And, if such have been the effects of the first year of peace, what would be the effects of the second, the third, and the fourth year, especially if you and your colleagues were to be the instruments of preserving to us this "blessing?" During the first year, we had the commerce from and to the conquered colonies, for nine months at least; and, as every thing which could possibly be exported from and imported to those colonies, was, for reasons too obvious to mention, so exported and imported, before those fatal sisters, your "peace and plenty," had for ever cut off the communication between those colonies and England, the nine months of last year, was, with respect to this very considerable branch of trade, more than equal to any former twelve months. The first year of peace was extremely favourable, too, with respect to the internal revenue. Sailors and soldiers were brought home and discharged: their pay fell, in great part, into the excise, instead of being spent abroad. The harvest was excellent, bread and other provisions, which had fallen considerably towards the end of the war, were reduced very much in price, and the people were, in consequence, enabled to spend more of their money on taxable commodities. But, all these, except the harvest, are temporary causes; and that too must be considered as such in a com-

(4) The whole of this account, for all the different ports in Great Britain, will be found in the Supplement to this volume.

parison between the effects of peace and those of war. The conquered colonies and their million and a half of revenue are gone never to return, and, with them, forty millions of British capital have been transferred to Holland and France; that is to say, to France alone. Peace did, indeed, bring home the soldiers and sailors, but this can take place only once during the peace, and it might have taken place equally well during such a war as we should have had to carry on: at any rate, it is an advantage not to be enjoyed this year, or in any future year of peace. And, as to the plenteous harvest, with all its numerous advantages, you will hardly pretend that they arose from the peace, seeing that the corn was safe in the mow, previous to the signature even of the preliminaries.—If, then, we find, that the first year of peace has had some great advantages, as to revenue, over the last year of war, which no future year of peace can possibly have; and if, notwithstanding these advantages, we find it to sink, not only in point of pecuniary product, but in the evidences of those means from which that product must arise, and by which it must be protected, must we not necessarily conclude, that peace, should it continue, will, in a pecuniary point of view, be less productive than war, if war had been continued?

The Expenditure of war, if war had continued, compared with the expenditure of the present peace, if it continue, is the only remaining point of my proposed inquiry. ——A favourite fallacy, employed by you, your colleagues, and your defenders, is, ever to speak of the expenses of war, if it had continued, as admitting of no diminution. Upon this notion it was, that you grounded your assertion, that another year of war would have cost £40,000,000 (5), and, more recently, that the annual savings of peace would be about £25 000,000 (6). But, Sir, is there a man in the kingdom, who must not perceive, that the war, if continued, must either have admitted of a vast diminution, in point of expense, or must have greatly added to our resources by new and most profitable conquests? It is not necessary, for my present purpose, to enquire, whether the war ought, in future, to have been more of an offensive than of a defensive nature; whether directed to new acquisitions, or solely to the retention of what we already possessed; all that I have to do is to prove, that the latter object might have been effected with an expenditure not exceeding what will be absolutely requisite for the maintenance, in peace, of what your peace has left us to maintain. "The "great heads of war expenditure," as Mr. Windham observed, "the *army extraordi-* "*naries*" [to which he might have added great part of the *navy extraordinaries*] "would, if war had been continued, have "ceased, in most parts of the world, and, "in the rest, have been greatly reduced. "The chief question," said he, "will be, "not between an ordinary peace establish- "ment, and a war, such as, from circum- "stances, ours has hitherto been, involving "*expeditions to all parts of the globe*; but be- "tween a peace establishment such as ours "will be, and a war, which had become, "and was likely to continue, merely defen- "sive, in which we should have had no- "thing to do, but to maintain a competent "force, with little prospect of being oblig- "ed to make use of it. . . . . The savings of "the present peace, therefore, can be look- "ed for only between the narrow limits of "a high peace and a low war establish- "ment; or, to state the case more cor- "rectly, between a high peace establish- "ment and that of a war, reduced in the "manner that I have described. I wish, "that a correct estimate were formed of "the difference, in point of expense, be- "tween these two states; recollecting al- "ways, that, among the expenses of peace "are to be counted the *provisions against the* "*new dangers brought by the peace itself.*"— To make this estimate correctly is impossible; because no one can tell what these new dangers, and the consequent provisions against them, will be. All that we know, at present is, that, in consequence of the peace, a very considerable augmentation of our naval force, in the West-Indies, has been found necessary, and that no reduction of our naval or military force in the East-Indies is thought of; for that the troops at the Cape, were to go, and, perhaps, are gone, to reinforce the peninsula of India against the dangers created by the surrender of Cochin and the Cape. But, the fairest way of coming at a probable estimate of the difference, which we want to ascertain, is, first to consider, on the side of war, all expeditions, at an end, and, of course, to deduct their attendant expenses; and next, on the side of peace, to take your own last estimates of the expenses of peace, and add thereto, for the present year, the expenses which will arise from preparations for war, should those preparations be discontinued in the course of a month or six weeks from this time.—The naval and military expenses of the last year of war, were,

(5) See Register, Vol. II. p. 1149 and (6) 1705.

in the account laid before Parliament on the 5th of May, 1802, stated as follows (7):

NAVY.			
Salaries to the Admiralty, and other offices	£76,000	0	0
Wages, bounty, flag-pay, half pay, and pensions	2,329,670	15	0
Dock-yards, buildings, stores, pilotage, and contingencies	7,133,008	2	5½
Marine service on shore	327,000	0	0
Victualling department	5,577,500	2	9½
Sick and wounded do.	515,000	0	0
Transport do.—for transports	1,209,192	0	11
Prisoners of war in health	76,000	0	0
Miscellaneous services	60,000	0	0
Total of the Navy	17,303,371	1	2
ORDNANCE.			
The whole of the ordnance	2,165,911	10	5¾
ARMY.			
For regulars, fencibles, militia, invalids, and volunteer corps	7,632,846	15	3
Barracks	651,840	0	0
Staff officers and officers of garrison	100,658	7	6
Half-pay	194,900	0	0
Widows' pensions	23,500	0	0
Chelsea Hospital	132,970	9	8
Exchequer fees	66,631	19	8
Pay of public offices	34,860	8	8
Extraordinary services	5,347,174	0	0
Total of the Army	14,185,382	0	9
——— Navy	17,303,371	1	2
——— Ordnance	2,165,911	10	5¾
Grand Total	33,654,665	0	4¾

Such, Sir, were the whole of the naval and military expenses during the last year of war; and, though we cannot ascertain with exactness, we may with tolerable precision, what part of these expenses belonged exclusively to *expeditions*, which had nothing to do with the defence of any part of our dominions, in any part of the world. There were, during this last year of war, three expeditions of this stamp, that to the Baltic, that against Boulogne, and the ever-memorable one to Egypt. The army extraordinaries will be seen to amount to £5,347,174, and, by referring to the distribution of that sum, it will be perceived, that more than £3,500,000 of it was occasioned by the expeditions, to which must be added about £1,200,000 for the ordinary service of the army, in the expeditions, during that year. Under the head of the navy, we must deduct, almost the whole of the sum for transports £1,209,192; also the expenses of the fleet to the Baltic, and of the fleet under Lord Keith, which, including victualling, stores, repairs, and contingencies, cannot be estimated at less than £3,000.000. If to these sums we add, only £700,000, as a proportionate reduction on account of dock-yard and building expenses, and £650,000, as a proportionate reduction in the ordnance, we shall find, that the whole reduction will amount to £10,259,192, which will bring the annual expenses of war, such as war would have been, had it been continued, down to £23,395,473. Taking, then, your peace establishment, according to your own estimate, and adding thereto £5,500,000 for the present armament, and comparing these with the above reduced war establishment, we shall come at the difference, which we have been seeking to ascertain.

Expenditure of one year of war, such as the war would have been, had it been continued		£23,395,473
Peace establishment as voted by Parliament for the present year	£14,957,325	
Expense of the armament	5,500,000	
		20,457,325
Less expenditure during the present year of peace, than would have been necessary for each year of war, if war had continued		2,938,148

Thus, Sir, without withdrawing a single ship from blockading the ports of our enemies, from the numerous cruises against the remnant of their commerce, or from the protection of our own commerce, colonies, and coasts; without discharging a single soldier, except in number equal to, or a little above, that of the army of Egypt, which we should not have wanted; without putting into the hands of our enemy those outworks of India, Malta, and the Cape; without laying down any one means of defence, or giving up any one of these conquests, which would, in any hands but yours, have always been the price of honourable, solid, and permanent peace and security; without making any of these sacrifices, we could have kept steadily on at an expenditure only £2,938,148 above that which is necessary to preserve a diminished commerce, a shaken credit, a curtailed dominion, and a degraded and dishonoured country.—But, you will say, perhaps, that the present armament ought not to be regarded as an annually recurring expense. And, do you really think so, Sir? "Do "you, in good sooth, Master Shallow, be-"lieve this thing?" If you do, you are not less deceived by your hopes than the stockholders and loan-jobbers have been by your financial representations. The Secretary at War stated the present army to be necessary, because France possessed such a mighty establishment; and, must not your means

(7) See Register, Vol. II. p. 911.

of defence increase in proportion as her means of offence increases? If 50,000 seamen, as a peace establishment, are wanted now, how many will be wanted, when France has had another year of uninterrupted preparation? When she has had a year's produce of the colonies of Holland and of the mines of Spain; when she has concentrated the maritime force of all her dependents, and added it to that of her revived and augmented navy; when she has completely subdued St. Domingo, gotten Louisiana safe within her grasp, stationed her armies at Cochin and the Cape, and swept the Mediterranean of British armies and British fleets? Do you hope, that Buonaparté will cease his endeavours to envelope our territories, to menace, to alarm, to harrass us, and to ruin our finances and our credit? As well may this humbled and degraded nation hope, that its base forbearance will make you cease lavishing its treasures on your insatiable relations. No, no. The Consul sees too clearly the way of destroying the only power on earth, which has the means of frustrating his ambitious, but, perhaps, indeed, his laudable views; for, he really seems to be designed, by a justly offended Providence, as the scourge of a people no longer worthy to be free. To effect this destruction, to produce confusion and revolution in this country, he has only to pursue his present line of policy, only to keep us in a state of armed peace, in which we shall see our expenditure constantly exceed our receipts, without the hope of a change for the better. The expenditure and income of the nation stand thus:

Permanent annual charge on account of national debt, civil list, and parliamentary grants	£24,631,931
Navy, army, ordnance, and miscellanies, for the present year, exclusive of the portion to be paid by Ireland	18,457,325
Total expenditure	43,089,256
Total income	32,270,604
Annual deficiency, to be raised *by loan*, or by *new taxes*	£10,818,652

This is the true statement, Sir. You may stave off the evil; you may coin Exchequer bills on aids; you may make use of what shifts or what cant you please; you may shuffle your estimates backwards or forwards as it best suits your purpose, and as is best adapted to the humour of your audience; but, to this statement, to this black account, or to a sponge, you and your peace must finally bring us, unless there is yet sense and courage enough left in the country, once more to take up arms, with a firm and unalterable resolution never to lay them down again, until such a peace can be obtained as will, by a reduction of establishments, enable us to bring our expenses down to a level with our income.———I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westr. 20th April, 1803.

THE BLOCKS!

We select the following as the best solutions of the Charade in our last, p. 555.

I.

Two years' blockading made fair Malta ours:
A noble struggle!—yet 'tis thought *(at Reading)*
That Britain's Island shews superior pow'rs,
To bear, and to survive, *two years* block-heading!

II.

Does the *Head* of the Cab'net, that "safe politician,"
With *Blocks* guard the Thames' sacred tide!—
Forbid, ye brave Britons, the *Blockhead's* ambition,
O'er the helm of the state to preside!

Reading, April 17. MASTER SHALLOW.

BLOCKS.

An Ode.

I.

Since now to *blocks*, and not *blockades*,
We mean to trust, when France invades,
Or threats, to sink our stocks;
If thou awhile canst leave the *Nore*,
Dulness! inspire one *blockhead* more
To speculate on *blocks*.

II.

And O! how largely *blocks* conduce
To arts of elegance, and use!
Much as our pride it shocks,
Truth yet compells us to confess,
Man would be often in distress,
Without the help of *blocks*.

III.

For *blocks* our riggers call amain
To fit our *fifty sail*—in vain!
Five now exhaust our docks.
The broken contract is restor'd,
With two old *Logs* * and one new Board,
ST. VINCENT yet wants *blocks*.

IV.

From *blocks* the types of BULMER grew:
Hence BEWICK's graver, softly true,
All nature's stores unlocks;
See too in stone from BACON's hand
The peace-maker of *Amiens* stand,
Colossal *block of blocks!*

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* "*Two old Logs*."—We believe these to be the same as the "*two Phocæ*," whom we have often had occasion to mention. Every body knows, that a seaman's *log* is a piece of wood, loaded with a quantity of lead, to make it lie a dead weight on the surface of the water. It is of no use 'till it is thrown out. *Phocæ* we call, in English, "*sea-calves*," because they make a noise, like that of a calf. The thing is all one, as honest Fluellin says, save only variations of phrases.

V.

And what are heads, which most we prize,
Heads of the fair, and of the wise,
From Misses in white frocks,
To Judges, and the Speaker's chair;—
Except when ADDINGTON was there?
Their wigs reply—"*our blocks.*"

VI.

To *upping-blocks* what thanks we owe,
The rise of ADDINGTON may show,
Tho' now PITT's aid he mocks:
And future caution may be taught,
As PITT perhaps of late has thought,
By former *stumbling-blocks.*

VII.

Once, to sustain the British name,
When Britain's safety stood on fame
Unshaken as her rocks,
No art our Fathers knew but this:
For ministers, who did amiss,
They recommended *blocks.*

VIII.

What, since THE FAMILY controuls,
Is public life? A game at bowls,
Where, after rubs and knocks,
The players, who well-skill'd to win
By wheeling round at last come in,
Get side by side with *blocks.*

IX.

Then cease, ye scribblers, cease your wit:
Among yourselves, as you think fit,
Scratch, peck, be Bantam-cocks;
But let our Ministers alone:
Lost is your labour, you will own,
With razors cutting *blocks.*

Plymouth. TIMOTHY TINBLOCK.

THE DOCTOR DEFENDED BY PRECEDENT.

Doctors of yore, with looks profound,
And *Roquelaure*, trailing to the ground,
And sage full-bottom'd tie,
Call'd to a case, first took their fee,
Then bled and purg'd their man, till he
Died from debility.

Our *Doctor's* practice is the same,
To *Park* and *Lodge* he makes his claim,
In Richmond's Palace dwells;
Gives Navy Purse to brother Bragge,
Hiley secures the Army-bag,
Young *Eolus* bolts the *Pells.*

The patient next, so high in blood!
Cupp'd, bled, and purg'd, as he thinks good,
He lowers to such condition;
That while he swears she's sweetly dozed,
And safe, in peace serene, composed,
She dies of her Physician.

THE DOCTOR'S EXCUSE.

Says a Friend to the *Doctor*, "Pray, Doctor, take care,
You'll ruin your Patient before you're aware;
You've feather'd your nest—then no longer deceive her—
Your nostrums will kill her—she's now in a fever"—
"'Tis true (says the Doctor), such symptoms I trace;
But really, dear Sir, I can't give up my *place!*"

BOLUS.

The Origin of the prevailing Influenza, called "LA GRIPPE."*

While the Faculty doubt whence *La Grippe* can arise,
The DOCTOR, in *every thing* EQUALLY wise,
From *himself* the infection can trace.—
The symptoms, a *heaviness* fix'd in the *head*,
A *weakness* that *rules*, whilst *all vigour* is fled,
And a dread of all *changes* of *place.*

GRIPPIST.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Constantinople, March 4.—The following ceremonies took place when Gen. Brune, presented his letters of credit to the Grand Vizier and to Sultan Selim the 3d.—The Gen. arrived at Constantinople on the 6th of Jan. He sent Citizen Parandier, 1st Secretary to the Embassy, to notify his arrival to the Sublime Porte. Citizen Parandier was first presented by Prince Scarlate Callimachi, first Dragoman of the Porte, to the Minister for internal affairs, the Grand Vizier, the Reis Effendi, and the Captain Pacha.—To these Ministers he delivered the notification, in the following terms:—"I have "the honour to notify to your Excellency, the arrival of Gen. Brune, in character of Ambassador, "nominated by the First Consul, Buonaparté, "from the French people to the Ottoman Porte. "—The rank which Gen. Brune occupies in the "state, the services which he has performed at "the head of its armies, and in the management "of public affairs, afford a presumption to the "Sublime Porte, that the French government regards this Embassy as a matter of the highest "consequence. The General-Ambassador has directed me to declare, that he entertains the highest respect for your Excellency, and will consider it as his duty to enter into the most friendly and unreserved conferences with your Excellency, in regard to the interests of France, and "of the Ottoman Empire."—Citizen Parandier was received with the greatest distinction, seated beside those Ministers, and politely served with coffee, sherbet, and perfumes. But, on account of the festivals of Ramazan, and Bairam, it was found necessary to defer the audiences of the Ambassador, till the 23d of Feb.—At 10 that morning, the Ambassador, with Parandier, his first secretary, and the Dragoman, sailed in a bark with 7 pair of oars, from Top-Hana to Vesir-Skelessi. They were followed by the whole train of the Embassy, in 120 other barks, supplied by the Sublime Porte. At their landing, they were received by the Tehaoux-bachi, and served with coffee, sherbet, and perfumes, at the Kiosk.—On 100 horses, furnished by the Porte, and superbly harnessed, the Ambassador then proceeded, with the principal persons in his train, to the Porte. He alighted at the Grand Vizier's palace, where he was received by Prince Callimachi, with some other officers of distinction. He was conducted immediately into the hall of the Divan, which the Grand Vizier entered at the very same time by a different door. They saluted each

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* The French appellation for a disease raging at Paris, from which some persons conceive the British Influenza to have been derived. Though, we think the origin of the infection, as here stated, to be correct, we allow, at the same time, that it is more than probable, that the violence of *the Doctor's* symptoms has been considerably aggravated by his intercourse with France.

other. The Grand Vizier then sat down on his sopha, and the Ambassador on a chair that was placed for him opposite. The Reis Effendi, with other Ottoman Ministers, continued standing on the Grand Vizier's right hand. The Ambassador then spoke as follows, and his words were interpreted by Prince Callimachi:—"The most great, "most puissant, and most magnanimous Buonaparté, First Consul of the French republic, has "sent me to the Sublime Porte in the character of "Ambassador. I come, according to custom, to "present to your Highness, the letters by which "I am invested with that eminent character. "Under the auspices of a treaty, which renews "the antient alliance, and by the happy disposition of the sentiments of your Highness, all the "steps I shall take will tend, and succeed, I hope, "to renew those ties of amity which imperious "circumstances had somewhat relaxed, but which "the Ottomans and the French are accustomed "to regard as pledges of their common prosperity. "The genius of the magnanimous First Consul, "the glory which he wishes to derive from the "maintenance of the peace of the world, the "splendour of his innumerable victories, the "peaceable situation of the powers formerly hos"tile to us, the weight of the French republic in "the balance of the destinies of Europe, are so "many pledges alike of the stability, and of the "importance of our engagements. Your High"ness knows, that France is the true friend and "natural ally of the Ottoman Empire; that for "fidelity, generosity, and greatness, the two peo"ple have no equals in the world; that they are "attached to each other by the dearest interests. "I think myself fortunate in having been chosen "to act for the immediate preservation and im"provement of this union. And I consider the "honourable post I hold at the Sublime Porte, as "a glorious reward for my military services. It is "agreeable to me to find, in the depository of the "confidence of his Highness, the Sultan Selim the "third, a Grand Vizier, who is a warrior, and "whose loyalty and wisdom cannot but smooth "all the difficulties which I might otherwise find "in the way of my new career."—The Grand Vizier made the following reply, which was interpreted to the Ambassador by Prince Callimachi: "—The Sublime Porte having received the high"est satisfaction from the renewal and confirma"tion of its antient and sincere friendship with "the French republic; as also from the good dis"position and the good-will manifested on the "part of the most magnanimous First Consul, "Buonaparté, towards the interests of the Otto"man Empire, will, of course, most certainly use "every effort to preserve the mutual engage"ments, and the sincere friendship between the "two powers."—"As the Sublime Porte has still "more particularly received the greatest satisfac"tion from the attention of the most magnani"mous First Consul, expressed in his choosing "for this Embassy a Gen. so highly esteemed, so "much considered, who has acquired so much "glory, and who enjoys the personal friendship "of the First Consul; the Sublime Porte is there"fore persuaded, that this Ambassador, in giving "on every occasion, proofs of his zeal and con"stant good-will, will faithfully and earnestly "take every means to strengthen the ties of "amity, now subsisting between the two powers."

The Ambassador was then treated with sweetmeats, sherbet, and coffee, and robed in a pellice of sable skins covered with cloth of gold, such as none but Pachas of 3 tails have permission to wear. Suitable honours were at the same time paid to his secretary and the rest of his train. He returned in grand procession, as before, to the palace of France.—On the 22d of Feb. he was introduced to an audience of the Grand Signior, who received him, sitting on his throne, in the Divan. The Ambassador had, on this occasion, the honour to dine with the Grand Vizier.—The Ambassador, at this audience, made the following address to the Sultan:—"*Most high, most excellent, most puis*"*sant, most magnanimous, and invincible Emperor of the* "*Mussulmans, Sultan Selim, in whom honour and virtue* "*shine.*—The most high, most puissant, and most "magnanimous First Consul of the French repub"lic, Buonaparté, sends me to your Sublime Porte "in the quality of Ambassador. These are the let"ters of credit, by which he invests me with this "character. I have directions, while I present "them to your Highness, to congratulate you on "the fortunate conclusion of a peace, which re"establishes the antient relations of amity, and to "testify that the most magnanimous First Consul "of the French republic warmly interests himself "in the glory and prosperity of your reign.—It is "that republic, that great empire, of which I am "the Ambassador, that by me offers to you its most "zealous wishes for perfect mutual amity. Fide"lity and generosity are the virtues equally of the "French and of the Ottomans. This similarity "of character is a natural tie between them. It "was confirmed by long habit. All their mutual "interests concurred to strengthen it. I take the "greater pleasure in the commission intrusted to "me, since I every day perceive that the same "justice and greatness of soul which animate your "Highness, have passed into the minds of those "enlightened men to whom you have confided "the different parts of your immense power. "Happy to have to testify to your Highness the "sentiments of unalterable friendship entertain"ed towards you by the First Consul, I am still "more happy to have it in my power to inform "my government, that I have been witness of the "respectful love borne towards you by all true "Mussulmans, and that I have had proofs from "your Highness and your Ministers, of an high "good-will, which evinces that you have preserv"ed a great attachment in your heart for the most "antient and most constant of your allies. I "pray Almighty God for the happiness of your "people, to prolong your life without pain or "trouble, and to make your glory and wisdom to "enlighten the whole universe."—The Grand Vizier made, in the name of his Sovereign, the following reply to this address:

"It is on the part of the most high, most august, and most powerful, his most gracious Lord and Master, that his Highness the Grand Vizier replies to your Excellency, and earnestly expresses the satisfaction which his Highness the Sultan feels in the renovation of the friendship between the Sublime Porte and the French republic; and in the good intention and sincere sentiment, manifested on the part of the most magnanimous First Consul, Buonaparié; and at the same time assures you of the disposition and attention of his Highness the Sultan to strengthen, by all means, the ties of the sincere and intimate friendship between the two powers." —The French Ambassador received, in the evening, the compliments of all the other Foreign Ministers at Constantinople. (*Moniteur.*)

Paris, April 13.—Official dispatches, addressed from St. Domingo to the minister of marine by the Gen. in Chief, announce, under date of the 3d and 4th of March, that 4000 men of the 11th

demi-brigade, of the 60th of the line, of the 14th light infantry, and the foreign battalion, had successively arrived at the Cape in the preceding days. The rest of the reinforcements sent from France were immediately expected, to resume the offensive at all points: already the Gen. of Brigade, Lacroix, had taken by the bayonet Laxavon, and escaladed the fort of Ouanaminthe.—The Brigands had again attempted to shew themselves in the plain of the Cape; the Gen. of Division, Clauzel, commanding the right of the division of the north, and the Gen. of Brigade, Claparede, had attacked and surrounded them; 500 of them remained on the field of battle; our loss did not amount to more than 40 killed and wounded.—Some movements of little importance had manifested themselves at Tortue. They were stopped by the firmness and good dispositions of Adjutant Boscus. Three hundred men, sent as a reinforcement from the Cape by the Gen. in Chief on board the Duquesne, and commanded by the Adjutant Ramel, had succeeded in exterminating the rebels.—The army occupies the whole circumference of the colony, with the exception of a few points of little importance, and which are watched by the ships of the station that cruize before them.—In the north, the environs of Laxavon and Ouanaminthe have been entirely cleared by Gen. Ferrand, and those of Port-de-Paix by the Chief of the Squadron, Rupert.—Gen. Sarrasin, at the head of 700 men of the 14th light infantry, had been detached to join the Black Gen. La Plume and Gen. Darbois, in the quarter of the south.—In that of the west we extend to, and take in, the Mirabelais, embracing the plains of the Cul-de-Sac, and of Croix-des-Bouquets. The Brigands are shut up in the interior, on the mountains which separate the department of the noth from that of the West, and Port Republicain from Jacmel.—The chiefs of the blacks are divided amongst themselves: already some of them have shot one another.—The Spanish part of the island remains unmolested.—The marine, under the orders of Rear-Admiral Latouche, seconds with all its activity, the operations of the land forces.—*(Moniteur.)*

Genoa, March 26. We are assured, that if a rupture takes place between France and England, a numerous corps of French troops will proceed to Sicily, with the consent of the King of Naples, to undertake from thence, as soon as an opportunity offers, an expedition against Malta. The coasts of Genoa and Tuscany have been put in the best state of defence. The garrisons of the islands of Elba and of Corsica have been reinforced. Gen. Murat will command in chief in Italy.

Vienna, April 2.—The English court has sent an officer hither, to request that a certain number of officers and common men from an excellent corps of bombadiers and canoneers may be permitted to enter into the English service. This request, however, has been refused.

Mechlin, April 6.—The day before yesterday arrived in this city a detachment of artillery, which yesterday proceeded on its march for Dutch Brabant. Yesterday likewise, two battalions of the 10th demi-brigade passed through, taking the same route. It appears that all the French troops on this destination will be provisionally stationed in garrison or cantonment in Breda, Bergen-op-Zoom, Bois le-Duc, Huisden, Gertruydenberg, and in the environs of those frontier places, and that they will not march into the interior of the Batavian Republic, except in the case of an actual war with England.

Hague, April 6.—All the French troops destined for our territory have arrived at Breda, and in the environs; they consist of the 2d regiment of hussars, the 11th of dragoons, the two first battalions of the 76th demi-brigade of infantry of the line, the two first of the 48th, and several companies of artillery.—The Batavian Government has been informed, that besides the above troops, it will receive on its territory 4 battalions of infantry and 3 squadrons of the 1st regiment of hussars. These troops are expected to-morrow at Breda.

Brussels, April 9.—Conformably to the instructions which have been received from Paris, the following military movements have taken place: the 95th demi-brigade of the line embarked for Flushing, where it is now in garrison; the 81st demi-brigade, which was in garrison at Bruges, embarked on the 4th for Zealand; on the 6th, about 200 cannoneers embarked for the same place. Various other bodies of troops are marching towards the Frontiers of the Batavian Republic.

Rotterdam, April 12.—By an express order from the First Consul, the Louisiana expedition is definitively suspended. The French Gen. began the day before yesterday to debark the troops that were on board the vessels; they will proceed with the other troops newly arrived in this Republic, to different destinations both on the frontiers and elsewhere. In several of our towns, among others at Numeguen and Grave, their entrance was at first opposed by the Commandants of the Dutch garrisons; but after an ulterior explanation, these Commandants thought fit to yield to necessity and force.—The news that Flushing has been put in a state of siege, is fully confirmed. In the end of last week, an Aid-de-Camp of the First Consul arrived, to inspect the means of defence. The French Ambassador, Semonville, sent, at the same time, one of his Secretaries, who passed through this town, with a particular commission.—Gen. Montrichard has, informed the Government, that, if it shall refuse to comply with his demands relative to the subsistence and pay of the troops, he will quarter the soldiers on the inhabitants, as was done in the year 1795.

Leyden, April 13.—The French troops which have entered Dutch Brabant, are occupying successively the strong places in this and the other neighbouring Departments. In the mean time, an English squadron has made its appearance off Schevening; and the French troops which had embarked at Helvoetsluys for Louisiana, began, on the 10th inst. to disembark.

DOMESTIC.

From the London Gazette.—Downing-Street, April 19, 1803.—The King has been pleased to appoint James Gambier, Esq. to be his Majesty's Consul-General at Lisbon.

Bankrupts.—Rawstorne, J. Pontefract, merchant.—Walker, W. Jun. Kingston-upon Hull, merchant.—Slade, T. M. Old Bond-street, picture dealer.—Halstead, R. Worsthorn, near Burnley, calico manufacturer.—Hustler, J. Weston Colville, farmer.—Dawson, W. Jun. Liverpool, merchant.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—Before this sheet reaches the hands of our readers, they will have learnt, through various other channels, that our opinion, with regard to a junction

between Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt, has been completely verified; and that, whatever other parts of Mr. Pitt's recent conduct they may have to lament, this sign of voluntary debasement is not to be added to the number.—The negotiation, as it has been called, for a partial change in the ministry, never, we believe, proceeded further than an overture to that effect, on the part of Mr. Addington, seconded, probably, by Lord Melville and by the joint intreaties of those gemini of the ministerial zodiac, Messrs. Rose and Long. Mr. Pitt, however, it is now well understood, never listened to the proposition; and, without believing his mind to have undergone a complete revolution, without believing imbecility and selfishness to have supplanted wisdom and a love of fame, it is impossible to suppose that he could. For, as we before observed, it is evident, that, in joining the present ministers, he would, in the eyes of all sensible men, have taken upon himself the whole of the responsibility attached to every one of their measures; and, would, besides, have justly exposed himself to the imputation of having, under a feigned pretext, broken up the former ministry, of having inveigled his colleagues out of their share of the powers of the state, in order, when a convenient opportunity offered, to resume the reins with none but his own low creatures about him, and thus to become the unchecked ruler, the absolute DICTATOR of the nation. We do not congratulate him on having escaped this danger; because, we always thought his own high and honourable mind a sufficient protection against it; and, both he and the public will do us the justice to acknowledge, that we never have, for one moment, lent an ear to suggestions of an opposite tendency, though, to all appearance, coming from the ministers themselves.—Thus baffled in their projects, with regard to Mr. Pitt, we should not be surprized if the ministers were, in case of necessity, to have recourse to the old opposition, who must be well convinced, that they can never hope to come into power as a predominant party. This has been long in contemplation, amongst the Addingtons, and would, indeed, be no more than the fulfilment of the threat, which they threw out against Mr. Pitt, in January last, when they declared: "the necessity of such an union "we can only in *one case* anticipate; and "that is one which, of all others, we must "deprecate, but about which we are *quite* "*at ease*." This case will, probably, very soon arise, and we shall be greatly deceived, if, in order to prolong their power and profits for a few months, they do not put their menace in execution. Some persons affect to believe, that Messrs. Fox, Sheridan, &c. would object to such a junction; that they would refuse to become the instruments, the mere props of Addingtonian ambition, the dernier resort, the pis-aller, of men whom they have described as "the *sitting part*" of their great opponents; but, alas! little does he know of the majority of the old opposition, totally must he have forgotten their conduct for ten years past, who imagines that their zeal to serve their country is to be restrained by any paltry considerations of character. Nor would such a coalition be at all unpopular. The Jenkinsons and Addingtons have, already with them, all the selfish, all the hypocritical, and all the cowardly part of the nation; the old opposition would bring the rabble; and, it would be to slander the common sense of our readers, to attempt to prove, that these two classes make nine-tenths, at least, of the nation: so that, amidst the never-ceasing din of "capital, credit and confidence," "and of cant, cowardice, and clamour, the voice of honour and of wisdom would be drowned, and the qualities themselves would soon be unknown in the land.—This coalition, however, will, as the Addingtons observed, be the work of "necessity." They will not receive the Maidstone opposition, if they can hobble on, in any way, without them. Not that they will be restrained by considerations of shame, or of respect for the repugnant feelings of their royal and much-abused Master: interest, their own private emolument, is the only obstacle that will stand, and that already has stood, in the way of the junction of which we are now speaking. This interest, this emolument, will still urge them to make almost any sacrifice of public good, rather than admit amongst them any associates at all, and particularly such as have experienced a twenty years fast, and whose voracious appetites nothing short of another Galilean miracle could possibly satisfy. Well aware of the difficulty to be apprehended on this last-mentioned account, the ministers will endeavour to stand alone; and, as they know, that they could not do so in open war, they will make another effort to preserve, not the "bles-"sing of peace," but the misapplied *name* of that blessing, by which means they will again have the approbation of Buonaparté, they will again become "the *prudent* mi-"nistry who govern Great Britain," and with this support at their back, they know, that they shall be able to set at defiance, the united forces of all the parties, into which the state is divided.—It being now notorious, that the shallow scheme of entrapping Mr. Pitt, of bringing in him and Lord Melville only, has failed, the ministerial writers

are endeavouring to make the public believe, that Mr. Pitt proposed a further change, which would have embraced Lords Spencer and Grenville, and Mr. Windham; but, that Mr. Addington would not consent to this, and, *thereupon*, the negotiation broke off. But, is there, can there be, a man in England, one single man, who knows, or has ever heard of the character of these noblemen, and of this gentleman, distinguished not less by their birth and by their talents, than by their integrity, and their high and honourable way of thinking, of speaking, and of acting; is it possible that any such man will believe, that any of them would, on any account whatever, become the underlings of the Addingtons, and, at the same time, give, from the paltry considerations of place, their tacit sanction to measures, which they have constantly deprecated, as fraught with the ruin and eternal disgrace of their country? Mr. Windham is, indeed, in most of the writings to which we allude, left out of this fabricated proposition, an honour which he certainly merits, but which he ought not to enjoy at the expense of Lords Spencer and Grenville, who would, with disdain not less than his, spurn at such an impudent attempt to render them the tools of men, whose public conduct they have openly condemned, and whom, in their hearts, they must despise. From a ministry, made up of such heterogeneous materials, what good could be expected? In a cabinet composed of such jarring elements, what harmony could possibly exist? To justify measures commensurate with the exigencies of the times, the new ministry must necessarily begin by an unreserved exposition of all the dangers of the country; and, how would it be possible to describe and characterise those dangers, without an implied, and, in many cases, a clearly expressed, condemnation of the measures, by which they had been produced? One half of a ministry, thus patched up, would, on every subject at all connected with the effects of the peace, be constantly at war with the other half; its existence, consequently, would be of short duration, and, with it, would sink beyond the power of resuscitation, the character of all its newly acquired members. And, as to the effect which such a junction would have upon the country; would it inspire confidence in the people? Would it tend to rouze them from that death-like disgust and indifference, into which they have sunk through a long series of humiliating and disgraceful concessions? Would it not, rather, confirm that disgust, by presenting to their view what they must regard as a juggle amongst a few inconsistent, not to say unprincipled, political men, of whom they, their King and their Country were the sport? In short, and, indeed, it is a truth, almost too evident to mention, such a compromise, would prove the annihilation of public confidence; it would bereave us even of hope; it would, at once, lead this devoted country to the execution of that "death-warrant," which was signed on the first of October, 1801!

Peace or War?—Neither. We shall have neither peace nor war; but a continuation of this war-peace, which has, for eighteen months past, been preparing this country for the rule of Buonaparté and his comrades. The object of the ministers, the sole object which they have at heart, is, to retain their places; to this point, and to this point alone, all their negotiations, all their intrigues, all their words, and all their silence, tend. There is but one thing in the world, about which they are more anxious; and that is their personal safety! That secured, therefore, it is our full persuasion, as it invariably has been, that they will make any sacrifice that Buonaparté can demand, and much greater sacrifices, than, perhaps, he has hitherto thought of demanding. They are, however, aware, that something must be found out to make a show of compensation for the present alarm, stagnation of commerce, and public expense. For this purpose an accommodation, a mean, senseless, and useless accommodation, relative to Malta, will probably take place: an agreement may be made to leave that post in our hands for a year or two; and, in return, we shall, in all likelihood, consent to something, which will be ten times more destructive to the essential interests, as well as the honour of the country. This has always been our opinion; it is so still; and, if it should prove unfounded, we shall readily confess, that, for once in our lives, we have overrated the selfishness and pusillanimity of the Richmond-Park Ministers. — Some few things it will, nevertheless, be difficult easily to get over. His Majesty's Message states, as the leading and principal cause, of his calling upon the Parliament, that France has assembled a great number of troops in Holland. It is notorious, that, since the Message, the French troops in Holland have been augmented from five to twenty-five or thirty thousand, if we include those evidently intended for the expedition to Louisiana, who are now disembarked, and who come under the description of those, who had occasioned the alarm. Will the ministers, then, have the assurance to tell

Parliament, that the dispute is settled, and that there is no longer any ground of alarm; and will they disembody the militia, while these troops, or any considerable part thereof, remain in Holland? If there was not *imminent danger of invasion*, it was, as we have before observed, not only wrong, but it was absolutely illegal, to call out the militia; and, if that danger existed, previous to the date of the message, it must continue to exist, till the number of troops in Holland be reduced, something, at least, below what it then was. Will the people, will the parliament, be satisfied with a vague assurance, that the Consul of France has returned to a pacific disposition? Ashamed as we are to make the acknowledgment, we confess that we think they will. The Addingtons and Hawkesburies well know with whom they have to do. They well know, that, in spite of a little huff and bluster, the word peace, the name of peace; has, in this humbled and degraded country, charms similar to those, which poets have attributed to music It will, however, be curious to hear the language, in which Mr. Sheridan * will express himself on the approaching occasion; how he will lash the sanguinary war faction; what pathetic eulogiums he will utter on the lovely goddess of the olive branch; and with what a complacent mein and theatrical air he will put up his dagger of lath! ——As to the New Opposition, whom the modest ministers, or their hirelings (no matter which) have denominated a "*little band of* BLOOD HOUNDS," they, indeed, may, we hope, be expected to express a wish, at least, to institute some inquiry into the late unprecedented measures; though we have little doubt, that they would fail of obtaining it. The stale charge of disheartening the country becoming no longer suitable to "existing circumstances" (wretched, destructive phrase!), the staler one of wishing for *eternal war* will be revived, and will be persisted in, with as much falsehood, and with more assurance, than ever. Never have these noblemen and gentlemen, in any one instance, called for *eternal war*. They have denied the charge, over and over again, in their places in Parliament. Never have they said, that they would not, upon proper terms, have made peace with Buonaparté. Never have they said, or done, any thing to prevent, or to impede, the due and honourable execution of the definitive treaty of peace. Look at the Address, which, during the debates on that disgraceful compact, they proposed to be carried to the King.— "We shall," say they, "consider it as our "first duty, as far as may depend on us, *to "maintain inviolate the public faith, as it is "pledged by this treaty*, and to assist His Ma- "jesty in performing, *with uprightness and "punctuality*, the engagements, into which "His Majesty has been advised to enter. "But, we cannot conceal the painful ap- "prehensions, with which we consider the "result of those engagements; nor can we "forbear to offer His Majesty our humble "and dutiful advice, for the adoption of "such measures, as can, alone, in our opi- "nion, under the blessings of Providence, "avert from us the dangers, with which we "are now surrounded. That it is impossi- "ble for us to have seen without the utmost "anxiety and alarm, all the unexampled "circumstances which have attended the "final conclusion of the present peace: the "extensive and important sacrifices, which, "without any corresponding concession, this "Treaty has added to those already made, "on our part, by the preliminary articles: "the unlooked-for and immense accessions "of territory, influence and power, which "it has tacitly confirmed to France: the "numerous subjects *of clashing interest and "unavoidable dispute*, which it has left en- "tirely unadjusted: and above all, those "continued and systematic *projects of aggran- "dizement*, of which, in the very moment of "peace, we have seen unhappily such un- "deniable and convincing evidence. That "by relinquishing so many sources of pros- "perity in peace, and so many bulwarks of "defence in war, and by renouncing at the "same time the advantage and security al- "ways hitherto derived from the ac- "customed renewal of former treaties, the "British Government has imposed on itself "a greater necessity than has ever before "existed, for measures of increased pre- "caution, and for determinations of un- "shaken constancy.—That we therefore "rely on His Majesty's paternal wisdom "for a watchful and *unremitted attention* to *the "situation and future conduct of the power with "whom we have negotiated*. And we think it "necessary more especially to assure His "Majesty of our ready and firm support in "that determination which we trust His "Majesty will henceforward steadily pur-

* MR. SHERIDAN, like Falstaff, is not only witty himself, but the occasion of wit in others. We did not flatter ourselves that the remarks, which we made on his famous bluster-speech (p. 385) would have become a subject for the fine arts, as it has, in the hands of MR. GILRAY, of St. James's street, who has presented our ideas to the public in the form of an heroic picture, which will, we doubt not, tend to immortalize both the hero and the artist. It is a striking likeness, and the drapery is peculiarly appropriate.

" sue, *of resisting every fresh encroachment (of* " *whatever nature), which shall be attempted on* " *the maritime, commercial, or colonial rights and* " *interests of the British Empire.*—This our " solemn declaration must, as we believe, " materially conduce to prevent the neces- " sity which it is calculated to meet. And " we trust that His Majesty will also ap- " prove of our desire to support it by all " practicable œconomy, in every branch of " the public expenditure, and by a scale of " naval and military defence *adequate to the* " *extent of our danger*, and to the importance " of the interests which we have to main- " tain.—The anxiety which we feel in this " respect is the necessary consequence of " our sincere *wish for the permanence of the* " *public tranquillity* which His Majesty now " has re-established. And it is for the same " important purpose, that we also most ear- " nestly recommend to His Majesty's wis- " dom, the pressing necessity of arranging, " by *immediate and amicable discussion*, those " points of essential interest, which had " been adjusted by former treaties, but for " which no provision has been made in this " negotiation.—These councils we submit " to His Majesty with confidence, in the " present awful crisis of public affairs, pre- " pared to meet with firmness all the diffi- " culties and dangers of our present situa- " tion, but desirous, above all things, *to* " *promote the stability and security of real* " *peace:* the object which it has been His " Majesty's benevolent desire, by such ex- " tensive sacrifice, to ensure to his loyal " and affectionate people." — Was this, then, to call for *eternal war?* Never was there so scandalous a misrepresentation of the conduct or the views of any party, or of any individual.—Let the people now ask themselves, whether the apprehensions of this party were not well founded. Has not France pursued " her *projects of aggrandize-* " *ment?*" Have not " numerous subjects " of *clashing interest and dispute*" arisen? Are we not surrounded with dangers of every sort? And, let any one deny, if he can, that, if the councils here proposed had been followed, we should never have been exposed to the peril and the contempt, with which we are now beset. This address recommended a " strict *maintenance of the public* " *faith, as pledged by the treaty*," a fulfilment of the treaty " with *uprightness* and *punctuality*." Have the ministers, the makers and lovers of peace, followed this advice? Have they " *maintained the public faith inviolate?*" Have they fulfilled the treaty with "*uprightness* and " *punctuality*," as recommended by Lord Grenville, Mr. Windham, and their friends; France accuses them of not having done the former, and all the world knows that they have not done the latter, because, as to several points, they have not fulfilled the treaty at all; and in consequence of this very non-fulfilment, they have been compelled, at the end of ten months from the ratification of the treaty, to call upon the country to arm, in order to protect itself against imminent danger of invasion from the power with which that treaty was made; a danger which would not have happened, if the councils of the new opposition had not been rejected. While the *appearance* of peace and amity with France subsisted, it was to be supposed, that these gentlemen would continue to be reproached with a fondness of war; but, to hear this reproach *now*, and from men, too who have already again placed the nation in hostile array; to hear them arraigned for a love of war, as exemplified in their disapprobation of the treaty; to hear them thus arraigned, at the very moment when a war has been produced by that treaty, argues, on the part of their opponents, a degree of impudence, or of ignorance, unparalleled.

NOTICES.

We are desired to say that our friend CANDIDUS, of Reading, who favoured us with the song (p. 398), entitled " BOB and the DOCTOR," is not the same MR. CANDIDUS, who, some time ago, published some letters in a newspaper, called the STAR.

AN ENGLISHMAN, on Lord St. Vincent and the Navy, shall appear in our next sheet.

MISO-COSMOPOLIS shall see his excellent letter in our next.

J. B.'s Letter will appear in our next. His observations are invaluable, and we shall be much obliged to him for the pamphlet, which he has had the goodness to offer us.

PHILO-MELITENSIS has our thanks, and shall certainly have a place in our next.

SEVERAL PIECES OF POETRY (the ministry seem to have awakened the Muses) shall be inserted without delay.

☞ In order to be able to communicate these articles, and other important matters, to our Readers, we shall, with our next, publish a SUPPLEMENTARY SHEET.

*** The two preceding sheets of the present volume, containing Mr. Cobbett's first and second letters to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the finances of the country, have been reprinted, and are now ready for delivery.

TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

SIR,—When I closed my last letter, I regarded the discussion of your financial statements as being, for the present, at an end. But, the Account of the CONSOLIDATED FUND, for the last year, being now made out, and laid before Parliament, I think it right to enter into an examination of it, as far as it tends to elucidate the points, which I have already discussed.

To describe the Consolidated Fund, more fully than I have hitherto done, may be necessary for the information of some few of my readers, and, I do really believe, that it is not altogether unnecessary with respect to yourself.—The CONSOLIDATED FUND consists of the net produce of all the permanent taxes, whether arising from Customs, Excise, Stamps, Letters, or Assessments, including Imprest Monies, and Monies repaid, which, indeed, makes the whole of the Public Income of the country, except the produce of the annual Land and Malt Tax and the profits of the Lottery. This Consolidated Fund is pledged for the payment of the interest, management, &c. of the National Debt, and also of the Civil List and of the special grants made by the Parliament. Whatever, therefore is, in the course of the year, brought into the Consolidated Fund, more than is required to answer these permanent charges, is called the *Surplus* of the Consolidated Fund, and is, together with the annual Land and Malt tax, the Lottery, and any other temporary resources, applied to the purpose of maintaining the army, navy, and ordnance, and to the discharge of such miscellaneous expenses as may arise within the year.—In making out the account of the Consolidated Fund, it is the custom to state, first the income arising from the taxes collected within the year, and, on the other side, the charge on account of the National Debt, Civil List, and Parliamentary Grants; after which are stated, on the income side, such heads of receipt as do not regularly occur, and, on the expenditure side, those payments for which no permanent provision is made, and also those which casually occur. The right-hand column, on the expenditure side, shews the payments that will be necessary for the year after that for which the account is made out. Such is the nature of the following account, lately laid before Parliament, and dated on the 25th of March, 1803.

Account of the CONSOLIDATED FUND of Great Britain for the Year ended 5th January, 1803.

INCOME.	£.	s.	d.	EXPENDITURE.	Paid in Year, ended 5th January 1803. £	s.	d.	Future annual Charge. £	s.	d.
Amount of Taxes collected in the year, ended 5th January, 1803	28,719,272	4	7	Charges on the Fund for Debt, Civil List, and grants	24,961,267	12	0¾	25,458,364	16	9¼
Money paid in by A. Newland and for dock-duty	18,239	15	7½							
Arrears of Voluntary Contributions	5,000	0	0	ToT. Masham, & R. Clark	36,500	0	0			
Add. Assessed Taxes	47,125	11	7¼							
Income Duty Ao. 1799	30,097	13	5¼							
1800	119,235	7	7¼	Additional permanent charge for Grants, &c	134,695	17	6¼	132,500	0	0
1801	1,286,615	8	—							
Goods & Shipping 1798	49,143	19	3¼							
Brought to this Account from Supplies 1802 and 1803, to replace the like Sum paid out of the Consolidated Customs for Bounties on Corn, Meal, Flour, and Rice imported	2,166,875	8	10½	Additional temporary charge	37,450	1	5	uncertain.		
				On account loan to Emperor	497,591	8	0	uncertain.		
Total Income of the Consol. Fund for the Year ended 5th Jan. 1803	32,423,605	9	—	Tot. payment and future charge	25,667,504	19	0	25,590,864	16	9¼

Now, Sir, after observing, that the last column of this account is intended to show what will be the charge of the Consolidated Fund for *this present year*, and for each *future year*, unless the debt or civil list be increased, I shall proceed to draw from the materials before me a clear and indubitable proof, of the correctness of my former statements, and of the fallacy of yours, respecting the amount of the *surplus* of this fund.—The total income is, we see, £32,423,605, and the total charge, or expenditure, for this present year, is £25,590,864, which, allowing the income of this year to be equal to the last, leaves a surplus of £6,832,741; and, as you, in your Ways and Means of 10th Dec. counted upon only £6,500,000, it would, to a shallow observer, appear, that you had under-rated your resources, instead of justifying the charge of exaggeration and deception, which I preferred, and which I still prefer, against you.—I might first remark, as to the expenditure, that under all the heads, where the amount is *uncertain*, nothing at all is placed, though it is quite certain that *something* will be wanted under most of them. By looking back into the detail of the account (what I have taken being only the recapitulation), it will be perceived, that the exact amount of the charges for the police offices, for instance, being uncertain, they are not included in the expenditure of the present, though they amounted, last year, to more than £20 000. I will not, however, dispute about these uncertainties; but will take the expenditure for the present year as you have given it. Coming, then, to the income side of the account, we see the sum of £32,423,605, being the total amount of the income, during the year ended 5th January, 1803. But, Sir, the total amount of the income of this present year will fall short of this sum, unless new taxes are imposed to a very considerable amount; because, during last year, as I am now about to show, large sums were brought to this account, from sources, which are *now dried up*, as will be instantly perceived by looking at the seven last mentioned heads on the income side of the account, to which I beg leave to refer you, before you proceed another step.—Arrears of *voluntary contributions* are at an end; so are those of *additional assessed taxes*; so are those of *income tax*; and so are those of goods and shipping, commonly and most jocularly called *convoy duty*. All these, it is well known, are no more; and, therefore, whatever sum, arising from them, is to be found included in the income of last year, must be deducted in our estimate of the income of the present year. The seventh head of these temporary resources is the amount of *bounties on corn, meal, flour, and rice imported*. And here I must say a word or two by way of explanation. Here is the sum of £2,166,875, which is to be brought to the Consolidated Fund out of the Supplies for 1802 and 1803, to *replace* a like sum, which had been paid out of the Fund for the said bounties. This is fair enough, upon the whole, but very fallacious, shamefully, I had almost said, detestably fallacious, as to the opinion which it is calculated to give of the *income* of 1802, that is of last year. The bounties on corn, &c. imported, are paid at the Custom-house, out of the duties received there; and, of course, as their amount is with-held from the net produce of the taxes which go to the making up of the Consolidated Fund, that amount should be brought into the Fund again in the *manner* that it is here brought; but, assuredly, no more should have been thus brought into the fund of last year, than was paid at the Custom-house *during last year*. The fact is, however, that, under the head, of which I am now speaking, *two years'* corn bounties are included! Those paid in 1801, and those paid in 1802! And, that which should *not* have been included makes *more than two thirds* of the whole sum! To Lord Auckland I owe infinite obligations; I look towards him with a sort of filial gratitude; but, in nothing has he been so truly paternal as in producing the Custom-house accounts, by which I have been enabled to detect this instance of more than Flemish fraud. Look, Sir, at the Custom house account for 1802, that is for last year, for the year of which you have here given us an account of the Consolidated Fund, and you will find that there was only £715,323, paid during the year, for corn bounties. This, therefore, was the sum which should have been replaced in the account of the Consolidated Fund for that year, but you have *replaced* it with £2,166,875!!! "To replace," say you, "a like sum *paid out of the Consolidated Fund*." You do not say, paid out of the fund *during the year* for which the account is made up: you do not *say* this, indeed; but do you not leave it to be so understood? You are not, in general, sparing of print and paper; and why not, then, make two lines of this credit, distinguishing the sum paid for corn bounties, out of the Consolidated Fund of last year, from the sum paid out of the fund of the year before? Was it not natural to do so? Was it not necessary? And, though the account, as it now stands, is not absolutely false, does it not leave a falsehood to be inferred, and are you not, if for this reason only,

fairly chargeable with ignorance, or with deception?—While, however, I make all these deductions from the total amount of the income of last year, I must make one *addition*; to wit: the probable *further produce of the new taxes, imposed last year.* As these taxes were not in operation 'till the middle of May, they did not yield so much by nearly one half, last year, as they will yield this year, and, therefore, the further produce of them must be added to the income of last year, in order to come at the income of this year, and to ascertain the amount of this year's surplus. The further produce, of which I am here speaking, was estimated by you at £2,000,000. That this is calculating to the full height will appear very plain, when it is known that these new taxes, from 12th of May to the end of the year, produced only £1,957,340. I will not, however, dispute about this: I will allow the £2,000,000 to be added, and then the result will be as follows:

TOTAL INCOME of the consolidated fund, in the year which ended on the 5th of January, 1803, including arrears of income tax, &c. &c.		£32,423,605
ADD, for further produce of new taxes, which were imposed last year, but which were under collection only part of the year		2,000,000
		34,423,605
DEDUCT. Arrears of voluntary contributions	5,000	
——— Arrears of additional assessed taxes	47,125	
——— Income duty (1)	2,305,267	
——— Convoy Duty	49,143	
——— Corn-bounties not paid out of the customs of last year, and, therefore, not to be included in the income of that year	1,451,552	
		3,858,087
TOTAL INCOME of the consolidated fund, in this present year, ending the 5th of January, 1804, unless increased by more new taxes		30,565,518
DEDUCT total annual charge upon this fund, as the said charge is stated at the foot of the preceding official account		25,590,864
Actual SURPLUS of the consolidated fund for this present year, ending 5th January, 1804		£4,974,654

(1) Besides the three sums of arrears stated in the recapitulation of the preceding account, there are three other sums, stated under the detailed heads of income arising from the sources of 1798, 1799, and 1802. These make, together £869,319. which added to the total of the three sums specified in the recapitulation, produce a total of £2,305,267. as is here stated.

This statement, Sir, is fair, clear and correct. Every thing that you can possibly ask is allowed. I have taken your own figures, and by those very figures I have produced a result, which incontestibly proves the deception, contained in your ways and means, laid before Parliament on the 10th of December. In those ways and means for defraying the expenses of the army, navy, ordnance, and miscellanies for the *present year*, ending 5th Jan. 1804, you took credit for £6,500,000, (2) as the *surplus of the consolidated fund* during the present year; and, unless your accounts now laid before Parliament are false, or, unless you augment the income of the fund by new taxes imposed this year, I have proved, that the said *surplus* will amount to no more than £4,974,654, a sum which falls £1,525,346 short, not only of your estimate of the surplus, but of *the credit which you took* on account thereof, in your ways and means of the 10th of December last. To this point, Sir, I wish to hold you. You have asserted, in the face of the House of Commons, that the surplus of the consolidated fund will, during the *present year*, and upon the *present taxes*, amount to £6,500,000 at least; I assert, that if your account of last year be not false, the said surplus will amount to only £4,974,654, or thereabouts. Here we are at issue. Time alone can finally decide between us; but, in the interim, I hope the Parliament and the people will perceive, that the *grounds* of your estimate have been proved to be false, and that they will view all your future estimates with that degree of caution and distrust, which your past are calculated to excite.——I am &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westr. 26 *April*, 1803.

P.S.—SIR, In my last letter (see p. 586), I took notice of an error, a falsehood, in the *account of British produce and manufactures exported.* The official value of that produce and of those manufactures, exported in 1801, is, in the account which was lately laid before the House, stated at £25,699,809, whereas, in the account laid before the House last year, the said value, for the same year, 1801, was stated at £25,719,979, making a difference of £20,170. In my remarks on this error (if it can be one), I observed, that *one* of the two accounts must be false; but, there is every reason to suppose, that the last year's account was correct, and, of course,

(2) See the Ways and Means.—Register, Vol. II. p. 780.

that the falsehood attaches to that of this year; for, I find the account of last year to correspond precisely with the statement, on this head, included in the financial resolutions, which were passed by the House of Commons on the 22d of June 1802. In order to show the probable *intention* of this *error*, I will just repeat this part of the two accounts.

Acc. presented last year.				Acc. presented this year			
Yrs.	£. Value.	s.	d.	Yrs.	£. Value.	s.	d.
1798	19,672,503		9	1798	19,672,503		9
1799	24,084,213		10	1799	24,084,213		10
1800	24,304,283	13	6	1800	24,304,283	13	6
1801	25,719,979	18	6	1808	25,699,809	6	1
					27,012,108	3	10

Now, Sir, it cannot be supposed, that this was a *mistake in casting up*, because it lies not in one figure only, but in several, and in the fractional sums also. Neither can it have been occasioned by sums having been before inadvertantly brought down into 1801, which really belonged to 1800; for, as to all the former years the two accounts exactly agree. The sum of £20,170, therefore, which is taken from 1801, must be now included in 1802; and, what is the consequence? It just *turns the corner of the million*, and the first class of figures, which immediately and most powerfully strikes the eye, is thus falsely swelled from 26 to 27 *millions*. It happens, too, rather singularly, that the third figure, the figure expressing *hundreds of thousands*, in the year 1801, is lowered by the same cause from 7 to 6. This looks very much like an intentional imposition; and, though one ought not hastily to impute such an intention to accounts coming under the signature of so respectable an officer as Mr. Irving, yet, every discordance between two official papers, from the same authority, ought to be fully and satisfactorily elucidated.—The papers, to which I am referring, are not *reprints* from the parliamentary papers, but the parliamentary papers themselves; and, I repeat, that the last mentioned paper was produced at the request, and on the motion, of Mr. George Rose, whilom Secretary of the Treasury, who has not, that I have heard of, pointed out the disagreement between it and the last year's account.—You will say, perhaps, that you could not have any dishonest purpose in view, because the papers speak not of money passing through your hands, but of sums merely showing the state of trade. Very true, Sir; I never said, nor did I ever think, nor do I even now think, that you would rob the Exchequer. The attempt of the Plymouth Tinker has rivetted your moral honesty in the mind of every man who has heard of the transaction. But, because I regard you as a strictly honest man, in the moral sense of the word honest, I am not to shut my eyes against the falsehoods which appear in your financial statements; nor am I bound, as your partizans seem to contend, to attribute those falsehoods to mere ignorance, and want of capacity. The House of Commons, "the "guardians of the public purse," resolve, upon a motion of yours, that the official value of the British produce and manufactures exported in 1801, amounted to £25,719,979. 18*s.* 6*d*; and, the account now presented to the House of Commons, says, that that very same produce, and these very same manufactures, amounted to no more than £25,699,809. 6*s.* 1*d*. Either, therefore, the House of Commons did, upon your motion, make a false resolution, or, the account, now presented to that House, is false. —That you may be able to prove this false statement to have arisen from some clerical error, ought to be the wish of every one; for, unless you do it, what reliance can we, in future, be reasonably expected to place on any public account whatever? Masses of figures may be presented to our eyes, and results may be drawn from them; but who, if this matter be not satisfactorily explained, will attach any belief to either?—But, Sir, a more weighty consideration is, the contempt, to which these contradictory statements tend to expose the House of Commons. The people have been accustomed to look up to that body as the watchful guardians of the public treasure; as the effectual check upon those, through whose hands that treasure passes; and must not this confidence be shaken, when accounts, such as I have been speaking of, are sent forth under the sanction of the House of Commons? If an error of twenty thousand pounds can pass unnoticed in one account, why not in another? And, if twenty thousand, why not a million?

THE GRAND CONSULTATION.

Ambubaiarum Collegia Pharmacopolæ.
Hor. Sat. II. Lib. I.

I.

If the health, and the strength, and the pure vital breath,
Of Old England, at last, must be Doctor'd to death,
Oh! why must we die of *One* Doctor alone?
And why must that Doctor be just such a one—
As Doctor Henry Addington?

II.

Oh! where is the great Doctor Dominicetti,
With his Stews, and his Flues, and his Vapours to sweat ye?
Oh! where is that Prince of all Mountebank Fame,
With his Baths of hot earth, and his Beds of hot name—
Oh! where is Doctor Graham?

III.

Where are Somnambulé MESMERS' Convulsions Magnetic?
Where is MYERSBACH, renowned for his skill diuretic?
Where is PERKINS, with Tractors of magical skill?
Where's the Anodyne Necklace of BASIL BURCHELL?
Oh! where is the great VAN BUTCHELL?

IV.

Where's Sangrado RUSH, so notorious for *bleedings*;
Where's RUMFORD, so fam'd for his Writings and Readings;
Where's that COUNT OF THE KETTLE, that friend to the belly,
So renown'd for transforming Old Bones into jelly—
Where, too, is the great Doctor KELLY?

V.

While SAM SOLOMON'S Lotion the public absterges,
He gives them his gold *, as well as his purges;
But *our* frugal DOCTOR, this practice to shun,
Gives his *Pills* to the Public, the *Pells* to his SON!
Oh! fie! fie! DOCTOR ADDINGTON!
Oh! Where is DOCTOR SOLOMON?

VI.

Where are *all* the great Doctors? No longer we want
This farrago of Cowardice, Cunning, and Cant;
These Braggarts! that one moment know not what fear is,
And the next moment, trembling, no longer know where is—
Lord HAWKESBURY'S March to Paris?

VII.

Then for HOBART and SULLIVAN, HAWKEY and HERVEY—
For WALLACE and CASTLEREAGH, BEESKE and GLENBERVIE—
For EDEN and WILBERFORCE, MARKHAM and SHEE—
Give us VELNO and ANDERSON, LEAKE, SPILSBURY—
Doctor BALL, Doctors ERODUM and BREE.

VIII.

And instead of the Jack-Pudding Bluster of SHERRY,
With his "dagger of lath," and his Speeches so merry! †
Let us bring to the field—every foe to appal—
ALDINI'S Galvanic *deceptions*—and all
The *slight of hand tricks* of Conjuror VAL.

IX.

So shall GOLDING and BOND, the Doctor's tall yeomen,
Dame HILEY, Dame BRAGGE, and the other old women,
For new Mountebanks chang'd, their old tricks bid farewell to,
And the fam'd d'IVERNOIS his Arithmetic sell to—
That wonderful wonder, the great KATTERFELTO.

X.

So shall England, escap'd from her "safe politicians,"
Such an Army array of her Quacks and Physicians—
Such Lotions and Potions, Pills, Lancets, and Leeches,
That MASSENA shall tremble, our coast when he reaches,
And the CONSUL himself—his breeches.

THE DOCTOR'S MODE OF PRACTISE PROVED TO BE NEITHER NEW NOR SUCCESSFUL.

As SANGRADO, with whom you're acquainted by reading,
Prescrib'd, in all cases, *hot-water* and *bleeding*;
And thus, in a trice, all his patients did kill:
So, with equal success and political skill,
Like his brother empiric, OUR DOCTOR proceeds—
In *hot-water* he keeps us, and copiously *bleeds*.

ANTI-SANGRADO.

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* Vide in Daily Papers, Doctor SOLOMON'S Charitable Subscriptions and Abstergent Lotion.

† See Mr. GILRAY'S admirable Caricature, entitled "*Dramatic Loyalty, or the Patriotic Courage of "Sherry Andrew,"*" just published.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Arrêté concerning the foreigners established in the Colonies of Martinique and St. Lucia.—30th Pluviose, 11th year.—Louis-Thomas Villaret Joyeuse, Captain General of Martinique and St. Lucia; and Charles Henry Bertin, Counsellor of State, Colonial Prefect of the said Islands.—On examination of the letters patent of the month of Oct. 1727, and the treaty of Amiens between the Fr. Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain.—In consequence of the just representations of the French merchants with regard to the liberty with which foreigners continue to trade at Martinique and St. Lucie, since the said Islands have been restored to France.—Considering that the justice and interests of governments require that the trade of their respective Colonial possessions should be exclusively reserved to the trade of the mother country.—That the same principle, acknowledged by all nations and enforced by the laws of all commercial countries, has been lately sanctioned again by the last treaty of peace between France and England.—Considering that the authorities of those Colonies have given to foreigners, by the facility left to them until this day to carry on trade, a sufficient proof of their wish to entertain and increase, if possible, that harmony and friendly connexion existing between their respective governments.—And lastly, considering that the losses and wants of all description, supported by the French trade during the war, makes it a duty for government to assist the restoration of the same by every possible means.—RESOLVE:—I. All dispositions of the letters patent of the month of Oct. 1727, and especially those of the title 6th, concerning foreigners established in the Colonies, which dispositions have not been since repealed by any subsequent laws, ordinances, regulations or arretes, shall be fulfilled according to their form and tenor.—II. The delay granted to foreigners by the letters patent to put an end to their commercial business is fixed to the 1st Messidor next (20th June, 1803, O. S.)—III. From that date of the 1st Messidor, all stores occupied by foreigners are to be ceded in preference, on even offers, to the Merchants or Captains of French vessels.—IV. All contracts, notes of hand, transactions or bonds made after the date of the 1st Messidor next, with foreigners, concerning operations of commerce, or trade, either on their account or as attornies, even French houses of trade, shall be void, and shall not be capable of binding the parties, unless it be for final settlements of business, or of commercial partnership.—All public officers are forbidden to make out, sign or even receive such instruments of writing,

from the above date, under penalty of 6000 livres, and of being superseded of their functions during 3 years.—V. All French merchants and traders in Martinique or St. Lucia who may have clerks, partners, agents, factors, or other foreign persons concerned in their commercial business, or who interfere therein, either directly or indirectly, are ordered to dissolve all connexions of the kind that may exist with them, between this and the 1st Messidor next (20th June, 1803), under pain against the merchants and traders, of a fine of 6000 livres; and against the foreigners, of being sent off the Colony.—One half of the fines determined shall be given to the persons who will give notice of the offenders against the preceding dispositions.—VI. Foreigners owning landed property, or houses, stores, or any establishments whatsoever, others than commercial property, are allowed to enjoy freely, and to regulate, administer and govern the same either by their own hands, or by others on their account; and to continue to reside in these Colonies under the same privilege and protection that the laws and government allow to such French citizens as are proprietors or cultivators.—VII. Such of the said foreigners whose intention will not be to reside in the said colonies, will under the same protection enjoy the facility granted to them by the 20th art. of the treaty of Amiens.—VIII. The execution of the present arrete is entrusted to the inspection of all functionaries and citizens invested with a public authority. The offences against the regulations it contains shall be prosecuted through the commissaries of government near the tribunals.—The same shall be translated, printed, published, posted up, and enregistered at the register's office of the prefecture.—A copy shall be sent to the grand judge, to be entered by his instructions on the registers of the offices of the tribunals of Martinique and St. Lucia.—Given at Martinique the 30th Pluviose, 11th year of the French republic. (Signed) *Villaret Joyeuse, Bertin.*

ON MALTA *from the Moniteur of the 20th of April* 1803.

Paris, April 20.—MALTA.—On his arrival, M. le bailli Buzi, minister plenip. and lieut. of the Grand Master, presented his letters of credence to the English commandant, Mr. Ball, and demanded of him the possession of the islands of Malta, Gozo, &c. Mr. Ball answered verbally, that he had no orders from his court authorizing him to evacuate those islands.—M. Buzi then wrote to the English commandant, and remarked, that the verbal communication did not appear to him to be sufficient; he, therefore, begged of him to explain himself in writing.—Accordingly Mr. Ball made a written communication to M. Buzi, dated March 2, and of which the following is an extract.—"You will have the goodness to observe, that it is certain the powers invited, conformably to the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, to guarantee the independence of Malta, have not agreed to that measure; and that I have no authority to put an end to the government of His Brit. Majesty in this island, without special orders from my court.—Your Exc. will also observe, that it is my wish to dissuade the Grand Master from coming to reside here. In this view I beg you will recollect that I have already spoken to him.—With respect to your observation, that the Grand Master hoped to have immediate possession of the palace in Valetta, I have apprised you, that in the present circumstances, I am unable to comply with the wish of his Eminence, because it is indispensably necessary that his Exc. Gen. Villette and myself, should continue to occupy that house, on account of the official duties of our respective departments. I must, however, observe to your Exc. that, at the same time, I made a tender of the palace Du Bosquet, which appeared to me a suitable residence, until he could enter upon the functions of his government: but as the palace Du Bosquet is at present unfurnished, I took the liberty to suggest, that it would be preferable, and much more convenient to the Grand Master, to remain some time longer in his present residence in Sicily; and especially, as it is no more than a day's sail from hence.—Finally, his Eminence may be assured, that the moment I shall be authorised to resign the government, I shall communicate the circumstance to him.—I have the honour to be, &c."

"BALL."

M. Buzi seeing that the English commandant persisted in refusing to give up Malta to him, applied to the French minister for his good offices on the occasion.—M. Buzi, by a letter dated the 1st of March, represented anew to the English commandant, the inconveniencies which may result from his conduct; and, at the same time, informed him of his application to the French minister in order to obtain his interference.—To this letter, the English commandant returned an answer, of which one phrase, as follows, is of essential importance. "I have the honour to assure you that I shall be always ready to co-operate with his Excellency the French minister, with respect to the terror of the article in question (the 10th of the treaty of Amiens)."—The French minister in answer to the requisition of his interference, immediately wrote to M. Buzi, and assured him that a just and faithful interpretation of the treaty left no doubt respecting the evacuation of Malta by the English, and the right of its possession by the order.—The French minister has transmitted to the Grand Master a copy of what he wrote on the occasion to the English minister, which was to the following effect:—"The minister plenip. of the French republic at Malta, has received the note which his Exc. the minister plenip. of his Brit. Majesty did him the honour to address to him, the 4th of March, in answer to that which the undersigned transmitted to him on the 2d day of that month.—Before he specially replies to this note, the French minister thinks it proper to state to his Excellency the minister of England that the ambas. extr. and plenip. of the Grand Master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, has required by a formal application to the Fr. republic, the interference of its minister at Malta, in order to induce the English minister to forego his opposition to the immediate execution of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, and to concur in its accomplishment.—The undersigned in considering the note which he has received from the minister plenip. of England, and also that which his Exc. has addressed to M. Buzi, perceives that both these notes contain a similar refusal to accede to the immediate execution of the article in question, and that in both this refusal is grounded on the same pretexts. His Exc. alleges that the powers invited under the article to guarantee the stipulated arrangements, not having acceded to the measure, he does not think himself authorised to fulfil the article, and further that he has received no special instructions from his court, for resigning the gov of these Islands to the Grand Master of the order of St. John of Jerusalem.—With respect to these two points the Undersigned has the honour to represent to his Exc. the minister of England: — I. That the independence of these islands, and arrangements respecting them, have been placed, by 6th paragraph of art. X. of the treaty of Amiens, under the protection and guarantee of six of the most independent powers of Europe. France and G. Britain, who were the contracting parties, and who have solicited the other powers to guarantee that clause of their treaty to

peace, cannot, without giving scandal, be the first to refuse to execute these arrangements, to insure that independence, and to grant that protection and guarantee.—II. That the invitation, set forth in the 13th par. of the said art. X. to the other powers to accede to the stipulations contained in that article, is only a mark of politeness, or an honour which these powers are at liberty to refuse: but it is otherwise with regard to France and G. Britain, who have promised their protection and accepted the guarantee, by the very act of signing the treaty which contains the arrangements to be guaranteed, who thus have placed themselves at the head of the powers to whom the invitation was addressed.—III. That the non-contracting powers may refuse the guarantee, because it is a burthen which these powers are at liberty not to impose upon themselves: but how absurd would it be to believe the refusal could involve and effect the annulling of the treaty of peace, and exonerate from their engagements the powers that have signed it.—IV. That an attempt to take advantage of so frivolous a pretext, and so glaring a sophism, in order to decline doing what they themselves have consented to do, would be a breach of faith unworthy of a great power, and with which England would not most assuredly sully the page of her history.—V. That this delay in the acceptation of an honourable duty in the supposition that it exists on the part of the non-contracting powers, cannot, above all, prove injurious to a third power, that has been acknowledged and solemnly established by the contracting parties, unless the latter be disposed openly to violate their own engagements, the faith of treaties and the law of nations.—VI. That Russia, Austria and Prussia, if they have not actually acceded, as the English minister pretends, to the invitation made to them, to accept the guarantee of the island, were far from imagining that by this delay they would have prevented the re-establishment of the order of Malta, the execution of the treaty of Amiens, or compromized the tranquillity of Europe. The undersigned requires of his Exc what these powers will think, when they find that their delay in acceding to the invitation has served as a pretext for the violation of so solemn a treaty of peace.—As to the declaration made by the minister of England, that he had no special instructions from his court on the subject of the resignation of the govt. of the island, or its surrender to the G. Master, the undersigned have the honour of observing to his Exc, that in quality of minister plenip. to his Brit. Majesty, the principal and immutable rule of his conduct is contained in the treaty itself; and such was so clearly the intention of his court, that in the full powers given him, and which he interchanged with the undersigned it is positively said, "You will, on your arrival at Malta, immediately inform general Vial that his Majesty, desirous of accomplishing, with the utmost fidelity, the engagement he contracted by the definitive treaty, wishes you to take, in concert with him, the necessary measures for giving effect to the stipulations contained in the 10th article of the treaty." His Exc. might be invested with another character in that island; but the Fr. Republic does not recognise these contradictory qualities, these opposing duties; and the undersigned sees, in the person of his Exc., nothing but the minister plenip. of his Brit. Majesty, charged with the execution and the maintenance of treaties.—The English minister has no doubt reflected duly on the consequences of an opposition which cannot fail to astonish all Europe. He ought to have seen that this refusal was a manifest violation of the treaty of peace, and that the Brit. government, to justify its intentions, and to give a striking proof of its good faith, ought distinctly to disavow a conduct so little conformable to honour, and throw the whole odium on the minister who had resorted to it without a positive order. For if, contrary to all appearances, this violation of a treaty, which has given peace to the world, was not disapproved of by his Brit. Majesty, the First Consul of the Fr. republic would be reduced to the necessity of appealing to the tribunal of Europe, and then he would find as many allies as there are powers friendly to peace, and jealous of their dignity, their independence of the rights of sovereigns, and the rigorous observance of the faith of treaties.—The undersigned supports, therefore, in the most formal manner, the demands made to the English minister, in the name of the Gr. Master of the order of Malta, by his extr. minister plenip. M. Busi. Of consequence he demands the prompt and entire execution of the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens.—Both the French and English ministers have written complimentary letters to the Gr. Master.—The English minister gave the Gr. Master to understand, that it was his opinion it might be better for the Gr. Master to wait at Messina for the decision of the Brit. cabinet, which he promises to communicate to him as soon as it arrived; and he offered, in the mean time, a country house to the Gr. Master, should he be disposed to come to Malta.—The Gr. Master observed in answer to the English minister, that having through the medium of his lieut. fulfilled what was enjoined him by the article of the treaty of Amiens respecting the Gr. Master, he should wait at Messina the evacuation of the island, or the decision of the two courts.—The Fr. minister invited the Gr. Master to come to Malta without delay. The Gr. Master observed in answer, that having performed the duty imposed on him by the treaty of Amiens, by the presence of his lieut. at Malta, he must look upon every other proceeding as unseasonable at the present moment, and that he would wait at Messina the decision of the courts.—*Moniteur.*

Paris, April 20.—We read in the English journal named *The Sun*, of Saturday, April 16, the following article:—"M. de Thomasi, present Gr. Master of the island of Malta is not only a creature of French intrigue, but M. de Busi his lieut. is a Frenchman; no doubt naturally devoted to France. Supposing the guarantee announced in the Moniteur to have been actually obtained, could England have, even under such a guarantee, any assurance that the possession of it would not be in fact French, since the lieut. of the Gr. Master, in contempt of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, which bear that *no Frenchman shall belong to the order of St. John of Jerusalem!*"—The same assertions are, with similar confidence, repeated in all the English papers of the same day, these being all written in the same spirit.—It is, however, grossly false, that the commander Bailli Busi is a Frenchman. He is of an ancient Italian family, which has been for several centuries resident in a town in the Papal dominions, about nine leagues distant from Rome. M. Bailli Buzi was born in that town.—Certain English journalists have a wonderful knack at making absurd suppositions to be followed by imputations which are not less absurd. They reason with the same good faith and logic as the wolf in the fable. *We recognise here the inclinations and spirit of that ferocious beast; but we do not see any lamb ready to let itself be devoured.*—Moniteur.

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Cape François, March 6.—On the 22d ult. the division of Leghorn, consisting of several thousand men, effected its disembarkation. This expedi-

tion of force re-animated the courage of the colonists. European merchandize has considerably risen in price. Confidence increases in proportion to the measures which have been employed for the reduction of the rebels.—General Rochambeau has just transferred his head-quarters to Port-au-Prince, whither the civil and military administrations also proceed. The rebels have retired two leagues from the Cape. No delay will now take place in the opening of the campaign: already some hundreds of negroes have returned to the habitations of the plain.—The epidemic has not made any ravages here; and, what is equally fortunate, we approach nearly the propitious season.

Constantinople, March 16.—The new French ambassador has made, within these few days past, his private visits. He has been received every where in the most distinguished manner. The people appear to see with the greatest pleasure the re-establishment of amicable relations with France; above all, the commercial relations. The ministers of the Porte do not shew less eagerness in seconding the views of their sovereign, whose wish is declared for the re-establishment of the ancient political system which unites so intimately the empire of the crescent to France. On the 6th instant the Grand Vizir gave a superb fete to General Brune.

Toulon, April 13.—Rear-Admiral Lesseigues has arrived in this port with the squadron which conveyed General Brune, the French Ambassador, to Constantinople. He stopped at St. John d'Acre on his return, where he was perfectly well received by Djezzar Pacha. He left Alexandria on the 30th March. The English evacuated it on the 17th March. Since their departure, tranquillity appears to be re-established in Egypt. The Mamelouks were cantoned in Upper Egypt. The Rear-Admiral anchored at Malta in the midst of the English squadron, which was composed of ten ships of war. The 4000 men who had returned from Alexandria were performing quarantine at the lazaretto. In all the seaports in the Levant, to which he went for the purpose of installing the commercial commissioners, they were received by the Turks with every mark of esteem, and every demonstration of joy.—*Moniteur.*

Amsterdam, April 15.—The French troops which daily arrive on our frontiers, continue their march into the interior of the republic. At present they occupy Nimeguen, Grave, Gorenchem, and other places. The English squadron has appeared within these few days upon our Coasts.

Hague, April 15.—There have been but six or seven hundred men disembarked of the troops who were to have sailed for Louisiana. The reason for disembarking them is, that they were too much crowded on board the ships. Vice-Admiral Hartsink has just sailed for the Mediterranean.—Our government has received assurance from France, that no more French troops shall enter our territories, unless in the event of a rupture with England; and that those who have entered shall not pass the frontiers as long as the negotiation lasts.

Ratisbon, April 16.—The Imperial ratification of the last conclusum of the diet is expected here on the 20th, at which epoch the diet will resume its sittings. It was said that the delay of the ratification has principally arisen from the sending a courier to Petersburgh from the court of Vienna, which judged it proper to enter into some explanations with the Emperor of Russia, before giving its sanction to this decision of the empire.

Strasbourg, April 17.—Besides the troops of the 104th demi-brigade, which are on their return from Switzerland, we expect here 3000 infantry and a regiment of cavalry, by which our garrison will be increased to 11000 men. It appears that these troops will form a camp a little distance from this city.

Brussels, April 17.—The English squadron which was lately seen off Ostend, consisted of six frigates and some cutters. They cruized along the coasts of Flanders and Zealand, to the mouth of the Meuse, where it was supposed they would join another squadron of three sail of the line and two frigates, to watch the expedition which was to sail to Louisiana; but as that expedition it now suspended, they will probably still cruize along the coasts of Holland to observe the military preparations which are carrying on.

Basle, April 19.—An arrêté has been published here of general Dejean, director in chief of the administration of war, which orders, that the French troops stationed in Switzerland shall not receive for the future any rations of meat, and that the officers shall no longer have forage. He remarks in general, that by this arrêté the military administration will have an entirely new organisation, advantageous for the troops and for the inhabitants of Switzerland.

Brussels, April 20.—All the pieces of the telegraph destined to establish the communication between Brussels and Lisle, arrived the day before yesterday at Alost. The telegraphic line will traverse the ci-devant Flanders, and will be finished and in full activity before the arrival of the First Consul. The geographical engineer, Chappe, director and inventor of telegraphs, has determined all the positions. It is understood that the telegraphic line will be continued by Antwerp unto the frontiers of the Batavian republic.

Brussels, April 22.—General Belliard is at present employed in examining the coasts of Dutch Flanders. He has given directions for the establishment of military posts, such as they were in the last war. In the island of Cadsand, the batteries and entrenchments are completing with the greatest celerity. A part of the French troops that have arrived at the island of Walcheren, are cantoned on the heighrs. They amount to about 6000 men. The English squadron cruizing off our coast, has been increased within these few days.

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Translation of a Letter from the Marquis de Casa Yrujo, to the Sec. of the U. States.—Washington, March 10, 1803.

"Sir, When you represented to me, towards the end of November last, that the port of New Orleans had been shut against the Citizens of the United States, without the assignment of any equivalent place of deposit for their merchandise on the banks of the Mississipi, according to the stipulation of the 22d article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, between the King my master, and the United States, I did not hesitate to declare to you, that I considered this measure as flowing solely from the mistaken zeal of the Intendant of Louisiana, without the approbation, and even without the knowledge of my Court. I well knew the sincere desire of the King my master to live in peace and good harmony with the United States, as I well knew the scrupulous good faith with which the Spanish Government fulfils the engagements which it forms, particularly when they are founded on the solemnity of a Treaty.—I have now the satisfaction of informing you, that my first opinion has been verified, and of declaring, in the most positive terms, that the proclamation of the Intendant is an act purely personal, without the sanction, and even without the knowledge of his

Catholic Majesty. In reality, if the said proclamation had appeared here in an entire state, no doubt could have taken place as to the source of this proceeding. But the operative part thereof merely has circulated through the United States; the preamble introducing it having been, probably without design, omitted.—I have therefore the honour to communicate herewith an entire and correct copy of the aforesaid proclamation; and by the expressions I have underlined, it will be clearly seen that the arrangement is absolutely personal, and has originated from the faculties which the Intendant supposed to be incident to his station. —This assertion is not founded merely on the obvious inferences from these expressions. The Intendant himself declares it to me in the most positive terms, in a letter of January 13, which I have just received from him, and the Governor of the province confirms the same thing with the same solemnity, in another letter of the same date. Neither the one nor the other dispute the right of the Citizens of the United States to a place of deposit on the Spanish banks of the Mississippi; but the Intendant thinks that the term of three years, allowed for the purpose of New Orleans, having expired, and much prejudice to the royal interests being experienced from its continuance in that city, it was incumbent on him to suspend the deposit there, without venturing to take on himself the assignment of another equivalent place. Not because he doubted the right of the inhabitants of the United States thereto, but because it appeared to him to be an act exceeding his authority, and which he ought to leave to the Royal determination of our Sovereign.— The Governor of Louisiana saw the subject under a point of view more correct, in my judgment, and more favourable to the inhabitants of the United States.—From the whole, it results that the suspension of the deposit not being an act of my Court, and no person ever disputing the right of the American Citizens in the case, I shall now take upon myself to adopt measures which must insure to the United States the enjoyment of all the rights stipulated in the 22d article of the Treaty, on the arrival at New Orleans of the dispatches, which will be forwarded under this date."

DOMESTIC.

Meeting of Ship-Owners.—On Tuesday the 26th inst. there was a numerous and respectable meeting of persons concerned in the shipping interest, held at the London Tavern. Mr. P. Kennion was voted to the chair.--Mr. Atcheson, the secretary, informed the meeting, that in consequence of the instruction which he had received from their committee, he had endeavoured to get a copy of the consolidation schedule. This, however, he had found it impossible to obtain. But he had seen and read it; and there could be no doubt that it was the intention of Mr. Addington to continue the tonnage duty.—Mr. Brown moved a resolution, expressive of the impolicy of the duty, and declaratory of their opinion of its injuring the carrying trade, and materially affecting the commerce of the country.—Mr. Hill observed, that the committee had been entrusted with powers to make application for the repeal of that duty, which was so obnoxious to the persons concerned in the shipping trade, and in fact so subversive of the general commercial relations of the country. This they would have done, but that the important change in the aspect of political affairs had induced them not to shew any thing like an inclination to embarrass the intentions of Government at this momentous crisis. A few days since, however, they had learned that it was the intention of Mr. Addington to renew the duty. A number of shipowners had thought it a duty incumbent on them, as a necessary measure of self-defence, to call the present meeting.—The resolution was read a second time, and agreed to unanimously.—The secretary, in a short, but impressive speech, denied that the opposition to the tonnage duty was the effect of the influence of a few powerful individuals. It was the spontaneous act of the whole body of the shipping interest, conscious how much their interests were affected by its oppressive operation.—Mr. Akenhead spoke warmly against the tax.—The thanks of the meeting were unanimously voted to the L. Mayor, for the part he had taken in the opposition to the tax, and his Lordship was requested to continue his exertions for the attainment of the important object of its repeal.---The thanks of the meeting were then moved to the late and present chairman, and the meeting adjourned.

Official dispatches have been received from Sir Roger Curtis, announcing that the Cape of Good Hope was actually surrendered to the Dutch on the 21st of February last. These dispatches were brought by the Penguin sloop of war, of 18 guns, which had just reached Portsmouth from this quarter, after a passage of two months and two days. It was surrendered in consequence of advices received to this effect by the Concorde. Prior orders for retaining it had been received a short time before, not only by the Imogene, but by the Fiorenzo frigate, capt. Bingham.---On the 20th of February a proclamation was issued by general Dundas, absolving all the inhabitants of the colony from their oath of allegiance to His Britannic Majesty.---Sir Roger Curtis and his squadron, with the troops, may be expected in a few days. They were to sail the latter end of Feb. An officer and a few men came home in the Penguin.

From the London Gazette, April 23, 1803.—Carlton-House, April 22, 1803.—The Prince of Wales has been pleased to appoint the Rev. Alexander Brodie, A.M. of Trinity College, Oxford, to be one of his Royal Highness's Chaplains in Ordinary.

Bankrupts.—Hitchen, W. Liverpool, merchant. —Lister, M. D. Southwall, Nottinghamshire, druggist.—Hull, W. Upper Boddington, Northamptonshire, and Lawrence Hull, Banbury, Oxfordshire, cow dealers.—Kennett, R. Charlotte Row, New Road, Mary-le-bonne, upholder.—Hudson, J. Devonshire Square, merchant.—Harris, J. Exeter, coach-maker.—Jones, J. Wood-street, Cheapside, Leghorn hat-warehouseman.—Watkins, W. Hereford, joiner.—Agnew, J. Grosvenor Square, banker.—Donald, J. Aldermanbury, warehouseman.—Chater, W. Charles-street, Long-Acre, coach spring-maker.—Jones, T. Aust, Gloucester, vintner.—Freeman, W. Stamford Baron, Northampton, grocer.—Johnston, W. Whitehaven, Cumberland, mercer.—Jacobs, S. Tabernacle Walk, Finsbury Square, dealer and chapman.—Gane, J. Bridgewater, Somerset, inn-keeper.

Births.—On Sunday, at her house in Lower Brook-street, Lady W. Beauclerk, of a daughter. —Same day, at the Marquis Cornwallis's, in Burlington-street, the Lady of Lord Viscount Brome, of a daughter.

Marriages.—On Thursday, at Aston Chapel, the Hon. Thomas Kenyon, to Miss Charlotte Lloyd. —Lately, at Wicklow, the Hon. Lord Kenna, of Ballyguile, to Miss Farrel.

Deaths.—On Sunday, at his house in Piccadilly, Sir John Smith Burgess, Bart —On Wednesday, at Paul's Cray, in Kent, the Dowager Lady Hoghton, relict of the late Sir Henry Hoghton, Bart.—On Monday, at Bedford, Sir John Payne, Bart.—On Saturday, at Exmouth, aged 62, Major-General William Elliott, late of the Hon. E. India Company's Artillery, Bengal.

PRICE OF STOCKS.—APRIL.

Day of Month.	Omnium	Bank Stock	3 pr. C. R. An.	3 per C. Con.	4 pr. C. Con.	5 pr. Ct. Ann.	5 per Ct. 1797.
17	13½	—	63⅛	64⅛	79	99⅜	97⅛
18	—	167	63½	64½	79¾	100¼	97⅜
19	—	—	64⅜	65⅜	81¼	101⅝	99½
20	9¾	173	66¼	67⅞	83⅞	102	101
21	—	173½	66⅜	67⅜	84¼	101⅝	100⅝
22	—	169	63⅜	63½	82⅜	98⅞	96¼
23	—	168	63	63⅜	81¼	98⅜	97½
24	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
25	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26	—	169½	64⅛	64⅞	82⅜	99½	98¼
27	—	170¼	64⅜	65⅛	82½	100⅜	99½
28	—	—	64⅛	65½	82½	100½	99¾
29	—	—	—	65	—	—	—

FRENCH FUNDS.

April	15..	54 f. 25 c.	April	22..	54 f.
	16..	53 80		23..	54 10
	18..	52 85		24..	54 10

LONDON COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

Amster. c. f.	36	1	2 us.	Leghorn	50½
D°, at sight	35	3		Naples.....	40¼
Rotterdam	36	5	2 us.	Genoa	46½
Hamburgh	34	4	2 us.	Venice, 58 livres piccole	
Altona....	34	5	2 us.	effective per £. ster.	
Paris 1 day	24	7		Lisbon	66½
Paris	24	12	2 us.	Oporto	66¾
Bourdeaux,	24	13		Dublin	14
Cadiz ...	36½		eff.	Bilboa	36½
Madrid ..	36⅜	effective		Agio, bank on Hol. p.	

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat pr q.	45s. to 58s	Hops per cwt.	160s to 180s
Rye.....	32..35	Hay per load....	86..130
Barley.....	20..25	Beef, per st.	4s.8d. to 5s.6d.
Malt.....	40..45	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	15..21	Veal	4s. 0d. to 6s. 0d.
Pease (white)....	35..41	Pork....	4s. 4d. to 5s. 4d.
Beans (horse)....	28..33	Tallow	0s. 0d.
Flour per sack ..	43..47	Av. of Sugar pr cwt	41s.4½d.
Seconds.....	40..43	Salt, per Bushel	13s.10d
Coals per chal....	51..00	Bread 9d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

Non-residence of the Clergy.—The bill, now before parliament, relative to this most important subject, we have thought it our duty to insert, at full length in the Supplement to the present sheet, p. 651. It is a matter, in which every man, in every parish in the kingdom, is interested; and, we hope, it will not pass into a law, till it has undergone a cool and ample discussion.—At the present moment, we have not room to give our humble opinion upon it; but we cannot refrain from pointing out three things, which appear to us as objectionable: 1. the ex post facto provisions contained in the first and second clauses of the bill, as far as they go to impair the just demands of the persons, by whom informations have been laid against non-resident clergymen: 2. The list of exceptions, in the eleventh clause, is, we think, by far too copious: 3. The power given to the bishop, in the fifteenth clause, to allow of residence out of the parsonage-house, in case the person having the living, or any one of his relatives, should have a house in the parish, wherein the parson should reside. We have not room to go into any remarks even upon these points, and have only just mentioned them here, in order to direct towards them the serious attention of our readers.

America and Louisiana.—Our conjectures respecting the conduct of France towards the United States of America, relative to Louisiana and the Mississippi, are now completely verified. By letters, which we have received, dated 23d of March, it appears, that, in consequence of a communication from the Spanish Minister in America to the American government, and of a more important communication to the same, from Mr. Chancellor Livingston, the American Minister at Paris, the whole dispute respecting the deposit at New Orleans, has been, as we said it would be, entirely hushed up for the present.—The Spanish Minister in America, who is nothing more than a tool of the French, states, that the hostile measure at New Orleans originated in a *mistake* of the Intendant at the port! And Mr. Livingston tells his government, that France has not the least inclination to violate any of the rights, or abridge any of the privileges, now enjoyed by the Americans, in virtue of their treaty, made with Spain, in 1795.—The consequences will be such as we pointed out in p. 297, of the present volume, to which we beg leave to refer our readers.—And, one of the steps, which we are taking to prevent these consequences, is, the sending, as our Minister to the United States, Anthony Merry, Esq.!!!!! This gentleman will make a noble figure by the side of General Bernadotte, who is now upon the point of his departure for that country. Poor Mr. Merry! What can he do? What use will he be of? His hand will not be wanted to counter-sign pass-ports in America. There are no crouching English nobility there, whom he may serve as gen-

tleman usher; and, as to any other public function, how can he be possibly fit for it? Bernadotte will ride over him. He will tread him down into the dirt; and we should not be at all surprized to hear, that the unfortunate representative of our Sovereign had been literally driven from the city of Washington. This is a hopeful prospect with respect to a country much more important to us, at this time in particular, than any other in the world.

Decree at Martinico.—On the 19th of February a decree was issued at Martinico, by Villaret Joyeuse, Captain General of that Island and of St. Lucia, concerning foreigners established in the said colonies. This decree, which will be found at full length in page 618 of the present sheet, has been, in some of the London papers, represented as a violation of the treaty of Amiens, on the part of France, because it is said to compel British subjects, in those islands, to dispose of their property by the 20th of June next. The 3d resolve of the decree has no such meaning as this. It only provides, that, *from* (that is to say *after*) the 20th of June next, such persons, if they dispose of their shops and warehouses at all, shall, on *even offers*, give the preference to French merchants and captains of ships; and, there must be every reason to presume, that none but such persons will make them any offers. According to the treaty of Amiens, article XIII. British subjects are allowed three years "to *dispose* of all their property, whe-"ther acquired or possessed by them, be-"fore, or during the continuance of the "war." This certainly can be extended no farther than to the property, which they had in the colonies at the time the treaty was concluded. It can never be construed to mean, that they should continue to import, to *buy* as well as to dispose of property. And, therefore, it does appear to us, that their having been allowed to bring goods from France to make up assortments, in order to get their own goods off, ought to be considered as an indulgence.—The 4th resolve of the decree is necessary to the due execution of the third; and as to the 5th, it relates merely to Frenchmen, who have foreigners under them or connected with them.—We have thought these observations not altogether unnecessary at this time, because, when a party has just ground of complaint, he never ought to weaken it by frivolous charges; and, it is truly lamentable to hear the decree at Martinico a subject of outery in the mouths of those very persons, who revile you for representing as breaches of treaty, the subjugation of Holland and the partition of Germany.

Tonnage-Duty.—When people complain against taxes, of any sort, their complaints are always to be heard with great caution, not to say suspicion. Till something can be found to re-place it, most assuredly this tax ought not to be given up; but, if any thing can be so found, to persevere in a duty on tonnage will require arguments such as we have not yet heard to support a justification of the minister. At any rate, his conduct has in this, as in every other instance, been marked by a most disgusting mixture of cunning and of folly. He knew, that the Lord Mayor had been instructed to bring forward and support a petition for the repeal of the duty on tonnage: He obtains a suspension of the Lord Mayor's proceedings, under the pretext that they might indirectly tend to embarrass the negotiations going on with France, and *during this suspension*, he brings forward his consolidation act, *including and confirming the duty on tonnage!*—And, will any one say, then, that he is not worthy of the house in Richmond Park?—The consolidation act once past, with what consistency can the Parliament entertain a proposition for the total repeal of a duty, which they have just before confirmed, by making its rates part of a permanent code of custom-house law! The ship-owners, aware of the obvious intention of the Minister, have, however, begun to take measures to frustrate it. They held a meeting, at the London Tavern on the 26th inst. at which they resolved to bring their grievances immediately forward. It was stated at this meeting, that "the Chancellor of "the Exchequer had called this tax, a tax "of *experiment*, and that he stood pledged to "the House of Commons and to the coun-"try, to shew and prove the result of it. "That he had now had the experience of "a year. We are (said one of the meeting) "here assembled to consider of the farther "means necessary to oppose it, and we "have a body of evidence to bring forward "in support of our objections, and to prove "that we are *navigating our ships to no profit*; "the Minister stands pledged to the public "and us to prove what has been the state of "the shipping-interest for the last twelve "months."—In this we perfectly agree. We, too, have proof, in abundance, that the shipping and the sailors are fast departing from the country. What we foretold, above a twelvemonth ago, has been perfectly realized. We opposed this duty, the moment it made its appearance; but, we cannot forget, that Mr. Burdon, the favourite of the ship-owners, sanctioned the peace, which has produced the far greater part of the falling off in their profits, and that, so late as

December last, the said Mr. Burdon stood foremost amongst the eulogists of that very minister, of whom they now complain, not because he has bartered away the honours won by the valour of their forefathers, not because he has imprinted indelible infamy on their country, not because he has done a deed that will bring the grey hairs of their Sovereign with sorrow to the grave, but because he has laid his hand upon their beggarly interests!—Nevertheless, as these interests are intimately connected, more so than those of almost any other description of men, with not only the interests, but with the naval strength and the independent existence of the country, they will, we hope, be manfully and effectually supported by the parliament.

The Cape of Good Hope.—By referring to our domestic intelligence, p 626, it will be perceived, that the Cape of Good Hope, has, at last, been surrendered entirely into the hands of the Dutch, and that, too, at the very moment when we were arming for a war, in which the Dutch, according to existing treaties, sanctioned by the treaty of Amiens, must be our enemies! We imagine, that this news will give a new turn to the present negotiations; and, we are very happy to see, that the *orders* and the *counter-orders*, respecting this important colony, have, at last, become a subject of discussion in Parliament. Lord Folkstone brought forward, on the 28th instant, a motion for copies of the dispatches sent to, and received from, our commander at the Cape. This motion was superseded by the order of the day, upon the ground, on the part of the ministers, that it tended *to embarrass the present negotiations with France!* But what can the Cape of Good Hope, which is now no longer in our hands, which was finally surrendered in virtue of an order sent out in November last; what, in the name of common sense, can this colony have to do with negotiations now pending with France, negotiations upon a dispute, *which must necessarily have arisen* since *the date of that order!* The ministers said, they had hoped, that no *detached* questions, respecting their conduct, would be agitated, but that the whole would be embraced in *one discussion*. This is precisely the evasive language which they held previous to the discussion of the definitive treaty. They wish to crowd all the numerous and important subjects necessary to be discussed, the rise, the progress, the result, and the probable consequences of their remonstrances respecting Switzerland, of their re-capture and subsequent surrender of the Cape, of their non-evacuation of Goree, of their delay to evacuate Egypt, of their new conventions respecting Malta, of their present retention of that island, of their Message to Parliament, of their calling out the militia without lawful cause, of the decrepitude of the navy, and of the depreciation of public credit; all these they wish to crowd into the discussion of one single evening, consisting of eight hours, six of which will be taken up with their own studied sophistical harangues. How is the Parliament to proceed to an examination into their conduct, without being *previously* possessed of the papers, from which alone a just opinion of that conduct can be formed? And of these papers, what part is at once so necessary and so entirely unconnected with the subjects of the present negotiation, as that part which relates to the Cape of Good Hope? This colony is no longer ours: it once was; and, surely, it may now be permitted to the House of Commons to enquire when, and how it was disposed of!——But, say they, Lord Folkstone, at the same time that he disavows any intention to embarrass the present negotiations, clearly signifies it to be his opinion, that *these negotiations* are closely *connected with our proceedings at the Cape*. Not so. His lordship said (we quote the True Briton), that "he wanted "to compare the date of the receipt of the "dispatches, which informed ministers of "the detention, or re-capture, of the Cape, "with the date of his Majesty's Message to "that House, because he did believe, that "*those dispatches conduced to the Message and* "*the consequent armament.*" And, in order to show that these measures could be produced by no other cause, his lordship cited the declarations of the French official paper, and of Buonaparté himself. But, because he thought that the news of the re-capture of the Cape was the real cause of the Message and of the armament; because he thought, that the present dispute with France was *invented* for the purpose of disguising the real motive of that Message and that armament, did it follow, thence, that he regarded the *Cape itself* as a subject of discussion *at this time*, when it is known that the place is no longer in our hands? All that his lordship seems to have asked for, was, to be informed of the time when ministers *received an account of the re-capture of the Cape*, in order that he might compare it with *the date of the King's Message*. What possible inconvenience to the present negotiations could arise from the giving of this information? It might, however, have produced great inconvenience *to the ministers*; for, unless we are greatly deceived, the papers, called for by Lord Folkstone, would have completely stripped off their

mask, and would have discovered to the astonished beholders, that the Cape of Good Hope, that this colony now no longer in our possession, and on which we shall never set foot again, has been the cause, the only true cause of all our warlike array!—The French allege, and with every appearance of truth, that the King's Message, together with the subsequent hostile preparations on the part of this country, had no other foundation than *the apprehensions, which the ministers entertained of the consequences that might arise from their forcible retention of the Cape.*—The French official gazette has uniformly asserted, in flat contradiction to the Message, that, as to "*military preparations* carrying on in the ports of France and Holland," there were none other than those which had been carrying on ever since the conclusion of the peace: and that, with respect to "*discussions* subsisting between his Majesty and the French government," there were, at the date of the Message, not only none "of *great importance*," but that there were no discussions *at all* then so subsisting. These assertions have been corroborated by Buonaparté's own declaration, made to Lord Whitworth, in the presence of the ambassadors of all the courts of Europe; and, we, for our parts, believe them to be perfectly correct.—Upon a mature consideration, therefore, of all the circumstances, past, present, and prospective, we look upon the following as being the true history of the message and of the armament, and to this disgraceful history we beg leave to call the attention of every one of our readers.—In the month of October last, the ministers were seized with a fit of vigour, which led them to resolve on keeping possession of Malta, the Cape, Demerara, &c. by way of counterpoise against the encroachments of France, in Italy, Switzerland, and Holland. In consequence of this resolution, they dispatched an order to retain the Cape, Demerara, &c. and soon after inserted, in the True Briton, the following observations, intended to prepare the Public for a favourable reception of the measure. "His Majesty's "ministers cannot proceed to carry into "effect the articles of the treaty with France, "which relate to the cessions to be made, "*without new stipulations.* If the Chief "Consul annexes Piedmont to the republic, "*let us keep Malta*; if he interferes in the "affairs of Holland, *let us keep the Cape, "Demerara, and Essequibo.*" This article appeared on the 30th of October, the order to retain the Cape and Demerara having been some days at sea. On the 1st of November arrived the Moniteur, containing a sort of manifesto, (1) in which France repeated her determination to exclude this country from any concern whatever in the affairs of the continent, but, in which manifesto, the Consul threw all the blame of misunderstanding, not upon the English ministers, but upon *their restless opponents*, expressing, at the same time, his hope, that those turbulent spirits would not be "able "*to produce a change* in the PRUDENT "MINISTRY by which Great Britain is "governed." This manifesto caused an entire, and almost instantaneous, change of system in the English cabinet; and, on the 5th of November, only four days after the manifesto was received in London, the True Briton conveyed an indication of this change: "The King's ministers will be *moderate*, but "firm. They must recollect how much the "relative situation of France with this coun-"try is changed since the signature of the "treaty of Amiens; but, *if any compromise "can be made with respect to the conquests we "still retain*, reserving to us even *less* than "our just demands, we trust, they will be "disposed to evince their moderation by ac-"cepting such compromise, *rather than have "recourse to the dreadful alternative of war.*" In conformity with this sentiment, though France had, in the interim, formally completed the annexation of Piedmont, and had interfered, in a manner more direct than ever, in the affairs of Holland, the ministers determined to revoke their order for the retention of the Cape, Demerara, &c. and the counter-order was, accordingly dispatched, in the hope that it would overtake the order for retention, which, in that case, would never have been either executed or heard of. But, on the other hand, if the order for the retention arrived first, and in time to be executed, they had to prepare against the odium and the hostility, to which the intelligence of its execution must inevitably give rise. In this state of suspense, therefore, they called upon Parliament for large peace establishments, disguising the real motive under the broad pretext of being in a state of preparation against the vast power and ambitious views of France, as if that power and those views had recently made their appearance! If news had arrived, that the counter-order (the order to give up the Cape) had *overtaken* the order to retain it; if such news had been received, then an excuse would have been framed for reducing the establishments, or, those establishments would have existed upon paper only. But, unfortunately for the Richmond-Park mi-

(1) See Register, Vol. II. p. 565.

nisters, though their order against Demerara was too late, that for the retention of the Cape arrived in time, and was punctually executed. Of this *they had intelligence on the 6th of March, in the night.* On the 7th, at seven o'clock in the morning, dispatches arrived at Windsor, whereupon the King, who was preparing to hunt that day, gave directions for his immediate return to London. He arrived about one o'clock, and a cabinet council was held at Buckingham-House at three o'clock, at which council the message was determined on, and the proclamation, for encouraging seamen to enter, was signed. The next day, the 8th of March, the message was communicated to Parliament, and press warrants were issued and executed. On the 10th of March, two days after the message had been communicated, the Public heard rumours of *the retention of the Cape*; and, a few days later, that event was circumstantially announced, through the English news-papers, to the astonished governments of France and Holland, who had never before received the slightest intimation of the matter! This was war to all intents and purposes. General Dundas absolutely *captured* the Cape, and the instrument by which he took possession of it was, accordingly, called a *capitulation.* The effect which this would have had, if it had found us in a state of *profound peace*, the ministers foresaw; and, therefore, they invented the pretexts, held forth in his Majesty's message, of "military preparations in the ports "of France and Holland," and of "important discussions between his Majesty and "the French government." To have suffered the capitulation of the Dutch garrison at the Cape to come upon the country unarmed, unprepared for, and unexpecting war; to have suffered this event to be announced to Europe, at a moment when our ministers were, in every possible way, inculcating the opinion of *permanent peace*; this would have been too glaring, too evidently perfidious, and too hostile to the interests of the country, not to have shocked even the most stupid and most base part of the nation. Therefore they armed; therefore they feigned pretexts of alarm; therefore they raised a war-like bustle, amidst the circumstances of which, the re-capture of the Cape might find a sort of tacit justification, in the minds, at least, of all those who would not reflect, that the "military preparations" and "important discussions" of the month of March could form no ground for re-capturing the Cape in the *preceding December.*— Having grounded their armament upon the double pretext of extraordinary military preparations, and of diplomatic discussions, and, being well assured, that the former did not exist, they were compelled to *make* the latter; and, if ever the papers relative to the present negotiation are made public, it will be seen, that it originated with them, and that, too, at the very same time that the message was resolved on. Why did they fix on Malta as the subject of dispute? Because they had nothing else left in their hands. Their counter-order would, they knew, deprive them of the Cape; Demerara, &c. were gone before; Egypt was demanded by the Porte, and nothing remained but Malta. That there existed, *previous* to the message, no dispute about this place is evident from several circumstances. They had, we now find, given up the point as to the suppression of the Langues of Castille and Aragon; they had consented to the mode of election, by which the Bailli Thomasi became Grand Master; the non acceptance of the powers *invited* to join in the guarantee could be no lawful obstacle to the fulfilment of the treaty; and, the Consul of France, in opening the session of the legislature, stated the final evacuation to be at hand. "Some "British troops," said he, "still remain at "Alexandria and Malta: of this our go-"vernment had a right to complain, but it "*has learned*, that the ships destined to con-"vey them to Europe, *are in the Mediterra-"nean.*" This was the light in which the Consul viewed the state of the affair of Malta, on the 22d of February, only thirteen days previous to the date of the King's message. The French government had, before that time, had a "right to complain" of delay in the evacuation of Malta; but, at the time of making the address (22d of February,) "*it had learned*" that the ships, destined to convey our troops home, "*were* "*in the Mediterranean.*" From *whom* had it *learned* this? From our ministers? Yes; and we would venture our lives, that they put off, from day to day, the evacuation of Malta, for no other purpose in the world, than that of having *something to make a dispute about*, some excuse for arming the country, in case their order for retaining the Cape should be carried into execution before their counter-order arrived. At any rate, there could not be, on the 22d of February, any discussions respecting Malta between his Majesty and the government of France; for, if there had, Buonaparté never would have spoken on the subject in the words here correctly cited from his speech; he never would have described all matter of complaint as being put an end to by the arrival of the ships destined to carry away the British troops. If, then, there were no discussions existing, thirteen days previous to the date of the message,

what "important discussions" could have arisen in that short space of time? Buonaparté has declared, that there were no discussions at all existing, even at the date of the message; and, as the ministers have not contradicted him, so we believe they cannot do it, without being guilty of a direct and unqualified falsehood, which it is in his power, at any time, to detect and expose.—To the retention of the Cape, therefore, and to that alone, we must look for the real cause of the message, of the armament, of the present negotiation, and of the war, if a war should be the result: to an order, issued on no better ground than the republican sallies of the news-papers in favour of the Swiss, and revoked from no other motive than that of preserving ministerial power and emolument through the friendship of Buonaparté; to this order, to this act so worthy of the "*safe* "politicians," we must attribute all the alarm, the uncertainty and embarrassment that have arisen, all the enormous expense that will arise, and all the blood that may flow, from the present hostile preparations.—That Malta, or any other of our conquests, would be justly retained is certain; because France has been, from the day the treaty was concluded, in a continual infraction of it: that war, too, is necessary, and that, in a few months, it will be unavoidable by any other means than that of subjugation to France, no man not blinded by ignorance or baseness will deny: but, that Malta should have been retained, and that the country should be placed in its present situation, from a cause such as we have described, is a consideration that would rouze any people not perfectly reconciled to humiliation and disgrace.—Towards such a people the ministers, provided they can come with peace in their mouths, will not find it difficult to make a satisfactory excuse for their conduct. The most trifling shew of compensation for all this embarrassment and expense will suffice. *Something*, however, must be invented. With a very great majority nothing at all, nothing but the bare name of peace, will be necessary; but there are a few persons, who will ask for a little more, and to obtain this little is, we imagine, the only object which the ministers now have in view. Buonaparté, on the other hand, thinks himself sufficiently generous in pardoning their capitulation at the Cape; yet, *for the sake of keeping them in their places*, 'till he is quite prepared to make an attack upon Ireland or England, he may possibly furnish them with something wherewith to give to their measures the appearance of having had a legitimate and laudable object. To obtain this boon they are now upon their knees before him; and, as they will, in return, make to him any sacrifice of the permanent interests of their country, they will, for this and for the before-mentioned forcible reason, be very likely to obtain it. The precise nature and amount of this boon it would be difficult even to guess at. Some miserable accommodation about Malta will probably take place; some quirking compact, which shall have the sound of dignity with the sense of disgrace; something or other that shall satisfy the selfish, deceive the ignorant, and, by the means of their united noise, silence the loyal, the patriotic, and the wise. Not for their country, therefore, but for themselves are they now negotiating with Buonaparté, seeing that no hope can be entertained of success with Mr. Pitt.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—And, is it with men like these that the Fitzwilliams, the Spencers, the Grenvilles, the Pitts, and the Windhams are to join! Will they assume a share of the responsibility for the retention of the Cape? Will they, too, crouch at the feet of Buonaparté? Will the Moiras and the Greys do this, for the sake of partaking in the honours of the Richmond Park ministry? No. Most assuredly they will not; and, therefore, no change will take place, 'till we receive a blow that shall shake the monarchy itself to the centre. —Lord Melville, indeed, together with the Roses, the Longs, and some few others of that description, are, we believe, tendering their services to the ministry; but, this set is worn out; they are absolutely blown upon by the nation. The ministers want *protection*, and that, they well know, is not to be found from those who are willing to join them. They want *shelter*, which they would not find under the battered, brazen shield of Lord Melville, though backed by his trusty and well-disciplined clan —No; the ministers, the "*safe* politicians," want associates whose talents and whose influence will operate as an *act of oblivion* for all that has been done since the signature of the peace. For this end, they would surrender a part of their power and emoluments; but, if their conduct is to be enquired into, if they are, in good earnest, to be made answerable for the great and numerous evils which they have brought upon their country, then there is no motive for yielding any portion of their places, which they, doubtless, regard as a sort of *hush-money*, given to those who may join them. And, again we ask, will the Fitzwilliams, the Moiras, the Spencers, the Grenvilles, the Pitts, the Windhams, or the Greys, take this hush-money? Will they thus dishonour

and debase themselves in the eyes of their country and of the world? And, were this thing possible, would the people silently witness so shameful, so detestable a juggle? Yes, the people not only might, but they would; for, such is the state of indifference, into which the disgraces of the last eighteen months have reduced them, that we, from our souls believe, that they would not utter a remonstrance, though Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Wight should be yielded to France, and though they themselves should be called upon to pay tribute to Buonaparté. But, to rouze them from this state, this deadly state, is, or ought to be, now the object of those who wish to save the country; and, is this object to be effected by a low selfish juggle, such as we have described? No, never. And we further believe, that a return of the former ministry, to the exclusion of all other persons, would have no very great good effect. It would, indeed, put a stop to degrading concessions, it would revive confidence in the commercial and monied men, it would restore us to some little degree of consequence abroad; but, in *the hearts of the people*, there, "where we must live, or have no life, the "fountain from which our current runs, "or else dries up;" on that most precious, that vital part of the empire, such a change would, we sincerely believe, be very far from producing an effect commensurate with the perils of our situation. To restore this country to her former greatness, to save her from destruction (for she must be great or she must be nothing), the people must be rouzed from their lethargy, they must be animated, their minds must be filled with high and honourable notions, their danger must be placed fairly before them, and they must be made to resolve, not only on a resistance of that danger, but on a removal of the cause of it. Unless this can be accomplished, the country is doomed to sink, not into poverty, insignificance, and contempt, but into absolute slavery. And this, we think cannot be accomplished without an administration, which, in presenting something *new* as well as great, shall excite new hopes. The present ministers can be looked upon as nothing more, they *are* looked upon as nothing more, than the dregs of the old administration; the mere return, therefore, of that old administration, would only tend to revive party animosities, unaccompanied with any one sentiment favourable to the energy of the government or the salvation of the country. A ministry composed of talents, and of great public influence, collected from all the parties that have hitherto existed, taking, as the bond of their union, an inflexible determination to resist the aggrandizement of France, and, as a proof that they themselves are pledged to a real responsibility, bringing the present ministers to a strict account for their conduct; with an administration so formed, so cemented, and so acting, the people would venture their last shilling and their last drop of blood; but, by any change which shall bear the marks of juggle, of selfishness, of mere love of rule, of rank, or of money, they will remain totally unmoved. They will continue obedient and silent, but it will be a cold grudging obedience and a sullen silence.—Next to a ministry, such as we wish to see, an *Opposition* of the same stamp is desirable. The old ground of warfare, between the great and leading men of the country, no longer exists. Though not in place, they are *in parliament*, and there they ought to unite for the purpose of preventing our final destruction. And, why do they not so unite? Why are they *all* silent in their seats, though, out of those seats, every one of them unreservedly declares, that the present measures directly lead to inevitable ruin? Is it that they are all seeking to gratify their own ambition; and, not being able to agree as to the division of the power, is each afraid to stir, lest his movements should favour the views of his rival? Are they actuated by motives like this? Is this the tenure on which Mr. Addington holds his place? Is it thus that they are held in silence and subjection; that they are become the mere automata, the sport, the mockery of a man, by whom, while they look on him with ineffable contempt, they are twirled about on the pivot of their own interests? This were, indeed, a shame, a disgrace, too great to be endured, and we trust that the result will contradict the supposition.

POSTSCRIPT.

We have just heard, that an order has been issued, in France, to prevent Englishmen from going to any of the sea-ports, CALAIS excepted.—This will deprive the Spaniel-like lords of the honour of any longer licking the dust off Buonaparté's shoes,—It may, too, perhaps, mar the fortunes of our female adventurers, who had set their caps at the marauding cut-throat generals.

NOTICES.

The Epistle from Capt. Macnamara's *Newfoundland dog* to Lord Pelham's *Spaniel*, is excellent; but to insert it in the Register would be a departure from our rule.

LONDON,

ON KER PORTER, AND HIS BATTLE OF LODI.

Mr. Cobbett,—As we seem to be upon the point of another contest with our inveterate foe, it is of some consequence to brave the dispositions which our countrymen bring with them to it. On former occasions, an attachment to our country, and a spirit of proud defiance to the enemy, have been cultivated in all popular ways, as necessary preparatives for times of hardship and struggle. Places of public exhibition, the theatres of every description, (not forgetting our old friends Master Astley and Sadler's Wells) have been eager to celebrate deeds of prowess that have adorned the annals of England in former wars. Music and painting have concurred in the same patriotic purpose; songs and pictures, by recording ancient triumphs of British valour, have stimulated the rising generation to equal exertions in the same race of glory. He who could not be expected to do his country service by his musquet or sword, was anxious to give it the benefit of his pen or his pencil. I have no quarrel with the theatres at present, though I find it a little difficult to forget a certain improved edition of Coriolanus exhibited a few years ago. I am glad to see that John Bull has resumed his station upon the boards; long may he hold it! Painting has done fairly in popular exhibitions of Aboukir and Copenhagen. But I am led to trouble you upon the occasion of one exhibition now open to the Public, which I am rather surprized has not yet received some mark of public reprobation, I mean Mr. Ker Porter's exhibition of Buonaparté's triumphs, at the Lyceum.

Sir, that an English artist should not be able to find employment enough for his talents, if they were ten times as great as any this said Mr. Ker Porter has to boast in the glorious deeds of his own countrymen, will be surprizing enough to those who remember the names of Howe, Duncan, St. Vincent, Nelson, Hood, Smyth, Saumarez, Abercromby, Hutchinson, Harris, and an 100 others, whom fame's hundred trumpets can never sufficiently proclaim to the world. In the name of common decency, and common gratitude, why are the artists of this country to quit the fond themes of British glory? Is it a British feeling that inclines them so to do, at a time when every British interest depends upon the elevation of British spirit? Even to wander to foreign transactions at all, though of nations perfectly neutral or indifferent, seems hardly seasonable at the present moment. We want our talents at present for our own purposes; we can't spare the use of them to strangers at a crisis, when every man must help his country in the way that he can; but for a man to select the enemies of his country as the objects of his decoration, and to exhibit, with all the degrading effect which his powers of art enable him to do, the heart-breaking event of the overthrow of his country's minds united in the same generous struggle for the salvation of Europe, argues surely a very unnatural perversion of mind. What are we to expect next!—The glorious victory of Gemappe, or the proud triumphs of Quiberon Bay? Mr. Ker Porter, I presume, is to lay hold of every scene of disaster that has happened to Great Britain or its friends, in order to plant his laurels as thick as they will stick together upon the brow of his favoured hero. And is a British public to encourage such a corruption of taste! such a defect of feeling! such an abandonment of principle! Who that has the heart of an Englishman, can look at such a picture, but with horror at the piece, and indignation at the artist, who is mean enough to lend, or *(possibly)* to *sell* his talents for such a purpose in the capital of the British Empire?

I know that the apology for all this is the cant that is making its way in the world—"that artists are of no country." In a little time, I fear, his Majesty will have no subjects left—so many classes of us are running a race after Anacharsis Cloots, to be citizens of the world and ambassadors of the human race. Royal philosophers are to lay themselves at the feet of French philosophers—for "*philosophers are of no country!*" British merchants are to stock the naval arsenals of France with stores—for "*merchants are of no country!*" Presidents of Royal Academies are to give for their public toast, "peace amongst the artists though war between the countries!"—*for artists, it seems, have no country!* I doubt a little whether we are substantially improved by being so many of us thus sublimed into independent gentlemen—independent of our governments, of our civil relations, and our civil duties. The old system bid as fair for social happiness, in which every man, be he what he might, was conceived to be individually embarked in the fortunes of his country; a friend to its friends, and an enemy to its enemies. I am a little of the mind of a very plain gentleman whom I saw at that same exhibition room, before this odious raree-show was publicly announced. On his enquiring what subject engaged the artist's pencil at that time, and being informed, he expressed some concern, that a British artist should be driven to celebrate

French victories over British allies. The Cicerone flippantly replied, *that* "*artists are of no country*," which he answered by quietly remarking, that "*he who was of no country, deserved to be kicked out of every country.*"

MISOCOSMOPOLIS.

REMARKS ON SWENSKA'S LETTER, WITH REGARD TO THE POLITICS OF FRANCE AND RUSSIA.

SIR,—This excellent letter contains many judicious remarks, and shows much sound judgment and extensive political knowledge; but I differ with him in some few particulars, which I beg leave to state, and I flatter myself that he will concur in my opinion when he shall have maturely considered my arguments.—What he says, p. 420, "*That* "*the revolution has in no wise altered the poli-*" *tics of France; it has changed the actors, and* "*they have adopted new measures,*" is most accurately stated, and it is very evident to every vigilant observer; but I differ from him widely, when he asks, "*can Russia and* "*republican France go mutual shares in the* "*trade and government of the Turkish empire?* "*this is by no means likely.*" Now I think this very likely, and not only likely but inevitable, whenever Great Britain shall have been deprived of the last port she holds in the Mediterranean *.

Oczakow is now known to be a place of no importance. It lies several miles from the channel for ships, which is commanded by Kinburn, and that fortress was before the time he mentions in the hands of the Russians, who demolished Oczakow after they got possession of it.

Your excellent correspondent says; "*It* "*is a known fact, that the Consul did propose* "*to the court of Petersburgh to leave Molda-*" *via, Walachia, Besarabia, Bosnia and Ser-*" *via, to the disposition of Russia and Austria,* "*on condition that France might possess Can-*" *dia, Negropont, and other Greek islands in* "*the Archipelago. But Russia would as soon* "*see France in possession of the channel of Con-*" *stantinople and the Crimea, as suffer her to* "*fix her feet on posts that might soon command* "*the communication between the Black and* "*Mediterranean Seas.*"—If Great Britain leave to the fleets of France the maritime empire of the Mediterranean, (which by putting Malta into the hands of the Order she will do,) and, as Swenska justly observes, "*lay open the only vulnerable part of the Rus-*" *sian frontiers,*" Buonaparté may send a fleet, and destroy the rising navy of Russia in the Black Sea, and do so much other mischief to her new establishments, that have cost much labour and immense sums, as will throw her back many years. Would not Russia prefer an accommodation with the Consul,—and secure the success of a project which ever has been "*pursued* (in his own "words) *with more or less energy by all his* "(Peter the First's) *successors; and is of* "*such importance to the Russian empire that it* "*can never be abandoned* *."

The Consul does not wish to quarrel with Russia. This is most evident. If Russia can have no advantage in quarrelling with the Consul; but on the contrary, by an arrangement with him, can accomplish what she has had in view for such a number of years, and which is considered as "*an essen-*" *tial article in the Russian system,*"—it will be most evident that Russia will not quarrel with France.

Some other plans may be proposed by the Consul, such as letting the Emperor of Russia dispose of Turkey in Europe, and the Archipelago as he pleases; setting his brother on the throne of Constantinople, &c. on condition that France might possess Candia, Corfu, and Egypt. Perhaps, Candia might be relinquished. It has very little connexion with the other Greek islands; it never entered into their confederacy, or declared in favour of Russia. France has always, however, cast a longing eye on Candia. In short, there is matter sufficient to negotiate about, and when the two powers were predetermined to come to a good understanding, negotiators, no abler than those of Amiens, may find a plan to conciliate them. Though, perhaps, each may have at the same time views of future encroachment, and future quarrels may arise.

In the meantime, what is the situation into which this devoted country will be placed! What may not the Consul alone, or in conjunction with Russia attempt

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* Respecting the politics of Russia and France, and the miserable situation of the Ottoman Porte, see "Survey of the Turkish Empire." (Cad. and Dav. 1798) which, though it appeared to be exaggerated at the time the book was written, is now found to be strictly accurate, and even moderate.

* If the French succeed in Italy, they will change their politics with respect to Turkey.—Had the Empress never before turned her thoughts to the liberating Greece, as an object of glory, she must now do it from motives of self-defence, and an interest she had not before.

The vast increase of power which the French will acquire, particularly in the number of sailors, will enable them to annihilate, at their pleasure, the Russian fleet, and its establishments in the ports of the Black Sea.—All the fair views of prosperity in the southern provinces will vanish, and Russia must depend solely on the pleasure of France for the exportation of its products. Survey of the Turkish Empire, 3d edit. p. 428.

against India! What will become of our trade to the Mediterranean! What a naval power will be created! What is to become of our alliance with Russia! Our commerce with her,—our supplies of naval stores! Russia and France united!!! What is to become of the whole continent of Europe! And will there be one single foreign port open to us!—I see no reason why the Consul should not, if he receive an equivalent, leave the Bosphorus to Russia: his superior navy will always put it in his power to dictate to Russia, and the islands may always be attacked. Neither is the Bosphorus, in the opinion of military and naval officers, capable of impeding the passage of a fleet with a strong and favourable wind.

With respect to the trade of the Black Sea, and other parts alluded to, the Russians and French may perfectly agree; the nature of it admits of no rivalship. On the contrary, it will be mutually advantageous to them. France will take Russian products, and furnish the empire with articles it stands in need of. France will supply Turkey or Greece with its manufactures; Russia has none of the same kind. Russia will supply those parts with what France has not: hemp, iron, butter, caviar, &c. Russia will take their wines, dry fruit, &c. which France does not want. More articles might be enumerated, all in a similar predicament.

I could extend these observations much farther, and draw still more consequences; but the outline of the feature of our situation is all that need be drawn. O Britain, how unlike what thou wast! thy case is desperate—thou wilt die of the *Doctor*.—The necessity of our keeping Malta is evident to all but those who would rather give up twenty Maltas than their places, that we may be able to have a fleet in the Mediterranean to prevent a union of interest and a co-operation between France and Russia *par force*, if we cannot otherwise *.

A firm and unqualified declaration of our resolution to keep Malta, would produce another kind of language from the court of St. Petersburgh than equivocating insinuations, but a contrary conduct will utterly put an end to the existence of every power on the continent, and bring swift destruction on this devoted land. What will it then avail us, if, after that, when Russia and France join frontiers, they quarrel! Before that time the name of Britain may no longer exist.

J. B.

ON THE IMPORTANCE OF MALTA.

Sir,—I have read with much pleasure the sentiments of Tyrtæus (Vol. II. p. 838) and others of your Correspondents respecting the retention of Malta. The arguments adduced in favour of that measure are to me conclusive, and I trust they will have their due weight with every well-wisher to his country. May I be permitted, Sir, to communicate, through the medium of your excellent Register, a few additional remarks on the subject of that island.

We are all liable to the prejudice of authority, and when we hear Members of the Senate (and those too men of superior talents and character) making unqualified assertions in that august assembly in questions on which they may naturally be supposed to be well informed, we are apt to give our implicit assent.—You may remember, Sir, that during the discussions of last session, relative to the terms of the treaty, it was maintained, that there seemed no reason why we should *now* more than formerly be particularly desirous of possessing a port in the Mediterranean? Is it possible, Sir, that any one can for a moment view the political map of Europe, without being conscious of the mighty difference operated by the late war? Where is now that extensive continental influence which enabled us to force a neutrality, and which opened to us those ports which are now either possessed by or under the immediate influence of France? Let it be also remembered that we had then no reason to apprehend that system of universal dominion so avowedly pursued by the First Consul, whose colossal strides towards the East can only

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* En donnant à l'isle de Malte, des ports commodes et une situation heureuse, la nature semble l'avoir destinée à être la clef du Levant et l'arbitre de la Méditerranée.———Voyez *Recherches Hist. et Politiques sur Malte*, Paris, chez Cramer. An. VII. page 96.

Quelques vaisseaux qui croiseraient à l'est jusqu'en Sicile, et quelques autres à l'ouest jusqu'en Barbarie, suffiraient pour couper toute communication avec le Levant. Idem. p. 97.

Quelques bâtimens en croisière entre Malte et la Sicile, d'un côté, entre Malte et l'Afrique, de l'autre, empêcheront sans peine les vaisseaux ennemis de franchir cette barrière. Une escadre, stationnée dans les beaux ports de l'isle, commandera les côtes de l'Italie sur la mer Adriatique, où la France possède déjà l'isle importante de *Corfou* [she has now also Elba.] Son influence s'étendra sur l'Archipel: elle pourra donner la loi à *Candie* et aux autres isles Turques. Si elle veut ouvrir une communication avec la *Mer Rouge*, Malte doit être considérée comme l'entrepôt des divers matériaux nécessaires à une telle entreprise. Idem. 98.

La France peut former à Malte des chantiers considérables, terminer le bassin, entrepris par le Grand-Maître Rohan, et en faire un autre. La proximité de l'Albanie, pour le bois de construction, et le bas prix de la main d'œuvre y favorisent la construction, et offrent une bien plus grande économie qu'a Toulon. Idem 102.

be checked by our possessing some advantageous post in the Mediterranean; having then such a post while we retain Malta, a post so arduously and so honourably obtained, shall we, under the influence of fear or false delicacy, tamely resign it to that power whose aim is our utter ruin as a nation.—No, it will be said, we do not resign it to the French Republic, but to the Government of the Order of St. John, under the protection of proper guarantees—I will venture to predict, Sir, that scarcely shall the British troops have reached the channel, before the island is virtually in the possession of France, and no sooner shall a rupture take place than the tri-coloured flag shall once more wave on the towers of La Vallette.—General Maitland, I remember, Sir, ventured to advance, that upon no occasion, not even in time of war, could Malta be considered as of any essential use to Great Britain; alledging, in proof of his assertion, that on the expedition to Egypt the troops destined for that country did not find it necessary to avail themselves of the port of La Vallette. * Had the General been well informed, he would have known that the army under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby not only touched at Malta, but there remained for the space of three weeks, during which time they were reviewed, and got seasonable supplies of vegetables and other provisions; and I believe, Sir, that it is the general opinion of the army, that had they proceeded directly to Alexandria instead of wasting their time in the Bay of Marmorice, it would have been a most fortunate circumstance, as they would then have found it totally unprepared for resistance.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.

PHILO MELITENSIS.

ON LORD ST. VINCENT, AND THE NAVY.
LETTER THE SECOND.

Sir.—When I addressed you last, in a letter dated the 11th of February, which, from the press of other matter, did not appear in your Register till the 19th of March, (see p. 392), I had very little expectation, and still less a wish, that the truth or falsehood of my opinions and predictions should so soon be brought to the test. So convinced was I that the result of such conduct (as was adopted by the present Admiralty) must be, what nearly six weeks of armament has proved, that I do not think I should have ventured to call the public attention to such weakness, had I conceived the moment to be so critical; but have rest satisfied that it would have so soon betrayed itself, that the Board of Admiralty would, from the consciousness of their own incapacity and unpopularity, have withdrawn themselves; or, should that not have been the case, that the minister's eyes would have been opened, and that he would have seen, what has long been the case, though he appears to be unconscious of it, that the Earl of St. Vincent, and his naval assistants at the Admiralty, instead of adding strength to his government, are, in fact, upheld against the almost universal public opinion, by his support alone. Unfortunately, this moment of conviction has not yet arrived, and so much increased alarm do I feel, every day that the present Admiralty continue in office, that I cannot help addressing you upon the subject; and as far as I can, without risking greater danger to the country than I mean to do good, shew how well founded I unfortunately was in the opinion I gave you in my last, when I said, "But should any unfortunate circumstance arise which may require this country to make any sudden exertion and arm for its defence, then will this system prove most fatal, and the full extent of the evil be found, (alas! too late) and we shall have nothing left but to execrate the names of those persons who, by their arbitrary conduct, violence, and partiality, have deprived this country of her greatest and most glorious defence."

Six weeks have now nearly elapsed since his Majesty's Message was sent to both Houses of Parliament, and we may naturally suppose, that the state of things, which led to that Message being sent, was such, that the ministers, and amongst them, the First Lord of the Admiralty, must have seen, that it was possible such a crisis might arise, and, in consequence, that he would have taken every step that could be taken, (without suspicion or alarm) towards preparation for it; but so far from any step being taken, the bare idea of such an event occurring seems never to have been conceived by him, and the scene of hurry, confusion, contradictory orders, and total want of system, that has been exhibited since the evil took place, has been in proportion to the ignorance, arrogance, and presumption of those who preside at and manage the naval department. To detail, what the state of our naval strength is, at this advanced period of our arming, would, I fear, be mischievous in the extreme, and as it is in the power of every man who is sufficiently interested for his country and for himself to ascertain the fact with little trouble; I feel it unnecessary, and alas it is too notorious. But it perhaps may be of use to try and shew some of the steps that have led us to this deplorable state, as by treading them *rapidly* back, it may be possible to recover somewhat of our former strength and energy. I troubled you so much at length in my last, with the detail of the state to which the present Admiralty had brought the whole *civil* department of the navy, by their violence, partiality, and arbitrary conduct, and by their carrying, to such extremity, all the innovations they found introduced by their immediate predecessors, that I will pass over that subject at present, and will advert only to some of the circumstances in the *military* part of the service which have materially led to the miserable state of weakness which we see just now exhibited.

Before the late war broke out, the noble lord, who then presided at the Admiralty, and whose conduct I had occasion to notice, when speaking of the *civil department* of the navy, as having

* See Register, Vol. II. p. 1339.

shewed such strong predilections to old establishments, shewed also the same predilections when conducting the military part of the service. He found an establishment of guard-ships, (which were ships of the line of battle, kept in a state to be fit for sea at an hour's notice, which cruised and formed squadrons of evolution in the summer, but with reduced compliments of men; that is, with a number of men more than sufficient to navigate them, but not to fight them). These ships were attached to the different ports of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Chatham: the men that entered for them knew that they had *no* reason to fear being turned over to other ships, that while the peace lasted their situations and that of their families would be comfortable, and that when a war came, they would be employed in the same ships, and with many of the same officers with whom they entered, and in consequence this service became most popular, and the choicest of our seamen took advantage of it, and the moment that the then Admiralty gave printed intimation to the officers commanding, that they might enter more men than their established complement, they found such numbers offer, that without *advertisement* or *bounty*, and without creating any alarm, (as the public was unacquainted with the circumstances till afterwards) above *double* the number of men were procured for the service (and they to a man volunteers) in the space of one month, from the 1st of December, 1792 to 1st of January, 1793, than that procured in nearly five weeks after the commencement of this armament, by *bounty*, *proclamation*, or as *severe a press* as ever was known; and that at a time that the greater part of our trade was at home. The Earl of Chatham found this establishment of guard-ships, on his coming into office, and he approved, continued, and extended it, and felt its good effects when he had occasion to bring forward an *especial* force at a short notice. On this, as well as all other subjects, facts, particularly notorious facts speak best. The number of guard-ships were sixteen; seven at Portsmouth, six at this port (Plymouth) and three at Chatham; besides these, there were frigates, which partook in a degree of the nature of guard-ships from being stationed to particular districts on the coast for three years, to cruise against smugglers in those districts. This service was popular amongst the seamen from the same causes as the guard-ships, as the men were not shifted about, and at the end of their cruise returned to the same port where their families were, and where they were occasionally allowed to go on shore. On the 2d of December, 1792, the Admiralty ordered the ships in the *harbour* at Portsmouth to Spithead: on the 4th they were there: on the 12th they were joined by the ships from this port (Plymouth) who had sailed in consequence of orders of the same date. These ships' compliements, as guard-ships, amounted to about 5600 men, all of them prime seamen, most of them fit for petty officers. 4500 more men put them at their full war complement, (which one night's press might have done); but we find that much above 6000 men voluntarily entered before the 1st of January, 1793. For no press took place till February, and even a proclamation offering bounty did not appear in the Gazette till the 11th of December. Thus we see 16 sail of the line produced for service, at a time the vote for seamen was but for 16000 men.

With this instance of the wisdom and policy of such a peace establishment before them, and having the power of recurring to the documents in their office to inform themselves of every step that had been then taken, the present Admiralty felt it derogatory to their superior abilities to tread in the steps of any of their predecessors, and therefore their plan for a peace establishment was to be different from all that went before them, and the very *ground-work* of it was *founded* on a *principle* which the noble lord, I have above alluded to, appeared to have decided in his own mind never to have recourse to except in cases of urgent necessity: namely, turning men over from a ship, officers and shipmates that they had been serving in and with, to ships they knew not, officers who were unacquainted with their merits, (if they had any), and shipmates that were strangers. How revolting this must be to the minds of men I need not labour to prove. The British sailors, who have as much sound sense as any body of men whatever, could judge of the necessity of the case, and therefore were never discontented when that necessity was evident, which, in the course of service, they knew must ever occur. But when they saw the peace establishment of the country avowedly formed on this principle, and that the present Admiralty had decided that guard-ships were no longer to exist, as they afforded a degree of ease and comfort to the seamen that was incompatible with their feelings to permit; and that a great number of frigates were to be commissioned, which were to be kept cruising after God knows what—whose crews, on the breaking out of a war, were to be immediately turned over to ships of the line, under new officers; and in consequence of this turn over, to lose all the advantage of prize-money, which sailors look to obtaining in *frigates* at the commencement of a war, which advantage must fall to the new raised men, who would take their places in the frigates; their disgust to the service, and unwillingness to enter into it, increased to the degree which is so unfortunately evident at this critical moment. Since this spirit of innovation and change first shewed itself at the Admiralty, nearly seven years ago, it has increased most rapidly, and amongst other things, in which the present Board has far outstripped their immediate predecessors, has been in the discouraging all following (as it is called) in the navy; that is, the attachment which junior officers felt to their superiors who had brought them up; of men to officers with whom they had served; conceiving that they make the whole thereby more dependent on the Admiralty; and therefore, few captains, now appointed to fit out ships, are allowed to chuse any of their officers, except they have great interest indeed; though they may have obtained men by their own personal interest and exertion, and not unfrequently by their own money; yet these men are taken from them without the smallest hesitation or considera-

tion: added to this, the coarse and unofficer-like behaviour they meet at the Admiralty, when attending in person, and by letter, when they have occasion to correspond, together with the arbitrary disposition manifested by that Board in the frequency of their courts-martial, ordered on persons of the highest rank and character on the most trivial occasions. For instance, in the cases of Sir William Parker, Lieutenant-General Innes of the marines, and Captain Ferrier, &c. from which practice they have not been deterred by, or evinced the least shame at, the strong censure implied on the prosecutors, which has, in every instance, been marked by singularly strong expression used in the sentences the courts-martial have come to. This and similar conduct has disgusted the *military* part of the service as much as, I conceive, I have before proved the civil part to have been. The consequence is too lamentably evident in the state our home fleet just now is in.—The only chance then that I see for salvation to our naval service, and that it will be in time to save it I will not presume to assert, is in a total change of the Admiralty, and that they may be succeeded by persons who shall unequivocally state and vow that it is their conviction that the present disjointed and palsied state of our navy, both in the military and civil departments, arises from the innovations, changes, and experiments that have been introduced in it for some time past, and that it is their determination to do away and remove all such, beginning with General Bentham's absurd and extravagant establishment, and that every thing shall revert to the state in which they stood in the year 1794. When every man knew what his responsibility was, and what his duty was, and when that noble lord quitted the Admiralty, who had brought our fleet forward with such rapidity and effect on the Spanish and Russian armaments, and in the first year of the late war, as I stated in my former letter, and which you referred to in your very able Summary of Politicks the week before the last. A change of men at the Admiralty, without such a change of measures as I have pointed out, accompanied by a degree of liberality unpractised by the present Board, will, I hesitate not to say, be utterly useless.—Yours's,

AN ENGLISHMAN.

Plymouth, April 10, 1803.

NON RESIDENCE OF THE CLERGY.

A Bill to amend and render more effectual the Laws relating to Spiritual Persons holding of Farms, and for enforcing the Residence of Spiritual Persons on their Benefices. [As amended by the Committee.]

WHEREAS many of the provisions of an Act, made in the 21st year of the reign of his Majesty King Henry the 8th, intituled, "*Spiritual Persons "abridged from having Pluralities of Livings, and from "taking of Ferms, &c.*" and other the laws now in force relating to spiritual persons residing on their benefices, have been found inconvenient; and it is expedient that certain of the provisions of the said Act should be repealed, and that other provisions should be made in lieu thereof: and that the said Act and laws aforesaid should be amended, and more effectual provisions made for enforcing the residence of spiritual persons on their benefices, and protecting spiritual persons from vexatious prosecutions;—*May it therefore please your Majesty*, —I. THAT it may be enacted; and be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from and after the passing of this Act, every spiritual person who shall before the passing of this Act have incurred any pecuniary penalty or penalties, or any forfeiture or forfeitures under the said recited Act, and against whom no action, suit, bill, plaint, or information shall have been brought in respect thereof under the said Act, shall be and is hereby indemnified, freed, and discharged from the same, any thing in the said recited Act to the contrary thereof notwithstanding; and all contracts, agreements, and leases, made by words or otherwise before the passing of this Act, by any spiritual person, either by himself or any other to or for his use, which if made after this Act would, according to the provisions thereof, be good and valid, shall notwithstanding the said recited Act or any Act or law or laws to the contrary, be and be deemed to be as good and valid in the law to all intents and purposes as if the same had been made after the passing of this Act.— II. AND *be it further enacted*, that immediately from and after the passing of this Act, it shall be lawful for any person or persons against whom any original suit, writ, action, bill, plaint, or information shall have been sued out, commenced, or prosecuted, before the passing of this Act, for any pecuniary penalty or penalties, or any forfeiture or forfeitures incurred or alledged to be under the said recited Act, to apply to the court in which such original writ, suit, action, bill, plaint, or information shall have been sued out, commenced, or prosecuted, if such court shall be sitting, or to any judge of any such court when not sitting, for an order that such writ, suit, action, bill, plaint, or information shall be discontinued, upon payment of the sum of ten pounds, in every case where a verdict shall be obtained, together with the costs; and where no verdict shall have been obtained, upon payment of the costs incurred up to the time of such application being made, all such costs to be taxed as between attorney and client, according to the practice of such court, and every such court or judge is hereby authorized and required upon such application, to make such order as aforesaid; and upon the making such order, and payment of such costs as aforesaid, such writ, suit, action, bill, plaint, or information, shall be forthwith discontinued, and in every case until such application shall be made as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for the plaintiff or plaintiffs in any such original writ, suit, action, bill, plaint, or information, to proceed therein as if this Act, or an Act passed in the 41st of his present Majesty, intituled, "*An Act to "stay until the 25th day of March, 1802, proceedings in "actions under the statute of King Henry the 8th for "abridging Spiritual Persons from having Pluralities of "Livings, and from taking of Ferms,*" had not been passed; any thing in this Act or the said last recited Act to the contrary thereof notwithstanding, —III. AND *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act, it shall be lawful for any spiritual person to take to farm to himself, or to any person or persons to his use, by lease, grant, words, or otherwise, for term of life, for term of years, or at will, any messuage, mansion, or dwelling house, with or without orchards, gardens, and other appurtenances, although not in any city,

borough, or town, any thing in the said recited Act or any other Act to the contrary thereof notwithstanding; and it shall also be lawful for any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, not having any sufficient or convenient glebe or demesne lands annexed to or in right of or by reason of his benefice or cure, or for any stipendiary curate, with the consent or approbation of the bishop of the diocese signified in writing, to take to ferm to himself or to any person or persons to his use, any farm or farms, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, that may under all the circumstances appear to such bishop proper to be taken, held or occupied by any such spiritual person, for the better support and maintenance of himself or family, without being subject or liable to any pains, penalties, or forfeitures under the said first recited Act or any other Act by reason thereof, any thing therein contained to the contrary notwithstanding: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend to authorize any non-residence of any such spiritual person as aforesaid.—IV. And *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for any spiritual person or persons, by himself or themselves or any other to his or their use, to have, hold, use, or occupy, in ferm or otherwise, any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, demised, leased, or granted, or in anyway belonging to such spiritual person or persons, as the property or estate of such spiritual person or persons; or to take, purchase, receive, or hold, as the property and estate of such spiritual person, any lease or leases, for life or lives, or for term or terms of years absolute or determinable on any life or lives, or to take any annual rent or other annual advantage or profit by occasion of any lease or term of any manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, the property or estate of any such spiritual person or persons belonging to him or them either in his or their own right, or in the right of any other person or persons, or in right or by reason of his or their having or holding any spiritual dignity or benefice, or so taken, purchased, received, or held as aforesaid, as the property or estate of such spiritual person, without being subject to any pains, penalties, or forfeitures whatever under the said first recited Act or any other Act, any thing therein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend to authorize any spiritual person, having or holding any benefice, parsonage, vicarage, donation, or perpetual curacy, or serving a stipendiary curacy, to take, receive, or hold any such manors, lands, tenements, or hereditaments, after the passing of this Act, for the purpose of occupying or to occupy the same, for the cultivation thereof, or procuring profit therefrom, by himself or any bailiff or bailiffs, or servant or servants for his use, unless by the consent or approbation of the bishop as aforesaid, for such purposes as aforesaid.—V. And *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for any spiritual person, by himself or by any other for him or to his use, to bargain, and buy to sell again for any lucre, gain, or profit, any manner of cattle that may be necessary, proper, or convenient to be bought, sold, kept, or maintained by such spiritual person, or any other person for him or to his use, for the occupation, manuring, improving, pasturage, or profit of any farms, lands, tenements, or hereditaments that may under and by virtue of any law or laws now in force, or under any of the provisions of this Act, be lawfully held and occupied, possessed or enjoyed by such spiritual person, or any other for him or to his use, without being subject to any pains, penalties, or forfeitures by reason thereof, under the said first recited Act or any other Act, or any thing therein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding: provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend or be construed to extend to authorize any such spiritual person to buy or sell any cattle as aforesaid, in person, in any market, fair, or place of public sale.—VI. And *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for any spiritual person having or holding any vicarage or perpetual cure, or for the stipendiary curate thereof, to occupy, by himself or by any other to his use in ferm, or the lease or grant of any person or persons, the impropriate parsonage, rectory, or vicarage, or any part thereof, of the parish of which such spiritual person shall be the vicar, or perpetual curate or stipendiary curate, or any part or parts thereof, or to take any profit or rent out of any such farm, without being subject to any pains, penalties, or forfeitures by means thereof, under the said first recited Act, any thing therein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.—VII. And *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act no lease or leases of any glebe or demesne lands, or of any tythes belonging to any spiritual person as annexed to or in right of any spiritual dignity or benefice, or donative or perpetual curacy, and leased or to be leased to any person or persons whomsoever by such spiritual person, shall be vacated or made void, or be deemed or construed to be void, nor shall the incumbent for the same forfeit any profit of his said dignity, benefice, donative, or perpetual curacy, by reason of the non-residence of any such spiritual person, in any case where such spiritual person shall be exempt from any pecuniary penalties on account of such non-residence, under any of the provisions of the said first recited Act, or of any other Act, or this Act; any thing in an Act passed in the 13th year of the reign of her late Majesty Queen Elizabeth, intituled "An Act touching Leases of Benefices and "other Ecclesiastical Livings with Cure," or any other Act or Acts, contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.—VIII. Provided *always, and be it further enacted*, that nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to extend, to deprive any spiritual person of any privilege, indemnity, or permission, as to the taking, having, or holding any ferms or lands to which any such spiritual person was or would be entitled unto, under any of the provisions of the said recited Act of his late Majesty King Henry the 8th.—IX. And *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act, so much of the said first recited Act as imposes the penalty of ten pounds, in the said Act mentioned, on any spiritual person therein described, who shall not keep residence on one of his dignities, prebends, or benefices, but absent himself wilfully by the space of one month together, or by the space of two months to be accounted at several times in any one year, shall be and the same is hereby repealed; and that from and after the passing of this Act, every spiritual person being beneficed with any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or any perpetual curacy, who shall without sufficient cause, as in the said first recited Act, or under an Act passed in the 25th year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, "An Act that "every Judge of the High Courts may have One

" Chaplain beneficed with Cure," or of another Act passed in the 28th year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " The Bill for Non-resi- " dence of Spiritual Men and their Benefices," or of another Act passed in the 33d year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " An Act for " the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and " others to have Chaplains," is specified, or such other sufficient cause as would exempt such spiritual person from any of the pains, penalties, and forfeitures under the said recited Acts, for any non-residence, and who shall not have any such licence as is in this Act mentioned for that purpose, wilfully absent himself for the space of three months together, or to be accounted at several times in any one year, and make his residence and abiding at any other place or places by such time, shall when such absence shall exceed such period as aforesaid, and not exceed six months, forfeit and pay one-fourth of the annual value (deducting therefrom all actual outgoings except any stipend paid to any curate) of the parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy from which he shall so absent himself as aforesaid, and when such absence shall exceed six months and not exceed eight months, one-third of such annual value; and when such absence shall exceed eight months, one-half of such annual value; and when such absence shall have been for the whole of the year, two-thirds of such annual value; to be recovered by action of debt, bill, plaint, or information in any of his Majesty's Courts of Record at Westminster, or the Courts of Great Sessions in Wales, wherein no essoign, privilege, protection, or wager of law, or more than one, imparlance, shall be allowed; and the whole of every such penalty or forfeiture shall go and be paid to the person or persons who shall inform and sue for the same, together with such costs of suit as shall be allowed according to the practice of the court in which such action shall be brought.—X. PROVIDED ALSO, *and be it further enacted*, that no spiritual person being beneficed with any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, who shall have made his residence and abided at his said benefice for the space of one whole year, without wilful absence therefrom for any longer time than three months together, or in the whole at several times, shall be liable to any of the pains, penalties, or forfeitures in this Act or the said recited Act contained, for any previous non-residence.—XI. AND *be it further enacted*, that no spiritual person having or holding any office, which under any of the provisions of the said first-recited Act, or of an Act passed in the 25th year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " An Act that every Judge of the High Courts " may have one Chaplain beneficed with Cure," or of another Act passed in the 28th year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " The Bill " for Non-residence of Spiritual Men and their " Benefices," or of another Act, passed in the 33d year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " An Act for the Chancellor of the Duchy of " Lancaster and others to have Chaplains," would exempt such spiritual persons from residence or from the penalties and forfeitures in the said Act contained for non-residence, or actually serving as a chaplain of the House of Commons, or as clerk of his Majesty's closet, or as a deputy clerk thereof, during the time of his attendance, or as a chaplain general of his Majesty's forces, or brigade chaplain on foreign service, or chaplain on board any of his Majesty's ships, or in any of his Majesty's garrisons, or chaplain of his Majesty's corps of artillery, doing duty therewith, or as chaplain in any British factory, or in the household of any British ambassador or public minister residing abroad, or as principal surrogate or official in any ecclesiastical court of any diocese, or as prebendary or canon, minor canon, or vicar choral, or priest vicar, or other public officer, in any cathedral or collegiate church, during the times for which they may be required by the canons or local statutes thereof to reside at such cathedral or collegiate church, and actually reside and perform duty at the same, or as a preacher or reader in any of the inns of court or at the rolls, or as bursar, dean, vice president or public tutor, or other public officer, in any college or hall in either of the Universities of Oxford or Cambridge, during the period for which he may respectively be required by reason of any such office to perform the duties of any such office, and actually performs the duties of the same, or as public librarian or public registrar, or proctor, or public orator or other public officer, in either of the said universities, during the period for which he may respectively be required by reason thereof to perform the duties of any such office, and actually performs the duties of the same, or as librarian at the British Museum or of Sion College, or as fellow of any college in either of the Universities, during the time for which he may be required to reside by any charter or statute, and actually resides therein, or as warden or provost of Eton or Winchester College, or fellow or schoolmaster in the same, or as schoolmaster in Westminster School, or as professor of Gresham College during the terms in which he may be required to read lectures therein, and shall actually read lectures in the same; nor any person holding a dignity, donative, or perpetual cure, in conjunction with a benefice, or donative or perpetual cure, during the times that he is residing upon either the dignity, benefice, or donative, or the perpetual cure, or one of them, shall be liable to any of the pains, penalties, or forfeitures in the said first recited Act or this Act contained, for or on account of any non-residence on any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, any thing in the said Act or this Act contained to the contrary notwithstanding.—XII. AND *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act no person or persons mentioned in an Act, passed in the 28th year of the reign of King Henry the 8th, intituled, " An Act " for Non-residence of Spiritual Men on their " Benefices," and entitled under the provisions of the said Act, to the privilege and liberty of non-residence until after and above the age of forty years, shall be by reason of any of the provisions of the said Act, entitled to enjoy the privilege and liberty of non-residence after or above the age of twenty-six years; any thing in the said Act contained to the contrary notwithstanding.—XIII. AND *be it further enacted*, that no penalty and costs incurred by reason of any non-residence shall be levied by execution against the body of any spiritual person, who shall continue to hold any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual cure, out of the profits of which, the same can be levied by sequestration. XIV. AND *be it further enacted*, that from and after the passing of this Act it shall be lawful for the several bishops respectively, in that part of the united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland called England, upon application made for that purpose by petition in writing, or otherwise, by any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage or vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, locally situated within their respective dioceses, upon such proofs as to any facts stated in any such petition as any

such bishop may think necessary, or if he shall require it, by affidavit made before any surrogate or master extraordinary in chancery (which oath any surrogate or master extraordinary in chancery is hereby authorized and required to administer, of such spiritual persons, in case the same shall be required by the Bishop to whom any such petition is presented, or application made under this Act) to grant in every case where on due consideration of all the circumstances stated in any such application and verified to the satisfaction of the bishop as aforesaid, such bishop shall in his discretion think it fit to grant the same, a license in writing under his hand, in such cases as are hereinafter enumerated, to such persons in relation to the residence or non-residence of such spiritual persons on their respective benefices, for the purpose of exempting such persons from any pecuniary penalties or forfeitures; under and subject nevertheless to the regulations, provisions, and restrictions in this Act contained.—XV. AND *be it further enacted*, That it shall be lawful for any bishop to grant licenses to any spiritual persons having any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy within his diocese, to reside out of the proper house of residence, or out of the parish, as the case may appear to such bishop to require, if upon the consideration of all the circumstances of any such case, such bishop shall in his discretion think the same fit and proper, in the several cases hereinafter-mentioned (that is to say) to any spiritual person who shall be prevented from residing in the proper house of residence, or in the parish, by actual illness or infirmity of body of himself, or wife or child making part of and residing with him as part of his family; and also to any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, wherein there shall be no house of residence, or where the house of residence shall be unfit for the residence of such ecclesiastical person, such unfitness not being occasioned by any negligence, default, or other misconduct of such ecclesiastical person; and also to any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, and having or possessing or occupying in the parish of such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual cure, any mansion or messuage belonging to himself or any relative, to reside in such mansion or messuage, such spiritual person keeping the house of residence in good, sufficient, and tenantable repair and condition, to the satisfaction of the bishop; and also for any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy of small value, and serving as a stipendiary curate elsewhere, with the license of the bishop of his diocese, and providing for the serving of such his parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, to the satisfaction of the bishop of his diocese; and also to any master or usher of any endowed school duly licensed by the bishop, and actually employed in teaching therein; and to any master or preacher of hospitals or incorporated charitable foundation, during the period for which he may be required to reside by any charter or statute of any such hospital or incorporated charitable foundation, or by any other lawful authority in the same; or to any person holding any endowed lectureship, or endowed chapelry, or to the trustees of Lord Crewe's charity, during the times of their personal attendance on the duties of their office: Provided always, That for any such license, the party obtaining the same shall not pay more to the secretary or officer of the bishop than the sum of ten shillings, exclusive of any such stamp as may be required by law: Provided always, that if any spiritual person applying to any bishop for any such license, shall think himself aggrieved by the refusal thereof, it shall be lawful for such spiritual person to appeal to the archbishop of the province, who shall forthwith either by himself or some commissioner or commissioners appointed from among the bishops of his province, under his hand, make or cause to be made enquiry into the same, and to confirm such refusal, or grant a license under this Act, as shall seem just and proper; provided nevertheless, that the party appealing, shall give security to the bishop for the payment of such reasonable expenses occasioned by the appeal, as the archbishop or his commissioner or commissioners shall award.—XVI. AND *be it further enacted*, That from and after the passing of this Act, it shall be lawful for any such bishop as aforesaid, in any cases not herein before enumerated, in which under all the circumstances of any such case such bishop shall think it expedient to grant to any such spiritual person a license to reside out of the proper house of residence, or out of the parish, as the case may appear to such bishop to require: Provided always, That in every such case the nature and special circumstances thereof, and the reasons that have induced such bishop to grant such license as aforesaid, shall be transmitted to the Archbishop of the province to which such bishop shall belong, who shall forthwith by himself or by some commissioner or commissioners appointed for that purpose from among the bishops of such province, by writing under his hand, which commissioner or commissioners is and are thereupon authorized to take upon himself or themselves the execution of the said commission, examine into such case, and make such enquiries as to any particulars relating thereto as such archbishop or commissioner or commissioners so appointed as aforesaid may think necessary, and shall thereupon allow or disallow such license, in the whole or in part, or make any alteration therein as to the period for which the same may have been granted, or otherwise, as to such archbishop or commissioner or commissioners shall seem fit; and no such license shall be good, valid, or effectual under this Act, for any purpose whatever, unless it shall have been so allowed and approved by such archbishop or commissioner or commissioners on his behalf; such allowance thereof being signified by the signing thereof by such archbishop; provided always, that it shall not be necessary in such license to specify the cause of granting thereof; provided also, that no license granted by any bishop or archbishop under this Act shall be made void by the death or removal of the bishop or archbishop granting thereof, but the same not having been revoked shall be and remain good and valid notwithstanding any such death or removal, unless the same shall be revoked by the next or any succeeding bishop or archbishop; provided also, that any spiritual person may appeal against any such revocation by the bishop, in like manner as is hereinbefore directed in case of any refusal of any license: Provided also, that the respective archbishops may in their respective dioceses of which they are bishops, grant licenses under the provisions and regulations in this act contained, in all cases in which any licenses may be granted by any bishop under this Act, either by his own authority or with the allowance and approval of the archbishop as aforesaid; provided also, that it shall be lawful for any such archbishop to order

and direct such reasonable fees and charges to be paid by any such spiritual person appealing as aforesaid in respect of any such proceedings as aforesaid, as he shall in his discretion think fit: Provided always, that in every case when any costs and charges directed by such archbishop or bishop as aforesaid, shall remain unpaid for the period of twenty-one days after demand thereof left at the usual or last place of abode of the perfon liable to the payment, it shall be lawful for such bishop or archbishop respectively to cause the same to be recovered by sequestration of the profits of the parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy of such spiritual person as aforesaid, and which sequestration such archbishop or bishop are respectively hereby empowered to issue. —XVII. PROVIDED *always, and be it further enacted*, That it shall be lawful for any bishop or archbishop who shall have granted any such license as aforesaid, or any successor of any such bishop or archbishop, to revoke any such license in any case in which it may appear to him proper and expedient to revoke the same: Provided also, that no license granted under this Act shall continue in force for more than two years from the granting thereof.—XVIII. AND *be it further enacted*, That every such bishop to whom any such petition shall be presented, and who shall grant or revoke any license founded thereon, shall and he is hereby required to cause a copy of such license or revocation to be filed in the registry of the diocese within which such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, in respect whereof any such license shall be granted or revocation made, shall be locally situate, with the register of such diocese; and an alphabetical list of such licenses and revocations shall be made out by such register, and entered in a book, and kept for the inspection of all persons upon payment of the sum of two shillings, and no more; and a copy of every such license and revocation shall be delivered to the churchwardens of the parish within one month after the grant of such license or revocation thereof; and a copy of the same shall likewise be publickly read at the visitation of the archdeacon of the archdeaconry within which the parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, in respect whereof the license shall have been granted or revocation made, shall be locally situate, immediately next succeeding the granting or revocation thereof.—XIX. PROVIDED *also, and be it further enacted*, That every archbishop, who shall confirm in manner directed by this act any license or licenses in any case or cases not enumerated in this Act, or who shall grant any such license in his own diocese, shall annually on or before the thirtieth day of January in each year, transmit to his Majesty's privy council a list of all such licenses so confirmed or granted respectively as aforesaid, in the year ending on the last day of December preceding such thirtieth day of January, and shall in every such list specify the reasons transmitted to him by the bishops of the several dioceses for granting the said licenses, and which have induced him to confirm the same, and also the reasons which have induced him to grant any such license as aforesaid within his own diocese; and it shall be lawful for his Majesty's privy council, by any order made for that purpose, to revoke and annul any such license, and his Majesty's privy council shall in such case transmit or cause to be transmitted to the archbishop, who shall have confirmed or granted such license, the order for the revocation or annulling thereof, who shall thereupon cause a copy of every such order made in relation to any license confirmed by him as aforementioned, to be transmitted to the bishop of the diocese in which such license shall have been granted, who shall thereupon cause the copy of the said order to be filed in the registry of such diocese, and a copy likewise to be delivered to the churchwardens in manner herein before directed as to licenses granted and revocations made by any such archbishop or bishop under this act; and every such archbishop shall cause a copy of every such order made in relation to any such license as aforesaid granted by him in his own diocese, to be in like manner filed in the registry of his diocese, and a copy also to be delivered to the churchwarden of the parish to which such license shall relate, in manner before mentioned.—XX. *And be it further enacted*, That it shall be lawful for any spiritual person to whom any such license shall be granted, and against whom any action shall hereafter during the continuance of this act be brought for any penalty or forfeiture under the said recited act, by reason of any non-residence, or any matter or thing relating thereto, to plead such license in bar of any such action; and if the plaintiff in such suit or action shall be nonsuit, or shall discontinue any such suit or action after any plea of license shall have been pleaded thereto under this act, then and in such case the defendant in such suit or action shall have full costs of suit; and if in any such suit or action a verdict shall be given for the defendant, the defendant shall have treble costs, and have the like remedy for the same as any defendant hath in other cases to recover costs by law.—XXI. AND *be it further enacted*, That nothing in this act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to exempt any person or persons from any canonical or ecclesiastical censures, or affect any proceedings that shall hereafter be instituted in any ecclesiastical court, in order to cause the same to be inflicted in relation to the non-residence of any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, not being duly licensed according to the provisions of this act to be absent therefrom, nor having any other lawful cause of absence: Provided always, that from and after the passing of this act, no such censures by reason of non-residence not exceeding three months shall be in force, nor shall any proceeding be admitted in any ecclesiastical court against any such spiritual person for such non-residence not exceeding three months, at the suit of any person or persons other than the bishop or archdeacon only of the diocese and archdeaconry within which such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, in respect whereof such non-residence shall have taken place, shall be locally situated; any thing in any law or laws, or ecclesiastical canon or canons, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.—XXII. AND *be it further enacted*, That in every case in which it shall appear to any such bishop as aforesaid, that any spiritual person having or holding any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, and not being licensed according to this act to be absent therefrom, nor having any other lawful cause of absence from the same, does not sufficiently reside on such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, it shall be lawful for such bishop to issue or cause to be issued a monition to such spiritual person, forthwith to proceed to and reside thereon, and perform the duties thereof, and to make a return to such monition within a certain number of days after the issuing thereof; so as that in every such case there shall

be thirty days between the time of delivering such monition to such spiritual person, or leaving the same at his then usual place of abode, or last place of abode, if not there to be found, and with the officiating minister or one of the churchwardens, and the time specified in such monition for the return thereof; and every such monition shall immediately on the issuing thereof be filed in the registry, and open for inspection on the payment of two shillings and no more; and the spiritual person to whom any such monition shall be sent under this act, shall within the time specified for that purpose make a return thereto; and it shall be lawful for the bishop to whom any such return shall be made to require such return, or any facts contained therein, to be verified by the oath of such spiritual person, or others, to be taken before some Surrogate or Master Extraordinary in Chancery, which oath any such Surrogate or Master Extraordinary in Chancery is hereby authorized and required to administer, on application being made for that purpose; and in every case where no such return shall be made, or where such return shall not state such reasons as shall be deemed satisfactory by such bishop for the non-residence of the spiritual person to whom such monition shall have been sent as aforesaid, or where the same or any of the facts contained therein shall not be so verified upon oath as aforesaid, when the same shall have been required; then and in such case it shall be lawful for such bishop to issue an order in writing under his hand and seal, to require such person to proceed to and reside as aforesaid, within thirty days after such order in writing, or a copy thereof shall have been delivered or left in like manner as is hereinbefore required as to monitions; and in case of non-compliance it shall be lawful for such bishop to sequester the profits of such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy of such spiritual person as aforesaid, until such monition shall be complied with, or such sufficient reasons for non-residence stated and proved as aforesaid, and to direct any order to be made for that purpose under his hand, the application of such profits, after deducting the necessary expenses of serving the cure, either in the whole or in such proportion as he shall think fit, in the first place, to the payment of such reasonable expenses as shall have been incurred in relation to such monition and sequestration, and in the next place towards the augmentation or improvement of any such parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, or the house of residence thereof, or any of the buildings and appurtenances thereof, or towards the improvement of any of the glebe or demesne lands thereof, or may order and direct the same, or any portion thereof, to be paid to the governors of the bounty of Queen Anne for the augmentation of the maintenance of the poor clergy, to be applied for the purpose of such augmentation as such bishop shall in his discretion under all the circumstances think fit and expedient; and it shall also be lawful for any such bishop to remit any such spiritual person any part or proportion of such sequestered profits, or cause the same or any part thereof that shall have been paid or directed to be paid to such governors of Queen Anne's bounty to be repaid to such spiritual person, which repayment the said governors are hereby authorized and required upon an order under the hand of any such bishop to make out of any money then in their hands, or if no money shall then be in their hands, out of the next money that shall come to their hands, in any case in which by reason of the subsequent obedience of any such spiritual person to any such monition, or the stating and proving such sufficient reasons as aforesaid, such bishop shall think the same proper: Provided always, that when any such spiritual person shall think himself aggrieved by reason of any such sequestration, it shall be lawful for any such spiritual person, within fifteen days after the making any order for any such sequestration as aforesaid, and upon notice thereof, the bishop to appeal to the archbishop of the province to which such bishop shall belong, who shall forthwith either by himself, or some commissioner or commissioners appointed from among the bishops of his province for that purpose under his hand and seal, make or cause to be made due enquiry into the same, and make such order therein or relating thereto, or to the profits that shall be so sequestered as aforesaid, for the return to such spiritual person of the same or any part thereof, or otherwise, as shall under all the circumstances of the case appear to such archbishop or his commissioner or commissioners to be just and proper: Provided always, that the party so appealing shall give security to the bishop for the payment of such reasonable expenses occasioned by the appeal as the archbishop or his commissioner or commissioners shall award: Provided also, that no such order for any sequestration shall be put in force during such appeal as aforesaid, and until the same is determined.—XXIII. PROVIDED *also, and be it further enacted*, That every spiritual person to whom any such monition or order in writing shall be sent as aforesaid under this act, who shall be at the time of the issuing thereof absent from residence in his parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, contrary to the provisions of the said first recited act and this act, but who shall in obedience to such monition or order forthwith return to due residence, and the profits of whose parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, shall by reason of such return not be sequestered, shall nevertheless pay all costs, charges, and expenses incurred by reason of the issuing and serving such monition or order; to be levied as any cost may be levied on any spiritual person by any archbishop or bishop under any of the provisions of this act.—XXIV. AND *be it further enacted*, That all contracts or agreements made after the passing of this act, for the letting of houses of residence belonging to any parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, to which any spiritual person shall be required by order of the bishop as aforesaid, to proceed and reside therein, shall be null and void; and any person continuing to hold the same after the day on which the said spiritual person shall be directed by the said order to reside therein, shall forfeit the sum of ten pounds for every day he shall continue to hold the same, to be recovered and applied in like manner as the penalties for non-residence, are directed to be recovered and applied by the provisions of this act.—XXV. AND *be it further enacted*, That where any such house of residence is occupied under a contract or agreement made before the passing of this act, the same may be held and occupied without subjecting the party holding and occupying the same to any penalty; and sequestration shall not issue for disobedience to the order of the bishop, for three calendar months after the day on which possession ought to be taken by the spiritual person, in obedience to the order of the bishop, at the expiration of which time the sequestration shall issue; and the party continuing to hold the house of resi-

dence shall forfeit the sum of ten pounds for every day he shall hold the same, after the expiration of the said three months; the said penalties to be recovered and applied in like manner as the penalties for non-residence are directed to be recovered and applied by the provisions of this act.—XXVI. AND *be it further enacted*, That if any clerk shall continue under such sequestration for non-residence for the space of three years, the parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual cure, in relation whereto the said non-residence shall have been committed, shall become *ipso facto* void; and the patron shall present or nominate another clerk thereto, as if the same had been avoided by the natural death or resignation of the party.—XXVII. PROVIDED *always, and be it further enacted*, That where any action, suit, bill, plaint, or information shall have been commenced or brought against any spiritual person to whom any monition shall be sent as aforesaid before the issuing thereof, for any penalty or forfeiture incurred by reason of the non-residence of any such spiritual person before the issuing of such monition, then and in such case the bishop sending such monition as aforesaid, shall upon notice of such action or suit, cause to be retained the profits or so much of the profits of the parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy, in respect whereof such action or suit shall be brought and monition issued as aforesaid, and which may under this act be sequestered as aforesaid, as will be sufficient to satisfy any penalty or penalties for which any such action or suit shall be brought, together with such costs as the plaintiff or plaintiffs therein may be entitled to, if any; and shall if a verdict shall be given for the plaintiff or plaintiffs in such action, and final judgment obtained therein, after deducting all the charges which shall have been occasioned by the said sequestration to the bishop or any person or persons who shall have acted therein under his authority, pay or cause to be paid to such plaintiff or plaintiffs the sum or sums of money that shall be recovered in any such action or suit to the plaintiff or plaintiffs therein: Provided always, that if at the time of filing any such monition as aforesaid, no action for any such penalty or forfeiture shall have been already commenced against any such spiritual person, then and in such case no such action, suit, bill, plaint, or information shall be afterwards brought for any penalty or forfeiture incurred by reason of any non-residence of such spiritual person before the issuing of such monition, or during any proceedings that may be had under such monition; and if any such action or suit shall be so commenced, the defendant therein may plead in bar thereof, that such a monition as aforesaid has issued in respect of the same parsonage, vicarage, donative, or perpetual curacy.—XXVIII. AND *be it further enacted*, That from and after the passing of this act, no oath shall be required of or taken by any vicar, in relation to residence on his vicarage; any law, custom, constitution, or usage, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.—XXIX. AND *be it further enacted*, That from and after the passing of this act all and every the clauses, provisions, penalties, and forfeitures, in the said first recited act and this act contained, in relation to residence on benefices, or to any other matters and things relating thereto, shall extend and be deemed and construed to extend to all parsonages with cure, vicarages, donatives, perpetual curacies, and all parochial chapelries, exempt as well as not exempt, and all peculiars, as fully and amply to all intents and purposes as if the same had been and were in the said first recited act or were in this act particularly mentioned and specified; any thing in any act or acts, law or laws, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding.—XXX. AND *be it further enacted*, That every archbishop, bishop, and archdeacon, within the limits of whose province, diocese, or jurisdiction respectively any such parsonage with cure, vicarage, donative, perpetual curacy, or parochial chapelry, exempt as well as not exempt, or peculiar, shall be locally situate, or where any such parsonage, vicarage, donative, perpetual curacy, or parochial chapelry, exempt as well as not exempt, or peculiar, shall be within the limits of more than one province, diocese, or jurisdiction aforesaid, or shall be situate between any two or more provinces, dioceses, or jurisdictions, then the archbishop or bishop to whose province or diocese the parish church, such parsonage, vicarage, donative, perpetual curacy, or parochial chapelry, exempt as well as not exempt, or peculiar, shall be nearest in local situation, shall have, use, and exercise all the powers, authorities, and jurisdictions necessary for the full execution of all the provisions of this act, and for enforcing the same, as fully and amply in every respect as if such parsonages, vicarages, donatives, perpetual curacies, or parochial chapelries, exempt as well as not exempt, or peculiar, were *eand fide* subject in every respect to such jurisdiction, and as if the same had been and were specified in all the clauses of this act; any thing in any act or acts, law or laws, usage or usages, to the contrary thereof notwithstanding: Provided that the peculiars belonging to any archbishopric or bishopric, though locally situated in another diocese, shall continue subject to the archbishop or bishop to whom they belong, as well for the purposes of this act, as for all other purposes of ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the law whatsoever.—XXXI. PROVIDED *always, and be it further enacted*, That nothing in this act contained shall extend or be construed to extend to alter or effect his Majesty's royal prerogative in the granting of dispensations for non-residence upon benefices, as the same now exists by law.

GOOD INTENTIONS!

A Poem.—Canto I.

ARGUMENT.

Happy that nation's lot, I ween,
(As Britain's Sons can tell)
Whose Rulers very *little mean*,
But *mean* that *little* well.

CONTENTS.—Folly of the system of politics pursued in this country since the revolution, up to the end of the last administration —Character of King William; Dutch Prejudices; Hook Nose; fond of standing armies and continental politics; liberties of Europe a mere pretext to shed the blood and spend the money of his subjects —Censure on Lord Somers and Duke of Marlborough.—Campaigns of the latter "ex-"tended, bloody, and expensive."—Peace of Utrecht commended, except for the idle provisions to prevent the cession of Louisiana to France.—That provision happily abolished by the treaty of Amiens.—Apostrophe to that treaty.—Episode on the separate con-

vention signed the same day between France and Holland.—Indecency of the Dutch Minister in laughing out so loud in the corner of the room while this transaction was going on.—Consolations attendant on being laughed at exemplified in the situation of the present Ministry —Insular system of politics recommended.—Great Britain an island, and why?—Ireland ditto.—Two islands do not make one continent; wherefore continental connexions to be avoided.—Protection of France to be ensured, particularly to THE FAMILY.—Character of the present Minister contrasted with the noisy and turbulent merits of his predecessor.—Mr. A. guileless and candid, with excellent intentions.—Mr. A. no conjuror; not capable of setting the Thames on fire; not likely to have invented gunpowder, if that destructive invention had remained undiscovered to his time.—Mr. A. guardian of British capital, &c. compared with the Goose of the capitol at Rome.—Preference decidedly given to Mr. A.

We shall for the present confine our extracts to the latter part of the Canto, beginning with the beautiful tirade against *Continental Connexions*, from verse 319.

O! hapless age! when fierce discussions,
With turban'd Turks, or fur-clad Russians!
Sprung from Connexions Continental,
(To Britain highly detrimental—
So deem'd by some wise heads in Yorkshire, (1)
And lads who clean our knives and forks here,) (2)
And leading oft to wounds and slaughter,
Still kept this island in hot water.
—In water hot! when, had she known
To trust no waters but her own
(The Ocean then, as now, surrounding
Her rocky coasts, and all sides bounding),
Britain, thrice blest! had seen, perhaps,
No world beyond her—but in maps!
Hail, happier age! hail just cosmography!
Hail doctrines of a sound geography,
Which teach, when seas encircle dry land,
That all within them forms an island. (3)
Safe in this truth (which doubt we dare not),
Let Europe sink or swim we care not.
Reckless alike of friends and foes,
We taste (blest nation!) sweet repose.—
Save when the guardians of our rest,
From time to time, in fear or jest,
Rouse us, as with a watchman's rattle,
With cries of fire, or shouts of battle;
And when we start, and ask the matter
That breaks our sleep with such a clatter,
Bid us, with simpering smile, turn round,
And sleep again in *peace profound*. (4)
But chief to thy narcotic aid,
O sage! from Woodley's classic shade!—(5)
Thy strength and sweetness, "happy mixture," (6)
We owe this peace (not yet a fixture!)
These wholesome slumbers, short but pleasing;
The brisk alarms those slumbers teazing;
This changeful course of noise and quiet,
Which keeps our pulse from running riot;
These armaments at *spring* and *fall*, (7)
O Sage! to thee we owe them all!
But, more than all, we love to dwell
On thy best talent, *meaning well!*
Whether thou flatter, or alarm us,
Th' *intention* never fails to charm us;
Whether, of peace retrenchments raving,
Thou promise *forty millions'* saving: (8)
Or (if a smaller sum content ye)
Reduce the boast to *five and twenty*;
Or, in bold phrases no way thrifty,
Of ships fit out a *monthly fifty*; (9)
Though every mortal man alive,
For FIFTY knows he *should* read FIVE,
Yet this small error no man mentions,
Still, still, we laud thy *good intentions!*
"'Twere best, no doubt, the truth to tell,
"But still, good soul! he *means so well!*"
Others, with *necromantic* skill,
May bend mens' passions to their will,

(1) See Wilberforce's Address to Yorkshire Freeholders, July, 1802. REG. Vol II. p. 1617.

(2) "The *lowest* classes of the people are generally averse to engagements with Continental Powers; nor is that wonderful, being *uninformed* (as they necessarily are) of their *bearing* upon the safety and greatness of their own country. Else such is the patriotism pervading all ranks of the people of England, that they would gladly unite with whatever nation, to repel the aggressions of an enemy, and specially of France."—*Smellon's Analyses of Public Sentiment.*

(3) Terram, quæ mari undequaque circundatur, insulam vocamus.—CELLARIUS.

(4) See Mr. Addington's Speech on the Prince of Wales's Additional Annuity Bill, in which he assured the House that we were in a state of "*profound peace*," not ten days before the King's Message!—*Words ever to be remembered.*

(5) Woodley, lately the residence of Mr. Addington, situated in the neighbourhood of Reading, where the great ball, in honour of the peace, was given on the 1st of Oct. 1802, at which Mr. A. assisted, and made a speech on the *durability of the peace*, just one week before he sent a remonstrance to Paris, which *might* have produced war, and not one month before he sent the order to retain the Cape, which (in its consequences) *must* produce it!—*circumstances never to be forgotten!*

(6) "By a *happy mixture* of firmness and conciliation we have made the peace, and hope to preserve it."—*Ministerial Speeches, passim.*

(7) It is good to begin this course of discipline at the *spring* and *fall* of the year; those being the seasons when the humours are most in circulation.—*Sydenham, Vol. I. c. 3. p. 215.*

(8) See Mr. Addington's various and varying statements of the savings to be made by the peace. At one time, in the Session of 1802, he boldly stated the amount at 40 millions. Before Christmas, on being asked the difference between a contracted war and an extended peace establishment (such as was then voted), he answered 25,000,000l. Considerable odds are taken that at the next budget (if he should ever see one) the diminution will be found still more considerable.

(9) "I engage upon an *emergency* to have *fifty ships of the line ready for sea in a month.*"—*Mr. Addington's Speech on Naval Estimate, Dec. 2, 1802.*—Ready for sea in the week beginning April 4th, or one month after the Message, according to some accounts 6, according to others 4 ships of the line. Quere, If the Message proved an "*emergency!*"

Raise with dark *spells* the tardy loan,
To shake the vaunting Consul's throne;—
In thee no *magic arts* surprise,
No *tricks* to cheat our wondering eyes;
On thee shall no suspicion fall,
Of *slight of hand*, or *cup and ball*,
E'en foes must own thy spotless fame,
Unbranded with a *Conjuror's Name!*
Ne'er shall thy virtuous thoughts conspire
To wrap majestic *Thames in fire!*
And if that black and nitrous grain,
Which strews the field with thousands slain,
Slept undiscover'd yet in earth—
Thou ne'er hadst caus'd the monstrous birth,
Nor aided (such thy pure *intention*)
That diabolical invention!
Hail then—on whom our state is leaning!
O! Minister of mildest meaning!
Blest with such virtues to talk big on,
With such a head (to hang a wig on)—
Head of wisdom—soul of candour—
Happy Britain's Guardian Gander, (10)
To rescue from th' invading *Gaul*
Her "Commerce, Credit, Capital!"—(11)
While Rome's great Goose could save alone
One Capitol—of senseless stone.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p.* 511.

Thursday, *March* 31.—LORDS.—English Militia Officers' Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—The House proceeded to ballot for committees severally to try the merits of the petitions complaining of an undue election and return for Harwich and Berwick upon Tweed. — Mr. Smith brought up the Minutes of the Proceedings before the Ilchester Committee.—Mr. White brought up Extracts of the Minutes of the Proceedings before the Dumfermline Committee, as far as they relate to James Trotter.—Leave given to bring in a Bill for erecting a new Work-house in the Parish of St. James, Westminster.—Roman Catholic Oath Bill read a third time.—Bill for increasing the Rates for Inn-keepers for quartering Soldiers read a first time.

Friday, *April* 1.—LORDS.—Report of Clergy Non-residence Bill put and agreed to.—Roman Catholic Test Bill, and Woolwich Ordnance Trust Bill read a first time.—Bill for Naturalization of Christian Sanders read a second time.

COMMONS.—St. Giles' Burial Ground Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Rose moved "that there be laid before the House accounts of the value of the exports and imports for the last 18 years, ending Jan. 5, 1803, exclusive of the value of corn and other grain imported, and exclusive of the imports from China and the East Indies, setting forth the difference of the declared value of British manufactures exported in each year."—Ordered. Sir M. W. Ridley moved, "that the Charges contained "in the Resolution of the Committee against "John Simpson, Esq. the Major and returning "Officer for Great Grimsby, be referred to the consideration of the House." Agreed.—Sir M. W. Ridley then moved, "that the said Charges be referred to the consideration of this House on "Tuesday the 19th of April instant."—Ordered.—"That the said John Simpson, Esq. do attend "this House on the said 19th day of April instant."—Ordered.—"That a Copy of the said "Charges be sent to the said John Simpson, Esq. "and that he be at liberty to be heard by his "Counsel thereon."—Ordered.—"That William "Reeder, Esq. and several other persons named, "do attend on that day, in order to be examined "touching the matter of the said Charges.."—Ordered.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "that as doubts existed as to the construction to "be put on Mr. Burke's Act, for Regulation of the "Civil List, it be an instruction to the Civil List "Committee, to consider so much of the Act as re-"lates to the establishment of invariable order in "his Majesty's Civil List, and to provide for the "liquidation by classes of the debts affecting it."—Ordered.—American Commissioners Bill passed a Committee of the whole House, and Report ordered to be received on Monday.—Report of Four Millions Exchequer Bills brought up and agreed to.—Report of Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill brought up and agreed to.—Bill for increasing the Rate of Subsistence to Inn-keepers on quartering Soldiers, read a second time.

Monday, *April* 4.—LORDS.—Counsel finally heard respecting the claim of the Rev. Mr. Brydges to the Barony of Chandos, Bill for Naturalization of Mr. Maurice de Johnn, read a second time.

COMMONS.—Mr. Tierney moved, "that James "Trotter, having been duly summoned with the "Speaker's warrant, &c. and disobeyed such war-"rant and order, had been guilty of a breach of "the privilege of this House.—Carried *nem. con.* Mr. Tierney then moved, "that the said James "Trotter be for his said offence, committed to his "Majesty's gaol of Newgate." Ordered *nem. con.* that the Speaker do issue his warrant accordingly. —Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill and Exchequer Bills Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Corry presented a Petition from the Trustees of the Irish Lying-in-Hospital, praying for leave to present a Petition for the purpose of obtaining Parliamentary aid.—Leave granted.—Report of American Commissioner's Bill brought up and agreed to.

Tuesday, *April* 5.—LORDS.—Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill read a first time.

COMMONS.—Sir J. Frederick moved, for leave to bring in a Bill for rebuilding Christ Church in the County of Surry. Leave granted.—The Solicitor General moved, for leave to bring in a Bill to empower the Lord Chancellor, or Lord Keeper of the Great Seal to direct the sale or mortgage of the freehold properties of Lunatics.—Leave given.—Southampton Water Works Bill read a third time and passed.—Mr. Tierney moved, "that an ac-"count of the sums paid into, and of the charges "upon, the consolidated fund from the 5th Jan. "1802, to the 5th Jan. 1803, be laid before the "House." Ordered.—Also that an account of the net produce of the permanent taxes on the 5th of January, and on the 5th April, 1803, be laid before the House, distinguishing the quarters.—Ordered.—Mr. Addington brought up the Report of the Survey of the Highlands of Scotland. Ordered to be printed.—American Commissioners Bill read a third time and passed.—Coroner's Bill read a second time.

Wednesday, *April* 6.—LORDS.—Roman Catholic Test Bill, Woolwich Ordnance Bill, &c.—Militia Officers' Bill read a third time and passed.—Exchequer Bills Bill, and Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill read a second time.

COMMONS.—Sir J. Pultency reported from the

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(10) "Gander," the male or worthier of the goose species. *Argentus Anser*, always hitherto translated "Goose," erroneously.

(11) "We have three C.'s to rely upon in peace, "*Commerce, Credit, and Capital*;" just as our treaty turns upon three T.'s, the Time, the Tone, and the Terms.—*Ministerial Speeches, passim.*

Committee appointed to try the merits of the Petition complaining of an undue Election for the County of Carmarthen, that the sitting Member J. H. Williams, Esq was duly elected, and that the Petition was not frivolous nor vexatious.—Glasgow Theatre Bill read a second time.—Lord Hervey reported from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Petitions complaining of an undue Election for Berwick upon Tweed, that the Committee had determined that Thomas Hall, Esq. and John Fordyce, Esq. were not duly elected; also that the Petitions were not frivolous or vexatious.—Southwark Paving Bill and Surry Rail-way Bill, read a third time and passed.—Sir W. Scott moved, for leave to bring in a Bill "to amend and "render more effectual an Act for preventing the "Clergy from holding farms, and for enforcing pa-"rochial residence."—Leave granted.—A new writ was issued for the Election of two Members for the Borough of Berwick-upon-Tweed.—Mr. Tierney moved, "that a sum not exceeding "£12,626 be granted, to enable His Majesty to "make a compensation to George Martin, the "younger, Esq. for losses sustained by him in "America, &c." Motion put and carried.—Mr. Corry brought up a Bill for continuing several Acts of Parliament for collecting the Revenue of Ireland, and to prevent fraud therein.—Read a first time

Thursday, April 7.—Lords.—Royal assent given by commission to 28 public and private Bills.—Lord Ellenborough moved, "that there be laid "before the House the Registry of the Burials at "certain Parishes in the County of Kent, at par-"ticular periods, in the year 1641 and 1642."—The Lord Chancellor moved, "that the decree of "the Scotch Court, in the case Lawson, *v.* Ross "and others be affirmed." On the motion of Lord Hobart, the House adjourned to the 19th instant.

Commons.—Col. Mitford reported from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the petition complaining of an undue election for the borough of Harwich, that the Committee had determined, that Thomas Myers, Esq. was not duly elected; that James Adams, Esq. the petitioner was duly elected and ought to have been returned, and that the opposition to the petition was not frivolous nor vexatious.—Innkeepers's Subsistence Bill read a third time and passed.—Dr. Duigenan presented several petitions against the Irish Courts of Law Bill.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a first time.—Mr. Addington moved, "That there be laid before the House, an Account of the Annual Produce of the Revenue of the Corporation of Queen Anne's Bounty, for the Augmentation of the Livings of the poor Clergy, from the time of their incorporation to the latest period when the same could be made up: and also, an Account of the Annual Application of the said Revenue, the number of benefices augmented by them, and to what amount." Ordered.—Report of Grenada Loan Bill agreed to, and ordered to be read a third time.—Irish Revenue Regulation Bill read a second time.—Sugar Exportation Bill read a first time. House adjourned to Tuesday the 19th instant.

Tuesday, April 19.—Lords.—Four Million Exchequer Loan Bill, Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and American Loyalists' Commissioners' Bill, read a third time and passed.

Commons.—Sir J. W. Anderson moved for leave to bring in a Bill for establishing a free market for the sale of coals. Leave granted.—Grenada Loan Bill read a third time and passed.—A Committee was appointed to prepare an Estimate of the Allowance to Subaltern officers of the Militia in time of peace.—A petition was presented from the electors of Coventry, complaining of an undue election for the above city. Ordered to be taken into consideration on the 19th of August.—A similar petition was also presented from Ilchester. Ordered to be taken into consideration on the 22d August.

Wednesday, April 20.—Commons.—Sir J. W. Anderson moved for leave to bring in a Bill for the better regulation of the leather trade. Leave granted.—On the Order of the Day being moved for taking into consideration the Report of the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Nottingham Election, Mr. Hawkins moved the following resolutions, viz.—1. "That it appears to this Committee, that John Allen, being the returning officer at the last election for the town and county of the town of Nottingham, acted contrary to his duty in opening a poll, and proceeding to take the votes of electors for the period of about an hour, and until forty-four electors had polled, there being, during the whole of that time, no third candidate." Consideration postponed.—Resolution 2. "That it appears to this Committee, that after the first day of the said election, the freedom of the election was grossly violated by disturbances and riots, accompanied with personal intimidation and violence, practised and continued during the six subsequent days of polling." Agreed to.—3. "That it appears to this Committee, that the petitioner, Daniel Parker Coke, Esq. after sustaining several insults and suffering personal violence, was obliged, from the just apprehension of hazard to his life, to leave the place, and could not venture to return; and that a large number of electors in his interest, were deterred from exercising their franchise of voting." Agreed to.—4. "That it appears to this Committee, that John Davison, the Mayor, and Joseph Oldknow, and Thomas Oldknow, two of the aldermen of the said town and county of the town of Nottingham, took no effectual means to preserve the freedom of election, or restore it when so violated, or to punish the offenders." Agreed to.—5. "That it appears to this Committee, by an entry in the corporation-book of the town and county of the town of Nottingham, that at a Common Hall, held on Thursday the 8th day of Jan. last past, (after reciting the petitions referred to this Committee,) it was 'Resolved, that this corporation 'will defray all such legal expenses as have al-'ready been, or shall hereafter be, incurred by 'them the said John Davison, Joseph Oldknow, 'Thomas Oldknow, and John Allen, or either of 'them, or George Coldham, under their direction, 'in preparing for, or making, their defence; and 'that the Chamberlains for the time being be 'hereby authorized and directed, from time to 'time, to advance Mr. Coldham all and every 'such sum and sums of money as may be neces-'sary for this purpose.'—Consideration postponed.—Mr. H. Browne then moved "for leave to bring in a Bill for more effectually securing the peace of the town and county of the town of Nottingham: and also, "that no new writ should issue for the town of Nottingham till this day three weeks. Agreed to.—Mr. Horrocks moved, "That there be laid before the House an Account of the quantity of cotton twist and yarn, imported from, and exported to India, from the years 1750 to 1788.

Thursday, April 21.—Commons.—Clergy Non-residence Bill read a second time.—A petition was

presented, complaining of an undue election for Ilchester.—Ordered to be taken into consideration on the same day as the former petition presented from that time.—Irish Revenue Law Bill read 3d time & passed.—Lunatic Property Bill read 2d time.

Friday, April 22.—Lords.—Royal assent given By commission to the Four Million Exchequer bill, the Militia Officers' Establishment Bill, the American Loyalists' Commissioners' Bill, Sir J. Saumarez's Annuity Bill, and several private bills.

Commons.—Glasgow Theatre Bill, Expiring Laws Bill, and Irish Revenue Bill, read a third time and passed.—On the order of the day being moved for taking into consideration the Report of the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Ilchester election, Mr. Smith moved the following resolutions. 1. "That such a system of corruption was formed, and such instances of individual acts of bribery were committed, previous to the said election, with a view to influence the same, as to render it incumbent on this Committee to submit the same to the most serious consideration of the House; in order that such proceedings may be instituted thereon as the House in its wisdom may think proper to adopt." Agreed to. —2. "That Alexander Davison, of St. James's Square, was engaged in the said system of corruption." Further consideration of this resolution was put off till Monday fortnight.—Clergy Non-residence Bill went through a Committee, and Report ordered to be taken into consideration on Tuesday the 3d of May. The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, "That the Report drawn up by order of the Lords of the Treasury, by a person employed to make a Survey of the Highlands of Scotland be referred to a Select Committee, of which five are to make a quorum." Agreed to.

Monday, April 25.—Lords.—Judgment was given in the Scotch Appeal, Syme, *v.* Dickson, and the decree of the Court of Session was affirmed.—Grenada Loan Bill, read a third time and passed.

Commons.—Admiral Berkeley presented a petition from the weavers of the county of Gloucester against the woollen manufacturer's Bill.—Leave granted to bring in a Bill for the improvement of the harbour of Greenock.—Mr. Fox presented a petition from the Mayor, Corporation, &c. of the town of Nottingham, praying for leave to be heard by counsel against the Nottingham Franchise Bill.—A new writ was ordered for the county of Nottingham in the room of Lord Edw. Cavendish Bentinck who has accepted the Chiltern Hundreds.—On the order of the day being moved for taking into consideration the merits of the Report brought up from the Committee appointed to try the merits of the Great Grimsby election, Sir M. W. Ridley moved that John Simpson be called to the bar. This being done, Sir M. W. Ridley moved the following resolutions. — 1. "That it appears to this Committee, That John Simpson, Esq. mayor and returning officer of the borough of Great Grimsby, did, on the day previous to the said election, hold a full court of mayor, aldermen, common councilmen, and burgesses of the said borough; at which court the said John Simpson did unlawfully, and of his own authority, admit certain persons to the freedom of the said borough, to whom objections were stated, and did refuse to submit to the consideration and judgment of the aldermen, common councilmen, and burgesses of the said borough, assembled at the said full court, the right of such persons to be admitted to their freedom, which, by the constitution of the borough, as determined by a resolution of a Committee of the House of Commons, reported to this House on the 11th day of April 1793, he ought to have done; and that the said John Simpson did also partially, unlawfully, and of his own authority, refuse to admit certain persons, who claimed at the said full court to be admitted freemen of the said borough, to their freedom therein, and did also refuse to submit to the aldermen, common councilmen, and burgesses of the said borough, in the said full court assembled, the right of such persons to be admitted to their freedom, and which by the aforesaid constitution he ought to have done.—That the said John Simpson, at and during the election, did act partially in the execution of his office as returning officer, and did, at the poll, partially and unlawfully reject the votes tendered by several persons having a right to vote at the said election, which votes he the said John Simpson ought to have received; and also did, at the said poll, partially and unlawfully receive and admit the votes of several persons who had no right to vote at the said election, which votes he the said John Simpson ought as returning officer to have rejected. —Mr. Simpson being called upon for his defence, said, "that he was a poor man, that he had a wife and five children, that he rented a small farm of 50l. a year, but he was to quit as much as came to 40l. on the 12th May, that what he had done proceeded from ignorance, for which he was very sorry, that he asked pardon of the House, and threw himself upon its mercy."—Sir M. W. Ridley then moved, "that the said J. Simpson be taken into the custody of the Serjeant at Arms." Agreed to.—Edinburgh Road Bill recommitted.

Tuesday, April 26.—Lords.—St. Pancras Poor House Bill read a second time.—Earl Moira presented two petitions against the bill.—Counsel heard on the Appeal Cause, the King *v.* the County of Cumberland.

Commons.—Sir L. Parsons presented a petition from the Grand Jury of the King's County against the Dublin Royal Canal Bill.—Mr. Jekyl presented a petition from certain woollen manufacturers of Yorkshire against the Woollen Clothier's Regulation Bill.—Colonel Longfield presented a petition from the Tanners of Cork complaining of the mode of collecting the tax on leather.—Mr. Vansittart moved, "that an account of the net produce of all the permanent taxes of Great Britain from April 5, 1802, to April 5, 1803, should be laid before the House." Ordered.—Militia Families Provision Bill recommitted.

Wednesday, April 27.—Lords.—Ld. Auckland moved for an account of the sums granted to the commissioners appointed to manage Q. Anne's Bounty.—Bill for better regulation of the law with respect to certain capital offences read a 2d time. —Sugar and Coffee bill, Irish Revenue bill, Innkeepers' Military Quarters' bill read a 2d time.

Commons.—Mr. Bragge moved for leave to bring in a bill to improve the harbour of Bristol.—Woollen Manufacturers' bill read a 2d time.—Mr. Dickens moved, that counsel be heard against the Woollen Manufacturers' bill. Agreed to.—Mr. Lee moved for leave to present a petition against the Irish Courts of Law bill. Granted.—Petition presented from the tanners of Waterford against the mode of collecting the tax on leather.—Sheerness Pier bill read a 1st time.

LONDON,

AUTHENTIC PAPERS,

RELATIVE TO THE RIGHTS AND THE CLAIMS OF THE PLOPLE OF MALTA.

The arrangements respecting Malta have, from the very commencement of the negotiations for peace, been involved in mystery. Information, as to the principles on which the stipulations of the Xth article of the Definitive Treaty were adopted, has frequently been asked for, and as frequently refused. The papers touching the rights of the Maltese and of the Knights were moved for by Lord Temple, during the debates on the Treaty of Amiens; but the ministers sheltered themselves under the memorable declaration, that they "*had no* "OFFICIAL *document on the subject.*" These were Lord Hawkesbury's very words, (1) and how far these words were from the truth the reader is now about to learn.

The information which Parliament has called for in vain has, at last, come into our hands. The very respectable gentleman, whose name is affixed to the letter, which stands at the head of these interesting papers, feeling, in common with the public in general, the utmost indignation at the conduct of ministers in with-holding every species of true and useful communication from the Parliament, has laudably resolved to unveil their dark and disgraceful deeds with respect to the people of Malta, towards whom, as our readers will perceive, they have committed an act of injustice, of cruelty, and of perfidy, unequalled in the annals of the world, not excepting those of Republican France.——The first paper is a letter from Mr. Mackenzie, a British merchant who has lately returned from Malta, where he, in common with many others, obtained copies of the papers, which he has had the goodness to communicate to us. The second is a translation of the Representation and Remonstrance of the Maltese, drawn up, on the 22d of Oct. 1801, the moment they were acquainted with the Preliminaries of Peace, and brought to London by certain Deputies early in February, a copy having been dispatched immediately after it was drawn up. The third is a letter from the said Deputies requesting an audience with Lord Hobart. The fourth is a Memorial from the Deputies to Lord Hobart, repeating and enforcing the statements contained in their first remonstrance. The fifth and last document is a letter from the Deputies to their Constituents, giving an account of the reception they had met with from the British ministry, and of the promises made by Lord Hobart.——Having translated the second and fifth documents from the *Italian*, and the third and fourth from the *French*, we will not take upon us to assert, that every phrase of our translation is exactly equivalent to the original, but, we venture to say, that no essential change has been made in the meaning; and, as to the *authenticity* of the originals, that is a point on which our veracity and the reputation of our work stand pledged.

No. I.

Oxford Street, May 3, 1803.

SIR,—The subject of Malta has lately been much canvassed by the public; but as I have not seen in any publication, the memorials of the Maltese Deputies, which appear to me very interesting, I send you inclosed, copies of them. They were distributed to several persons at Malta, and one of them fell into my hands.——If you think them as important as I do, they are at your service to publish in your Weekly Register, if not, be pleased to return them by the bearer.——I am, Sir,—Your most obedient Servant,

Wm. Cobbett, Esq. *A. McKenzie.*

No. II.

The humble Representation of the Deputies of the Islands of Malta and Gozo, at the foot of the Throne of the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland.

The Maltese were the first who took up arms against the French, and besieged them in Valetta: they were afterwards assisted by the Portuguese, the Neapolitans and the English, who blocked up the Great Harbour and the port of St. Paul, while the Maltese guarded every other avenue to the Island.——The gates of Valetta were shut on the 2d of September 1798, and on the 4th of September 1800, the city surrendered.——The foreign troops, (as all the manifestoes and proclamations of the different generals clearly prove) were solely auxiliaries. The Maltese were the principals in the war. ——During the blockade, the Maltese lost more than 20,000 souls. The British army had

(1) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1259.

not a single soldier killed.——Reduced to the utmost extremity, from a scarcity of provisions, the French garrison offered to capitulate, and to leave hostages for the vast sums which they had taken from the public treasury, from the University, from the Monte di Pietà, from the Churches, and, lastly, from individuals, under the name of forced loans——The British General, as well as the Maltese, were acquainted with the situation of the French garrison; they knew that in two days it must surrender at discretion. And in the city there were actually found no more than a few salms of wheat, and no other provisions whatever. ——Notwithstanding this, General Pigot (without the knowledge and consent of the Maltese) granted the garrison a capitulation, by which the French were permitted to carry away all their effects. In consequence of which, before the gates were opened, the French again plundered the city of the few jewels and effects which still remained to the abandoned inhabitants, and carried them in triumph on board the vessels that were to convey to France the spoils of a victorious people.——The British troops took possession of the place, and persuaded the Maltese to lay down their arms upon the glacis before they entered the town.——Confiding in the good faith of the British nation, the Maltese consigned the government of their country, into the hands of the British Generals, without suspicion, without stipulation, and faithfully obeying them, as ministers of the Sovereign whom their hearts had elected.——As to the manner in which they were treated, they wish to remain silent; as they are fully persuaded that it will be reprobated, with horror and regret, by the Ministers of the King of Great Britain.——The expenses of the war by land, and the pay of the Maltese battalions, were defrayed by the Maltese; and, in order to enable them to do this, they mortgaged the lands of several villages.——The Maltese, therefore, demand, that their Island may be restored to them; or that all the expenses incurred by them, for their share of the war, may be paid them, and that they may be indemnified for the losses occasioned by the war, and for the plunder which the French were permitted to carry away.——We affirm, that being the principals in the war, we were the lawful captors; that every species of public property is ours; and that if, by a superior force it should be wrested from our hands, the mortgages on them ought, at least, to be paid.——The Maltese demand the possession of their Island by right of conquest from the French, who conquered it from the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem.——As to the pretensions of this Order to the Island, it is our duty to assert, that it was ceded by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in quality of fief, and as a deposit for arms, and the maintenance of troops, in order to make perpetual war against the infidels.—— As to the landed property which that Order has acquired in Malta, it is contrary to the stipulations, and has been obtained by an usurpation of the property of individuals; and a great part of the fortresses themselves and the public edifices were built by taxes imposed upon the Maltese. The University, the Monte di Pietà, and other institutions belong, solely, to the Maltese, are the property of individuals, and never did belong to the Order.——Whatever pretensions the Knights of the Order of Saint John might have to the Island, they have forfeited them by an act much more conclusive than that of conquest, by the most unworthy treason to their own body, violating the sacred laws of religion, honour, and the statutes of the Order, which they solemnly swore at the altar to maintain with the last drop of their blood: by this act, according to their own laws, they cease to be members of the Order, are degraded with infamy, and the sound part of them, if such there were amongst them, were obligated to put them to death. And if at that time, when the Knights of the Order were entire, assembled in the seat of their establishment, which had been witness of so many glorious actions, with every means of defence, and without any wants; if at that time, when their honour had still a name, they were traitors, and partizans of the French, how much more must they be so now, covered as they are with shame and infamy, and reduced to indigence, and the most disgraceful mendicity!——But the Maltese have other pretensions to the sovereignty of their own Island. Without recurring to the maxim of some writers, that "when the throne "becomes vacant, the right of nominating the "Sovereign devolves to the people," the Maltese found their right to independence in having twice purchased Malta, and paid the stipulated price to the Kings of Spain and Sicily. King Alphonsus (to whose *alto dominio*, or suzerainty, our ancestors voluntarily submitted after having purchased the Island) in his diploma of the 27th of November 1397, declared, that Malta formed a portion of his dominion; and in case any of his successors alienated it from the crown, under whatever title, whether as a government, or perpetual or temporary rectory, to any person whatever, even though he should be of the most exalted blood of the reigning Sovereign. Malta was to be preserved "conjunctam semper tanquam membrum &: Re-"gie Corone, &c;" permitting the Maltese, in case of a contrary conduct, to resist "manu forti "pro quo in nullum crimen, delictum, vel in "inobedientiam merrere reputentur, et aliqua-"tenus consentu." This was confirmed by King Ferdinando on the 4th of January 1486; the Maltese consider it as their *Magna Charta*, and confident they are, that a charter so dear to the English, will never be ravished from them, by that nation.——With these privileges, Malta remained annexed to the crown of Sicily; and her inhabitants were treated by the King of Spain as a free people, until the reign of Charles the Fifth, who ceded the government to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, after the expulsion of that Order from Rhodes. After a long negotiation, the Maltese submitted, but under the express condition, that they should enjoy their privileges for ever, and be considered as vassals, and annexed to the crown of Sicily; and that *if the Order of Saint John should remove to another residence or establishment, Malta should return, as before, under the King of Sicily.* The submission of the Maltese to the King of Sicily, or to the King of Spain, was not in consequence of any right in those sovereigns to the sovereignty of the Island, but their *alto dominio* or suzerainty, and their protection was a favour solicited from them by the Maltese, for the sake of being protected by a powerful state against their enemies. They were *free allies, elected their Sovereigns,* the Kings of Sicily, and *governed their Island themselves.* Numerous documents are still in existence, to establish the truth of every assertion we have advanced, and still more.——Convinced of their own political weakness, and placing a full reliance in the sincerity of the British government, and in the faith of the British nation, the Maltese were more desirous of becoming subjects of the King of England, and of enjoying all the advantages of free subjects of a Monarch who is the father of all his people, than to assert and maintain their own en-

tire independence; but never did they suspect, nor can they now for a moment believe, that, violating all the laws of justice, divine and human, they are to be forcibly delivered up by their auxiliary allies, as a conquered people, or as vile slaves sold for a political consideration to other masters, to masters whose tyranny, extortion, and sacrilege, have rendered them the execration of every virtuous mind, and to whom, whatever horrible calamity may ensue, the Maltese nation never will submit. Excluded from the fortifications, almost entirely without arms, without ammunition, without provisions, and absolutely without any foreign alliance or promise of assistance, our brave islanders resolved to perish or be free. The whole country rose up, armed for the greater part, with instruments of husbandry, and drove the French out of every post, except the great fortresses, which they blockaded, repulsed every sally of the enemy, and mortgaged their very lands, in order to procure grain from Sicily. The entrance of the Great Harbour they could not command. But while this entrance was blockaded by the British fleet, the Maltese defended every other pass, till at last Valletta surrendered.—— And can it be expected, that such a people will deliver up their privileges and their liberty to such masters? They may be free, they may perish in the attempt, but never will the Maltese submit! At whose hands will Divine Justice demand their blood? Upon whose head will the vengeance of Heaven fall; that vengeance which our fathers invoke, together with our innocent children, our venerable clergy, our wives, and our violated daughters!—His Britannic Majesty has never declared himself in any public act, or in any of the manifestoes of his generals, our sovereign. Never has he made use of any other title than that of Protector, however ardently the Maltese were desirous of being united with his subjects!——We conceive it totally superfluous to enter into a detail of the indignities which the Maltese have received at the hands of the Order of St. John, how they were held in base subjection, treated as beings of an inferior class, every Noble excluded from all pretensions to honour and distinction, every man of merit or talent deprived of every honourable situation; how our families were dishonoured or ruined, whenever the caprice of a knight fixed upon its victim. What those men were, and what must have been the situation of their Government, may be conceived from this single fact—every one of them had betrayed his own order—We pass indignantly over this point, to prove, that to deliver up the Island of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, would be the same as to deliver it over to the French. If the knights of the Order, in possession of an independant sovereignty and revenue, enjoying every ease and pleasure that the imagination can form, engaged in objects of luxury, caressed and reverenced as so many sovereigns; if, in this condition, the French could command them to quit their terrestrial paradise to wander in the wide world, and could induce them to become partizans of their cause, what must not the power of the same French over them now be, dependent, degraded, dishonoured, reduced to beggary, in whom is extinct every spark of honour, and who have been guilty of the blackest, the most infamous of crimes, that of treachery, the most horrible infidelity, apostacy towards their God, and violation of the sacramental ordinances.— France has three langues: Spain two. The Spaniards are dependant upon the French, and were so at the moment the Island was betrayed. Two langues only remain, which can, in any manner be said to be independant, the Knights of Naples and Sicily. All those of the Cisalpine Republic and of the countries either conquered or subject to a vassalage, if not in name, must, in fact, be partizans of the French. Almost every post of confidence, was occupied by the French. In short, there are not (even including those of the New Anglo-Bavarian langue) more than a thirtieth part of the Knights who are not at the blind disposal of France.—— The public treasures dissipated, and the commanderies (supposing them to be all restored) belonging to France, the Order must, of necessity, look up to France for the expenses of forming and maintaining an army for occupying the fortifications, and for purchasing and equipping a fleet, or at least a few gallies, in order to protect commerce, to cruize against the infidels, and to provision the island. France will, without doubt, furnish these necessary funds, and will be well indemnified, by securing to herself an impregnable fortress. The troops furnished by the Order, will, assuredly, be those most attached to the French Government.——Many additional proofs will be produced to confirm our assertion, that to give up Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem is, in fact, consigning it over to the French. ——And can any one possibly doubt, that the principal object of the French Government in making peace, was not to obtain possession of Malta? Since on the possession of Malta depend the existence of India to Great Britain, her alliance with Russia, the security of Sicily, the commerce of the Mediterranean, of the Adriatic, of the Levant, and an uncontrouled sway over every circumjacent country.—— The French once in possession of Malta, Sicily, we too well know, must instantly fall an easy prey to them. To defend Sicily in all her vulnerable points, would require a large and a better disciplined army than the sovereign of that kingdom can ever support. ——When the French were in possession of Malta, and had no idea that they would one day be driven out of it, they openly declared in print (in our newspapers and in pamphlets), in letters, and in public harangues, the extent of their views, and their projects of future conquest. They demonstrated, "that they could procure from the "Black Sea and the Adriatic timber, masts and "all sorts of naval stores, at a much cheaper "rate than from the Baltic and other parts of the "North. That they considered the fleets and "ports of Russia, and the contemptible Go- "vernment of Turkey, as dependent upon them; "and that, at any time, they could dictate to "them conditions or vassalage. That Russia "never would abandon her project of expelling "the Turks from Europe, and of founding a new "Greek state. That Russia has always treated, "as friends, those nations who, in this point, "entered into her projects; and as enemies, "those who ventured to oppose them; making "every thing subservient to this one considera- "tion. That, in consequence, France could dic- "tate to Russia, and detach her from her alliance "with Great Britain. That the formidable Rus- "sian navy in the Black Sea, united to that of "Greece, though it would be too feeble to cope "with the French fleet, when united with it, as "it always must be, would be an overmatch for "the navy of Great Britain; which, on no occa- "sion, would be in a condition to detach a "squadron of sufficient magnitude to enter the "Mediterranean, as she must always keep up a

" sufficient force to guard her own coasts." All this have they printed both in and out of Malta, never imagining that they would be obliged to abandon the island. They concluded " that the " Mediterranean was exclusively theirs; and " that from Egypt they would be able to send an " army to conquer India, by attacking it in vari- " ous points."——Malta again placed in the hands of the French, no power on earth will be able to expel them. There are no measures, however violent, that this artful nation, deterred by no principle of justice or humanity, will not take to obtain their object; such as driving the inhabitants out of the fortresses, disarming and putting to death all those whom they suppose enemies, and, perhaps, (as they have already once proposed) to send the whole population of Malta to France or to the Coast of Barbary, and to re-people the island with French. This threat, with which the inhabitants were well acquainted, was one of the principal reasons which first induced them to take up arms, and many reasons have we for believing, that it would have been carried into execution, if their affairs in Egypt had turned out prosperously.——With respect to the guarantee of this or that power, but too well is our island acquainted with the French and the Order, not to be convinced of the fallibility of such a proposition. The first war, whether of long or short duration, puts an end to it entirely. If even a third power were to occupy some parts of the fortresses, the troops would be corrupted by French money and French principles, and immense are the sums that would be wisely expended for that purpose. The military posts are dependant one upon the other. We are able to point out the utter impossibility of occupying a part without being in possession of the whole. We can clearly demonstrate how they can and will obtain their several ends. We can make it evident, that there is no security for the inhabitants, unless British troops are placed in possession of all the fortresses, and unless the administration of justice is placed in the hands of a British Civil Government. We wish not to enter into the profound views of Cabinets, but we beg to be permitted solely to observe, that if France and Russia had no other intentions than the re-establishment of the Order in its pristine splendour and independence, why have they not chosen a place where they could be more independant? Why have they considered the possession of Malta as necessary to the re-establishment of the Order? It is but too evident to every one capable of reflection, that Malta is not to be taken out of the hands of the English, for the purpose of remaining long in the hands of the Order of St. John.

(Signed) The Deputies, and all the Representatives of the City, Towns, Villages, &c.

Malta, Oct. 22, 1801.

No. III.

Letter from the Maltese Deputies to Lord Hobart, on their arrival in London.

My Lord,—We have the honour of announcing to your lordship, our arrival in this capital, in quality of Deputies from the Maltese nation, appointed as soon as the intelligence of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace reached that island. Happy shall we be, my lord, in the opportunity of laying before your lordship the truth and justice of the demands with which we are entrusted. It is this hope, and the confidence we have in the equity of the British Government which have conducted us hither.——We pray your lordship to have the goodness to inform us, in the course of three days from the date of this letter, when it will be convenient to your lordship to receive the homage of the respectful attachment with which we have the honour to be, &c. &c.

(Signed) The Deputies, &c.

London, Feb. 4, 1802.

No. IV.

The Deputies appointed by the Extraordinary Congress held at Malta and Gozo, consisting of the Chiefs of Batallions and Representatives of each Town or Burgh, have the Honour of laying before his Excellency LORD HOBART, *his Britannic Majesty's Minister for the War Department, the following* MEMORIAL, *according to the Instructions received by them from their Constituents on the 9th day of November,* 1801.

My Lord,—It is with the most lively affliction, and the utmost astonishment, that the people of Malta have learnt the severe and unmerited fate to which they are destined, by the return of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem to the Islands of Malta and Gozo. The defection and treason of which this Order was guilty, will form an epoch in the annals of the world, as striking as that by which we are again thrown under its despotic dominion, after it had abandoned us to an army, unfaithful to all its promises and engagements. The sentence which impartial posterity will pronounce upon these transactions, will not, assuredly, be creditable to the age in which we live, and already we foresee the complaints and reproaches with which we should be loaded by our latest posterity, were we to permit an unworthy timidity to impose silence upon us, before the just and magnanimous tribunal to which we have, happily, the opportunity of appealing.——We shall pass over, my Lord, the many motives which we have of resentment against the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem. The blood which has been spilt, the death of about twenty thousand of our fellow citizens after scenes of the most heart-rending misery, the expenses we incurred in the first months of the revolution to maintain our batallions, and the loss of six millions of crowns, sufficiently prove the falsehood of the atrocious calumnies heaped upon us by the author of the *Reply to the Manifesto of the Prior of Russia.* The imposture carries its own contradiction with it. No one is ignorant, that the plan of the invasion of Malta was projected in Paris, and confided to the principal Knights of the Order, resident at Malta. Letters in cyphers were incessantly passing and repassing, without, however, alarming the suspicions of the deceased Grand Master de Rohan, or of the Grand Master Hompesch.——After these irrefragable facts, thus hastily cited, consider, my Lord, whether the Maltese people could behold without astonishment and terror, the authors of all the miseries which have befallen them, again set foot in their country, and again domineer over them. Were we, my Lord, to remain silent, the ashes, still warm, of our brave relatives who fell to liberate and *to conquer* their country, would call upon us more effectually to defend our rights, and the cause of truth and of justice.—Yes, my Lord, we dare to repeat it: the Knights of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem can never be re-established in Malta, without an infringement of the legitimate rights of the august descendants of Charles the 5th, the rights of the Maltese, and without exposing them to fresh conflicts. The Maltese,

ever distinguished for their attachment to their antient Sovereign, have, in these latter times, proved that they ought equally to be so, for their love of justice, and their bravery.——They can readily bury all their resentments; but they cannot help being desirous, that *the sacrifices they have made may not be forgotten.* As a proof of these sacrifices, may we be permitted, my Lord, to instance the peaceable resignation of the Maltese to the capitulation which the British General made with M. Vaubois. The blood we had spilt, our exertions, *our rights*, and all our interests were either *forgotten or despised.* We beheld with exemplary moderation, as every one is forced to acknowledge, the French lay down their arms on the glacis, *only to load themselves with the remainder of our spoils*; and the faithful and virtuous Maltese were reduced to the necessity, of envying the treatment of their rebellious and criminal brethren. Would we could conceal from our descendants the particulars of a capitulation which, at the same time, *wounded our rights and rendered us miserable!* It is true, that the presence and wisdom of Captain Ball, to whom we preferred our complaints, contributed greatly to alleviate our sacrifices; but circumstances not having seconded either our expectations or necessities, we cannot, my Lord, dissemble the *unfavourable impressions* which the preliminaries of peace *have given us of a government*, to which we have ever been anxious of shewing our attachment, our fidelity and our preference.——We know, my Lord, that it is not for us to influence the political operations of nations. Nature has placed Malta to be considered for her situation and strength, and not to dictate arrangements to other countries. But still, my Lord, it may be prudent not to pass over her numerous population. Russia and France, as well as the other great powers of Europe, are too just and too enlightened to censure the Maltese for the steps they have taken, and for their opposition to the re-establishment of an Order, which from its despotism, its defection, its treachery, and its depravity of manners, can never inspire confidence nor reconcile differences.——Nevertheless, my Lord, if from unavoidable and imperious circumstances, the Maltese must undergo the pain and mortification of being separated from the Empire of his Britannic Majesty; if, for the tranquillity of Europe, the Islands of Malta and Gozo must remain in a state of neutrality, we beseech you, my Lord, in the name of our constituents and of all that is most dear and sacred among men; in the name of every law, human and divine, in the name of the *laws of nations and of justice*, to supplicate his Britannic Majesty to deign to employ his effectual and powerful mediation, with the other powers, in order that the Islands of Malta and Gozo may be left *in their independence*, under the mutual guarantee of Great Britain and France, and that they may not, after their inhabitants have shed their blood, and expended their substance, be considered as *a conquered country.*——You well know, my Lord, that as deputies from the Maltese people, we cannot dispense with laying before your Excellency, the wishes and *intentions* of our nation. In citing a portion of the crimes of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, we have not merely been desirous of giving vent to our feelings, but of justifying, in the face of the whole universe, *our eternal opposition and vigorous resistance, if it should ever* dare to re-appear in our dwellings—still dyed with the blood which it caused to flow.——Condescend, my Lord, to exert your influence with his Britannic Majesty, in favour of justice, truth, humanity, and of a nation worthy of a better fate. Deign to accept the homage of our respectful attachment.

(Signed) The Deputies.

TESTAFERRATA.—ABBÉ RICCAUD.—ABBÉ MALIA.—CASTAGNA.—MALIA.—CACHIA.

London, No. 7, Upper Berkley Street, March 1, 1802.

No. V.

Extract of a Letter written by the Deputies of Malta and Gozo to their Constituents, dated London, 2d of March, 1802.

MOST ILLUSTRIOUS SEIGNIORS.—We arrived here the 1st ult. The 4th we wrote the inclosed letter [No. III.] to Lord Hobart, the minister, stating we were arrived in this capital in the character of deputies to represent the demands of our fellow citizens.—In consequence of this letter, by means of Sir Alexander Ball, the minister made known to the deputation, that *they would do well to procure their departure from London, as soon as possible*, adducing for reasons, that *their remaining would give jealousy to France*, and thereby, impede the conclusion of the definitive articles of peace, and that he could not, for reasons of state, receive and hear them *in his office*, but that he would permit them to come *in private to his house*, where he would hear them. We were received by the minister on the 8th of February, and he heard, with patience, all the reasons for which we were sent to London, particularly to *protest to the British government, in the name of our nation, against the cession of our Island to the Order of St. John*, and all the reasons for which we do not recognize the right of the Order to the dominion of our island, and the firm and effectual resistance which we were resolved to make, to oppose the return of the Order into our mother country.——To this representation the Minister answered that the English government would *take care of the happiness* of the Maltese, and that the result would prove to us, that the return of the Order in Malta would be of advantage, *by the precautions which the English government would take to guarantee the people of Malta.*——Yesterday, with the approbation of Sir Alexander Ball, we presented the inclosed memorial No. 2. [No. IV. in this series] and wait his answer.——It is one day reported that there will be war, and the next that peace will be concluded, &c. We are, &c.

What answer the deputies received, or whether they received any at all, MR. MACKENZIE was not informed; but he has heard, that the high-minded Lord Hobart, for the cogent reason stated in the request conveyed by Captain Ball; that is to say, *for fear of giving umbrage to France*, and thereby hazarding the conclusion of the definitive treaty, declined giving them any answer at all, and left them "to procure their speedy "departure from London," in any manner they could, or else to join the beggars in the streets!

By comparing the definitive treaty, as far as it relates to Malta, with the remonstrances of the Maltese deputies, we at once perceive, that they are in direct contradiction to each other.—With respect to the interests of this country, they have been, in the opinion of the deputies, completely abandoned by the treaty. To give the Knights

the command of the Island, was, as they truly said to give it to the French. The perfect inutility of all guarantees of other powers is forcibly and truly stated, in the remonstrance, and we well know, that no other security has been provided by the treaty, except that of a Maltese Langue, *which has not been, and which cannot be formed.* The ministers, therefore, in affecting to give up the Island to the Knights, *knew* that they were, in fact, giving it up to the French, a deed which they have still more deliberately and wickedly consummated, since the conclusion of the treaty, *by agreeing to the Pope's appointing a Grand Master, without the approbation or consent of the people of Malta.*

But, shameful as the conduct of ministers has been, in abandoning the interests of their own country, as connected with Malta, their conduct towards the gallant people of that Island is ten thousand times more shameful. It is as clear as day-light, that we possessed no right whatever to impose a government upon Malta. We did not conquer the Island; we entered it, not as conquerors, but as *protectors* of the Maltese, who themselves conquered it from the French, into whose hands it had been betrayed by the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The Maltese offered to become subjects of his Majesty, an offer which his Majesty was certainly at liberty to refuse, but, if he did so refuse, he had nothing further to do but to leave the people to themselves: his ministers had no right to impose on them any other Sovereign, much less to place them under a government, which they abhorred, a government by which they had been, not abandoned, but betrayed into the hands of a power, who had, plundered them of their property, defiled their altars, and violated their wives and their daughters.——It will now be remembered, and with emotions of inexpressible indignation, that the ministers, in defending the definitive treaty, represented the arrangement respecting Malta, as a *favour* done to the inhabitants; as something of which those people were *glad*, and for which they were *grateful* to this country!!! Lord Hobart, in his reply to Lord Spencer, on the 7th of May, said, "It was "politic to pay *marked attention* to the native "inhabitants of Malta by creating a Mal-"tese Langue; and that, as *we won the* "*Island by force of arms*, we had an indis-"putable *right* to arrange its govern-"ment." (2) The Maltese deputies positively deny the latter position, and, as to the "*marked attention*," which it was "politic" to pay to them, the reader has seen, in the preceding documents, how far his Lordship's conduct agreed with this opinion. The "marked attention," which he paid to the native inhabitants, was to desire them instantly to quit London, lest their remaining here should give umbrage to the rapacious, cruel, and brutal wretches, by whom they had been oppressed, and from whom they themselves had delivered their country. This was the "marked attention" paid them by that "*safe* politician," who would not even permit them to enter his office!!!— The minister, the pure, the upright, the candid, the safe, Richmond Park minister, was, on this subject, still more explicit than his worthy colleague. In answer to Mr. Windham, on the 3d of May, 1802, he made use of the following declaration, which, when he takes the title of Lord AMIENS, we would humbly propose as the future motto of The Family.—"Without entering into the particu-"lars of the Right Honourable Gentleman's "statement, I have the satisfaction to know, "that THE MALTESE THEMSELVES "*do not partake in his sentiments: theirs are* "*those of* SATISFACTION, *and of* GRA-"TITUDE *to Great Britain for the terms pro-*"*cured them.*"!!!!!! (3) This is the *pure* and *candid* minister! This is the minister of *good intentions!* Little did he imagine, that the documents, which we have now published, would ever see the light. Little did he imagine, that the mask would so soon have been pulled off from his dark and selfish intrigues. Let it be observed, that he made this declaration *after* he was fully informed of the sentiments of the Maltese, after he must necessarily have read their remonstrance, and have been well acquainted not only of their abhorrence of being again placed under the knights, but of their resolution to resist the authority of treacherous and dastardly masters; and, with the knowledge of all this it was, that he declared the Maltese to be not only *satisfied* with, but *grateful* for, the terms of a treaty which irrevocably doomed them to submit to those masters, or to exchange their sway for the still more hated and dreadful tyranny of the French, by whom they had so lately been plundered and tormented! And this is your *candid* minister! this is your minister of *good intentions!*—As to the *present* sentiments of the people of Malta, they may easily be guessed at from the circumstances which have taken place, since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens. The agreement respecting a Maltese langue was despised by them. It was a deception

(2) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1241.

(3) See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1213.

too shameful for them to give the least sanction to. No such langue has been formed, and the British ministers have, accordingly, left the choice of a Grand Master to the Pope, who, being himself a creature of Buonaparté, has appointed to that post another creature of Buonaparté. The publication of these papers is, of itself, a sufficient proof of the resentment of the Maltese, who have produced and promulgated them on their island as evidence of British injustice and perfidy, and who have resolved, in order to avenge themselves on us, to throw themselves and their island into the hands even of the French! They have, we are well informed, an agent now at Paris, negotiating with the court of St. Cloud. Their request is to be a free and independent state, *under the protection of France*. They wish France to support them in their resistance of the Knights, in their resistance of that abominable system, which England had framed for "their *happiness*." They offer to receive, at all times, an unlimited number of French ships, of all sorts, into their ports, upon the condition, that only a limited number of French troops shall, at any one time, be permitted to land on their island.——Whether Buonaparté will listen to these propositions is more than we can say; but, if he does not, it is because the agreeing to them might, in some degree, retard the views which he has of obtaining, through the means of his tool, the Grand Master Thomasi, an exclusive possession of the island, an object which, we doubt not, he will, in one way or other, very soon accomplish.

TO THE RT. HON. LORD AUCKLAND, &c.

My lord,—The newspaper editors having published a paragraph, purporting to be a speech delivered by your lordship, in the House of Lords, on the 2d instant; which pretended speech is calculated to destroy the public credit of the country, I have, after some hesitation, resolved to trouble your lordship with a few words, in order to convince you of the necessity of removing the dangerous impression, which your silence might produce. These editors (for they all agree in their report) impute to you the following statement: "that the net revenue of the country would be found to "exceed £34,000,000. sterling, of which, "after deducting about £17,600 000 for "the discharge of the National Debt, there "would be the sum of £16,400,000 *applicable to public purposes*." Now, my lord, as it is well known, that you may be regarded as a steady supporter of all the measures, not only of this administration, but of every administration, past, present, or to come, I have been a good deal alarmed, lest the speech, thus imputed to your lordship, should be looked upon as an indication of a design, which the present or future minister has conceived of *annihilating the Sinking Fund*, together with all the provisions for the reduction of the Debt. These news editors make you say, in addition to what I have above quoted: "that you have the "most sanguine hopes on this important "national subject, and that you entertain "no doubt of being able to establish your "statement by documents."—If your lordship should make it out that the net revenue amounts to £34,000,000. and that the discharge of the annual expenses of the National Debt demands no more than about £17,600,000. it certainly will not be very difficult to prove, that there are £16,400,000 remaining, "*applicable to public purposes*." But, my lord, unless, in those *public purposes*, your lordship means to include the expenses of the Sinking Fund, which amount annually to about £5,800,000. you must, if the report of your speech be correct, have in view the annihilation of that fund. "Applicable to public purposes!" If this has any meaning at all, it refers to a sum that is *not* already pledged; it refers to what, in the language of traders, is called *loose cash*, that the minister may employ in war or in any thing else that the times may call for; but your lordship must know, that the annual £1,000,000. the annual £200,000. the annual £2,500,000. arising from the 1 per cent. upon capitals created since 1793, together with the annual produce of fallen-in annuities, and of stock bought up by the commissioners; all these, amounting annually to about £5,800,000 your lordship well knows, are pledged, fast pledged, for the support of the Sinking Fund, and therefore cannot be "applicable" to any other purpose whatever. The fact is, my lord, that the persons above-mentioned have taken your lordship's words, and have given to them the appearance of a most jesuitical attempt to deceive the vulgar, the mere porter-drinking politicians. Your lordship knows, as well as I do, that, for this very year, in which I am now writing, and for each succeeding year, there must be paid, *in taxes*, on account of the National Debt, more than £24,000,000. whereas your speech has been so distorted as to tend to make poor ignorant people believe, that the annual expense of the debt absorbs only £17,600,000. and that there are £16,400,000. a year remaining to be expended, if need be, in powder and ball.

Having troubled your lordship so far, I am tempted to go a little farther, in order to call your attention to an account, which has just been published, of the Consolidated Fund, for the quarter ending on the 5th of last month, and which, as far as it goes, exhibits a complete refutation of the estimates laid before the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 10th of December last, (1) the correctness of which estimates it was your lordship's laudable intention to establish. Mr. Addington, in order to keep *within the mark*, stated the surplus of the Consolidated Fund, for the present year, at £6,500. The result of the first quarter of the year, according to the official account, dated on the 21st ult. is as follows:

Income	£6,796,238	8	1
Charge	5,758,905	17	8
Surplus	1,037,332	10	5

The dividends charged on the income of the quarters ending in July and January are each of them about £2,000,000 greater in amount than are those which are charged on the April and October quarters; so that, unless there be a very great rise in the income in the three remaining quarters of the year, I am afraid Mr. Addington must seek for his surplus in the bag of DOCTOR VAL, or of some other potent conjuror.—I have constantly given it, as my opinion, that the surplus of the present year will fall more than £2,000,000. short of the minister's estimate;(2)and now, I believe, few persons will be found to controvert that opinion.—I beg your lordship to believe, that this is a source from which I derive no pleasure. Could I have had my choice, I would rather have seen my calculations prove erroneous; but, as it is now very clear, that deception was practised upon our Sovereign, upon his parliament, and his people, I am by no means sorry, that I was the first to detect and expose it. Nothing, my lord, is more injurious to the permanent credit of a country than exaggerated statements on the part of a minister of finance; and the man, who can make such statements, for the sake of any political purpose whatever, merits the severest reprobation. Mr. Addington's estimate of December has produced a lasting depreciation in public credit: it has deceived hundreds of thousands, and has ruined not a few, whose mouths are filled with bitter reproaches against him, nor are they more bitter than just. With respect to the people at large, too, flattering financial statements have a most fatal tendency. The country is deceived; men's minds are not prepared for the contributions which they are called upon to make; the minister always comes to parliament, and the tax-gather to the doors of individuals, with a demand, which is heavy and vexatious only because it is *unexpected*. And, if such misrepresentations ought always to be avoided, they ought at this time more especially, when every thing indicates the absolute necessity of great and permanent pecuniary sacrifices. I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Str. West. 4th May, 1803.

(1) See Register, Vol. II. p. 780.
(2) See Register, Vol. II. p. 550.

Richmond Park, April 29, 1803.

SIR,—Your insertion of the following account of my situation will extremely oblige a moderate man, of moderate talents, as you will perceive; and if you can give him any advice that may extricate him from his present embarrassing ideas, it will be received with gratitude.—You must be informed, Sir, that for many years I presided over a large mansion, where nothing was done without consulting me, and I was much respected by all my neighbours; but, as there were inconveniencies attending the place, and my family was numerous, I thought it prudent to economize; and, for that purpose, removed to a lodge in Richmond-Park, which a friend gave me, rent-free. My business frequently led me to town; and, as the roads are sometimes dangerous, I was, at first, for the sake of security, induced to vary my route homewards, that I might not be waylaid by some daring highwayman: but I here placed the foundation of a passion that harasses my mind extremely; yet such is the force of habit, that, vexatious as it is, I cannot prevail on myself totally to discard it.—It is no less, Sir, than a resolution to go in and out of town, by a different road, every day, in which I have met with so many adventures, as I think will deter others from such singular speculations. In charity I publish them.—In my way to town, as I was not much known at first, I passed quietly enough, the country people are so good natured; but, by crossing the fields, my name soon became known, and, by way of distinction, I was called *The Doctor*, which title, some of the servants had mentioned to have belonged to my papa; and as the idea of rank spreads rapidly, wherever I went, by whatever lanes or crooked paths I passed, I heard the term *Doctor*, continually sounding in my ears, as if the claim to such distinction had been

written in my face, which indeed is not by any means so expressive. It is only simple, good-natured, as if the owner was fond of water-gruel. At last, however, in the country, I was considered with that courtesy granted to silly people, and which entitles them to be privileged in their thoughts and actions.—I was frequently forced to hear discussions of the merits and demerits of the Richmond Doctor, under a pretence of being deaf. But my adventures in my way to town were not numerous; I was always in a hurry to do the business I had left unfinished the day before, and from this reason was in a certain degree compelled to relinquish this part of my project.—My first plan to return to Richmond was through Windsor, and my servant, apparently a little surprized, went on through Hounslow; but when he found I took such a round in my way home, not observing the private nod I made, *en passant*, to my friend near the Castle, he grumbled very much about my whimsicals, as he called them.—The next day I went by Wimbledon, to see if any thing new was going on there, and looked over Lord Spencer's pailings, but could hear of nothing but sinking wells, in great perseverance, for which his lordship is famous, and of indefatigable activity, for his time of life, in an elderly gentleman of that neighbourhood.—I one day sent my horses to the end of Oxford-road, intending to go round Hyde-park, and I walked towards Bond-street, when I suddenly recollected, that somebody once told me that one side of that street was fashionable, the other vulgar; and as I could not remember the proper side, the classic of "*in medio tutissimus ibis*," became my guide, to the great amusement of the people, but to the vexation of many a charioteer.—Once I thought of sending my horses to Whitechapel, and going home by the City-road: in my way, curiosity led me into Lloyd's Coffee-house, where, I believe, they actually took me for a madman, for they immediately turned me out; and, as misfortunes seldom come single, a shower of rain sent me for shelter to the Stock Exchange, when a set of Jews absolutely hustled me, and I was glad to escape with my life.—On one fine day, I thought of going by water a little way down the river, directing my horses to meet me at the Isle of Dogs. I took a boat at Westminster, and was much entertained with the grandeur of the city of which I had previously no adequate idea. As we approached London-bridge, observing the immense and tremendous current under it, I was terrified beyond imagination, and begged of my conductors to pull ashore; but, to my extreme astonishment, they declared it was too late to return, and that there was no danger: in fact, these sailors swore they would answer for me, if I would only trust to them, and they really did carry me safe through a very awful scene.—I may again trouble you, at a future day, with some more of my adventures, and am, Sir,

PROJET ET CONTRE PROJET.

DOMESTIC.

The following account of the transactions of Wednesday last, we copy from a morning paper, without adopting any one of the sentiments which it contains.

"One of the most infamous frauds and impositions ever practised, yesterday threw the whole City of London into confusion. Some persons, yet unknown, about half past 8 o'clock, or about 9, sent the following letter to the Lord Mayor:—"*To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor*:—Downing Street, 8. a.m.—Lord Hawkesbury presents compliments to the Lord Mayor, and has the honour to acquaint his lordship that the negociation between this Country and the French Republic has been amicably adjusted."—The Lord Mayor, without the least suspicion of fraud, sent a copy to Lloyd's, stuck up the substance of the note on the Mansion-House and went himself to the Stock Exchange. The market began at 69, and the price varied to 70¾. No suspicion appears to have been entertained for three hours. At length the following letter from Lord Hawkesbury arrived at the Mansion House.—"Downing Street, May 5. My Lord.—As I have just been informed that a letter has been sent to your lordship, pretended to be signed by me, respecting the state of the negotiations, between this Country and France, I lose no time in informing your lordship, that no such letter has been sent by me, and I request, therefore, that you would take immediate steps for undeceiving the public, and detecting the daring forgery. I have the honor to be, &c. &c. *To the Rt. Hon. the Lord Mayor.* HAWKESBURY." Previous to this, however, Mr. Goldsmid having called at the Mansion House, on seeing the paper, pronounced it a forgery. The Lord Mayor on finding that he had been made the dupe of an imposture, took every method in his power to undeceive the Public.—Government mean-while were active in contradicting this atrocious fraud, and counteracting its effects. The following Official Note was sent round to all the evening papers.—"*To the Editor.*—Treasury, May 5, 1803.—1 o'clock. Sir, I have to acquaint you, that the Message, which was supposed to have been sent this morning from Lord Hawkesbury to the Lord Mayor, stating that the negociations with France had terminated amicably, is a fabrication, and totally destitute of truth. I am, Sir, &c. JOHN SARGENT." Upon the discovery, it is impossible to conceive the tumult and indignation which broke out at the Stock Exchange: all was consternation and uproar. A great deal of business had been done. Business was suspended, and a deliberation rather of a hasty kind was held, to consider what was to be done. It was resolved that the bargains transacted in the course of the day should be null and void. In this the House have done right, in as far as they could do any thing at all. They have decided that time bargains should not be binding; but certainly it is wholly out of their competence to

decide whether a *bonâ fide* sale and an actual transfer shall be held valid. This will, in all probability, come to be tried by another Tribunal, for we understand that several buyers had directed that the checks they had given for the payment of stock sold should not be paid. If this is not acquiesced in by the seller, a law suit must be the consequence. We understand, however, that several persons are willing to acquiesce in the decision of the House, though not binding in law.—An extraordinary Committee has been appointed to investigate the whole of this mysterious affair. The Committee sat last night. One of their objects is to examine the accounts of every member of the Stock Exchange, both for the transactions of Wednesday and yesterday, to endeavour to find out whether there be any traces of a concerted design having been acted upon. The House has offered a reward of 5,000l. for a discovery of the actors in this villainous fraud, and the Lord Mayor, individaully, has offered a reward of 500l. The inconvenience, though more conspicuous, and the loss to individuals in the event of sales being adhered to more considerable, in the Stock Exchange, was not confined to it. Merchants immediately set about putting their affairs in a train adapted to peace, and *order and counter order* quickly succeeded a short period of unexampled bustle and agitation. Besides, expresses were sent off with important orders, which it was necessary instantly to recall.—Indeed from what we observed, and have been told, nothing has happened for many years which has excited so great a sensation. It *exceeded* even the surprise which the signing of the Preliminaries produced.—The Lord Mayor was not at home when the card was delivered. We are told that the person who brought it was booted and spurred, and seemed to have come from a journey; that he wore a great coat; that he had a grey-hound on his button, like a King's messenger, &c. Some now say, that he spoke with a foreign accent; that he gave in the letter by the side door, not at the front gate, &c. These circumstances, so far from allaying should have excited suspicion: for it was not to be supposed that Lord Hawkesbury would send the messenger who arrived from Dover. Besides, there was time sufficient to make inquiries. The circumstance of the communication coming from the Lord Mayor lulled all suspicion, because it was naturally supposed that the Lord Mayor had reason to be satisfied from the manner in which the inteligence was brought to him, &c. that the communication was authentic. —The impression of Lord Hawkesbury's seal, it appears, is genuine. It had been taken whole from a letter, and dextrously affixed to the Lord Mayor's letter by some fresh wax!—The transactions of yesterday being held to be cancelled, there has been no price of stocks issued. It was stated, however, that the prices fell to something below 63, and again rose to 64, in private bargains."—*(Morning Chronicle).*

The *joyful intelligence* spread through this large City, with the rapidity of lightning, and it is impossible to describe the demonstrations of *satisfaction* and *joy* which were every where expressed.—Never was there such a scene of *consternation* and *confusion* as that which took place immediately after the discovery of the imposition. Between one and two o'clock, the confusion and uproar about the Stock Exchange were unexampled. Every one believed the fabrication to have originated with some persons about the Stock Exchange. The gaping throng flocked to Capel-court, looking out for the scene of the bulls and bears saying, "*Aye, this must be the place by the crowd and noise.*" In the mean time those who had been gambling, were passing to and fro, some swearing the bargains should stand good, others swearing they should not. Indications of scenes *à la Belcher* were even given. The mutual heat and fury were great, still the mob rolled on to see the *Peace* and *Peace-makers*, the *Temple of Peace* as some called it, till at last the neighbourhood was impassable." *(Morning Post.)*

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

KING OF FRANCE.—The Morning Post of Monday last, from whence it has been copied into the other papers, has given the particulars of a transaction, as extraordinary in its nature, as it is important in its issue, and in the consequences which must necessarily result from it. We allude to the proposition made, at the desire of Buonaparté, to Louis XVIII. his master. Although what has appeared in these papers is not altogether correct, it is, nevertheless, founded in fact. We have for some time been in possession of this intelligence, together with the circumstances attending it, and should, before now, have laid them before our readers, had we not been restrained by great and important considerations. These considerations, which still exist, prevent us from entering, at present, into so detailed an account as we could otherwise have desired, of what has passed upon this subject; but we can assure our readers, that we will not fail to present them, as soon as we prudently can, with a faithful and circumstantial detail of the proposition which has been made to Louis XVIII. together with the noble and dignified answers of this magnanimous Prince. We shall then see, that the conduct of this unfortunate Monarch, on the 26th of February last, renders him a thousand times greater than Louis XIV. after his most brilliant victories and important conquests: we shall then see the bitterest enemy of the King of France reduced to the necessity of acknowledging, that this circumstance, if he had no other claims, from his long calamities and the courage he has constantly shewn in adversity, would alone entitle him to immortality; they will then confess, that, by the noble manner in which this prince rejected the insidious propositions which were made him, he has shewn himself, at once, the father of his people, the real friend of his faithful subjects, the protector of all sovereigns, and that, proud of his misfortunes, and with no support but the justice of his cause and the legitimacy of his rights, he has rendered more real service to France, to Europe, and to the whole world, in one day, than all the armies and all the coalitions, that have not for their real and avowed object, the

re-establishment of the Bourbons on the throne of their ancestors, will ever be able to accomplish.

As in all great events, it is highly essential, in order to form a correct judgement, to be acquainted with the most minute details, and as facts, in passing from mouth to mouth, are generally distorted, we entreat our readers to be upon their guard against the various reports to which this circumstance may give birth: in the mean time, we present them with the following outline.

A person charged with powers and instructions from the King of Prussia, presented himself, on the 26th of February last, to Louis XVIII. for the purpose of engaging him to abdicate and renounce his legitimate rights, and to obtain a similar renunciation from the princes of his family. No negotiation whatever took place. A formal and positive, though dignified, refusal immediately followed the proposition. The newspapers are mistaken, when they assert, that the proposition was rejected by the King of France with contempt. Contempt is a sentiment incapable of finding a place in the bosom of a King, and more especially of such a King as Louis XVIII. A "brilliant "establishment," a "certain and permanent "existence," for the unfortunate Monarch and his family; such were the written expressions presented to him; and, although the promise of the Kingdom of Poland was not formally expressed, we can, nevertheless, assure our readers, that such was the intention of Buonaparté, and his mediator the King of Prussia, who relied upon the acquiescence of Russia and the other principal powers of the Continent, although, it appears, that those powers had never been consulted. And as indemnities are now become fashionable, and, under this pretext, we are accustomed to consider a seizure of the possessions of our neighbours, in order to aggrandize ourselves, justifiable, it was proposed to give Hanover, Hamburg, Bremen and the adjoining countries to Prussia; a portion of Turkey to the Emperors of Russia and Germany; and Egypt, of course, to the Corsican Usurper, as the reward of his good offices. It is evident that this plan was entirely directed against this country, and our readers will not fail to perceive, that the King of France, by his noble conduct on this occasion, has proved, that if England has no greater enemy than Buonaparté, so she has no friend more faithful or sincere, than Louis XVIII.

Many persons seem to consider it extraordinary, that the King of Prussia should have lent his assistance to such a mediation. We are, certainly, far from approving such a line of conduct; but we have powerful reasons for believing, that on this, as well as on many other occasions, the wishes of this monarch are at variance with his actions. The Treaty of Basle, which, in 1795, his perfidious ministers obliged him to sign with the execrable Convention which at that time governed France, placed him in a situation which has constantly obliged him, ever since that moment, to yield to circumstances. It is not, therefore, the Monarch, whom we ought to blame or accuse, but the infamous advisers with whom he is surrounded, and who, from one false step to another, are insensibly conducting him to his ruin.

It is not a little extraordinary, that, while all the Sovereigns of Europe, since the murder of the unfortunate Lewis the XVI. have treated his lawful successor as if he had no claims whatever to the throne of France, an Usurper and a rebel subject should be the first to *acknowledge* the legitimacy of those claims, by the proposition he has made for an abandonment of them.

The Navy.—A motion brought forward, in the House of Commons, on the 4th instant, by Sir Henry Mildmay, has, at last, produced some little information from the ministers, on this most important subject. They declined giving any thing very unequivocal; but what they said amounted to a tacit acknowledgment of the truth of all our former statements relative to the decrepid state of the navy. Mr. Addington stated, that there were 32 ships of the line *in commission* in our European ports; but he did not venture to state the number *fit for sea*, which our readers may be assured does not, even now amount to *ten* after two months of preparation, after two months of imminent danger of invasion! The debate, to which we allude, brought from the Chancellor of the Exchequer an explanation of his memorable promise of fifty additional ships of the line, in the space of a month. That promise was made on the 2d of December last, and in the following words:— "What apprehension can be felt for our "safety, when it is known, that, by the *pru-* "*dent* and *wise* conduct of the First Lord "of the Admiralty, such arrangements are "made, that, in case of emergency, *fifty* "sail of the line can be prepared *for sea* "within one month, and even a larger "number, should the exigency be pressing? "Thus are we situated, *ready for any event.*" —The explanation given to this promise, in Mr. Addington's speech, in answer to Sir Henry Mildmay, on the 4th instant, was this:—"The Honourable Baronet, has," said he, "incidentally thrown out an ex- "pression, that the system of the Board of

" Admiralty is such as to starve the sup-
" plies for the public service, and has al-
" luded to an expression which fell from me
" on a former occasion; that in case of an
" emergency fifty sail of the line would be
" ready for sea within the space of a month.
" Now, Sir, I will rather risk the imputa-
" tion of having uttered unguarded language
" than have any improper insinuation thrown
" out against the present Board of Admi-
" ralty. I never said that within a month
" from the time that an emergency should
" occur, fifty sail of the line would be *com-*
" *pletely manned and ready for service.* But I
" said, and I state it again, not on my *own*
" authority, but on the authority of one
" who I am confident is *incapable of de-*
" *ceiving me*, that within a month after an
" emergency, there would be ready, fully
" *rigged* and *fitted out*, fifty sail of the line.
" I did not, when I made this statement,
" allude to the *complement of men*."—What a shuffle! No; not even a shuffle, but a most miserable *attempt* at a shuffle. The promise was, fifty sail of the line, " pre-
" pared (or ready) *for sea*." This the candid gentleman does not deny; but, he says, that " *ready for sea*" means only " fully *rig-*
" *ged* and *fitted out*," and does not include the circumstance of *manning*, which he seems to regard as not properly belonging to the readiness of a ship! But, when we say a ship of war is ready *for sea*, do we not always mean, that she is in a state that requires nothing but orders and a fair wind to send her *out to sea to fight against the enemy?* Is not this the grammatical as well as the technical meaning, is it not the obvious, is it not the only meaning, of the words? Since, then, Mr. Addington has now declared, that he was *not* deceived with respect to the exertions of which the Admiralty was capable; and, as he has acknowledged that those exertions were *not* adequate to the preparing of fifty sail, in the space of a month, completely manned, it inevitably follows, either that he thought the ships might *sail out and fight without men*, or, that he told the parliament and the country *an intentional falsehood*, any thing in the prosecution of the Plymouth Tinker to the contrary notwithstanding. This fact, however, did not want to be confirmed by his speech of Thursday night: it was well established before, and would long ago have been resented, in a manner to drive him from his ill-gotten power in any country but this, and in this country too, at any former period of its history.——But, after all, the question is, how does the navy stand *now?* How many ships of the line are there in our European ports, ready for sea, not without men, but with men? Not *ten*. Positively we assert, *not ten*. There are no men. We have ships enough; but, for any purposes of national defence, they are as useless as the huge stones upon Salisbury Plain. Nor were the present difficulties unforeseen. In descanting on the disadvantages which the peace of Amiens would produce with respect to the renewal of the war, if it should be found necessary, we made, so long ago as October last, the following observations:——" Well do we re-
" member, that (Lord Hawkesbury) in
" stating the relative strength of the two
" countries, made a proud enumeration of
" our ships; but, ships without *men* are only
" useless masses of timber and iron, and the
" men who formed the soul of our eight
" hundred and thirty-four armed ships *are*
" *now nearly all scattered far beyond the reach*
" *of a press-gang*. It is said, that from ten
" to twenty thousand of these men have
" gone to France. This is improbable;
" but, we have very good reason to believe,
" that several thousands have gone thither;
" and to the United States of America such
" is their desire to go, that ships bound
" to that country are now, especially from
" Bristol and Liverpool, frequently navi-
" gated free of the expense of seamen's
" wages. That the artificers, of which the
" dock-yards are already stripped, will fol-
" low the example of the sailors, there can
" be no doubt, nor can there be any, that
" their loss will be most severely felt. This
" loss, both of sailors and of artificers, would
" have taken place, to a certain degree, at
" the peace, whenever and however it might
" have been made; but, if France had
" been, by the treaty, reduced within pro-
" per bounds, or if we had retained foreign
" possessions to balance, in some sort,
" against her acquisitions on the Continent;
" in other words, if we had preserved, un-
" diminished, our *navigation* and our *honour*,
" neither poverty nor shame would have
" driven our sailors and shipwrights to
" France, Holland, and America."—These observations have been but too soon and too fatally verified. There are no sailors to be found for the Royal Navy; neither bounties nor press-gangs can reach them; they are gone after the *honour of the flag*, which was formerly their boast, and which was basely bartered away by the peace, that peace, that ruinous and infamous peace, from which have flowed all the evils now experienced by this dishonoured country. Queen Mary, when at the point of death, told her attendants to have her opened, and to look for Calais at the bottom of her heart. So, when England expires, at the bottom of her heart will be found the poisonous, the corroding,

the accursed treaty of Amiens.——There are persons, who, feeling the just severity of our censures, cut down by our exposure of their criminal selfishness and deceptions, attempt to retaliate by attributing to us a desire to witness the dishonour of our country. Did the editor of this work discover such a desire, when, at the risk of his property and his life, he stood alone in resisting the efforts made by the hirelings of ministry, to compel him to exhibit signs of joy at the conclusion of the ignominious treaty, which is the cause, and the only cause, of all our present embarrassments, and of all the calamities and horrors that attend us? Where were, then, those diurnal writers, who now lend their pens to prefer this atrociously false accusation against him? Where were you then, you base rampant creatures? Hailing the harbinger of peace; hanging on the skirts of the insolent Lauriston; unanimously joining in the shouts of the rabble; echoing the cry of "peace and plenty!—Peace "and a large loaf!" and reviling those who had the sagacity to foresee, and the honesty to foretell, the very troubles which have now come upon the country, and which you yourselves deplore, only because you personnally feel their mischievous effects. And, where will you be found, should the French make a successful invasion of our Island? Under the banners of your Sovereign? No; but in the camp of the enemy; at the headquarters of their commander, making him a tender of your treacherous services. Amongst millions of the base, you would be the basest; amongst hundreds of thousands of traitors, you would take special care to merit the infamous pre-eminence.

THE MESSAGE.—In our last Summary, under the head of Cape of Good Hope, we endeavoured, (and we believe with some degree of success) to convince our readers, that the Message, which the ministers advised his Majesty to make to Parliament, stated, as reasons for arming, facts which did not exist. The "*preparations going on* "*in the ports of France and Holland*" we believe to be a mere pretext, and this belief is now confirmed, as far as any thing can be said to derive confirmation, from the acknowledgments of the present ministers; one of the Lords of the Admiralty having declared, in Parliament, that "he desired "to state, in the most unqualified terms, "that in all parts of the world we had a "naval force much more than adequate to "cope with the force of any power in Eu-"rope, and that at home our force was "amply sufficient to meet any French "force, which, indeed, consisted *of nothing* "*better than fishing boats*, and *existed only in* "*in the minds of a few gentlemen on the* "*other side of the House.*"—What a declaration to make in the face of the country, and of all Europe, at a moment when we are endeavouring to fit out a fleet, and when the militia is embodied, under the pretext of *repelling a contemplated invasion* on the part of France! An attempt was made to explain away the meaning of this memorable acknowledgment, to turn it into a mere professional boast; but, this was not thought of, till the inconvenience, which would result from the confession, was pointed out. Here, then, the assertions of the French Government, with respect to the principal alleged cause of the armament, are fully corroborated by the ministers themselves; and, on our parts, we have more than ever reason to suspect, that the apprehensions which those ministers entertained of the consequences that would follow the intelligence of their recapture of the Cape, was the principal, if not the only real cause, of the Message and the armament, and that the dispute, about which negotiations are now going on, was *made* by the ministers themselves, in order to disguise the true object of their hostile measures. This is our firm belief; and, as we before observed, the papers, relative to the negotiation, will, if they are ever made public, establish the truth of all our conjectures on the subject.—For this reason, therefore, if for no other, the ministers will patch up an accommodation, if possible. They dare not show the papers, and, if they will but preserve peace, the base nation will not trouble itself about the means they have made use of to attain the blessed object.

CHANGE OF MINISTRY.—On this subject nothing new has transpired; but, as being closely connected therewith, we think it right to notice the recent defection of the two newspapers, the *True Briton* and the *Sun*, which, till within these few days, were under the absolute controul of the Treasury. These prints were originally established by the Treasury, through the medium of MR. GEORGE ROSE, late Secretary, who committed them to the direction of a Scotchman, named JOHN HERIOT. The types, &c. &c. were paid for out of the public money, and the property was given to HERIOT, who, as long as it was understood that MR. PITT (and Mr. Rose, of course) approved of the conduct of the present ministry, defended and eulogized that ministry on every occasion, but who has now left them, from the same motives that sagacious vermin desert a house which has long been their favourite haunt.—In pos-

session of these facts, the reader will enter on the following interesting contrast with peculiar advantage. When he has read one paragraph, we request him to read the opposite one, paying great attention to the *dates*.

LORD ST. VINCENT AND THE ADMIRALTY.

On Mr. Addington's clear and satisfactory statement of the naval strength of Great Britain we *congratulate* the country. In case of any sudden emergency, what can we have to apprehend? If *fifty additional sail of the line could be equipped in a month*, how much larger a proportion of frigates, sloops, cutters, gun-boats, &c. might not, even, in a less time, be prepared. (*Dec.* 2. 1802.)

We are the sincere friends and zealous supporters of the government, though we disdain to become like *the Times*, the mean panegyrists of the Admiralty, the only department of the public service, to which the charge of *incapacity* and *misconduct* can truly attach. (*April* 8, 1803.)

We are happy to learn that the *alacrity* with which seamen re-enter the service *is absolutely without example*. This is, indeed, a genuine proof of British spirit! especially as immediate views of gain, in case of a renewal of the war, cannot be their inducement.—(*11th March*, 1803.)

Several more ships of the line have within these two days been commissioned, but there is *a great complaint of want of men*. The reign of terror at the Admiralty must cease, before either officers or men will come forward with *alacrity*. (*April* 8, 1803.)

The reports which have been so *industriously* circulated of the intended resignation of Earl St. Vincent, *are wholly without foundation*. (*March* 8, 1803.)

It is quite certain that Earl St. Vincent will, very shortly, resign his office as First Lord of the Admiralty. The only cause of delay is the difficulty of finding some one to accept of the office in his room. We would earnestly recommend to whoever is his successor, *to tread back most of the steps which his Lordship has taken* since he has been at the head of that department. (*April* 19.)

They [the ministers] need not deprecate the continuance of an opposition, which has so recently *stigmatized itself by its resistence to a measure for the reform of abuses*, which was so loudly called for, and the *necessity* of which has been so long acknowledged. (*Feb.* 4, 1803.)

The Commissioners appointed to inquire into the *abuses* of the navy, are called upon by Parliament for a report of their proceedings, but the three naval officers having long lost the aid of the two legal commissioners, they are at a loss whether to form the line a-breast, or throw out a signal of distress. (*April* 29.)

FINANCE.

This great financial measure, on which we believe, but one opinion prevails, has *established his reputation* in that difficult branch of public business. (*Jan.* 4, 1801.)—We cannot but *congratulate* the country upon the flourishing and prosperous state of its resources, which has been *proved beyond all doubt*, by the unanswerable documents brought forward by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. (*Dec.* 29, 1802.)

It is understood that Lord Grenville means to attack the financial statement made by the minister *in December last*. In the statement alluded to we *fear* some *inaccuracies* have *crept in*. (*May* 2, 1803.)

ABLE AND WISE ADMINISTRATION.

Our minister is highly respected abroad. His *talents*, are of *the very first* rate description. None better than him knows the value of the *blessings of peace*: but if forced into a war, *an event not at all probable*, he will possess the fullest confidence of the nation. (*November* 20, 1802).—To those who have hazarded the *idle* and *unfounded* accusation of *want of energy* and *vigour* against our ministers, we answer by a single question—What solitary instance can be adduced, since his Majesty called them to their present situations, *that can furnish even a colour for it?* (JAN. 1, 1803).—We know, that we have a government, *able, observant, vigilant*, and *firm*; and (wholly indifferent to the charge of *adulation* and *subserviency*) we readily leave to the public to determine, whether our *confidence* does or does not sympathize with the feelings and opinions of our countrymen at large. (*Feb.* 28, 1803).

Whatever may be the issue of the present negotiation with France A STRONG ADMINISTRATION will be NECESSARY FOR OUR SECURITY. In whatever way the present negotiation with France ends, the country will naturally look to a *strong* administration, because experience has taught us that we have only difficulty to expect. It is hardly necessary for us to say, that among the present ministers there are *some* whom we most highly respect—in whose talents and whose characters we have great confidence: but these are times in which *every* department should be filled with the ablest men in the country. We have already expressed our disappointment and regret, in observing the conduct of the Naval Department, and when we look *round*, much as we respect *some* of his Majesty's ministers, we must own, that UNLESS SOME CHANGES take place, *our best consolation will rest in the faint hope of secure Peace.*"—(*Apr.* 29).

ADDINGTON AND PITT.

That *consistent* statesman, Lord Grenville, is pleased to tell us, that Mr. Pitt is the ONLY person, at the present crisis, capable of saving the country!!!—The measures of a Government may be very wise and highly salutary to the country, whose affairs are intrusted to its management, though unaccompanied with the *display of extraordinary* ORATORICAL talents. Like the powers of mechanism, the affairs of state may generally be considered as going on the *most correctly* and satisfactorily, when there is the *least appearance of effort*.

" ——————— *Stillest* streams
" Oft water *fairest meadows*, and the bird
" That flutters *least* is *longest on the wing*."

Of this quotation we willingly leave to the judgment of our readers, and to the course of time, the justice and propriety of the application. (*February* 4, 1803).

As the ivy that embraces the oak, is sheltered by its proud height and spreading branches from the ravages of the storm, so we cling to the genius of Mr. Pitt, as the surest saviour of our country. *It is he alone that, in our opinion, can successfully cope with the duplicity, the cunning, and the rooted enmity of France towards the British Empire*—It is *he alone*, that can curb and defeat its hostile views in the deceitful calm of nominal peace, or direct our efforts with effect during the less dangerous storm of open and declared warfare. ——We really believe, that Mr. Pitt is himself disinclined to the resumption of official situation; but it is only a small part of the true patriotism of his soul, to sacrifice all personal considerations to the public welfare. Were he called to the chief management of the public affairs by the mandate of his Sovereign, he would, no doubt, feel it his duty to draw around him the best talents which the country can afford; but these arrangements are with us *but very secondary considerations—let but the genius of Mr. Pitt preside, and we shall think ourselves secure.*—(*May* 4, 1803).

To attempt a becoming expression of the indignation and disgust, excited by this loathsome picture of political servility and perfidy, would be vain, and, we trust, useless; for who is there that can view it, without entertaining those feelings in an inexpressible degree! But, we do hope, for the sake of MR. PITT'S reputation, that he will use some means or other to prevent the longer continuance of this most shameful traffic. To be eulogized, to be called for, in publications like these, implies every thing that is mean and suspicious. That he does not sanction, that he does not view with pleasure, the parasitical conduct of the persons who dictate the sentiments of these prints is certain; but, his character requires, that he should *prevent* the promulgation of such sentiments through such channels. The tone, now taken by the *True Briton* and the *Sun*, is regarded, by many, as a prelude to the return to office of all those low and selfish persons, who formerly hung so heavily upon Mr. Pitt, and who, when he retired, dropped off, gorged with the wealth of the nation. Aptly enough do they compare themselves to the *ivy* clinging round the *oak*:

" See there the selfish world pourtrayed
" In that dark look, that creeping pace!
" No flower can bear the ivy's shade;
" No tree support its cold embrace.

" The oak that rears it from the ground,
" And bears its tendrils to the skies,
" Feels at his heart the rankling wound,
" And in its poisonous arms he dies."

Such is the illustration of the figure, which these parasites have chosen: the moral we leave to the contemplation of MR. PITT.

SPLENDID HUMBUG.—Referring our readers to the Domestic head for an account of the facts, relative to the waggish trick, which was, on the 5th instant, played upon the ministry and the stock-jobbers, through the medium of those two sapient personages, Lord Hawkesbury and the Lord Mayor of London, we have to observe here on a circumstance or two, which, in the bustle, seem to have escaped the attention of the public.—And, first, that the charge of an "*infamous fraud*," of a "*daring forgery*," which have been so confidently preferred against the person who played off the joke, are entirely unfounded, unless his intention was to obtain money thereby, which is by no means apparent, or even probable, since he must have known, that any speculations made in consequence of the news, would be rendered of no effect. *Forgery*, according to the statutes, it is none. Lord Hawkesbury may, indeed bring an action, at common law, against the person who has counterfeited his name; but no jury, unless composed of unprincipled stock-jobbers, would give him more than *sixpence* damages. The fact is, that it is a jest, very mortifying, we allow, to the dignified inhabitants of Downing Street and the Mansion House, but no more criminal, either in a legal or a moral point of view, than any of the innumerable tricks that are constantly played off on the first of April; and, therefore, if the wag wants money, we would advise him to turn informer himself, and demand the 5,000 pounds, so "*liberally* offered by the "*gentlemen* of the Stock Exchange." If he be a weak-bodied person, indeed, some caution may be necessary in making himself

known; for, in that case, we should not be surprized if "the *gentlemen* of the Stock "Exchange" were to crucify him. But, let Belcher claim the joke, and we'll answer for his getting the "liberal" reward, the value of which, if we take into consideration the depreciation of money, is, we find, exactly equal to the 30 pieces of silver, so "liberally" paid to Judas Iscariot by the "gentlemen" of Jerusalem.——No, no; there was nothing unlawful, nothing criminal in this trick, unless it had been intended for the purpose of obtaining money. It was a joke, and an admirable joke. The citizens wanted "*good news*," they got it; and now, forsooth, they threaten to tear to pieces the person who gave it them! "It was of such *short duration*." How could he help that? Besides, is not short pleasure better than none? He announced to them the glad tidings of peace. *What* peace he did not say; nor did they *inquire*. Whether short or long, good or bad, honourable or infamous, they never asked. Without hearing a word about *the terms*, they began instantly to rejoice. "Have you heard *the* GOOD *news*," was the question they put to one another. The "*Right Honourable* the Lord Mayor" went, we are told, in person, "to communicate the *glad tidings* to the gentlemen "of the Stock Exchange," and, we are further told, that he wrote to Lord Hawkesbury, the "*safe* politician" Lord Hawkesbury, to thank him for his communication of "the *happy* event." A general *grand illumination* was to have followed, and the Post-Office crew were, very probably, already preparing themselves with stones and bludgeons for the purpose. And, all this, without once asking *what were the terms* of the accommodation! Without even thinking any thing about the object of the armament; without caring a straw about Malta or any thing else; and, we sincerely believe, that if Guernsey, Jersey, the Isle of Wight, or even Ireland, had been the price, it would not have been thought too great for the "inestimable blessing." Such are the principles, on which the treaty of Amiens was made and defended, and such are the principles it has instilled into the minds of this sordid and degenerated people.—The merchants and traders were said to be enraged against Buonaparté, and extremely impatient for a decision on the part of our cabinet; but, the April-fool trick has amply proved, that their rage and their impatience arose from no other cause than the interruption given to lucrative operations. And, it is to us something wonderful, that no one seems to have perceived, that the trick might be of a *political* and not of a pecuniary nature. Mens minds are so entirely filled with ideas of money, that they never imagine it possible for any one to have made use of sham-news of peace, in order *to discover the real sentiments of the nation*, or, at least, of the City of London, which, unfortunately for the honour and independence of England, but too often gives the tone to the country. We do not know, that this was the object of the letter to the Mayor; but, it must be obvious to every one, that it has had this effect; that it has made a discovery which was not to be come at by any other means. The *terms* are now proved to be no obstacle in the way of an accommodation; and that this is a great point gained, is well known to all the profound and enlightened members of our corps diplomatic. Far be it from us to insinuate, that the Richmond-park ministry would have recourse to such an invention (the Plymouth Tinker for that); but we are not bound to discard the supposition with respect to Buonaparté, who, without any violation of that amity, "which so happily subsists between the two countries," and for endeavouring to disturb which Mr. Peltier was prosecuted, might, perhaps, make use of this ingenious method of coming at a true statement of the dispositions of the "*enlightened* people of Great-Britain," whom his official paper has lately asserted not to be fairly represented in Parliament. Be this as it may, the joke, or trick, or whatever else it is, has made the discovery to him, and we may be assured, that he will profit from it, with that address which characterises all his transactions.

POSTSCRIPT.

In the House of Commons, this evening, ministers declared, that intelligence had arrived of Lord Whitworth having applied for passports, in order to leave Paris; and that General Andreossi had also applied for passports, for the purpose of leaving London.—On a motion made by the ministers, for an adjournment to Monday next, of which an amendment (substituting to-morrow instead of Monday) was proposed, there was a debate of considerable length and animation. The ministers finally carried the motion for an adjournment to Monday, 189 to 95.—So! here is a little spirit plucked up at last. It is high time!—The *gallery was cleared* during the debate, on the motion of a ministerial member! —Last Friday was the anniversary of the *demolition of my house*, in Pall Mall!

May 6, 1803. *Wm. Cobbett.*

NOTICES.

MR. COBBETT'S *Letters on Finance* have been republished in a pamphlet, and may be had of HARDING, Pall-Mall, BAGSHAW, Bow Street, and RICHARDSON, Royal Exchange.

MALTESE DEPUTATION.

SIR,—I have seen with great satisfaction, in your Register, the memorials of the Maltese deputies, and think that not only the Maltese, but the British nation are obliged to you, for laying before the publick, documents of such great national concern, that a shameful violation of public faith may not be imputed to a country so justly proud of its honour, which, according to the sentiment of Mr. Fox, is its "proudest possession," but that the infamy may attach only to those few individuals, who, abusing the power intrusted to them, have dared to do that which, from the British throne to the British cottage, must, when heard of, be held in contempt and abhorrence.—But, the reason why I have taken up my pen, is to furnish you with the sequel of the history of the Maltese deputies, which I had an opportunity of knowing, as I saw one or other of them almost every day while they remained in England.—When the deputies had an *unofficial* audience of Lord Hobart, at his *private* house, the Abbé Riccaud, who spoke French more fluently than any of the others, found himself so much hurt by the little impression the statement of their claims made on his Lordship, that he suffered himself to be carried away by the violence of his indignation, and expressed himself in terms the most energetic, and perhaps the most *uncourtly*. He said, in short, every thing that a man devoted to his country, and regardless even of life, which he, though a priest, had often risked in its defence, can be supposed to say when he feels the fulness of its injuries. His Lordship heard all with great patience, but the next day he sent a gentleman to the Abbé to remonstrate with him on the impropriety of his language. He confessed, his feelings had made him forget every consideration but the cause of his injured country; that, though his language might be blameable, the sentiments he had uttered were such as he never should disavow, and that he should adhere to them as long as he had life, conscious that his God must approve them.———An excuse for his having "*perdu là tête*" was carried back to Lord Hobart.—From that day however (it is not for me to insinuate why) the treatment of the deputies was very different: they were in a *private manner*, caressed.—Sir Alexander Ball accompanied them every where, and shewed them the *Lions*, St. Paul's, the Tower, &c. and their expenses were defrayed by government. Before they left England, they wished to be presented to his Majesty. This was promised them, and they were carried *to Windsor*, where they saw the King on the terrace, who certainly spoke to them with such gracious condescension, that, when they returned to London they related it with tears in their eyes.—A few days after the definitive treaty was signed, they resolved to return to Malta, and accordingly they were, at the expense of government, sent to Portsmouth, and carried to Malta in the Acasta frigate. At their departure each of them received *a handsome present in money*,—and they expressed to Lord Hobart, as gentlemen would on such an occasion, their "*gratitude* for all the PERSONAL FAVOURS they had received."—Soon after their departure, Sir Alexander Ball, who had all along attended them, with the greatest assiduity, was appointed his Majesty's minister to the Grand Master and Order of St. John of Jerusalem.—It is well known to me, and it is well known to Lord Hobart, that *since the return of these deputies*, the Maltese have, if it be possible, been *more violent in their opposition to the Order, than they were before*.—The deputies were enjoined by their constituents to represent and enforce all the memorial contained. It must therefore be considered as their instructions and full powers. Never was any deputation from a nation more *legitimate* than this, for, as soon as the deputies had been appointed, it was announced to the people in the whole island by a *written* notification (as his Majesty's civil commissioner refused to allow them to print it,) stuck up at the churches, public offices, and corners of the streets, &c. and all those who had any objection to any one of the deputies, or to any part of the object of the mission, were required to signify the same within three days to the public notary, and it is a most singular circumstance, that there

was not one dissenting voice; as appears by the formal certificates given to the deputies by the notaries.—The deputies, assured me, that, before their departure from Malta, they gave a copy and a translation of their memorial to his Majesty's civil commissioner, to transmit officially to the King's ministry.—Amongst other circumstances, I recollect, their having assured me, that on the arrival of the preliminary articles of peace at Malta, so far from any public rejoicings having taken place, a mournful consternation was visible in every countenance. I have since heard by letter, that, when the people were informed of the final decision of their fate, by the publication of the 10th article of the definitive treaty of Amiens, (*printed* at Malta, with an Italian translation) it was *torn down from all the places where the government had caused it to be affixed*, and, the people became almost furious; but no kind of riot or disorder whatever took place. At length a sad funeral silence ensued, and people moved through the streets as in mournful procession to the interment of their dear-bought liberties.--No cannon were fired. No windows were lighted in Malta!—On his Majesty's next birth day, the cannon were fired as usual. In the evening the ships in the port fired the musketry and the garrison several running fires round the works. There were also fire-works and a general illumination. The repeated and animated huzzas of the Maltese in the streets were louder than the musketry. It is impossible that a more enthusiastic attachment could be testified by any people to their Sovereign, than was shewn by the Maltese on this occasion; and it as plainly spoke their sentiments of his Majesty, as the deputies did of his ministers.—Now, let it be asked, whether those people are worthy to be incorporated into the British empire, or whether they deserve, by its ministers, "*to be sold as slaves for a* "*political consideration.*"——I am, &c. &c.

J. W.

P.S. This last circumstance of his Majesty's birth-day has been confirmed to me, by several officers returned from Malta.

GEN. BENTHAM'S PROJECTS.

SIR,—I am a person understood by the denomination of a plain country gentleman, and having a natural desire for the sea, was, when very young, intended for the service of my country in the naval line. Constant sickness however soon taught me, that it was an element which would be at variance with my constitution, and reluctantly I left it.—I have always felt a pleasure in embracing every opportunity of seeing and contemplating the bulwark of our country, and having heard of the extensive works, which have been carrying on in Portsmouth Yard for some years; such as the constructing new docks, basins, &c. I was lately induced to visit that place, hitherto the great repository of the British navy.—I was shewn two new docks for repairing the largest ships, and told that a canal, which I saw, was next to be converted into docks for smaller ships. There are two new basins for repairing line of battle ships and frigates; planned, as I was told, by General Bentham, together with other immense works, all of which are solely of his plan, and under his direction, and not by the Navy Board, as ever heretofore. These works, I find, have been in hand, constantly employing a great number of workmen, for 11 or 12 years. The first thing which strikes the mind upon surveying these great works is the *national expense:* judge then of my ideas and surprize when told by my conductor, that it was not only an enormous but positively useless expense. Not leaving me in suspense he explained himself directly; he reverted as far back as the glorious war of 1759, and said at the commencement of that war, the ordinary of the post included 49 sail of the line, with frigates in proportion: these were kept in repair and brought forward for commissioning, all through that war, faster than men could be procured to man them, waiting always for men, so remarkably the case at this day. In the peace concluded in 1763 the docks were greatly improved and additional slips for the building of ships were added: and consequently in the next war, called the American, the Dock-yard was always beforehand, so that ships were repaired much faster than men could be found for them. What more then could be wanted, there being ample docks, ample building slips? Here expense should have stopped, but novel and extensive works were to be formed without regard to expenditure, urged by wild speculation to gain a name, and specious representation unhappily succeeded.—That the same readiness of equipment again was found in the last war is recent enough for every one to know, and to the list of ships continuing at Spithead in the years 1793 and 1794 in want of men, every underwriter at Lloyd's of that day can bear feeling testimony: while the enemies cruizers were cutting up our trade, and uninterruptedly enriching themselves, having nothing to oppose. Where then, said my conductor, was the occassion for the enormous expense of new docks, new basins, new works of various descriptions! He then added, eleven or twelve years have these works been carrying on, and one of the docks and

the great basins have been completed some time; but there was no occasion for them, for in the height of this last war, the ships which the old docks contained, required more shipwrights than there were belonging to the yard; and the other Dock-yards, even to Plymouth, were forced to find each their quota of shipwrights to be sent here in aid, and altogether were not enough for the ships already in the old docks, and those coming into the harbour for occasional repairs. Many more in addition to those might have been employed, if more could have been found. He then carried me round the yard and shewed me four line of battle ships of the largest kind lying in docks to receive repairs, in not one of which was there a single shipwright at work. What are the ideas which must naturally strike a foreigner, seeing this; for, although there is a prohibition of foreigners coming into the yards, least they should discover the nakedness of the land; nevertheless, permits from the Admiralty, I am told, are given occasionally, which do admit those who probably have the greatest discernment. The ships before mentioned in the docks, I think were the Queen, Barfleur, Ajax, and Montague: the whole power of the yard being employed, together with the master carpenters of the ships in ordinary *working as common men* (never before known) on board of 3 frigates in the docks, and the ships fitting in the harbour. He added, the want of shipwrights, indeed of every description of artificers and labourers in the yard, (of which you shall hear more hereafter) is one of the blessed effects of discharging men and driving them out of the service, whose youth, vigour, and maturity have been passed in it and attached to it. Many of whom from experience were far better qualified to continue in the performance of their different departments, than the young and new comers placed in their stead, nevertheless too far advanced in life to begin a new line elsewhere. Is this holding forth encouragement for the *King* and *Country's* service? He then shewed me the slips for building line of battle ships, covered with lumber, and told me that there had not been a keel of a line of battle ship laid in this yard the last two years, and that during this time *two* only had been launched, and which had been previously building. — I must own it struck me forcibly, that there should not have been a keel of one ship laid down since the peace in this great dock-yard, while our enemy is known to be so active.—If we have in our late wars equipped ships from our ports faster than men could be procured to man them, the enormous expense of these *new works* is *futile*. Should not a board be appointed to examine such works as to their utility, and to put a stop to wild speculations, tending to drain the vitals of the nation.—I am an admirer of your strenuous endeavours to awaken the nation to a sense of its real situation, and shall conclude with a remark of your own, that "of 600 noblemen and gentlemen; "the constitutional guardians of this coun- "try, no one should be found to examine "into this, is strange indeed."—I am, Sir, yours, &c. VIATOR.

London, 3 May, 1803.

ON THE NAVY.

SIR,—I have perused your Register with great attention for some months past, particularly that part which relates to the conduct of the Admiralty, and having some knowledge of what is going on, in this season of *puffing* and *vain-boasting*, I have presumed to offer a few observations on the measures of that Board. Much has been said in the House of Commons and Morning Papers, upon the *wise* and *politic* proceedings of the Admiralty, but I contend their plans have had a far different effect than what they and their friends suppose, for that which has been held out as an encouragement, is considered a gross infringement upon one of the most important branches of mechanism this country can boast of; I mean the mode which the Admiralty have adopted in distributing apprentices to the shipwrights. In a few years the *modellers* and *draftsmen* will be extinct, for the apprentices brought into the service upon the present system cannot (for the want of a knowledge of the art of drawing, &c. necessary for laying down a ship), have any idea beyond the laborious part. Does the Admiralty think that to be a shipwright it requires no other ability than to dub and chop? I do not mean to say it is necessary every shipwright should possess the knowledge I describe, but it is certainly expedient a proportion of them should. The lads that are now taken into that line are the sons of indigent men, who have it not in their power to give their children an education beyond common reading and writing, and many cannot afford them even those necessary qualifications.—Formerly interest was made to get respectable young men apprenticed to the principal officers of the trade, by which means the mould loft was full of young men of good education, who were capable of obtaining a knowledge of the more intricate branch of their profession.—But, Sir, a most wonderful change for the worse has been, and will continue to be the result of the present measures pur-

sued by the Admiralty; for now, no one of the description I have just alluded to, comes forward, indeed many who were in the service previous to the late regulations, having taken place, have gone in disgust to seek employment elsewhere, and the few now remaining are only waiting a favourable opportunity to follow them.—But, Sir, perhaps the Admiralty will say, we will make those, whose duty we conceive it to be, to instruct the new apprentices in every part of their profession. In answer to which I contend, it is morally impossible for such an order to be complied with, unless the master shipwrights and their assistants turn schoolmasters, and teach the boys to read and write, and so to go on progressively till they arrive at a knowledge of the *geometrical problems, drawing, &c.* for without those qualifications, it will be utterly impossible for them to form the moulds by which the timbers of a ship are put together; therefore, in a few years, when new ships are to be built, (if the present system is pursued) the King's yards will be destitute of artists of this description, to whom fundamental knowledge is as necessary in the construction of a ship, as the materials with which it is composed.—The Admiralty have been obliged to resort to the assistance of the warranted carpenter of ships to do the common duty of working shipwrights. An *unprecedented* measure!!! Adopted in consequence of the want of men in some of the yards, which deficiency, (for a deficiency there is, notwithstanding it was advanced in the House the dock-yards were full of artificers) has been occasioned by the furious and highly inconsiderate conduct of the Admiralty, by their driving from the service a number of the best and most approved workmen.—You observed, some little time since, the Victory could not be got to sea in six months, the Admiralty (I suppose to refute your assertion) have strained every nerve to get her to Long Reach, which they have done by keeping ships in commission which ought to have been paid off three weeks ago, and by taking the pensioners (men sent from Greenwich to assist in fitting the ships) from the *blocks* and *hulks* preparing to guard the mouth of the Thames, and by that measure procrastinated the equipment of those *powerful* means of our *security*, and particularly at a time when the ministers were congratulating the country on their being in such a state of forwardness, so as to take their stations in a few days. It is true the Victory is in Long Reach, with her guns and stores in; but she is yet in want of a *trifling* requisite, *trifling* indeed in the eyes of the minister, I mean the want of men, for I believe last week (independent of her marines) she had not more than 50 on board including officers, men, and boys. She has been commissioned a month, and therefore if their endeavours to procure hands in the same proportion of time is not attended with better success, your statement will prove but *too* true.—With regard to the dock-yards being full of stores, as a morning paper the other day asserted, I have only to observe, respecting the article of timber, the yards in general are very short. Chatham yard I believe is pretty well stocked, but in the others a very great scarcity prevails; I only refer your readers to *Deptford* and *Woolwich*, and I have every reason to suppose the same deficiency will be found at the western yards.—At the commencement of the armament many of the poor fellows on board ship were obliged to sleep night after night on the decks without beds and blankets, and, therefore, numbers were sent to the hospital attacked with severe colds and rheumatism, and this in consequence of the ill-judged conduct of the Admiralty, in refusing to take off the contractors hands a number of those articles he had made during the latter part of the last war for the express purpose of government. Notwithstanding these defalcations, their partizans have the *audacity* to assure the Public, that no want of stores has at any time prevailed. But will they attempt to deny the truth of these assertions? No, Sir, they cannot, they are facts *too* glaring, facts incontrovertible.—The orders of the Admiralty are now so complicated and confused, that individuals hardly know how to act; an order of to-day is contradicted to-morrow. For instance, the Unicorn frigate was ordered from Sheerness to Chatham, to be fitted for service, another order was sent to Sheerness for her to be taken in hand there, which did not arrive till four days after she had sailed for Chatham; the shipwrights, in consequence, were almost at a stand for want of work; whereas, at Chatham, the greatest hurry and bustle prevailed, and, in order to keep the shipwrights at Sheerness employed, they took the Commissioner's yacht into dock, to caulk and copper her bottom; a *trifling* service in comparison with what was going on in other yards. Last October, positive directions were sent to the yards, that artificers were not to be entered whose ageexceeded 28, since which, that *well digested* order has been superseded, and now the extension is to 35, the limited age that was wisely ordered in the days of our ancestors. That these blunders and inconveniencies would not have happened un-

der any other set of men must be, notorious to every well informed person.—Captain Markham observed, on Wednesday last, in the House, that "attacks unjust, unfounded, and malevolent might be made on the conduct of the Admiralty. But how did those attacks accord with the truth? Three months after the proclamation of war in 1793, the effective naval force of Great-Britain was much less than that which we now had in readiness to act against any enemy at the present moment. In every part of the world we had a naval force more than equal to all the strength of the navy of France, which exhibited nothing better than *fishing boats* in their ports, and had, in fact, no existence, unless, perhaps, in the minds of certain hon. gentlemen on the opposite side of the House, and their friends!!!" The most *bare-faced* and *impudent* assertion I ever met with! This precisely corresponds with every part of their former conduct. The Admiralty have invariably taken upon themselves the credit of every plan that was framed by their predecessors. Does the *hon.* captain mean to attach any credit to the present Admiralty for the number of ships that are now on foreign stations? I only wish to remind him, that those ships are the remains of our fleets commissioned during the late war, and that nothing but *dire* necessity has kept them so long abroad, and had it not been for that *lamented* necessity, those very ships which the Admiralty now boasts of as being ready to act, would long since have been dismantled.—I contend we ought to look to the ships that have been *got ready in our harbours at home, since the peace* (and not to those on foreign stations) by which we ought to judge of the exertion and conduct of the Admiralty; let every unprejudiced person do that, and it will be found how very much we have fallen short of what was formerly done on similar occasions, and this in consequence of the *unwise* and *ignorant* proceedings of the Board of Admiralty; a Board that has abused its authority, a Board that has *insulted* and *degraded* almost every person under their controul, of which many hundreds, both civil and military, can bear testimony. —I am, Sir, your hearty well-wisher,

May 8, 1803. L. M.

Extract, from an Italian book, entitled Le Richezze dell' Italia passate in Franchia, &c. —or the Riches of Italy gone into France, or an account of the Plunder made by the French Republic since 1794. (*Italia* 1800.)

	Livres Tournois.
1. Contributions in silver and gold coin - - - -	151,150,000
2. By pillage, requisition, and various other ways, money, jewels, and valuable furniture - - - - -	242,110,000
3. Forced loans, contributions in kind, obtained by requisition, or taken by force, &c. - - - - -	145,000,000
Total	£538,260,000

Besides invaluable productions of the arts, (which never can be replaced) private plunder and destruction of all kind, &c.—Among the treasures of antiquity which during the revolution have been carried from Italy into France, the author mentions the following.—1 The whole of the Archives of the ancient Senate of Venice.—2. The most important documents for the history of this government.—3. An immense collection of natural history, which the *English General at Malta, after the surrender of Valetta, out of respect to the famous philosopher and jacobin*, DOLOMIEU, *sent from Malta to Marseilles in a flag of truce!!!*

FOREIGN COUNTRIES.

Paris, April 27.—The corvettes l'Etormante and la Foudroyante have arrived at Brest from Guadaloupe, which place they left on the 8th of March. —An article from Rennes of the 20th states, "that "two detachments of the 6th regiment of artil- "lery, in garrison in that city, marched a few "days ago for Belle Isle, and the Isles St. Marcou. "Notwithstanding the little appearance of a rup- "ture between France and England, both powers "are taking the necessary precautions."—We are informed from Besançon, under date of the 22d, that Toussaint Louverture, who was in custody at Fort de Joux, departed this life a week ago.

Paris, April 28.—The English evacuated Alexandria on the 17th March. They embarked with them, Mahommed Elfy Bey, as Ambassador Extr. from the Beys to the court of London. The English also took with them all the bronze cannon, and all the military effects which were at Alexandria, so that the Porte will have to send fresh artillery to fortify that place.—Moniteur.—They received on the 24th at Strasbourg, the intelligence that the imperial ratification of the conclusum of the diet had arrived at Ratisbon.—The Prince of Nassau Orange, ci-devant Stadtholder of Holland, has published the convention by which he abandons in entire property to his son, the Hereditary Prince, all the indemnities allotted to him by the Germanic Empire.

Constantinople, March 20.—The Porte has, by another courier, received news from Arabia, which is said to be of a disagreeable nature. According to public report, the Pacha of Mecca advanced with a body of troops against the rebel Abdul Wechab. An engagement ensued. It was fought with obstinacy, and with great bloodshed. The troops

of the Pacha were, in the end, defeated and dispersed.

Petersburgh, March 30.—Upon the arrival of couriers from London, Paris, Vienna, and Berlin, conferences were here opened, in which several of the foreign ministers were invited to take part. We have room to hope, that the result of those negotiations will be favourable to the maintenance of the general peace of Europe. However, the proposal made to England to evacuate Malta, and leave it to be occupied by Russian troops, has not been accepted.

Leghorn, April 13.—The reports of peace and war succeed daily to each other. The English families who were settled here have embarked, disembarked, and re-embarked themselves and their property. The English frigate that is in these roads has ordered all the merchant ships of that nation to quit the port, and to anchor in the roads.

Milan, April 14.—They write from Naples, under date of the 9th of April, that the arrival of an English vessel had occasioned the holding of a Council of State, at the breaking up of which the French Minister expedited a Courier to Paris in all haste. The Courier set out about twelve hours after the English vessel had entered the port. This event has not failed to give birth to several contradictory reports, for instance, of a convention concluded with France for receiving 20,000 men in their ports in case of war, and of another set on foot with England relative to Sicily.

Brussels, May 2.—They write from the Batavian frontiers, that the French troops, which are already arrived at Nimeguen, and in the environs of that place, consist of a body of 6,000 men, which will be augmented according to circumstances. Our troops have also occupied, within these few days, some new places in Holland, on the second, and even the third line. The Batavian Government has given orders to embark, very speedily, the troops destined to reinforce the garrison of the Cape of Good Hope. The last advices received from Flushing import, that all is still in the same situation; that place has been put in a good state of defence; the garrison is exact in its service, but hitherto the other ordinary dispositions in a town in a state of siege have not been carried into execution. The town of Veau, situate in the Isle of Walcheren, has also a French garrison. At Middleburg the garrison is composed of French troops, and a battalion of Dutch infantry.—It is even apparent that all Zealand will be exclusively occupied by French troops.

Paris, May 5.—Lord Whitworth had announced his departure as fixed for yesterday, at five in the morning; the Ambassador has, however, changed his resolution, but it is not said how long the delay will last. Whatever may be the cause of this new incident, it is impossible not to conceive some hope of the preservation of peace.—Much is said of the approaching departure of all the French troops stationed in Switzerland. The greater part of these troops will, it is said, proceed to Italy; the rest to the departments of the ci-devant Alsace and Franche Comté.——*May* 8.—From the news of yesterday it was no longer doubted that the English Ambassador was about to depart, and the report of a rupture between France and England appeared to be confirmed. Since this morning, however, the aspect of affairs is changed, and hopes are entertained that peace will not be interrupted. It is said, that Lord Whitworth's departure is deferred; that he had this morning an important conference with the Minister for Foreign Affairs; and that after that conference a Messenger Extraordinary was dispatched to London.—On the 2d inst. Citizen Thorn, who is appointed by the First Consul, President of the General Consistory of Protestants of Augsburg, in the two departments of the Rhine, took, in that character, the oaths prescribed by the Concordat at the Thuilleries. The three Consuls were seated in chairs, and the New Testament was placed on a table before them. The President knelt down on a velvet cushion, and, laying his right hand on the New Testament, pronounced the oath with a loud voice. The three Consuls then arose, and Buonaparté put several questions to the new President.

DOMESTIC.

From the London Gazette.—St. James', April 28, 1803.—CEREMONIAL *of the Knighthood and Investiture of Gen. Sir D. Dundas, Knight of the Most Honourable Military Order of the Bath.*

The Knights and Officers of the Order, attending in the Privy Chamber, in their mantles, collars, &c. proceeded from thence into the Sovereign's presence, making the usual reverences:—Then by the Sovereign's command, Gen. Dundas was introduced into the presence between the Right Hon. Sir W. Fawcett and the Earl of Malmesbury, the two Junior Knights present, preceded by the Gentleman Usher of the Order, with reverences as before.—The Sword of State was delivered to the Sovereign by Lord De Blaqueire, the Second Knight in seniority, and Gen. Dundas, kneeling, was knighted therewith. Then His Royal Highness the Duke of York, senior Knight, presented the Ribbon and Badge to the Sovereign, and his Majesty put them over the new Knight's right shoulder, who, being thus invested, had the honour to kiss his Majesty's hand, and the procession returned to the Privy Chamber.—The ceremony was performed in his Majesty's closet before the drawing-room, several of the great officers of the court being present.

Crown-Office, April 20, 1803.—*Members returned to serve in this present Parliament.*—Town of Berwick-upon-Tweed—Francis Sitwell, of Barmoor Castle, in the County of Northumberland, Esq and Alexander Allan, of Baker-street, St. Mary-la-Bone, in the County of Middlesex, Esq. in the room of Thomas Hall and John Fordyce, Esqrs. whose election for the said town has been adjudged to be void.

St. James' Palace, May 4, 1803.—His Majesty has been pleased to appoint William Earl of Mansfield, to be Lord Lieutenant of the Shire of Clackmannan, in North Britain.—This day the Chevalier d'Anduaga, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from Spain, had a private audience of his Majesty to deliver his Credentials.—And Rufus King, Esq. Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, had an audience of Leave of his Majesty:—To which they were respectively introduced by the Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and conducted by Sir Stephen Cottrell, Knight, Master of the Ceremonies.—The King was this day pleased to confer the Honour of Knighthood on Colonel Charles Green, William Bulkeley Hughes, Esq Francis Hartwell, Esq. and Samuel Auchmoutty, Esq

Whitehall, May 5.—The King has been pleased to grant to Joseph Hawker, Esq. late Rouge

Croix Pursuivant of Arms, the Office of Richmond Herald, void by the Promotion of Ralph Bigland, Esq. to the Office of Norroy, King of Arms.

St. James' Palace, May 6.—His Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland has been pleased to appoint Major Thornton to be one of his Royal Highness' Equerries.

Extract from Daily Papers.—The following extraordinary communication in a morning print of Saturday (the 7th instant) excited much doubt and anxiety, and operated a complete stagnation of all monied concerns in the city:—

"*TIMES OFFICE,*

"*Saturday Morning, Half past Two o'clock.*

"We stop the press to announce the arrival of "Mr. Silvester, with dispatches from Lord Whit-"worth, and also a French courier, with dis-"patches for General Andreossi.—We have seen "a gentleman who is also this moment arrived "from France. He states, that previous to his "leaving Calais, Mengaud, the French commis-"sary, had received official information from Pa-"ris that the negotiation had been amicably ter-"minated.—In consequence of this joyful intel-"ligence, Mengaud ordered that public demon-"strations of joy should immediately take place; "and when our informant left Calais, the military "were assembling to celebrate the happy tidings. "—The above intelligence, the truth of which we "entertain no doubt, will at once dispel *the gloom,* "which prevailed yesterday, from the apparent "certainty of hostilities.—We have been also fa-"voured with a sight of the Moniteur of the 3d "and 4th inst. and also of the Argus of the last "date.—There is nothing new in these papers. "The French funds were on the 3d at 53f. 25c.—"At the audience on Sunday last, Mr. Monroe, "the American Envoy Extraordinary, presented "his credentials to the First Consul."

To prevent any improper advantage, however, from being taken by those who might possibly be possessed of intelligence, and to learn to a certainty whether the news was true, some of the gentlemen of the Stock Exchange waited on the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, to request the favour of *his sending to Lord Hawkesbury to ascertain the fact.* His Lordship, with great politeness, cheerfully acquiesced, and in consequence it was put to the vote at the Stock Exchange, whether it would not be most proper to suspend all business until the answer arrived. The House was unanimous, and waited with the utmost anxiety until three quarters past twelve o'clock, when the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor came to the Stock Exchange, and addressed them to the following effect:—His Lordship lamented that he had inadvertently and unintentionally been the means of so much mischief, by announcing the impudent forgery which had been practised upon him on Thursday last; but he trusted that the House would do him the justice to believe, that what he did he conceived was for the public good.—[Here was a general cry of "Yes! Yes!"]—His Lordship then stated, that, in consequence of their request, he had written to Lord Hawkesbury, and his messenger was detained until that moment; that he had received, however, an answer from Mr. Addington, which he begged leave to read; it was as follows:—

"My Lord,——As Lord Hawkesbury is not at "the Foreign Office, I have opened your Lordship's "note, conformably to the wish expressed through "your messenger.—If any information had been "received by government, which could properly "be the subject of public communication, your "Lordship may be assured that such communi-"cation would not have been with-held.—I feel it, "however, my duty distinctly to caution your "Lordship against receiving impressions of the "description alluded to, through any unauthо-"rised channel of information.——I have the ho-"nour to be, &c. HENRY ADDINGTON."

Downing-street, Saturday noon.

The following resolutions were then put and unanimously carried, a copy of which was delivered to his Lordship:—"At a meeting of the mem-"bers of the Stock Exchange, held on Saturday "the 7th of May, 1803.—It was unanimously re-"solved, That the thanks of the whole House "should be given to the Right Hon. the Lord "Mayor, for the laudable promptitude displayed "by his Lordship on this day, by communicating "in person, to the members of the Stock Exchange, "an official answer to their application.—It was "farther resolved, that a copy of that resolution "should be transmitted to his Lordship, in tes-"timony of their entire satisfaction in his Lord-"ship's explanation, as well as the most perfect "confidence in the solicitude manifested by his "Lordship for the public welfare.

Signed, by authority,

C. H. HANCOCK, Chairman."

The Lord Mayor then, in a neat speech, returned thanks for the honour done him; and assured them, that at all times he should be happy, and feel it his duty, to attend to what he conceived was material to the welfare of his fellow citizens in general, and to *that House in particular.*—His Lordship afterwards went out by the door which leads into Broad-street, to avoid the crowd which had assembled in Capel-court; and the chairman having given notice, that, on the going round of the *rattle,* business would commence, *the rattle was immediately sprung,* and the first price was 66. They then fell to 65. Considerable sums were sold from that price to 64½, after which they rose to 65¾ for money, 66 for account, and left off at 65¾ for either money or time.

Jamaica.—A dissenting minister, named Campbell, who some time since was a popular preacher in this city, lately went to Jamaica, with the view to convert and *enlighten* the Blacks;—the Magistrates, however, under authority of the law for preventing preaching by persons not duly qualified, ordered him to prison, and the Grand Court, after three day's hearing, confirmed their order. The penalty is six months imprisonment; but this being his first offence there, he was only to be confined a month.—In New England, they would have justly bestowed on him *forty lacking one.*

Gibraltar, April 18, 1803.—On the 14th the Anacreon transport, with the 88th regiment on board, arrived here from Egypt, on their way to England. They sailed from Alexandria with the rest of the army on the 12th of March, the embarkation having taken place on the 11th. They touched at Malta, where the whole of the other ships with the rest of the troops had also arrived before they left it.—His Royal Highness embarks in a few days for England.—By a vessel in eight days from Marseilles we learn, that they are pressing every young man there, and at Toulon also, from 16 to 26, for either the navy or army.

DOMESTIC OFFICIAL PAPERS.

COPIES OF LETTERS RESPECTING THE EXPORTATION OF 5,000 QUARTERS OF SEED CORN TO NORWAY, LAID BEFORE

THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE 9TH OF MAY, 1803.

Letter from Lord Hawkesbury to the Lords of the Treasury, dated 24th March, 1803.

My Lords,—Mr. Gyldenpalm, his Danish Majesty's Chargé-d'Affaires at this Court, has represented to me, by order of his Government, that, owing to the failure of the crops of the last season, the kingdom of Norway is at this moment in the utmost distress for every species of grain. He has consequently applied for permission to export to that country, from the ports of Scotland, 5,000 quarters of seed corn (oats and barley), if your lordships should see no objection to comply with this request. It is highly important, at this advanced season, that no time should be lost in giving the necessary orders for that purpose. (Signed) Hawkesbury.

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Commissioners of Customs in Scotland, dated 25th March, 1803.

Gentlemen,—Lord Hawkesbury, one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, having represented to the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, that Mr. Gyldenpalm, his Danish Majesty's Chargé-d'Affaires at this Court, has applied for permission to export to Norway, from the port of Scotland, 5,000 quarters of seed corn (oats and barley) in consequence of the distressed state of that kingdom from the failure of the crops of last season; their lordships are pleased, under the circumstances stated by Mr. Gyldenpalm, to comply with the request. I have therefore received their lordships' commands to desire you will forthwith give the necessary directions for permitting the exportation of the above-mentioned quantities of oats and barley to Norway accordingly. (Signed) John Sargent.

Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury to the Commissioners of Customs in Scotland, dated April 14, 1803.

Gentlemen,—It being in contemplation to issue an Order in Council to permit a certain quantity of seed corn to be sent to Fronthiem in Norway, and several vessels having been loaded for that purpose, as mentioned in the enclosed paper;—I have received the commands of the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury to desire, that you will give the necessary orders to permit the said vessels to clear out and sail for that place accordingly; and to cancel the coasting bonds.——The Order in Council alluded to will be transmitted to you as soon as possible.

(Signed) N. Vansittart.

Names of Ships and Masters engaged to take Part of the Seed Grain intended for Denmark; viz.

The Lady Ridlers, Smith, Master, at Lynn, loaded with 1,000 quarters barley; ready for sea, and only waiting permission to sail.——The Calne, Joseph Stanford, Master, with 600 quarters barley, at Yarmouth; ready for sea.—— The Margaret, John Bishop, Master, with 600 quarters barley, also at Yarmouth; ready for sea.——The Diamond Packet, James Nesbitt, Master, in loading at Berwick; will carry about 600 a. 620 quarters of oats. Scott, Harris, and Co.

London, April 13, 1803.

Notice issued by the Commissioners for Claims under the Convention with the United States of America, dated from their Office, Great Marlborough Street, May 7, 1803.

Whereas by an Act passed in this present Session of Parliament, intituled "An Act for appointing Commissioners for distributing the "Money stipulated to be paid by the United "States of America, under the Convention made "between his Majesty and the said United States, "among the Persons having Claims to Compen-"sation out of such Money;" Thomas Macdonald, Esq Henry Pye Rich, Esq. and John Guillemard, Esq are constituted and appointed Commissioners for the purposes aforesaid; and it is enacted that the adjudication of such Commissioners, or any two of them, as to all claims made for compensation out of such money, and also as to the apportionment or distribution thereof as aforesaid, shall be final and conclusive: And whereas it is thereby further enacted, that no claim or request of any person or persons under the said Act, shall be received after the first day of June, 1804: And whereas his Majesty by the said Convention (dated the 8th day of January, 1802), consented to accept of the said money so to be paid by the said United States, (amounting in the whole to £600,000 sterling), for the use of the persons described in the Sixth Article of the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, concluded at London, on the 4th day of November, 1794, between his Majesty and the said United States, in satisfaction and discharge of the money which the United States might have been liable to pay in pursuance of the provisions of the said Sixth Article —All persons who think themselves entitled, as being within the description of the said 6th Article of the said Treaty, and the meaning of the said Convention, to claim under the said Act; and who have not already preferred claims at this Office under the said Convention, pursuant to and in terms of the notice in the London Gazette of the 11th day of September last, (which claims so preferred in terms of the said notice, will be held and considered by the said Commissioners as claims under the above Act of Parliament,) are hereby required, without delay, and at farthest on or before the said first day of June, 1804, when the sum total of claims will be finally made up and ascertained; to present and deliver at this office, their respective claims, in the form of memorials, addressed to the Commissioners under the said Act of Parliament, and duly signed by the parties, or their agents respectively authorised for that purpose, with such relative lists or schedules of debts and debtors as the several cases may admit of or require; the said memorials and relative lists or schedules distinctly setting forth the several points enumerated and described in the said former notice under the convention; of which former notice, printed copies will be delivered at this office to all who shall apply for the same.—And inasmuch as claims have already been received, under the said convention, to a much greater amount than the money to be distributed, and the commissioners, while they prevent, as far as in them lies, all unnecessary discussion and delay, will nevertheless proceed so as to ensure as much as possible the means of full investigation, and of equal justice to all concerned, notice is hereby given, That the several claims, schedules, and accounts, with a list of all the claimants, will be open at this office for the inspection of every claimant, or the authorised agent of such claimant, who may state such objections in writing (duly signed by such claimant or agent) as he may desire to have submitted to the consideration of the commissioners; which objections the said commissioners, if

they see cause so to do, will allow the respective claimants against whose claims, in the whole or in part, the same shall be directed, to see and answer; such inspection of claims to be made in the manner, and according to the rules, which, with the general orders of the board for regulating the course of the proceedings before them, will be communicated at this office. By order of the commissioners. J. W. Hay, Sec.

At a general meeting of the Manufacturers of Silk Handkerchiefs, and others concerned in that branch of trade, held at the London Tavern on the 6th instant, to consider of the proposed admission of India Silk Handkerchiefs for Home Consumption, subject to certain Duties.—Mr. Alderman Le, in the Chair.

The former minutes were read and confirmed.—Received and read communications from Manchester and Macclesfield, and the resolutions of the public meeting of Macclesfield.—The following resolutions were passed unanimously:—1st. That the remonstrances of the silk trade, through their committee appointed at the general meeting of the 18th of February, against the intended permission to import India silk handkerchiefs for home consumption, having met a decided opposition from government, it is the opinion of this meeting, that as the admission of India silk handkerchiefs under any duty, however high, would inevitably ruin the silk handkerchief manufactory of this country, which gives employment to thousands; and would moreover serve probably as a precedent for a similar permission to import India silk piece-goods, to the destruction of the whole of the British silk manufactory, it becomes the indispensable duty of all persons concerned in the silk trade of this country, to resist, as strongly as possible, that clause of the consolidation bill about to be introduced into the Hon. the House of Commons, which would allow India silk handkerchiefs to be imported into this country for home consumption, subject to certain duties.—2d. That a petition, signed by all persons interested in the silk trade, be presented to the Hon. the House of Commons, praying to be heard by counsel against such part of the said bill.—3d. That the committee appointed at the former meeting be continued, and be requested to draw up the said petition, and attend its progress through the House.—4th. That the committee be requested to wait on the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor, and H. C. Combe, Esq. praying them to present this petition, and to wait on the other members for this city, the members for Middlesex, Chester, Staffordshire, Coventry, and other parts of the country interested in the silk trade, praying their support.—5th. That the committee be desired to draw up a particular statement of the grounds upon which this innovation is opposed, and that the same be printed, and a copy sent to every member of the Hon. the House of Commons.—6th. That it appears to this meeting, that increased duties have, from time to time, been imposed on the importation of silks without an increase of drawback; it is recommended to the committee, to consider of the best mode to obtain the equalization.—7th. That the resolutions of this meeting, signed by the chairman, be published in such Morning and Evening Papers as the committee may direct.

(Signed) Richard Lea, Chairman.

French Funds. Tiers Consolidés. — May 1st. 53. 40.—3d. 53. 20.—4th. 53. 25.—5th. 53. 10. 7th. 54. 25.—8th. 54. 75.—Moniteurs to the 9th have been received, but the last contains no price of funds.

General Distribution of the British Army, May 1, 1803.	Regulars. Cav.	Inf.	Milit.	Tot Ba.	Inv.	Co
England and Wales	20	28	76	124	—	—
North Britain	1	4	15	20	—	—
Ireland	8	23	—	31	—	—
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	1	6	6	—	—
Gibraltar	—	—	7	7	—	—
Egypt and Malta	—	—	8	8	—	—
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	—	4	4	—	—
West-Indies	—	—	24	24	—	—
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	—	3	3	—	—
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	20	—	25	—	—
On Passage to England or Ire.	1	6	—	7	—	—
Total....	35	133	91	259	—	—

Er. Navy, 1st May.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot.
In Port and fitting, and with sealed orders	24	5	38	50	117
English and Irish Channels	14	1	12	19	46
Downs and North Sea	1	2	13	17	33
West-Indies and Passage	2	0	6	11	19
Jamaica station	9	0	5	8	22
America and Newfoundland	0	1	2	4	7
Cape of G. Hope, East-Indies,	4	5	8	10	27
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	1	0	3	2	6
Mediterranean and on Passage	10	2	16	7	35
Hospital and Prison Ships	2	0	0	0	2
Total in Commission	67	16	104	129	316
Receiving Ships	7	0	7	1	15
Serviceable and repairing	13	0	8	2	23
In Ordinary	83	9	86	64	244
Building	24	0	12	9	45
Total.....	196	25	217	205	643
ORDINARY.					
Portsmouth	31	2	24	13	69
Plymouth	35	1	20	21	77
Chatham	35	6	21	4	66
Sheerness	1	0	6	7	14
River	3	0	29	16	48
Total....	105	9	99	61	274

PRICE OF STOCKS.—APRIL 16 TO MAY 11.

Day of Month	Bank Stock	3 pr. C. R. An.	3 per C. Con.	4 pr. C. Con.	5 pr. Ct. Ann.	Bank L. Ann.	Omnium
16	167	63⅜	63⅝	78⅞	—	16	—
18	—	63⅛	64⅛	79	—	18¾	—
19	167	63½	64½	80⅛	—	19	—
20	—	64¼	64⅝	82	—	16½	—
21	173	65⅛	67½	83⅞	—	19¾	—
22	173⅜	66⅛	67½	84	—	16¾	—
23	170½	65	63½	82	—	16¼	—
25	168	63½	64¾	81¼	—	19	—
27	169½	64⅛	65⅛	82⅛	—	19⅛	—
28	170½	64¾	65⅞	82⅜	—	19⅜	—
29	171	65⅞	65¾	82½	—	19½	—
30	171	63¾	64	82¼	—	—	—
2	—	62⅜	63⅜	80¼	—	16⅞	—
3	165	63	63⅞	80⅞	—	16	—
4	167	64⅝	64½	82⅝	—	19	—
7	—	61½	62¾	79½	—	18½	—
9	—	64	65⅛	—	—	19⅛	—
10	—	63¾	64⅝	80⅛	—	—	—
11	—	62½	63½	81	—	13	—

PRICES CURRENT IN LONDON.

Eng. Wheat prq.	47s. to 61s	Hops per cwt.	100s to 163s
Rye	32 .. 35	Hay per load	90 .. 140
Barley	21 .. 26	Beef, per st.	4s.4d. to 5s.8d.
Malt	41 .. 46	Mutton	5s. 0d. to 6s 0d.
Oats	15 .. 21	Veal	5s. 0d. to 6s. 3d.
Pease (white)	36 .. 42	Pork	4s. 4d. to 5s. 4d.
Beans (horse)	30 .. 34	Tallow	4s. 2d.
Flour per sack	43 .. 47	Av. of Sugar pr cw.	41s.5d.
Seconds	40 .. 43	Salt, per Bushel	14s.10d.
Coals per chal.	50 .. 00	Bread 9d the Quar. Loaf.	

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

PRESS-GANGS.—At, and in the neighbourhood of Newcastle, some very serious disturbances have taken place in consequence of the impress service. The mischief appears to have arisen, chiefly, from an advertisement, inserted by some of the *ship-owners*, in a paper, the editor of which has long been famed for his disloyalty. These persons admit the *necessity* of the impress service for the purpose of manning the fleet, but they are by no means of opinion, that the accomplishment of that object ought to interfere, for ever so short a time, with their individual interests! This combination was, however, broken by the more respectable class of Ship-owners, who seemed fully sensible of the criminal folly of their brethren. Nevertheless, as it is much easier to foment than allay a malcontent spirit, a very troublesome opposition to the service has been raised amongst the lower orders of the people, which has produced consequences far from being pleasant. His Majesty's officers have been insulted; in some instances, acts of violence have been committed against them and their men; and, we are well informed, that a boat from the Lapwing has been even *fired into* from Newcastle bridge.—That a vile democratic printer, that is to say, a rebel by principle, and almost by trade, should endeavour to create so mischievous a disposition, is not at all wonderful; but, that his nefarious efforts should be countenanced by any portion, however small, of the ship-owners of Great-Britain, is a circumstance that could not fail to excite both astonishment and indignation, at any time, and especially at this moment, when their whole body is petitioning His Majesty's Parliament for a repeal of the tonnage duty, upon the express plea, that their ships are the *nursery where seamen are raised for the Royal Navy!* This is the ground, and the only good ground, of their petition. It is well known, the experience of ages has proved, that a numerous fleet cannot be expeditiously manned without the aid of press-gangs. If therefore, the ship-owners oppose this established, this absolutely necessary mode of obtaining seamen from their ships, those ships are a species of property entitled to no more favour than dwelling-houses, barns or stables are entitled to. The Royal Navy is necessary to the maintenance of the honour, the security, the independence, of the country: its object is to protect the persons and the property of all His Majesty's subjects; but, it cannot be denied, that it yields a more immediate protection to mercantile mariners and the mercantile marine than to any other class of subjects or any other sort of property. The farmer or mechanic may, without much offence against reason, be supposed capable of entertaining doubts of the necessity of a fleet of men of war, the operations of which are so distant from the scene of his calling and the seat of his property; but, the ship-owner must know, that, without the protection of the Royal Navy, his trade must instantly cease.—And, as to the *legality* and *justice* of the impress, considered in respect to the seamen impressed, the man must be very ignorant, or incorrigibly perverse, who calls either in question. The warrants, in virtue of which the impress is executed, are as legal as any warrant whatever; and, what ship-owner, what mariner, does not know, when he becomes a mariner, that he will be liable to the impress? This is one of the *conditions*, on which he enters the profession, and on which he demands and enjoys the numerous advantages thereunto belonging. If we look round the country we shall find, that no small portion of its wealth belongs to men who have, in one way or another, followed the sea. And, if that property is saved, if they have been too, protected in its acquirement by the navy of the country, shall they not be called on to contribute towards the support of that navy? The mercantile marine of the whole empire does not employ less than 300,000 persons, not more, perhaps, than 30,000 of whom are ever, at any one time, impressed into the service of their country; and, is this contributing too largely to the support of that, without which their whole profession must immediately perish? The *militia* is not, indeed, raised by press-gangs; but, it is not composed of *volunteers*. The soldiers are *compelled* to come into the service, and a service, which, though it does not take them out of the kingdom, is much more contrary to their habits and their inclinations, than that of the fleet can possibly be to the seamen of the mercantile marine, who have been inured to the element on which they are to serve, and whose minds are accustomed to long absence from relations and friends. As to the *compensation*,

too, what poor man's calling offers a better or more secure? In the first place, the impressed seaman has a bounty full as great as if he were a volunteer. His pay is nearly as great as he can obtain in a merchant ship, his provisions and accommodations better. He has his chance of prize-money, and, if he is in greater danger from powder and ball, he is in less danger from the wrecks and other accidents to which merchantmen are exposed much more than men of war; and after all, if he be disabled or worn out in the service, his king and country provide him with a comfortable and honorable maintenance for the rest of his days, which he may spend under the the roof of a palace far surpassing any one of the dwellings of his sovereign, whereas, should the same circumstances overtake him in the merchant service, he must pine out his life under the misery and degradation of a workhouse.—This is the light, in which the subject must be viewed, by every one who takes time to bestow on it a careful and impartial examination; and therefore, we cannot but express our reprobation of the conduct of any persons whatever, and particularly ship-owners who attempt to throw obstacles in the way of the impress service, by the means of which only, the Royal Navy can possibly be manned.

STOCK JOBBING NATION.—The Mercure de France of the 26th of March last, has the following remarks on the conduct of the London stock jobbers.—"Hitherto, we have "been able to discover, in the minds of the "English, little more that the spirit of "stock jobbing, which seems to have ac "quired new vigour from the warlike-blus"ter of the ministers; and, as the spirit of "stock-jobbing is no more than the parody "of the spirit of patriotism, one may take "the liberty to laugh at the agitation it pro"duces. The gaping inhabitants of the Lon"don 'Change, look, with great solicitude, "towards the stocks in France, to see whether "they rise or fall: doubtless, if there were "stock-jobbers in France, they would look "to the stocks of London, in order to know "what value to set on the credit of their "own country. Miserable game! at which "Frenchmen formerly had to blush: sel"fish calculation! which can never grow "up amongst an agricultural people, with"out producing the total extinction of pub"lic spirit, but which suits very well in a "nation, where every thing is bought and "sold, where the government is compelled "to buy even the power of governing!" (1) —If such were the sentiments of this writer, two months ago, what must he think of us now? What must he think of the nation, which has been disturbed, to the remotest corners of its territory, by a mere waggish trick, played off on the Mayor of one of its cities, and, a second time, by a paragraph in one of its news-papers? These are most alarming symptoms. They prove the body politic to be in a state of fearful feebleness. Its nerves are shattered.—It starts and trembles at every report.—The events of the last week have, we fear, stamped the character of the British public for ever, or, at least, till some great and strong, and perhaps violent remedy be adopted for the cure of the money-loving malady, which now weighs us down to the earth. What that remedy will be, or whence it is to come, we know not; but, this we venture to assert, that England cannot, with its present feelings, long continue to be an independent nation.—Our readers will do us the justice to acknowledge, that we long ago predicted, that it would be on the side of the funds, which France would first attack us. We then stated, that, with our present funded debt, it was impossible to maintain public credit, while there was a power, who could *raise and sink our funds at its pleasure.* It is absolutely impossible; and, therefore, that debt must be destroyed, or we must, by some means or other, get rid of that *menacing power*, which France has acquired over us, and which she now exercises, with so much address and insolence on her part, and with so much folly and cowardice on ours. It is asserted, and, we believe, upon no very weak foundation, that the French have gained *two millions* in the British funds, since the date of the King's message. Of this sum a part has passed over to France in cash, the rest has been and is now passing in merchandize, through various channels, and the effect is felt amongst our bankers and other speculators in stock. We now feel the salutary, the practical influence, of that "ca"p tal, credit, and confidence," which Lord Hawkesbury and his worthy colleague held forth as the "*best security*" to Great Britain. ——While, therefore, France is gaining so immensely in this way, as well as by the base folly of the English nobility and gentry, who are daily making a pilgrimage to kiss the boot of the First Consul, that nation would be very foolish not to keep peace with us on almost any terms. A little quarrel, a menace of war, about three times a year, would effect her object much sooner than it could possiby be effected by any other means. "France," said Mr. Windham, in his speech upon the Preliminaries, "will be "under no necessity to go to war with us;

(1) Mercure de France, p. 84.

" and *nothing but her own intemperance and in-*
" *solence, and an opinion of our endurance and*
" *weakness, beyond even what they may be*
" *found to deserve, can force upon us that ex-*
" *tremity.* She has much surer and safer
" means of going to work; means at the
" same time sufficiently quick in their ope-
" ration to satisfy any ordinary ambition:—
" she has nothing to do but to trust to the
" progress of her own power in peace,
" *quickened, as often as she shall see occasion,*
" *by a smart threat of war.* I cannot con-
" ceive the object, which a judicious appli-
" cation of these two means is not calcu-
" lated to obtain. A peace, such as France
" has now made, *mixed with proportions of a*
" *seasonable menace of war,* is a specific, for
" the undoing of a rival country, which
" seems to me impossible to fail." (2)—
How correct, how exactly correct, was this opinion!—Whether the intemperance and insolence of France have, or have not, been pushed *beyond our forbearance* is a question that remains to be solved; but, that she has tried them to the utmost is certain.——If peace, beloved peace, should, after all be continued for some time longer, the stock-jobber's hope will not, however, be realized. The nation must keep up an establishment nearly equal to that of war, or we shall have to arm a-fresh, and pay new bounties, twice or thrice a year. One or the other of these must be, or we must become the subjects of Frenchmen. The candid minister now stands between the horrors of war and the greater horrors of a financial deficit, which will be discovered, to the eyes of the most ignorant, long before the end of the year. War would be a good act of oblivion for his estimates of December last, and, accordingly, the French writers do not scruple to say, that, to obtain this act, was one of the objects of the present quarrel (3). Indeed, every man of any tolerable knowledge in the public affairs of the country cannot but perceive, that it is absolutely impossible for us to maintain, for any length of time, the peace establishment last fixed on, without *annual loans* or immense *new taxes* annually added to those already in existence; and, that such a course would, in a very short space, inevitably produce a failure in the payment of the interest on the public debt, or consequences infinitely more fatal, it requires no great sagacity to foretell. Therefore " the hope of the coward *must* perish." Something must be done to add to our power, or to diminish that of our mortal enemy. The lovers of " peace and plenty," the hypocrite, the coward, the drunkard, the glutton, the pic nic, and the miser, may continue to unite their voices in the praise of peace, they may continue to despise the terms of that peace, they may continue to revile all those who yet stand up for national honour; but, neither their praise nor their revilings shall avail them aught; that honour must be regained, or their wealth and their luxury shall be destroyed, and they themselves shall become the most wretched, as they already are, the basest of mankind.——There are some persons, who, adopting the opinion lately quoted by us from a daily paper, seem to think, that a remedy for all our evils is to be found in a *mere change of ministry*, without any subsequent sacrifice or exertion on the part of the country. " Give us MR. PITT," say they, " only give us Mr. Pitt, and we shall " think ourselves *perfectly safe.*" And why? We should be glad to know why? Is it supposed, that Mr. Pitt can curtail the sea-coast of the French, which now sweeps round one half of the Continent of Europe? Can he make Buonaparté disband any portion of his army? Can he prevent the sudden rise of a French naval force? Can he reduce, *greatly* reduce, the establishments of England, without hazarding the safety of the country? If he cannot do these things, he can bring no security in peace. Undoubtedly the French would not insult him as they have done his creatures; they would proceed more cautiously, perhaps not quite so fast as they hitherto have done, but their object would be still the same; and, it is by no means unlikely, that caution and a relaxation of pace would only render its accomplishment the more sure. It is the immense disproportion of that relative state, in which we were placed by the treaty of Amiens, that must be got rid of, before any reasonable man will see a hope of safety for England, and this is to be done only by war; yes, horrid as is the sound, war, war, another war, *a successful war against France*, is the remedy, and the sole remedy, for the disease, which is now eating out the heart of the kingdom. " What!" say the slavish crew who have been crouching at the feet of Buonaparté, " would you go to war in order to drive " the French within their ancient limits? " You are *mad.*"—Mad as we are, you degenerate beings, the nation must think with us, and act up to its thoughts, or your splendid mansions will 'ere long change possessors, the emblems of your honours will be trampled in the dirt, while you yourselves will shift places with those who

(2) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1162.
(3) Mercure de France, March 19.

now eat the crums that fall from your tables. *Mad,* indeed! This charge is never preferred against the silly ministry who made, and the sickly-brained Parliament who approved of the treaty of Amiens. That imbecility which looked for strength in the credit, capital, and confidence of four hundred miserable jews; that canting enthusiasm which bids us rely on Providence while we were too base to use the means which Providence had placed in our hands; those fits and lucid intervals which one day dictated a remonstrance in favour of the Swiss, and the next day abandoned them to their fate; which one day ordered the retention of the Cape, and the next its surrender. None of these are called *madness*; no fear, however groundless, no reliance, however absurd, no assertion, however false, inconsistent, and contradictory, nothing is thus stigmatized, unless it leads to war; nothing is *madness* which does not call for exertion, which does not point to *national valour* as the only source of national hope. Except this, nothing is excluded from some share of wisdom: money and manufactures; the nasal twang of a methodistical nose; the extermination of bull-dogs; the converting of negroes into saints; Sunday schools for making scholars of those whose business it is to delve; soup-shops for feeding those who are too idle to work and too proud to beg; the abolition of tithes; thick handkerchiefs for ladies bosoms: each of these, as being *the means of national salvation,* has its numerous partizans, while, in resistance of France and her half a million of soldiers, to use powder and steel, to call on the people to buckle on their armour, is almost universally regarded as *madness!*—Such a nation cannot, it will not, and it ought not, to remain independent. It voluntarily bows its neck to the yoke of a foreign power, and that yoke it ought to wear.

FINANCE AND TRADE.—The deceptions, on these subjects, are kept up with unremitted attention. The following article we have extracted from a daily paper called the ORACLE.—"Notwithstanding the *croaking* "*that prevails amongst people in trade*, it ap- "pears from the accounts of the Custom- "House, now lying on the table of the "House of Commons, that our exports a- "mounted last year to £48,500,683, which "is £6,800,000 more than the foregoing "year, and this only the British produce "and manufactures. Our foreign mer- "chandize augmented also still more in pro- "portion.—Our exports of foreign mer- "chandize have trebled since the year 1792, "and that of our manufactures and pro- "duce has increased 50 per cent. Our im- "ports have not increased nearly in an "equal proportion; thus the balance in our "favour is great beyond example. Last year "our imports were £1,750,000, less than "the year before, which, added to the ex- "cess of the exports, makes an *augmentation* "of *balance* in our favour in last year of "£8,550,000." This article has been inserted in *all* the daily papers, and has not, perhaps, cost the public less than the paragraph inserted in the Morning Post on the 5th instant, *comparing the conduct of the opposers of Lord St. Vincent to that of the traitor Despard.* Blessed liberty of the press! Blessed "palladium of free men!" Not only does it deceive the people, but makes them *pay for the deception!*—As to this article on Finance and Trade, however, we cannot much blame the editors of the daily papers for inserting it. The subject is one that they do not understand, and, such is the nature of their publications, they have not *time* to inquire into the truth of any statement, of this sort, which is sent to them. It arrives at their office at midnight, perhaps, and it is in print before three o'clock in the morning. But, we request the editor of the Oracle to look into the Register of the 23d of April, p. 584, *et seq.* and that of April 30th, p. 614, where he will find the deception, with regard to British produce and manufactures exported, completely exposed.——With respect to the *diminution* in our imports, which he seems to have been led to view as a *favourable* circumstance, what would he say, if he were told that our own West-India and North American produce, our own sugar, cotton, and furs, are included in those imports? This discovery would certainly overset his "*balance.*" But, the truth is, that there has been, during the last year, no other positive diminution in our imports than that which has arisen from the falling off in the importation of *corn, meal,* and *flour,* which was brought hither in such great quantities during the preceding year, for the sake of the bounty offered by Parliament.——We shall take an early opportunity of going, more at length, into the state of our commerce and navigation. If articles, such as we have here quoted, are inserted from inadvertency, we have said enough to prevent future impositions of the kind, and, if their insertion is *paid for*, we have not the vanity to hope that any thing we could say would have the least effect on those who insert them; for, of all the sweet moments of a newsmonger's sweet life, the sweetest are those which bring him *paid for paragraphs.* No matter what it is, so that it comes accom-

panied with the guineas. Hence the never-ending inconsistencies and contradictions that are seen in all the London papers The *editor*, who is generally a man of some talent, would, perhaps, reject articles which militate against his statements of the preceding day; but, in comes the interest of the *proprietor*, and silences all the remonstrances of sense, reason, and conscience; and, as the editor is not known to the world, his reputation is not at stake, and he has no right to complain. And, yet, it is to publications like these, that the public look for information! It is in publications like these, that they think they find it! It is the continuation of a shameful traffic like this which is styled "the liberty of the press," and which is boasted of as the "birth-right of Britons!" Oh, the inestimable birth-right! the right of being led by the nose, by a set of the meanest and most ignorant creatures that ever existed upon earth; the right of being continually agitated and deceived, and the right of paying for that agitation and deception! Some persons, while they will readily acknowledge the justice of these remarks, will call in question the prudence of making them. Alas! there is nothing to be hoped for from the press, particularly the newspaper press, which always has been, and always will be, as long as it lasts, the curse of the country. No; it must be an influence quite different from this that will save this monarchy, if it be saved at all. The people must act from the dictates of their own minds, and not from the notions they imbibe through this, from this corrupted and all-corrupting and degrading source.

MAIDSTONE OPPOSITION.—The persons coming under this denomination have already taken the ground, on which they mean *to oppose the war*, which they now regard as unavoidable. The Morning Chronicle of the 9th instant contains their Manifesto, which we are well assured was written by Mr. Fox himself, who is now preparing to pursue precisely that line of conduct, which, several months ago, we said he would pursue.—The Manifesto sets out with asserting, that "*necessity*, and no-"thing but necessity, in the *strictest sense* of "the word, could justify a war with "France; that the war could *never* be "any thing but a war of *self-defence*, cold, "lifeless, languid defence." It next proceeds, through a far-fetched chain of reasoning, to show, that "France is, and will "remain, invulnerable on the Continent of "Europe, and that it is *on the Continent* "*alone* that she can ever be beaten into a "compliance with any thing that shall render a peace with her more secure than "the present." The conclusion, therefore, is, that "if there be a prospect of our en-"joying any *tolerable security*, it is better "than a war, a naval or colonial war, "which can *never lead* to any decisive vic-"tory or advantage over France."—But, in order to obtain even this *tolerable* security, we must have *another administration*, to be composed, we presume, wholly of those who gave evidence to the character of O'Connor, who said and who swore, that his principles were *the same as their own*. ——We deny that the war must necessarily be "nothing but a war of *self-defence*;" we deny, that it is "on the Continent of Europe *alone* that France is to be beaten into a peace more secure than the present;" we deny, that "she is, and will remain, *invulnerable* on that Continent;" we deny, that "a naval and colonial war can *never lead* to any decisive advantage over her;" and, of course, we deny all the conclusions drawn from these premises.——If, by self-defence, the demagogue means, the defending of our country against final subjugation, our gracious and beloved Sovereign from the fate of Louis XVI. and ourselves from the most abject slavery, then the war, if it takes place, will be a war of self-defence; but, that, in the conducting of this war, we are to do nothing but line our own shores and our coasts, and there wait the arrival of the enemy; if this be his meaning, we trust, that he expresses his own, and not the nation's wishes, for such a war would, most assuredly, be infinitely more fatal than even the continuance of the present peace and of that "*tolerable* security" which it has brought us.——That the Continent of Europe is, for the far greater part, in the chains of Buonaparté, we'll allow; but, will those chains be weakened, or will they be strengthened by *time?* Will not every future day of this peace, as every past day of it has done, add new links and new rivets to those chains, and will not a few more years of slavery extinguish not only the hope but the desire of freedom? If France is to be beaten into a peace of security to us, on the continent of Europe *only*, is it wise to suffer her to extend and consolidate her power on that continent? To the evils produced, in this respect by the treaty of Amiens, is it wise to add the further and greater evils of another disgraceful accommodation? Is it wise to do an act which shall convince every soul upon the continent, that there is no hope left in Great Britain? —How long has it been a fact so very obvious, that no solid advantage is ever to be gained over France, except by the aid of

the continental powers? We remember, that Mr. Fox and his party opposed every subsidy granted to our continental allies; we remember that, for ten long years, they declaimed against all continental connections indiscriminately; and now, behold, when they regard us as completely cut off from those connections, they have the effrontery to assert, that *it is from the influence of such connections alone, we can ever hope to obtain a peace more secure than the present!*— That a war, merely colonial and naval, carried on upon the mean and selfish plan of the last war, would produce no good effect is certain. But, are we compelled to repeat our former errors? Are we compelled so to act, that no foreign nation shall sympathise in our successes; that they shall view us with constant jealousy and envy; that none of the glorious deeds of our navy shall revive the hopes, shall awaken the dormant spirit of revenge, in the breasts of those who are now crouching under the cruel and impious tyranny of France? Is there any obligation upon us thus to conduct a colonial and naval war; has Providence doomed us so to conduct it? If not, there is hope, great and solid hope, that, by a colonial and naval war, into which the whole spirit and utmost exertion of England, should be thrown, and steadily pointing, through all the reverses of fortune, to a great and definite object, interesting to the world, not only our own lasting security might be provided for, but that the oppressed continent might be once brought into action, and its efforts crowned with ultimate success; while, on the contrary, the "*tole-*" *rable*" or rather *intolerable* "security," purchased by the great and numerous sacrifices of the peace of Amiens, and rendered, as it must be, still more intolerable by another miserable accommodation, must inevitably tend to our further dishonour and our final slavery, in spite of the pacific exertions of Mr. Fox.

MALTESE DEPUTATION. — By referring to the first page of the present sheet, the reader will perceive, that we have now obtained the sequel of the dark history of the conduct of ministers with respect to the deputies and the people of Malta. We, in our last, adduced their negociations at Paris as a proof of their hostility to the tenth article of the disgraceful treaty of Amiens; another proof is now exhibited, in an account, on the correctness of which we place the firmest reliance, of their conduct at the publication of that article in Malta. They "*tore it down* "*from all the places where the government had* "*caused it to be affixed.*" And, this was the sign they gave of that "*satisfaction,*" which Mr. Addington declared they felt; of that "*gratitude,*" which he declared they entertained "*towards Great-Britain, for the terms pro-*" *cured them!!!*" (4) There is not to be found, even amongst the transactions of the present ministry, any thing so black, so detestable as this. But the parliamentary charge against the ministers is, that they with-held, when called for, the papers relative to this matter, under the pretext, under the positive assertion, *that they possessed no such papers.* Lord Temple moved for papers, containing the statutes of the order of St. John of Jerusalem, and such other papers as might shew what were the rights, privileges, and claims of that Order. The answer was, that ministry "had *no official document on the sub-*" *ject;*" (5) and, upon that ground, and that ground alone it was, that the ministers opposed the motion and caused it to be rejected, at a time when they had been four months, at least, in full possession of Number II. of the papers contained in our last sheet, which paper contains the very information which Lord Temple called for. The parliament was thus kept totally in the dark as to Malta. Those who opposed the treaty saw an odd, impracticable arrangement; but they knew not distinctly who was the injured party at Malta, the people or the knights. In acknowledging the rights of the latter, they perceived, that these rights were violated by the forced intrusion of the Maltese into the Order; but with the rights and claims the merits and wishes of the people of Malta they were totally unacquainted, and so they would have remained, had not the Maltese themselves, by the aid of their friends, made the communication through the press. Never was such an insult offered to any body of legislators, Buonaparté's mutes not excepted. It was not thus that a British parliament was *formerly* treated; it was not thus that insults were received by those Houses of Commons who brought Clarendon and Danby, and Somers and Portland, and Oxford to the bar of the House of Lords, for advising breaches of national faith, and for concluding treaties destructive of the interests and the honour of England; it was not thus that our forefathers suffered themselves to be trampled on by France for the sake of exalting and enriching the ministers of the day; and we do yet hope, that, when the parliament and the nation shall clearly see into all the conduct of the present selfish ministers, when they shall feel the full weight of all the miseries which the incapacity and wickedness of these men have brought and

(4) See his Speech, Register, Vol. II. p. 1213.
(5) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1259.

is bringing upon them; we do yet hope that *then* there will be found spirit enough in the people to demand, and integrity enough in their rulers to execute, such justice upon the offenders as shall convince future ministers, that their *responsibility* is not an empty sound. Never, since England has been a nation, was there a set of men who could justly be charged with having heaped so much calamity upon the people, so much disgrace upon the English name; and, shall not that injured people demand and obtain justice on them? We have heard more of *responsibility* within these last eighteen months, than during any ten years before. It has been the constant plea, the standing, the insuperable bar, against all inquiry whatever. And, shall this responsibility, this bond of surety, at last dwindle into a mere name? Shall the nation be harrassed, burdened, disgraced, and insulted, past all enduring, and, shall they be told, after all, that ministerial responsibility "is not worth *two pence*?" Shall the mere vote of a majority of the last parliament, approving of the Treaty of Amiens be quoted as an act of *indemnity and oblivion* for those who counselled that destructive compact? Did such a vote save Oxford from the Tower? Did such a vote prevent Darnley from lying two years in prison, with King Charles's pardon in his pocket? No; and we trust, that such a vote will now be no bar to that justice, which the people have a right to demand, and which we hope they will obtain, through the legal means pointed out by that constitution for which their fathers shed their blood.—His Majesty, too, that gracious Sovereign, who has made so many sacrifices to the happiness of his people, shall he be deserted by them at this awful crisis? Will that people basely acknowledge that his servants have no responsibility, and thereby render them his master, thereby create and submit to the worst and most odious of all despotisms, that of a subject reigning, in the name of the king, over both king and people? —In order to come at something like *fixed notions* on a subject, which we hope will ere long, occupy the attention of the country, we propose, in a future sheet, to enquire, 1. Into the nature and maxims of that responsibility, which is attached to a British ministry; 2. Whether the conduct of the present ministers be not, when compared with precedent cases, a subject that calls loudly for enquiry; 3. What are the prominent and specific acts that they justly stand charged with, and what resemblance they bear to those acts of former ministers, who have been impeached by the House of Commons; 4. Whether the interference of parliament, in this respect, be not, at the present time, peculiarly necessary to the cherishing and preserving of that confidence which the people ever ought to repose in their sovereign and his government.—We could have wished to see this important enquiry in abler hands; but we shall not, by that consideration, be deterred from the discharge of our duty. We have often, heretofore, led the way, as pioneers in enterprizes finally crowned with success; and, however mighty the present task, when contrasted with the feebleness of our powers, we cannot help recollecting and repeating, that the lion was once released from his toils by the patient nibblings of the mouse.

THE NEGOTIATION.—Before what we are now writing will make its appearance before the public, the negotiation with France will, probably, be brought to a close. Near, however, as we have touched the verge of war, it will, to us, be something very surprizing, if one of the parties, or both of them, do not recede far enough from their demands to produce an accommodation. Buonaparté cannot *wish* for war yet; he can never wish for war, while he can sport with our funds as he has done for six months past. A war will, too, drive all the rich and base English out of his country, and, they spend there at the rate of £3,000,000 per annum, which, together with what the French drain out through the channel of the funds, is a source of riches not to be despised, particularly when it is considered, that what is gained by France is lost by the nation, whose public credit she wishes to destroy.—Buonaparté's preparations are by no means made. He wanted Louisiana in his hands; St. Domingo well settled and arranged; Martinico and Guadaloupe with numerous garrisons; the Cape and Cochin in the same state; his intrigues with the Princes of India wanted ripening; also his intrigues in Turkey; and the surrender of Malta, on our part, was a principal object with him. Nor has he got things in Ireland so far advanced as they would have been, and, if there is not war, as they *will be*, in the course of another year, during which, too, all his means of invasion would be fully prepared.—Situated as he is, therefore, he will feel a strong disposition to keep us in the miserable state, into which we were plunged by the treaty of Amiens, and under the sway of a ministry who seem to have been made to his hands, and whom he ought to make almost any sacrifice to preserve in their places, which nothing is so likely to do as a continuation of the name of *peace*.—For these reasons, though we are at this moment (*Friday* morning) told, that Lord Whitworth is arrived at Dover, we still think that another disgraceful accommodation will take place.

ERRATA in our last.—p. 676. l. 34, read membrum Regiæ Coronæ.—p. 687. l. 15 for 6,500—read 6,500,000.

Several Correspondents are requested to excuse us this week. They shall be punctually attended to in our next.

LONDON,

TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD AUCKLAND.

My Lord,—In times like the present, the public conduct of every man, be he high or low, ought to be strictly canvassed, in order that the people may know on whom they can safely place confidence; in order that they may be able to distinguish the true friends of their sovereign and their country from those who make use of the affectation of such friendship as a mask to disguise views which are directed solely to their own interest and ambition. Upon this principle, my lord, without pretending to say which of these classes your lordship belongs to, I am about to compare your support of the peace of Amiens with your former opinions and professions on the subject of peace with France.

Your lordship can scarcely have forgotten, that, in the year 1795, you wrote and published a pamphlet, entitled, "*Some Remarks on the apparent Circumstances of the War in the fourth week of October*, 1795," the object of which pamphlet was to clear the road for negotiations with France, and to point out the terms which ought to form the basis of a peace between his Majesty and the king-killing Directors who then governed the Republic.—The relative situation of the two powers is the first object of consideration. I shall now quote your description of that situation, begging your lordship to ask yourself, as you proceed, whether, at the time when the fatal peace of Amiens was concluded, we were not in a much better state, than that which you here describe.—"I am content "to argue, even on the hypothesis, that "our allies in the war are either conquered, or worn out, or withdrawn, or so "circumstanced, that they afford no reasonable hope of farther aid or concurrence; that all prospect of success on "the eastern or northern frontiers of France "is lost; that our continental exertions "(and expenses) are or ought to be suspended; and that the several European "powers will either make a forced peace, "maintain an interested neutrality, or "pursue inefficient hostilities, according "to their necessities, speculations, and faculties. On the other hand I assume, "that England possesses a great naval "superiority. I will further suppose, that "the French leaders are disposed to treat "for peace. In this predicament, feeling "the pressure of the public expense; feeling that the country is desirous of peace; "and considering the high price of the "necessaries of life, to the general scarcity "of which the war certainly contributes, "though in a much less degree than is "commonly supposed; knowing also that "there are certain bounds, beyond which "our resources cannot be forced without "danger; I ask myself whether it is expedient to treat for peace, and on what "general outline and stipulations it might "be expedient to conclude a peace."—Now, my lord, as to the Continent, you here suppose our situation to be full as bad as it was in October, 1801; while, on the other hand, you had not to balance against it, the possession of the Dutch colonies in the East and West-Indies and South America, of Elba, of Malta, of the Cape of Good Hope, to which may be added the effects of the victories of Lords Duncan and Nelson, and of the brilliant Egyptian campaign. With respect to our domestic concerns, you allow the people to be desirous of peace: they were much less so in 1801. You allow of the high price and great scarcity of the necessaries of life: in October, 1801, all alarm on that head was at an end; the most abundant harvest ever known had just been housed without the least injury from the weather, and the price of provisions, of every sort, was rapidly on the decline. You felt the pressure of the public expense, and perceived, that there were certain bounds, beyond which our resources could not be forced without danger: the makers of the peace have constantly rejected, with disdain, the plea of pecuniary necessity: Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt have both explicitly declared, that, in October, 1801, we were "far, very far indeed, from the end of our resources," and to support this assertion has been the prin-

cipal object of your lordship's public endeavours for four months past.

Seeing, then, that our relative situation, at the time of signing the preliminaries, was in no one respect worse, and in most respects so much better, than it was when you wrote and published your pamphlet, let us see whether the terms, on which you would then have insisted, were obtained by that treaty, of which you afterwards approved.—"It is the *duty*," say you, "of "those who conduct the war to treat for "peace whenever negotiation *can* TEND to "*any* PROBABLE good. The *system* of the "French government (whatever may be "its particular *form*) is no longer likely to "be an obstacle to negotiation."—I stop here, just to remark, that, as to the first of these propositions, whatever war-minister is weak enough to make it a rule of his conduct will most assuredly be defeated; he will never have, and he never ought to have, an *ally*; and, which is still worse, he will certainly never have the cordial support of the country. He may, by acting upon such a maxim, always preserve a majority of poor, feeble, time-serving voices; he may keep his place, but he will ruin his country.—As to the second proposition, that the *system* and *form* of the French government would be *no obstacle to negotiation*, it was, unhappily for the safety and honour of England, but too correct a prediction of what was about to follow,—a regicide negotiation, begun, broken off, resumed, broken off again, again solicited and ending at last in the regicide peace of Amiens. Yes, my lord, you had the honour to be one of the avant-coureurs in this pursuit of national degradation, of the woeful effects of which what we have hitherto felt and what we now feel is but the mere foretaste of that which is to follow.—But, to come to the *terms*, on which you would have insisted in the fourth week of October, 1795. —"The extent of the French claims, as "to the price of pacification is known. If "we are to suppose, that their leaders will "*adhere* to what they have professed in "their late decree" [and Buonaparté has adhered to it, my lord, without the least relaxation; observe that well]. "I cannot "hesitate to say, that the preponderance, "which our accession to those claims, *or* "*to any considerable part of them*, must give "to France, unless an adequate compensation in some other shape can be secured "to us, would be *dishonourable*, and exhibit "us to the present age, and to posterity, "as submitting to have the law prescribed "to us by our enemy.—And what law? "*The sacrifice of powers that have been the "most nearly connected with us*; the direct "or indirect *annexation to France of all the "ports of the continent from Dunkirk to Hamburgh*; an immense cession of territory; "and, in one word, the *abandonment of the "independence of Europe*."—Well, then, my Lord, we did accede to these claims, and claims ten times greater, by the peace of Amiens, and yet you approved of, you voted for, and you endeavoured to defend this peace!—To come at a full and fair view of your inconsistency, however, we must hear your terms of 1795 a little more in detail. We have seen what you would have rejected; let us now see your demands.—"On the whole view of our respective situations, and after making to France a "full allowance for all her continental advantages, and considering at the same "time our acquisitions and prospects, and "the comparative state of circumstances, "we are entitled to require, *that the French "armies shall be recalled within their* OLD "BOUNDARIES; that Europe, in the general effect of arrangements, shall be replaced as nearly as may be, *on the same "balance* AS BEFORE THE WAR; and particularly with respect to the naval and "commercial interests of these kingdoms, "that France shall *not have obtained*, in the "result, *any new means of* PREPONDERANCE."—These, my Lord, these were the conditions on which, and on which alone, you would have made peace at the disastrous time when your pamphlet was written; at a time when our situation, and our prospects, were infinitely worse than at any other period of the war, and particularly at that period, that successful, prosperous, and brilliant period when the preliminary treaty of peace was concluded. The Richmond Park minister might plead the fallen state of the powers of the Continent; but this circumstance could have no weight in your Lordship's mind, seeing that, in 1795, you bottomed your demands upon the hypothesis, that all those allies "were "either conquered, or worn out, or withdrawn; that all our continental exertions "were, or ought to be, suspended; and "that the several powers would either make "a forced peace, or maintain an interested "neutrality." You, therefore, my Lord, have no ground whatever, whereon to set up a justification of your defence of the treaty of Amiens, by which all your principles, all your practical propositions, were completely abandoned.

Nor shall we, I fear, discover any greater degree of consistency by referring your opinions of 1795, as to the alternative of continuing the war.—"We have incurred the

" chief expenses and inconveniencies of war; " we have compleated arrangements of " force, which, by the nature of our com- " merce and constitution, can never be at- " tained *without great delay and difficulty*; " our military establishment is high and re- " spectable; our navy is carried to an im- " provement and pre-eminence in strength " and skill, of which there is no example " in our history; we have prepared, and " are sending to sea an expedition, from " which it is reasonable to expect impor- " tant effects: thus circumstanced it is " surely wiser to prosecute the war, than to " close it on conditions which would oblige " us, either *to continue the expense of war*, or " to expose ourselves to *a sudden return of* " *dangers and calamities*, with the disadvan- " tage of being *unprepared for them*. Let us " have a peace, and *not a temporary and* " *short suspension of war*; let us have a peace, " such as may make it *consistent with prudence* " *to disarm*, and such as may afford a good " ground of *social security*."—Was this, my Lord, the description of the peace of Amiens? Was this the sort of peace, which the ministers made, and which you have, for eighteen months past, been endeavouring to defend? Has not this peace obliged us to continue the expense of war? Has it not been a temporary and short suspension of hostilities? In short, were not its terms, and have not its effects been, precisely such terms and such consequences as you deprecated? And, yet, my Lord, have you not, even with a zeal which may be justly described as officious, endeavoured to defend this peace, and to prolong the fatal influence by which it was brought upon the country? Into the *motives*, by which you have been actuated, my Lord, I, at present, forbear to inquire. Your conduct is before me; it is clearly seen; and upon that conduct I and every other of his Majesty's faithful subjects have an undoubted right to form, and to express, our opinions. Weak and wicked ministers would never be formidable to the country, unless supported by persons not making part of the cabinet, not immediately partaking of their responsibility: it is, therefore, of the utmost importance, when we are preparing to demand justice on the heads of such ministers, to point out those by whom they have been aided and abetted, to turn the eyes of the nation towards such abettors, and, thereby, to subject their conduct to that scrutiny, the result and the effects of which is the only possible check upon the further pursuit of their views. Such, my Lord, is the object of this letter; and, certain I am, that it is an object which must meet with general approbation amongst all those who prefer the good of their country to the furthering of their own private interests.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westr. 16th May, 1803.

LORD HAWKESBURY ON MALTA.

SIR,—Party hostility is apt sometimes to confuse the very best intellects, and it seems to have thrown a cloud over your understanding, in your last number; for I am in candour bound to suppose that your unfounded attack on Lord Hawkesbury's veracity is to be attributed to no worse cause.

You charge his Lordship in very direct terms with falsehood, because he once declared that ministers " *had no* OFFICIAL *do-* " *cuments*," relative to the rights of the people of Malta and the Order. Now, Sir, pray look again at the papers which you print as the evidence of your charge, and acknowledge your own calumny.—It is possible that your readers may think that you do establish the " injustice, cruelty, and " perfidy" of ministers towards the poor Maltese. Perhaps too, there may be some little apparent ground for charging them with pusillanimity in their conduct towards the deputies. It may have been a paltry departure from true old English feeling to shut the doors of all our offices against those who came to seek our protection, and hurry them as fast as we could out of the kingdom, under an apprehension of giving jealousy to France. But, in point of fact, were they not hurried out of the kingdom? were not the doors of our offices shut against them? How then could a letter delivered to Lord Hobart's porter, *at his own private house*, be called an official document? When ministers had so sacrificed the honour and faith of the country, for the very purpose of making all these communications unofficial, it was impossible they could produce them as official. It would have been an affront to Parliament, as well as to the First Consul; and Lord Hawkesbury was equally correct in his assertion and his conduct.—Mr. Addington's declaration, indeed, may seem more difficult to reconcile with Mr. Mackenzie's papers. The respectable gentleman is said to have stated, that, he had the satisfaction to know that the Maltese were grateful for what we had done in their favour, while the deputies themselves, in their remonstrance, avow that the preliminary articles had made a very unfavourable impression. But every body knows that Mr. Addington is a man of the best intentions, and it is probable that he may have made a slight mistake of one word for another, between " hope" and " satisfaction,"

just as he lately did with regard to the same words, in answer to General Gascoign's enquiries about the present negotiation. If this defence gives no satisfaction, I must content myself with hoping that a better will be suggested by my namesake of Reading. I am more immediately interested for my friend Lord Hawkesbury, whose veracity I trust you will now admit.—I am, Sir, yours,

CANDIDUS.

Albemarle Street, 9th May.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

DECLARATION OF WAR, *on the Part of Great-Britain, laid before Parliament, on the 18th May*, 1803.

His Majesty's earnest endeavours for the preservation of peace having failed of success, he entertains the fullest confidence that he shall recieve the same support from his Parliament, and that the same zeal and spirit will be manifested by his people, which he has experienced on every occasion when the honour of his Crown has been attacked, or the essential interests of his Dominions have been endangered.——During the whole course of the negotiations which led to the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties of Peace between his Majesty and the French Republic, it was his Majesty's sincere desire, not only to put an end to the hostilities which subsisted between the two countries, but to adopt such measures, and to concur in such propositions, as might most effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe. The same motives by which his Majesty was actuated during the negotiations for peace, have since invariably governed his conduct. As soon as the Treaty of Amiens was concluded, his Majesty's Courts were open to the people of France for every purpose of legal redress; all sequestrations were taken off their property; all prohibitions on their trade which had been imposed during the war were removed, and they were placed, in every respect, on the same footing with regatd to commerce and intercourse, as the inhabitants of any other State in amity with his Majesty, with which there existed no treaty of commerce——To a system of conduct thus open, liberal, and friendly, the proceedings of the French Government afford the most striking contrast. The prohibitions which had been placed on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects during the war, have been enforced with increased strictness and severity; violence has been offered in several instances to their vessels and their property; and, in no case, has justice been afforded to those who may have been aggrieved in consequence of such acts, nor has any satisfactory answer been given to the repeated representations made by his Majesty's Ministers or Ambassador at Paris. Under such circumstances, when his Majesty's subjects were not suffered to enjoy the common advantages of peace within the territories of the French Republic, and the countries dependent upon it, the French Government had recourse to the extraordinary measure of sending over to this country a number of persons for the professed purpose of residing in the most considerable Sea-port Towns of Great-Britain and Ireland, in the character of Commercial Agents or Consuls. These persons could have no pretensions to be acknowledged in that character, as the right of being so acknowledged, as well as all the privileges attached to such a situation, could only be derived from a Commercial Treaty; and as no treaty of that description was in existence between his Majesty and the French Republic.——There was consequently too much reason to suppose, that the real object of their mission was by no means of a commercial nature, and this suspicion was confirmed, not only by the circumstance that some of them were military men, but by the actual discovery, that several of them were furnished with instructions to obtain the soundings of the harbours, and to procure military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside. His Majesty felt it to be his duty to prevent their departure to their respective places of destination, and represented to the French Government the necessity of withdrawing them; and it cannot be denied, that the circumstances under which they were sent, and the instructions which were given to them, ought to be considered as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions of the Government by whom they were employed.—— The conduct of the French Government, with respect to the commercial intercourse between the two countries, must therefore be considered as ill suited to a state of peace, and their proceedings in their more general political relations, as well as in those which immediately concern his Majesty's Dominions, appear to have been altogether inconsistent with every principle of good faith, moderation, and justice. His Majesty has entertained hopes, in consequence of the repeated assurances and professions of the French Government, that they might have been induced to adopt a system of policy which, if it had not inspired other powers with confidence, might at least have allayed their jealousies. If the French Government had really appeared to be actuated by a due attention to such a system; if their dispositions had proved to be essentially pacific, allowances would have been made for the situation in which a new government must be placed after so dreadful and extensive a convulsion as that which has been produced by the French Revolution. But his Majesty has unfortunately had too much reason to observe and to lament, that the system of violence, aggression, and aggrandizement which characterized the proceedings of the different Governments of France during the war, has been continued with as little disguise since its termination. They have continued to keep a French army in Holland against the will, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the Batavian Government, and in repugnance to the letter of three solemn treaties. They have, in a period of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss Nation, in defiance of the Treaty of Luneville, which had stipulated the independence of their territory, and the right of the inhabitants to choose their own form of Government. They have annexed to the dominions of France, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, and the Island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound, by a solemn engagement to the Emperor of Russia, to attend to his interests, and to provide for his establishment. It may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that the period which has elapsed since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, has been marked with one continued series of aggression, violence, and insult on the part of the French Government —— In the month of October last, his Majesty was induced, in consequence of the earnest solicita-

tion of the Swiss Nation, to make an effort, by a representation to the French Government, to avert the evils which were then impending over that country. This representation was couched in the most temperate terms; and measures were taken by his Majesty for ascertaining, under the circumstances which then existed, the real situation and wishes of the Swiss Cantons, as well as the sentiments of the other Cabinets of Europe. His Majesty learned, however, with the utmost regret, that no disposition to counteract these repeated infractions of treaties and acts of violence was manifested by any of the powers most immediately interested in preventing them; and his Majesty therefore felt that, with respect to these objects, his single efforts could not be expected to produce any considerable advantage to those in whose favour they might be exerted.——It was about this time that the French Government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his Majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or to interfere with the proceedings of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably founded upon the same principle as every other antecedent treaty or convention, on the assumption of the state of possession and of engagements subsisting at the time of its conclusion; and if that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the change so made, may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a General Law of Nations, which, though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by Conventional Law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where Conventional Law is admitted to have been silent. The Treaty of Amiens, and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulations, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other States, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence. These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretension advanced by the French Government, to exclude his Majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right, at least, to claim the benefit of this principle, in every case of difference between the two countries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers who were no parties to the treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his Majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of a war which is alleged to arise out of the same treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing.——His Majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence to hostilities on account of the views of ambition and acts of aggression manifested by France on the Continent; yet an experience of the character and dispositions of the French government could not fail to impress his Majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance in guarding the rights and dignity of his Crown, and in protecting the interests of His people.—Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments, He was called upon by the French government to evacuate the Island of Malta. His Majesty had manifested, from the moment of the signature of the Definitive Treaty, an anxious disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens relative to that Island. As soon as he was informed that an election of a Grand Master had taken place, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia, and that it had been agreed by the different Priories assembled at St. Petersburgh to acknowledge the person whom the Court of Rome should select out of those who had been named by them to be Grand Master of the Order of St. John, his Majesty proposed to the French government, for the purpose of avoiding any difficulties which might arise in the execution of the arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid: and when, in the month of August, the French government applied to his Majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the Island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for preventing any unnecessary delay, his Majesty consented without hesitation to this proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the Island. His Majesty had thus shewn his disposition not only to throw no obstacle in the way of the execution of the Treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by every means in his power. His Majesty cannot, however, admit, that at any period since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, the French government have had a right to call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that Treaty, to withdraw his forces from the Island of Malta. At the time when this demand was made by the French government, several of the most important stipulations of the arrangement respecting Malta remained unexecuted: the election of a Grand Master had not been carried into effect. The tenth article had stipulated that the independence of the Island should be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. The Emperor of Germany had acceded to the guarantee, but only on condition of a like accession on the part of the other powers specified in the article. The Emperor of Russia had refused his accession, except on the condition that the Maltese Langue should be abrogated; and the King of Prussia had given no answer whatever to the application which had been made to him to accede to the arrangement. But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place in the constitution of the Order since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace. It was to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem that his Majesty was, by the first stipulation of the 10th

article, bound to restore the Island of Malta. The Order is defined to consist of those Langues which were in existence at the time of the conclusion of the Treaty: the three French Langues having been abolished, and a Maltese Langue added to the institution. The Order consisted, therefore, at that time of the following Langues, viz. of Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, the Langues of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the Order by Spain, a part of the Italian Langue has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France. There is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequestrate the property of the Bavarian Langue, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian Langues within the dominions of the Emperor.——Under these circumstances, the Order of St. John cannot now be considered as that body to which, according to the stipulations of the Treaty, the Island was to be restored; and the funds indispensably necessary for its support, and for the maintenance of the independence of that Island, have been nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if this had arisen from circumstances which it was not in the power of any of the contracting parties to the treaty to control, his Majesty would nevertheless have had a right to defer the evacuation of the Island by his forces, until such time as an equivalent arrangement had been concluded for the preservation of the independence of the Order and of the Island. But if these changes have taken place in consequence of any acts of the other parties of the Treaty; if the French government shall appear to have proceeded upon a system of rendering the Order whose independence they had stipulated, incapable of maintaining that independence, his Majesty's right to continue in the occupation of the Island, under such circumstances, will hardly be contested. It is indisputable, that the revenues of the two Spanish Langues have been withdrawn from the Order by his Catholic Majesty; a part of the Italian Langue has in fact been abolished by France, through the unjust annexation of Piedmont and Parma, and Placentia, to the French territory. The Elector of Bavaria has been instigated by the French government to sequestrate the property of the Order within his territories; and it is certain that they have not only sanctioned, but encouraged the idea of the propriety of separating the Russian Langues from the remainder of the Order——As the conduct of the governments of France and Spain, have, therefore, in some instances directly, and in others indirectly, contributed to the changes which have taken place in the Order, and thus destroyed its means of supporting its independence, it is to those governments, and not to his Majesty, that the non-execution of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens must be ascribed.——Such would be the just conclusion, if the tenth article of that Treaty were considered as an arrangement by itself. It must be observed, however, that this article forms a part only of a Treaty of Peace, the whole of which is connected together, and the stipulations of which must, upon a principle common to all Treaties, be construed as having a reference to each other.——His Majesty was induced by the Treaty of Peace to consent to abandon, and to restore to the Order of St. John the Island of Malta, on condition of its independence and neutrality. But a further condition which must necessarily be supposed to have had considerable influence with his Majesty in inducing him to make so important a concession, was the acquiescence of the French government in an arrangement for the security of the Levant, by the eighth and ninth articles of the Treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and the independence of the Ionian Islands. His Majesty has, however, since learnt, that the French government have entertained views hostile to both these objects; and that they have even suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish Empire. These views must now be manifest to all the world, from the official publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani; from the conduct of that officer, and of the other French agents in Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian Islands, and from the distinct admission of the First Consul himself, in his communication with Lord Whitworth. His Majesty was, therefore, warranted in considering it to be the determination of the French government to violate those articles of the Treaty of Peace, which stipulated for the integrity and independence of the Turkish Empire, and of the Ionian Islands, and consequently he would not have been justified in evacuating the Island of Malta, without receiving some other security, which might equally provide for these important objects. His Majesty accordingly feels that he has an incontestable claim, in consequence of the conduct of France since the Treaty of Peace, and with reference to the objects which made part of the stipulations of that Treaty to refuse, under the present circumstances, to relinquish the possession of the Island of Malta.—Yet notwithstanding this right, so clear and so unquestionable, the alternative presented by the French government to his Majesty, in language the most peremptory and menacing, was the evacuation of Malta, or the renewal of war.—If the views of ambition and aggrandizement, which have thus been manifested by the French government since the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace, have in so very particular a manner attracted the attention of his Majesty, it has been equally impossible for him not to feel, and not to notice, the repeated indignities which have been offered by that government to his Crown, and to his people.—The report of Colonel Sebastiani contains the most unwarrantable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's government, against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter. This paper cannot be considered as the publication of a private individual; it has been avowed, and indeed bears evidence upon the face of it, that it is the official report of an accredited agent, published by the authority of the government to which it was addressed, who thereby have given it their express sanction.——This report had been published a very short time, when another indignity was offered to this country in the communication of the First Consul of France to the Legislative Body. In this communication he presumes to affirm, in the character of Chief Magistrate of that country, "that "Great Britain cannot singly contend against the "power of France;" an assertion as unfounded as it is indecent, disproved by the events of many wars, and by none more than by those of the war which has been recently concluded. Such an assertion, advanced in the most solemn official act of a government, and thereby meant to be avowed to all the powers of Europe, can be considered in no other light than as a defiance publicly offered to his Majesty, and to a brave and powerful people, who are both willing and able to defend his just rights, and those of their country, against every insult and aggression. The conduct of the First

Consul to his Majesty's Ambassador at his audience, in presence of the ministers of most of the Sovereigns and States of Europe, furnishes another instance of provocation on the part of the French government, which it would be improper not to notice on the present occasion, and the subsequent explanation of this transaction may be considered as having the effect of aggravating instead of palliating the affront.

At the very time when his Majesty was demanding satisfaction and explanation on some of the points above-mentioned, the French Minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of a most gross and opprobrious libel against his Majesty; and when difficulties were made respecting the insertion of it, he availed himself of his official character of Minister of the French Republic, to require the publication of it by order of his Government in the Gazette of the Senate of that Town. With this requisition so made, the Senate of Hamburgh were induced to comply; and thus has the independence of that town been violated, and a free State made the instrument, by the menace of the French Government, of propagating throughout Europe, upon their authority, the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against his Majesty and his Government. His Majesty might add to this list of indignities, the requisition which the French Government have repeatedly urged, that the Laws and Constitution of his Country should be changed relative to the Liberty of the Press. His Majesty might likewise add the calls which the French Government have on several occasions made upon him to violate the laws of hospitality with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his Dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated. It is impossible to reflect on these different proceedings, and the course which the French Government have thought proper to adopt respecting them, without the thorough conviction that they are not the effect of accident; but that they form a part of a system which has been adopted for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his Government.

Under all these insults and provocations, his Majesty, not without a due sense of his dignity has proceeded with every degree of temper and moderation to obtain satisfaction and redress, while he has neglected no means consistent with his honour and the safety of his Dominions, to induce the Government of France to concede to him, what is, in his judgment, absolutely necessary for the future tranquillity of Europe. His efforts in this respect have proved abortive, and he has therefore judged it necessary to order his Ambassador to leave Paris. In having recourse to this proceeding, it has been his Majesty's object to put an end to the fruitless discussions which have too long subsisted between the two Governments, and to close a period of suspense peculiarly injurious to the subjects of his Majesty. But though the provocations which His Majesty has received might entitle him to larger claims than those which he has advanced, yet anxious to prevent calamities which might thus be extended to every part of Europe, he is still willing, as far as is consistent with his own Honour, and the interests of His People, to afford every facility to any just and honourable arrangement, by which such evils may be averted. He has therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all Europe, that notwithstanding all the changes which have taken place since the Treaty of Peace, notwithstanding the extension of the Power of France, in repugnance to that Treaty, and to the spirit of Peace itself, His Majesty will not avail Himself of these circumstances, to demand in compensation all that He is entitled to require, but will be ready to concur, even now, in an arrangement by which Satisfaction shall be given to Him, for the Indignities which have been offered to His Crown and to His People, and substantial security afforded against further encroachments on the part of France.—His Majesty has thus distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons of those proceedings to which he has found himself compelled to resort. He is actuated by no disposition to interfere in the internal concerns of any other State; by no projects of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely by a sense of what is due to the honour of His Crown, and the interests of His People, and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world.

Order of his Britannic Majesty in Council for making reprisals on the French Republic.—Dated May 16, 1803, and taken from the London Gazette of May 17.

At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 16th of May 1803, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas, in consequence of the repeated insults and provocations which his Majesty has experienced from the government of France, his Majesty finds himself compelled to take such measures as are necessary for vindicating the honour of his crown, and the just rights of his subjects; his Majesty, therefore, is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of the French Republic; so that as well his Majesty's fleets and ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissionated, by letters of marque, or general reprisals, or otherwise, by his Majesty's commissioners for executing the Office of Lord High Admiral of Great Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the French Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic, and bring the same to judgment in such Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof; and, to that end, his Majesty's Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorising the commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, or any person or persons by them empowered and appointed, to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisals to any of his Majesty's subjects, or others whom the said commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, for the apprehending, seizing, and taking the ships, vessels, and goods, belonging to the French Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission, as have been usual, and are according to former precedents; and his Majesty's said Advocate-General, with the Advocate of the Admiralty, are also forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to his Majesty at this board, authorising the said commissioners for executing the office of Lord High Admiral, to will and require

the High Court of Admiralty of Great Britain, and the lieutenant and judge of the said Court, his surrogate or surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be made, and to hear and determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty and the laws of nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, and goods as shall belong to the French Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the French Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the French Republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission as have been usual and are according to former precedents; and they are likewise to prepare and lay before his Majesty at this board a draft of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the said several Courts of Admiralty in his Majesty's foreign governments and plantations for their guidance herein; as also another draft of instructions for such ships as shall be commissionated for the purposes above-mentioned.

From the Court at the Queen's Palace, the sixteenth day of May, One thousand eight hundred and three.

Eldon, C. Portland, P. Westmorland, C. P. S. Atholl, Roxburgh, Salisbury, C. Townshend, Dartmouth, Chesterfield, Harlington, Chatham, Rosslyn, Onslow, Courtown, Castlereagh, Hawkesbury, Pelham, Cathcart, Auckland, Bayning, Glenbervie, Henry Addington, C. F. Greville, Vice Ch. Wm. Wynne, Thomas Steele, Wm. Scott, Isaac Corry, C. Yorke, Thomas Wallace, J. Smyth, J. Hiley Addington.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

EMIGRATION.—A report has been made to the House of Commons from the committee appointed to examine into the survey of the coasts, &c. of Scotland, relating to emigration; and, upon the authority of this report, the following resolutions were, on the 17th inst. moved by Mr Hawkins Browne.—"That "persons emigrating from different parts of "the United Kingdom to his Majesty's "plantations, &c. had suffered greatly from "the crowded state of the ships, from the "want of provisions, &c.—That the ships "ought to be regulated with regard to the "number of persons they take on board, the "quantity of provisions, &c."—Those who read some of the first numbers of the newspaper called THE PORCUPINE, will recollect, that, in an article, entitled "*White Slave* "*Trade*," the necessity of some such regulation as that which appears to be now in contemplation was pointed out, and the aid of the legislature therein loudly called for. We cannot, however, help expressing our surprise, that the subject should have lain dormant for nearly three years, and that it should now have been brought forward by a cause so comparatively insignificant. The present report gives an account of the emigration, during the years 1801, and 1802, *from the coasts and central Highlands of Scotland*. The places to which the emigrants have gone, the numbers in each year, and the totals of both years taken together, are as follows.

Emigrated to	in 1801	in 1802	in both.
Nova Scotia.....	669	198	867
Upper Canada.....		2,173	2,173
Cape Breton.....		340	340
United States of America.....	130	600	730
Totals	799	3,311	4,110

The first observation that presents itself is, the great difference between the last year of war and the first year of the "blessings "of peace," of that peace and plenty, brought us by the treaty of Amiens; and, one cannot but admire the modesty and candour of Mr. Addington in not availing himself of this circumstance in stating the vast increase of his *exports* of British produce.—Four thousand one hundred and ten persons are, we perceive all that have emigrated from the Highlands in the course of two years, and of this number the whole, except 730, have gone *to his Majesty's dominions*, are still his subjects, and are, probably, as to the general interests of the empire, full as advantageously employed, and full as happily for themselves, as if they had remained in the Highlands, or had come to crowd the Custom-house, the Excise, and the other public offices in London. In the Appendix of the Report, the committee has given an extract from the evidence of a Mr. James Grant of Redcastle, who states, that the emigration, from the part of the country alluded to, *since* the conclusion of the war, has amounted to 5,000 souls; that an equal number are ready to embark this season; that the whole depopulation to be expected from this cause, might extend to 25,000 souls, a full *third part* of all the existing inhabitants of the West-Highlands including the adjacent Islands.——Truely this is an alarming circumstance, and highly deserving legislative attention; but, how comes it, that the ministers, both the present and the last, have constantly turned a deaf ear to all the representations relative to the emigration from Ireland and Wales? In the latter of these, the means of emigration have been furnished by the parish officers, in order to get rid of the poor. Publications the most delusive and false have been made for the express purpose of inveighing away the ignorant country people, not to Nova Scotia and Canada, but to the United States of America, where they must be for ever lost to the British empire. We know, that these facts

were duly communicated to the present ministers: and we also know, that they paid no attention to them; that they made no one exertion to undeceive the people, though ample means for so doing were ready at their hand. How comes it, then, that the subject is *now* taken up? There have been more than 10,000 souls, upon an average, emigrated from Ireland to the United States, every year for ten years last past. Horrid is the treatment, which these people have met with at sea, and, after their landing, they have been sold by public advertisement. How comes it, then, we again ask, that the voice of neither interest nor humanity has been listened to till *now?* The emigration from Ireland, not to the King's dominions, but to foreign parts, has been greater in amount, within the last ten years, than the whole population of the West Highlands of Scotland; and, why are not the interests of Ireland, why are not the health and lives of her people as dear to the government as are the interests of Scotland and the health and lives of her people? Where is the ground of this partiality? Is Ireland less fertile than the Highlands of Scotland? Can the people live in the latter easier and better than in the former? or are the land-holders in the Highlands more faithful to the minister of the day than are the land-holders of Ireland? All that appears to be intended by the bill, at present to be brought in, is, to prevent ill-treatment to the emigrants; but, it is very clear from the language of the report, that the ultimate object is to *prevent emigration*, not only of men but of *money*; for at the close of the return for 1802, it is said: "this "year, the passengers, including freight-"money, took out of the country, above "£100,000 sterling cash—*lost to it for* "*ever!*"—Almost all the emigrants went to Canada, Nova Scotia, and Cape Breton, and it is not very fair to suppose, that their cash, their dear delicious cash, was lost to the *country* for ever, unless, by the word country Scotland *alone* is meant. Besides, why should not the poor Highlanders carry away their cash as well as the noblemen and gentlemen of Scotland and England? We greatly doubt that cash expended by these people on the woods of Canada and Nova Scotia is more completely lost to the empire than that which the Duchess of Gordon, Duke of Bedford, and a list of others too loathsome to enumerate, have expended in Paris. A hundred thousand pounds lost to the country for ever! *Three millions* of pounds have been thus lost for ever, during the same year, by those who have been crouching at the feet of Buonaparté and his wife. The very baubles bought expressly for the purpose of shining in the eyes of our mortal enemy, who to that quality adds the more hateful ones of rebel and usurper, have cost more than all the three thousand Highlanders have taken to America.—That every government has a *right* to prevent emigration to foreign parts is certain; it is not only an undoubted, but a just and equitable right of sovereignty; but, as to the *expedience* of using force for this purpose, that must depend upon circumstances, one of which certainly is not, that the possessers of the land set the un-patriotic example.

FINANCE.—The hirelings of the ministry are always unfortunate in the *time* they choose for vilifying our statements. Just at the moment when a discussion in the House of Lords was *confirming* our representations on the subject of Mr. Addington's estimates, some ministerial creature was advertising a *refutation* of those representations. We have not looked into this representation, a neglect which we participate with the Public, but certain we are, that whatever sum of the nation's money it has been purchased with has been totally thrown away.—Lord Grenville, in admitting, for argument's sake, the correctness of all the accounts laid before Parliament, and proceeding upon the supposition that peace had continued, clearly made out a *deficit* of more than £4,000,000 per annum, instead of a *surplus* of £1,000,000, on which Mr. Addington taught the deceived people to rely, making a difference of more than £5,000,000, between the reality and the estimates of the minister.—The debate, to which we allude, and which will, of course, be given at length in the Supplement to this Volume, was opened, with great ability by Lord King, who appears to be a young nobleman of promise. Lord Moira's speech was one of the best that ever was heard even in that assembly. He acknowledged that he had been deceived as to the treaty of Amiens; he deprecated that system of financial deception, which had long been practised upon the people, in order to cover the blunders and misconduct of ministers, and to prepare the way for some new and unlooked-for sacrifice; and, he satirized, in a most happy vein of contempt, the display of Lord Auckland's "*magnificent* receipts."—Magnificent receipts! What a phrase! What a phrase for a *nobleman* to use! Not a whit less disgusting than the "*heavenly* turtle" of a *Right Honourable* and guttling Lord Mayor. The speech of Lord Grenville, of which those who were not present can have but a very faint notion, unravelled the whole of the labyrinthian deception, and exhibited the juggling minister in his native duplicity. Under blows

like these Lord Auckland was *supported* by the Earl of Westmoreland; *how*, it would not be becoming in us to attempt to describe.——The stock-jobbing lovers of peace and plenty; the omnium eaters; all the innumerable swarm of locusts, who, without stirring ten miles from the capital, devour three-fourths of the produce of the whole land; this destructive race of beings may, and will abuse every one who attempts to open the eyes of the nation, because they must know, that every such attempt tends to their annihilation. But, events will, ere long, speak to them in a most tremendous voice. The thunder already begins to roll, and the bolt will assuredly fall. They may howl, but their howlings will not save them. They may cry "blood-hounds" as long as they please; but they must have war, and *to them* most certainly a war of extermination. The stroke may be postponed for a few months, or for a year or two; but it must come, and that shortly. We, for our parts, believe, that another accommodation with Buonaparté will yet take place: another short respite from conflict: and, the war will, probably, be nothing more than a sort of half peace, conducted by the sapient Addington and his colleagues: but, all this will avail nothing, the great and tremendous war must finally come, and then adieu to all the golden dreams of the votaries of the Temple of Mammon.—— The scenes exhibited in the City of London for the last three weeks are too disgusting, too hateful, to contemplate without a mixture of indescribable loathing and horror; and the man who does not desire to see an effectual bar against their recurrence in future must be lost to every sense of shame as well as of honour.

THE WAR.—It is unnecessary to refer our readers to any official document, in order to convince them that war now exists between this country and France: the fact is notorious; it is our province to investigate the circumstances attending that fact, and to examine into the conduct of those who have, on the part of His Majesty, conducted the discussions which have finally led thereunto. Before, however, we enter on this examination; before we make any statement founded on the diplomatic correspondence now on the table of the Parliament; before we exhibit a confirmation of our former conjectures, that the dispute was *invented* for the purpose of *disguising the real cause of the armament*; before we discharge the painful duty of shewing, that the present weak and wicked ministers, after having passed over many just grounds of war, have finally commenced a war, become indeed absolutely necessary to the safety of the kingdom, but the *alleged* grounds of which are not only inadequate but totally false: before we enter on these topics, we cannot refrain from making some general reflections on the present state of things, compared with that state, in which we were previous to the signature of the preliminaries of peace.

After one year and sixteen days of peace, or rather of suspended hostilities, war has again begun, France having during the interval, received from us, all the conquests we had made (the Island of Malta excepted), and having, since the signature of the Preliminaries, and even *in consequence thereof*, gained an immense acquisition of power and of territory, on the Continent of Europe. Holland, from the whole tenor of our complaints as well as from the well-known fact itself, can now be regarded as neither more nor less than an appendage of the Republic of France. The Cape, therefore, Cochin, Demerara, Surinam, Essequibo, and every other spot of earth, which we have restored to the Dutch, have, in reality, been surrendered to France. To France we knew that we were surrendering the Island of Elba, and its almost impregnable fortress and harbour. This was explicitly stated in Parliament, previous to the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty. We have surrendered to her Pondicherry, Martinico, St. Lucia, and Tobago, and have again given her a footing in Newfoundland. We have thrown Turkey into her arms, given her an entrance into the Black Sea, once more exposed the famed Seven Islands to her intrigues, and laid Egypt open to her invasions. Till the preliminary treaty, the treaty of the 1st of October, 1801, the news of which Lord Hawkesbury was so *happy* to communicate to the Mayor of London, till that "death warrant" of England was signed, France did not attempt to take possession of the Italian Republic; it was not till then, that she annexed Piedmont to her territory, and that, by hemming up the Emperor in the further corner of Europe, and by new-modelling the constitution and making a new distribution of the territory and of power of the Empire of Germany, she completed her plan for excluding us from all connexion with the continent, and from all hope of its aid or co-operation.—All these possessions, all these sources of power, all these means of defence as well as of offence, all these innumerable and incalculable advantages, France has gained by the peace, and by the peace alone; while, on our side, that peace

has brought no one single advantage, but has, on the contrary, been productive of almost every mischief that can fall upon a nation. Not one penny of money has it saved to the state, though it, in great part, has disbanded the army and dismantled the fleet, at the same time that it has blasted our fame for good faith as well as for courage, has shaken the credit and broken the spirit of the nation. — Such is the change which the peace has made in our relative state; such is the price which we have paid for three hundred and eighty-one days of the "blessings of peace"; such is the difference between a *renewal* and a *continuation* of the war; such is the accomplishment of Mr. Windham's predictions, and such the comment on the policy of Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt. — Shame on the coward, who, at the formidable name of this latter gentleman, disguises his sentiments, and affects to believe, that *a ministry differently composed* would have avoided the present crisis, and would have rendered the peace of Amiens advantageous to the country. If any proof were wanted of the fallacy of this supposition, the diplomatic correspondence and other documents, now before the Public, would most amply afford that proof. No; it is the treaties, the degrading, the infamous treaties, these, and these alone have produced the mischief, and would have produced the same mischief, though not quite so soon, perhaps, in the hands of any set of ministers that His Majesty could possibly have chosen. In these treaties were sown the seeds of war and of destruction to England. This was evident to the most superficial politician, though Mr. Pitt could, or affected, not to perceive it. The arrangement respecting Malta that gentleman highly applauded. Malta is now the ostensible object of the war, and it is become so principally because Russia will, on no account, agree *to garrison its fortresses*. This was explicitly foretold in less than twenty days after the signature of the Preliminary Treaty (1); it was repeated again and again, amidst the sneers of the ministers and their stock-jobbing partizans, one of whom had the folly and the assurance to assert, that "the "independence of Malta was as amply pro- "vided for by the Treaty of Amiens, as "the independence of Spain was by the "Treaty of Utrecht"! Let it not, therefore, be said, that the present evils have not *naturally flowed* from the peace. A thousand and a thousand times were the supporters of that peace forewarned, that the moment all our conquests were surrendered, war would ensue. The conquests are surrendered; the war has ensued; the warning was despised, but the prediction is fulfilled; and, unless the people are irretrievably sunk in ignorance and baseness, they will now look with veneration, gratitude, and confidence, to those noblemen and gentlemen, who had the wisdom to foresee, and the integrity and zeal to endeavour to prevent, the calamity and disgrace which has since fallen upon the country. (2)

Having thus stated our opinion as to the first, and constantly prevailing, cause of the event which is now come to pass, we shall now, we trust, clearly shew, that the dispute which has immediately led to this event, was begun by our ministers, and from motives, too, very different indeed from those alleged in their divers declarations. By referring to our Register of the 30th ultimo, p. 631, it will be perceived, that, in noticing a motion, made by Lord Folkestone, for papers relative to the retention and evacuation of the Cape of Good Hope, we stated our concurrence in his lordship's opinion, that the retention, or, rather, the recapture of that post, was the principal, if not the sole, cause of His Majesty's message, and of the armament which thereupon followed; and, that the grounds, alleged in the said message were feigned for the purpose of disguising the real motives of the ministers, who dreaded the charge of perfidy, as well as the real danger to the country, and more especially themselves personally, which might arise, and which would unquestionably have arisen, *if the news of the recapture of the Cape had found them unengaged in any serious dispute with France*. Requesting our readers to re-peruse the whole of the observations, to which we refer, we beg leave to call

(1) See Cobbett's Letters on the Peace, 2d edit. p. 41.—In this letter, and in another, which will be found in the Register, Vol. I. p. 353, the causes of the present rupture, as far as relates to Malta, are clearly pointed out.

(2) The members who voted against the treaty of Amiens, in the House of Lords, on the 13th of May, 1802, were: *Duke* of Richmond; *Marquis* of Buckingham; *Earls*, Carlisle, Warwick, Fitzwilliam, Darlington, Radnor, Spencer, Fortescue, Mansfield, Caernarvon, Carysfort; *Lords*, Kenyon, Grenville, Cawder, Minto; *Bishop* of Rochester (now St. Asaph.)

The members who voted against it in the House of Commons, on the 14th of May, 1803, were: Mr. Windham, Hon. T. Grenville, Lord Temple, Lord Folkestone, Lord Morpeth, Lord Bruce, Lord Kensington, Sir Watkin William Wynne, Bart. Sir Wm. Young, Bart. Hon. C. Dundas, Messrs. C. Wynne, Elliot, Baker, S. Poyntz, Ellis, G. Ellis, Folgambe, Chamberline, B. Cooke, Dr. Laurence, General Lennox, and General Gascoyne.

their particular attention to the following passage : —— " The ministers having " grounded their armament upon the double " pretext of *extraordinary military preparations*, and of *important discussions*, and " being well assured, that the former did " not exist, they were compelled to *make* " the latter ; and, if ever the papers re- " lative to the present negotiation should " be made public, it will be seen, that the " important discussions *originated with them*, " and, that, too *at the very same time when* " *the Message was resolved on.*" — These papers have now been made public, and no one can regret more sincerely than we do, that they amply confirm this conjecture. The war is necessary, absolutely necessary to the preservation of our liberties and lives, and, therefore, we cannot but lament, that the ostensible grounds of it are manifestly unfounded in truth; we cannot but lament, that, for the purpose of sheltering the ignorance, the indecision, the weakness, the selfishness, and the wickedness, of the ministers, the nation has been plunged into a war, upon pretexts that gives to our enemy the appearance of having *right* on his side, and that inevitably tend to excite mistrust of us abroad, and to create and cherish a domestic opposition, a French faction, a political serpent in the bosom of the country, by which all our warlike operations will be cramped, and which may finally produce, at no very distant period, a peace still more injurious, disgraceful and fatal, than the last. Nevertheless, truth and justice, wisdom and policy, all concur in demanding a faithful statement of the case, as it now stands upon the evidence contained in the papers ; for, as there is nothing more dishonourable, so is there nothing more foolish, than to hope of succeeding in a war, the real causes and objects of which are hidden from the people.

The papers relative to the negotiation (all of which will be inserted together in the Supplement to this Volume) may be compared to a poem, the main subject of which is Malta, relieved occasionally, by episodes respecting Holland, Switzerland, the Royalists, and the Liberty of the Press, in the last of which the Editor of this work has the honour to be introduced as one of the most implacable enemies of France. To all these topics we shall hereafter have occasion to call the attention of our readers. At present, we must confine ourselves to Malta, which is the pivot of the discussions, and on the terms respecting which the negotiations were finally broken off.

On the 23d of May, only 24 days after the peace was proclaimed in London, we find Otto and Lord Hawkesbury (persons well worthy of each others friendship) corresponding about the appointment of ambassadors to Malta. Between this time and the latter end of January, several letters passed between the secretary of state and others relating to the guarantees of Prussia, Austria, and Russia, which last court refused, unless some modification was made in the Xth article of the treaty of Amiens. —On the 27th of January, we find Talleyrand asking Lord Whitworth, when England meant to evacuate Malta; observing, at the same time, " that another grand " master (Prince Ruspoli having declined the office) " would soon be elected ; that " all the powers of Europe invited so to do, " with the exception of Russia, whose dif- " ficulties it was easy to remove, and with- " out whom the guaranty would be equally " complete, were ready to come forward ; " (3) and that consequently the term would " soon arrive, when Great-Britain would " have no pretext for keeping longer pos- " session." — This was communicated to Lord Hawkesbury, who, on the 9th of February wrote to Lord Whitworth a statement of the views then entertained by this government relative to Malta. He states, that agreeably to the principles on which the treaty of Amiens was made, His Majesty would have had a right to demand some compensation for the late acquisitions of power which France had made on the Continent ; but, that he had waived these pretensions, and that a communication respecting an amicable arrangement as to the evacuation of Malta had been actually prepared, and was about to be sent to Lord Whitworth, when the attention of his Majesty's government was attracted by the official report of Colonel Sebastiani, (4) which appeared in the Moniteur of the 30th of January.—" It " is impossible," says Lord Hawkesbury, " for His Majesty to view this report in any " other light than as an official publication ; " for without referring particularly to expla- " nations which have been repeatedly given " upon the subject of publications in the " Moniteur, the article in question, as it " purports to be the report of the First " Consul in an accredited agent, as it ap- " pears to have been signed by Colonel Se- " bastiani himself, and as it is published in " the official paper, with an official title " affixed to it, must be considered as au- " thorized by the French government. This " report contains *the most unjustifiable insi-*

(3) Did ever any man besides Lord Whitworth write a sentence like this?

(4) See this Report; Register, Vol. III. p. 246.

" *nuations and charges against the officer who* " *commanded his forces in Egypt, and against* " *the British army in that quarter,* insinuations " and charges wholly destitute of founda- " tion, and such as would warrant His Ma- " jesty in demanding that satisfaction, " which, on occasions of this nature, inde- " pendent powers, in a state of amity, have " a right to expect from each other. *It dis* " *closes, moreover, views in the highest degree* " *injurious to the interests of His Majesty's do-* " *minions, and directly repugnant to, and ut-* " *terly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter* " *of the treaty of peace* concluded between " His Majesty and the French government; " and His Majesty would feel that he was " wanting in a proper regard to the honour " of his crown, and to the interests of his " dominions, if he could see with indiffer- " ence such a system developed and avowed. " His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the " conduct of the French government on " various occasions since the conclusion of " the Definitive Treaty, the insinuations " and charges contained in the report of " Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which " that report discloses, without feeling it " necessary for him distinctly to declare, " that it will be impossible for him to enter " into any further discussion relative to " Malta, unless he receives satisfactory ex- " planation on the subject of this commu- " nication."—This was on the 9th of February; *satisfactory explanation* with regard to Sebastiani's report was the object, and must have been the only rational object; for, as to the abuse of General Stuart and the British army in Egypt, strange indeed would it have been for the ministers to make that a ground of quarrel after the affair of Captain D'Auvergne, and after the official publication, in the Moniteur, in which His Majesty himself was styled the *rewarder of assassins.* What was there, then, in this report of Sebastiani? What views did it disclose so peculiarly injurious to the interests of His Majesty's *dominions*, and so much more repugnant to, and inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace, than any of the other publications which France had issued since the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty? Sebastiani observes, that " six " thousand French would at present be " enough to conquer Egypt;" but, we believe, that a fair construction of this sentence, if considered together with the context, will by no means warrant the inference, that the French *intended* to attempt such an expedition. The report is full of lies and vain boasting; but it does not breathe a spirit so hostile to this country as many other previous publications in the Moniteur, and this is a fact which will be denied by no man who has read those publications. But whatever might be the anger or alarm excited by this report, " *satisfactory* " *explanation*" was all that was demanded or expected on the subject; and, accordingly, we find Talleyrand, on the 17th of February, desiring to know from Lord Whitworth " what was *the nature and degree* " *of the satisfaction* which his Majesty would " require," and Lord Whithworth, for want of a better answer, we suppose, replied, that " he could not pretend to say!!!"—On the Friday previous to the 21st of February, Lord Whitworth had a two hours conversation with Buonaparté, who positively denied having any intentions of invading Egypt.—As this Ambassador of ours talks about Fridays and Tuesdays as familiarly as if he were writing to a cousin in the country, and as we have not an almanack before us, we must now and then use a circumlocution in describing the time at which certain circumstances passed.—On the 21st of February Lord Whitworth saw Talleyrand, and told him, that, " what he had said to the First " Consul (at their long interview) amount- " ed to an assurance of the readiness of his " Majesty's ministers to remove all subjects " of discussion, and to *fulfil strictly the en-* " *gagements which they had contracted,* in as " much as that could be reconciled *with the* " *safety of the state,*" which, by the by, was rather an odd sort of declaration; but, those who have read these dispatches will experience very little surprise at any thing they shall in future meet with from the pen of Lord Whitworth. Talleyrand replied, " that" (alluding to the subject of Sebastiani's report) " a project was in contemplation, by " which *the integrity of the Turkish Empire* " *would be so effectually secured,* as to *do away* " *every cause of doubt or uneasiness,* either " with regard to Egypt or any part of the " Turkish dominions."—In answer to a communication of this promise Lord Hawkesbury wrote to Lord Whitworth on the 28th of February, (5) saying:—" From " the postscript of your Excellency's letter, " it appears that a project was in contem- " plation, by which, according to the de- " claration of Mr. Talleyrand, the integrity " of the Turkish territory would be secured " so as to do away every cause of doubt or " uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or " to any other part of the Turkish domi- " nions. His Majesty *will consider the com-*

(5) There is, in the copy laid before the Houses of Parliament, a mistake in the date of this letter of Lord Hawkesbury. It should be 28th and not 18th, since it acknowledges the receipt of a letter, dated Paris, 21st February.

" *munication of such a project as indicating a* " *disposition on the part of the French govern* " *ment, to afford him explanation and satisfac-* " *tion respecting some of the points which have* " *been the subject of his representations.* But " after all that passed, his Majesty cannot " consent that his troops should evacuate " the Island of Malta, until *substantial secu-* " *rity* has been provided for those objects, " which, under the present circumstances, " might be materially endangered by their " removal"—Here we see them rising from *satisfactory explanation* to *substantial security*, a very considerable step, and which cannot, we think, be fairly ascribed to any thing short of a desire, and even a determination, to protract the dispute and to hang on upon Malta, for some purpose, other than that which was alleged. At any rate, however, who would not have expected from this language of Lord Hawkesbury, that the project of Talleyrand, that project, the communication of which his Majesty " would " consider as indicating a disposition, on " the part of the French government, *to af-* " *ford him explanation and satisfaction* respect- " ing some of the points in dispute;" who would not have regarded this as the language of conciliation, as the harbinger of peace? What, then, must have been the surprise of Lord Whitworth, what must have been the surprise of Buonaparté, and what must be the astonishment and indignation of the British people, to hear, that their ministers, without hearing one word further from Paris, without waiting for the possibility of an answer to the letter conveying this conciliatory language, brought a message to the Parliament calling for *preparations for war!* The letter, which we have last quoted, was, as we have before remarked, written on the 28th of February; on the 7th of March the message was resolved on, and a copy of it transmitted to Lord Whitworth; and, between the pacific letter of the 28th of February and the delivery of the message, *no communication, touching the dispute with France, was made to the ministers, from any quarter whatever!*

Strange, wonderfully strange and inconsistent as this conduct appears, however, the mystery vanishes in an instant, when we find, which was really the case, that on the 5th or 6th of March, before the answer to Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February could reach London, *news arrived, that General Dundas had re-captured the Cape of Good Hope.* The ministers perceived the odium and the danger, to which the communication of this event would expose them, unless they could, previously to its being generally known, place the nation in a warlike attitude They had just grace enough left to dread the infamy of announcing their recommencement of hostilities at the Southern point of Africa, while they were speaking the language of peace and amity in Europe; and they were, too, far from being certain, that Buonaparté would not instantly attempt an invasion of Ireland or England by way of revenge. Therefore it was that they brought the message, therefore it was that they armed; and, having thus prepared themselves, the news of the re capture of the Cape was communicated to the Public, who, not perceiving the ruse de guerre, and not reflecting on the nature of the transaction, regarded the re-capture as a lucky circumstance, instead of viewing it as the grossest of follies, or the most shameful act of fraud, that ever was committed by a nation.

Of the cause of this re-capture, too, and of the subsequent evacuation, the papers before us furnish an explanation. On the 3d of October last, we find the accomplished Mr Merry writing to his no less accomplished principal in Downing Street, and conveying to him an overture of a Swiss agent at Paris, who, having failed in his negotiations with Buonaparté, and having found the door of all the other foreign Ambassadors shut against him, applied, as to a pis-aller, to our dignified and sapient representative. This enterprising Swiss wanted arms, ammunition, stores, and, above all, *money*, sticking to the old proverb " point " d'argent point de Suisse;" and, it really appears, that our ministers, those ministers who were, and who still are, suffering the French royalists to starve in the streets of London; those ministers who abandoned to the mercy, or rather to the hellish cruelty, of the Corsican murderer, the brave, the faithful, the loyal Vendeans, thousands of whom have, since the signature of the Definitive Treaty, fallen beneath his knife; those ministers, who, at that very moment were taking measures to " *transport*" General Georges and his gallant followers to the woods of Canada, in order to sooth the rebel usurper against whom they had fought in the service of England; those very ministers listen to the proposition of this Swiss adventurer; and, without more ado, actually dispatched one of their habile corps diplomatique to Switzerland with offers of " *pecuniary succours.*" Mr. Moore, who was the knight errant chosen upon this occasion, sallied forth in search of adventures on the 10th of October, at which time the ministers sent out orders of retention to their other knight at the Cape of Good Hope. At the same time that Mr. Moore was dispatched to Switzerland or its neighbour-

hood, a remonstrance was made by Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Otto, to which *no answer* has ever been given from that day to this.—On the 31st of Oct. Mr. Moore writes home, that, upon his arrival at Constance, on the 27th, he found that the Diet of Schwitz had made a formal submission to the French arms; and, on the 25th of November, Lord Hawkesbury writes to him to return home; which the unfortunate knight was, doubtless, very glad to do, having, without even entering their territory, rendered the Swiss much about the same sort of service as that which Don Quixotte rendered the farmer's boy; and having himself been, for nearly two months, the standing jest of the French and German writers, who absolutely laughed him off the Continent.—When, therefore, it was known, that the Diet of Schwitz had submitted, the ministers hastened to countermand the orders they had sent out for the retention of the Cape. They were in a humour now to surrender every thing; for, under the date of the 30th of November, we find an apology sent by Lord Hawkesbury for General Stuart's not having evacuated Egypt, and stating, that an order had *now* been sent him to do it immediately. There was still some excuse for keeping Malta till the guarantees were completed; but that too would have been surrendered, had no orders been gone out for the retention of the Cape. Those orders might be executed, and the news might come off, before the counter-order arrived; if so, as we should have had nothing at all left in hand, a war, on the part of France, would have instantly ensued; she would, as her first act, have seized on Malta and on Egypt, just about the time when we should have heard of the final surrender of the Cape. This the "*safe* politicians" were afraid of, and, therefore, they kept talking about *arrangements, grand-masters, guarantees*, and *Sebastiani's Report*, till they should hear whether their order for surrendering the Cape overtook the order for its retention. It did not. The recapture was made; the news came while they were eking out their tenure upon the gasconades of Sebastiani, which appear to have been their last resource, and instantly they changed their tone from the pacific language of Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 28th of February, to that of the King's Message and the measures subsequent thereto.

Now, therefore, and *not till now*, the "*important* discussions," mentioned in the Message *began*. A demand was now, for the first time, made to retain Malta for a term of years, or in perpetuity; and, as we before observed, a dispute was thus *invented* by the ministers, to hide their real motives. Having, however, begun the quarrel, they soon brought into it all those points which ought to have been the subject of discussion long before; but, the real object of the Message and the armament was, the dread which they justly entertained of the consequences that might arise from the news of the recapture of the Cape finding them in an attitude of profound peace. When they perceived, that this news, being almost immediately followed by that of a final restoration of the Cape, produced no very great effect in France and Holland, they would gladly have recalled the Message together with its attendant measures; but, here the love of place interposed; they well knew that the *cause* of the Message would have been demanded at their hands; they well knew, that proof of the "*military preparations*" having ceased, proof of the satisfactory termination of the "*important discussions*," would have been required, in order to justify the discontinuance of the armament; such proof they could not have given the true motive of their conduct; must have appeared, and even the vain and insolent Addingtons had not the assurance to hope, that the people would have patiently borne the expense of two or three millions merely on account of those upstarts having retained, for a few days, a post since given up. Something, therefore, and something a little solid, too, they were compelled to obtain in their own defence, and to this we have to attribute their demands respecting Malta. If they obtained what they asked, it gave them a new lease of their places; if not, they could but lose those places, a loss which already threatened them, and which, on account of the finances in particular, they began to regard as inevitable. Their demands were not acceded to, and the consequence is, we are now in a state of war; a war for which there were and are many *good and sufficient* causes, a war which is absolutely necessary to the very existence of England as an independent nation, but which, as far as is proved by the diplomatic papers, is grounded upon pretexts totally false, and which, if the language of the declaration be adhered to, may consistently be closed, without having effected any one of the objects for which alone it ought to have been commenced; a war, in short, undertaken neither for national honour nor national security, but solely for purposes of ministerial interest and ambition.—And, is it true, can it possibly be true, that Mr. Pitt will defend the authors of this measure? Will

be for ever blast his fame by identifying himself with these men? We trust not; but, whatever may be his line of conduct, whatever national sacrifices he may be determined to make rather than acknowledge his error respecting the treaty of Amiens, rather than suffer his creatures to incur the responsibility which the nation has a right to demand at their hands, we hope that the Parliament will not forget, or neglect, *their* duty to their Sovereign and his people.

"We are" say the writers of a daily paper, "the very last who would attempt to "vindicate the conduct of the present crazy "and impotent ministry. Such a task would "require the greatest effort of ingenuity. "At this awful and alarming crisis, however, "when the enemy is at our gate—when he "threatens the destruction of our dearest "rights and liberties—when he avows that "nothing will satisfy him but the complete "humiliation or slavery of Englishmen, the "reduction of this seat of freedom to the "groveling and detestable state of a French "province—*it is then our duty to invigorate the "measures of Government.* At such a moment-"ous and dangerous crisis, *party distinctions "and party prejudices ought to cease*, and the "only spirit of emulation ought to be, who, "on such a great and urgent occasion, will "first meet and repel our common Enemy, "and the Enemy of Mankind."—Amen! So be it, with all our hearts! We are under the influence of *no party*; we are of no party but that of our King and his faithful people. Yes, perish the man, who would not, at this time, endeavour to "*invigorate* the measures of government." That is the very object of all our endeavours, and it will be readily allowed, that nothing is so likely to effect it, as driving from that government *weakness and pusillanimity*. But, the government, to have lasting vigour, must possess the confidence of the people. It may just sustain itself by means of their money; but, in order to make the required exertions, it must have their hearts also, and these are not to be obtained without an *assurance*, without "the *evidence of facts*," that another peace of Amiens will not be made; that the interests and honour of their country will not be again sacrificed to gratify the avarice and the vanity of another set of weak and wicked ministers. Until they obtain such an assurance, they will never again give their cordial support to the government; and this assurance can be given them only in bringing to justice, strict justice, the authors of their present calamity and disgrace. True it is, that the enemy will be satisfied with nothing short of the slavery of Englishmen, nothing short of "reducing this seat of freedom to the gro-"velling and detestable state of a province "of France;" but, let it be remembered, that it was to this enemy, this insolent, and malignant enemy, that the present ministers surrendered the means of effecting his object (if it ever is to be effected) and that they did this, too, with a perfect knowledge of the disposition and intentions of that enemy. Till, therefore, justice be rendered them on this score, what hope can they entertain from any sacrifices or exertions of theirs? and what confidence can they repose in the government which shall refuse them that justice?

NOTICES.

Next week we shall publish two sheets, and, shall, if possible, enter fully into our proposed discussion relative to the *justice and necessity of impeaching the ministers*, a subject to which, we are glad to perceive, the public has, at last, turned its serious attention.

☞ Correspondents will, we doubt not, have the goodness to excuse our omissions of this week. The communications respecting Malta shall certainly appear in our next.

*** The readers of the Register must, on several occasions have derived great pleasure and information, from the writings which have been published therein, under the name of SWENSKA. They will doubtless remember that it was from this gentleman, we received and published an intimation of the project for the new division of Germany, several days before even the ministers had any suspicion on the subject. We have lately made some extracts from a work by the same hand: some copies of this work, which has been published at the Hague, are now received in London, and we take the liberty to recommend its perusal to every gentleman who wishes to possess an accurate knowledge of the present situation, interests and views of the nations on the continent. The author writes generally from personal observation; and, as to France in particular, his information is interesting and valuable beyond description.—The work is English, and the price is 12s. It is entitled "*Sketches on the "Intrinsic Strength, Military and Naval Force "of France and Russia; with remarks on their "present connexion, political influence, and future "projects.*"—Sold by Harding, Pall Mall; Bagshaw, Bow Street, Covent Garden; and Richardson, Royal Exchange.

ERRATUM in last sheet, p. 735, l. 29 for *Darnley* read *Danby*.

MALTESE QUESTION.

The conduct of his Majesty's ministers, with respect to foreign powers, since the negotiation of the Preliminary Treaty, that negotiation inclusive, exhibits a series of acts, amongst which it is difficult to point out the meanest, the most dishonourable in itself, or the most injurious to their country; but, if, in this picture of political iniquity, any one part assumes a dye peculiarly dark, and, by aiming at the scandalous pre-eminence, breaks through the odious and detestable uniformity, it is their conduct relative to the Island and the people of Malta.

In order to obtain a full and correct view of this their conduct, the reader will find it necessary first to go back to the terms of the Preliminary Treaty with France, Article IV. (1) where it is stipulated, that, "the "Island of Malta, with its dependencies, "shall be evacuated by the troops of his "Britannic Majesty, and restored to the "Order of St John of Jerusalem;" and that, "for the purpose of rendering this "Island completely independent of either "of the two contracting parties, it shall be "placed under the guarantee and protec- "tion of a third power, to be agreed upon "in the Definitive Treaty."—For opinions as to the *wisdom* of this stipulation, considered with regard to ourselves, we refer the reader to the speech of Mr. Pitt; (2) and, for opinions as to its *folly*, we refer him to the speech of Mr. Windham (3), to which references we beg leave to add another, to Mr. Cobbett's Letters on the Preliminary Treaty, published in the very same month of October which witnessed the signature of that most silly, destructive, and disgraceful compact (4). It was here stated, in less than twenty days after the Preliminary Treaty was promulgated, that the stipulations relative to Malta were absolutely impracticable, and that, whenever the Island should be evacuated by the English, it would most assuredly be taken possession of by the French. But, it is not the question between the nation and the ministers, so much as that between the ministers and the people of Malta, into which we are now to examine.

No sooner was the treaty of Downing Street, the disgraceful Preliminary Treaty, made known to the Maltese, than they remonstrated against the injustice and cruelty of the stipulations relative to their country, of which they alleged that they themselves had the sole right, both of possession and of sovereignty, which rights they were willing to transfer to his Britannic Majesty, but by no means to the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This remonstrance (which we beg the reader to re-peruse in page 674 et seq. of the present volume), was drawn up at Malta, and sanctioned by the people, in the most lawful manner, on the 22d of October, 1801; a copy of it was immediately forwarded to his Majesty's secretary of state for the war department, Lord Hobart; and, lest that mode of application should fail of success, a deputation consisting of six persons was chosen, and dispatched to London, with orders to present the remonstrance in person, and to enforce its demands. Early in February, 1802, while the negotiation of the Definitive Treaty was going on, these deputies arrived in London, and, on the 4th of that month, they wrote an official letter to Lord Hobart, stating their quality and their business, also soliciting an interview (5). In answer to this letter, they received, from Lord Hobart, a verbal message, through Sir Alexander Ball, in which they were told, "*they would do well* "*to procure their departure from London as* "*soon as possible*, aducing for reasons, that "*their remaining would give jealousy to France*, "and thereby impede the conclusion of the "Definitive Treaty; and that he could not "for reasons of state, receive and hear "them *at his office*, but would permit them

(1) See Register, Vol. I. p. 163.
(2) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1138.
(3) Ibid, p. 1167. We beg the reader to turn to these pages. They record opinions highly important at this time.
(4) Letters on the Peace, 2d Edition, p. 40, *et seq.*
(5) See this Volume, p. 679.

" to come to his *private* house."—On the 8th of February they went to his private house, where they repeated, amplified, and enforced, every statement in their original remonstrance (which we again beg our readers to re-peruse); and, on the 1st of March, they sent in, to Lord Hobart's office, the memorial which will be found in the present Vol. p. 680 et seq. and in which memorial, are recapitulated all the statements, reasonings, and determinations, contained in the remonstrance.—The day after this memorial was delivered in, the deputies wrote to their constituents at Malta, a letter, giving them an account of the unworthy treatment they had met with in London, an extract from which letter we shall by-and-by insert. After, however, the interview with Lord Hobart, at which one of the deputies had freely expressed the indignant feelings of his countrymen, the deputation was better treated. They were shown about London, a *sum of money was given to each of them*, and having desired to be introduced to his Majesty, they were taken to Windsor, where a meeting which should, in case of complaint on the part of France, be capable of being construed into *mere accident*, was contrived.—After the Definitive Treaty was signed, a frigate was prepared for their reception, at Portsmouth, on board of which frigate they embarked for Malta, having, on the 2d of April, been prevailed on to write a letter to Lord Hobart, containing such expressions as might be regarded as amounting *to an approbation of the stipulations in the Definitive Treaty, relative to the Island and the people of Malta*, which letter was, on Friday, the 19th inst. read in the House of Commons by Lord Hawkesbury, as a sort of reply to the charges, which we have, on this head, heretofore preferred against him and his colleagues; but, so far were the people of Malta, *the constituents of the deputies*, from being satisfied with these stipulations, that, upon the promulgation of them in their Island, they tore down the posting bills (containing a translation of the 10th article of the treaty), from every place where they had been stuck up; and, as we have before stated, they carried their resentment against this country to such a length, that they resolved to *yield up their country to France*, rather than submit to the arrangement we had imposed on them, a measure the accomplishment of which could have been prevented only by the war, which has now taken place.

Such is the history of this shameful transaction, relative to which there are four points that present themselves for particular inquiry, or rather comment, for, as to the facts charged against ministers very little doubt can exist: 1. The right, on which the ministers proceeded in making the arrangement agreed on in the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, or rather, to use the expression of the Maltese, " in selling them " as slaves for a political consideration:" 2. The deception, which ministers practised on the parliament, by stating, as they did in the debates on the Definitive Treaty, that the people of Malta, were satisfied with and grateful for, that arrangement: 3. The shameful pusillanimity, towards France, and the more shameful injustice, cruelty, and insolence, which they discovered with respect to the Maltese, in their refusal to give the deputies an official reception and hearing: 4. The deception, which the ministers practised on the parliament, by refusing, as they did upon the motion of Lord Temple, to produce the information which they possessed relative to the rights and claims of the Maltese, alleging, on the ground of such refusal, that they were in possession of no official papers on the subject.

1. The right, on which ministers proceeded to make the arrangement contained in the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens, was, as stated by Lord Hobart himself, the *right of conquest*. " As we *won the Island by* " *force of arms*, we had an indisputable " right to arrange its government." This was the justification set up by Lord Hobart (6), under whose department the consideration of this part of the treaty more immediately fell. And, very glad indeed, should we be to be able to maintain his Lordship's position; for, much as we dislike the ministers, great as is the anger and resentment which we feel against them for the disgrace they have brought upon their country, that country must be answerable for their acts, and, therefore, we cannot but regret that those acts admit of no palliation. —Our right " *to arrange the government*" of Malta rests then, it seems, on the pre-existent *right of conquest*, which is, in fact, the least equivocal of all possible rights. But, this right of conquest is denied, flatly denied, not by our enemies, not by the unprincipled and malignant Buonaparté, nor by his worthy brother in apostacy, Talleyrand, but by our friends, the people of Malta themselves, who, though they will not " be sold " as slaves for a political consideration," desire nothing better, nothing more happy or honourable, than to become the fellow-subjects of Englishmen.—The conquest, says Lord Hobart, we effected " by *force of*

(6) See his Speech on the Definitive Treaty, Register, Vol. II. p. 1241.

" *arms*." It may be possible for a right of conquest to accrue from something less than force of arms; but, at any rate, Malta was not won by the actual force of British arms. The Maltese allege, and with great truth, that *they themselves* subdued the French force, and won the Island, and that the conquest was theirs, a fact which we think is clearly established by the history of the war in that Island, and particularly from " a " Journal of the siege of Valetta, written " by COLONEL CORDONA, commander of " the Neapolitan auxiliary troops at the " blockade of Malta, published at Naples in " 1801," of which Journal the following is an extract.

The 2d Sept. 1798. The insurrection against the French began in Citta Vecchia, which the Maltese took by storm, and put the whole of the garrison to the sword. They broke the aqueduct that supplies Valetta with water, and seized on the magazines of powder in Cotoner, but were not able to keep that part of the great fortress, not having formed in Valetta a party sufficient to support them. *On the walls of Citta Vecchia they displayed the ancient Maltese Standard, red and white.* The 3d Sept. The French made a sally from Valetta, but were driven back. The Maltese had nearly gotten possession of all the forts on the side of the Great Port opposite Valetta; but they failed in the attempt, and they remained to the day of the surrender of Valetta in the hands of the French; but the Maltese emptied the powder magazines, and took away many stands of arms. ——The Maltese transported all the cannon from the different forts and batteries they had taken, and raised batteries and encamped round Valetta. They drove the French vessels out of Marsa Muscetto port, and cannonaded those in the Great Port from Corodino height, and obliged them to retire into the inner ports.——They established four camps round Valetta and batteries—and posted advanced guards near all the gates. They appointed two generals, colonels, and heads of battalions, and organized the army.——They sent a boat to inform the King of the two Sicilies of their undertaking and success, and to ask his assistance, and a supply of provisions which they offered to pay for.—The rapidity with which the Maltese accomplished these operations is incredible, and every thing was finished before September, when a Portuguese squadron of four ships appeared, the Maltese sent to them, and they afforded every assistance in their power of arms and ammunition.——The French offered a general pardon and a peace, which was refused.—— Oct. 5th. The French made at one time four sallies in four columns to attack the Maltese camp and batteries. They were from every one driven back with very great loss.——Now the Maltese felt their superiority, and only thought of storming Valetta.——The 18th Oct. The division of the British fleet appeared off Malta, and assisted them with mortars, cannon, and muskets. The King of Naples now allowed them to export from Sicily 10,000 quarters of wheat on credit, for which they mortgaged the lands of some villages.——The people of Gozo had in like manner driven the French into Fort Chamberg, and taken every other post. This was now taken by the Maltese under the command of Castagna (one of the Deputies sent to London) the 29th Oct.——The 21st Nov. was the last sortie the French made. They attacked the Maltese battery on the Hill of Corodino, and were defeated with great loss by the Maltese, who were there alone.——The French remained thus blockaded, till the 4th of Sept. 1800, when it surrendered.

The British and allied troops did not gain one inch of ground from the French, or take one single fortress or post from them. General Pigot and Colonel Graham are here in London; let them be called on to say, if they can, the contrary.——The Maltese had taken from the French all that was taken from them, until the surrender of Valetta, and they had conquered the whole Island except Valetta and the fortresses on the other side of the Great Port belonging to it, before the Portuguese arrived by chance, who were the first that gave them any assistance. The Maltese had concerted with no power, not even Sicily that is within six hours sail. They rose and expelled the French out of every post and drove them into Valetta.——On the 19th of June, 1800, Colonel (then Brigadier-General) Graham, who commanded the handful of British troops, just then arrived at Malta, issued the following address to the Maltese, to excite them to storm Valetta.

BRAVE MALTESE,—You have rendered yourselves interesting and conspicuous to all the world. History does not present a more surprising example. Given in prey to your invaders, deprived of the means of resistance, an eternal slavery seemed to be your inevitable destiny.—The *oppression*, and the *sacrilege* of your *tyrants* [the knights] *became insufferable*. Without considering consequences, you determined at any price to vindicate your wrongs; without arms, without the resources of war, you broke in pieces your chains.—Your patriotism, your courage, your religion, supplied all wants. *Your* energy commanded *victory*, and enemies formidable to the best disciplined troops of Europe, ceded in every point to *your* matchless efforts, and hid their disgrace behind the ramparts.—The courageous battalions of the towns (*casali*) have, *ever since*, *confined them there*, with a vigilance and a patience worthy of the cause of liberty.—You asked *assistance*. The powers which act in alliance for the support of civil society, and of religion, hastened to your alleviation. Arms, ammunition, money, and corn, were furnished you; their ships have intercepted the succours to your enemies.—My Master, Sovereign of a people free and *generous*, sent me with *a handful of men*, to support you, (*sostenervi*) until an imposing force should be prepared for the reduction of Valetta; but the circumstances of the war have hitherto retarded it: in the mean-time, this is a precious moment, and it ought not to be lost.—What then is to be done to profit by so favourable a circumstance? I will anticipate your answer You are again ready to unite in mass, to complete the glorious work which *you* began.—To arms then, O Maltese! be the universal cry of the island: for GOD and your COUNTRY! Who is there so deaf to every sentiment of duty and of honour, who will not volun-

tarily obey such an invitation! None, none, but traitors, or vile time-servers: such we do not desire in our ranks. That infallible voice which shall distinguish with the title of hero, every man who exposes himself for his country, will equally imprint on the names of those traitors indelible infamy.—Abandon then for a few weeks, the exercise of your accustomed industry. Put yourselves under the immediate direction of *your own officers*, and under their guidance; their skill and experience in their profession, will conduct you, with the utmost advantage, to the great and important object of the *final conquest* of your enemies. —A weak and dispirited garrison, disproportioned to the defence of such extensive works, cannot resist your efforts: success will recompense your labour, and you will return instantly into the bosom of your families, proud, justly proud, of having saved your country.

At the head-quarters at CUDIA, *the 19th June*, 1800.

THOS. GRAHAM, *B. General, commanding the allied troops at the blockade of Valetta.*

Now, from all the occurrences here truly related, from the dates of those occurrences, as well as from the form, the manner, the language, and every other circumstance appertaining to the Address of General Graham, it is evident, that the Maltese were, to all intents and purposes, the principals in the war carried on for the conquest of Malta from the French. The English general evidently regarded himself as acting in the capacity of an auxiliary, bringing, indeed, succour and protection to the people of Malta, but not dreaming of commanding them, of entering their country as a conqueror. According to his own statement, he brought with him but a "handful of men." The garrison of Valetta, he acknowledges, was no longer in a state to hold out against the Maltese, who had of themselves blockaded the place. All he does is, to urge the Maltese to an assault. He claims no share of the honour of having reduced the French to distress, much less does he affect to regard the island as *a conquest*, which was the ground, on which the ministry justified their having *disposed* of it by the treaty of Amiens. What will the world think, what *must* the world think, of a government, which, after this address of General Graham to the "brave Maltese," could give up those brave Maltese to "the *insufferable oppression* and *sacrilege* of their *tyrants!*" The fact is, that Buonaparté was well acquainted with the hatred, which the people of Malta entertained towards the French, and he also well knew that the knights were creatures perfectly at his disposal; from the former he never could hope to obtain the island, while from the latter he was sure to obtain it at a very cheap rate. For these reasons he chose the arrangement made by the tenth article of the treaty of Amiens, to which article the ministers consented, because, without that consent, they could not have had peace, and without peace they could not have kept their places during the twelve months, which, to their own profit, and to the ruin and infamy of their country, they have kept them.—But, to return to the point at issue; the garrison capitulated, not with the Maltese, who had subdued them, but *with the English General* PIGOT, who had, previous to the month of September, 1800, taken the command of the allied troops serving at the blockade. On the subject of this capitulation, however, we must now hear the Maltese, who, it is very evident, disapproved of the capitulation, and only submitted to it upon the condition, clearly understood between them and our commanders, that they were then become the subjects of our gracious Sovereign.—"Reduced," say they, "to the utmost extremity, from scarcity of "provisions, the French garrison offered to "capitulate, and to leave hostages for the "vast sums which they had taken from the "public Treasury, from the University, "from the Monte di Pietà, from the "Churches, and, lastly, from individuals, "under the name of forced loans. The "British General, as well as the Maltese, "were acquainted with the situation of "the French garrison; they knew that in "two days it must surrender at discretion. "And in the city there were actually found "no more than a few salms of wheat, and "and no other provisions whatever. Notwithstanding this, General Pigot (*without "the knowledge and consent of the Maltese*) "granted the garrison a capitulation, by "which the French were permitted to "carry away all their effects. In consequence of which, before the gates were "opened, the French again plundered the "city of the few jewels and effects which "still remained to the abandoned inhabitants, and carried them in triumph on "board the vessels that were to convey to "France the spoils of a victorious people. "The British troops took possession of the "place, and *persuaded the Maltese to lay "down their arms upon the glacis before they "entered the town.* Confiding in the *good "faith of the British nation*, the Maltese "consigned the government of their country, into the hands of the British Generals, "without suspicion, without stipulation, "and faithfully obeying them, *as ministers "of the Sovereign whom their hearts had "elected.* As to the manner in which they "were treated, they wish to remain silent; "as they are fully persuaded that it will be "reprobated, with horror and regret, by "the Ministers of the King of Great Britain. The expenses of the war by land,

" and the pay of the Maltese battalions, " were defrayed by the Maltese; and, in " order to enable them to do this, they " mortgaged the lands of several villages. " The Maltese, therefore, demand, that " their Island may be restored to them; or " that all the expenses incurred by them, " for their share of the war, may be paid " them, and that they may be indemnified " for the losses occasioned by the war, and " for the plunder which the French were " permitted to carry away. We affirm, " that being the principals in the war, we " were the lawful captors; that every spe- " cies of public property is ours; and that " if, by a superior force it should be wrest- " ed from our hands, the mortgages on " them ought, at least, to be paid. The " Maltese demand the possession of their " Island by right of conquest from the " French, who conquered it from the Or- " der of Saint John of Jerusalem "——Deferring, for the present the questions which we should have a right to ask, relative to an inquiry into the conduct of General PIGOT, we now ask if there be any man of honour, or of common honesty, who will attempt to maintain, that the mere act of making, under such circumstances, this capitulation with the French, changed, all at once, our quality of *auxiliaries* into that of *principals* in the war, and rendered the brave Maltese, who had begun and continued that war, who obtained the object of it, and who had therein lost twenty thousand men, while we lost not one man, merely auxiliaries? Besides, if we were principals in the war, we formed only *a part* of the principals. Our *allies* were engaged with us in the enterprize, and, therefore, if, agreeably to the assertion of Lord Hobart, we " won " the Island by force of arms," those allies were entitled to their share of the prize; and, thus is our right of conquest considerably impaired, whereas, by acknowledging the truth, that the Maltese were the principals, we acquired the Island by their choice of our King as their Sovereign.——It being, then, an indisputable fact, that the people of Malta were the principals in the war, the right of conquest belongs to them of course; for it is a maxim, in which all the writers on public law agree, and which has been thus briefly and clearly stated by Martens, that, " the auxiliary has *no right* to " any *share in the booty or conquests*." (7) —— Thus is the right, thus are the claims, of the people of Malta established; thus is their Remonstrance justified, and thus do the ministers stand charged with attempting an act the most unjust, cruel, and perfidious, that it ever entered into the mind of man to commit, and that failed in its consummation only because even this and other similar acts of disgrace were all found insufficient for the preservation of that peace, on which the political existence of the ministers depended.

2. The deception, which the ministers practised on the parliament, with respect to the sentiments entertained by the people of Malta, in consequence of the arrangement of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, ought never to be forgotten, and, in a political point of view, never forgiven, till full atonement has been made for it. The language of the whole of them evidently tended to create a belief, that this arrangement was quite agreeable to the Maltese, and that their approbation of it had been unequivocally expressed; but, the minister, the candid, well-meaning, Richmond-Park minister, made an unreserved declaration on the subject. Others were shy; they wished to blink the question; to reserve a way of escape from detection; but he, honest soul, feeling no qualms either of honour or of conscience, flatly asserted, that " the Maltese " themselves did not partake in the senti- " ments of the Right Honourable Gentle- " man" [Mr. Windham] " that *theirs* were " sentiments of *satisfaction*, and *gratitude* to " Great Britain, *for the terms procured them!!*" He said this, too, after he had read, after he must have read, their remonstrance, that remonstrance in which they formally protest against any and every arrangement that shall again place them under the government of the Knights, " under the *oppression* and *sa-* " *crilege* of their *tyrants*, which was become " *insufferable*." But, in answer to this charge, the well-meaning man now pleads the letter, read by Lord Hawkesbury in the House of Commons, on the 19th instant. This letter was written by the deputies, after the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, and also after they had received many soothing favours, including *a sum of money to each*; but *before* they had had an opportunity of *consulting their constituents*. The remonstrance was an official document, speaking the sentiments of the people of Malta; the letter could not possibly express more than the sentiments of the deputies, who, under such circumstances, with a frigate promised, but on board of which they were not yet safely embarked, must be supposed to mix a good deal of *personal* feeling. These deputies were sent to declare the resolution of the people of Malta, never, on any account, to re-admit the Knights: they did not, and

(7) Martens' Law of Nations, Cobbett's translation, p. 317.

they *could* not, in their letter of the 2d of April, express the sentiments of their constituents: they had, in fact, no authority to express any other sentiments than those contained in the remonstrance: their letter was, therefore, unofficial, and this the Richmond-Park minister well knew; he must know it; and the conclusion is, that he was guilty, in this instance, of an imposition not less shameful than that which he practised relative to the finance, the fleet, and the prospective durability of peace.

3. The refusal of Lord Hobart to give the deputies an official audience, for fear of giving umbrage to France, was, during the debate of the 19th inst. styled "a charge "too *shameful* and *infamous* to be true," and the ministers being called on to deny it, contented themselves with saying, that they had "*never heard of it before.*" They had certainly *seen* it in the Political Register, but *seeing* is not *hearing*, and so they might, possibly, for once, speak the truth. The authority which we had for stating this fact, was, the following extract of a letter from the deputies to their constituents, dated London, 2d March, 1802.

Most Illustrious Seigniors.—We arrived here the 1st u t. The 4th we wrote the inclosed letter to Lord Hobart, the minister, stating we were arrived in this capital in the character of deputies to represent the demands of our fellow citizens.—In consequence of this letter, by means of Sir Alexander Ball, the minister made known to the deputation, that *they would do well to procure their departure from London, as soon as possible*, adducing for reasons, that *their remaining would give jealousy to France*, and thereby impede the conclusion of the definitive articles of peace, and that he could not, for reasons of state, receive and hear them *in his office*, but that he would permit them to come *in private to his house*, where he would hear them. We were received by the minister on the 8th of February, and he heard, with patience, all the reasons for which we were sent to London, particularly to *protest to the British government, in the name of our nation, against the cession of our Island to the Order of St. John*, and all the reasons for which we do not recognize the right of the Order to the dominion of our island, and the firm and effectual resistance which we were resolved to make, to oppose the return of the Order into our mother country.——To this representation the Minister answered that the English government would *take care of the happiness* of the Maltese, and that the result would prove to us, that the return of the Order in Malta would be of advantage, *by the precautions which the English government would take to guarantee the people of Malta.*——Yesterday, with the approbation of Sir Alexander Ball, we presented the inclosed memorial, No. 2. and wait his answer. ——It is one day reported that there will be war, and the next that peace will be concluded, &c. We are, &c.

As the charge has been called an "*infa-*"*mous*" one, we think it right here to subjoin the original Italian, in which this letter was written, observing that there is a slight error in our translation, which, instead of "they would *do well* to procure their de-"parture from London," should have said, "they would do EXCEEDINGLY well, &c."

Illustrisimi Signori,—Eccoci finalmente in Londra. Siamo arrivati al primo del scorso Febraro. Il di 4 scrissimo l'acclusa letteta al Lord Hobart, ministro, rilatando d'essere giunti in questa capitale, col carrattere di Deputati per rappresentare le domande dei nostri concitadini. —— In seguito di questa lettera, per nuzzo del Cavalier Ball, fece il ministro sapere alla deputazione che farebbero malto bene di procurare di partine da Londra del piu presto, adducendo per raggione che la loro permanenza avrebbe data gelosia alla Francia ed impedito perció la conclusione dei capitoli diffinitivi della pace. e che non potiva per raggione di stato riceverli ed ascoltarli nel suo officio; ma che solamente permetteva loro di portarsi in privato nella sua casa ove l'avrebbe ascoltati.——Fummo ricevati dal ministro il di 8 dello scorso mese ed ascoltati con tutta sofferenza, tutte le raggioni per le quali eravamo stati spediti in Londra, particolarmente per protestare ul Governo Britannico a nome dei nostri nazionali *contro la cessione* della nostra isola al Ordine di S. G. etutte le raggioni per le quali non riconnoschiamo il diritto dell Ordine al dominio delle nostre isole, e la più ferma e valida resistenza che eramo resoluti fare per opporsi al ritorno dell Ordine nella nostra patria.——A questa rappresentanza il ministro risposa che il governo avrebbe pensato alla felicità dei Maltesi, e che l'effetto c'avrebbe dimostrato, che il ritorno dell Order in Malta sarebbe stato di giovamento per le precauzioni che il Governo Inglise avrebbe prese per garantié questa popolaz one.——Teri, sotto l'approvazione del Cavalier Ball abbiamo presentato la memoria acchiusa, No. 2. ed ora aspettiamo la risposta.——Oggi si dice che c'é la guerra, e domani che si tará la pace, &c.

This paper the ministers never saw, of course. It was a letter from the deputies to their constituents; and the ministers do not deny, though they say they never before heard of, the odious charge it conveys. But, as they have tacitly acknowledged the authenticity of all the other papers; that is to say, of the remonstrance, the memorial, and the introductory letter to Lord Hobart, will not the public believe, that this paper also is authentic? Yes; the ministers will scarcely succeed in persuading any one that we have fabricated this paper. Then, as to the principal facts which it relates, will any one believe, that the deputies *invented* them? Are there not, too, presumptive proofs of their truth? That the deputies asked to be admitted at Lord Hobart's *office* is proved by the papers now in that very office. *Were* they so admitted? Were they *not* admitted to his *private house?* These are points which can be settled in a moment. As to the *reason*, the most scandalous reason, conveyed by Sir Alexander Ball, he might invent it, but what *other* reason could be given? The subsequent fact, too, stated by us a fortnight ago, of the deputies being taken *to*

Windsor to meet his Majesty, as it were *by accident*, upon the Terrace, and which can be proved upon oath, if required, amounts to a full confirmation of all the other facts stated in this extract.—Of the ignominy of this transaction we shall have occasion to speak more at large hereafter, when we make a regular and solemn appeal to the *justice* of parliament: at present, we shall content ourselves with having established the charge.

4. The refusal of papers relative to Malta, during the debates on the Definitive Treaty, is the last point on which we purpose, at present to touch.—On the 6th of May, 1802, Lord Temple made a motion, in the House of Commons, for an address to his Majesty to cause to be laid before the House, "a copy of the *laws* and *constitution* of the "Order of Malta, referred to in the 10th "and 11th sections of the 10th article of "the Definitive Treaty."—The object of this motion was, to obtain a knowledge of the rights of the Knights and of the people of Malta, which rights, as founded on the laws and constitution of Malta, are most clearly and satisfactorily explained, by one of the parties, most nearly concerned, in the remonstrance, to which we have so frequently referred. The motion was, however, negatived upon a motion of Lord Hawkesbury, and on the ground, that "his Ma-"jesty's ministers were not in possession of "any *official* document of *this nature* (8)," though he must have known, that the remonstrance was, at that moment, in his or Lord Hobart's office! But, to have produced that document would, for reasons too evident to mention, have been attended with great inconvenience to those, who had the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens to defend; and, therefore, it was withheld, therefore it was said not to exist, therefore the majority of the parliament together with the ignorant part of the nation, were kept in the dark, imposed upon, and misled into an approbation of that part of the treaty, which, after having proved impracticable, has, at the end of twelve months and sixteen days, produced another war. All the circumstances which have now come to light, which have now received practical demonstration, the nullity of the Order, the inadequacy of the revenues of the Island, the inefficacy of guarantees, the utter impossibility of preserving Malta from France by any other means than that of a British garrison; all these are stated in the remonstrance. To have exposed such a paper during the discussion of a treaty, on which Lord Hawkesbury built his hope of immortality, and by the means of which he and all his colleagues fondly imagined that they should fatten themselves and their kindred to the fourteenth generation, would have been the height of imprudence; and, accordingly, they not only kept it hidden from the Windhams and the Grenvilles, *but even from Mr. Pitt!* On most points they did communicate with him; but with regard to this remonstrance he was not to be trusted, nor did he, we believe, ever see it, 'till it appeared in the Political Register, though, we trust, he will yet hear it read in Westminster Hall.

(8) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1233.

TO THE RIGHT HON. LORD HAWKESBURY, &c. &c.

My Lord,—The peace of Amiens, that peace which surrendered to our mortal enemy the means of accomplishing our destruction, that peace by which our allies were abandoned and betrayed, that peace which tore from us the honours won and handed down to us by our forefathers, that peace which branded England with the mark of traitor and of coward, that peace, that odious and infamous peace, by which your Lordship wished to be known to posterity, is, thank God, now annihilated by war. You call on us for zealous support in this war; and, base indeed must be the man who with-holds such support. But, first let us settle the account of the peace; first let us inquire into the conduct of those, who advised his Majesty to adopt a measure so derogatory of the dignity and honour of his crown, and so destructive of the interests of his people; first let us be assured, that a second peace of Amiens shall never take place; for, without that assurance, all our sacrifices and exertions will avail nothing against the foreign foe, and will only tend to subjugate us, in the mean time, to the will of some selfish, ambitious, unresponsible, ministerial despot. I, my lord, am no demagogue; through all the volumes, which my patient perseverance has put together, there will not be found one single sentiment calculated to obtain favour with the senseless multitude; a flatterer of the mob I hold to be the most despicable of parasites; and, were I put to my choice, I would rather be trampled to death by the rabble, than be borne to riches and power on their shoulders. But, because I despise those arts by which the ignorant are cajoled; because I hold in contempt the empty noise about liberty; because I adopt, even to the letter, the obligations of obedience to my Sovereign, imposed by the doctrines of the church in which I had the happiness to be

born and educated; it does not thence follow, that I am content to be a slave; it does not follow, that I set no value on real freedom; it does not follow that I am passively to yield implicit obedience to a fellow subject, who, by whatever means, assumes despotic sway over both my Sovereign and myself, which, however the truth may be disguised, is really the case, if there be no *substantial* responsibility attached to the conduct of a minister, and if that responsibility is not called for, with respect to the Treaty of Amiens and the subsequent negotiations with France.

Under the influence of these sentiments it is, my lord, that I have determined to use the utmost of my exertions for obtaining that justice, which, on this account, the nation has, in my opinion, a right to demand. But, there are previous steps to be taken. The grounds of this demand should be first stated; the culpability of ministers should first be regularly established; the discussions in parliament should be patiently listened to; in short, an ample, fair, and satisfactory examination of all the conduct of which I am speaking should precede any thing in the shape of a deliberate charge, in the making of which the people should be publickly called on to unite.—To furnish some materials, to arrange some few facts accompanied with illustrative comments, to afford some little aid in the prosecution of this examination, is the object of the present letter, which I address to your Lordship, not by way of insulting a falling man, but because it was to you that I addressed those observations on the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties, those predictions which are now so completely fulfilled. —In the pursuit of this object, my lord, it is my intention briefly to touch upon, I. The fatal consequences of the peace, and, II. The prominent features of the misconduct of ministers since the conclusion thereof.

1. The fatal consequences, which have flowed from the peace of Amiens, are so numerous; they present a mass of evils so great and so complicated, that to estimate each separately would require a volume of no moderate bulk. I must, therefore, as to this point, content myself with a general statement.

We made a peace, which was finally concluded one year ago. This peace, however, if dated from the signature of the Preliminaries, existed nineteen months, during which time, *we have gained nothing*, while our enemy has gained, upon the continent, in territory, Piedmont, Parma and its dependencies, the Italian republic, and, in influence, a deciding voice in all the affairs of the German Empire, whose princes and whose kings are now become little more than his vassals. From us he has gained, *to our loss*, a long list of conquests, which, being now garrisoned by his troops, or by the troops of his dependent allies, places our neighbouring possessions in a state of imminent danger, lessens their value to the colonial proprietor, and, though these distant dominions, diminishes the resources and enfeebles the power of the mother country. Egypt, which we had re-conquered in behalf of Turkey, and, indirectly for the security of India on that side, has, by the peace, been re-opened to the invasions of France, and India is thereby again exposed to all the danger, whatever that danger might be, which menaced her from the borders of the Mediterranean. Of Louisiana France has not, it is true, taken possession. She has not, by the means of this territory, already accomplished the subjugation of the American government, to the dreadful danger, if not to the utter ruin of Great Britain. But, has she gained nothing by it? Is it nothing to have settled a dispute with America, and, a dispute, too, which would long have rankled in the hearts of the American people? Is it nothing to have discharged a debt of 30,000,000 of dollars, and to have actually received 2,000,000 more in hard cash, for the colony of Louisiana? Is it nothing to have obtained £7,000,000 sterling from the United States, and to have laid, at the same time, an immoveable foundation for the influence of her partizans in that country, not to mention the secret stipulations, with regard to commerce, navigation, and neutrality, which may probably make part of this arrangement, to the great annoyance of England both in war and in peace? Surely, my lord, all this is something; and, no less sure it is, that, whatever it be, she owes it all to your improvident and pusillanimous peace; because, through a treaty promulgated by her, previous to the conclusion of that peace, you were fully informed, that she had obtained from Spain the cession of this valuable and important colony, which you and your defenders (amongst whom I am sorry to number the Master of the Rolls) chose to represent as an acquisition of scarcely any importance, and even as one, which would operate to the *advantage of Great Britain* (1)!

But, to balance against all these immense acquisitions, on the part of France, and, at the same time, to compensate for all our own losses, since the signature of the

(1) See the Speeches of Mr. Addington, Colonel Maitland, the Master of the Rolls, and Lord Hawkesbury, Register, Vol. II. p. 1211, 1377, 1344, 1309.

Preliminaries of Peace, we have, it seems, by your lordship's declaration, "gained "*conviction*," conviction, *that peace with France, under her present government, and with her present pretensions, is impracticable.*—Deferring, for a moment, the consideration of this point, I must observe, my lord, that the *objects* of the peace, as stated by those who made and those who defended it, have been in a state of constant change, from the moment the preliminaries were signed to the present hour.

FIRST of all it was a peace of *honour, and even of glory*. This was soon hooted down by common consent of all parties, and all persons, Mr. Fox excepted, who rejoiced at the peace, because it was glorious indeed, but glorious to France, and whose real ground of opposition to the present war may, I think, from that circumstance, be easily guessed at. SECONDLY, it was a peace, not of necessity; no, "to such a plea," said your right worthy colleague, "to such a plea I will be no party." It was not a peace of necessity but a "*necessary peace!*" It was a peace of economy, a peace for "husbanding our resources." Your partisans, out of doors, did, indeed, openly avow, that the cause was "a want of money;" but this avowal in the Houses of Parliament, would not have very well agreed with the statements of Mr. Pitt; and, therefore, such a mode of expression and of arguing was adopted as did not amount to an explicit acknowledgment of the fact, but which, did nevertheless leave that fact to be clearly understood. THIRDLY, it was a peace of "*sincerity and durability.*" The fashionable assertion was, that it had "left nothing to higgle about." This must be fresh in every ones memory. How often, my lord, were the persons who opposed the peace reviled for their "unfounded suspicions" relative to the sincerity of France? Who can have forgotten the harsh, not to say foul, language made use of, on one of these occasions against Mr. Elliot, by the late Attorney-General, whose speech, every one allowed, smelt strongly of the brief? FOURTHLY, it was a peace of "*security.*" There were even some feeble attempts made by Lord Castlereagh towards making out "indemnity for the past and security for the future;" but, in this his lordship's success fell short of his zeal; and, therefore, the House was very prudently content with security alone. FIFTHLY, after some little experience, of a nature not very promising, it sunk, all at once, down to a "*peace of experiment,*" at which point, in the opinions of some persons, it finally made its exit. And, my lord, I must confess, that any peace, whatever might be its terms, made with the regicide republic of France and the rebel who has usurped its government, must necessarily have been a peace of experiment; but, the very circumstances which rendered it so, ought to have prevented the stipulations, in virtue of which the enemy obtained a surrender of our conquests, while he retained all his own, and while he extended his territory and his influence, to an amazing extent, even in the interval between the conclusion of the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties. To have made the experiment rational, the terms should have left both parties in possession of all their acquisitions, or have made the restoration of conquests reciprocal, as well with respect to time, as to extent of territory, power, and political influence. But, such were the terms of your peace, my lord, that the enemy, the implacable enemy of our country kept all, whereas we, in order to make a trial of his sincerity, began by surrendering our means of offence and of defence into his hands, and the moment that the surrender was completed, or that we would surrender no more, the experiment ceased, and the peace of experiment became a war of necessity.

As to all these objects, then, my lord, the peace has failed. It is now unanimously agreed, that the peace was neither glorious nor honourable, except with respect to the enemy: that it has produced no saving in a pecuniary point of view, that it has not, to use the phrase of the well-meaning Mr. Addington, "husbanded our resources "against another day of trial," is lamentably, pitiously notorious: that it has discovered no sincerity, on the part of France, and that it has not been of long duration, you will not deny, for you now declare that the Consul has never ceased to show a hostile mind, and we well know that even the name of peace has had but a twelve months existence: as an experiment, too, it has failed in every sense of the word, except that it has afforded the nation dear-bought experience of the effects of committing its interests and its honour to the care of "*safe* politicians," of ignorant, low-minded, selfish men, chosen according to the recommendation of the pious Wilberforce, out of "the middling class of society," in which respect the experiment has succeeded even, I should suppose, beyond the expectation and the wishes of that saint-like personage himself.

There has, however, as I before observed, been discovered, in the late parliamentary discussions, a SIXTH object of the peace, which, to the great consolation of that pro-

found statesman, Lord Castlreagh, and to the no small amusement of his hearers, has, it seems, been completely accomplished; to wit, "*conviction*," a conviction, that peace with Buonaparté is impracticable! in whom, I pray you, my lord, has this conviction been produced? Not in the Windhams and Grenvilles, for they stood in no need of it; they possessed this conviction before; all the doubts which they might entertain were satisfactorily removed by the conduct of France and her ursurper between the signing of Preliminary and that of the Definitive Treaty Not in the Foxes and Wilberforces, as does, I think, pretty clearly appear from the division on the address to the throne. It is in the people, then, the unthinking people, the ministers inclusive, that this salutary conviction has been produced. As to the ministers, I readily grant the fact; but, with respect to the people, my denial is as positive as words can convey.—Previous to the signature of the Preliminary Treaty, the scarcity of provisions, which the very ignorant only had ascribed to the war, had been removed by a most abundant and fortunate harvest; and, the people of this country, properly so called, were, while even the issue of the Egyptian campaign was yet doubtful, perfectly reconciled to a continuation of the contest, till a safe and honourable peace, wearing all the aspects of durability, could be obtained. Not a single remonstrance or petition, against the continuation of the war, had been presented from any one part of the kingdom; no sound of complaint was heard; and, in Parliament, the opposition to the war was reduced to a much smaller number than that which the conductors of war will now have to combat. To attempt, therefore, to ride off on the shoulders of the people, is at once the meanest and most impudent manœuvre that has been practised even by the present administration. The Preliminary Treaty was received by the people with a mixture of surprise and suspicion; surprise, at the event, and suspicion from the unusual and unnecessary secrecy, with which the negotiation had been conducted, and which seemed to forebode dishonourable conditions. But, by means of a regularly conducted system of deception, notions totally false, respecting those conditions, were inculcated amongst the people, previous to the publication of the Treaty; and, my lord, I assert, that a paragraph, *in Mr. Hiley Addington's own hand writing*, stated, that one of the conditions was, that "our allies should be "established in their integrity, *as before the* "*war*," when it afterwards appeared, that Portugal had been robbed of part of her dominions, and that the King of Sardinia, the Stadtholder, and brave Vandeans, had been shamefully and basely abandoned. The illuminations in London, which gave the example to the rest of the country, were begun at the offices of you and your colleagues, and where elsewhere enforced by the dread of the rabble, headed by the myrmidons of the General Post-Office. Thus, my lord, were the mass of the people of England, betrayed on the one hand, and bullied on the other, into the frantic demonstrations of joy, which you, on the 13th of May, 1802, affected to condemn, after having, by the lowest species of deception, called forth those demonstrations, and even after having, on a previous occasion, urged them against Mr. Windham as a proof of the goodness of the peace!—But, had the fact you allege been true; had the people been clamorous for peace, would it have followed that you were to yield to the clamour? And, moreover, that you were to make an insecure, an injurious, and dishonourable peace? It was your duty to lead the people, and not to be led by them. If their minds had been degraded, the fault would have been with the ministers, and with no minister more than yourself, who set the memorable example of degradation, by soliciting an interview with a commissary of prisoners, in order to lay the foundation of that monument of eternal shame, which was completed at the city of Amiens. Then commenced the humiliation of the people: then, and not till then, their minds began to sink; till then they had borne taxes and scarcity with fortitude unexampled; they had spared neither their purse nor their persons; they had given you their all, and you gave them, in return, ruin and disgrace, to which you are now adding the foulest of calumny.—The *people*, indeed! So, the blame is, at last, to fall on them! And this is the famous *responsibility*, with which you have, of late, entertained us! You have injured and disgraced the country, and now you pretend, that you were induced so to do by the desire of the people, over whom you have been appointed to exercise authority. That you thought you should please the people by the peace of Amiens, I have no doubt; but this motive so far from being a palliation of your conduct, does, in reality, attach to it its most odious and criminal quality. Your chief object was, as all the world now agree, to preserve your places; this object was to be accomplished only by ingratiating yourselves with the people previous to the general election, and, in order so to ingratiate yourselves, peace, peace on any terms, you thought was necessary. You now declare,

in the most solemn manner, that France has never, since the conclusion of the peace, ceased to discover a hostile mind, which, indeed, evidently appears from the papers laid before Parliament; but, you took special care not to divulge this fact to the people, till *after the close of the elections*. This was the motive of your conduct, and this motive now stands clearly exposed by your attempt to ascribe the peace to the people, by your acknowledgment, that the measure, which has proved so ruinous and disgraceful, was adopted for the sake of pleasing them, and not for purposes of public good, not for the happiness of the nation and honour of your Sovereign. To this conclusion, then, my lord, we are inevitably led: either you were, in making such a peace as the peace of Amiens, influenced by the wishes of the people, or you were not: if the latter, your present plea, your justification grounded on a yielding to those wishes, is false; if the former, you stand self-accused of having sacrificed your trust for the sake of popularity, or of having participated in that vile, foolish and fruitless desire which you now ascribe exclusively to the people.

Such, my lord, is the matter, arising from rather a general view of the consequences of the Treaty of Amiens, and of the conduct and motives of yourself and your colleagues relative to that injurious and infamous compact. I shall hereafter endeavour to give to the several particular instances of culpability a more minute and methodical arrangement, in the form of articles of accusation, founded on the laws and usages of our country. In the mean-time, and before I come to my 2d head (which I am compelled to reserve for another letter), let me beseech your lordship not to place any reliance on the plea, *that you could not* KNOW *that such would be the consequence of the treaty*. The proof that you could have known it, is, that these consequences, *all* these consequences were foretold, repeatedly foretold to you, before you adopted the terms of the Definitive Treaty, long before you surrendered any one of our numerous conquests; and, if you ask me *why* you were to believe the persons who gave you this intimation, my answer is: because they were wiser than yourselves, a fact which is now proved, and which proof you must acknowledge, unless you choose to incur the imputation of premeditated guilt rather than the imputation of ignorance. Having deprived yourselves of the plea of necessity, you must now allow that you were grossly ignorant, or shamefully deceitful and perfidious; totally incapable of the trust, which you had the criminal temerity to assume, or more criminally guilty of a breach of that trust. Remember well, my lord, that incapacity is no excuse for a ministry: the welfare of nations is not to be so trifled with: it is the effect of their measures, and that alone, which constitutes their merit, or their crime; which entitles them to reward, or subjects them to punishment. The whole means of the country are placed in their hands; it is for them to find integrity, zeal, and wisdom to make use of those means for the advantage of their Sovereign and his people, and not, after having appropriated thousands upon thousands of the public wealth to the use of themselves and their families, to plead want of knowledge in the exercise of those functions, by which alone they have been enabled to make such appropriations. But, in the present instance, this integrity, zeal, and wisdom, have been voluntarily tendered to them. Nothing has been wanting with respect either to person, place, time, or argument, to prevent the evils, which you have brought upon your country, and of which you have, step by step, and in the most ample detail, been duly forewarned by Members of the Parliament, speaking in their public capacity. With wilful perverseness, therefore, or with a crime of still blacker dye, you justly stand charged; and, this charge, my lord, I, for one, live in hopes of seeing preferred, at the bar of that august assembly, to the wisdom and justice of which England has so often owed her salvation.——I am, &c. &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Str. Westm. May 25, 1803.

MONSIEUR DE TINSEAU.

The public are well acquainted with the character and merit of this loyal gentleman and ingenious writer, who, some time ago, published, in London, an excellent work entitled, "*The Empire of Germany, divided into "Departments, under the Prefecture of the "Elector of * * *,*" a translation of which work is inserted in Vol. II. of the Register. On another work of Mr. Tinseau, forming a sequel to that which we have just mentioned, and which work was also published and translated like the former, a French paper, entitled the CLEF DU CABINET, has made the following remarks, in reply to which we have below published a letter from Mr. Tinseau.

Extract from the Clef du Cabinet of the 17th of May, 1803.——"It is well to "know, that this Mr. Tinseau is one of "the most incorrigible beings in existence. "He has been seen to figure, very actively, "in all the conspiracies against the French "government; he is even regarded as the

" inventor of those mild and gentle means, " employed in the affair of the 3d Nivôse " [the Infernal Machine], and he is at pre- " sent more eager than ever to raise up " enemies against France.——He begins " his work with a violent invective against " the consular government; draws a pic- " ture of the defensive and offensive situa- " tion of France, and, concludes with con- " juring the maritime powers to block up " by sea, France, Spain, and the Batavian " Republic; to seize on all their vessels; " to stop those of other nations trading " with them; and, finally, he exhorts Rus- " sia to trade exclusively with Great Bri- " tain, and to have no commerce or con- " nexion with France.——At a time when " the greatest part of the emigrants have " returned, and have been reconciled to the " government, it is perfectly pitiful and " ridiculous to see Mr. Tinseau, in Eng- " land, and the wedded Abbé Delille, in " France, writing, the former, a manifesto " to rally an external war against his coun- " try, and the latter, a plaintive poem, to " excite afresh internal dissentions. Mr. " Tinseau has, over the Abbé, the advan- " tage of being one of the most able engi- " neers in Europe; but, with the mar- " ried Abbé he amply participates in a fa- " naticism, which has deprived him of all " sober judgment."

To the Editor of the Register.

SIR,—Accused of a very serious fact by the Clef du Cabinet, I think myself called on to deny it in English, because the calumnies of that and other Consular Gazettes are constantly repeated as truths, in the Argus, and in Bell's Weekly Messenger, the latter of which is, I understand, the only English paper that has the honour to be permitted to circulate in France.——If the author of the work in question really be *pitiful, ridiculous,* and *fanatically mad,* those who waste their time in attempting to refute him, will, I imagine find it difficult to persuade their readers, that they themselves are persons of sentiments very dignified, or of judgment very well matured; while, from their invectives, most people will be apt to conclude, that the author has truly exposed the views, the means, and the hidden decrepitude of the Consular government.

Hinc mihi prima mali labes; hinc semper Ulysses Criminibus terrere novis.

Asking pardon of the shade of Ulysses, for having compared him to Buonaparté, and throwing aside, with contempt, the abuse of the *Clef du Cabinet,* I come to the imputation of being the inventor of the expedition of the infernal machine, of that expedition for which seventy of the jacobins, heretofore friends and brothers of the First Consul, have been sent to Madagascar, though, two months afterwards, several royalists were condemned and shot to death, as being the sole authors of the deed; of that expedition, in short, of which, it seems, I am, at last, the inventor.—It is not for me to pass judgment on this deed; it is an affair which has passed in France, between Frenchmen and Frenchmen, and can only be estimated and tried by French maxims and French laws: but, I solemnly declare, upon my honour, that I never had, at any time, either directly or indirectly, any concern in the act, nor ever heard of it, except in the same way as the public in general: and I further declare, that I have never, in even the slightest degree, participated in the alarm of the senators, the counsellors of state, prefects, spies, Mamelukes, &c. &c. as to the danger, to which was exposed a head so precious as that of the *first*, and, I hope, *last*, Consul of France: moreover, I declare, that, if he had fallen, his fall would not have excited in me the least regret, all my pity having before been exhausted on the thousands of my countrymen slaughtered at Toulon, in 1793, and at Paris on the 13th Vendémiaire, or sent to a death, useless to their country, on the burning sands of Egypt, and pestiferous soil of St. Domingo. It is not my fault if Pygmalion and Cromwell changed beds every night, or that Lady Macbeth saw on her hands indelible stains of blood. In short, I have never assassinated myself nor caused assassination, and, accordingly, I have never dreamt in the night, nor thought in the day, that any one intended to assassinate me.——I am, Mr. Editor, yours, &c.

CHR. TINSEAU.

London, May 25, 1803.

DOMESTIC.

Whitehall, April 19.—The King has been pleased to grant unto the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Cavan, Major-General of his Majesty's Forces, his Royal License and Permission that he may receive and wear the Badge of the Order of the Crescent, transmitted to his Lordship by the Grand Seignior:—And also to command, that his Majesty's concession and declaration, together with the relative documents, may be registered in his College of Arms.

By the King.—A Proclamation, for encouraging Seamen and Landmen to enter themselves on board his Majesty's Ships of War.

GEORGE R.—Whereas it is our Royal Intention to give all due encouragement to all such seamen and landmen who shall voluntarily enter themselves in our service, we have thought fit, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our Royal Proclamation: and we do hereby promise and declare, that all such able seamen not above the age of fifty, nor under the age of twenty years, fit for our service, who shall on or before

the thirtieth day of June next, voluntarily enter themselves to serve in our Royal Navy, either with the captains or lieutenants of our ships or vessels, or officers employed on shore for raising men for the service of our Navy, shall receive, as our Royal Bounty, the sum of five pounds each man: and all such ordinary seamen, fit for our service, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of two pounds ten shillings each man and all such able bodied landmen, not above the age of thirty-five, nor under the age of twenty years, who shall so enter themselves as aforesaid, shall receive the sum of thirty shillings each man, as our Royal Bounty, in lieu of the bounties promised in our Royal Proclamation dated the seventh day of March last; such respective sums to be paid them by the respective Clerks of the Checque residing at the ports where the ships or vessels on board which such seamen and landmen may be appointed to serve, shall be immediately after the third muster of such seamen or landmen: And we do declare, that the qualifications of the seamen and landmen so entering themselves, shall be certified by the Captain, Master, and Boatswain of the ship or vessel on board which they shall be appointed to serve: And for prevention of any abuses, by any persons leaving the vessels to which they shall belong, and entering themselves on board any other our ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty money, we do hereby declare and command, that such seamen and landmen belonging to any of our ships or vessels, as shall absent themselves from any of the said ships or vessels to which they shall belong, and shall enter themselves on board any other of our said ships or vessels, in order to obtain the said bounty, shall not only lose the wages due to them in the ships or vessels they shall leave, but also be punished according to their demerits.——Given at our Court at the Queen's Palace, the *sixteenth day of May*, one thousand eight hundred and three, and in the *forty-third year of our reign*.——God save the King.

By the King.—A Proclamation.

GEORGE R.—Whereas we are informed, that great numbers of mariners and seafaring men, our natural-born subjects, are in the service of divers Foreign Princes and States, to the prejudice of our Kingdom: And whereas attempts may be made to seduce some of our subjects, contrary to their allegiance and duty to us, to enter on board ships or vessels of war, or other ships or vessels belonging to the French and Batavian Republics, with intent to commit hostilities against us or our subjects, or otherwise to adhere, or give aid or comfort to our enemies upon the sea: Now we, in order that none of our subjects may ignorantly incur the guilt and penalties of such breaches of their allegiance and duty, have thought it necessary, by and with the advice of our Privy Council, to publish this our Royal Proclamation, hereby notifying and declaring, that all persons, being our subjects, who shall enter or serve, or be found on board any ships or vessels of war, or other ships or vessels belonging to the French or Batavian Republics, with intent to commit hostilities against us or our subjects, or who shall otherwise adhere, or give aid or comfort to our enemies upon the sea, will thereby become liable to suffer the pains of death, and all other pains and penalties of high treason and piracy; and we do hereby declare our Royal Intention and firm Resolution to proceed against all such offenders according to law.——Given at our Court at the Queen's Palace, the *sixteenth day of May*, one thousand eight hundred and three, in the *forty-third year of our reign*.——God save the King.

The same Gazette contains an Order of the Privy Council for issuing Letters of Marque and General Reprisals against France (see the Order in this sheet under the head of *Public Papers*); also an Order of Council (see the same head) for laying an embargo on all vessels belonging to the French and Batavian Republics, or destined to any country occupied by the armies of France.—Besides these, the same Gazette contains Orders for preventing the exportation of warlike and naval stores, with some exceptions respecting Africa.—A proclamation is also inserted for electing a Scotch Peer in lieu of the Earl of Dumfries.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT have published, in the form of a communication to the Legislative Body, a paper tracing the conduct of the British government from the conclusion of the peace to the breaking off of the late negotiation, to which they have prefixed all the papers relative to the negotiations of the Treaty of Amiens, and, indeed, every document relating to negotiations with England, from Buonaparté's insolent letter to the king to the present time. Some of these documents are extremely interesting; but, the series should, by no means be broken, and, the limits of the weekly part of our work does not admit of their insertion entire: in the Supplement to the Volume we shall give them, of course, with great accuracy. —Upon a perusal of them we discover nothing to strengthen the cause of the usurper against England; but much, very much, still to weaken the cause of the English ministers with respect to their country.—We shall, occasionally refer to these papers, and, perhaps, in our next, give an analysis of some of them. The declaration of the French government we shall certainly publish without delay; but, as the close of our 3d volume is so near at hand, our readers will not have long to wait for the series complete.

IN THE PARLIAMENT, the debates have been animated and interesting. Every one who has spoken, in these debates, and who approved of the Definitive Treaty, has, as far as we have observed, declared his regret for having given it that approbation, with the exception of the Duke of Norfolk, Lord Stanhope, Mr. Whitbread. Mr. Fox, and Mr. Pitt. Why the four former adhered to their opinion we need not say; the reason was very well explained by Mr. Fox, upon the first arrival of the treaty. Mr. Pitt continued to call it "*a peace of experiment*," and, as far as that ground will carry him, we greatly fear, he intends to endeavour to sup-

port the ministers. Mr. Windham, Lord Grenville, and their friends, gave their hearty support to the address, because, as they explicitly declared, they did not regard it as pledging them, in the smallest degree, to approve of the conduct of the ministry, either as to the Treaty of Amiens, or their subsequent measures relative to France.—— On the Treaty of Peace, Messrs. Pitt and Fox, almost for the first time for twenty years past, spoke and voted on the same side. They are now again in opposition to each other; the unhappy nation is once more divided into Foxites and Pittites; all the numerous swarm of insignificant creatures, who have neither character nor name, are again ranging themselves on the side, again becoming the lacquay-like retainers, of one or the other of these rival orators, who, after each taking his turn of secession, are now returned to the political arena, to combat and compliment each other, while the silly herd, in the galleries, astonished at their wondrous wisdom, seem to have totally forgotten, that the only measure of importance, in which this "Cicero" and this "Demosthenes" ever agreed, was that by which the interest, the power, and the honour of England were bartered for a peace of three hundred and eighty one days! Of Mr. Fox we had no hope; he has pursued precisely that line of conduct, which we thought, and we said, he would pursue; the man who rejoiced at the peace, because it was glorious to France, must naturally be opposed to a war which is necessary for the salvation of England. But, from Mr. Pitt we did expect an open and manly acknowledgment of his error; we did expect from him something more than an eloquent Phillippic on the character and views of our enemy, and an animated appeal to the patriotism and loyalty of the people. These were very proper; but we expected and wanted something more; something to encourage us to hope, that the sacrifices and exertions, for which he called, would not, as far as rested with him, again be rendered useless, again be thrown away, by another peace, such as that of which he last approved. Something of this sort we did hope for and expect from Mr. Pitt, and something of this sort we must hear from him, before we shall see any reasonable ground for his being again called to power. He did not, indeed, pledge himself to support the ministers as to their measures *since the conclusion of the peace*; on the contrary, he carefully distinguished those measures from the peace itself; but, it is supposed, by some, that he means *not to be present*, during the debates on this subject. We still hope, that this supposition is false; we still hope he has too high a regard for his character; but, should this hope prove unfounded, we shall indeed despair of ever again seeing him act that great and high-minded part, which is absolutely necessary in the statesman, who is to deliver this country from the dangers, with which it is now threatened. These common-place party manœuvres, this indulgence in adhering to family and personal connexion, are very ill suited to the times, and to the cause, in which the people are called on to make sacrifices, which they never before dreamt of. What is it to the King and his people, that Mr. Addington's father was the devoted creature of the father of Mr. Pitt; that the connexion and dependence has been handed down to the sons, who, by a judicious distribution of characters, by reciprocal affection, forbearance, and support, have contrived to keep the government in their hands, under a total change of measures and of principles? What is there in all this to satisfy the King, his Parliament, and his people? Is the juvenile attachment of Mr. Addington and Mr. Pitt to be placed in the balance against the happiness and honour of a nation? Is this the mighty cause that is to stifle all inquiry, to be a bar to all justice, to render nugatory that responsibility, which is the sole safeguard against ministerial incapacity and guilt? If so, what, in reality, is our political state? Neither more nor less than that of Oligarchy, and that, too, of the most odious kind. We may endeavour, as long as we please, to hide the shameful truth; but, if the power of the government, with all its attendant patronage and emolument, can be thus rendered a property, can be handed backward and forward, and alternately enjoyed by men who hold it in abeyance for each other; if this be so, our boasted freedom is a despicable farce, we are made for these men, and not they for us; if this be so, disguise the fact how we may, they are our masters and we are their slaves.——No; we repeat, that we, for our parts, are, by no means, content with a flaming speech for war, and with a call on us for sacrifices and exertions. These are good; the war is absolutely necessary, the very existence of every thing dear to us depends upon its success, and to obtain this success, great exertions and great sacrifices are required. But, before we were called on to make them, we wished for some assurance, that they would not again be employed to our injury, to our humiliation, and to the dishonour of our Sovereign.—Mr. Addington, modest well-meaning man! He, too, calls for "sacri-" fices and exertions *such as were never be-*

"*fore made*;" he who, a twelvemonth ago, made a peace of economy, a peace "to "husband our resources against another "day of trial," and who, upon the strength, and by the means, of that peace, in which he has surrendered our power into the hands of our enemy, has taken to himself and his family thousands upon thousands of the public wealth; this is the man who now demands sacrifices hitherto unheard-of, in order to carry on a war to cure the defects of that very peace! And, shall we be thus treated, shall we be led along from folly to folly, from evil to evil, without making any inquiry, without obtaining any redress, without any assurance or any hope, that the dangers we are called on to resist and remove will not be augmented a hundred fold by another treaty of Downing Street and of Amiens? If we are asked what we want, our answer is ready: "indemnity for "the past and security for the future:" indemnity, by an inquiry, into the conduct of those who have produced the necessity for such great and hitherto unheard-of sacrifices; a solemn, legal inquiry, and a just, a strictly just decision, according to the laws and usages of the realm. The best security for the future would be, first of all the removal from power of those persons, every one of those persons, who were concerned in advising the peace. This is a preliminary step; and, till it is taken, not a shilling more should be voted by the Parliament. The next thing that naturally presents itself, is, to give the power into the hands of those, who disapproved of the peace, who had the wisdom to perceive, and the uprightness, public-spirit and loyalty, to warn the nation against the consequences which have now come to pass. On this point, however, we would not be very tenacious: provided the makers of the peace of Amiens were completely excluded, and that men acting upon the *principles* of Lord Grenville and Mr. Windham were to assume the reins of government, the mere circumstance of *persons* would be of little weight with any body but those who are actuated by some foolish or sinister motive, who are vain of wearing the livery of a great man, or who are seeking a market for their adulation and their influence, and, of such persons, in the approaching times, the opinion and the exertions will be found to be of very little value. —As a further security, we could wish, too, for something like a defined *object* of the war; some security, that it shall not be a little, low, peddling, selfish object, in which no foreigner upon the face of the earth can wish us to succeed. Unless we can, before we lay down our arms, effect a total alteration in our state relative to France, it is perfectly useless to take them up; and, this alteration is not to be effected by a war merely for Malta, or for any other place or thing, the obtaining of which shall appear to redound only to our own advantage. With respect to ourselves, too, men of information, indeed, know, that war is become necessary in order to save the monarchy from destruction; the financier knows, that public credit, that "credit, capital, and confidence," which were to be our rock of defence, must have perished by a continuation of the peace; the merchant and ship-owner rejoice at the war as a means of restoring trade and navigation; but, as the matter now stands, the mass of the people, the husbandmen and the hard-labouring artizans, who, when the day of trial arrives, will be found to be the bones and sinews of the country; they will not, without further and fuller explanation, ever believe, that they are called on to go to war for any thing but the Island of Malta, and that Island they will never estimate by any other standard than the number of its inhabitants and the produce of its soil.—Some object, therefore, some great and definite object, which shall fill the minds and engage the hearts of the people, and, at the same time, command the good wishes of all the virtuous and gallant part of mankind; some such object as this, and nothing short of such an object, will, in our opinions, ever lead us to a successful termination of the present contest.

POSTSCRIPT.

The readers of the Register will, I trust, hear, with great satisfaction, that the prosecution of the ingenious, the zealous, and loyal MR. PELTIER, has been dropped. The Term has passed, without his being called up to receive judgment, and, of course, he is discharged. Some persons will, probably imagine, that the rupture between the two countries has produced this pleasing result of an affair which must have given great pain to all honourable men; but, though in declaring my opinion to the contrary, I must necessarily take some little merit to myself, I do sincerely believe, that, unless the Attorney General had, in the interval between the trial and the expiration of the Term, been convinced, that the prosecution was not founded in the spirit of the law of the land, he would, notwithstanding the change of circumstances, have demanded punishment; for I am persuaded, that, whatever motives might influence the ministers, the case being once in his hands, justice would never have been made to bend to political considerations. In fact, I am myself fully convinced, that the doctrine which I laid

down on the subject, was found to be so clear, established by arguments so entirely incontrovertible, that to have proceeded to punishment would have been universally regarded as a most flagrant violation of justice in the present case, and would, moreover, have opened a door for endless complaints and unlimited ministerial oppression:—I beg to be understood as not to say this by way of boast. I am very far from wishing to be thought learned in the law, with which I never desire to have any thing to do, particularly with *the law of libels*; and, I only state my opinion as to the effect of my defence of MR. PELTIER, in order to remind my readers of what *might* have been done by his advocate at the bar.—With respect to MR. PELTIER, though he has, to the honour of the Attorney General and of the law of England, found *personal* protection against the vengeance of Buonaparté and the pusillanimity of our ministers, in *property* he must have considerably suffered. His time, his mind, his means, have been expended in a long, anxious, and expensive attendance on, and provision for his defence. His affairs must have suffered much from the state of uncertainty, in which he so long has been kept; and, though I know little, or rather nothing, of the intentions of himself and his friends, I trust that there will be found liberality enough to produce him a compensation. That we should honour and cherish him, there can be no better proof, than that he is hated and dreaded by Buonaparté; and, when to this consideration is added that of his having suffered in our country and for our own cause, that cause for which we are now again at war, I should be ashamed to doubt of his obtaining, in some way or other, full and adequate reparation and reward. WM. COBBETT.

NOTICES.

VERITAS, on the Navy, shall appear next week without fail.

The address TO THE PUBLIC, on the conduct of Lord St. Vincent relative to the Mediterranean shall also appear.

A LAYMAN, on the Clergy-Bill, shall be inserted, if we have room for some remarks, on it, without which it would be, in us, an unjustifiable act to publish it to the world. We, too, could have wished the bill to undergo some further alterations; but, the dislike which we have to this measure, is founded, in most respects, upon reasons *exactly opposite* to those advanced by this writer; and this circumstance tends to show, that if the framer of the bill had given way to every adviser, he would have furnished a remarkable illustration of the fable of the man, suffering under the accumulated sin and sorrow of a double marriage. In short, we had ourselves, an intention of offering some suggestions on this bill, particularly on the clause relative to parsonage-houses, which, we fear, will suffer great dilapidation and decay from it; but, when we came to hear the opinions of others, we found, that if the advice of all of us were listened to, the bill would soon be reduced to blank paper. Agreeing, therefore, with this brother layman, that some law on the subject is absolutely necessary, and having got the better of our own desire to be heard in regulating the affairs of the Church, we hope he will not think it altogether unreasonable, if we exhort him to make a similar sacrifice.

MONSIEUR TINSEAU has in the press, and, we understand, will publish, next week, an "Apologie des Royalistes Emigrés, contre le libelle diffamatoire, publié sous le nom d'Amnistie, par le nommé Napoléone Buonaparté, *alias*, Buonaparté d'Ajaccio, se disant Consul de France."—A work of this sort was very much wanted in this country, where very erroneous opinions are, by some persons, entertained respecting the Amnesty of Buonaparté, which is, in reality, an act of cruelty and of perfidy.

THE SKETCHES OF SWENSKA, which we noticed last week, as being for sale in London, will be found particularly useful in examining the views of Russia relative to France. We cannot but repeat, that every politician should be in possession of this book. Mark, too, the author's predictions with respect to the views of Russia, on the side of Turkey and India, and compare what he says, with the events now passing in that quarter.

☞ We have to apologize to our Readers for having almost entirely filled up this sheet with our remarks on different subjects, to the exclusion of more solid and useful matter; but, in our next, which will consist of two sheets, we hope to be able to make reparation.

*** The first Volume of this Work is now reprinted, and will be ready for delivery on Monday next.—Both FIRST and SECOND Volumes, together with the foregoing Numbers of the THIRD, may be had of HARDING, Pall Mall, BAGSHAW, Bow Street, and RICHARDSON, Royal Exchange.

LONDON,

TO THE RT. HON. LD. HAWKESBURY, &c.

My Lord,—In my last letter (see p. 782), I endeavoured to exhibit a view of the consequences resulting from the treaty of Amiens, together with the conduct and motives of your lordship and your colleagues relative to that treaty. The second head of examination, that on which I am now about to enter, is, the prominent features of your misconduct, *since the conclusion of the peace;* and these I propose to consider in the following order: 1. The press; 2. the French Emigrants and Vendean royalists; 3. Switzerland; 4. French troops in Holland, and the Cape of Good Hope and other Dutch colonies; 5. Malta and Egypt; 6. Louisiana.

1. The Press, my lord, has long been a favourite folly in this island; it has done infinite mischief; it has, beyond all comparison, done more harm than good, as to religion and civil liberty, as well as to politics. To the press it is that we owe the innumerable swarms of sectaries, who have, for an hundred and fifty years past, distracted the minds of the people, and in some instances, led them to commit the most detestable and horrid of crimes; to the press we owe all those hard-biting laws, which, though absolutely necessary for the preservation of the peace and the safety of the state, must be regarded as a considerable diminution of the civil liberty, enjoyed by the mass of the people, previous to the prevalent influence of the press; to the press we owe the American rebellion, the rebellion in Ireland, and to the press, the English press, the world owes the rebellion and the ursurpation in France. But, my lord, this most potent instrument, after having been employed in the work of irreligion, civil slavery, and rebellion, became, at the close of the last war, formidable to Buonaparté, not because he was an apostate, a rebel, an ursurper, and a tyrant; but, because, after having established his power, he had become the enemy of the press itself, from a suspicion, that it might produce, with respect to him, effects similar to those which it had produced with respect to his lawful Sovereign. Very easy, therefore, was it to perceive, that he would use his influence to the utmost, in order to silence, with regard to himself and his government, the press of England, and of America, but particularly that of the former country. This his inclination and intention I pointed out more than a year ago, even before the treaty of peace was concluded; and, I stated, at the same time, that he would certainly endeavour to silence also every member of parliament, who should dare to expose his views and justly characterize his conduct (1).—Thus, my lord, you were duly forewarned of this source of altercation and quarrel; and, therefore, it was your duty to have been upon your guard, and to have opposed a resolute or inflexible resistance, against the very first approaches of the ursurper's interference on the subject of the press. Do we find this resolution and inflexibility in your conduct, as exhibited in the correspondence laid before Parliament? No, my lord; we perceive you, in the first instance, adopting a tone well calculated to invite further interference, reiterated demands, and additional insults. If, in answer to Otto's (your dear friend Otto's) impudent request to punish *Peltier*, *Cobbett*, and *Regnier* (editor of the Courier de Londres), you had simply observed, that the courts were open, but that neither you nor your colleagues had, or could or would have, any thing to do with the matter, you would have heard no more of these complaints, or the dispute would have been brought to an issue, while the conquered places were yet in our hands; but, instead of this firm and dignified sort of reply, you fell into a strain of explanation made up of that pacific pusillanimity and hacknied pleader-like equivocation, which are so disgustingly apparent in your letter to your friend Otto of the 28th of July. This letter is a paltry *apology* for the existence of what is called the liberty of the press: you say, that it is "impossible his Majesty's government (meaning the *ministry*, I suppose) "could "peruse the article in question" (an article by Mr. Peltier), "without the greatest dis-

(1) See Register for March 6 and 27, 1802.—Vol. I. p. 221 and 317.

" pleasure, and without an *anxious desire*, " that the person who published it should " suffer the *punishment he so justly deserves.*" Then, after lamenting the *inconveniencies* of prosecutions for libel, and the *difficulty* of obtaining judgment against the offenders, you conclude by stating that you have, with regard to the article complained of, referred the matter to the King's Attorney General, " for his opinion *whether it is or is not a libel.*" So, my lord, after having declared, that you and your colleagues have read the article with the *greatest displeasure*, after having declared Mr. Peltier to be *justly deserving of punishment*, and that you *anxiously desire* to see him punished; after all this, you acknowledge, that you do not know, whether the article be or be not a libel, whether the publisher be or be not deserving of punishment, of that very punishment, which you *anxiously desire* he should receive!—That this proof of so complying a disposition was well calculated to produce a renewal and perseverance in those attempts, which the French Consul had already made against the press, is certain. When the insolent commissary of prisoners perceived, that you and your worthy colleagues were so ready to join in the condemnation of the persons he accused, and especially when he found you, merely to humour his master, *anxiously desirous* to punish that which you did not know to be a crime; thus encouraged, it was no wonder that he should rise in his demands, and that he should have the audacity, in his letter of the 17th of August, to give to his complaints a retrospective extent, embracing those persons who had " written " volumes to prove the *necessity of the last* " *war against France*," the suppression of which also he would have demanded, and, perhaps, not without success, if you and your colleagues had not feared the consequences as to your own persons.—It is not, however, as a cause of adding to the misunderstanding, and, finally, as contributing towards the rupture which has now taken place, that I am now to consider your letter of the 28th of July; but, as discovering a disposition, on your part, to shackle the press, for the purpose of preserving the friendship of Buonaparté; and, this disposition is, I think, clearly manifested by your expressing the opinion of His Majesty's government that Mr. Peltier deserved punishment, and by declaring your anxious desire to see him suffer punishment, *before* you had been able to ascertain *whether the act he was charged with was a crime or not.* This is the ground of accusation against you, a ground, too, which gathers great strength from the subsequent proceedings against that injured gentleman; for, we now know, that, in consequence of the complaints of the French Minister, Mr. Peltier has been prosecuted for the pretended libel laid to his charge, that the prosecution was grounded upon the precedent cases of Lord George Gordon and Mr. Vint, that the Attorney General stated the relation of an historical fact *not* to come within the just causes for such a prosecution, and, it is notorious, that the matters for which Lord George Gordon and Mr. Vint were prosecuted were, in the strictest sense of the words, relations of historical facts; yet, upon this ground, and in virtue of this doctrine, we have seen Mr. Peltier convicted under a strong charge from the Bench to that effect; but, after an investigation of his case by the public, and after all hopes of keeping peace with Buonaparté had vanished, we have seen the Attorney General refrain from demanding judgement, and we must now regard Mr. Peltier as legally discharged. These circumstances, viewed in conjunction with your letter of the 28th of July, amount to an irrefragable proof of your desire, if not of your intention, to impose shackles on the press, unwarranted by the law of the land.

2. The French Emigrants and Vendean Royalists you did not, my lord, consent to drive out of the country; this act of abominable despotism, to which you were moved, was not consummated; but, in your letter of the 28th of August, to suppose the case of the Princes of the house of Bourbon being induced to quit Great Britain; your words are: " His Majesty has no desire, " that they should continue to reside in this " country, if they are disposed, *or can be* " *induced to quit it*;" which appears to me to amount to a pretty clear indication of your intention to urge them so to do; or, in other words, to oblige them to do it, if they should not take the hint in due time.—As to the wearing of the insignia of the orders of French nobility, your lordship thought, that the persons so doing did wrong, though you happened to have no law to prevent, or punish it: " It might be *more proper* if " they all *abstained from it.*" And why? why more proper? Because their Sovereign was in exile, and because a rebel had usurped his throne? Was this the reason? Was it thus that you would, under similar circumstances, evince your fidelity to your Sovereign? God send you may never be put to the trial, and let all the people say, *Amen!* This is a tolerable good criterion whereby to judge of your lordship's notions of nobility, of the obligations of honour and of allegiance. Were I your King, you most assuredly would never be exposed to the temp-

tation of committing the base act, here recommended to the French nobility. What a figure does this nation make, in the papers now before Parliament! Never surely was degradation half so complete! But, the worst act of all was, the promise to *transport* GEORGES and his fellow Royalists to Canada. This is denied, or, at least, qualified; but, will any one believe, that the French minister would have spoken of the promise in such confident terms, if no such promise had been made? I *know*, my lord, that an endeavour was made *to accomplish this promise*, and you as well as I know that it failed. To comment on this attempt would be useless: the naked fact is all that is wanted, and that I am sure you dare not deny; if you should, an exposure, not less complete than that respecting the Maltese deputation, shall very soon make its appearance. It is not unnecessary here to observe, however, that this nation was bound, not merely by the ties of gratitude and hospitality, but by bonds still more powerful, to protect *all* the Vendean Royalists, and to make an ample provision for their future support. People in general seem to imagine, that the poor miserable pennies, bestowed as a sort of alms, accompanied with all the insolence of office, are to be regarded as *a favour* towards these gallant gentlemen; but, the fact is, that this nation was bound by the most sacred obligations to make stipulations for them in the treaty of peace, obligations which were basely set at nought. If Oxford and his colleagues deserved impeachment for their conduct towards the Catalans, what, my lord, do the Richmond Park Ministry deserve for their conduct towards the Vendeans?

3. SWITZERLAND, like every other country whereunto France extended her encroachments, was an object worthy the attention of a British ministry; but, having made a remonstrance in favour of the Swiss, how came you to be satisfied without a satisfactory answer, and even without any answer at all? The remonstrance was made on the 10th of October, 1802. Yet, after this you not only kept peace, but proceeded in the surrender of the conquests then remaining in our hands; But, what strikes me as the most singular in this remonstrance, is, that it was grounded on the principles of the treaty of Amiens as viewed in conjunction with the stipulations of that of Luneville, when it is well known, that, during the debates on the former of those treaties, you yourself had declared, that its stipulations were in no-wise connected with those of the latter, and that upon this very ground, you opposed the laying the treaty of Luneville before the Parliament, when a motion for that purpose was, on the 6th of May, 1802, made by Lord Temple, which motion was by your means negatived by the last complying parliament (2).

4. FRENCH TROOPS IN HOLLAND. You complained of the French troops remaining in Holland. The ground of your complaint existed the moment the treaty of Amiens was concluded; yet, from an examination of the papers; in which we are told to look for a justification of your conduct, we find that no remonstrance was ever made on this subject till the month of February, 1803, and even then incidentally; yet you proceeded in the restoration of the Dutch colonies, including the Cape, when you must have known, that the mother country was garrisoned by French troops, and was, to all intents and purposes, an appendage of the French empire. On the 17th of October, you gave orders, in consequence of the French incursion into Switzerland, with which the Dutch had nothing to do, to retain the Dutch colonies: the Cape was retained, or rather, as it happened, recaptured. On the 14th of November you instruct Lord Whitworth to remonstrate about the French troops in Holland; yet, with this proof of your knowledge of the subjugated state of Holland before our eyes, we see you, on the very next day, the 15th of November, sending a counter order to give up the Dutch colonies, and the Cape amongst the rest! Holland being, then, on the 15th of November, in exactly the same state with respect to France as she was in on the 17th of October, it follows of course, that, if she was independent at the later date, she was so at the more early. This, therefore, is the dilemma, to which you are reduced: if Holland was independent, you were, on the 17th of October, guilty of a most scandalous violation of the treaty of Amiens; and, if she was not independent, you knowingly surrendered, on the 15th of November, the Cape into the hands of France, and that, too, after having had repeated and very recent proofs of the hostile intentions of that power.

5. MALTA AND EGYPT.—Your conduct with regard to Malta, as far down as the treaty of Amiens inclusive, has been amply exposed in the publication of the authentic papers relative thereto. The subsequent transactions, the abolition of some of the langues, the consent to a mode of electing the Grand Master unknown to the treaty, together with all your various pitiful subterfuges about guarantees, are they not written

(2) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1235.

in the book which you have laid before Parliament, and are they not too ridiculous to merit particular animadversion. But, Malta considered as the out-work of Egypt, and by that means of India; Malta, considered as the final cause of the rupture, and as the ostensible object of the war, cannot be separated from Sebastiani's Report, which was the principal ground on which you resolved, as you say, not to give it up. When, therefore, did you first hear of this report? In January, 1803. But, my lord, though you had not seen the *report* before January, you were, as appears by your letter of the 30th of November, at that more early period informed of *the arrival of Sebastiani in Egypt*; and who can doubt, that you were by the same means, duly informed of his offensive language, and of the evident object of his mission? Yet, after the receipt of this information, you not only gave orders to evacuate Egypt, but we find you professing an intention to lose no time in evacuating Malta also! With this evidence before our eyes, can we possibly regard Sebastiani's Report, which only gives a detailed account of the least hostile part of his conduct in Egypt; is it possible that we can regard it as being, with respect to the present war, any thing more than a mere pretext, a mere disguise to the real motives, by which you and your colleagues were actuated in deferring the surrender of Malta? These motives were, first to have something in hand, as a security against the consequences which you expected to arise from your retention of the Cape, if that retention happened to take place; something about which to make a quarrel, whereby to form a plausible pretext for the arming of the country, if the news of the retention of the Cape should arise previous to that of its final surrender, and which pretext was at last brought forward in the message, which His Majesty was advised to send to the Parliament on the 8th of March. I have, my lord, before given it as my decided opinion, that the news of the retention of the Cape, was the *immediate* cause of the message, which opinion has not been, in the smallest degree, shaken by the papers before Parliament, notwithstanding the 18th of March is stated to be the day, when you received the *dispatch* of General Dundas, giving an account of his having executed your orders for that retention. You do not say, nor can you say, my lord, that you *did not*, through another channel, receive more early information of that event. You dare not say, that you did not receive the intelligence, on which you acted, on the 5th or 6th of March; and I say, that I am fully persuaded you did, a persuasion which is not at all impaired by any statement made by the present ministry, that ministry who denied having any official document relative to the laws and constitution of Malta; that ministry who have declared that they never heard of the Maltese deputies having been refused an official audience; that ministry who are now accused to the world, and with every appearance of justice, of having suppressed a very material part of Lord Whitworth's note to Talleyrand of the 10th of May, which note they present to the Parliament as being entire: by any statement of such men, my opinion, as to the matter in question is not to be altered, and I remain fully convinced, that if the order for the final evacuation of the Cape had overtaken the order for its retention, the hostile message would not even yet have reached the houses of Parliament.—There were, however, other motives. A war was necessary for the purpose of creating circumstances sufficient to render the financial statements of Mr. Addington no longer applicable. The deficit, the alarming deficit was discovered. No hopes of a commercial treaty could be entertained. In short, the whole finance system, the whole of the system for "husbanding our resources against another "day of trial," had proved abortive. Instead of increasing the "capital, credit and con-"fidence," which were to give us strength and security, the peace was found to have placed the funds absolutely in the power of Buonaparté, who, through that channel, drew from us the means of maintaining the army destined to invade and subdue us; and thus "the horrors of war" became necessary to prevent the approaching and greater horrors of peace. It was not, therefore, for the possession of Malta, and, through it, for the defence of Egypt and the security of India that we were called on to arm; but, generally, to put an end to the peace, and particularly, to be prepared for the consequences that might result from the intelligence of our having retained, or recaptured, the Cape of Good Hope.

6. LOUISIANA is the last topic, on which I proposed to speak to your Lordship; and, a very important topic it is.—I stated, in my former letter, the advantages which our enemy has derived from the cession of this colony, in consequence of the peace: I am now to show, how this might have been prevented, and what advantages we might have derived from a *more speedy termination* of that peace. The Louisiana expedition was ready to sail at the moment when the King's first message was delivered. If we had brought the negotiation to a close immediately, and had had a small squadron to

send to sea with four thousand men on board, we might have taken Louisiana before Mr. Munro had reached France. Having done this, the Americans might have received the country from *our* hands, by which means France would have still owed the United States 30,000,000 of dollars, instead of wiping off that debt and that source of misunderstanding and receiving in addition, as she now has done, 2,000,000 of dollars from the people of that country, at the same time that she is by them regarded as a benefactress.—Of all the traits of *modesty* discovered by you and your colleagues, that of claiming *merit* for having, by your dispute with France, caused this arrangement between her and America is certainly the most remarkable. After having asserted, that the peace was not injurious on account of the cession which it sanctioned of this immense and valuable territory; after having gone so far as to declare, that this cession was *advantageous* to Great Britain, because it would attach the Americans to her by placing the French upon their back; after all this you do not blush to boast of having done away the effects of this salutary cession, and that, too, by a renewal of the war!—That Louisiana is in the hands of the Americans I sincerely rejoice; but, I am by no means pleased, that France has, by this transfer, obtained £7,000,000 sterling, and, which is of still more value, a decided influence in America, neither of which she would ever have obtained had not the cession to her been sanctioned by the Treaty of Amiens. Inasmuch, therefore, as the arrangement between France and America is an evil, it is the effect of the peace; and, inasmuch as it is a good, it is the effect of the renewal of war, of the mere sound of war, of "horrid war," of that which you and your colleagues have taught the people of this country to regard as an evil unattended with any good, an evil to avoid which no sacrifice either of interest or of honour could possibly be too great.—But, my lord, your claim of *merit*, on this score, is certainly the most extraordinary that ever was set up: you first, by the peace of Amiens, sanction the cession of Louisiana to France, for, till that sanction was given, she could derive no advantage from the country; she dared not even say it was hers: you first create the evil, and when, afterwards, the evil is mitigated, by a renewal of war, *by a total frustration of your own plans*, you have the confidence to assume to yourselves merit for that mitigation! Merit for having been, against your will, prevented from doing so much mischief as you intended to do!

Here, my Lord, I conclude my remarks on the conduct of you and your colleagues, relative to the negotiations with France, since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens. It is to this treaty, together with that of Downing-street, to which, I have to attribute the honour of corresponding with your Lordship; and, though you have not condescended to answer directly, any of my numerous letters, I have had the satisfaction to perceive, that, you have, in several instances, answered them indirectly, or, at least, endeavoured so to do. From the moment you began negotiating with the commissary of prisoners, I foresaw the result of that negotiation; from the moment the Preliminary Treaty was concluded, I foresaw and foretold its consequences, even in the minutest detail; I have followed, or rather gone before you, step by step, through the whole of your diplomatic career, faithfully warning you against every danger, and not less faithfully exposing your errors. In return for all this, I am told, my Lord, that you have intended to confer on me some special marks of your gratitude, a little à la Peltier or so; and, if your power, or your courage, has fallen short of your wishes, be assured, my Lord, that I take the will for the deed ——I am, my Lord, your, &c. &c.

Duke Street, Westminster,
3d June, 1803. WM. COBBETT.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p.* 672.

Thursday April 28.—LORDS.—Progress made in the second reading of Markham's Divorce-Bill. Deferred 'till to-morrow.—Lord Viscount Bulkley sworn and took his seat. Several Bills before the House forwarded.—COMMONS.—Committees appointed to try the elections for Taunton and Boston.—Agreed to call the House over on Thursday next.—Lord Folkestone moved for copies of dispatches to and from the officer or officers commanding at the Cape of Good Hope, which motion, after a debate of some length, was superseded by another for the order of the day, which was moved for by the Chancellor of the Exchequer.—Mr. Fox presented a petition in behalf of certain persons of Nottingham, against the Bill, then pending, relative to the opening of their borough and county to the magistrates of the shire of Nottingham. Ordered to lie on the table.—Lord Castlereagh moved for accounts of all the goods sold at the India Company's sales from 1st of March, 1802, to 1st March 1803. Also of the stock of the East India Company. Ordered. He then moved for leave to bring in a Bill to enable the East India Company to raise and pay a volunteer corps of two companies.

Friday, April 29.——LORDS.—Progress made in the examinations respecting the claim of the Rev. Mr. Brydges to the Barony of Chandos.—Further discussions on Markham's Divorce Bill, which was ordered to be printed.—The Sailor's and Soldier's Relief Bill and the vexatious Arrest's Bill went through a committee of the whole.—Second reading of the Insolvent Debtor's Bill postponed.—Committment of the Irish Chaulking Bill defer-

ed for a month.——COMMONS.—Mr. Lascelles brought up a petition from the Yorkshire Clothiers for the repeal of certain laws relative to their trade.—Counsel heard against the Nottingham Magistrate Bill. Motion for the said Bill's going into a committee. A debate thereon. Motion carried without a division. Bill ordered to be committed on Monday next.

Monday, May 2.——LORDS.—Lord Auckland moved to postpone the second reading of the Irish Bank Restriction Bill 'till to-morrow. Agreed to. —He then moved for certain financial documents, and, in his preface to the said motion, he stated *that the net revenue of the country would be found to exceed* 34 *millions sterling, of which, after deducting about* 17,600,000 *for the discharge of the national debt, there would be the sum of* 16,400,000 *applicable to public purposes.*—Motion agreed to.—Lord Darnley moved for the House to be summoned for Monday next in order to submit to them a motion on the state of the country. Ordered.——COMMONS.—Mr. Patterson presented a petition from the Norwich Weavers against the Woollen Manufactures Bill before the House. Read and referred to a committee.—Order of the day being read for taking into consideration the consolidation of the custom duties, the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed to postpone the subject 'till Monday, when, or before, he hoped to have a communication to make.—Mr. Patten put off his promised motion. —On the third reading of the Edinburgh Road Bill, the House divided—Ayes 116, Noes 106.—Coroner's Bill ordered to be engrossed.—Progress in the Nottingham Magistrates' Bill.

Tuesday, May 3.——LORDS.—Order of the day: second reading of the Irish Bank Restriction Bill. Lords, King, Limerick, and Auckland spoke on the subject.—— COMMONS.—Third reading of the Nottingham Bill. After a debate there appeared for the bill, 164, against 29. Bill passed. —Progress made in discussing the clauses of the Clergy Residence Bill.

Wednesday, May 4.——LORDS.—Progress made in Markham's Divorce-Bill. —— COMMONS.—Droitwich Road-Bill passed.—On a proposed motion, on the Navy Abuse Commission, by Sir H. St. J. Mildmay, a debate ensued, during which some remarkable declarations fell from Capt. Markham (on the Lords of the Admiralty,) and from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Sir H. Mildmay withdrew his motion.

Thursday, May 5.——LORDS.—In a committee of the whole, on the Irish Bank Restriction Bill, two new clauses, moved by Lord King, were rejected. —— COMMONS.—Election for Taunton confirmed.—Bill relative to Scotch Schoolmasters discussed. Boast of the Lord Advocate about the morals of the Scotch.—General Gascoygne moved for papers relative to duties on coffee. Mr. W. Dundas made a strange remark: "that the House "should not grant papers merely to *gratify curi-* "*osity!*" Reproved by Dr. Laurence.—John Simpson, Mayor of Great Grimsby was, after a debate and a hearing of his counsel, ordered, on the motion of Mr. Burdon, to be committed to Newgate. —On motion of Mr. Gregor papers relative to corn &c. imported since October, 1802, were ordered to be laid before the House.—Progress made in the Clergy Non-residence Bill.

Friday, May 6.——LORDS.—After some debate on Lord Moira's Bill relative to Insolvent Debtors, it was laid aside for the present session.—Upon a motion by Ministers for adjourning 'till Monday a debate took place, which ended in a division, for it 29 against it 8.——COMMONS.—A new writ issued for Boston in lieu of Mr. Fydell.—A message from the Lords, who had agreed to the Irish Bank Restriction Bill.—On a motion made by Ministers for an adjournment to Monday, a debate took place. Divided, Ayes 185, Noes 95.— James Trotter called to the bar, reprimanded and discharged upon paying his fees.—Progress made in the Irish Courts of Law Bill.

Monday, May 9.—LORDS.—In a Committee progress was made in discussing the Chandos claim.—Papers presented relative to Queen Anne's Bounty.—Some conversation on the state of the dispute with France.—A paper presented relative to Field Officers serving in the Militia.—— COMMONS.—First reading of a Bill for the free sale of Coals in London.—Papers brought up relative to Queen Anne's Bounty.—Lords ask for evidence relative to the Nottingham Election.— London Port Bill went through a Committee.— Papers brought up relative to the exportation of gunpowder, &c.—Some conversation relative to the dispute with France.

Tuesday, May 10.—LORDS.—Upon motion of the Duke of Athol that the Edinburgh Road Bill be read a third time on Thursday next, the Duke of Norfolk divided the House: for the reading 65, against it 15.—Progress made in Markham's Divorce Bill.——COMMONS.—Upon a third reading of the Coroner's Bill a division took place, for the bill 67, against it 63.—Bill thrown out.—The report of the Committee on the Kircudbright Election, stated that Montgomery Stuart, Esq. ought to have been, and therefore was, duly elected.—A motion was made by the Minister for postponing the consideration of the Election Petitions which stood on the list for this Session.—Motion withdrawn.—A petition brought in from certain Tanners in Ireland.—Progress made in the Clergy Non-residence Bill.

Wednesday, May 11.—LORDS.—Papers relative to finance, moved for by Lord Auckland, laid before the House.—Order of Council presented relating to the exportation of pig-iron and warlike stores ——COMMONS.—Ordered, upon motion of Mr. Bagwell, that the Clerks of the Peace of the several counties of Ireland lay before the House a return of freeholders.—Bill for East-India Company's Volunteers read a third time and passed.—Lunatic Estate Bill read a third time and passed.—Progress made in the Irish Courts of Law Bill.—Progress made in the Clergy Non-residence Bill.

Thursday, May 12.—LORDS.—Further progress made in the Scotch Appeal, and in the Chandos claim.—On the third reading of the Edinburgh Road Bill the House divided, for it 69, against it 19.—Nottingham Magistrate Bill read a second time.—First report presented from the Commissaries of Naval Abuses.——COMMONS.—Committees appointed for trying the elections of Cirencester and Bishop's Castle.—Report from the Commissaries under the Naval Abuse Bill.—Motion for papers relative to Irish distilleries. Ordered.—Bill of indemnity moved for relative to the exportation of corn to Denmark. Debate thereon. Leave given to bring in the bill.—Further progress made in discussing the Clergy Non-residence Bill. Report thereon brought up, and the bill ordered to be printed.

Friday, May 13.—LORDS.—East-India Company's Volunteers Bill brought up from the Commons.—Order of the day, financial discussion. Lord King, at the close of a speech of considerable length, moved for "a Committee for the pur- "pose of inquiring into the real situation of the

" finances of the country." The motion was opposed by Lord Auckland. Lords Moira and Grenville then spoke for the motion. Lord Westmoreland spoke against it, and it was negatived without a division.—A bill moved for by Lord Ellenborough to punish persons concerned in wilfully sinking ships, &c. &c. Bill read first time.—On motion of Lord Pelham the House adjourned to Monday.——COMMONS.—London Coal Market Bill read a second time.—Bishop's Castle Election confirmed. The petition against, vexatious and groundless.—Militia Families Bill read a third time and passed.—Irish Courts of Law Bill read a third time and passed.—On the motion of Lord Grenville Levison, " that the House should at its rising adjourn to to-morrow," a debate ensued, and the motion was withdrawn. It was then moved, by the Minister, that the House adjourn to Monday, which was carried without a division.

Monday, May 16.—LORDS.—Nottingham Magistrate Bill read a third time.—The following Message from the King was read:——" GEORGE " R.—His Majesty thinks it proper to acquaint " the House of Commons, that the discussions " which he announced to them in his Message of " the 8th of March last, as then subsisting be- " tween his Majesty and the French Government, " have been terminated. That the conduct of " the French Government has obliged his Ma- " jesty to recall his Ambassador from Paris, and " that the Ambassador from the French Repub- " lic, has left London. His Majesty has given " directions for laying before the House of Com- " mons, with as little delay as possible, copies of " such papers as will afford the fullest informa- " tion to his Parliament at this important junc- " ture——It is a consolation to his Majesty to " reflect, that no endeavours have been wanting " on his part to preserve to his subjects the " blessings of peace; but under the circum- " stances which have occurred to disappoint his " just expectations, his Majesty relies with con- " fidence on the zeal and public spirit of his " faithful Commons, and on the exertions of his " brave and loyal subjects, to support him in his " determination to employ the power and re- " sources of the nation, in opposing the spirit of " ambition and encroachment which at present " actuates the Councils of France, in upholding " the dignity of his crown, and in asserting and " maintaining the rights and interests of his " people."

COMMONS.—Report on the Cirencester Election declared Sir Robert Preston and Mr. Beach to be duly elected.—A Message from the Lords, stated that they had agreed to the Nottingham Magistrate and other bills without any alteration in them.—Indemnity Bill read a second time.—Leave given to bring in a bill to amend the Medicine Act.—King's Message (see Lords of this day) read. Motion by Lord Hawkesbury to take it into consideration on Monday next.—Motion by Lord Castlereagh for leave to bring in a bill to amend the Act of the 39th of the King, allowing the East-India Company to hire ships for their service. Referred to a Committee of the whole House to-morrow.—Report of the Clergy Bill postponed till Wednesday next.—Committee of the whole House on the bill to prevent vexatious arrests.

Tuesday, May 17.——LORDS.—Progress made in the Chandos claim. The Royal assent was given by commission to 36 public and private bills, amongst which was the Nottingham Magistrate Bill. A committee of the whole on the Lunatic's Estates Bill, on which the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.——COMMONS.—Markham's Divorce Bill read a second time.——A petition was presented from John Simpson, late Mayor of Great Grimsby, and now in confinement in Newgate, by order of the House, praying to be discharged.—Ordered that Simpson be brought up on Thursday next.—Mr. Hawkins Browne moved certain resolutions relating to emigration, upon which a Bill was ordered to be brought in.—General Gascoyne gave notice that, if the papers about to be presented, relative to the negotiation with France, did not include papers touching matters which passed previous to the Definitive Treaty, he should move for such papers, particularly those relating to Malta and the Italian Republic. The ministers stated, that it was their intention to lay before the House such papers only as related to discussions, which had arisen since the Treaty of Amiens.—Order of the day for a committee of the whole on the consolidation of the Custom-Duties. The report to be received to-morrow.

Wednesday, May 18.——COMMONS.—Mr. Grey moved for the substance of any intelligence relative to the military preparations carrying on in the ports of Holland and France. After some observations from the Chancellor of the Exchequer the motion was withdrawn.—The consideration of the report on the Ilchester election was resumed, and after an argument of some length, Mr. Rose moved " that the House do agree with the " committee in the said resolution that Alexander " Davison was involved in the said system of " bribery and corruption." The motion was opposed by Mr. Wallace and the Master of the Rolls, and supported by Mr. Bragge and Mr. Sturgess, and after some debate was carried, Ayes, 56—Noes, 47.—Another motion was then made, " that the Attorney General be directed to pro- " secute Alexander Davison for the same of- " fence," which was agreed to. Ayes, 60—Noes, 39.——Report on the Clergy Residence Bill agreed to, and ordered to be read a third time to-morrow.

Thursday, May 19.——COMMONS.—Committee appointed for trying the elections of Evesham and East Retford. Mr. Grey moved for papers, 1st. relative to that part of the declaration which stated that violence had been offered to the vessels and property of his Majesty's subjects; 2d. relative to the commercial agents of France; 3d. relative to the date of the instructions which had been sent to the French agent at Dublin; 4th. relative to the sending of French troops into Holland; 5th. relative to the remonstrance which had been made against the review presented to the Legislative Body of France; 6th. relative to the reply of the French to the note presented by Lord Whitworth on the subject of Switzerland; 7th. relative to the orders sent out to retain the Cape and other places; 8th. relative to the cession of Louisiana by France to America; 9th. relative to the armaments in the ports of France and Holland. The motion was opposed by Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and supported by Mr. Whitbread, Dr. Lawrence, and Mr. Windham.——The question was then put on the several resolutions, when the first, third, and eighth were carried; on the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth the previous question was moved by Lord Hawkesbury, and carried.—On the seventh Lord Folkestone moved the following amendment: " And also the date when the dispatches were received in England, announcing the reten-

tion of the Cape of Good Hope." The motion as amended was then carried.——On the ninth resolution the House divided.——For it 136—Against it 59.—Majority 77.

Friday, May 20.——LORDS.—Counsel heard relative to the Scotch appeal, which was deferred to Tuesday.—Earls Strathmore and Rochfort, Viscount Middleton and Lord Foley were sworn, and took their seats.—Bills on the table forwarded.—Gold and Silver Bullion Bill brought from the House of Commons, and several private Bills, all which were read.—Lord Boringdon moved for information concerning the violence offered to the vessels of his Majesty's subjects, for which no redress had been obtained, &c.; also concerning the arrest of Captain D'Auvergne; also concerning the *entre projet* respecting Malta. These motions his Lordship after some observations from Lord Pelham, declined urging at this time. Lord Fitzwilliam moved for information concerning the commercial agents; but, after some debate in which Lords Pelham, Carlisle, Hobart, and Spencer bore a part, he agreed to postpone it.——COMMONS.—On motion of Mr. Hawkins Browne, a new writ was ordered to be issued for electing a Burgess for Nottingham, in the room of Joseph Birch, Esq. whose election has been declared void.——Committee to try the election of Evesham reported that the sitting member was duly elected, and that the petition was neither frivolous nor vexatious. —Secretary at War, moved for leave to bring in a bill, for speedily completing the Militia, &c. which, after some observations from Mr. Windham and others, was granted.——Lord Hawkesbury presented several papers, relating the subjects noticed by Mr. Grey, upon which a long and interesting debate took place between Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Grey, Mr. Canning, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Whitbread, Dr. Lawrence, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer.——General Gascoine moved, 1st for a copy of all the representations or remonstrances made by ministers on the part of Malta from the 1st. of March, 1801, to the last of March, 1802, &c.; 2d. for a copy of all such representations or remonstrances as were made by the British Government on the subject of the Italian Republic, and the annexation of Piedmont, previous and subsequent to the Treaty of Amiens; 3d. for a copy of all orders sent to any Governor, &c. in the West Indies, since the treaty; 4th. for an account of the remonstrance, &c. made respecting the continuance of the French troops in Holland. After considerable discussion the previous question was carried against all the motions except the third which was agreed to.——Bill for the defence of the country read, and committed.—Indemnity Bill discussed in committee of the whole, and the report ordered to be received on Monday.——An engrossed Bill from the Lords, for punishing persons burning ships at sea, &c. read, and ordered to be printed.——Third reading of the Clergy Non-Residence Bill, postponed till Thursday.——Land Redemption Bill read, and ordered to be read a second time on Monday.——Committees of Supply, and of Ways and Means postponed till Monday.——Third reading of the Bill for preventing vexatious arrests postponed till Monday.

Monday, May 23.——LORDS.—Marquis of Salisbury reported that the King would be pleased to give directions for the production of the papers solicited by their Lordships.—St. Pancras Workhouse Bill rejected on motion of Lord Moira——Order of the day for considering his Majesty's message being read, Lord Pelham rose, and concluded a long speech with moving, "That an humble address be presented to his Majesty, to "return his Majesty the thanks of this House for "his most gracious message, and for the communication of the several papers which have been "laid before them in obedience to his Majesty's "command.——To assure his Majesty of the just "sense we entertain of his Majesty's anxions and "uniform endeavours to preserve to his people "the blessings of peace, and our perfect confidence in his Majesty's disposition to terminate "the calamities of war, whenever that object can "be accomplished, consistently with the honour "of his Majesty's Crown, and the interests of his "people.——That we have observed, with the "strongest feelings of indignation, that his Majesty's endeavours have been frustrated by that "restless spirit of ambition and domination by which "the government of France had been led to advance "pretensions the most extravagant and injurious, "and to avow designs at once inconsistent with "obligations of good faith, and with the essential interests of the British Empire, and that for "these indignities and provocations his Majesty "has in vain demanded satisfaction and redress. "That actuated by these sentiments we feel it "our indispensable duty to express, on our part, "a firm determination to co-operate with his Majesty, in calling forth the resources of the United Kingdom for the vigorous support of a "cause, in which are involved the dignity of his "Majesty's Crown, the rights and liberties of his "people, and all that is dear and valuable to us "as a free and independent nation."——He was seconded by the Duke of Cumberland, and supported by the Duke of Clarence, Lords Mulgrave, and Melville. Lord King moved the following amendment, in place of what followed the words "his Majesty's commands," "To assure his Majesty of our firm determination to co-operate "with his Majesty in calling forth the resources of "the United Kingdom, for the vigorous prosecution of the war in which we are involved, and "to express to his Majesty the satisfaction with "which his faithful Peers have received his Majesty's gracious Declaration, that he is willing "to afford, as far as may be consistent with his "own honours and the interests of his people, "every facility to any just arrangement by which "the blessings of peace may be restored to his "loyal subjects."—Which after a very long debate between Lords Ellenborough, Moira, Spencer, Rosslyn, and Grenville, was negatived, 142 to 10. —Address put and carried.——COMMONS.—An address similar to the one proposed in the House of Lords was proposed in the House of Commons by Lord Hawkesbury, and supported by Mr. Pitt. Messrs. Erskine and Grey opposed it, and an amendment similar to the one proposed in the House of Lords, was proposed by Mr. Grey. The debate was adjourned till to-morrow.

Tuesday, May 24.——LORDS.—Scotch Appeal postponed till Wednesday fortnight.—Marquis of Salisbury informed the House that the King would receive their address to-morrow.——Bills on the table forwarded.——After some conversation between Lords Darnly and Auckland, a motion relative to the productions of papers on Louisiana, the Cape, &c. was agreed to.— COMMONS.— The County Bridge Bill and Ship Passenger Bill postponed till to-morrow.——Leave given to bring in a bill to regulate the Court of Appeal in the High Court of Admiralty in Scotland.——Papers from the Office of Chief Secretary of Ireland presented, read and ordered to be printed.——Mi-

litia Bill read a second time and committed.—— Leave given to bring in a bill for the better protection of trade.——Papers relative to the negotiation were presented by Lord Hawkesbury and ordered to lie on the table.——On the motion of Lord Grenville, a motion for copies of all representations made respecting the continuance of French troops in Holland, &c. was agreed to.—— On the Address to his Majesty a long debate took place between Messrs. Grenville, Whitbread, Dallas, Elliot, Canning, Fox, and Windham. The amendment proposed by Mr. Grey was negatived 398 to 67, and the original motion put and carried.

Wednesday, May 25.—LORDS.—After waiting upon his Majesty, and transacting some business of a private nature, a motion was made by the Earl of Suffolk, praying that his Majesty would order copies of the surveys taken, and the report of the inspector of the Caledonian Canal, between the Highlands and the Western Sea, to be laid before the House.—Lord Hobart presented a Message from his Majesty respecting his intention of calling out the Supplementary Militia.—Lord Hobart moved an Address, which, after some observations from the Earl of Radnor was agreed to.—Lord Pelham presented by command of his Majesty several State Papers, which were ordered to lie on the table.——COMMONS.—Lord Stopford informed the House that his Majesty would receive their Address to-morrow.—Counsel heard on Markham's Divorce Bill.—A Message from the Lords, stating their agreement to the Bullion Bill, and several private bills. —— Soldier's Pass-Bill postponed till to-morrow.—National Defence Bill read and ordered to be engrossed.—Col. Patton gave notice of his intentions to bring forward certain resolutions relative to the conduct of ministers on Friday next.—Mr. Grenville moved for papers, 1st, for ascertaining the date of the annexation of the Spanish Langue of the Order of St. John to Spain; 2d, such representations as had been made to the French and Spanish Governments on the subject; 3d, the answer to the Emperor of Russia's proposition respecting the guarantee of Malta. The first and last were agreed to.—Mr. Sheridan gave notice that he should move, on Friday, for information concerning the Commercial Agents.—Lord Hawkesbury laid before the House, by command of his Majesty, copies of papers concerning the French troops in Holland, which were ordered to be printed.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer presented the following Message from his Majesty.—"GEORGE R.— "His Majesty thinks it proper to acquaint the "House of Commons, that he has judged it ne- "cessary to adopt, without delay, all the means "within his power, which may contribute to de- "feat the avowed designs of the enemy, and to "afford the most effectual protection and security "to his faithful people.——In pursuance, there- "fore, of the Acts of Parliament, enabling his "Majesty to increase the number of his Militia "Forces, his Majesty makes this communication "to the House of Commons, to the end that his "Majesty may cause the Supplementary Militia "to be forthwith raised and enrolled, and there- "after to be drawn out, and embodied, and "marched as occasion may require." G. R.—— The Message being read,—The Secretary at War moved, "That an humble Address be presented "to his Majesty, to return his Majesty the thanks "of this House for his most gracious Message, "which affords a fresh proof of his Majesty's so- "licitude for the security and defence of his peo- "ple." Ordered.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer gave notice, that on Monday se'nnight he should propose the Ways and Means for raising the Supplies.—Mr. Fox gave notice, that on Friday next he should move an Address to his Majesty on the subject of making an application to the Emperor of Russia for his Mediation between us and France, &c.—The ballots for Committees on the elections of Newcastle-under-Line and Radnorshire were postponed till Friday next.—Report of the address on the War was read a first time, and, after considerable debate, was received. —Bill for punishing persons setting fire to ships read a second time and committed for to-morrow. —Committee of the whole House for the better regulation of trade reported.—Land Tax Redemption Bill considered in Committee of the whole House. Report to be received to-morrow.

Thursday, May 26.—LORDS.—After a long conversation relative to the notice which Lord Fitzwilliam had previously given of his intention of bringing forward some motions this evening, Lord Grenville made three motions respecting Malta (similar to those moved by Mr. Grenville in the Commons yesterday) which were decided as they had been.—Lord Carlisle moved for papers relative to the French troops in Holland, which were ordered.—The Earl of Radnor made a motion for the proceedings which had taken place towards carrying the 2d article of the Treaty of Amiens into effect, which, after some conversation was negatived.—The Duke of Norfolk presented to the House, a letter he had from the Claimants of the Chandos Peerage, which was referred to the Committee of Privileges.—The order of the day on the motion of Lord Fitzwilliam was discharged and renewed for Thursday.—On the motion of Lord Fitzwilliam, certain papers relative to the annexation of Parma and Placentia were ordered.—— COMMONS.—The Speaker informed the House that his Majesty had been waited upon with the Address of that House, to which his Majesty was pleased to return a most gracious answer, "thanking his faithful Commons for their very "loyal and dutiful Address, and expressing his "Majesty's high gratification at the assurance it "contained of their support, in the present con- "test undertaken for the maintenance of the ho- "nour of his Majesty's Crown, and the preserva- "tion of the dearest rights and interests of the "people."—A Message from the Lords stated, that they had agreed to the Militia Bill, and the Bill to prevent vexatious Arrests.—Committee of the election of East Renford reported the sitting members to be duly elected, and the petition to be neither frivolous or vexatious.—Clergy Non-Residence Bill read a third time, and after some debate between Sir F. Burdett, the Attorney-General, Mr. Windham, and Sir W. Scott, Mr. Burdon proposed a clause to exempt licensed preachers of Proprietary Chapels, which was not agreed to. Mr. Pole Carew proposed the following clause, "That patrons shall have the power, on "presenting to a living, to render that living "void in case of non-residence, by giving him six "months notice." Mr. Fellowes proposed a clause giving to the patron of a living, or the churchwardens of a parish, a right of appeal to the Archbishop, where they conceived that leave of absence had been improperly granted; which, after some conversation, was negatived. Mr. Sheridan proposed an amendment, provided that nothing herein contained shall extend, or be construed to extend, so as to subject any spiritual person holding by lease any lands, tenements, or

hereditaments, previous to the 6th of April, 1803, to any penalties for cultivating the same. After a conversation of some length the bill passed, 50 to 5.

Friday, May 27.—LORDS.—Counsel in the Appeal, Marshall *v.* Stein. On motion of the Lord Chancellor, the judgment was affirmed with the annexation of £150 costs.—Royal assent given by commission to 14 public and private bills.—Much private business done.—Lord Pelham presented, by command of his Majesty, several State Papers, which were ordered to lie on the table.—Various bills were forwarded.—The Exporter's Indemnity Bill and Scotch Schoolmaster's Bill severally went through Committees of the House.—The Irish Courts of Law Bill underwent some discussion in the Committee of the whole House, and their report was ordered for Wednesday.——COMMONS.—After some other business had been gone through, Col. Patton deferred his motion to this day se'nnight.—Mr. Canning moved, "That an "humble Address be presented to his Majesty, "praying, that his Majesty would be graciously "pleased to order to be laid before the House, "copies of any orders for the removal of the per- "sons from this country calling themselves Com- "mercial Commissioners from France, and also "copies of any communications which passed "between this Government and that of France, "relative to the mission of such persons." Ordered.—Sir G. Cornwall gave notice of his intention to move, on Wednesday, for leave to bring in a bill to regulate the Turnpike Act.—Lord Folkstone, of his intention to move, on Wednesday, for certain papers relative to the execution of the 2d article of the Treaty of Amiens.—After a speech of considerable length, Mr. Fox moved, "That an humble Address be presented to his "Majesty, praying that his Majesty would be "graciously pleased to avail himself of the dispo- "sition expressed by the Emperor of Russia, to "interpose his good offices for the termination "of the present war between his Majesty and the "French Republic, an interposition which would, "probably, be attended with the best advantages, "in support of the dignity of his Majesty's "Crown, and for the general and permanent tran- "quillity of Europe." After some debate between Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Pitt, and Mr. Fox, the motion was withdrawn.—Militia Regulation Bill considered in a Committee of the whole House, and afterwards ordered to be engrossed and read a third time on Wednesday.—Ship Burning Bill considered in a Committee of the whole House.—Custom Duty Bill read and ordered for Wednesday.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the House go into a Committee, on Wednesday, on the subject of assessed taxes.—Committees of Supply and of Ways and Means postponed till Wednesday.——Ships Passengers Bill to be read a third time on Wednesday.——Convoy Bill read a second time and committed for Wednesday.——Land Tax Bill considered, and after some amendments ordered to be read a third time on Wednesday.——Adjourned, on account of the Whitsun holidays, to Wednesday, the 1st. of June.

Wednesday, June 1.—LORDS.—The Clergy Bill was ordered to be read a second time on Tuesday next.—Irish Courts' Bill read a third time and passed, as was the Scotch Schoolmasters' Bill.—Several bills will be brought up from the Commons.——COMMONS.—Land Tax Redemption Bill read a third time and passed.—Soldiers' Relief Bill committed.—Order for second reading of the East-India Shipping Bill postponed till Monday.—Convoy Bill went through the Committee; reported.—Leave to bring in a Bill for further repairing the Port of London.—Mr. Canning rose to give notice of a motion which he intended to make to morrow for some papers, the nature of which he should briefly state. The first was for copies of all the Remonstrances made to his Majesty's ministers by the natives of Malta, respecting the intended restoration of that Island to the Order of St. John, and of all the correspondence of ministers on that subject. It appeared from the official Papers published by the French government, that the disposition of the people of Malta had formed the subject of considerable discussion during the Negotiation at Amiens. He should therefore move for an account of the conferences between Lord Cornwallis and the French Plenipotentiary, on the 18th and 19th of February, relative to the inhabitants of Malta, and copies of the dispatches received by his Majesty's ministers on that subject from Lord Cornwallis.——The Customs Consolidation Bill read a second time.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

THE TRUE BRITON, in order, we suppose, to out-strip its fellows in that anti-gallican zeal, of which it has, for several months past discovered such a plentiful deficiency, has, during the last week published a paper, purporting to be a memorial from Talleyrand to Buonaparté, pointing out the means by which this country is to be destroyed in peace. As to the matter contained in this curious state paper we can certainly have no objection, seeing that it is, in substance, borrowed from our writings; but, with respect to the *authenticity* of the paper itself we must beg leave to doubt, especially as we know, that a copy of it was in possession of the editors of the Anti-Jacobin Review *some months ago*, and that they considered it as unauthentic, is very evident from the slight attention they paid to it. The fact is, that the fabrication is too gross to impose on any person of sense, a circumstance, however, which by no means renders it less suited to the readers of the True Briton and the Sun, whose powers of perception we should not suppose to rise much superior to those of the more intelligent species of quadrupeds. There is a wonderful pliancy which seems to prevail in the mind of Mr. Heriot. The really authentic papers published by France, some time ago, against this country, he never could be brought to acknowledge as such, though they were published in Buonaparté's official gazette; whereas he now discovers all the marks of authenticity in a paper, which, we dare say, has reached him through the two-penny post, and which, without the least investigation or reflection, he believes in good earnest, or affects to believe, has actually been purloined from the escrutoire of Talleyrand or Buonaparté! But, whatever motive may have led to the publication in question, we

cannot but regard it as a most foolish act, to speak of it in the mildest terms. No cause was ever assisted by base and dishonourable means, and of such means, the basest and most dishonourable, is, the employing of fabricated letters, a device totally unworthy of any one above a courtizan or a stock-jobber.

GARBLED STATE PAPER. If, then, it be unjustifiable in a mere news-printer to publish a fabricated paper, what epithet shall we affix to similar conduct in the officers of government, in ministers of state? The French government has accused the British ministry, in the face of the world, of garbling one of the official notes, presented by Lord Whitworth to Talleyrand, and, by the means of such garbling, of exhibiting a misrepresentation to the parliament and the country, as well as to foreign courts and nations. Much as we dislike the ministers, great as our resentment against them must be, on account of the injury and disgrace they have brought upon us, in common with the rest of His Majesty's subjects, we should, for the honour of our country, gladly exert whatever power we may possess to remove this infamous imputation; but, upon a careful examination of the papers, a regard for truth and for the reputation of our work compels us to confess, that, at present, we think there are strong reasons to fear, that, by some means or other, a very material part of the note alluded to, has been suppressed, in that copy of the papers which has been presented to the Parliament. The whole note is in these words, the suppressed part of which is designated by *Italics*. — "The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the French Republic, having transmitted to his Court the proposal which was made to him by the minister for foreign affairs on the 4th instant, *and that proposition having been judged impracticable in consequence of the refusal of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to listen to it, and as falling, at the same time, short of the just pretensions of His Majesty*, (1) has just received orders to transmit to his excellency the accompanying project of a convention, founded on the only basis which His Majesty conceives, under the existing circumstances, to be susceptible of a definitive and amicable arrangement. The minister for foreign affairs will not fail to observe to what degree His Majesty has endeavoured to conciliate the security of his interests with the dignity of the First Consul. The undersigned flatters himself, that the First Consul, doing justice to these sentiments, will adopt in concert with His Majesty an expedient so suitable for restoring permanent tranquillity to both nations, and to all Europe.—The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, to renew to his excellency the assurance of his highest consideration."—The passage, in Italics, which, as we have already observed, is not to be found in that copy of this note which was laid before the House of Commons, is very material indeed in forming an opinion of the real views of the negotiating parties; especially when considered in conjunction with the subsequent note of Talleyrand, which was dated on the 12th of May, and which will be found in page 856 of the supplementary sheet, attached to the one on which we are now writing. The principal ostensible object of the negotiation was, on our part, to render Malta *perfectly independent of France*. The proposition, which Talleyrand had made, on the 4th of May, for the purpose of effecting this object, was rejected by the British government; and, according to the above note of Lord Whitworth, one of the reasons why it was rejected, was, that it was judged impracticable, and it was judged impracticable, "*in consequence of the refusal of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to accede to it.*" This refusal was, then, alleged, by our ministers, to be the obstacle to the *practicability* of Talleyrand's proposition; and this obstacle Talleyrand says, in his note of the 12th of May (which we beg the reader to peruse), does not exist, it having been removed *by the assurances just then given by the Emperor of Russia, through his ambassador at Paris*. The suppressed passage, therefore, must be considered as very material indeed, if to obtain for Malta real independence of France was the principal object, or a considerable object, of the negotiation. For our parts, we believe the war absolutely necessary for the preservation of our liberties and our lives, unless the evils of the treaty of Amiens could have been cured, unless the relative situation of England and France could have been totally changed, by negotiation; but, this is not the ground, on which the ministers have proceeded, and on which they now stand: Malta, the keeping of Malta out of the hands, and from under the influence, of France; this is the pivot on which the whole of their negotiation has turned; their objection to surrender that island has been the want of the guarantee of Russia, and, till towards the close of the

(1) The words, in the Moniteur, are as follows:—"et cette proposition ayant été jugée impraticable, par le refus de S. M. l'empereur de Russie de s'y prêter, et, en même temps, au-dessous des justes prétensions de Sa Majesté."....

negotiation, it was their *only* objection. To remove this objection, Talleyrand makes, on the 4th of May, a proposition in the following words: "The First Consul is ready "to consent, that the island of Malta shall "be placed in the hands of one of the three "powers who have guaranteed its inde- "pendence, either Austria, Russia, or Prus- "sia, with a proviso, that, as soon as France "and England shall have come to an agree- "ment upon this article, they shall unite "in their requisitions to engage other pow- "ers, either contracting or acceding to the "treaty of Amiens, to consent to it."—To this proposition Lord Hawkesbury, in a letter to Lord Whitworth of the 7th of May, that, "if His Majesty could be dis- "posed to waive his demand for a tempo- "rary occupation of the island of Malta, "the Emperor of Russia would be the only "sovereign, to whom, in the present state "of Europe, he could consent that the "island should be assigned; and His Ma- "jes has certain and authentic information, "*that the Emperor of Russia would, on no account,* "*consent to garrison Malta.*"—Agreeably to this Lord Whitworth, on the 10th of May, delivered, to Talleyrand, the note which the French accuse our ministers of having garbled, in which note, according to the ministerial edition, his lordship makes not even an allusion to Russia, whereas, according to the French edition, he places at the very head of his objections *the refusal of Russia to accede to the proposition*, and in answer to this objection, Talleyrand's note of the 12th of May, (which was *kept back from the Parliament 'till after the debate on the papers)*, states, that assurances are just received at Paris *that Russia no longer persists in such refusal.* —What, then, are we to think of ministers leaving out of Lord Whitworth's note the passage relative to Russia, and of their keeping back, *'till after the debate*, Talleyrand's note of the 12th of May? If the fact does so appear; if the fact be so established, what are we to think of them, and what will the world think and say of our government and of our country? And, that such is the fact admits of very little doubt: indeed, it is evident from the papers themselves.—The True Briton and the Sun, which have lately published a gross fabrication, as being an authentic memorial of Talleyrand to Buonaparté, have the modesty to assert, that Talleyrand has fabricated the passage of Lord Whitworth's note, said to have been suppressed by the ministers. Talleyrand is very capable of a trick of this sort, if it could be played off with any hope of success; but, we do not rely upon the assertions of the honest Talleyrand; we take the internal evidence furnished by the papers laid before Parliament, and by those papers the shameful fact is completely established.—In the first place, the passage of Lord Whitworth's note, which we have given in *italics*, is not to be found in that note as laid before Parliament. This cannot be attributed to a *mistake* of the clerks, or the printers, because, unfortunately for the ministers, the French as well as the English, of this note, is inserted in the papers; and, no one will ever believe, that either clerks or printers, happened to omit, by mistake, exactly the same words in both French and English. That the note, in the parliamentary papers is such as the ministers intended it to be, is certain; and, that it is not such as it was delivered to Talleyrand appears, 1. from the statement of the French government, who must possess the original, and who, for their own sakes, would not have made an assertion so unequivocal, if they knew that Lord Whitworth had the power to contradict it. 2. Talleyrand in his note of the 12th, in reply to Lord Whitworth's of the 10th (which is the note in question) says; "moreover, the *assertion contained in his Ex-* "*cellency's note of the 20th of this month*" (that is of Floreal, answering to the 10th of May), is expressed in the following terms: *by the refusal* "*of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia* "*to listen to it:*" but, in looking into Lord Whitworth's note of the tenth of May, as that note was presented to Parliament, we find no such assertion; and, if it had *not* been in the original note delivered to Talleyrand, Talleyrand could not have thus commented on it, which he did, observe, on the 12th of May, long before the papers were published in England, and while Lord Whitworth was yet at Paris. 3. Lord Whitworth, in his letter to Lord Hawkesbury of the 12th of May, describing the note which he delivered to Talleyrand on the 10th, says, that in this note, he stated, that, the proposition of the 4th "was considered "as on the one hand impracticable *from* "*the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to take* "*charge of Malta*, &c. &c." whereas, as we before observed, and as our readers will have seen, there is not, in this note, as presented to Parliament, even an allusion relative to Russia. Thus we have Lord Whitworth's own evidence as to the garbling of his note.—But, the French accuse our ministers of having suppressed *entirely* Talleyrand's note of the 12th of May, which was an answer to the garbled note; and, the London news-papers, with an unanimity and zeal worthy of a better cause, insist that the accusation is false, and invented for the purpose of vilifying this country. Softly, good gentlemen! You

say, the accusation *is false*, because Talleyrand's note of the 12th *was* laid before Parliament; but, *when* was it laid before Parliament? Not along with the other papers relative to the negotiation, but six days later, to wit, on the *24th of May*, which, as it happens, is the very day, on which the French published their accusation. Therefore, their accusation was not false; for they could not know, on the 24th of May, that the note had, on that day, been presented to Parliament. Besides, good, honest, steady gentlemen, pray tell us *why* this note was not presented amongst the *first* parcel of papers. Was it of too late a date? Did it arive later than some of the others? No; for we find amongst the first papers that were presented, a note from Lord Whitworth to Talleyrand, *dated on the very same day that the note of Talleyrand was dated.* Lord Whitworth takes care to send forward this his note, by which he demanded his pasports, and which was the last, *the very last paper, that was written at Paris;* but, the important note of Talleyrand, which he had *previously* received, *he keeps in his pocket 'till he comes home, and then encloses it to Lord Hawkesbury in a letter, dated at London on the 20th of May!!!* Still, however, there was time to present it to Parliament previous to the debate on the papers, which was on the 23d of May; but it was not so presented, *'till after that debate was over;* for the presentation is *dated* on the 24th, and it was not actually slipped upon the table 'till some days later.—Thus is the charge, preferred by the French government, incontestibly established. How will the ministers, how can they do away this charge? Yet, if it be not done away, and effectually too, what nation will ever again place reliance on British faith? If one paper can be garbled by ministers, so may another paper; and, as far as relates to that part of the correspondence which is represented as having taken place between themselves and their agents, what reason have we to suppose, that *the whole* of it has not been new-moddled to suit "existing circumstances," or rather, have we not good reason to suppose that it has? For our own parts, if this matter be not satisfactorily cleared up, we shall not think ourselves bound to regard, as an admitted fact, any thing that they state, though accompanied with the most solemn asseverations; for, what can be more solemn, than a statement made to the legislature in the name of His Majesty?——Lord Whitworth, too, appears to be strangely implicated in this charge. As to the garbled note, he will, doubtless, easily prove, that he sent home a true copy of what he presented to Talleyrand; but, it does appear, at present, that the Note which he received from Talleyrand on the 12th of May, was not sent forward to government along with a Note, which he wrote *subsequent* to the receipt of Talleyrand's, and which subsequent Note was presented to Parliament amongst the papers first presented. Why was not this Note of Talleyrand's forwarded? Why was it kept back by his lordship till the 20th of May, till he himself arrived in London? Why was it not sent along with the Note which he wrote from Paris *after* the receipt of it, and which Note was sent time enough to find a place amongst the first papers? These are questions, which it behoves your lordship to answer without delay; the country has a right to demand this answer at his hands; and, if he withholds it, the conclusion will be by no means difficult to draw.

THE ARREST OF ENGLISH PEOPLE IN FRANCE seems to have excited a good deal of public indignation, in which we should most amply participate, if we did not recollect, that that same public applauded the infamous peace, which emboldened Buonaparté thus to trample on the public law of Europe. With regard to the illegality, therefore, the injustice and the cruelty, of this act, we can have very little to say. Let those complain, who wished and who expected to live in peace with Buonaparté; we had no such expectation, nor had we any such wish. Let those who hastened to crouch at the feet of the rebel and usurper, take the reward of their baseness; we are totally indifferent to their fate, and we should, most assuredly, object to their being exchanged against prisoners of war, prisoners captured at the expense of the nation, and at the risk of the lives of His Majesty's soldiers and sailors; no, these people have no such claim on their country, which, as far as their interest and convenience would permit them, they had abandoned, carrying with them their treasure and whatever further degree of support might be derived from their presence, their countenance, and their abilities. What! shall these base rich men, after having deserted their country, after having given the preference to France, after having carried away and squandered on our enemy the money raised by the labour of the husbandman, the artizan, and the manufacturer; shall they now, in the hour of their distress, call for the lives of those whom they have abandoned and insulted to be risked for their deliverance? They may call, but, we trust, they will call in vain. Let them *purchase* their ransom out of their own private property. The nation ought not to be taxed a penny for their release; and the minister who should pro-

pose to release them by such means, would, we trust, suffer the punishment due to so shameful and criminal an act.—We remember well, that, when *in profound peace*, Captain D'Auvergne was arrested, not a word of complaint was made by the public. The act was even justified in several of the public papers; or, it was, at least, so varnished over, so qualified, and apologized for, that it was made to appear to be a matter beneath the notice of government. "We, too, have an "alien act," said Lord Castlereagh! "It "is," said Lord Hawkesbury, "a mere mat-"ter of police!" Captain d'Auvergne went to France on very important business; he was a valuable officer in the King's service; no effort was made to obtain redress; none was obtained; and the *prudence* of ministers was applauded. And, shall our purses and our persons now be pressed into the service of the admiring crowd, who have been to pay their court to Buonaparté?—Nor can the particular case of Mr. Talbot be looked upon as an exception. The news-papers have called his imprisonment a violation of *the rights of Embassy*, forgetting, that, if they should make out this point, they will most assuredly establish the assertion of Buonaparté, who contends, that we have captured his people *previous to any declaration of war*. We say, and we say with truth, that the putting an end to the embassy at Paris, under the circumstances then existing, was, to all intents and purposes, a declaration of war; but, it would not be very consistent or very decent to complain of a violation of the rights of an embassy, the very putting an end to which we hold to be our justification for exercising the rights of war. Either, therefore, we must acknowledge Buonaparté's seizing of the Gallico-English to be founded on the established law of retaliation, or we must refrain from preferring against him the charge of violating the rights of embassy; either *all* the detained persons, except Mr. Talbot, are justly detained, or he is upon exactly the same footing with the rest. We know not, for our parts, what could induce Mr. Talbot to remain at Paris after the demise of the embassy; unless, like the spirit of a departed epicurean, he was still attracted to the scenes of his former enjoyment; and, if so, his detention can scarcely be regarded as a hardship.

The mediation of Russia, as moved for by Mr. Fox, and seconded by Mr. Pitt, on that happy, happy, happy day, the 27th ultimo, may very probably be obtained; for, it really appears, that the Emperor Alexander is fitting out a considerable *fleet of men of war*.—Read Swenska's Sketches!—But, how foolish, how ridiculously foolish will this nation look, in a few month's time, if it expects any thing from this mediation, except the further humiliation of England. Buonaparté and Alexander understand each other perfectly well; and, we may be assured, that if Russia has prepared a fleet, it is only *to give efficacy to that admirable convention*, which was Lord Hawkesbury's *coup d'essai* in the diplomatic career, and by which we virtually gave up one of the most important maritime rights that we ever possessed. Russia must, too, be excellently disposed to mediate a peace advantageous for us after the trick which our ministers have played, in order to prevent her from setting foot in Malta, a post which, above all others in the world she was desirous to occupy, and which the Consul artfully proposed to give her possession of. This must most sweetly dispose her for acts of amity towards us! Yet, there are not wanting politicians to entertain very sanguine hopes from this mediation, notwithstanding it is evidently the policy, as it is, indeed, the interest of Russia (if gratifying her ambition be interest) to side with France against England, and to lower the maritime power and pride of the latter by every possible means, particularly while she holds Malta, the very place to obtain which in perpetuity we are asking, begging, beseeching this monstrous mediation! It is a maxim, and long has been a maxim with the Richmond Park Ministry, that "no good was to be expected from Russia, "*while* Count Markoff *remained in* "*Paris*." The Count is still at Paris; and, what is more, he is to be the channel of the mediation, if the ridiculous proposition should really be acted upon.—Mr. Fox must have made the motion, to which we have alluded, without any hope of its being adopted. What, then, must have been his surprize to see all his notions as well as his mischievous motion, adopted by Mr. Pitt? We were surprized to see Mr. Windham and Mr. Grenville silent on this occasion. Approve of the motion they could not, we are certain; and, though it was not put to the vote, though that was prevented by the ministers *promising to adopt the measure which it recommended*, still, we think, that Mr. Windham should have taken an opportunity of giving to the whole proceeding some strong mark of his disapprobation. All the sound part of the nation look to him, at this momentous crisis, for the reasons whereon to form their opinions, both of men and of measures. Since the signing of the fatal preliminaries, since the sun of England sunk beneath the genius of France, since our political horizon has been enveloped in darkness, and the vessel of state committed to an ignorant, a low-minded and

cowardly crew, he has been our polar star, shining while other lights hid their head, always in his place and always luminous; constantly forewarning us of our dangers, and constantly pointing to the cause of safety and of honour. From him, therefore, on every important occasion, we must naturally wish to hear something; and, particularly when, by, his keeping silence, a destructive measure may go forth with the appearance of having his consent.

CHANGE IN THE MINISTRY.—Mr. Tierney; we beg his pardon, "the *Right Ho-* "*nourable* Mr. Tierney" (we do not know his Christian name); the famous Mr. Tierney, who so long made a conspicuous figure in the poems and caricatures of the friends of Mr. Pitt, has, after a long and arduous struggle, made a safe lodgment upon the ministerial bench, in character of Treasurer of the Navy, a place of four thousand a year. Mr. Bragge, the predecessor of Mr. Tierney, is, it seems to be Chancellor of the duchy of Lancaster, in place of Lord Liverpool, who with a disinterestedness and patriotism peculiar to well-meaning men and "*safe* politicians," has thus, at the age of four-score, given up four thousand out of about seven thousand a year, which he has enjoyed from before the far greater part of us were born, and which he now partly relinquishes with the hope of keeping together an administration, on the existence of which depend upwards of thirty thousand a year, received by his son and other of his relations. It is, we suppose, in emulation of this venerable and noble "col-" lector of the customs inwards," that Mr. Bragge has yielded a place of four thousand a year, held during pleasure, for a place of the same value, held during life.—It is said, that further changes are to take place; and, if such can take place, without any diminution of the emoluments of the The Family, we should think they would; for some sort of change is absolutely necessary to keep even the meanest of the people quiet.—Mr. Tierney is said to have been admitted for the sake of his talents in finance; and, if public rumour does not deceive us, he has conceived some plan, which he imagines will, in future, *render loans unnecessary*. On the first point we must observe, that the fact, if true, seems to contradict that high opinion, which the wiseacres had formed of Mr. Addington's financial abilities. With respect to the second point, we are rather inclined to doubt the fact; but, if it be true, if Mr. Tierney has conceived such a plan, and if he really does provide for the exigencies of the state, without the aid of loans, we hesitate not to pronounce him a conjuror far surpassing Dr. Val. Mr. Tierney's father was, if we mistake not, something in the treasuring and financiering way, and even for the navy, and, therefore, like his worthy, his truly worthy colleague, Lord Hawkesbury, he may, probably, possess "an "hereditary disposition to office;" but, conjuring, it is well known, does not go by descent, and, therefore, though we have no reason to suppose, that Mr. Tierney is, in any one point, inferior to his worthy ancestors, and though that ancestor should himself have been a conjuror, it does not follow, that Mr. Tierney will prove a conjuror too; and, we repeat, that nothing short of conjuring, nothing short of the down-right black art, will enable him, without loans, to carry on the war, or even to keep up the peace establishment last fixed on. The national expenditure of this present year will be about £54,000,000, and the revenue will be about £30,000,000; so that, if there be any truth in figures, there will be a deficit of about £24,000,000 to be raised by *new taxes*. That this sum never can be raised from the people Mr. Tierney must be very well assured, and therefore, he must intend to proceed by conjuration, in which it is unnecessary for us to say, that we most heartily wish him success.——But, in the expenditure of the year, we have included the charges on account of the National Debt and the Sinking Fund, which amount to about twenty-four out of the fifty-four millions; so that, if Mr. Tierney means *not to pay these charges*, or to *tax the funds*, which is nearly the same thing, he may possibly effect his object without the aid of supernatural faculties. At any rate, we hope, that, in the prosecution of his plan, he will endeavour to spare the inhabitants of the Borough, to whom, like another Mayor of Garrat, he has, for many years past, been constantly pledging his honour to bring about an alleviation of their burdens.—— Farcical, however, as all this is in the eyes of other people, Mr. Tierney's promotion can be no farce with Mr. Pitt, towards whom that promotion is, on the part of Mr. Addington, a guage of defiance, if not a stupid mark of contempt, and, on the part of Mr. Tierney, a signal of triumph. This is the man, and the only man, who, for several years past, has set himself, foot to foot, against Mr. Pitt; who has constantly opposed his principles, his measures, and his system, particularly his favourite system of finance, that great foundation of his fame, that pedestal without the durability of which his statue must sink into the earth. Disguise the thing, therefore, in whatever manner he pleases, Mr. Pitt must feel, that he has, at last, been over-reached, out-witted, and

defeated; for, it is absolutely impossible, that he should not be cut to the very soul at seeing Mr. Tierney the dictator on that Bench, from which he so long looked down on Mr. Tierney with contempt. Mr. Pitt *must* entertain these feelings, and the attempt to hide them, by giving the ministers his support, will only discover a conscious weakness, a conscious inability to oppose them with success. He perceives clearly enough the defection of his former adherents, who are daily becoming less and less numerous, less and less warm, and who, though they still profess their admiration of his character and talents, will give their support to his enemy, in which support, to avoid the mortification of being left in a minority, and of seeing his fall recorded by a vote of that Parliament, over which he so long has ruled, he himself will join. Those persons, who, having nothing within themselves whereby to obtain a name or attract notice, still endeavour to get rid of their insignificance by calling themselves Pittites, affect to live in hopes, and perhaps really do live in hopes, of seeing their leader restored to his former power and splendor. This is possible; but, nothing that we find in history, nothing that we can collect from the circumstances of the present times, authorizes us to regard it as probable. Public opinion is a stream, which, if it once changes a long continued course, seldom or never returns to its ancient bed. Had Mr. Pitt, when he retired from his Majesty's service, left his place to be supplied without any interference of his own; had he regularly continued his attendance in Parliament, speaking and voting merely as a member of that body, supporting those measures that were good, and opposing those that were bad; had he left the war to be continued, or the peace to be made, by the ministers themselves; and, had he, when the peace of Amiens came to be discussed, given it that mark of reprobation, which it has been found to merit; had this been his line of conduct, his return to power would, at this day, have been the undivided wish of the nation, who would have looked to him as an immoveable rock of defence. But, he, unhappily for his country and for his own fame, chose a course entirely different. The new cabinet was moulded up by his assistance, and with every appearance of wishing to retain his power after he had yielded his place, not unaccompanied with some marks of having retired himself for the purpose of getting rid of his colleagues, and with a view of returning to exercise absolute sway amongst others of his own creation. The moment, too, that he ceased to be minister, he seemed to have forgotten that he was a member of parliament; and, as if it were beneath him to be any thing less than the ruler of the nation, he imitated the example of secession which had been given him by his rival orator. In the mean time, however, by whispers and nods, his followers were instructed to support the ministers, lest they should sink under their opponents, lest a breach should be made, and lest the cabinet should fall into the hands of others whom he hated, or, which was nearly the same thing, over whom he could not hope to have an absolute controul. From this motive it was, that he supported the Preliminary and Definitive Treaties; for, it is utterly incredible that he should not have seen their destructive tendency; and, having supported them, having pledged himself to that support in the most unequivocal manner, he could not now avail himself of that opposition, which might yet have restored him to power. Therefore, it is that we see his simple followers, fed by vain hopes of a future opportunity, lending their aid to preserve his consistency and to disguise his mortification. His friends, indeed, do say that he means to join in the vote of censure, this night (Friday, 3d of June,) to be brought forward. We shall rejoice to see this assertion verified, and we are sorry, that the nature of our publication does not permit us to wait the event, before this sheet is put to the press; but, these are our opinions, and though we shall be glad to see cause for retracting them, we regard it as a duty to submit them to our readers.—In the mean time, the proceedings in the House of Lords strongly corroborate all that we have said. On the 2d instant, Earl Fitzwilliam brought forward *certain resolutions*, disapproving of the conduct of ministers, on which the *previous question* was moved by Lord Grosvenor, after which the middle course of *adjournment* was moved by Lord Mulgrave and supported by Lord Melville; and, the result was, that the adjournment was *negatived*, 100 to 18, the previous question was *carried*, 110 to 15, and the resolutions negatived without a division; so that, in approbation of their conduct, the ministers had a majority of 95 out of 125.

POSTSCRIPT, *Friday noon.*

We have just heard that MR. SUETT, of Drury Lane Theatre, is about to be appointed Secretary at War!!!!!

TO THE PUBLIC.

At this time when the eyes of all the civilized world are directed to Egypt and Malta, the possession and retention of which countries by France and England have produced such important effects, and been attended with so considerable an expense of blood and treasure, when Great-Britain has become so interested in their fate as to engage exclusively on their account in a war with France, after the short interval of a few months of peace; it will not be considered as ill-timed or uninteresting by an intelligent Public to inquire more minutely than has been done heretofore, into the very extraordinary circumstance of their being allowed to fall a prey to our enemy, at a time when our navy had attained a height of improvement and pre-eminence in strength and skill unexampled in our history, and when the marine of our enemies was sunk to the lowest ebb of insignificance approaching annihilation.

The importance to this country of the occupation of these places by the French, was as well understood by us at the time the expedition was preparing for Egypt at Toulon, as it is at this moment; yet strange and unaccountable to relate, the French were knowingly and uninterruptedly permitted to collect their force for this enterprize eight or ten months previous to its sailing, and to draw vessels, troops, and stores with the same security as if in time of peace, from every port in the Mediterranean, without which foreign aid nothing of importance could have been undertaken from that port.

Before we proceed to examine the past conduct of the Marine Minister in this singular and eventful business, let us take a view of the force under Lord St. Vincent, who then commanded on the Mediterranean station, and of the means his lordship possessed to counteract and defeat the designs of the enemy, whose force and position may be also described.

From the latter end of the year 1797, when the French began to collect a force at Toulon, until the latter end of May, when their expedition sailed for Malta, our Mediterranean fleet consisted of about 24 sail of the line, (of which none carried less than 74 guns) some ships of 50 and 44 guns on two decks, with a very large proportion of frigates and smaller vessels; and during a portion of this time, Lord St. Vincent had at his disposal, a squadron of five or six Portuguese ships of the line, with some frigates of that nation. The only two very material objects for his lordship's attention within the limits of his command, were the Spanish fleet in Cadiz, and the French force collecting at Toulon; the former consisted of 20 or 21 sail of the line in some sort of preparation for sea, but with few men on board, (part of the fleet of 27 sail of the line his lordship had beaten off Cape St. Vincent with his squadron of 14 sail) together with seven or eight others unrigged, or in a state of ordinary, and several frigates. The latter varied from three or four ill provided ships of the line with two or three frigates of the first, until it was augmented in the end to 12 or 13 ships of the line and four or five frigates with near 400 transports. The Spanish fleet, which had been most insultingly and effectually blockaded in Cadiz during a great part of this time by eight or nine sail of the British line, were known to be in a miserable state of unfitness for active service; and officers and men but very little zealous in the cause they appeared compelled to support; and it was clear the French force at Toulon could only attach a degree of strength and importance, and early arrive at a fitness for service, by being totally unmolested and left at full *liberty* to receive external supplies.

The disposition during this time of Lord St. Vincent's fleet was in general as follows; about half the ships of the line, sometimes more, with a very small proportion of frigates and other vessels were stationed off Cadiz; two ships of the line were kept almost constantly cruizing off Cape St. Vincent, and, at the same time, two others were sent off Madeira to look for prizes; of the remainder of the ships of the line, some of them at Gibraltar, others at the Tagus; some of the frigates were kept off Cape Finisterre, others off Corunna, and some along the Coast of Portugal. No part of the fleet was stationed to the eastward of Gibraltar, except a fifty gun ship with a frigate, and one or two sloops, which had latterly been sent up the Mediterranean, but not particularly to cruize off the Port of Toulon. Insignificant as this last mentioned little squadron was, had it been exclusively employed, *at an early period*, to interrupt the communication with Toulon, it might have been of material service; but it was kept cruizing for other purposes, in the Mediterranean generally, and returned to Gibraltar about a fortnight before the sailing of the Toulon fleet; the moment of all others, when it ought to have been left there, if only to lay on the skirts of the convoy to ascertain its route. Instead of this disposition, had the four or five ships of the line generally employed to look after

prizes, been detached with a fifty gun ship and three or four frigates, about two or three months before the sailing of the enemy from Toulon, with orders to retard the equipment of the expedition forming in that port by every possible means, such as intercepting their supplies, &c. the sailing of the expedition must have been considerably delayed, and certainly until a junction might have been formed between this squadron and a reinforcement of seven or eight sail of the line sent from England, which reached Toulon about ten days or a fortnight after the sailing of the French fleet; when its departure must have been effectually put a stop to.

That Lord St. Vincent seems in duty bound to have done this at least, must, I conceive, appear evident to every one acquainted with the strength of the fleet at his lordship's disposal; with the wretched state of the Spanish ships in Cadiz; and with the serious consequences that might attend the successful issue of the French enterprize.

That his lordship might have done more, that he might have detached from his fleet a force sufficient to have stopped the French expedition had it been encountered in *full* force, and yet left ships enough off Cadiz to keep the Spaniard in check, I could venture to assert and prove. Ten sail of the line of *British* ships only were frequently absent at one time from the blockade of Cadiz, even when Lord St. Vincent commanded it in person; though never of so material a service as this would have been, which indeed, it might be said, had become the first object for his lordship's attention.

Had his lordship, however, done what is mentioned in the first instance, neither Malta nor Egypt would ever have been in the possession of the French!!!

What an expense of blood and treasure would the adoption of either of these measures have saved! What a difference in the actual state of this country might they have produced!—Why neither of them were resorted to, why the French were entirely left to themselves until too late to be interrupted effectually, remains to be explained, as certainly it ought, and that without delay.

It will not be pretended, after what has been already said, that four or five sail of the British line with a fifty and frigates was too small a force to be risked off Toulon; nor will it be said, that our not having a port in the Mediterranean was a sufficient reason for our not sending ships there. Lord Nelson, who had just joined Lord St. Vincent with one ship of the line, was detached with only three, a fifty gun ship and about four smaller vessels on that service, (though too late) when the enemy were known to be in their *greatest force*. His lordship's ship was dismantled; he got shelter to repair in Sardinia, and in Sicily he procured water and provisions. In the worst case, they might have had supplies sent them from Gibraltar.

Neither will it be held by professional men, that an English squadron of ten or eleven sail of the line would have been unequal at that period, to stop the progress of twelve or thirteen defective French line of battle ships, ill manned and equipped, crowded with troops, and charged with a convoy of near 400 sail of ill provided vessels, some of them with hardly a second sail to bend. Indeed the recent achievement of Sir James Saumarez in the Gut of Gibraltar is fresh in the memory of every one.

With respect to the part which the board of Admiralty had in this transaction, it certainly might have sent a reinforcement to Lord St. Vincent at an earlier period than it did, considering the importance of certainly and effectually counteracting the designs of the enemy in the Mediterranean. The defeat of the Dutch fleet, and the capture of several of their large ships by Lord Duncan in the preceding October, had considerably increased our disposeable force, and many ships of the line were suffered to remain uncommissioned in our ports, which might have been added to our fleet in the Mediterranean.

Of such importance was it to foil this last and greatest of the French expeditions during the late war; so long in preparing, so formidable in its nature, and so apparently vast in its design, that no effort should have been left untried by the minister or his admiral to effect it.

Our letting the French escape on their expedition to Bantry Bay, and from Brest to the Mediterranean and back again, were bad samples of our naval exertion; but the allowing Buonaparté with his immense and ill appointed armada, to reach Egypt without interruption, after capturing the hitherto considered impregnable fortress of La Valetta and the Island of Malta, in defiance of our navy, then omnipotent, was worse than all; nothing, in short, appeared wanting to crown the triumph of the French and to complete the disgrace of our then omnipotent navy or rather of its rulers, but the safe return of the French fleet to Toulon; a circumstance, which had Admiral Bruix been allowed to act as he proposed, would cer-

tainly have taken place about the time Lord Nelson reached the coast of Egypt the second time.

THE NAVY.

SIR,—I cannot suffer the *miserable* attempt which was yesterday made to justify the proceedings of the Board of Admiralty by that *hireling* and contemptible *time-serving* paper called the "*Times*," to go abroad to the public without making some observations thereon.—I shall therefore, state my ideas in support of your correspondent L. M., and I most solemnly declare, that I will not advance one observation that I could not justify before any tribunal whatever.—Sir, in the first place, the *sapient* partizans of the present Admiralty attach the *credit* to Earl Spencer for his recommendation with regard to the arrangement of shipwrights' apprentices; although I cannot entirely approve of his plan, still I condemn ten times, nay, an hundred times more, the mode which our present *wise rulers* have adopted. Sir, their plan (as was observed in your Register on Saturday last) is pregnant with the most destructive consequences, it is considered by every person, from the highest to the lowest of the trade, as an extremely unwise measure, a measure which if pursued, will ultimately ruin a profession, upon the prosperity of which, our very existence as a nation depends. Even those very men to whom servants have been given, so far from being grateful, for that which the Admiralty conceive an *encouragement* and *reward* for *past services*, are (I have every reason to believe) equally dissatisfied. —The boys that are now brought into the service are of the lowest education, or more properly speaking of no education at all, and therefore, cannot possibly, nor will they ever have an idea beyond the laborious part. The instructors of them (for by that appellation the people are known who receive *two-thirds* of their wages) have likewise lost all *their* zeal to teach them the common duties of their trade, and it now appears a matter of perfect indifference to both, the one whether he shall take any trouble to instruct, and the other to learn. And, now Sir, let us enquire who were the *wise* projectors of such a *wise* plan. It certainly could not have originated with the surveyors of the navy, that is impossible! for they have not been more than *forty or fifty* years in the service, and therefore *they cannot* be supposed capable of giving an opinion after so *little* experience!!! No Sir, it first occurred to men who have been to sea nearly the whole of their lives, (and who by the bye have evinced, in many instances, a very contracted idea of the duties of the civil department,) I mean the *triumvirate* at the Admiralty, and the *sagacious* Mr. *Commissioner* Tucker: these are the men who possess such *wonderful* knowledge, and who are so capable of *benefitting* the country, by revolutionizing the civil department of the navy: these are the men who are so *immaculate* as to be above all advice!! And therefore the surveyors were put on the shelf, as mere non-entities. And in order to save the nation a few pounds a year by putting a stop to the *frauds* (as they are pleased to express themselves, and which are magnified to an extent beyond any thing that ever existed,) they will strike the very vitals of a profession of the utmost importance.—It is likewise with confidence asserted, by the tools of Lord St. Vincent, that the Dock Yards are full of stores, and further state, that had there been any wants, it must have been the fault of the Navy Board, and not the Admiralty, as the keeping up the compliment of stores particularly relate to them.

A most *impudent* falsehood, for I positively affirm, that with regard to the article of timber the utmost scarcity prevails, excepting in Chatham yard, where I believe there is more timber than in all the other yards put together. So far from any blame being attached to the Navy Board, I am persuaded that had they have been left to themselves, the many, very many grievances now complained of would never have existed. But Sir, the Navy Board have long since lost *their* authority, in the opinion of the Admiralty they are now mere cyphers, and into such a degraded state have they fallen, that they dare not venture to give an order however trivial, without consulting their *unrelenting* superiors; and if they should presume to offer their advice, it is ten to one but that they are *insulted*. So much for the Navy Board, a board that was once considered of the first importance, a board whom former Admiralties have *deigned* to consult: and Sir, it is with pain I must state my belief, that if the present Admiralty retain their situation, they will continue to fall, till at last the name of the Navy Board will no longer be known. Unless it should happen that either *Sir Thomas Troubridge* or *Captain Markham* should succeed to the comptrollership, then what a mighty change will take place, then will they once more shine forth in all their splendour, then will they regain their wonted consequence.——With regard to the ship carpenters being employed in the Dock yards, I am thoroughly persuaded that no consideration would have induced the Admiralty to have resorted to *their* services,

had they not have been absolutely wanted in consequence of the deficiency of shipwrights; and therefore they wisely make a *merit* of *necessity*.—It is said, that not a shipwright who was capable of working was discharged at the visitation of the Admiralty, this Sir, I believe is very true, for the yards in general were then likewise very considerably short of the intended *peace* establishment, the discharges which your correspondent alludes to, were those which took place in May 1801, as observed in page 120 in the 5th No of the 3d Volume of your Register.—But Sir, the circumstance of the *Victory* seems to be their rallying point, on her it appears they have placed all their hopes of refutation, and in the delirium of their joy, they call you a *base calumniator*, and an *utterer of falsehoods*, and in order to make your assertion appear more glaring they further assure the public that *no exertion* was made use of beyond *what* was given to other ships. Never was there a more infamous falsehood advanced, for I have every reason to suppose, (and I solemnly declare my firm conviction of the truth of my information,) that the Victory had every preference which could possibly be given to her, that the most pressing orders were sent to hasten her equipment, and can there be a stronger proof of it, than their keeping ships in commission an unusual length of time in order that their crews might be employed on board her, and likewise, from their taking the *pensioners* from the *blocks* and *hulks*, as observed by your correspondent L. M.; could they Sir, evince a more striking proof of their anxiety to get her to sea? Most indubitably not. But notwithstanding all their exertions she would still have been in Long Reach, had she not have been nearly manned, owing to an unforeseen *accident*, (unforeseen by our present *wise* rulers at the Admiralty,) by her receiving the crew of the *Utrecht* of 64 guns, one of the ships fitted *since* the King's message of the 8th March, and since *unfitted* for sea by a gale of wind, in consequence of the defective state in which she was sent out, to fulfil the boasted vaunt of our *well informed* minister; who "*would rather risk* "*the imputation of having uttered unguarded* "*language than have any improper insinuation*, "*thrown out against the present board of* "*Admiralty!!!*"——And now Sir, having taken a view of every part that was advanced by those *zealous partizans* of the *illustrious triumvirate* at the Admiralty, I will only ask them their reasons why, when they took up their pens, they did not attempt to refute the assertions that were adduced by your correspondent; I allude to those which relate to the men being obliged to sleep night after night on the decks without *beds* and *blankets*, although the Dock Yards, (as they are *pleased* to say,) are *full* of stores of every description; and to the circumstance of the strange contradictory proceedings with regard to the Unicorn frigate, and to their rescinding their own *well digested* orders? No, Sir, they wisely thought that the least said on those subjects the better, and therefore they prudently remained silent.—Nor did they advance ever one solitary assertion in support of the arguments of their *friend* and *patron*, Captain Markham, who within the walls of St. Stephen's Chapel proclaimed the French navy, *fishing boats*, and who *modestly* attributed the force we have now abroad, to the *prudent* and extremely *wise* exertions of himself and *colleagues*.—I will conclude by advising those *base hirelings*, who dare to call your publication a *catalogue of lies*, to be in future less forward in their fulsome panegyrics, and never again attempt to vindicate the conduct of a set of men, whose measures have been and will continue to be *unwise* and *inconsistent* in the extreme; for in their attempt to justify, they only expose, and, by every effort to extricate themselves, only get deeper and deeper in the mire.——Yours, &c.
7th May, 1803. VERITAS.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

DECLARATION *of France, relative to the rupture with England, addressed to Lord Whitworth the day after he left Paris, and communicated by the Counseller of State to the Conservative Senate of the French Republic, as the formal Manifesto of the French Government, on the 23d Floreal, Year* 11, *that is*, 14*th of May*, 1803.

In the important and serious situations in which the two nations are involved, the undersigned Minister for the Foreign Department of the French Republic has orders to deliver to the British Government the following note:

On the 17th Ventôse (March 8), his Britannic Majesty made a communication to Parliament by a special message, that formidable armaments were preparing in the ports of France and Holland; and that important discussions, of an uncertain event, divided the two governments.

That unexpected and extraordinary declaration excited general astonishment. The maritime situation of France was open. All Europe knew that there was no formidable armament either in the ports of France or of Holland.

The undersigned need not to recall to his Excellency Lord Whitworth's remembrance what was said at that time. The source of such intelligence was inexplicable, as it was without any foundation. The personal discernment of Lord Whitworth, and the loyalty of his character, are not for a moment to be suspected.

The assertion that France was making hostile armaments was a manifest supposition, and could not deceive any person. Its natural effect was to induce an opinion that it was only the means sought after by men remarkable for their love of disturbance, and who sought with avidity a pretext for exciting trouble, and inflaming the passions of the British people, to create jealousy, hatred and alarm.

As to the English government, though it might by false reports be led into error with regard to the existence of armaments, it could not be so with regard to the existence of negotiations.

The Ambassador of the Republic at London was no sooner informed of the message of his Britannic Majesty, than astonished at hearing of negotiations of which he had not any knowledge, he went to Lord Hawkesbury, suspecting that an appeal to arms, founded upon false suppositions, might be a cover for the project of violating the Treaty of Amiens, with regard to the clauses not yet executed; and presented on the 19th Ventôse (Feb. 20), a note demanding an explanation.

At the same time, the undersigned had orders to ask of his Excellency Lord Whitworth, what motives could determine his government to use in the message two assertions, both equally false, in order to arm the nation, and break its connexion with France.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury returned on the 24th Ventôse (March 15,) a vague, aggressive, and positive note: that note, far from clearing up any point, involved the matters in discussion in greater obscurity.—It left little means of opening discussion, and still less of bringing it to a happy termination.

The answer of the French Government of the 8th Germinal (March 29,) was as moderate and pacific as that of the British Government had been hostile.

The First Consul declared, that he would not accept the warlike challenge of England: that he would avoid weighing the expressions in that hostile sense in which they might be taken; and that, in short, he would not believe that his Britannic Majesty would violate the sacredness of a treaty, on which the safety of all nations depends. That declaration, made by order of the First Consul, brought forth a new note of 17th Germinal (April 7), in which the French Government was surprised to find an indeterminate demand of satisfactions addressed to it.—The vague manner of that demand, made without motive and without object, only shewed the impropriety of its meaning.

The intention, evident from that note, was the violation of the Treaty of Amiens, by refusing to evacuate Malta. They seemed to be flattered with the hope that the French people would consent to give satisfaction, for two supposed facts, on the alleging of which they had perhaps themselves a right to demand satisfaction.

In transmitting that communication, Lord Whitworth demanded, that an arrangement should be immediately made upon the basis already explained; and he even insinuated, that in case that was not done, he was afraid he should have orders from his government very soon to leave France, and put an end to his embassy.

What could the government of the Republic answer to such rude and strange overtures? Nothing but a great love of peace could subdue indignation.

To determine upon a calm and cool decision, which might give time for reason and justice to subdue passion, it was necessary to be deeply impressed with the idea that the numerous victims of the quarrels between governments have no share in those insults which create their anger; that the thousands of brave citizens, who, through devotion to the cause of their country, shed their blood, have no desire to offend a neighbouring and powerful people; and that they have no interest in the proud and vain pretensions of supremacy. It is not only necessary to be impressed with these ideas, but to be entirely governed by them.

His Excellency, Lord Whitworth, consented to write to his Court, that the First Consul would not agree to the violation of a solemn treaty, but that he wished for peace, and that if the English government desired a convention, in order to settle the arrangements which were not included in the Treaty of Amiens, he would not object to it; and that the object of that convention would be to redress reciprocal grievances.

These intentions were moderate and just. It would have been difficult to propose a negotiation on a more liberal ground. It is not foreign to the purpose here to observe, that it was six weeks after the message in which a negotiation of a serious na-

ture had been announced: and that the ministers of the two governments had not yet been able to begin a real negotiation.

Lord Whitworth received fresh orders; he presented successively two projets of convention.

By the 1st it was proposed, that Malta should remain under the dominion of the King of England; and that clause agreed to, his Britannic Majesty offered to acknowledge all that had been done in Europe posterior to the Treaty of Amiens.

The King of England promised, besides, to take measures, so that those men, who in different parts of England laid plots against France, should be effectually suppressed.

The undersigned had the honour of observing to his Excellency, Lord Whitworth, that the first projet of convention was a palpable violation of the Treaty of Amiens, and overturned the basis of the negotiation which his Excellency had undertaken to present to his Court. That, as to the acknowledgment offered by his Majesty, there were no objects to which that could apply; that there had been no changes in Europe posterior to the Treaty of Amiens, except the organization of the Empire, to which the King of England had assented as Elector of Hanover, which was not, indeed, any more than a necessary consequence of the Treaty of Luneville, long anterior to the Treaty of Amiens.

That the events relative to the political existence of Piedmont, of the kingdom of Etruria, and of the Italian and Ligurian Republics, were previous to the Treaty of Amiens; and that in the negotiation of that treaty, France had wished England to acknowledge those three powers; but as they could neither agree upon that point, nor upon the affairs of India, with regard to the destruction of some of the leading powers, and the unexampled acquisitions of the English in that country, it remained to be considered, as they did not constitute a part of the Preliminary Articles, nor of the fundamental object of the pacification of the two States. The undersigned observed, that the French Government neither demanded acknowledgment nor approbation on the part of his Britannic Majesty.

The undersigned added, that, as to the Batavian Republic, it had been acknowledged by the King of England, as he had treated with it; and that, by the treaties existing between that country and France, the rear guard of French troops was to be withdrawn on the entire fulfilment of the Treaty of Amiens.

As to the criminal refugees in London, or in Jersey, where they gave themselves up to all those perverse practices, far from being suppressed, they were pentioned, and well treated by England; and the French Government thought, that, in the present situation of affairs, no importance should be given to that subject.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth proposed a second projet, in which England demanded, that the Civil Government of Malta being left to the Grand Master, the British garrisons should continue to occupy the fortifications of the Island. That proposition was impracticable and tiresome; and, as the first projet, it was contrary to the Treaty of Amiens, and consequently to the basis of the treaty acceded to by the First Consul; it had, besides, the insurmountable inconveniency of placing all the Knights of the Order belonging to the different powers of Europe under the authority and arbitrary government of one; it was, in fact, in itself, an insult to the honour and religion of the Order, bound by every tie to the honour and religion of all Europe.

Thus in all the progress of the negotiation, the Government of the Republic could not but see, that the English Government had only one view and one will—that of not fulfilling the Treaty of Amiens, and to preserve Malta, for the only reason that Malta suited her; and she called that acquisition a *sufficient guarantee*.

But where is the power of Europe, even were it ready to acknowledge its inferiority, which would submit to the will of another, without even a discussion of its rights, and without an appeal to the principles of justice? Where is the power which, placed as France has been during that discussion, would have submitted to conditions dictated at the commencement of the negotiation, and rather announced by the noise and menace of war, and the preparations for hostilities, than proposed as the means of bringing the two States to a reconciliation.

In a case somewhat similar to the present, a feeble nation, not feeble by want of courage, but by its extent and population, dared to brave the English power in its capital—to expose the habitation of its Kings—endanger its magazines, and the fruits of accumulated industry during 100 years of peace and economy—rather than subscribe to the unjust proposals then made to them, as they are to us to-day, under the idea of the convenience of England, and supported by a forcible argument—Brave men perished—the Danish colonies were invaded, but, however unequal was the contest, honour left that generous nation no choice of the party which it had to embrace.

In the present discussion, policy and honour speaks the same language. If the British Government has the power to conform or not to its own engagements—If it can in the treaties which it has made distinguish between the spirit and the letter—If one admits those mental restrictions as so many authorised restrictions—if the conveniencies of England are the meaning of political conventions—what will not the concessions be that it will not hope to extort successfully from the weakness of France? What will be the measure of the sacrifices and humiliation which she will undertake to impose? To-day the conveniency of England requires a guarantee against France, and she keeps Malta! Formerly the conveniency of England wanted a guarantee against France, and she destroyed Dunkirk, and an English Commissary gave laws in a country, while the colours of France hung waving in the air! To-morrow English conveniency will demand a guarantee against the progress of French industry, and a tarif will be made to stop the progress of commerce, together with our industry.

If we repair our harbours—if we construct a canal—if, by means of encouragement, we re-establish our manufactures—we shall be ordered to destroy our harbours, and demolish our moles, our canals filled up, and our manufactures ruined. They will demand the poverty of France, and that it lays down its arms in order to conform to the conveniencies of England, and afford a *sufficient guarantee* to its Government.

Whether one considers the principles, or examines the consequences, one is equally struck with the injustice and disgrace of these pretensions. It may be asked, if they were submitted to an English Jury, would it hesitate to condemn them unanimously?

The Government of the Republic has a right to be astonished, that the British Ministry could believe itself authorised to impute to it such a degree of abasement. How could they conceive that the actual Government of France would lose in stupid repose both the memory of all that it has done, and the consciousness of all its duties?

Our provinces, are they less extended, less populous? Are we no longer the same men that have sacrificed every thing for the maintenance of our just interests? And if after our success we have shewn the greatest moderation, to what other cause can that moderation be imputed, if not to the justice of our rights and the consciousness of our strength? The undersigned, in making these observations to Lord Whitworth, thinks himself entitled to point out, that the moderate conduct of the whole French Administration, during two whole months of offensive provocations, and in spite of the deep impressions it felt from them, ought to make him appreciate the true character of the French Government. Nevertheless, it is when by its profound silence upon repeated insults, the Government of the French Republic had waited in expectation of having some reparation, or at least differences terminated; when, avoiding to prejudge the final result which affairs might take, it evinced the attention and wish only of considering the means which might be proposed to conciliate and satisfy the British Government; it was then that *verbally*, and without wishing to consent to give any written declaration, his Excellency Lord Whitworth delivered, in the name and by order of his Government, on the 6th Floreal (April 26), to the undersigned the following demands:—

That England shall retain Malta for ten years;

That England shall take possession of the Island of Lampedosa;

That Holland shall be evacuated by the French troops.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth farther declared, that these propositions formed the *ultimatum* of his Court, and that upon refusal to accept them, his Excellency had orders to quit Paris in the course of seven days afterwards.

The undersigned dare say, that there is no example on record of so imperious an *ultimatum*.

What! has war no inconveniencies but to us! Is the English Minister to judge the French nation so weak, that at a moment when he agitates it by the most important deliberations, he does not think himself bound to conform, on its account, to the usages which are observed by all the Governments of civilized Europe?

Or, indeed, is it not rather that the operation of injustice, which weighs upon the conscience of the public as well as upon that of the private man, has precluded the British Government from signing the demand which it had made; and which, by a course less decisive, it endeavours to reserve to itself in future the means of obliterating the traces of its real claims, and some day to mislead opinion upon the origin of the rupture?

Or, in short, do the Ministers of his Britannic Majesty know so imperfectly the character of the First Consul, as to hope, by means of provocations, to exasperate or to intimidate him, by inducing him either to

forget the interests of the nation, or to instigate him to some overt acts, so as that they might afterwards in the eyes of Europe misrepresent the beginning of the war?

The First Consul, more than any man who exists, knows the evils of war, because more than any other man he is accustomed to its calculations and chances. He believes that in such circumstances, when the first sentiments of governments ought to be to calculate upon the catastrophes and the calamities which may be engendered in a new war—he believes that their first duty is not only not to yield to motives of irritation, but to attempt by every way to explain, and to moderate the ungovernable passions of the people.

The undersigned attending at first a moment to the form of that communication of his Excellency Lord Whitworth, begged him to observe, that verbal and fugitive conversations were insufficient for the discussion of such immense interests, of which in ordinary cases all the motives are treated of in the Councils of Nations, after the most mature deliberation. In such Councils, and under such circumstances, nothing is considered as indifferent; forms, expressions even, are weighed, examined, discussed, appreciated, and serve to decide as well as to justify the party that ought to be taken.

If so imprudent and so gross a violation of all forms had originated with the French, what would not have been said, what would not have been written in England? There is not a speaker in either House of Parliament who would not have declared that this departure from the general rules established between nations in important cases was an outrage to the British nation. In the judgment of every body, an offence of this nature would be a motive sufficient for putting an end to the negotiation.

As to the substance of the *ultimatum* proposed, the undersigned has the honour to recal to the recollection of Lord Whitworth, that he was charged to declare to him by a Note delivered the 12th Floreal, that the First Consul was not affected with menaces or with abuse, and that he was content even to pass by forms, which every other Government in similar circumstances would have insisted on.

That the Isle of Lampedosa did not belong to France; that it was under the Sovereignty of another Power; and that as to the wish of his Britannic Majesty to obtain the possession of it, the First Consul had no right to express in the consent or refusal.

That the independence of the Order and Island of Malta was the result of a special article of the Treaty of Amiens, and that therefore the First Consul cannot take any new determination on the subject, without consulting the other contracting parties, the King of Spain, and the Batavian Republic. That the independence of the Island of Malta had been guaranteed by his Majesty, the Emperor of Germany, and that the ratifications of that guarantee were exchanged; that their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia, had guaranteed the independence of the Order and of the Island of Malta; that their guarantees had been demanded by England as well as France; that it was the duty of the First Consul to accept them, and that he had accepted them; that the First Consul could not listen to any proposal with respect to the independence of the Order and Island of Malta, without first knowing the intentions of the governments which had guaranteed it.

That a small corps of French troops were at the time of the message stationed in Holland, in virtue of a convention between that Republic and France, and that the First Consul had not hesitated to say that he should evacuate Holland as soon as the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens had been carried into effect by England.

To this note, which from its stile and the precision of the motives alleged, breathed only equity, peace, and moderation, Lord Whitworth replied, by a peremptory demand of passports, and in giving the information that he expected to use them on Wednesday, the 4th of May, at 5 o'clock in the morning.

The French Government deeply felt the contrast between a determination so absolute, and that character of urbanity, justice, and conciliation, which in all circumstances, but particularly in the last which occurred, it had endeavoured to display. Nevertheless, it thought a sacrifice was due to the interest of humanity. It would not abandon all hopes of peace till the last moment, and the undersigned delivered a new note to Lord Whitworth, by which France offered to consent that Malta should be given up to the protection of any of those guaranteeing powers, Austria, Russia, or Prussia.

This proposal appeared to Lord Whitworth himself, as if it ought to satisfy the pretensions of the court; he suspended his departure, and took the note for the purpose of referring it to his Court.

In the mean-time the Ambassador of the Republic at London, informed of the demand that Lord Whitworth had made of passports to return to England, received orders to hold himself in readiness for his de-

parture. He consequently demanded his passports, which were immediately granted him. This mezzotermine proposed by the French was far from the Treaty of Amiens; but it had the double advantage of coming as near as possible to its spirit, that is to say, to make Malta independent of both nations, and at the same time offering that guarantee which was so much called for, and which the British ministers pretended to be the only object of their alarms.

The British government understood the force of these reasons, and the unhappy fatality which leads it now into war, afforded it no reply but a false assertion.

The 21st of this month Lord Whitworth delivered a note, in which he stated that Russia had refused what had been demanded of her.

There were three guaranteeing powers, and if Russia had refused her guarantee, still there remained the Emperor of Germany and the King of Prussia. But how could Russia have signified its intentions on a new proposition which had been suggested only a few days? It was in the knowledge of England, that Russia and Prussia had promised to guarantee the independence of Malta with some slight modifications, and that the French government were anxious to accept the guarantee, and from the consistency and fidelity to his engagement, which characterises the Emperor Alexander, there was no doubt but he would accept the proposition which was submitted to him: but Providence, which is sometimes pleased to confound bad faith, caused to arrive at the same hour, at the same instant, even when Lord Whitworth delivered his note, a Courier from Russia, addressed to the plenipotentiaries of that power at Paris and at London, by which his Majesty the Emperor of Russia manifested with particular energy the pain that he had felt at hearing the resolution of his Britannic Majesty to keep Malta. He renewed the assurances of his guarantee, and declared, that he accepted the demand made of his mediation by the First Consul, if both the powers would accede to it. The undersigned without delay informed Lord Whitworth, by a note, of the error into which his Court had fallen, not doubting that since that was the only objection which had been presented, that as soon as that Court should be informed of the reiterated and positive assurances of Russia, she would readily deliver Malta to one of the three guaranteeing powers. What, then, must have been the astonishment of the undersigned, when Lord Whitworth, instead of entering into any explanation, or without endeavouring either to contradict or discuss the declarations which the undersigned has made him, has informed him by a note of the same day, that by the tenor of his instructions, he was ordered to depart thirty-six hours after the delivery of his last note, and has renewed his demand for passports! The undersigned therefore forwarded them to him immediately.

Could the English Ambassador have behaved himself differently if the French government had been besieged in a town incable of defence, and that the question was not about the most important interests which the British cabinet has treated of for more than 300 years, but about a simple capitulation.

The opening of the negotiations has been preceded by armaments announced with great parade. Every day, every hour, the commencement of hostilities has been expected; and what is this *ultimatum* which is presented to the French government to be signed in 24 hours?—It must consent to give up an Island which does not belong to it; it must violate, itself, to its own disadvantage, a solemn treaty, under the pretence that England wants some new security against her; it must give up all the respect due to the other contracting parties, in destroying, without their consent, an article of the treaty, which, for their sake, had occupied a considerable time in the conferences of peace. It must also be wanting in respect for the guaranteeing powers, in consenting that an Island which they have wished to be independent, shall remain ten years under the authority of the British Crown. That it is to take from the Order of Malta the sovereignty of that state which has been restored to it, and that this sovereignty is to be transmitted to the inhabitants: that by this spoliation it is to offend all the powers which have acknowledged the re-establishment of the Order, which have guaranteed it, and which, in the arrangement of Germany, have secured its indemnities for the losses which it has experienced.

Such is the substance of this *ultimatum*, which presents a series of pretensions always increasing, in proportion to the moderation which the government of the Republic has shewn. At first England consented to the preservation of the Order of Malta, and only wished to subject the Order and its possessions to the British authority.—To day, and for the first time, she demands the abolition of the Order, and that this must be agreed to in thirty-six hours.

But as to the conditions proposed, were they as agreeable to the Treaty of Amiens and the interest of France as they are contrary to them, the form of the demand, the

term of 36 hours prescribed for the answer, must decide the determination of the French government. No, never will France acknowledge in any government the right of annulling, by a single act of its pleasure, the stipulations of a reciprocal engagement. If it has even permitted that in a form somewhat menacing an *ultimatum* of seven days to be considered, if it has received another *ultimatum* with a term of 36 hours annexed to it, and treaties presented in a conclusive form which were never negotiated, it could have no other object than to give the British government an example of moderation, but it can consent to nothing that compromises its dignity or its power.

The undersigned is then charged to declare to his Excellency Lord Whitworth, that no communication which, both in substance and in form, does not agree with the usages observed among the great powers, and with the most perfect equality between the two states, can any longer be admitted in France; that nothing shall oblige the French government to dispose of countries which do not belong to it, and that it never will acknowledge in England the right of violating, in any manner whatsoever, the treaties made between the two countries.

The undersigned repeats the proposition of giving up Malta to one of the three guaranteeing powers; and as to every other object, unconnected with the Treaty of Amiens, it renews its declaration, that the French government is ready to open a negotiation with respect to them.

If the English government shall give the signal of war, nothing remains for the government of the Republic but to confide in the justice of its cause, and in the God of armies.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
(Signed) CH. M. TALLEYRAND.

Message from the First Consul of France to the Legislative Body, relative to War with England, dated St. Cloud, May 20, 1803.

The English Ambassador has been recalled; compelled by this circumstance, the Ambassador of the Republic has quitted a country where he could no longer hear the language of peace.

In this decisive moment Government lays before you, will lay before France, and before all Europe, its first relations with the British Ministry, the negotiations which were terminated by the Treaty of Amiens, and the new discussions which seem to terminate by an absolute rupture. The present age and posterity will there see what it has done to put an end to the calamities of war, with what moderation and with what patience it has laboured to prevent the return of them.

Nothing could break the course of the projects formed for rekindling the flames of discord between the two nations. The Treaty of Amiens was negotiated amidst the clamours of a party hostile to peace. Scarcely was it concluded, when it became an object of the bitterest censure. It was represented as fatal to England, because it was not disgraceful to France. The seeds of uneasiness were soon sown and dangers were supposed, on which was established the necessity of such a state of peace, that it was a permanent signal for new hostilities. Those base miscreants who had torn the bosom of their country, and who are still destined to tear it, were kept in reserve and in pay. Vain calculations of hatred! The object of it is no longer, France divided by factions and agitated by storms. It is France restored to internal tranquillity, regenerated in her administration and laws, ready to fall with her whole weight on the foreign nation which shall dare to attack her, and to unite with the brigands which atrocious policy might pour into her territories, to organize in it pillage and assassination.

At length an unexpected Message suddenly alarmed England with imaginary armaments in France and in Batavia, and supposed important discussions which divided the two Governments, while no discussion of the kind was known to the French Government.

Formidable preparations for arming were then begun on all the coasts and in the ports of Great-Britain. The sea was covered with ships of war, and it was amidst this preparation that the Cabinet of London required of France to abrogate a fundamental article in the Treaty of Amiens.

They wished, they said, for new guarantees, and they disowned the sacredness of treaties; the execution of which is the first of guarantees that nations can give to each other.

In vain did France invoke that faith which they had sworn to maintain: in vain did she consent to wink at the actual non-execution of the article of the Treaty of Amiens, which England pretended to pass over; in vain did she defer taking a definitive part until the moment when Spain and Batavia, both contracting parties, should have manifested their will; in vain did she call for the mediation of the powers which had been invited to guarantee, and who, indeed, have guaranteed the stipulation, the abrogation of which was demanded. All her proposals were rejected, and the de-

mands of England became more imperious and more absolute.

It was not consistent with the principles of Government to yield to threats; it was not in its power to make the Majesty of the French people bend under laws prescribed to it with forms so haughty and so novel; had it done so, it would have consecrated to England the right of annulling by its will alone all the stipulations by which it is bound towards France.

It would have authorized it to require from France new guarantees on the least alarm which it might be pleased to suppose, and hence two new principles which would have been placed in the public right of Great-Britain, along with that by which it has disinherited other nations of the common sovereignty of the seas, and subjected to its laws and regulations the independence of their flag.

Government has stopped at that line traced out to it by its principles and its duty. The negotiations have been broken off; we are ready to combat if attacked.

At any rate, we shall combat to maintain the faith of treaties, and for the honour of the French name.

Had we yielded to vain terror, it would have been necessary to combat in order to repel new pretentions; but we should have combated, dishonoured by weakness, degraded in our own eyes, and vilified in the eyes of an enemy, who would have made us at once yield to their unjust pretentions.

The nation will confide in a sensation of its own strength, whatever may be the wounds which the enemy may inflict where we can neither prevent nor reach them. The result of this contest will be such as we have a right to expect from the justice of our cause, and from the courage of our warriors.

The First Consul, BUONAPARTE.
By the First Consul,
The Secretary of State, H. B. MARET.

RUSSIAN GUARANTEE.—*This note is referred to in No.* 34 *of the original Correspondence laid before the House by Lord Hawkesbury, and should have formed a part of the inclosure in that number. In No.* 2 *of the papers "on the Guarantee of Russia" ordered to be printed on the* 26*th of May, on the motion of Mr. T. Grenville, is a reply to it by Lord Hawkesbury. It is to be found among the papers printed by the First Consul, and has been admitted to be authentic.*

The Chancellor of the Empire having received the orders of the Emperor relative to the invitation made to his Imperial Majesty by the two principal contracting parties to the Treaty of Amiens, to accede in quality of guarantee to this Treaty, so far as relates to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and their restoration to the possession of the Island of Malta and its dependencies, is authorised to give to the communications of the 22d of October the following reply:

His Majesty the Emperor, from the moment of his accession to the throne, has constantly shewn so strong a desire to seize every opportunity which presented itself of giving to the two principal contracting parties to the Treaty of Amiens the most unequivocal proofs of his sincere desire to do whatever might be agreeable to both of them, and to contribute as far as was in his power to re-establish and to confirm the continuance of the peace existing betwixt them, that it cannot now be supposed that his invariable sentiments on this point can have suffered any change. On the other hand, the two governments are too equitable not to acknowledge that it is beyond the power of the Emperor to yield to the demands made to him in virtue of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, which fixes the future establishment of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, since it is, under every consideration, impossible for his Imperial Majesty to accede as a guarantee to stipulations which are not only contrary to wishes expressed relative to the Order, honoured by the interest he felt in their favour, and the protection he had pledged himself to give them, but which would be inconsistent with what had been agreed upon anterior to that treaty betwixt his Imperial Majesty and one of the two contracting powers, with respect to the said Order, and relative to the independence and neutrality of the Island of Malta.

This consideration, as important in itself, as it is necessarily supported by considerations of a different kind, has obliged the Emperor not to accede to the pressing requests which have been made to him on the point, by the Court of London, in spite of the ardent desire of his Imperial Majesty to comply with the wishes expressed on this subject. The dispositions, which that Court has manifested to accede to the wishes of the Emperor, with respect to the Order and the Island of Malta, and the readiness expressed by the French government to concert measures for promoting the same end, have not failed to be felt with corresponding sentiments of gratitude by his Imperial Majesty. But, the obstacle which opposed his compliance with their wishes, was not weakened, since the public and formal act

continued still contradictory to the known and expressed intention of his Imperial Majesty, and that it was for this act that his guarantee was solicited. Since, however, one of the principal difficulties is removed by the nomination and acknowledgment of the Grand Master, his Majesty the Emperor, desirous of giving to the contracting parties to the Treaty of Amiens the clearest proofs of his friendship, and wishing to omit nothing on his part which can tend to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe, has determined to propose to the two governments the only plan which, under existing circumstances, can furnish the possibility of waving the demand which they have mutually made, and this plan would be, that the two contracting powers should form a convention or some other act supplementary to the Treaty of Amiens, by which the 10th article of the said treaty relative to the Order and the Island of Malta might be modified, altered, and completed, with respect to several of its dispositions, agreeably to the stipulations of the first arrangement agreed upon by his Imperial Majesty; which by this means being fully and formally re-established, would receive the same sanction as the treaty, of which they would then form an integral part. If the two powers believed that such a supplementary article could be agreed upon, his Majesty the Emperor would hasten to accede to it in quality of guarantee, and to share the obligations attached to such a character, with the courts of Vienna, Madrid, Naples, and Berlin. His Imperial Majesty would do this the more readily, because in complying with the wishes of the two powers, he would only follow the impulse of his own feelings on this subject, from which he is desirous of giving them manifest and reiterated proofs of his good will, by concurring in all possible cases with their wishes.

The Chancellor, by order of the Emperor, that in this affair no delay might be supposed to arise on the part of the court of Russia, hastens to subjoin a projet of the articles which may serve as the basis of a supplementary act alluded to above, in case the two powers should be inclined to accede to it.

The Chancellor of the Empire in communicating these instructions to General Hedouville, Minister Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, which express the intentions of the Emperor, in answer to the note of the 22d of October, has the honour of repeating to him his high consideration.

(Signed) C. ALEXANDER DE WORONTZOW.

St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1802.

(The following Public Papers being imperfect, without the explalanation accompanying them, and which are translated from the Moniteur, the whole is inserted here together.)

Paris, May, 2-th, 1803.—The Declaration of the KING of ENGLAND has appeared. It is accompanied by a volume of Papers of 145 folio pages.—This volume contains 72 articles, amongst which ten only are official, and several of those are insignificant. Sixty-two are extracts of letters from ministers to their agents, and from the English agents to their cabinet, letters doubtless fabricated by the Chancellerie, according to the convenience of ministers.—The notes, which are most important, and the most proper to inform the English people of the steps taken by the French government, and of the true spirit of the negotiation, have been carefully suppressed.—And what appears the last degree of shamelessness, and even of folly, is that in the note of Lord Whitworth, dated the 10th of May, printed in page 112 of the Official Papers of London, the most essential passage is omitted, through an unfaithfulness which could not fail to be discovered.

Original Note transmitted by the English Ambassador to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Paris, May 10, 1803.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from his Britannic Majesty to the French Republic, having transmitted to his Court the proposition made to him by the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 4th instant, *and that proposition having been judged to be impracticable, by the refusal of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia to listen to it, and as falling, at the same time, below the just pretensions of his Majesty.*

[The remainder of the note is exactly similar to that published in the Correspondence here. The words marked in italics are those which the Moniteur charges the English minister with having omitted.]

This infidelity, committed to cover a false allegation, which they durst not support, has given rise to another. The English ministers have in consequence omitted the note transmitted in answer by Citizen Talleyrand on the 12th of May, which is to the following effect:

Paris, May 12, 1803.

The undersigned is charged to make known to his Excellency Lord Whitworth, Ambassador from his Britannic Majesty, that the First Consul having proposed in the Note of the 4th instant, that the Island of Malta should be delivered into the hands of one of the guaranteeing powers, Russia, Austria, or Prussia, it does not suffice to put an end to that proposition, to argue from the refusal of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia to receive that depôt, since it still remains to be known what are the intentions of their Majesties the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia.

——That besides the assertion contained in the Note of his Excellency, dated the 10th instant, and which is expressed in these terms—"By the refusal of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, to accede, entirely contrary to the guarantee which his Imperial Majesty has formally offered, under the condition of some slight changes which the First Consul had no difficulty in adopting, and which he knows that the English ministry refused, doubtless meditating upon the strange pretensions of keeping Malta.——Moreover, this assertion is in direct contradiction to the assurances which the First Consul has received from Petersburgh, since the Message from his Britannic Majesty was known, and which has been renewed by an authentic communication, which the Count De Marcoff made yesterday of the intentions of his Court.——From whence it results that it is impossible to reconcile the last Note, transmitted by his Excellency Lord Whitworth, with the new confirmation which has been acquired of the disposition of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, and he cannot refuse to believe that his Britannic Majesty, better informed, will himself hasten to give to his Excellency different instructions to those which he has received and communicated, in the name of his Government.——The undersigned seizes this occasion of renewing to his Excellency Lord Whitworth, the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) C. M. TALLEYRAND.

And the English nation calls itself free, and the parliament represents the nation.—We have translated the whole verbatim, which will be printed in this Journal, for nothing ought to be hidden from the French people.—If they have had the shamelessness to suppress the most important notes, and to garble those of which the originals are in the hands of our government, with respect to objects so important, what confidence can we place in the recital of conversations made by English agents, and turned by the ministry to suit its own purposes?—And thus fifty millions of men are delivered up to be slaughtered.—The giddy spirit which has for two months seized upon the English government will not allow it to reflect; it doubtless thinks that we have neither ink nor arms.—But of what importance to the cabinet of London is the opinion of Europe, or that of posterity? The parliament will make its address, several of the members will be led away by false reports, and this is all that the English ministers desire.—The following decree was communicated on Monday, to the senate, the legislative body, and the tribunate, by the orators of government.

Extract from the Register of the Deliberations of the Government of the Republic. May 22, 1803.

The government of the Republic having heard read, by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the acts of his Britannic Majesty, dated the 16th of May, and which are to the following effect.

(Then follow the orders of council for an embargo, and for the issuing of Letters of Marque.)

Having heard read by the Minister of Marine and Colonies, a dispatch from the Maritime Prefect of Brest, dated this day, announcing that two English frigates having taken two French merchant vessels in the Bay of Audierne, without any previous declaration of war, and in manifest violation of the law of nations, which dispatch is to the following effect:——The day before yesterday two English frigates captured two vessels in the Bay of Audierne; the one was destined for Quimper, to procure timber for building, and the other was laden with salt for Fecamp.

(Signed) "CAFFARELLY, Maritime Prefect."

DECREES.

Art. I. It is prescribed to all Commanders of Squadrons or Naval Divisions of the Republic, Captains of its Ships and other Vessels of War, to chase those of the King of England, as well as those vessels belonging to his subjects, to attack, capture, and conduct them into the ports of the Republic.

II. Commissions will be delivered, in course, to those French Privateers for which they are demanded, and which, in the event of obtaining those commissions, will be regulated, in conformity with the existing laws and regulations, or with whatever may be made in the mean-time.

III. All the English enrolled in the Militia, from the age of eighteen to sixty, or holding any commission from his Britannic Majesty, who are at present in France, shall be immediately constituted prisoners of war, to answer for those citizens of the Republic who may have been arrested and made prisoners by the vessels or subjects of his Britannic Majesty, previous to any declaration of war.

IV. The Ministers are charged each with what concerns him with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of Laws.

The First Consul

(Signed) BUONAPARTÉ.

By the First Consul, the Secretary of State

(Signed) H. B. MARET.

The English government has then commenced hostilities by the ruin of one or two miserable traders, who under the faith of treaties were peaceably navigating on our coasts.—It has committed this act of hostility without a declaration of war, without any of the forms used by polished nations and agreed upon amongst them, and in pursuance of those odious principles of public law which it has created for itself alone, and which are entirely barbarous.—It is with pain that the government of the republic sees itself forced to use reprisals, and to constitute prisoners of war all the English enrolled in the militia, and residing in the French territory.—In every thing that is illiberal it will always leave initiation to England, but the French people ought to act towards England as she acts towards France. For too long a period Europe has pursued a different line of conduct. This is what has more particularly authorized England to constitute for herself alone, a public law, to which she is now so much accustomed, that every act of just

reciprocity appears to her an injustice.—A measure was yesterday taken with the English who were in *Paris*, which, it is said, will be adopted generally to all those who are in France.—According to the directions which were given to each of them, at their place of residence, they repaired to the place where the staff was assembled, where their names were taken down, and an order was given to them, to go to-morrow to Gen. Junot, the commandant of the place.—It is thought that the place will then be pointed out to them, to which they are to go and reside, until some determination is come to respecting them, conformably to the conduct which shall be adopted in England. It is said that all the English now in *Paris*, will be sent to *Fountainbleau*.

Proclamation by his Majesty as Elector of Hanover.

GEORGE III. &c.—Whatever the event of the differences now existing between our Crown and the French government may be, we shall, in our capacity as Elector and Member of the German Empire, observe the strictest neutrality, and might therefore justly and confidently expect, that whatever termination the present negotiation may have, our German States and faithful subjects will not be affected by any consequences which may ensue.—Considering, however, the obvious movements of the troops in Holland, the possibility must occur to us, that in case the before-mentioned differences should, against our wishes, not be amicably settled, our German States and subjects may be exposed to a danger, which, if realised, would have the most unfortunate consequences for the whole country in general, and every individual in particular: we, for this reason, hold it to be our most sacred duty to adopt such means, as will, under the blessing of God, prove most efficacious to protect our faithful German subjects, whom Divine Providence has committed to our care. We apply, therefore, to all the loyal subjects of our German States with that confidence to which the love and affection we bear our people, and their uninterrupted loyalty and attachment intitle us to make, in case of such danger, all those efforts and sacrifices to which the duties they owe to us, their loving Sovereign, their attachment to their native country, their family connexions, and every thing dear to them, already bind them. And we do it with the more confidence, as our dearly beloved Son, the Duke of Cambridge, actuated by the tender affection he bears our faithful German States and subjects, is willing to share every danger that may befall them, and personally to assist in every thing that may promote their safety and security. To be prepared for every event that may happen, it is for the present absolutely necessary to know immediately, the exact number of our German subjects, who, if necessity calls, can take up arms for the defence of their country. It is to effect this, that we command all the magistrates of our German States, to lose no time in giving in complete lists of such our German subjects as are fit for military service, excepting those only who serve us, and their country in other capacities: and to make them solemnly promise to come forth when called upon, and give all the assistance in their power for the defence of their country, whenever, and for as long as may be thought necessary.——The known loyalty and patriotism of our beloved subjects, leave us no room to suppose, that any one of them will be so lost, as to transgress so solemn an obligation, or to withdraw himself by a cowardly and treacherous flight from giving his assistance to the defence of his country.—Should, however, against our better expectations such be found, who, in time of danger would desert their country and refuse their aid, such wretches shall, the case being lawfully proved, without hope of pardon, be deprived of all they may possess in our German dominions, and be cut off from all inheritance therein. But we have a better opinion of all our German subjects, and are firmly persuaded, that when necessity calls, they will unanimously and zealously unite to assist, to the utmost of their power in the defence, and for the salvation of their native country.

Hanover, May 16, 1803.

Order for an Embargo, of French and Dutch Vessels, and Vessels bound to Countries occupied by the Armies of France.

At the Court at the Queen's Palace, the 16th day of May 1803, present, the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

It is this day ordered by his Majesty, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, that no ships or vessels, belonging to any of his Majesty's subjects, be permitted to enter and clear out for any of the Ports of the French or Batavian Republics, or for the Ports of any Country occupied by the armies of France, until further order; and his Majesty is further pleased to order, that a General Embargo or Stop be made on all ships, belonging to the French and Batavian Republics whatsoever, now within or which hereafter shall come into any of the Ports, Harbours, or Roads, within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, together with all persons and effects on board the said ships and vessels; but that the utmost care be taken for the preservation of all and every part of the cargoes on board any of the said ships, so that no damage or embezzlement whatever be sustained; and the Right Honourable the Lords Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury, the Lords Commissions of the Admiralty, and the Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports are to give the necessary directions herein, as to them may respectively appertain.—*W. Fawkener.*

DOMESTIC.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

'*Downing Street, May* 9.—His Majesty has been pleased to appoint Major-General David Douglas Wemyss, to be Commander of all his Majesty's Land Forces serving in the Island of Ceylon.

St James', May 12.—This day Chevalier d'Anduaga, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from the King of Spain, had his first private Audience of her Majesty.

St. James', May 12.—This day Rufus King, Esq. Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, had his Audience of Leave of her Majesty. [*Note of Editor.*—It is said that Mr. King's place is to be supplied by Mr. Munro, now at Paris, who has always been the mortal enemy of England, and the warm friend of France. We shall attend to his movements here, where we confess, we shall be very sorry to see him.]

Crown-Office, May 13.—Member returned to serve in this present Parliament.—County of Nottingham.—Anthony Hardolph Eyre, of Grove, in the said County, Esq. in the room of the Right Hon. William Cavendish Bentinck, commonly called Lord William Cavendish Bentinck, who hath accepted the Office of Steward or Bailiff of his Majesty's Three Chiltern Hundreds of Stoke, Desborough, and Bonenham, in the County of Buckingham.

Whitehall, May 14.—The King has been pleased to present the Rev. Richard Garveys Grylls, Clerk, Master of Arts, to the Vicarage of Breage, in the County of Cornwall, and Diocese of Exeter, void by the death of the Rev. Edward Marshall.

St. James', May 23.—The King has been pleased to confer the Honour of Knighthood on Sir James Pulteney, Bart. Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Whitworth, Captain Robert Boulton, of the Royal Navy, Rupert George, Esq. and Richard Hankey, Esq. as Proxies to Five of the Knights of the Most Honourable Order of the Bath, at the late Installation.

Whitehall, May 24.—The King has been pleased to grant to Edward Bowyer Sparke, Doctor in Divinity, the Place and Dignity of Dean of the Cathedral Church of Bristol, void by the death of Doctor Charles Peter Layard, late Dean thereof.

The King has also been pleased to grant to William Nelson, Clerk, Doctor in Divinity, the Place and Dignity of a Canon or Prebendary of the Metropolitical Church of Canterbury, void by the death of John Lynch, Clerk, Doctor of Laws, late Canon thereof.

Whitehall, May 12.—The King has been graciously pleased to appoint William Radcliffe, of Barnsley, in the County of York, Esq. to the Office of Rouge Croix Pursuivant of Arms, in the Heralds' College, vacant by the promotion of Joseph Hawker, Esq. to the Office of Richmond Herald, in the same College.

Whitehall, May 28.—The King has been pleased to grant to Howel Holland Edwards, Clerk, Master of Arts, the Place and Dignity of a Prebendary of the Collegiate Church of St. Peter, Westminster, void by the death of Doctor Robert Poole Finch, late Prebendary thereof.

The King has also been pleased to present the Reverend William Baker, Clerk, Bachelor of Laws, to the Vicarage of Stonehouse, in the County and Diocese of Gloucester, void by the Cession of Thomas Pettat, Clerk, the last Incumbent.

St. James', May 26.—This day Baron Belmont de Melcor, Minister Plenipotentiary from his Serene Highness the Elector of Wirtemberg, had an Audience of her Majesty.

Crown-Office, May 31.—Member returned to serve in this present Parliament.—Borough of Boston.—Thomas Fydell the younger, Esq. in the room of Thomas Fydell, Esq. whose Election for the said Borough has been adjudged to be void.

Monday, May 16.—On the 14th inst. the Lord Mayor received the following letter from Lord Hawkesbury:

"My Lord, I think it right to lose no time in informing your Lordship, that Lisle, the Messenger, has just arrived from Paris, with dispatches from Lord Whitworth, and that his Lordship had received his passports, and was on the point of setting out from Paris on Thursday evening, when the Messenger came away.——I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HAWKESBURY.

This communication the Lord Mayor carried to the Stock Exchange, and published in the usual manner. In the course of the morning various expresses had arrived with intelligence to the above effect, and the funds had fallen upon it. They recovered for some time upon the intelligence in Lord Hawkesbury's note, but they fell again, and left off at 61¾.

On the 15th, the French Ambassador received the Orders of his Court to depart, and accordingly yesterday morning, at 5 o'clock, he set off from his house in Portland Place, with his suite, and proceeded on their route for Dover.

On Thursday evening last, May the 12th, Lord Whitworth departed from Paris, and arrived on Friday night at Breteuil, where he received some communication, which induced his Lordship to send off Sylvester, the Messenger, who arrived in Town at one o'clock yesterday morning. What the nature of the circumstance was that induced his Lordship to take this step has not transpired, but we learn that Ministers on receiving his dispatch, sent back a Messenger with orders to him to come to London with all expedition. Lord Whitworth was prevented from sailing from Boulogne by a contrary wind, he was in consequence to proceed to Calais yesterday, and he was not therefore expected here before this day, the tide not serving to come out of the harbour till night.

Friday, May 20.—Lord Whitworth landed at Dover, at about twelve o'clock yesterday evening, and arrived in town on the night of the 19th. His Lordship was treated on his departure from Calais with every demonstration of respect by the people, as well as by the municipal officers, and the military. He was saluted by a discharge of guns, and all parties seemed to regret the occasion of his departure. On his arrival at Dover, where he found General Andreossi, who had received similar honours, his Lordship sent a message to the French Ambassador, importing a desire to have an interview with his Excellency, before he left this country, and requesting that the latter would point out the mode for the accomplishment of that purpose. General Andreossi returned an answer expressive of high respect and acquiesence, but leaving the arrangement to Lord Whitworth. It was then determined that neither should meet the other at their respective Hotels, and an interview was held at a third place. What passed at this interview, we do not pretend to state. After the meeting, each of the Ambassadors visited the other at their hotels, and both expressed their strong sense of the treatment which they had received in their respective countries, and their anxious hopes that all causes of national differences would soon be removed. General Andreossi then took his leave, with every testimony of public and private respect. He embarked on Wednesday morning at 7 o'clock.

The grand ceremony of the installation of the Knights of the Bath took place on the 19th instant. We have only to remark, that the whole ceremony was conducted with the greatest possible order. The procession commenced about eleven, from the Prince's Chamber to the Abbey. It was near twelve before it had entered Henry VII.'s Chapel. The ceremony of installation took up nearly three hours. The Queen and Princesses had a gallery over the great gate, which they occupied during the ceremony of installation. The Duchess of York came to see the procession return. His Royal Highness the Duke of York, the Grand Master of the Order, was greeted by the

people with the most cordial huzzas. The crowd in every direction was immense.

MR. WINDHAM.

The following account of the celebration of Mr. Windham's Birth Day, at the City of Norwich, will, we trust, give great pleasure to our Readers.

On the 14th of May, more than 140 of the friends of the Right Hon. Wm. Windham, in this City and its neighbourhood, dined at the White Swan, in St. Peter's, in order to celebrate that gentleman's Birth-Day.—The Stewards were, Sir Roger Kerrison, (Mayor of Norwich) Capt. Laton, Capt. John Harvey, and Alderman Browne. After dinner, the following toasts and sentiments were given:

The KING—May limited Monarchy ever be an overmatch for Consular despotism.

The Queen.

The Prince of Wales and Royal Family.

The Duke of York and the Army.

The Duke of Clarence and the Navy.

The Right Honourable Wm. Windham—May the day which gave birth to this accomplished and disinterested Statesman, ever be commemorated by all the truly loyal to the King and Constitution.

[On Mr. Windham's health being given from the Chair, Captain John Harvey pronounced a warm and spirited panegyric on his eminent talents and distinguished public services. He then read a letter which he had received from Mr. Windham, expressing, in terms highly flattering to the stewards and the company present, the sense which he entertained of so public a mark of their esteem.—After this, Mr. Windham's health was drunk with great applause, and a gentleman sung "Rule Britannia," with some additional stanzas, applicable to the occasion; the last of which was encored by the whole company, and Mr. Windham's health was drunk a second time with increased enthusiasm.]

The Mayor of Norwich—Prosperity to the City of Norwich—The Lord Lieutenant, and Prosperity to the County of Norfolk.

Mr. Pitt.

Mr. Alderman Browne in giving Lord Spencer, added—and success to a general Press Warrant—I mean one which would bring to the service of their country, the wisdom, the integrity, and energy, which its present state requires.

Lord Nelson—The Walls of Wood, and the Hearts of Oak, of Old England.

Lord Hutchinson.

Lord Grenville—And to a broad, firm, and able Ministry; with clear, fixed, and decided principles of action.

Sir Sydney Smith.—The Lord Bishop of Norwich.—Mr. Frere.—Colonel Wodehouse.—Colonel Patteson, and the Norwich Volunteers.—General Cowell.—Mrs. Windham.—The Mayor, and Prosperity to the Borough of Yarmouth.

The Country Gentlemen who distinguished and exerted themselves in the cause of Windham and Loyalty.

May the honour of the Nation be supported against the influence of *Consuls* and *Consols*, and this be still our motto, when insulted,

"Britons strike home,
"Revenge your Country's wrongs."

The healths of Lord Nelson, Lord Spencer, and Mr. Pitt, were received with great applause.

General Distribution of the British Army, JUNE 1, 1803.	Regulars. Cav.	Inf.	Militia.	Tot Ba.
England and Wales	20	32	76	128
North Britain	1	4	15	20
Ireland	7	23	—	30
Jersey, Guernsey, &c.	—	9	—	9
Gibraltar	—	15	—	15
Egypt and Malta	—	—	—	—
Canada, Nova Scotia, &c.	—	5	—	5
West-Indies	—	22	—	22
Cape of Good Hope, Goree, &c.	—	1	—	1
East-Indies, and on Passage to	5	23	—	28
On Passage to England or Ire.	1	1	—	2
Total....	34	135	91	260

BR. NAVY, 1st JUNE.	Line.	50's	Frig.	Sps.	Tot.
In Port and fitting, and with sealed orders	22	5	28	40	95
English and Irish Channels	17	1	21	25	64
Downs and North Sea	3	1	14	21	39
West-Indies and Passage	3	0	4	14	21
Jamaica station	10	0	5	8	23
America and Newfoundland	0	1	6	4	11
Cape of G. Hope, East-Indies.	4	6	8	9	27
Coast of Africa	0	0	1	1	2
Portugal and Gibraltar	0	0	2	2	4
Mediterranean and on Passage	11	2	17	7	37
Hospital and Prison Ships	2	0	2	0	2
Total in Commission	72	16	108	131	327
Receiving Ships	7	0	6	1	14
Serviceable and repairing	9	1	9	6	25
In Ordinary	83	8	78	49	218
Building	24	0	14	9	47
Total.....	195	25	215	196	631
ORDINARY.					
Portsmouth	30	2	22	14	68
Plymouth	34	1	18	23	76
Chatham	31	6	21	3	61
Sheerness	2	0	7	8	17
River	2	0	25	8	35
Total....	99	9	93	56	257

Day of May.	3 per C. Con.	3 pr. C. R. An.	4 pr. C. Con.	5 per Ct. 1797	Navy 5 per Ct.	Imp. 3 per Ct.	Bank L. Ann.
12	65	63 1/8	80 1/2	97 1/8	99 3/8	61 7/8	18 3/4
13	64 1/8	64	81 1/4	98 1/8	99 1/8	62 1/4	18 15/16
14	61 1/4	62	79 1/2	97	98 1/4	—	18 15/16
16	60 3/8	59 3/8	76 1/4	94 1/2	95 3/4	57 3/4	17 7/8
20	74 3/8	58 3/8	74 3/8	93 1/4	94 1/8	57 1/4	17 1/4
21	74 1/2	58 1/2	74 1/2	93 1/2	94 1/4	57	15
23	74 3/8	58 1/2	74 3/8	93 3/8	94 1/8	—	17
24	57 1/2	56 3/8	73 1/4	92 1/8	93 1/8	—	16 3/4
25	57 1/8	57	72	91 1/2	92 1/4	—	13
26	58 1/8	56 1/4	73	91 1/2	93	—	16 2/4
27	57 1/8	57 3/8	72 3/8	92 3/8	92 3/8	—	15
28	—	59	74 1/4	93 3/8	94 1/8	—	17 3/4

ON THE NAVY.

SIR,—I have attentively observed the answers that have been made in the "*Times*" to the several Letters which have appeared in your Register relative to the Navy; and in order to expose the *contradictory* and *shuffling* attempts to refute the assertions that have been adduced by your Correspondents, I have extracted from that disinterested *Journal* the "*Times*," the paragraphs which have been inserted by the *partizans*.

Monday, 16th May, in answer to L. M.

No greater exertion has been used in fitting the *Victory*, than any other ship, as a very superficial inquiry of what has been done at the several Ports will show; and as if fate had decreed, that this ship, which was to be trumpeted about as a striking instance of the imbecility of the Admiralty, should in the end be a *proof* of the *infamous falsehoods* to which their calumniators have had recourse, at the very time this catalogue of lies was issuing from the Committee, stating "that by the greatest efforts, and *forsooth* solely to contradict the auricular *Cobbett*, she was got to Long Reach," *We pledge ourselves that she had actually sailed from the Nore*, "not with 50 men, including officers, men, and boys, independent of her marines," but with her *full* complement.

With respect to the stated deficiency of blankets, stores, timber, &c. We repeat, however, *that there is no want of stores.*

Monday, 6th June, in answer to "Veritas."

We have been at some pains to get *minute information* respecting the *Victory*, about which ship so much has been said, as well by Cobbett as others, and find, *in truth*, that the Admiralty *had their eyes particularly upon her*, or, in all probability she would *now* have been in the River Medway.

On the subject of stores, we can only again repeat, that if there is a want, the Navy Board only are responsible, and if there really is a scarcity of timber in the yards, inquiry should be made, &c.

And now, Sir, having faithfully transcribed the answer of the tools of the Admiralty, to the observations of your correspondents at the different periods alluded to, I will only ask every unprejudiced person, if upon the very face of their replies the most *palpable* contradiction does not appear? In the first place, on the 16th of May, they say, that with regard to the Victory, *no* extraordinary exertions were made use of, and speaking of the stores, they assure the public, *that there is no want.*—On the 6th of June following, they then observe, that if their eyes had not been particularly on the Victory she would *now* have been in the River Medway, a decided acknowledgment that *extraordinary* exertions were made use of, and therefore a confirmation of L. M's assertion.—And with regard to stores (to make use of their own words) "if there really is a scarcity of timber." *Real scarcity!* What does this observation imply? A tacit confession that a scarcity does exist, whereas, before, they *flatly* contradicted the statement of your correspondent.—But Sir, their shifting the culpability from the shoulders of the Admiralty to those of the Navy Board, when they could no longer defend them from the just attacks of your correspondents, must be considered by every impartial person as a paltry subterfuge, worthy only of the *little* minds they possess.——I cannot help remarking, that many observations which have been adduced in your Register, they have passed over unnoticed, because, Sir, they were thoroughly persuaded that they had nothing to offer in extenuation.——They talk much of the thwarting system, and *basely* throw out insinuations tending to *defame* and *villify* the Navy Board.—For my own part, I cannot help observing, that I think the principle of thwarting ought solely to be attached to the Admiralty, for had they not so *furiously* have driven so many of the shipwrights from the Dock-Yards, our means of *offence* and *defence* would now have been much more considerable, not to say a word of the remains of our fleets abroad which were commissioned during the late war.—And, Sir, I have strong reason to suppose, that had not the war have broken out, the emigration of artificers this

summer would have been very considerable. But happily for the country the war has prevented that evil, and has likewise completely frustrated the highly impolitic parsimonious proceedings of the Admiralty, such proceedings as Lord St. Vincent, himself, strongly reprobated at the close of the American war.——Believe me, Sir, your hearty well-wisher. E. R.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Coevorden, May 25, 1803.

Edouard Mortier, Lieutenant-General, Commander in Chief, to the Inhabitants of the Electorate of Hanover.

Hanoverians,—A French army is entering your territory; it comes not to spread consternation in your fields, but to withdraw the portion of the continent which you inhabit, from a government inimical to the repose of Europe, and which makes it its glory to tread under feet all the principles of the rights of men and of civilized nations.——The First Consul, faithful to the sentiments of moderation and humanity, which distinguish him as eminently as his political and warlike virtues, the First Consul has, in vain, exhausted all the means of conciliation to prevent a rupture.——The King of England, perjured as to his most sacred engagements, has falsified his signature by refusing to evacuate Malta, as he had solemnly bound himself to do by the Treaty of Amiens; he has given the signal for hostilities, and remains alone responsible before God and men for the calamities which the scourge of war may bring upon the States under his dominions.——I am informed, that proclamations, dictated by the blindest fury, have been made to engage you in a dispute, to which you ought to be strangers: preserve yourselves from an aggression equally absurd and useless, and of which you alone will remain the victims.——Hanoverians, I promise you safety and protection, if, consulting your true interests, you separate your cause from that of a Sovereign, who, in breaking all the ties of good faith, has thereby freed you from the attachment which you might have held yourselves to owe him.——The severest discipline will reign amongst the troops whom I command; your persons, your properties will be respected; but in return I require from you such proceedings as there is a right to expect from a peaceable people. ED. MORTIER.

Translation of a Letter from the Maltese Deputies to Lord Hobart, dated London, 2d April, 1802. Laid before Parliament on the 6th of June, 1803.

My Lord,—The Deputies of the Islands of Malta and Gozo, have the honour of presenting to your Excellency, the warmest thanks for all that you have deigned to do in favour of their Nation. We are not ignorant, my Lord, of all that you must have had to overcome, in order to insure the tranquillity and happiness of our Country. The defence of it, which you have been pleased to undertake, is worthy the loyalty and magnanimity of your nation. Being unable to have the honour of forming a part of the Empire of his Britannic Majesty, by a faithful submission, we shall have that of being always united to it by an affectionate gratitude.——In transmitting to our latest descendants the story of our revolution, we shall tell them, that, without the assistance of Great Britain, our ruin must have been inevitable; and the date of our happiness will be the date of the protection with which your Excellency has honoured us.——We entreat you, my Lord, to permit us, at a seasonable opportunity, to lay before you that, which would complete the felicity of the Maltese Nation; and to accept, if you please, the homage of the lively gratitude and respectful devotion, with which we have the honour to be, My Lord, Your most humble, and most obedient Servants, (Signed)—Le Marquis Testaferrata, L'Abbé Mallia, Député, L'Abbé Ricaud, Député, Antoine Mallia, Député, Ph. Castagna, Lieut. and Député, Michel Cachia, Député.

To H. E. Lord Hobart, Minister of H. B. M.

OFFICIAL PAPER.

London, June 8.—To the King's Most Excellent Majesty. The Humble Address of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons, of the City of London, in Common Council assembled.

May it please your Majesty,——We your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Commons of the City of London, in Common Council assembled, beg leave to approach the Throne at this important crisis, with our renewed sentiments of fidelity and allegiance to your Majesty's person, crown, and government.

We are fully persuaded of the necessity for the decisive and dignified measures adopted by your Majesty by the recall of your Majesty's Ambassador from France, and the vigorous posture of defence of the United Kingdom to repel the designs of that government, whose inordinate and insatiable views of restless ambition, are manifestly directed to overthrow the glorious constitution of these realms, and give a mortal stab to our existence as a free and independent nation. The justice of your Majesty's cause, and the moderation of your claims, must be felt and acknowledged by every surrounding power; and we are convinced that the brave and happy people of this land, conscious of the purity of their freedom, and the inestimable privileges they enjoy under your Majesty's mild and paternal rule, will, with one hand and heart, resolve to defend and maintain them. Your Majesty's faithful Citizens of London feel a grateful pride in this assurance of kindred loyalty throughout your Majesty's dominions, and are deeply sensible of the eminent distinction they are invested with by this opportunity of testifying their fidelity and attachment to their beloved Sovereign.——It is our earnest prayer that every blessing may attend and prosper your Majesty's zeal and exertions for the welfare of your people, and should *substantial peace not be attainable but by the decision of the sword*, may the *calamities of a war not to be averted* be lost in the success and glory of its achievements.——Your Majesty's faithful Citizens, cannot, however, refrain from expressing their satisfaction at the disposition manifested by your Majesty, *of availing yourself of any favourable circumstance of terminating the subsisting differences*, whenever it can be done consistently with the honour and dignity of your Majesty's Crown, and the security and welfare of the British Empire.

(Signed) by order of Court,
HENRY WOODTHORPE.

His Majesty received them very graciously, and returned the following answer.

I receive with great satisfaction this dutiful and loyal address from My City of London——My endeavours to preserve peace have been unhappily frustrated by the restless spirit of aggrandizement which actuates the councils of the French govern-

ment—but I trust the united and vigorous exertions of the Nation at large in support of the just cause in which we are engaged, will, under the protection of Divine Providence, enable Me to maintain the dignity of My Crown, and to defend the rights and interests of My people against every aggression.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES (*from page* 820.)

Thursday, June 2.——LORDS.—Duke of Leeds took his seat.—Several public and private Bills brought from Commons, and read.—Bills on table forwarded.—Earl Fitzwilliam after a long speech moved the following resolutions:—"1st, Resolved, "That it appears to this House from the Declaration issued by his Majesty on the 18th inst. "and laid before this House by his Majesty's "command, that the conduct of the French Republic towards this country during the whole "period which has elapsed since the conclusion "of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, is considered "by his Majesty's ministers as having exhibited "one continued series of aggression, violence, and "insult; and as necessarily creating a thorough "conviction of a system deliberately adopted by "France for the purpose of degrading, vilifying, "and insulting his Majesty and his government."——2d, Resolved, "That his Majesty's ministers "having throughout the whole period from the "Definitive Treaty of Peace to the breaking out "of the present war, neither communicated to "Parliament any knowledge of the sense which "they now appear to have entertained respecting "the conduct and system of France, nor any re"gular information of the particulars on which "the same was founded, or of the steps taken by "his Majesty's government thereupon, have there"by withheld from this House the necessary ma"terials for the due and full discharge of its con"stitutional functions; and that by encouraging "throughout the country an unfounded security "and confidence in the permanence of peace, they "have embarrassed and perplexed our commerce; "have deceived the expectations, and unnecessa"rily harassed the spirit of the people; and have "materially increased and aggravated the diffi"culties of our actual situation."——A long debate ensued between Lords Limerick, Grosvenor, Darnley, Fife, Boringdon, Suffolk, Westmoreland, Mulgrave, Carlisle, Ellenborough, Carysfort, Alvanley, Grenville, Grantley, Warwick, the Lord Chancellor, and his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland.—During the debate, an adjournment was moved by Lord Mulgrave and negatived 106 to 18.—The minority were, Duke of Montrose, Earls Pomfret, Gower, Essex, Bathurst, Camden, Romney, Aboyne, Glasgow, Macartney, Harrington (gold stick) Viscount Melville, Lords Lowther, Borringdon, Gwydir, Amherst (bedchamb.), Braybrooke, Mulgrave.——The question on the first resolution was then put and negatived 96 to 14.—The minority were—Earls Fitzwilliam, Spencer, Carlisle, Caernarvon, Thanet, Besborough, Carysfort, Warwick, Mansfield, Fortescue, Lords Grenville, Minto, Kenyon, Yarborough. The others were negatived without a division.—House summoned for Monday.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Port of London and Ordnance Bills read.—Convoy Bill reported with amendments.—Markham's Divorce Bill from the Lords, read and passed.—Mr. Canning moved, "That an humble address "be presented to his Majesty, praying that he "would graciously be pleased to order that there "be laid before the House, a copy of the conferences held between Lord Cornwallis and Citizen J. Buonaparté, on the 18th and 19th of "February 1802, at Amiens, respecting the indisposition of the Maltese, towards the Order "of St. John of Jerusalem."—Also, "A copy of "the Protocol published by the French government relative to the same subject."—Also, "A "copy of the memorials transmitted by the inhabitants of Malta, through their deputies, or our "commissioners in that Island to the British ministers."—Also, "The date of the order issued "for sending away the French commercial commissioner, Citizen Chapir, from Jersey." First and last resolutions agreed to.—On motion of the Attorney General, leave granted to bring in a Bill to remove certain defects which have occurred in issuing certain Exchequer Bills.—On motion of the Secretary at War, a committee appointed "to "consider how the provisions of the Militia Law "of England might be applied to Scotland, when "the Militia was called out for actual service."—"Mr. Sheridan moved, that Mr. Mainwaring do, "by himself or agent, deliver in, on or before, the "31st of the present month, a list of Freeholders, "who gave their votes for him to serve as a Member of Parliament for the County of Middlesex, "and that Sir Francis Burdett, also, by himself or "agent, deliver in the same at the time above "mentioned."—After some conversation between Messrs. Fox, Bragge, Sheridan, and the Attorney General, the first of November was fixed on for the exchange on motion of the latter gentleman.—Ship Burning Bill read in Committee.—Cotton Workmen's Dispute Bill read, and ordered to be printed.—Resolutions reported by the committee on the assessed taxes agreed to, and leave given to bring in a Bill.—Reports of the Committees of Supply, and of Ways and Means, ordered for Wednesday.——Militia Provision Bill, committed for this day sennight.—Adjourned.

Friday, June 3.——COMMONS.—Report on the survey of the Highlands of Scotland, laid on table, and ordered to be printed.—Ordnance estimates laid on table.—Report on Ship Burning Bill agreed to.—Ordnance Estate Bill read second time and committed for Monday.—Convoy Bill read third time and passed.—Mr. Giles moved for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal so much of the Act of the 42d of his present Majesty, as relates to the oath or affirmation, respecting bribery to be taken at elections, enacted 2d George II.—Mr. Patten moved the following resolutions:—"That it ap"pears to this House, from the Declaration is"sued by his Majesty on the 18th day of May "last, and laid before this House by his Majesty's "command, that the conduct of the French Republic, during the whole period which has "elapsed since the conclusion of the Definitive "Treaty of Peace, is considered by his Majesty's "ministers as having been altogether inconsistent "with every principle of good faith, moderation, "and justice; as having exhibited one continued "series of aggression, violence, and insult, and as "necessarily creating a thorough conviction of a "system deliberately adopted by France for the "purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting, "his Majesty and his government."—"That his "Majesty's ministers having, throughout the "whole period, from the conclusion of the Definitive Treaty of Peace, to the issuing of His "Majesty's declaration of the 18th day of May "last, neither communicated to Parliament any "knowledge of the sense which they now appear "to have entertained respecting the conduct and "system of France, nor any regular information

" of the particulars on which the same was founded, or of the steps taken by his Majesty's government thereupon, have thereby withheld " from this House the necessary materials for a " due and full discharge of its constitutional functions; and that, by encouraging throughout " the country an unfounded security [and confidence in the permanence of peace, they have " embarrassed and perplexed our commerce, have " deceived the expectations, and unnecessarily " harassed the spirit of the people, and have materially increased and aggravated the difficulties " of our actual situation —That it was the duty " of his Majesty's ministers to make timely and " adequate representations against such acts as " have, in their judgment, constituted a series of " aggression, violence, and insult, on the part of " France: that, by dignified and temperate remonstrances, followed up with consistency, and " sustained with firmness, either the course and " progress of such acts would have been arrested, " without the necessity of recurring to arms, or " the determination of the French government to " persist therein, would have been distinctly ascertained, before his Majesty had, by the reduction of His forces, and the surrender of His conquests, put out of His hands the most effectual " means of obtaining redress and reparation: that " this essential duty appears to have been, in a " very great degree, neglected by his Majesty's " ministers; and that such their neglect and omission have been highly injurious to the public " interests:—That it appears to this House, that " on the 17th of October last, counter orders " were dispatched by his Majesty's government, " revoking the orders before given for the surrender of the Cape of Good Hope, and of the " other conquests then held by his Majesty; and " that the final order, by virtue of which his Majesty's forces actually evacuated the Cape, was " sent on the 16th of November: that on the said " 16th of November, the hostile spirit of France " had (in the judgment of his Majesty's ministers " as now avowed by them) already been manifested, for more than six months, by one continued " series of aggression, violence, and insult, for " which neither reparation nor redress had down " to that moment been obtained: that the offensive principle had already been distinctly advanced, of excluding his Majesty from all concern in the affairs of the Continent; that the " Spanish and other Priories had already been " withdrawn from the Order of Malta; Piedmont, " Parma, Placentia, and Elba, had been annexed " to France, Switzerland had been attacked and " subjugated, and the remonstrance of his Majesty's government upon that subject had been " treated with indignity and contempt; the territory of the Batavian Republic was at that very " moment still occupied by the armies of the " Chief Consul of France, and its internal administration still controuled by his interference; " and the French government was then actually " engaged in the pursuit of those plans and measures for the subversion of the Turkish Empire, " to which his Majesty's declaration refers, as a " violation of the Treaty of Peace: that in directing, under such circumstances, the final surrender of the Cape, without having previously " explained or arranged the numerous points of " difference and complaint which then actually " subsisted between the two governments, his " Majesty's ministers acted in contradiction to " the sense which they had themselves manifested of their own duty, and have improvidently exposed to danger some of the " most important interests of his Majesty's dominions."—A long debate took place between Colonels Graham, and Boston, Mr. Browne, Lords Kensington and Temple, Mr. Hobhouse, Sir W. Young, Messrs. Fonblanque, Archdale, and Courtney, Sirs W. W. Wynne, and W. Milner, Messrs. Metcalfe, Gregor, Borland, and Grenville, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Pitt, Lord Hawkesbury, Mr. Canning, Lord Castlereagh, the Master of the Rolls, and Secretary at War.—During the debate on the first resolution, the order of the day was moved by Mr. Pitt, and negatived 333 to 56.—The minority were—Lord Binning, Sir R. Buxton, Messrs. Burdon, Bradshaw, Brandling, Cowper, Dupre, Dickenson, sen. Dickenson, jun. Hon. R. Dundas, Rt. Hon. W. Dundas, Sir H. Dalrymple, Mr. Elliot, Sir W. Elford, Lord Fitzharris, Messrs. Fuller, Ferguson, Col. Graham, Messrs. T. Graham, Gunning, C. Hope, Hammet, Henderson, Long, Lord Lovaine, Mr. H. Leigh, Hon. H. Lascelles, Messrs. T. Lowther, W. Lowther, Manning, Sir H. Mildmay, Messrs. Mordaunt, Morland, Pitt, M. Pitt, Phipps, Sir R. Peel, Sir Robert Preston, Lord H. Petty, Messrs. R. Penn, Rose, Rutherford, Sloane, Sturges, Sir J. Stewart, Messrs. G. Smith, Smith, C. Smith, Claude Scott, Sam. Scott, H. Thornton, T. Villiers, J. Warde, Wigram, Wilberforce, G. Warde.—The original motion was then put and negatived 275 to 34. The minority were. Rt. H. W. Windham, W. Sturges, Sir W. Young, W. Elliott, Hon. G. H. Dundas, H. A. Dillon, Gascoyne, Lord G. L. Gower, Sir W. Elford, Hon. T. Berkley, C. Codrington, Holland, Rt. H. G. Canning, Lords Temple, Porchester, Folkstone, Hon. L. Dundas, J. C. Beresford, Sirs. W. W. Wynne, Gregor, Cartwright, Lord Kensington, B. Cook, W. Poyntz, Peter Patton, Rt. H. T. Grenville, Dr. Lawrence, Hon. C. Dundas, Sirs H. Mildmay, Dent, C. Wynne, J. Osborne, Sir R. Lawley, Lord Morpeth, Sir J. C. Hippesley, Foljambe.—The others were negatived without a division.—Adjourned.

Monday, June 6.—LORDS.—Committee of privileges postponed.—Several private bills from the Commons read.—Archbishop of Cashel and Bishop of Lincoln took their seats.—Second Report from Commissioners' Naval Enquiry presented and ordered to be printed.—Bills on table forwarded.—Lord Sheffield presented a bill " to regulate the " forms of convictions by Justices of the Peace, " and to render such Justices more safe in the " execution of their office," which was read.—Duke of Norfolk called the attention of their lordships to a breach of privilege, upon which the strangers were ordered to withdraw.—Earl Fitzwilliam moved, " 1. That it was the duty of his " Majesty's ministers to make timely and adequate representations against all those acts as " have, in their judgment, constituted a series of " systematic 'aggressions, violence, and insult' " on the part of France.—That, by dignified and " temperate remonstrances, followed up with " consistency and sustained with firmness, either " the course and progress of such acts would " have been arrested, without the necessity of re- " curring to arms; or the determination of the " French Government, to persist therein, would " have been distinctly ascertained, before his " Majesty had proceeded so far, both in the re- " duction of his forces, and the surrender of his " conquests.—That this essential duty appears to " have been neglected by his Majesty's ministers, " and that such their omission and neglect have " been highly injurious to the public interests.

" 2. That the principal circumstances which " have in the judgment of his Majesty's ministers " rendered it impossible to execute the Tenth " Article of the Treaty of Amiens must have been " known to his Majesty's ministers either before, " or very soon after, the exchange of its Ratifica- " tions, which exchange took place on the 18th " April.—That nevertheless no steps appear to " have been taken until the 9th of February last, " towards obtaining by discussion or explanation " with the French Government, the removal of " this most important difficulty.—That so far " from taking any such steps, his Majesty's mi- " nisters made repeated applications to that Go- " vernment during the whole of the last summer " to accelerate the execution of the article in its " present shape, by co-operating with his Ma- " jesty in inviting other powers to guarantee it. " That in consequence of those applications the " guarantee of Austria was actually obtained in " the month of August, and those of Russia and " Prussia were jointly solicited, by the British " and French ministers at Petersburgh and Ber- " lin, so late as the 25th of November last, many " months after his Majesty's ministers well knew " that the execution of the said article was utterly " impracticable.—That this conduct, alike incon- " sistent with wisdom, dignity, and good faith, " was no less detrimental to the interests than " prejudicial to the character of the British na- " tion, inasmuch as the favourable opportunity " for negotiating on this subject, while his Ma- " jesty was still in possession of his other con- " quests, was thereby lost, and the discussion re- " served to a period when a recourse to arms " constituted the only means by which his Ma- " jesty can resist the unreasonable demands of " the enemy, and support the just cause of his " people.

" 3. That it appears to this House, that on the " 17th of October last, counter-orders were dis- " patched by his Majesty's Government, revoking " the orders before given for the surrender of the " Cape of Good Hope, and of the other conquests " then held by his Majesty; and that the final order, " by virtue of which his Majesty's forces actually " evacuated the Cape of Good Hope, was not sent " till the 16th of November last.—That on the " said 16th of November the hostile spirit of " France had (in the judgment of his Majesty's " ministers) already been manifested for more " than six months, by one continued series ' of " aggression, violence, and insult,' for which " ' neither reparation nor redress' had down to " that moment been obtained.—That the offen- " sive principle had already been distinctly ad- " vanced, of excluding his Majesty from all con- " cern in the affairs of the Continent. That the " Spanish and other Priories had already been " withdrawn from the Order of Malta. Pied- " mont, Parma, Placentia, and Elba had been an- " nexed to France; Switzerland had been attack- " ed and subjugated, and the remonstrance of his " Majesty's Government on that subject, had " been treated with indignity and contempt. The " territory of the Batavian Republic was at that " very moment still occupied by the armies of the " French, and its internal administration still " controuled by their interference, and the French " Government itself was then actually engaged " in the pursuit of those plans and measures for " the subversion of the Turkish Empire, to which " his Majesty's Declaration has referred as a vio- " lation of the treaty of peace.—That in direct- " ing under such circumstances the final surren- " der of the Cape, without having in the interval " made any previous attempts to explain or ar- " range the numerous points of difference and " complaint which then actually subsisted be- " tween the two Governments, his Majesty's mi- " nisters have acted in contradiction to the sense " they had themselves manifested of their own " duty, and have improvidently exposed to dan- " ger some of the most important interests of his " Majesty's dominions.

" 4. That by these instances of misconduct, " his Majesty's ministers have proved them- " selves unworthy of the confidence of this House, " and incapable of administering with advantage " the public affairs in a crisis of such unexampled " difficulty and danger."—This produced a long debate between his R. H. the Duke of Clarence, Lords Coventry, Minto, Grosvenor, Bolton, Warwick, Scarborough, De Dunstanville, Carysfort, Darnley, Hobart, Suffolk, Grenville, the Lord Chancellor, and Lords Spencer and Pelham.—The first motion was negatived 86 to 17, and the others without a division. Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Second Report of Commissioners Naval Enquiry presented and ordered to be printed.—Petitions from Manufacturers of Silk and of Earthen-ware, against the Consolidated Duty Bill, presented, and laid on table.—Radnor Election Committee reported the sitting members duly elected, and the petitions not frivolous or vexatious.—Ship Burning Bill and Ship Passengers Bill read and passed.—His Majesty's Speech of November last, concerning the accommodation of mercantile persons, ordered to be considered in Committee to-morrow.—Militia Pay Bill read and ordered to be printed.—Committee reported Ordnance Land Bill which was ordered for to-morrow.—House went into Committee of Supply, and the Secretary at War presented the usual Estimates, upon which considerable debate arose between Messrs. Windham and Pitt, the Secretary at War, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Generals Tarleton and Norton, and Sir J. Pulteney. The Secretary at War then moved the following resolutions, which were agreed to.—29,337l. for the full pay of the Supernumeraries of the Army for one year, from the 25th December, 1802, to the 24th December, 1803.—266,004l. 14s. 1d. for the In and Out-Pensioners of Chelsea and Kilmainham Hospitals.—81101. 8s. 11d. for the Royal Military College—31,000l. for Royal Military Asylum at Chelsea.—218,270l. 11s. 1d. for one Regiment of Light Dragoons, and one West-India Regiment retained on the establishment of the Army; of an Augmentation of Dragoons in Great Britain, and the three Regiments of Foot Guards.—31,000l. for Allowances to General and Staff Officers.—35,751l. for the effective Captains to the Companies of Cavalry and Infantry, heretofore commanded by Colonels, Lieutenant-Colonels, and Majors.—1,747,570l. for the Militia embodied in Great-Britain and Ireland, and Miners of Cornwall and Devon.—38,345l. 12s. 7d. for Contingencies of Ditto.—143,891l. for Cloathing of Ditto.—145,000l. for increased Subsistence to Inn-keepers, and Allowance of Beer to Non-Commissioned Officers and Privates of Militia, &c.—416,000l. for Supplementary Militia.—300,000l. charge of Volunteer Corps in Great-Britain.—58,333l. for Barrack Department.—Mr. Pole then moved the following resolutions concerning the ordnance, which were also agreed to.—282,065l. 10s. 11d. for Great-Britain.—20,000l. further Charges of the Ordnance Office in Ireland.—38,900l. outstanding Claims on the said Office.—Report of

the Committee ordered for to-morrow.—Secretary at War presented certain papers respecting Malta, which were ordered to be on the table.—Consolidation Duty Bill postponed to Thursday.—Dublin Port Improvement Bill read a second time and committed for to-morrow.—Supply and Ways and Means postponed to Wednesday.—Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 7.—LORDS.—Evidence heard in Foote's Divorce Bill, which was postponed to Friday.—Bills before the House forwarded.—Private bills from Commons read.—Clergy Residence Bill, after some discussion between the Lord Chancellor, Lords Suffolk, Auckland, and Roslin, the Bishops of St. Asaph and Norwich, and the Duke of Richmond, committed for Friday.—Bills before the House disposed of.—Adjourned.—COMMONS.—Committee of the whole House on so much of the King's Speech of Nov. 23. as relates to the accommodation to be afforded to mercantile transactions of this Country. Report to be received to-morrow.—On motion of Mr. Wickham, leave granted to bring in a bill to empower the Commissioners of the First Fruits in Ireland, to lend a certain sum to incumbents, &c. without interest, to enable them to erect houses and offices in places convenient to their prescribed residences, &c.—On motion of Mr. Pole, leave granted to bring in a bill to enable the Board of Ordnance to purchase ground for a dépôt of Ordnance Stores, Small Arms, &c.—Mr. Whitbread moved, that copies of certain examinations before the Commissioners on the Abuse of the Navy, be laid before the House. On the suggestion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the motion was deferred till Monday.—Bill to remedy the defects of certain Exchequer Bills brought in and read.—Election Bribery Oath Bill read and ordered to be printed.—Ordnance Land Bill read and passed.—Report of Committee of Supply read, and resolutions agreed to.—Petition of Irish Tanners referred to Select Committee.—Mr. Garthshore laid the Navy Estimates on table.—Militia Pay Bill read a second time and ordered to be printed.—Soldier's Pass Bill read and passed.—Writ moved for member in the room of Hon. E. Bouverie.—Committee to prepare estimates for the pay, &c. of Irish Militia, revived.—Mr. Fitzgerald moved for account of sums levied by Grand Juries of Ireland for last ten years; also sums levied by them for the Militia.—County Bridge Bill read and passed.—Adjourned.

FOREIGN.

Constantinople, May 5.—The Arabian Rebel, ABDUL WECHAB, has recently published several Manifestos, in which he announces his determination to establish the *Mahometan Religion* in its original purity. His numbers are said to amount, already, to nearly 150,000 men. Notwithstanding the decided opposition he has met with from the Turks, he has extended his conquests to the City of MECCA.

Vienna, May 12.—The Deputation of the *German Empire* having terminated its labours, was dissolved on the 10th instant.

Switzerland, May 18.—The Elections in this Country, under the new Constitution, have terminated, almost universally, in favour of the friends of the Old System.

Paris, May 12.—On Sunday, the First Consul, attended by Madame Buonaparté and Cambacérès, took an airing in his Phaeton, near St. Cloud, and the horses having been frightened, he was thrown out, but sustained no other injury than a sprain of his hand.——*June 4.*—The Paris merchants have voted a ship of 110 guns for the service of Government, as have also the Conservative Senate. The Agents of Exchange have voted two frigates of 44 guns. The Mayors of Paris have opened subscriptions for building sloops and gunboats. The Prefect of Police has ordered gunboats to be built. The Students of the Polytechnic School have required permission to build a flat-bottomed boat. Antwerp has subscribed for a frigate of 44 guns.

Lucien Buonaparté set out for Spain in the beginning of the present month.

Peterbaugh, May 6.—During the year 1802, the number of *Births* in this City, was 7347, *Deaths*, 7324, and *Marriages*, 1430. Of the former, 300 were natural children, 14 foundlings, and 25 stillborn. Of the second, 2 were above 100 years old, 28 from 80 to 100, and 1700 under 2, of whom 1270 were boys, and 490 girls.

DOMESTIC.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

At the Court at St. James's, the 1st Day of June, 1803, present the King's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

This day the Right Honourable George Tierney, Treasurer of his Majesty's Navy, was, by his Majesty's command, sworn of his Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and took his place at the Board accordingly.

Whitehall, June 4, 1803.—The King has been pleased, by Letters patent under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to grant and confirm to his Grace Henry Duke of Beaufort, and the heirs of his body lawfully begotten, the ancient Barony of Bottetourt, by the name, style, and title of Baron De Bottetourt, as also the place and precedency due and belonging to the said Barony.

Whitehall, June 7, 1803.—The King has been pleased to present the Rev. George Addison to the Church and Parish of Glenyla, in the Presbytery of Meigle, and County of Forfar, vacant by the translation of Mr. George Haldam, late Minister there, to the Church and Parish of Kingoldrum.

St. James's, June 7, 1803.—Saturday last being the anniversary of the King's birth day, the same was observed at Court, where there was a very numerous and splendid appearance of the nobility, Foreign ministers, and other persons of distinction, to compliment his Majesty on the occasion. The guns in the Park and at the Tower were fired at one o'clock; and in the evening there were illuminations and other public demonstrations of joy throughout London and Westminster.

ODE—*For his Majesty's Birth-Day, 1803.—By Henry James Pye, Esq.—Poet Laureat.*

Britain, alas! has woo'd in vain,
Reluctant Peace, thy placid charms;
Compell'd, she treads once more th' ensanguin'd plain,
Where Fame, where Freedom call aloud for arms.
Yet be awhile the battle's sound
In notes of festive triumph drown'd;
Whether the fiends of Discord fly
Portentous through the fiery sky,
Or, bound in Fate's coercive chain,
Howl 'mid th' infernal seats in vain,
On this auspicious day the Muse,
Jocund, with grateful voice, her wonted theme pursues.

Amid the boast of tyrant pride,
The pomp of state, of arm'd array,
Can all the shouts of slavery hide
That slaves unwilling homage pay?
No force can shield Ambition's head
From noontide care, from midnight dread,
When the still monitor within
Searches th' abode of blood and sin:
While he who rules with virtuous sway,
Whom freemen glory to obey,
Sees every breast the bulwark of a throne,
His people's surest guard, its sacred rights their own.

Then let the Muse, with duteous hand,
Strike the bold lyre's responsive strings,
While every tongue through Albion's land
Joins in the hymn of praise she sings;
And Labour, from the furrow'd plain,
And Commerce, from the billowy main,
With one symphonious bid arise
The purest incense to the skies,
Above the proudest wreath of fame,
Which ever grac'd the victor's name,
A nation's votive breath by truth consign'd
To bless a patriot King—the friend of human kind!

On Wednesday, the 8th of June, the Mayor and Aldermen of London presented an address to his Majesty at the present crisis of public affairs. (See p. 868.)

MILITARY.

The French troops under the command of GENERAL MORTIER, assembled on the *Lower Rhine*, early in the month of May, to the number of 40,000 men. On the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of the same month, they passed the WAAL at *Nimeguen*, taking with them a great quantity of ammunition and provisions, and continued their march to *Arnheim*, *Doesburg*, and the department of *Oderysse'*, and established their head quarters at *Coevorden*. They entered the County of *Bentheim* on the 26th, and made prisoners of the garrison of the town of *Bentheim*, which consisted of an officer and 36 men. A proclamation was issued by *Gen. Mortier*, to the Hanoverians, accusing the King of violating his most solemn engagements, and assuring them of the favour and protection of the French. (see page 867.) On the 28th, the Hanoverian garrison evacuated *Osnaburg* and went to *Diepenau*, and the inhabitants sent a deputation to the French General, requesting his good treatment for the town. On the same day, the French troops passed the EMS, near Mippen; part of the infantry marched to *Hadelune*, and, on the 29th 10,000 men entered the principality of *Osnaburg*. The French troops in *Dutch Brabant*, *Bergen op-Zoom* and *Zealand* were also in motion to join the army against Hanover. They were to be replaced by other troops.

A body of French troops took possession of *Bremen* on the 2d inst. and another column was on the march to *Hamburgh*.

The Hanoverians are making the most active preparations for the defence of that Electorate. Field Marshall COUNT DE WALLMODEN has been appointed Commander in Chief of all the Hanoverian troops, and HIS R. H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, Lieutenant-General, and inspector of the cavalry and infantry. The greatest part of the army began its march, on the 24th of May, for the territory of Osnaburg, and the frontiers of Westphalia. Their force amounted to 18,000 regulars, and it was expected that it would speedily be augmented to 30,000. During the absence of these troops, all who were capable of bearing arms were to do duty at Hanover. A general levy was about to be made, throughout the Electorate, in consequence of his Majesty's Proclamation, of the 22d (see page 859) of all persons between the ages of 16 and 60, which it was supposed would produce 200,000 men.

The Gallo-Italian army has received orders to occupy the principal sea-ports of Italy. Thirteen thousand French and Italian troops arrived at *Bologna* on the 5th of May, destined for that purpose, and *General* LICCHI was expected there on the 8th with a division from *Milan*.—The new fortification erecting at Alexandria, in the Department of Marengo, were, on the 27th of May, going on with the greatest activity. The garrison consists of 10,000 men, of whom 1500 are constantly employed on the works.

GEN. STUART, with 3000 men has been ordered from *Malta* to *Sicily*, for the protection of that Island.

NAVAL.

May 18th.—*Capt. Pearson* in the *Doris*, cruizing off Ushant, fell in with the French lugger, *l'Affronteur*, commanded by Mons. *Morce André Dutoya*, mounting 14 guns, with 92 men, which he took after a short running action. On board l'Affronteur, the Captain and 8 men were killed and 14 wounded. On board the Doris one man was wounded.—*May 28*—*Capt. Mansfield* in the *Minotaur*, in company with the *Thunderer*, made prize of the French frigate *la Française*, Capt. *Jurien*, 35 days from *Port au-Prince*. She is pierced for 44 guns, and had on board 187 men. ——Since the commencement of the war, a great number of prizes of various descriptions has been taken from the enemy and brought into the different ports of the Kingdom. A very considerable portion of them from St. Domingo, laden with the produce of that Island.

" NUMERISQUE FERTUR, LEGE SOLUTIS.

The Doctor versus Cocker.—Doctor Loquitor.

" *I lisped in Numbers.*"—POPE.

When ARITHMETIC first I begun,
At school I was taught NUMERATION;
So, I soon learn'd to count *number one*,
The principal care of the nation.

Never sure was so hopeful a lad!
And, in spite of all peevish detraction,
One and *one* to make *three* I can ADD!
And can put a new case in *subtraction*.

If *thirteen* from *nine* you SUBTRACT,
A surplus of *one* will remain;
Should the Stock Holders doubt of the fact,
Lord AUCKLAND shall swear it is plain! *

When to MULTIPLY next I attained,
I met with some doleful disgraces;
But the best end of numbers was gained,
When I learn'd how to MULTIPLY Places.

Thus to MULTIPLY, ADD, and SUBTRACT,
Calculators may hold in derision;
But when in the *House* I'm attack'd,
They shall see how I shine in DIVISION.

In REDUCTION my skill you may know,
Tho' my PRACTICE is basely traduced;
Army, Navy, and Ordnance can shew
They were never before so REDUCED.

The next *rule* my wits did confound,
That *Golden* and *Grand* RULE OF THREE;
But *Golden* the *rule* soon I found,
That found *Gold* for BRAGGE, HILEY, and ME.

* Lord Auckland, for what reason is best known to himself, became, some time ago, the voluntary defender of Mr. Addington's statement of the 18th of December last. This defence failed completely; and, we are very anxious to see how Lord Auckland will make head against the proofs, which the Finance Minister himself must soon bring forward, of the incorrectness, not to say gross deception, of his own accounts.—The *war*, as a *cause* of the defalcation, will not do. The defalcation began *before* the King's Message was sent to Parliament.—But, to take Lord Auckland's own motto: " Que faire, dans une telle nuit? " Attendre le jour!"

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

ST. DOMINGO.—In reading the several accounts, which have, for a year past, been published, from time to time, under this head, one would think, that there must be *two* islands named St. Domingo; for the accounts to which we allude, though agreeing in dates, have constantly disagreed in every other particular. Within this fortnight, the public has, for the third time, been informed, through the London news-papers, that the French army of St. Domingo was, at last, reduced to so low and wretched a state by the Blacks, as to be compelled *to evacuate the colony*. When and how this evacuation took place, and whither the miserable remnant of the army had proceeded, were points that were not, indeed, specified with sufficient detail; but the principal facts, the over-running and total ruin of the colony by the Blacks, the destruction by the sword and by pestilence of the French, the driving of these latter from all the strong holds, and the final evacuation of the island by them, these have all been distinctly and positively stated; yet, we now find, from advices of a date so recent as the 15th of April, that, at that time, the French were not only still in the island, but were in possession of every important post and town, and had, of late, met with no annoyance from the Blacks, except at Fort Dauphin, where the Blacks had got into the town by stealth, but had been instantly driven out with considerable loss. There are, in the island, ten principal places, Santo Domingo, Les Cayes, Jaquemel, Cape Nicholas Mole, Port-au-Prince, Port de Paix, Leogane, St. Mark, Cape François, and Fort Dauphin, every one of which are in the hands of the French; and, the far greater part of them never have been disturbed by the Blacks, since the French army was, by the provident wisdom of our ministers, suffered to reach its destination. Whether this army be greatly reduced, or not, is a fact which we have not the means of ascertaining; but, as we have lately been told by the London news-papers, that the Polish Brigade, " which was " *very strong*," went over to the Blacks, and as we now know, that they did not go over to the Blacks, we must conclude, that the French have, at least, one strong brigade, unless the circumstance of its not having deserted should be found to have reduced it to a skeleton. The real state of the case, as far as we are able to ascertain it, is, that the French have from 25 to 30 thousand European troops in St. Domingo, and, perhaps, 10 thousand Blacks and Mulattoes, either bearing arms or performing the laborious part of the military services. Provisions are supplied by the United States of America, and are paid for, partly in colonial produce, and partly in *bills upon England*. The hard cash that is wanted for the army and navy, comes from the Havannah and from La Vera Cruz. As to the destruction of the colony, considered merely in point of cultivation, there can be no doubt but it has, in some degree, and even in a considerable degree, taken place; but, upon looking into the accounts of imports into the United States of America, during the last year, we find that more colonial produce has been brought thither from St. Domingo, than from any *three* other islands of the West-Indies put

together; and we beg leave to ask, whether the prizes which our ships have already taken, and one half of which are laden with the produce of St. Domingo, do not afford a striking corroboration of our statement.—That the war will greatly, and most injuriously affect this colony, cannot be doubted; for, though the Americans should carry on the trade to and from it, more troops cannot be sent without great risk, and more troops are necessary, to complete the reduction of the Blacks, to keep them in order when reduced, and to defend the sea-ports against our attacks. But, here arises a question which we once before started, and which must receive a solution, before we can proceed to speculate on the consequences which war will produce with respect to St. Domingo. It is a maxim, elaborately laid down by the ministers, and deliberately sanctioned by the last parliament, that the independence of the Blacks in St. Domingo, or to use the phrase of Lord Castlereagh, the "exis-"tence of a Black Empire," is more dangerous to our colonies, than any force which France can possibly establish there. Now, according to this maxim, how can ministers, without intentionally injuring their country, and betraying their trust, adopt any measure, or wilfully permit the doing of any act, which must evidently tend to the restoration of this dreaded Black Empire? The French army cannot continue masters of the Blacks, without receiving, from time to time, supplies of arms and ammunition and re-inforcements of men; to cut off, therefore, these supplies and reinforcements, will be to restore the Black Empire, and thereby to produce an event which, according to the maxim of the ministers themselves, must be infinitely more dangerous to us, than the safe arrival of fifty, or even a hundred, thousand French troops in St. Domingo. As to taking the colony from the French, and subduing the Blacks ourselves, that, we should suppose, would not be attempted, unless Mr. Tierney should make the Treasury overflow. Then, indeed, Lord Melville and General Maitland may, probably, be called in to carry on another St. Domingo war, at the expense of ten thousand men and twenty millions of money; but, as this is a case not to be anticipated upon slight grounds, we conclude, that ministers will make no attempt to conquer the island. Either, therefore, the French must be not only left quietly in St. Domingo, but must be permitted, during the war, to receive supplies and re-inforcements; or the fearful black empire, governed by a chief who will not forget that the English betrayed his predecessor, must be revived and re-established. —One cannot, then, suppress one's astonishment to hear the ministers and their partizans building any part of their hopes of successful hostility on the injury, which they shall be able to do to the fleet and army at St. Domingo, when that injury must, in whatever degree it is inflicted, tend, in the same degree, to the producing of an event, which, above all other events, they dreaded, at the close of the last war, and which they must now dread still more; because the Black Empire, if re-established, will, from having overcome the strongest European army that ever was seen in the West-Indies, have acquired a reputation it never before possessed, and will have given to the negroes in all the other islands, the dangerous example of triumphant revolt.

American States.—The permanent interests of America demand, on her part, a participation in the present war *against* France. If she had adopted this measure last war, she would not have lost thirty millions of dollars by French seizures; she would not have suffered such unheard-of insults from that power, nor would she now have had to *purchase* the free navigation of the Mississippi, the countries on both sides of which, down to the very mouth, she would have had as her portion of conquest. It must be confessed, however, that it was not her fault, that she did not join in the war. She was ready to do it; both the people and the government were, at one time, anxious for such a junction; but Mr. Pitt's views never extended beyond St. Stephen's and the Bank, if they had, Buonaparté never would have been Consul of France. The minister really seemed to have adopted the notion of the True Briton, that "America was at *too* "*great a distance* to be of any weight in the "scale of European politics;" when it is evident to every man who understands the subject, that, with America on our side, France, Spain, and Holland must have yielded to any terms that we chose to dictate.—The same narrow policy will, we fear, be pursued, by this country, in the present war; and, such are the materials of which the American executive government is *now* composed, that the same opportunity of gaining the accession of that power to a war against France, will scarcely ever return, till a total change in the external connexions, as well as in the internal politics of America, has taken place.—The Americans will perceive, their government will suffer them to perceive, nothing but their *immediate* interests, which interests are certainly to be furthered by neutrality; and, the same notice

which dictates neutrality in preference to war, will dictate a neutrality upon the French principle in preference to a neutrality upon the principle, on which England has hitherto acted. We do not think it likely, that America would join France in the war; but, we are certain, that she will endeavour to stretch the rights of neutrality so far as greatly to embarrass our maritime operations; and, her flag, while it shelters the floating property of France, will also shelter not less than 25 or 30 thousand British seamen. Will the Hawkesburies and Addington's issue such orders as shall prevent this? They dare not. The manufacturers, merchants, and money-holders of Great-Britain would soon inform them, that *any thing* must be submitted to, rather than risk a war with America, for which war the present American ministry would rejoice to find such an excuse as should reconcile the measure to the people. Our choice, in this respect, will, therefore, *now* lie between two very great evils, both of which might have been effectually prevented by continuing the last war to a safe and honorable close; or, by beginning the present war only six weeks sooner than it was begun. This is a circumstance in our affairs, which people seem to think very little about; but, let them remember, that, next October, our commercial treaty with America expires; that Mr. Jefferson may then impose extra duties on British goods, and may do many other injurious things, unless we leave a free course to American navigation. In short, let them recollect, that America is fully capable of carrying on the commerce of France, and that, if she is resolved to do it, we cannot prevent her without war, without cutting off one-fourth part of the export of our manufactures, without causing the confiscation of £40,000,000 of British property in America, without exposing our own West-India Islands to starvation; and, let them recollect, that this great and imminent danger might have been effectually prevented, if the ministers had listened to the counsel which was repeatedly given them. They despised this counsel, and the people joined in their stupid contempt. Their *reward* is at no great distance. Such a people must and ought to suffer. They have sanctioned the expunging of the lilies and the bartering of the honours of the flag, and what right have they, then, to hope for respect either on the land or the sea? What right have they, above all other nations, to prevent the ships of an independent power from carrying what goods they please, and whither they please: the ancient law of nations, indeed, gives us this right; but, have we not basely abandoned all the principles of that law? Have we not bound ourselves up by the convention with Russia? And shall not the Americans claim a right to navigate upon the principles of that convention? Most assuredly they will; and, as that convention will certainly be interpreted to allow the produce of the colonies of France to be carried to or from France by neutral vessels, we can see no obstacle, that the commerce of France can, after the first four or five months, experience from our maritime exertions, without immediately producing a quarrel with the neutral powers, and particularly with the American States, which quarrel, especially in the hands of "*safe* politicians," could not fail to hasten that catastrophe, which all men now begin to dread.

THE CONDUCT OF FRANCE is precisely such as every reasonable man must have expected from her. The arrest of English travellers in France is an act of great injustice and cruelty; but, who could expect any thing but injustice and cruelty from Buonaparté and his comrades? If you will play with a tyger, you must take care of his claws; and, if you say, that you did not expect such treatment, the answer is,—more fool you. Besides, you were duly forewarned; and, therefore, you stand charged with perverseness as well as folly, you are entitled neither to respect nor compassion.—From our military intelligence it appears, that the French have entered His Majesty's German dominions, in spite of that prohibition, on the part of Russia and Prussia, with which the London newspapers amused their readers, some days ago. We threw out, in our last, some hints as to the disposition of Russia, relative to our quarrel with France. We have seen nothing to alter the opinion we then entertained; and, as we believe, that the dispute between Sweden and Russia was a mere pretext for making preparations to revive the armed neutrality, so we believe, that Russia will, with great pleasure, see a war, and a long war, between England and France, without the least desire, that it should terminate in the triumph of the former. If, therefore, any convention has been formed for the purpose of keeping open the Weser and the Elbe, and for preserving the strict neutrality of the Hanseatic towns, Hamburgh, Lubeck, and Bremen; if any such convention has been formed between Russia and Prussia, a fact, however, of which we greatly doubt, that compact is by no means to be regarded as a mark of friendship, on the part of those powers, towards England, but merely as a measure of self-defence.——In the electorate of Hanover the French will find a considerable booty.

Hanover escaped the fraternal hug which Suabia and other parts of the empire experienced: it is fresh and fat, and a most delightful conquest, a conquest more valuable, beyond all comparison, than the prizes which we shall make at sea during the whole of the war. The Consul will not only plunder the electorate of its moveables, but will confiscate all the public buildings, lands, and other property, and will finally sell the whole of it by auction; so that, it is by no means unreasonable to suppose, that His Majesty's British dominions may be invaded by troops, bearing the produce of the sale of Hanover in their pockets. Nothing, certainly, can be more mortifying than this reflection; but, such is the natural consequence of committing one's affairs to "*safe* politicians," to ignorant, low-bred, low-minded, selfish, crawling ministers. It is, we suppose, very pleasant for a country to have such ministers; but, then, people must not expect to be exempt from the pain which attends this pleasure. He who prefers the spaniel to the mastiff, must submit with patience to the robbery of his house. — Whether France has or has not a *right* to make war upon the Elector of Hanover by way of avenging herself on the King of England, is a question, the discussion of which we willingly leave to the superior talents of that able civilian Lord Hawkesbury, to whom His Majesty is, in great part, indebted for all the innumerable indignities that have fallen, and that are still falling, upon his head —The proclamation, issued, at Osnaburgh, by General Mortier is full of falsehoods; it contains a most infamous charge against His Majesty, whom this marauding general accuses of "*perjury*, " and of *falsifying his signature*, in refusing " to evacuate Malta, according to the so- " lemn obligations contracted by the treaty " of Amiens." Now, His Majesty certainly has not *denied his signature*, and, as to *perjury*, it is absolutely impossible, that, in the present case, he should have committed it. But, though this proclamation is nonsensical as well as brutal and false, it will gain belief on the continent of Europe, and even amongst those to whom it is more immediately addressed; for, such is the way, in which the dispute with France has been managed, that, to ninety nine persons out of every hundred, England appears to be the aggressor; and to have begun the war purely for the purpose of avoiding the fulfilment, on her part, of the treaty of Amiens. This is not the fact, but the world will believe it to be the fact; and, it is a very old saying, that, "*what every body believes, must be true*" At any rate, it is the same, in the practical effect, as if it were true. And this sort of fatal error it is, that the conduct of our ministers has enabled the French to invent, and to propagate with such mischievous success. In short, we are now entered on a war of absolute necessity, on grounds absolutely false. Good grounds did exist, grounds that would have put all the world on our side; but, the bad grounds, the paltry, the false grounds, have been taken, merely because an open avowal of the true grounds of the war, would have been a decided condemnation of those who made and defended the peace. Thus, it is not sufficient that we submit to the evils of an injurious and dishonorable peace, for the base purpose of indulging the folly and selfishness of these ministers, but, we are also to submit to the probably greater evils of a war generally regarded as unjust, we are to return to the contest stripped of our character for good faith as well as for courage, for the baser purpose of disguising that folly and that selfishness. This is precisely our situation; and yet we affect to contemn the people of France! We, who are the puppets, the mere sport, of the Addingtons and Hawkesburies, do really affect to laugh at those who are now surfeiting the Consul with addresses! We, who can patiently hear Mr. Addington call on us for *sacrifices such as we never before dreamed of*, while we see him heaping thousands upon thousands a year on himself and his family; we it is who affect to despise the slaves of Buonaparté!

GARBLED PAPERS.—But, that which will, perhaps, do more than any thing else towards blasting our character for good faith, is, the garbling of the correspondence relative to the negotiation with France; and, we are utterly astonished, that, out of nearly a thousand Lords and Commons, not one should be found to demand an explanation on this head; that not one should have discovered a solicitude to wipe away the stain which this transaction must leave upon the government and the country! The correspondence, such as it was laid before Parliament, is now printed in French, for the purpose of being circulated over the Continent, and particularly in the several courts of Europe; but, this correspondence is garbled, say the French, and we have, in our last, given our reasons for believing the French accusation to be just. Why, then, is not this matter cleared up? Can any one suppose, that the silence of the ministers will remove the charge? Are those poor men weak and vain enough to imagine, that the politicians of Europe will regard their silence as a dignified mode of treating a groundless calumny? We do not know but they may, but we are certain, that they are,

and will be, looked upon as guilty of the crime of which they are accused, unless they bring *proof* to the contrary. We beg leave to refer the reader to p. 821, in our last sheet, for a full explanation of this matter, which is well worthy of the public attention; because, unless the accusation of France be met by contradictory proof, no nation, no individual, is bound to admit as truth any official paper published by the British government.

King of Sardinia.—Our readers will certainly remember, the repeated boasts of the ministers and their adherents of having *obtained so much for our allies*. It was hard, indeed, to discover any thing but loss and humiliation, which they had obtained for them; but, there was some subterfuge found out respecting every one except the King of Sardinia, for whom they said it was impossible to obtain any terms, without giving up all hopes of peace. Mr. Pitt, during his defence of the preliminary treaty, said, "he "was ready to grant, that *we ought to have* "*claimed Piedmont for its sovereign, but could* "*we have obtained it?*"(1) The answer to to this was ready, that, if *we could not obtain it by the peace, we should not have made that peace*. Mr. Windham strongly disapproved of the abandonment of the King of Sardinia, and denied that we had made any exertions to save him. "We have," said he, "left Sardinia, without an attempt to re- "lieve her, without even a helping hand "stretched out to support or to cheer her, "under that ruin which she has brought "upon herself, with no fault on her part, "while adhering faithfully to her treaty "with us."(2) This charge against the makers of the peace is now preferred by the French, and communicated to every court and every politician in Europe, through the official channel of the Moniteur, which print, under the date of the 31st of May, in commenting upon that part of the speech of the Duke of Clarence, in which his Royal Highness lamented the hard fate of the King of Sardinia, observes: that, "If En- "gland had, at the forming of the treaty of "Amiens, been willing to make any sacri- "fice in favour of the King of Sardinia; if "she would have consented to restore Tri- "nidada to Spain, or Ceylon to the Batavian "Republic, there is no doubt, that *France* "*would have made any stipulations in favour* "*of the King of Sardinia that England* "*would have desired*. But, the cabinet of "London, rejected every arrangement, and "founded its refusal upon the principle "(often expressed during the negotiation of "Amiens), that *the Continent is no concern of* "*Great Britain*, that she esteems no one of "its nations, and that she relies on herself "only."(3)—Now, if this charge be well-founded, what will the world think of us? What a selfish and perfidious nation must we pass for? And, if it be not well-founded, it should meet with instant and explicit contradiction. The ministers must not say, that they are not called upon to refute allegations that appear in the French news-papers. This excuse might have had the appearance of reason some months ago, but now that they have acknowledged the official character of the Moniteur, nay, now that they have pleaded that official character as giving to the Report of Sebastiani that importance which rendered it the subject of a negotiation, and finally the immediate cause of a war; *now*, we think, that they will not affect to regard the Moniteur as an unofficial paper, and its charges as beneath their notice. This, then, is the state of the case: they are accused of *having abandoned our ally, the King of Sardinia, for the sake of holding for ourselves Ceylon or Trinidada*; and further, of having, during the negotiation of Amiens, repeatedly declared, *that the Continent was no concern of Great Britain, that she esteemed no one of its nations, and that she relied on herself only*: the paper, in which they are thus charged, in the face of all Europe, is full as authentic and official as the Report of Sebastiani: Sebastiani's Report has served them as the pretext for refusing to fulfil the treaty of Amiens: therefore, unless they notice the more recent publication, which we have quoted above, and which contains a charge most injurious to the character of themselves and their country, we must conclude, and all the world must conclude, that that charge is true.

The Continental Powers will, we are fully persuaded, feel no inclination to meddle in the present contest. The principles on which we made the peace of Amiens, the selfish and base motives by which this country has evidently been actuated since the present ministers came into power, and

(1) See Debates on the Preliminaries, Register, Vol. II. p. 1141.

(2) See Debates, Register, Vol. II. p. 1180.

(3) "Si l'Angleterre avait volu, lors du traité d'A- "miens, faire quelque sacrifice en faveur de son allié "le Roi de Sardaigne; si elle avait consenti à laisser "ou la Trinité à l'Espagne, ou Ceylon à la Repub- "lique Batave, il n'y a pas de doute que la France "n'eût stipulé pour le Roi de Sardaigne ce que l'An- "gleterre aurait desiré. Mais le cabinet de Londres "a repoussé tout arrangement, et fondé son refus sur "ce principe, souvent exprimé dans la négociation "d'Amiens, que le *Continent ne concerne pas la Grande* "*Bretagne*, qu'elle n'en estime aucune nation, et "qu'elle ne se fie qu'a elle même."

by which it is still actuated, as appears from the closing paragraph of the Declaration laid before Parliament, must prevent any of the powers of the Continent from reposing any confidence in us; and, we believe, that the far greater part of them would rejoice to hear, that this island was sunk to the bottom of the sea. The Morning Chronicle informs us, indeed, that Mr. Bastard, in the debate on Mr. Patten's motions, on the 3d instant, expressed his hopes, that "we were not yet so low but that we might "readily have the *assistance* of STRONG *and* "POWERFUL continental *allies*." To dive into the sources of the honourable gentleman's hope, would, of course be venturing beyond our depth; but, if we really should get *allies*, it is very probable that we shall have their *assistance*; and, if those allies should be *strong*, we confess the likelihood of their being *powerful*. All, therefore, that we have to regret, is, that the honourable gentleman did not enter a little more into particulars, in order to afford us grounds for participating in his flattering hope.—On this subject, we must, too, beg leave to revert to Mr. Addington's doctrine respecting continental allies. "The *duty of nego-* "*tiation commenced, when all hopes of* CON- "TINENTAL AID *in checking the power of* "*France were at an end.*" (4) Well, then, are these hopes now *revived?* Can we, agreeably to Mr. Bastard's wish, readily obtain powerful allies upon the Continent? If we cannot, "the *duty of negotiation*" is again begun.—Mr. Yorke, also, no longer ago than Monday last, during the debate on the army estimates, still attempted to justify the treaty of Amiens, upon the ground of our having been left without any allies on the Continent. But, if this was a reason for making peace, that peace should not have been broken, until we had recovered our continental allies; and is Mr. Yorke prepared to say that we have done this? No, says he, but we have had a breathing time, we have recovered our strength! And has not France had a breathing time too? And have we really renovated our strength by yielding the Cape, Porto Ferrajio, Minorca and Martinico, by disbanding some of the best of our soldiers, by dismantling the fleet, and by driving thirty thousand of our own sailors and naval artizans to join another thirty thousand, belonging to France, Spain, and Holland, which we have released from our prisons? Are these the changes in point of strength, which now enable us to renew single-handed the contest which, before these changes took place, we were *unable to prosecute without continental aid?* No; it is a fact which no man of common sense and common sincerity will attempt to deny, that we are, at this moment, *less* able to meet France single-handed than we were to have continued the war with her; and, therefore, if we are now able to renew the war, and if it be wise for us to do it, without allies upon the Continent, is it not absurd, is it not scandalous to the last degree, still to plead, as a justification of the peace, the *want of such allies?*—But, however we may settle the matter amongst ourselves, the powers of the Continent will certainly not interfere, while the makers and defenders of the peace of Amiens, have the conducting of the national concerns. We, for our parts, do not believe, that *any* set of ministers that could possibly be chosen, would, for a long time, at least, be able to retrieve the character of the country, so far as to regain the confidence of other nations; and, as to the present ministry, any foreign statesman, who should advise his sovereign to enter into an alliance with England, while they are entrusted with her power, would richly merit the mad-house or the block. No; the Stadtholder and the King of Sardinia, "*remember the Stadthol-* "*der and the King of Sardinia!*" This is the reply, and the only reply, that the Addingtonian Ministry ought to receive, to every overture that they may attempt to make towards obtaining continental allies.

THE MALTESE PAPERS, which were published in the Register have produced greater effect on the public mind, than any thing which has appeared in print for many years past. The parliament has taken the matter up, and, upon the motion of Mr. Canning, two papers have been printed; one is the memorial addressed to Lord Hobart, by the deputies, after their arrival in London; and, the other, their letter to Lord Hobart, previous to their departure for Malta. This latter we did not before possess; but, the former we published so long ago as on the 7th of May (see page 680). The ministers have laid before parliament both the original French, and a translation, of this memorial. The French agrees word for word with the copy which we have, and there is no material difference in the translation. But, how comes it that the remonstrance, the first paper of all, is not laid before Parliament? Is there to be no end of garbling? This remonstrance, of which the reader will find a translation in p. 674 et seq. we possess in the original Italian. We know, that the government has possessed a copy of it ever since the month of Ja-

(4) See Debates on the Peace, Register, Vol. II. p. 1149.

nuary last. Why, then, is it kept back? Why is not the Parliament to see it? Is the House of Commons to be thus sported with by a ministry? If it has no right to call for these papers, why is a part given? And, if it has a right, why is not the whole given? There never was an assembly, calling itself legislative, Buonaparté's mutes not excepted, so disdainfully, so contemptuously treated, as the British Parliament now is.—The letter from the Maltese Deputies to Lord Hobart, dated 2d April, 1802, (which letter will be found in a foregoing page of this present sheet,) is intended to make good the assertion of the ministers, "that the *people* "*of Malta* were *satisfied* with, and *grateful* "for, the terms which had been obtained "for them in the Definitive Treaty."—— This letter was written in London, without any consultation with the people of Malta; and, therefore, as we before observed, the Deputies could not speak officially; they had no power to approve of any thing which should provide for the restoration of the Knights, in any way or form whatsoever. Their letter could amount to nothing more than an expression of their own private feelings and opinions. Besides, what do they say? They beg Lord Hobart to accept of their "warmest thanks for *all that he has* "*deigned to do in favour of their nation*;" and, towards the close of their letter, the whole of which is couched in very ambiguous terms, they ask him "to permit them, at "some seasonable opportunity, to *lay before* "*him that, which would complete the felicity of* "*the Maltese Nation.*" Thus, it appears, then, that, in spite of all the presents and money they had received, previous to the writing of this letter, they could not be brought to give their explicit approbation to the terms of the Treaty of Amiens, which terms, on the contrary, they are very careful not to mention. The Deputies were sent to *protest against the restoration of the Knights*, and to declare the resolution of the Maltese *to resist such restoration with the last drop of their blood.* By the Definitive Treaty the Knights were restored. The Deputies *could not*, therefore, on the part of their constituents, approve of the terms of that treaty: if, then, their letter will bear this construction it is of no validity; for they were not empowered to write such a letter; they exceeded their powers, and this the ministers well knew. But, we deny that it will bear this construction; and, we ask if it be credible, that the deputies, if they had meant to express their approbation of the Treaty of Amiens, would not have mentioned that compact? Which they do not, in any way whatever, from the first word of their letter to the last.—Referring our readers to p. 769 of this Volume, we must, for the present, dismiss this subject, which, however, we shall not fail to revive.

FINANCE.—The partizans of this centipede ministry, amply partaking in all the qualities of their principals; are now putting forth writings, recommending peace, on account of its *œconomy*, just at the very moment when that peace is turned into a war, and a war, too, which calls for sacrifices hitherto unheard-of, and that would have remained unheard-of, if we had not made a peace "to husband our resources," a peace of "capital, credit, and confidence!"—One point only of this extensive and complicated subject we shall here press upon the attention of the reader. Mr. Addington, in his estimates of 10th December last, took credit for £6,500,000 as the *surplus* of the Consolidated Fund, during the year 1803. We have stated, that the said surplus will fall £2,000,000 short of this estimate. Here we remain at issue with Mr. Addington; and, if war be pleaded as the cause of the defalcation, we shall remind him, that the defalcation *preceded* the war. Then, too, we shall have the other object of comparison; to wit, the produce of *last war* with that of *this war*; and here we shall soon discover how prodigiously our pecuniary resources have been augmented by the peace. ——There is to be *a loan*, it seems, after all; notwithstanding Mr. Addington's resolution to raise, within the year, the sums necessary for the expenses of the year. This loan will, probably, be small; for, every trick will be played, in order to put off the evil day; but, by the terms of this loan compared with those of the loan made during the last year of the war, we shall be able to form some judgment as to the increase of "capital, credit, and con- "fidence," which has arisen from the peace. —But, with what face can Mr. Addington come forward with a measure whereby an addition is made to the national debt for the purpose of carrying on war, without having first made a public and formal recantation of the principles on which he made the peace? In defending the Preliminary Treaty, he made use of the following ever-memorable words: "I perfectly concur with "my noble friend in thinking, that we ought "to watch with great care, *any tendency to* "*increase the colonial territory of this country.*" —And again.—"To those who wished to "continue the war for the purpose of *re-* "*ducing the power of France*, I wish to state, "that another campaign could not have "been made at a less expense than "£40,000,000, and that even CERTAIN

" SUCCESS would *not have been worth such* " *a price!!!!!*" (6) Why, then, does he now call on us to make sacrifices? He persists in the principles which dictated the Treaty of Amiens, and yet he now calls on us to make sacrifices hitherto unheard-of for the purpose of carrying on war! When he had made the peace of Amiens, he deprecated any addition to our colonial territory, which, indeed, he has, since that time, very greatly diminished. If, then, *an addition to our own territory be an evil*, and if " certain " success" in *reducing the power of France* be not worth forty millions of money; we once more ask, in the name of all that's vain, and silly, and impudent, we ask, why we are now at war, and why, for the prosecution of that war, we are called on to make sacrifices, which we never before heard of?

CENSURE ON MINISTERS.—The motions which have been made, in Parliament, on this subject, together with an exact account of the several results, will be found in the present sheet, under the head of Parliamentary Minutes.—The defence made by the ministers and their partizans was, in truth, no defence at all; nor did they stand in need of any; they are regarded as the persons having the places and pensions in their gift, and as the most likely men in the world again to crawl to Buonaparté, and this was enough. Every one, however, knows them to be worthy of censure, and of something more than censure; and, of this we rest assured, that justice must be done them, or this country must become a province of France. People may be shocked at this; they may fret, and bluster, and talk big; but that will not prevent them from being the slaves of Buonaparté; that will not prevent them from yielding their land and their houses, and their carriages and their plate into the hands of some marauding prefect or general. Making the peace of Amiens is a crime that must be punished, or another peace of Amiens will be made; and one more such a peace, though it exist but a year, will finish the work which Lord Hawkesbury began in conjunction with the Commissary of Prisoners.—The pretext of Mr. Pitt, and others of the same stamp, for not passing a vote of censure *now*, was, that such a vote would *contradict* the sentiments of the address, wherein the two Houses pledged themselves to *assist* His Majesty in carrying on the war. Just as if the removal of men, who, according to Mr. Pitt's own opinion, *did not deserve a vote of acquittal*, did not deserve to be regarded as *capable* of conducting the affairs of the nation at this awful crisis; just as if voting for the removal of such men, would tend to *weaken* His Majesty's efforts for prosecuting the war with success.—The fact is, that Mr. Pitt, not to join in a condemnation of the treaty of Amiens, which he had supported, and not to vote with those who opposed that treaty, and who now led the way in proposing the censure, took a middle, a course of " existing circumstances," which may do very well when a man is minister and has a weather-cock majority at his command; but which is not always safe in a leader of opposition, a truth which Mr. Pitt now experienced; for, in endeavouring to avoid the charge of inconsistency with respect to the treaty of Amiens, and also the mortification of falling into the ranks of Mr. Windham, he exposed himself to be, and he was, from the mouth of his own creatures Lords Hawkesbury and Castlereagh, justly charged with greater inconsistency; and he experienced the greater mortification of being, in an opposition against Addington, the miserable Doctor Addington, left in a minority of 56 against 333!—It is curious to observe the effect, which this division has produced in the minds of the public. Men with whom Mr. Pitt was formerly a sort of deity, now speak of him as of other men, scruple not to say, that he has acted an inconsistent and foolish part, and, in some instances, they push their satire to contempt and ridicule. One cannot help being shocked at the baseness of such persons, however, though their conduct is precisely what might have been expected. The *birth-day*, too, which was to be celebrated *every year*, has passed unnoticed. Mr. Pitt is a great orator, but he is not a great statesman. His measure of peace, the most important one he ever adopted, has failed, and the country feels it. If he could not bring himself to vote in the ranks of Mr. Windham, he should have kept away, and not have used all his influence to thwart the only measure which can possibly give the country a chance of escaping destruction. His absence would have added about 40 to those who voted for the censure of ministers, and rather than see such an accession to the strength of Mr. Windham, he exposed himself to defeat, and his country to destruction. We have watched all his conduct very narrowly, all his manœuvres, all his sallies, all his sneers, and, we are fully persuaded, that, next to the possession of power, next to an absolute controul over every living creature in this kingdom, nothing is so near his heart as to keep Mr. Windham from that eminence, to which *he knows* him to be better entitled than himself. This is the great and leading

(6) See Debates, Vol. II. p. 1149.

object of all his party intrigues. Fox he does not envy; he cares very little about the popularity that he may obtain; that will not injure him; that only makes Fox an antagonist more worthy of him. But, every thing which Mr. Windham gains is taken from Mr. Pitt; and this the latter well knows, that it has been owing only to the success of a well combined system of misrepresentation and detraction, that Mr. Windham was not, long ago, universally regarded as his superior. The times are, however, approaching, when this base system will no longer have a prevalent effect, and when the nation will look for a guide in the man who foresaw, who foretold, and who endeavoured to prevent, all the mighty mischiefs, which have already befallen, and which are now befalling us. We may be mistaken with respect to the conduct of the nation in this respect; but, as to the alternative we assuredly are not: either Mr. Windham, or some one of his mind and principles, will direct the affairs of this country, or this country will be subdued and enslaved. If Mr. Windham had been minister of Great Britain, America would not have had to purchase Louisiana of France, the King of Sardinia, the Stadtholder, and the Vendeans, would not have been abandoned, Germany would not have been new-modelled, the French troops would not have been at Hanover.—We shall resume this subject in our next.

THE CITY ADDRESS, which will be found in p. 868 of this sheet, comes rather tardily, and by no means breathes that ardour for the contest, which we could have wished to hear. In fact, the address amounts to this, that the Corporation of London are ready to risk their lives and fortunes in order to enable their beloved King to make peace with the rebel and usurper of France as soon as possible; and, in these dutiful, loyal, and patriotic sentiments, we dare say, they are most cordially joined by ninety-nine hundredths of their fellow citizens.

POSTSCRIPT.

MR. SUETT.—Always ready to correct the errors into which we may fall, we have now to state, that we were misinformed as to the intended appointment of this gentleman to the post of Secretary at War. But though our information appears to have been incorrect, it was not altogether unfounded, for we understand that Mr. SUETT, while he declines taking the office himself, is to give the ministers all the support that he can in his own line, upon condition that they provide, in their line, for one of his relatives; and, in order to an honourable fulfilment of this stipulation, we hear, that the diverting gentleman has been busily at work, during his absence from the boards, arranging the drolleries and jests which he has collected from the books and newspapers, ancient and modern. These are, we are informed, all pasted together in slips, which are numbered and fitted with a shifting head and tail piece, so as to be ready to foist into any speech that the actor may have to repeat. We do certainly see many things to blame; but, when we find cause for commendation we are the first to bestow it; and, we trust that no one will suspect us of flattery, when we congratulate the ministers on the acquisition, which they have made in the inimitable talents of MR. SUETT, whose *single-handed* exertions, dictated by his *true English feeling*, will, we doubt not, be more than a match for all the support that Buonaparté can derive from his innumerable host of chanteurs and harlequins.

☞ We are glad to perceive, that MR. PELTIER'S trial will be ready for publication next week; and also, that this gentleman will, in the course of the present month, revive the AMBIGU, which the tyranny of Buonaparté, aided by the yielding disposition of the ministers, compelled him to lay aside, during "*the peace which so* HAPPILY *subsisted between the two countries.*" We would, however, advise Mr. Peltier to be cautious; for, though he should even again be requested to write for the government, let him not forget, how they uniformly abandoned their friends, let him never forget their treatment of the Royalists of La Vendée, and let him not be too confident, that the very works, which they may prevail on him to write and publish during the war, they will not, after the war is over, prosecute him for selling.

FUNDS.

FRENCH.—*May* 28	29	*June* 1	2	3	4
5 pr Ct. Con. 47 10	48 50	47 80	48	48 25	48 25

ENGLISH.—*June* 1	2	3	6	7	8
4 per Ct. Con.	73⅜	74¼	74⅛	73⅝	73⅜	73½
3 per Ct. Red.	58	57⅜	58⅛	57¼	57⅜	57⅞

BREAD.—*May* 26	31	*June* 8
Quartern Loaf.....	9⅛	9¾	9⅝

LONDON,

TO THE EDITOR.

SIR,—In your Summary of Politics for the week ending the 7th of May, I observe a paragraph referring to Sir Henry Mildmay's motion upon the state of the navy, in which you again quote the promise made by Mr. Addington, on the 2d December last, in the following words: "What apprehension can be felt for our safety, "when it is known, that by the *prudent* and "*wise* conduct of the First Lord of the "Admiralty, such arrangements were "made, that, in case of emergency, *fifty* "sail of the line can be prepared *for sea* "within one month, and even a larger "number, should the exigency be pressing. "Thus we are situated, *ready for any event.*" —The explanation which you represent Mr. Addington to have given respecting this promise, in answer to Sir Henry Mildmay, on the 4th ultimo, bears on the face of it such a glaring trait of dissimulation, if not of treachery, that I really cannot conceive the minister, incapable as he may be of his station, could have committed himself in such a gross manner to the House of Commons, to the nation, and even to the whole world. If you did not hear the explanatory words from Mr. Addington's lips yourself, I do hope and trust you will feel yourself called upon, in justice to the minister and for the credit of the country, to declare, that the quotation you have given from his speech, in answer to Sir Henry Mildmay, is incorrect, and that the reporter from whom you extracted it, has grossly misrepresented him.—If this be not the case, well may you exclaim, "What a shuf"fle!" Indeed it would be a trick of the darkest hue. That any minister of any country should declare in the face of the world, that fifty sail of the line, "*ready for* "*sea*," means only "*fully rigged and fitted* "*out*," but without the "*complement of men*," is what I cannot yet credit.—Admitting, however, for the sake of argument, that the quotation you have made from Mr. Addington's speech is correct, though while I feel myself, as I have already observed, under the necessity of doubting, is it possible to conceive, that Mr. Addington, or indeed any other public man, could be so completely ignorant of the nature of naval equipments, as to assert in the parliament of this maritime empire, that fifty sail of the line, "*ready for sea*," means only "*fully rigged* "*and fitted out*," but without the "*complement* "*of men.*" Such a palpable want of common understanding I do not wish to attribute to the meanest capacity; much less can I be inclined to think, that the first minister of the crown could entertain such a fallacious idea, or attempt to impose it upon the representatives of the people.—But, Sir, I am far more inclined to believe, that, instead of your quotation being correct, Mr. Addington must have said—If we have but *men*, *fifty* sail of the line will not only be ready for sea, but shall be actually at sea, in less than a month. Thus much Mr. Addington might have said with great truth and safety; indeed, he would have been perfectly correct, if he had taken a much shorter space of time for the equipment of such an armament, provided the ships were in a state fit for service; but this the injudicious measures of the Board of Admiralty have rendered totally the reverse.—The circumstance of ships being fully "*rigged and* "*fitted out*," but without "*men*," *would be worse than having none at all*; for without men to take care of them, their sails would be rotting and their stores spoiling, and the ships themselves in absolute danger of being driven from their anchors for want of hands to secure them in tempestuous weather. How often do we hear of our ships, when even completely manned, driving from their anchors, and experiencing the most imminent danger? So much, indeed, that many are under the necessity of calling for assistance.—It would be well if Mr. Addington, or any other minister (whether your report be correct or not) would give himself the trouble to acquire a little theoretical knowledge, before he speaks on a professional subject, upon which he has not had any practical experience. The evils that arise from the assertions of men in high and dignified situations, when speaking upon professional subjects, of which they have no knowledge, are incalculable. For what

man, much less a professional man, could imagine that a declaration of a minister in parliament, that *fifty* ships of the line could be ready for sea in a month, simply meant "*rigged and fitted out*," but without "*men?*" Into what a false hope of security must the nation be lulled by such a declaration, and into what a state of despair must it be driven, when the threatening approach of the enemy to our shores should call forth an explanation, as you have ascribed to Mr. Addington, on this momentous and important subject?—Let it be supposed, the French could effect a landing and preserve a footing even but for a short time, in the vicinity of our naval arsenals, and were there to find *fifty* sail of the line, fully "*rigged and fitted out*," and of course without men, for with men the enemy never could have approached them; the consequence would be, that these *fifty* ships of the line would instantly be sent to the ports of France, from the very circumstance of their being equipped for sea; while the other ships which should be found in a state of ordinary, or unequipped, would, if not destroyed, be suffered to remain in our hands. Of the two, it would be far better that our whole marine should be destroyed, than that we should furnish the enemy with the means of our own subjugation.

(to be continued)

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Letter from Lieut. Gen. Mortier, commanding in chief the French army, in the Electorate of Hanover, to the French Minister at War.—Dated Head Quarters, Niewburg, June 4, 1803.

CITIZEN MINISTER,—I had the honour to inform you, by my letter of the 28th ult. of the march of the French army towards Hanover. After a march excessively fatiguing across arid sands and marshy heaths, I took a position on the 31st before Wechte. I was assured that the enemy guarded the line of the Hunte. Gen. Hammerstein, commanding the advanced guard of the King of England, occupied Diepholtz with the second and sixth regiments of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and a division of artillery. I made my dispositions to dislodge him on the following morning. The second division commanded by Gen. Schiner, that of cavalry under the orders of Gen. Nansouty, received orders to march to Goldenstedt, to force the passage of the Hunte, and then march to Suhlingen, that they might cut off every thing they might find between that place and Diepholtz, which the division of Gen. Montrichard had orders briskly to attack. The enemy seeing that by this movement he was turned on his right, retired during the night to Bersten —On the 1st inst. the advanced guard, commanded by Gen. Drouet, had a warm skirmish before Banver, with the rear-guard of the enemy. —On the 2d the army united before Suhlingen; the advanced guard moved towards Bersten; it here fell in with the enemy, and notwithstanding the superiority of numbers, and the extreme fatigue of the troops, who had that day marched twelve leagues, Gen. Drouet gave the order to attack. The enemy kept up a warm cannonade. Some squadrons of the second regiment of hussars charged with valour the light dragoons of the 9th regiment. They broke the line of that corps, who fled, and we took several prisoners.—I was informed by my spies, that the head of the bridge of Niewbourg was repaired, and that the enemy had collected all his artillery on the right bank of the Weser. I saw how important it was for me to precipitate my movement. I marched my reserve artillery, and I made all my dispositions to push and beat every thing before me in the Weser, to force the head of the bridge of Niewbourg, or to pass behind Stolzeau, and intercept by that means the communication with the capital.—The troops were in march when the Civil and Military Deputies of the Regency of Hanover presented themselves before my advanced posts: they invited me to suspend my march, and announced to me that they were ready to make advantageous propositions.—My answer was in the negative; they returned to make me new propositions; I informed them I would listen to none, unless I had the certainty of immediately occupying the country of Hanover, and particularly all the strong places belonging to it. After a long discussion, they signed a convention, which I accepted under the condition that it should be ratified by the respective governments. You will see that the army of the King of England are prisoners of war, that I am master of the whole country, and particularly of the mouths of the Elbe and the Weser.—I have given orders to seize all the vessels which are on those rivers. The Duke of Cambridge, the son of the King of England, and Governor of Hanover, judged it proper to give in his resignation before the battle, and to make his retreat in haste. He had, however, promised to die with the levy *en masse*; it is probable, that he will be embarked before we arrive at the mouth of the Elbe.—We found at Niewbourg 14,000 new muskets, and a good deal of artillery. According to the accounts rendered to me, I presume that I shall find in the magazines and places of Hanover about 100,000 muskets, and more than 1000 pieces of artillery.—I shall be the day after to-morrow in the City of Hanover, the continental capital of the King of England. I have found a considerable number of horses for remounting the cavalry, and furnishing the artillery. Much praise is due to the care and zeal of Gen. Dulauly.—I have the honour to salute you. EDWARD MORTIER.

Convention signed between Messrs. the Civil and Military Deputies of the Regency of Hanover and Lieutenant-General Mortier, Commander in Chief of the French Army.

Art. 1. Hanover shall be occupied by the French army, as well as the forts dependent on it. —2. The Hanoverian troops shall retire behind the Elbe; they shall engage on their parole of honour not to commit any hostilities, or to bear arms against the French army or its allies, so long as the war shall continue between France and England. They shall not be released from this oath until after they have been exchanged against an equal number of French generals, officers, subalterns, soldiers, or sailors, who may happen to be at the disposal of England —3. No individual of the Hanoverian troops shall quit the place assigned him, without information being given to the general commander in chief.—4. The Hanoverian army shall retire with the honours of war; the regiments shall take with them their field pieces.—5. The artillery, powder, arms, and ammunition of every description, shall be placed at

the disposal of the French army.—6. All the effects whatsoever belonging to the King of England, shall be placed at the disposal of the French army.—7. All public monies shall be sequestrated, but that of the university shall be appropriated to its original object.—8. Every English soldier, or agent whatsoever, in the pay of England, shall be arrested by order of the general commander in chief, and sent into France.—9. The general commander in chief reserves to himself the power of making in the government, and authorities constituted by the Elector, such changes as he shall think proper.—10. All the French cavalry shall be remounted at the expense of Hanover; the electora e shall also provide for the pay, clothing, and food of the French army.—11. The worship of the different religions shall be maintained on the present footing.—12. All persons, and all the property and families of Hanoverian officers, shall be under the safeguard of French honour.—13. All the revenues of the country, as well as the electoral domains, and the public contributions, shall be at the disposal of the French government. The engagements already made shall be respected.—14. The present government of the electorate shall abstain from exercising any species of authority throughout the country occupied by the French troops.—15. The general commander in chief shall levy on the electorate of Hanover such contribution as he shall think necessary for the wants of the army.—16 Every article on which doubts shall arise, shall be interpreted favourably to the inhabitants of the electorate.—17. The preceding articles shall not prejudice the stipulations which may be agreed upon in favour of the electorate, between the First Consul and any Mediating Power.

Done at the Head Quarters at Suhlingen, the 3d of June, 1803. — (*Saving the approbation of the First Consul*)

ED. MORTIER, *Licutenant-General, Commander in Chief.*—F. DE BREMER, *Judge of the Electoral Court of Justice and Provincial Counsellor.*—G. DE BOCH, *Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant of the Regiment of Electoral Body Guards.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Orders issued at Hanover, addressed to the Magistrates, &c. &c. on the 31st of May, 1803.

As we understand that many of the Magistrates and Public Officers of the country wish to receive directions in what manner to conduct themselves, should French troops advance near the frontiers of this territory, we recommend to them in general—1. That they regulate especially their whole conduct on the principle of the strictest neutrality, which it belongs to this territory to maintain, as entirely independent of the Crown of Great Britain and Ireland, and a completely separate possession, according to the constitution of the Empire, and the guarantee of the treaty of Luneville.—2. That they readily furnish whatever may be required of them; as it is hoped only on the frontiers, and—3. That they on no account desert their offices and posts, but remain in them, and faithfully fulfill their duty.

C. A. R. Count VON KIELMANSEGGE.

Circular Letter from the First Consul of France to the Cardinals, Archbishops, and Bishops of that country.—Dated 7th June, 1803.

Sir,—The motives of the present war are known to all Europe. The bad faith of the King of England, who has violated the sanctity of treaties, in refusing to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, who has attacked our merchant ships without any previous declaration of war, the necessity of a just defence, every thing obliges us to resort to arms. I, therefore, write you this letter to tell you, that I wish you to offer up prayers to obtain the blessing of Heaven upon our enterprises. The proofs I have received of your zeal for the service of the state, assure me that you will conform with pleasure to my intentions. BUONAPARTÉ.

FOREIGN.

Rome, May 16.—His Holiness held a secret consistory this day, at the Quirinal Palace, when *Joseph Charles Lo*, of Norogna and Abranches, grandee of the kingdom and head of the patriarchal church of Lisbon, was created *Cardinal.*

Petersbourg, May 26.—The hundredth anniversary of the foundation of this city, by Peter the Great, was celebrated here on the 24th inst. with the greatest solemnity.

Naples, May 28.—The approaching contest between England and France has created the greatest alarm throughout the dominions of his Neapolitan Majesty, who is said to have applied to the Emperor of Russia for security.

Berlin, May 29.—A few days ago, *M. de César* departed on his embassy from his Majesty to the Batavian Republic.

Hague, June 2.—The Legislative Body of the Batavian Republic terminated its session yesterday. Cit. *Heldewier* was nominated President of the extraordinary sittings which may take place previous to a new convocation. To-day a message was sent from the government requiring an extraordinary session. The Legislative Assembly adjourned to the 14th inst.

Paris, June 11.—Addresses come pouring in daily from all parts of France to the First Consul, assuring him of support in the war against England.—The city of Rouen has voted a 74 gun ship for the government —Voluntary subscriptions for building gun boats, &c. are made with great liberality.

DOMESTIC.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

The Gazette of Saturday, June 11, contains an Order in Council for prolonging, to the 1st of January, 1804, the Order of the 13th July 1801, which declared the Port of La Valetta, in the Island of Malta to be free to the subjects of all states in amity with His Majesty.

Carlton House, June 3, 1803.—His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales has been pleased to appoint the Reverend Charles Barker, B. D. Sub-Dean and Canon-Residentiary of Wells, to be one of His Royal Highness's Chaplains in Ordinary.

Whitehall, June 14, 1803.—The King has been pleased to grant the dignity of a Baronet of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to the following gentlemen, and the respective heirs male of their bodies lawfully begotten, viz.—— Richard Brooke de Capell Brooke, of Great Oakley, in the county of Northampton, and of Ahadoe and Roborough, in the county of Cork, Esq.— The Right Honourable John Stewart, of Athenree, in the county of Tyrone.—The Rev. James Stronge, Clerk, Master of Arts, of Tynan, in the county of Armagh, and of Thornhill, in the county of Dublin.

Crown Office, June 14, 1803.—Member returned

to serve in this present Parliament.—Town of Nottingham—Daniel Parker Coke, Esq. in the room of Joseph Birch, Esq. whose election for the said town has been determined to be void.

Nottingham, June 6.—At the close of the poll, this evening, for the election of member of parliament, Mr. Birch had 1165 votes, and Mr. Coke 1355. Majority in favour of Mr. Coke 190. Mr. Birch having consulted his friends gave up the contest. The town was very quiet.

London, June 10.—The Lord Mayor held a wardmote this day, in the ward of Bridge, for the election of an alderman in the room of George Hibbert, Esq. resigned, when Sir Matthew Bloxman was elected.—*June* 11. Capt. James Bowen, Capt. Thomas Hamilton, and Mr. E. Bouverie have been recently appointed to the Transport Board.—The Right Hon. John Stewart, late attorney-general for Ireland, has resigned, and is succeeded by Standish O'Grady, Esq.—*June* 14. Yesterday morning at ten o'clock the gentlemen who intended to bid for the loan, waited upon the minister at his house in Downing-street. The biddings were as follow:—Messrs. Esdaile and Mr. Shewell, L. 0 6 5 Long Ann.—Goldsmid and Co. 0 8 4 Ditto.——Baring and Co. 0 8 4 Ditto.——The Bankers, 0 12 3 Ditto.——The Stock Exchange, 0 12 3 Ditto.——Messrs. Esdaide and Shewell, of course, had the loan.—The following was the rate at which the loan was taken:

8ol. 3 per Cent. Consols, at 58½ the price of Saturday	46 14 0
8ol. 3 per Cent. Red. at the same price	46 14 0
6s. 5d. Long Ann. at 17½ years purchase	5 12 3
Discount	2 6 3
	L.101 6 6

The Bonus to the contractors is consequently 1l. 6s. 6d. and the interest on the whole 5l. 2s. 3d. —*June* 15. Their R. Highnesses the Duke of Cambridge, and Prince William of Gloucester, came to town yesterday from Yarmouth, where they had arrived on Monday, in the Amethyst frigate from the Elbe.—Mr. Liston and his suite arrived on the same day at Yarmouth, from the Hague.—M. Schimmelpenninck has obtained his passports, and leaves London to-day.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p.* 875.

Wednesday, June 8.——LORDS.—Counsel heard on the Scotch Appeal, Lothian, &c. *v.* Henderson, &c. which, after a speech from the Lord Chancellor, was postponed to April 1.——Earl of *Clanricarde* took his seat.——Bills before the House forwarded.——Message to Commons to request a copy of the report concerning the Highlands of Scotland.— Oaths administered to—*Belcher*, and Bill for his naturalization read second time.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Weaver's Bill postponed to Friday.——Ordnance Dépôt Bill read, and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—Fish Company Bill ordered for second reading on Tuesday.—Two Bills on Consolidation read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.——Soldier's Relief Bill passed.——Report of Committee on accommodation of Merchants brought up. Resolutions agreed to, and Committee on Consolidation Bill instructed to make provision accordingly.——Notice of motion, on Friday next, for additional seamen.——Estimates of Transport service, prisoners of war, &c. laid on table.——After some conversation, second reading of Bill for amending Turnpike act, negatived.——Notice of motion, tomorrow, for leave to bring in a Bill to discharge professional Seamen from Militia.——Committee on Militia Pay Bill, report received, and Bill ordered to be printed.——Irish army estimates laid on table and ordered for Friday.——Motion for leave to bring in a Bill to prevent destruction of shipping in Ireland, and another to regulate collection of revenue in Ireland, postponed till tomorrow.——Exchequer Bill Bill read second time and commiued for to-morrow.——Committees of Supply, and Ways and Means postponed till Friday.——Adjourned.

Thursday, June 9——LORDS—Counsel heard on Appeal from Court of Chancery, Thelluson *v.* Woodford, postponed till Tuesday.——Ship destroying, Supplementary Militia, Soldiers' and Seamen's Relief Bills, and several private Bills brought from Commons.—Chandos Peerage, after some conversation between Lords Hawke and Walsingham, Bishop of St. Asaph, Earl Roslin, H. R. H. the Duke of Clarence, and the Lord Chancellor, postponed till Monday.—Bills on table forwarded.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.——Message from Lords stating their agreement to Land Tax regulation Bill and several private bills. —Reports respecting Highlands of Scotland ordered to be transmitted to Lords, agreeably to their request.——Port of London Bill read second time and committed for Tuesday.— Motion on petitions of distillers postponed.——Committee on Consolidation Duty Bill postponed till to-morrow. —Gen. Gascoyne gave notice of two motions in Committee to-morrow, 1. to extend tonnage duty to Ireland, 2. that no import duty should be greater in the outports than in London.——Accounts respecting the funded and unfunded debt of Ireland laid on table.——On motion of Mr. Corry, leave given to bring in a Bill to prevent destruction of Shipping in Ireland, and another to regulate collection of revenue in Ireland ——Assessed Tax Consolidation Bill, and Assessed Tax Collection Bill read second time and committed for tomorrow.—Committee on Exchequer Bills Bill, report to be received to-morrow.——Leave granted, on motion of Secretary of War, to bring in a Bill to allow Seamen in Militia to enter in the Navy.——Bill brought in, read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.— Report of Committee to prepare an estimate of the pay and clothing of the Irish Militia laid on table.——Malicious Shooting Bill read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.——Committees on Medicine Duty Bill, and East-India Shipping Bill postponed till to-morrow. —Adjourned.

Friday, June 10.——LORDS.—Foote's Divorce Bill read second time, and, after some conversation, committed for Monday.——Several private Bills from Commons read.——On motion for committee on the Clergy Non-Residence Bill, the bishops of St. Asaph, and Oxford, and Lord Auckland, entered into a long discussion of the bill itself. Earl Caernarvon spoke to order, and after some conversation, the commitment of the bill was postponed till Monday.—Earl Suffolk moved to postpone Chandos Peerage till Tuesday; after some conversation between his Lordship, the Lord Chancellor, and H. R. H. the Duke of Cumberland, motion withdrawn.——Bills on table forwarded.—Adjourned. ——COMMONS.—Message from Lords stating their assent to National Defence Bill and several private bills.——Papers relative to Irish distilleries laid on table.——Report of Committee on the relief of wives and children of Scotch Militia brought up, and committed for Monday.——On motion of Lord Glenbervie, ad-

dress to his Majesty, ordered, praying for account of proceedings of Commissioners under Land Tax Redemption Act.——Petition from debtors in four Courts, Marshalsea, Dublin, laid on table.—Report of Commitee on Exchequer Bills bill read, agreed to, and bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.——Committee on Bills relative to consolidation and collection of assessed taxes, reports ordered to-morrow.——Militia Transfer Bill read second time and committed for Monday.—Notice for motion, on Monday, for grant of money for new roads in Highlands of Scotland. Committee of Supply, Sir Philip Stephens moved for an additional vote of 40,000 seamen, including 8,000 marines for seven months, which, after some conversation between Col. Wood, Mr. Bastard, Lord Temple, the Secretary at War, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, was agreed to. The following sums were also voted.—£518,000 for wages,—£532,000 for victuals.—£840,000 for wear and tear of vessels,—£70,000 ordnance for sea-service,—£300,000 for the transport service,—£65,000 for the maintenance of prisoners of war,—£29,000 for the sick,—£54,900 7s. 3d. for the barrack department of Ireland.——Mr. Corry moved for provision for paying and clothing the Irish Militia.—Report ordered Monday.—Irish First Fruits Bill read, ordered to be printed and read second time Monday.——On motion for the Committee on the Consolidation Duty Bill some conversation took place between the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Lords Temple and Gower, Alderman Combe, and Mr. Macnamara. Gen. Gascoyne, moved "that it be an instruction to the Committee that the principle of the tonnage duty be "extended to Ireland."—Speaker declared the motion irregular. Gen. Gascoyne then moved as another instruction to the Committee "that no "greater duty should be laid on the out-ports by "the present bill, than on the port of London." On a suggestion made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the motion was withdrawn.——In Committee, after some observations by Messrs. Vansittart, Walpole, Kinnaird, and Bragge, the Lord Mayor of London, Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Gen. Gascoyne, part of the bill was agreed to.——Irish Ship Burning Bill read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.——Second reading of Bribery Oath Bill postponed till Tuesday, Committee of Ways and Means till Monday, and East India Ship Bill till to-morrow.——Adjourned.

Saturday, June 11.——LORDS.—Private business disposed of.——Royal assent given by commission to sixty one bills, public, local, and private: among them were General Defence Bill, Land Tax Redemption, Corn Exporters' Indemnity, Irish Law Courts, Scotch Schoolmasters, English Militia, Cork and Sligo harbours, and Markham's Divorce Bills.—Bills on table forwarded.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.——House attended Lords, where Royal assent was given to various bills.—Committee on commercial accommodation. On motion of Mr. Vansittart, after some conversation, agreed that £80 be laid on every £100 porcelain imported, 15s. on every lb. of opium imported from the place of its growth, with a drawback of 6s. on exportation, 12s. 6d. on every lb. not imported from East-Indies, and 5s. on exportation.—Resolutions agreed to and report ordered Monday.—Consolidation Tax Bills reported and ordered Monday.—Report Committee of Supply, after some conversation between Mr. Elliot, Sir Philip Stephens, and Col. Bagwell, agreed to.—Exchequer Bills bill passed.—Irish Ship Burning Bill read second time and committed for Monday.—Adjourned.

Monday, June 13.——LORDS.—Committee on Chandos Peerage. After some discussion, decided that the *Rev. Mr. Brydges* had not made good his claim to that peerage. Contents 15, Non Contents 7. Majority 8.—Report ordered Friday.—Counsel on Foote's Divorce Bill.—Clergy Non Residence Bill deferred till to-morrow.—Third report of Commissioners Naval enquiry laid on table.—Bills forwarded.——Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Writ moved for Newport, Cornwall, in room of J. Richardson, Esq. deceased.—Accounts laid on table by Chamberlain of London.—Irish Revenue collecting Bill brought in, read, ordered for second reading to morrow, and to be printed.—Committee on Scotch Militia report for to-morrow.——Maliciously Maiming Bill and Irish Ship Burning Bill read second time and committed for to-morrow.—Report of Committee on Consolidation Custom Bill read and agreed to——Leave granted, on motion of Mr. Vansittart, to bring in a bill for employing foreign seamen on board British ships.—The Chancellor of the Exchequer brought forward *the Budget*. He said, that, in consistency with the assurances, which the House had given his Majesty, of support in the present contest, it now behoved them to make the efforts, which were absolutely necessary for that purpose. We are, said he, called on to summon all our fortitude, and to put forth all our force; but, to make these efforts, we must submit to great privations, and unusual inconveniencies; to make even great and extensive sacrifices. We had an enemy to contend with that had calculated the means as well as the circumstances of our exertions, and had built hopes of overcoming us by the length of a contest. It was therefore necessary for us to be prepared, not only for a vigorous, but for a protracted contest. This was a system which was not less consistent with the calculation of the coldest prudence, than due to the fortitude and wisdom of a great and powerful people. It was upon opinions such as these, and with reference to such a system as that to which he had adverted, that he felt it his duty to propose a plan which he was now about to submit to the Committee; and having stated generally the principle upon which the plan was founded, he should enter upon the particulars, first with a reference to supplies voted, and those remaining to be voted; after which he should state the Ways and Means by which, (according to the best consideration and reflection he had been able to give) it was desirable the supply should be raised. The following were the heads.

SUPPLY.

Navy (inclusive of Ordnance for Sea Service)	10,021,000
Army	8,721,849
Army Extraordinaries, to be voted on a future day	2,000,000
Extraordinaries of the preceding year	1,032,151
Ordnance	1,280,000
Vote of Credit	2,000,000
Corn Bounties	524,000
Miscellaneous Services	1,300,000
Total	26,879,000

Joint Charges of Great Britain and Ireland.

SEPARATE CHARGES FOR GREAT BRITAIN.

Deficiency of Malt	118,842
Deficiency of Ways and Means last year	171,431

We had also to pay under the provisions of a treaty between us and the United States of America, entered into in the year 1794	330,000
And it would appear by the accounts on the table, that there was an engagement subsisting between Government and the East India Company, in consequence of expeditions carried on on the Continent, on which there was a considerable balance, for which he proposed to vote	1,000,000
Exchequer Bills already voted.....	2,781,000
Interest on ditto	920,000
Remains of Exchequer Bills of 1798, advanced by the Bank.....	1,500,000
Total separate charge of Great Britain	6,821,679
Total of the Supplies	33,730,679
Two seventeenths for Ireland..... 3,162,235	
Additional for Civil List, &c. 170,224	
For Ireland,.....	3,332,459
Leaving on account of England for Supply,.....	30,398,220

WAYS AND MEANS.

The means of providing this sum will, said he, consist of three parts. The taxes voted annually —the growing produce of the Consolidated Fund, and issue of Exchequer Bills; and lastly, an augmentation of the duties of Excise and Customs, and a separate tax on Property. The last I wish to be considered solely as resource applicable to the war. The Ways and Means then will be as follows:—

WAYS AND MEANS.

Land and Malt voted annually.....	2,750,000
Exchequer Bills—Although authority has been given by Parliament for an issue of 4 millions, take only	3,000,000
Surplus of the Consolidated Fund....	6,500,000

Last October I ventured to calculate upon this sum as the produce of the Consolidated Fund. That calculation was formed upon the estimate and returns, as far as then ascertained, of the taxes laid in 1802, and it is fully justified by the accounts now upon the table. This, however, is not the proper time to enter into a discussion of the correctness of the estimate, because I do not now ask the Committee for a vote upon the subject. I merely submit the statement as part of the means for raising the resources of the year. When it comes to be voted it may be inquired how far the amount is likely to accord with the estimate.

It is proposed to liquidate certain advances made by the Bank by an issue of Exchequer Bills, which, it is hoped, that the Bank, with that spirit of accommodation to the public service which they displayed last war, will from the same motive, be now inclined to accept. The Debt due to the Bank on this head would therefore be paid by an issue of Exchequer Bills, on aids of 1804, to that extent..... 1,500,000

Money in Treasury, residue of Bounties on Hemp, &c.....	37,782
Lottery	400,000

I now come to the Ways and Means by which I propose to raise the amount of the sum which I have stated to be necessary for the service of the year. The three great objects to which I look as the sources of this revenue are the Excise and Custom Duties, on which I intend to submit to the Committee a large augmentation; and a tax upon property. If it should be the pleasure of the Committee to agree with me as to the propriety, I wish it to be distinctly understood that I consider these duties as applicable to war only, and I intend to propose that they should cease within a certain period, probably six months after the restoration of peace.

CUSTOMS.

IMPORTS.—An increased Duty on *Sugar* imported, of 20 per cent. on the duty now paid; and an increased duty of 12½ per cent. on the duty now paid, on other goods imported; with the exception of Cotton-Wool, Tea, and Wine	1,300,000
EXPORTS.—On all Articles exported to any part of Europe, a duty of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*, and, to any other part of the world, a duty of 3 per cent. *ad valorem*.....	460,000
On Cotton-Wool exported 1 penny in the lb.....	250,000
Tonnage.—An additional Duty on Tonnage	150,000
	2,160,000
Deduct increase of drawbacks.....	160,000
Produce of Customs.....	2,000,000

EXCISE.

Tea.—An additional 15 per cent. *ad valorem* on the lower sorts, and 45 per cent. *ad valorem* on the higher *	1,300,000
Wine.—An additional duty of £10 per Pipe	500,000
Spirits.—50 per cent. on the present duty on all Foreign and British Spirits.....	1,500,000
Malt.—Additional Duty of two Shillings a bushel	2,700,000
	6,000,000

RENTS AND FUNDS.

A Tax of 1 Shilling in the Pound, on the actual rent of all Land in England, to be paid by the Land Owner, and 9d in the Pound, to be paid by the Tenant. In Scotland, the Tenant to pay only 6d in the Pound. Besides this a tax of 5 per cent. on the net produce of all Trades and Professions; and also of 5 per cent. upon the dividends due on the public funds, except upon such dividends as are due to Foreigners residing out of this country 4,500,000

With regard, said he, to that species of property arising from Government Securities, I know

* It has already been charged to 45 per cent. on *all* sorts of tea.

perfectly well the delicacy which has always been felt upon this subject, but I am sure that it will not be expected, at the present time, that that kind of property should not be called upon to bear its share in the general contribution, when every other species is called upon to contribute so heavily. The question now is, not what species of property shall be exempted, but in what proportion each species shall contribute? It certainly is intended that this kind of property shall be made contributory, though it is not in every instance. I mean, however, now to propose, that all persons possessing property in the Funds shall be required to make returns to Commissioners by whom this Bill is to be carried into execution. These Commissioners will not be all of them resident in London, as under the Income Bill, but they will be appointed in different parts of the country. They are to have the same powers for certain purposes as the Commercial Commissioners All persons having property in the Funds are to lay their accounts before these Commissioners; and if they do not do it before a certain day, they will be held to have made their election, in which case provision is made that they shall be charged in another way. It will be understood that no person can be charged except according to the first provisions to which I have alluded unless it is by his own choice. If the persons do not make their returns to the Commissioners at a proper time, then, and in that case only, the provisions are to be executed at the Bank. All agents for Foreigners, and persons not being British subjects, having property in the Funds will be exempted: the Committee will feel that they could not with justice have been included in this *impost*. When I say Foreigners, I mean those not resident in England.——I shall now, for the sake of clearness, give a summary recapitulation of the taxes.

On the Custom Duties	£2,000,000
On the Excise Duties	6,000,000
On the Land and Property	4,500,000
Making in all	12 500,000

The Committee, however, must be aware, that though Parliament may determine to raise so large a part of the supplies for the service of the year, yet it must be obvious, that a very considerable part of this sum cannot be raised within the *present* year. I will, therefore, only calculate upon the sum to be produced by these taxes in this year, at 4,500,000l. there would then remain, 10,000,000l. to be provided for the service of the present year; this sum must be raised by way of

LOAN,

and I have this day entered into an agreement with some respectable Bankers of the City of London, for a Loan for 12 000,000l. 10,000,000l. of which was for England, on the following terms:—For every 100l. 80l. 3 per cent Consols, which at 58½ the price of Saturday, would be 46l. 14s. 0d.—80l. reduced at the same price, 46l. 14s. 0d. The bidding was upon the Long Annuities; they were taken at 6s. 5d. which at 17 years and a half purchase, was 5l. 12s. 3d.—The discount was 2l. 6s. 3d. which made the whole amount 10rl. 6s. 6d. The bonus to the Contractors is therefore 1l. 6s. 6d. and the interest to be paid by the Public, 5l. 2s. 3d. per cent. I have to congratulate the House, I have to congratulate the Country, that, under such circumstances, so beneficial a bargain has been made; and I am convinced it will be found no less advantageous to the persons contracting than to the public. But I am the more disposed to congratulate the House on this bargain, because there are very few instances of any contract ever having been made on terms equally advantageous with a reference to the price of stocks. There were indeed only two instances of bargains in which the advantage to the public had been greater. Those instances occurred in the years 1799 and 1800. In the first of these years the Government had a clear premium of 6s. 7d. and in 1800 the bonus was 10s. 5d. These were, in fact, the only instances in which the public had derived more advantage from the terms of the Loan than the present. But in what circumstances were those Loans made? The first took place under the operation of that Act, which was the first attempt to raise a considerable proportion of the Supplies within the year. The second took place under the actual operation of the Income Tax. These were years too, in which all the taxes, which can be regarded as the best criterions of the prosperity of a country, were the most productive. What inference is to be drawn from this fact? Is it not evident that those wise measures inspired confidence in those who were willing to become the creditors of the country? These examples are therefore sufficient to encourage us to follow the same system now, which cannot fail to be attended by similar beneficial effects. I have now to state the means by which I propose to provide for the Interest of the Loan.—I mean the 10 millions for Great-Britain, which create a capital of above 32 millions of stock, and the interest on which amounts to 480,000

To which add the Charges for Management, and one per Cent. for the Sinking Fund 190.000

And the whole sum to be provided for will be 670,589

"This sum I propose to raise by an increase of the duties on certain articles of the Customs, which I have calculated, will amount to 250,000l. The increase in consequence of the consolidation of the Assessed Taxes will amount to 220,000l. But there will still be a considerable sum wanting. The measure by which I propose to make it up is one which has often been recommended. I mean a change in the mode of collecting the Receipt Tax. I mean to propose, that in all cases where money is to be paid, it shall be competent for the person paying to demand a stamp from him who is paid. The price of the stamp used, it is intended, shall bear a very minute relation to the sum paid; but that in no one instance shall it be less than 2d. or more than 5s. The produce of this regulation I estimate at 220,000l. Those three sources of revenue will produce 690,000l. applicable to the payment of the above 670,589l. being the amount of the interest and expenses on the Loan. I shall now recapitulate the different heads of Supply and Ways and Means.

SUPPLY.

Navy (exclusive of Ordnance for Sea Service)	10,021,000
Army	8,721,849
Army Extraordinaries, to be voted	2,000,000
Extraordinaries of the preceding year remaining unprovided for	1,032,251
Ordnance	1,280,000

Vote of Credit	2,000,000
Corn Bounties	524,000
Miscellaneous Services	1,300,000
Total	26,879,000

Joint Charge of Great-Britain and Ireland.

SEPARATE CHARGES FOR GREAT-BRITAIN.

Deficiency of the Malt Duty	118,840
Deficiency of Ways and Means	171,431
American Commissioners	330,000
Expedition, East-India Company	1,000,000
Exchequer Bills	2,781,000
Interest on ditto	920,408
Exchequer Bills remaining of 1798	1 500,000
Total separate Charges of Great-Britain	6,821,679
Total Supplies	33,730,679
Two Seventeenths for Ireland	3,162,235
Additional on account of Civil List, &c.	170,224
For Ireland	3,332,459
Supplies to be provided for	30,398,220

WAYS AND MEANS.

Malt Duty, Tax on Pensions, &c. and remains of Land Tax	2,750,000
Exchequer Bills	5,000,000
Surplus Consolidated Fund 1804	6,500,000
Exchequer Bills for Bank Advances	1,500,000
Bounties remaining in Exchequer	37,782
Lottery	400,000
Loan	10,000,000
Produce of the new Taxes in the present year	4,500,000
	30,687,782
Supplies	30,398,220
Overplus	289,562

The Committee will perceive that the great object I have in view is to raise a large part of the Supplies within the year. The extent to which I wish to carry this principle is this, that there shall be *no increase whatever of the Public Debt during the course of the war*. In the first place it will be necessary to ascertain the probable amount of the annual charges of the War, and then to make provisions for carrying on a vigorous and *even protracted contest*, without making any greater addition to the Public Debt *than what will be annually liquidated by the Sinking Fund*. The annual Charge of the War, unless demands should be made upon us by the intervention of Foreign Powers who may wish to make a common cause with us, I think will not exceed 26,000,000l. I do not mean to deny that this is a great, an enormous sum, but certainly not greater than the object for which we have now to contend. If then the House think fit to adopt the measure I am now proposing, if I am right in my estimate of the growing produce of the Consolidated Fund, which I have considered at about six millions, and if my calculation of the Annual Taxes be correct, which I have estimated at 12,500,000l. but which for this purpose I will only take at 10,000,000l. there will only remain a sum of 6,000 000l. to be borrowed, which will be more than covered by the Sinking Fund, which now produces considerably more than six millions. The growing produce of the Consolidated Fund is also likely to increase, unless we are again visited by those calamities with which the country has been afflicted. If then my calculations are correct, we shall be enabled to meet a War Expenditure of Twenty-six Millions without any increase to the Public Debt, an object so desirable that no difference of opinion can be entertained upon the subject. I trust, therefore, this system will be adopted; it is one which has been before tried, and of which the effect is known: it has inspired confidence at home and created respect abroad.—— But the pecuniary effect is not all, it will be a difference in another respect, the difference between a temporary and a permanent tax: it will have another effect also, that of convincing the enemy of this country, that it is hopeless for him to contend with our finances, that it is not in his power to affect us in that respect:—it will have a still farther effect, that of convincing the other Powers of Europe, that they may safely join with us in a common cause of resistance against the common enemy, for that the resources of this country are such as to give full security for the punctual discharge of any engagement it may enter into, and this is an object for which I have in view some provisions. I will not fatigue the Committee, by stating all the advantages of such a system; they are such as the necessity of the times exact of us, and similar efforts are to be found in early periods of our history. I desire the Committee to look at the mode adopted for raising the Supplies for the service of the year: they will find on Land a considerable duty imposed, as well as upon Personal Property. They will find, at an early period of our history, taxes were raised within the year on all descriptions of property, descending even to the wages of Servants. To illustrate this I will refer to the times of King William and Queen Anne, when the Funding System was first introduced; let it be recollected, that then not only 4s. in the pound on Land was imposed, but also 5os. per cent. on stock in trade; 5s. on all salaries, offices, perquisites or pensions; 4s. in the pound on all annuities and pensions, and all persons of any profession were charged 4s. in the pound for that which was received or got by any practices, or emolument whatsoever. It is to be recollected that those times, although they were arduous, and the object for which we were then contending was considerable, yet they were minor to the objects which we have now in view, and therefore the exertions which we now make ought to be so much the greater. That was a great and a glorious period in the history of this country, but not so great as the present, the contest being very different, *for the present contest is for the existence of this country as a free state, and the question now is, whether we shall maintain and support that existence, or whether we shall abandon the people of this land as a prey to the French?* Our prospects with regard to revenue, are most flattering. It has been increasing progressively from 1792 to the year 1803. In the year 1792 the permanent taxes were 14,263,000l. but on the 5th of April 1803, the permanent taxes of that period were 15,994,000l. increasing in those eleven years, in permanent taxes, upwards of 1,700,000l.; but this is not all, the permanent taxes of this country which were imposed during the War, have been productive in an equal degree. In the year 1793 they greatly exceeded the amount of the charges for which they were provided. The taxes of the last year were levied

for the purpose of providing for a charge of 3,200,000l. and they have been found to yield a revenue of five millions; nor am I speaking this upon conjecture, for the ground of this calculation I now hold in my hand. There is an increase in the last year, of 1,700,000 l. beyond the amount of the charge for which the taxes were raised.—During that period, and even at the present moment, we have increased, and are increasing in our internal strength; we have not only increased last year, as a year of peace, but it is evident we have been increasing from year to year, from 1792 down to the present time, even in a period of war;—neither is this speaking on conjecture, for it is manifest, by the accounts which are now upon the table, the particulars of which I will not now recapitulate. We have besides this, and which is a most consolatory prospect, the benefit of the operation of that great system, that sheet-anchor of this country, the system which has been long adopted for the gradual reduction of the debt, which is a capital operation for the benefit of the public, *an operation which carries with it this singular advantage, that it executes its purposes for our relief* IN PROPORTION TO OUR PRESSURE, *and its operation is felt even during the war*; and if the system which I am now about to recommend shall be adopted, we shall not only provide for our expenditure within the year, but *we shall have a gradual diminution, even during the war, of the public debt.* Now I apprehend that in the support of such a system, all descriptions and classes of the community are interested; I have, therefore, thought it incumbent on me to propose such modes for raising the supplies, as are likely to be effectual, even though I know part of them will bear hard on that part of the community which I should most rejoice to spare: but such are the circumstances in which they are involved, and so well convinced are all classes of the community of the necessity of making great exertions at the present moment, that I am persuaded the poorest peasant in the country feels a deep interest in our present contest, and that he will readily yield a part of his present pittance, rather than see his country trampled on; *for the question now is* (and every peasant in the country is convinced of it, as well as those of the highest rank), *whether Great Britain shall continue her present power and estimation in the scale of nations, or make an item in the catalogue of the conquests of France:* I am, therefore, prepared not only to express hope, but a confident expectation, that all classes of the community will see the necessity of our preparing not only for a vigorous, but also *for a protracted war.* It is on this principle that I propose the present measures. I remember what was said by a GREAT PERSON (Mr. Fox) upon a former occasion, when he was asked, what interest a person, who was reading a stamped paper by a taxed rush-light, had in maintaining a share in the balance of the power of Europe? To which he answered, that the proportion he paid for his rush-light and his paper, he felt to be no more than his share, in preserving his rights, to enjoy them and all the other advantages which belonged to freedom. Nor will I hurt the feelings of gentlemen, by supposing they do not feel it as much as the poor man; nor do I believe that the lower orders of the people imagine that they are not as deeply interested as the higher, in the present contest. I believe, indeed, that the lower classes of the community feel more warmth in the present case than many gentlemen imagine, for it must be remembered that the mass of both the army and navy is composed of them, and that to their exertions was (in conjunction with the skill of their commanders) our victories by a Nelson and an Abercromby. Nor must we ever forget that it is to their ardour and enthusiasm that every thing is and must continue to be owing. It therefore must always be admitted, that the lower classes of the community have a deep interest, and I am persuaded they have a feeling for the welfare of their country. It is with this sentiment and with this feeling, that I venture to recommend the adoption of measures which must fall in some degree hard upon that class of the community. Whether the system I propose, shall appear practicable, will be for the wisdom of the House to determine; but, it has been planned from an earnest wish on my part to diffuse over every part of the community, the burthens which must be now borne, not to afford any ground of complaint to any class, that they are disproportionably burthened, neither one class improperly pressed upon, nor another improperly spared. I have endeavoured to make all contribute their just proportion, but I do not call upon the rich, for such a system would be impracticable. To be efficient, the impost must be general, and must be made to affect all classes and descriptions of persons in the country. It has been expected, that whenever applications were made to the liberality of Parliament for large supplies to support government, something should be said on the conduct of such government. I am aware, however, that the committee will not expect from me many declarations on this subject. I feel it a duty to make great exertion. I trust it will appear upon a full examination of the conduct of government that ministers have not been negligent. I will not expatiate on what ministers intend to do, but I will say generally, it is their wish to avoid extremes; to avoid any thing that may endanger our honour—not to plunge the nation into a war of extermination, nor to submit to any humiliation: to hold out that we enter into the war with reluctance, but have no fear of the issue: that ministers ask assistance, not because they wish to go to war, but because we are at war; and *that we are at war because we cannot be at peace:* that our object is peace on fair and honourable terms; *but that we have no means of obtaining peace but by great exertions in support of war:* this is the principle on which we appeal to the patriotism of Parliament. We are acting on a principle of firmness, for the support of the dignity of the King and the true interests of His people: we will endeavour to maintain dignity without arrogance, and also endeavour to shew moderation without pusillanimity. I know that many imputations have been cast upon ministers which they do not deserve, and I know it requires fortitude to bear unmerited obloquy, but I shall I hope never be wanting in the performance of my duty, on account of any imputation endeavoured to be cast upon me.—I will ask, whether persons acting on such a system are persons to be distrusted? I have brought forward the present measure, from a conviction of its necessity in itself, not for the purpose of showing, that the charge of the want of firmness and energy made against ministers are unfounded:—So far from it, that I beg to remind the committee, when the Income Bill was repealed, I expressed an entire approbation of the principle of it as a war tax, and observed how much the public were indebted to my Right Hon. Friend for bringing it forward. I expressed my admiration of the system proposed by my Right Hon. Friend, a system to which, with some modifications, I said, we must recur in the event of a war.—All the members of

the committee will attest the truth of this declaration.—I hope, therefore, I shall hear of no more of such charges as, that I and my colleagues have been seeking popularity at the expense of prudence. I beg pardon for calling the attention of the Committee to *so insignificant an individual as myself*, but I think these observations have been extorted from me. To conclude, I desire, every one to reflect on the great scene before us, in which we have *an opportunity of making an effort that will render our name illustrious for ever:* to reflect that the resources of the country are happily equal to its mighty object, an object greater than has ever yet been *accomplished* even by Great Britain. I trust that in such a state of things the Parliament of United Britain will prove itself worthy of the Sovereign whom it serves, worthy of the people whom it represents, and worthy of the blessings of the great country in which they have the happiness to live.——He then moved his resolutions *pro forma*, which past without debate, discussion being reserved for a future stage of the proceeding.

The House having resumed, the report was ordered to be received to-morrow, and the Committee to sit again on Wednesday.——The Committee of Supply was postponed till Wednesday.—A message from the Lords stated, that their Lordships had agreed to the Ordnance Lands Bill, and several private bills, without any amendment.—The Irish First Fruits Bill was read a second time, and ordered to be committed for Thursday next.—The House went into a Committee of the whole House on the East India Shipping Bill, and the report was ordered to be received to-morrow.—Mr. Hawkins Browne gave notice, that he should move in a Committee of Supply, on Wednesday, for a grant of money for the repair of the roads in Scotland. —The House adjourned.

MILITARY.

The French army, under the command of GEN. MORTIER, on the 31st of May took their position in front of *Wechte*. The advanced guard of the Hanoverians, commanded by GEN. HAMMERSTEIN, occupied *Diepholtz*, with two regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and a division of artillery. From this place GEN. MORTIER immediately made preparations for dislodging them. GEN. SCHENER, with the second division was ordered to proceed against *Goldenstedt*, to force the passage of the *Hante*, which was guarded by the Hanoverians, and by directing his march to *Sulklingen*, to cut off all that were stationed between that place and *Diepholtz*, which GEN. MONTRICHARD received orders to attack. GEN HAMMERSTEIN, finding his right turned by this movement, retreated during the night to *Borsten*; and on the *1st of June*, his rear guard had a sharp skirmish with the advanced guard of the enemy near *Bouver*. On the 2d he was attacked near *Borsten* by a detachment of the French army under GEN. DROUET, and after a heavy cannonade was compelled to fly. GEN. MORTIER then commenced his march towards *Nieuburg*. At *Sulklingen* he was met by a deputation from *Hanover*, imploring his clemency, and having concluded a convention (see p. 900) he entered *Nieuburg*, where he found 14,000 stand of arms, and a great quantity of artillery. The French issued orders for seizing all shipping in the ELBE and the WESER.

General MURAT set out on the 18th ult. from *Milan*, for the army on the frontiers of the Ecclesiastical States, which was destined to advance into the Neapolitan territory. The army of the Italian Republic was to be augmented to 60,000 men.

NAVAL.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

May 29.—*Capt. Wallis*, in the *Naiad*, captured the French national corvette *L'Impatient*, *Capt. Arnous*, of 20 guns and 80 men, from Senegal to Rochfort.—*May* 31.—*Capt. Wallis* captured the French merchant ship *Le Chasseur*, *Capt. Lamar*, laden with sugar, coffee, cotton, &c. from St. Domingo to L'Orient.—*June* 1.—*Lieut. Senhouse*, in the *Hind* revenue cutter, whilst cruising off Portland, captured the French privateer *La Felicité*, with 22 men; the French merchant brig *Le Charles*, laden with ship timber, from Rouen to Rochfort; a Dutch galliot, laden with salt, from Portugal to Rotterdam; and a Dutch Indiaman, laden with cotton and coffee, from Surinam.—*June* 9. The *Boadicea* captured a French armed brig, with 27 men; 11 days from St. Maloes.

TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

SIR,—Towards the close of your Budget speech, that speech on which I am about to make a few remarks, you are pleased to describe yourself as being "an *insignificant* "person;" but, though I can have little objection to acknowledge the accuracy of this description, as far as it may apply to your birth, qualities, and talents, yet, when I behold you giving up, for the sake of *peace* and *œconomy* a long list of great and invaluable conquests, purchased with the blood and treasure of the country; when I behold you, at the end of nine months breaking that peace, and imposing on us annually twelve millions of additional taxes, for the purpose of retaining only *one* out of those numerous conquests, after having surrendered all the rest to the enemy; when, I behold you wallowing in the wealth, strutting in the domains, bestowed on you by that Sovereign, whom the keeping of you in place has already cost a part of his dominions; when, in spite of all the insults and injuries you have brought upon your king

and his people, and of the miseries and horrors that your administration, if it continue, will inevitably bring upon them; when, in spite of all this, I behold you supported by a dead majority in both Houses of Parliament, I cannot doubt but I shall be excused for thinking you not too insignificant to be the object of this address.

The *Budget* which you have opened to the Parliament, and which is, perhaps, better worthy of that name than any thing of the kind ever before exhibited, naturally calls for some remarks from me, who, at the time when the nation was drunk with joy on account of the "blessings of peace," told you, not only that the peace could not last, but, that "*the interval between the wars would "create the necessity for sacrifices such as the "people never before heard of.*" The London news-papers do, for the most part, I perceive, practice great forbearance towards you. The enormous taxes, now proposed, they acquiesce in, with very little complaining; because they are partakers with you in the guilt of the peace, which alone has produced the necessity of those taxes, and because, too, they are fully persuaded, that the collection of them will soon be rendered unnecessary by another regicide peace, which they think, with me, you are ready to make, the moment a fair opportunity shall offer. From me, however, who own not one particle of the crime of making or approving of the peace, you have no right to reckon on this sort of fellow feeling; from me you have nothing to expect but those reproaches which are due from a man who loves his country to a minister who has ruined it.

Your plan of finance is objectionable, first, because it will fail of its immediate object. Your taxes will not, I am persuaded, produce any thing near what they are estimated at; and, if they should, the amount will fall greatly short of the expenditure of the war. Then as to the principle, it may, in a *pecuniary* point of view, be good, sometimes, but not always: to *begin* a funding system, and to continue such a system when begun, are measures widely different from each other; and, *politically* considered, to raise the whole of the supplies within the year, during war, while there is, at the same time, an immense sum to pay in the shape of interest of the national debt, is a plan which seems calculated for the express purpose of producing an irresistible opposition to the very object it is intended to accomplish. If enormous taxes, pecuniary burthens almost unbearable, are laid upon the people, accompanied with a promise, that they shall be taken off at the expiration of six months after the termination of the war, will not the people hate the war? Will they not wish it at an end? Will they not ask for peace, peace on any terms? If you mean, as I suppose you do, to negotiate the next peace as well as the last, you have assuredly fallen upon an infallible mode of providing before-hand the means of securing an unanimous approbation of the treaty, even though its conditions should resemble those, which have lately been accepted by the "*safe* politicians" composing the Regency of Hanover, who, by the by, appear to me to be most worthy coadjutors of you and your colleagues, and who have, in fact, done no more than follow up the principles, on which the peace of Amiens was made.

The nature of taxes themselves is of little consequence. If they are wanted and are productive, they can scarcely be bad, unless the collection of them be tyrannical or vexatious. On this latter score only it is that I could have wished not to see that set of little despotic inquisitors, the commissioners of income-tax, revived: for, while this species of oppression exists, to talk about freedom, and about fighting for freedom too, is a most mortifying mockery. Every thing that is *visible* is a fair object of taxation; to pry into a man's secrets is not fair. This, however, would be bearable, could the inquisitorial powers be confined to a few great persons, far removed from the sphere of the party with respect to whom the inquest is made; but to set a man's neighbours to dive into his secrets, to arm them with legal authority to perform this act of scandalous and odious persecution; yet this, even this, might be borne, were it not accompanied with the insulting assertion, of its being absolutely necessary for the *preservation of his freedom!*

As to the tax upon the *funds*, the object is visible; to make good the collection demands no disclosure of those secrets, which a man wishes to keep from all the world; but, whether the impost be just or not is a question which depends upon the result of another question, to wit, *whether the tax is necessary to the existence of the state.* I observe, that you speak with great tenderness on this subject. You seem to imagine, that the world will regard this direct tax upon the public funds as a direct and flagrant *breach of national faith*, which it most assuredly is, unless the previous question of absolute necessity can be clearly made out.—The agreement with the stockholders is, that they shall receive such and such dividends, "*subject to no deduction whatever.*" For the punctual adherence to this bargain the faith of the nation is pledged. On that faith it is, that thousands and hundreds of thousands of persons have deposited their all

in the hands of government. But, the first law of every land, the first duty of those who administer the government, is, to secure the *existence of the state*. This law of self-preservation supersedes every other law; and, therefore, if a tax upon the funds has this sanction, it stands in need of no other. The tax is, in that case, no breach of national faith; because, to constitute such breach, the nation must want the *will* to fulfil its engagements, and, it never can be said to want the will, if it has already gone as far as it can go without producing its own destruction as a state. Many other arguments suggest themselves in support of this position; but, if the case of necessity exists, what I have said already, Sir, sufficiently justifies the tax, and, if the necessity does not exist, all that can possibly be urged by the most ingenious reasoner, will fall far short of producing conviction. With you, therefore, Sir, it rests to show, that this dire necessity does exist; and, while you are about it, you may also show us *whence it has arisen*, and who has been the cause of it.——Some persons affect to regard the five per cent. to be deducted from the dividends, as a tax upon *income*, and not a tax upon the funds. This distinction is, I imagine, too puerile to deceive any one for the space of five minutes. Every tax that you can name is ultimately a tax upon income; because it is from income that all taxes are paid. But, this tax upon the funds is levied immediately upon the commodity itself, and the Bank, which is now become a formidable rival of the Custom House and the Excise Office, will continue so as long as the name of stock exists within its walls, which, if we are to be preserved, will, I think, be about four or five years.

The *loan*, which you have made, does, I must confess, surprize me. I did not think, that there were to be found any persons, possessed of considerable property, so totally void of reason, as to suppose, that the government, in your hands, would ever be able to make good its engagements of any sort; and, I did say, that those who should make you another loan, would deserve to die in a work-house, a fate, which, if appearances are not fallacious, may probably befal many of the present holders of omnium, which, in the space of four days has fallen to a discount of 4 per centum. You *boasted* of the terms of this loan, Sir, and expressed your confident expectation, that they would "turn out advantageous to the "contractors, because the House must be "sorry, when *honourable* and *public-spirited* "men, who come forward to assist the nation, suffer any loss from their *zeal* to *promote its service!*" Your candour, Sir, is almost proverbial, and, therefore, I wonder, that you should not have informed these honourable and public-spirited men, that they were bidding for the loan under very false impressions; I wonder that you had not told them, that the messenger who came on Sunday, instead of bringing pacific news from the Grand Mediator, brought an account of the subjugation of his Majesty's German dominions. You *knew*, that the biddings for the loan were made under the former persuasion; to what, then, are we to ascribe your hope that the contractors would derive benefit from it? Think not, however, that I pity the loan-jobbers. If your character of them and their motives be truly drawn, they stand in need of no consolation: on the contrary, such public-spirited men, who come forward "to *assist the nation*," must feel gratified at having had so fair an opportunity of "*promoting its service*;" and, give me leave to think, Sir, that it must have wounded the feelings of these honourable and disinterested Jews to talk about their "*suffering* from any loss" that might arise from their zealous endeavours. To be serious, Sir, what would you say, if the stock, which is to form the payment of this loan, should be at a discount of 20 per centum? What would you say, if the loan should never be paid in to the Exchequer? I do not positively assert, that either of these will be the case; but, if you continue minister, it is right that the country should be prepared of some such mishap: the whole of the paper fabrick begins to shake in your unsteady hands: there wants nothing but a sudden gust to shiver it to atoms.——Let the widows, the orphans, the aged, the infirm, the helpless stockholders of every description, take care: let them beware in time.

The *Sinking Fund* is, it seems, to be kept up in all its glory, and *no addition whatever* is to be made to the Public Debt, during the war, be its duration ever so protracted! How is this to be, Sir? You estimate (much below what will be found necessary) the annual supplies for the war at £26,000,000. All this, say you, is to come out of the taxes raised during the year, except about £6,000,000, which is to be obtained by a loan annually made to that amount; but, as the debt annually created by these loans, will be no greater in amount than the part of the Public Debt bought up annually by the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, *the loans will make no addition to the debt!* It is, I think, impossible that you should not perceive the fallacy of this state-

ment. What becomes of the part of the Public Debt bought up by the Commissioners? What, Sir, becomes of the stock so bought up? Why, it is carried to the account of the nation; it becomes the property of the nation; the nation annually receives the dividends on it, but *it first raises the money to pay those dividends.* And what becomes of the dividends, after the nation has thus received them from itself? Why, they are disposed of in the buying up of more stock, in order that the nation may have an increase of dividends, which, like the former, are to be paid by itself to itself; and thus the delusive wirligig goes on, but without ever lessening the Public Debt in the amount of one single penny. —— If, indeed, the stock bought up by the Commissioners were destroyed; if, when so bought up, it instantly *ceased to exist*, as nine hundred and ninety-nine thousandths of the people imagine it does, then your statement would be fair; but, while it is in existence, and while the people have regularly to pay taxes to discharge the dividends on it, where is the difference whether the said stock be called the property of individuals or the property of the nation? Where is the difference, as to the £6,000,000, to be annually borrowed, whether the interest of it be paid to individuals or to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund? So that it must be paid by the people, where is the difference to them whether it be paid on the right hand or on the left?—Another question brings your statement to the test. You say, there will be no increase to the debt during the war, because stock, equal in amount to that which is created by the annual loan of £6,000,000, will be annually bought up by the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. Now, then, Sir, if this be really so, why not take the produce of the Sinking Fund, during the war, and appropriate it to the public use, instead of a loan to the same amount? Would not this be much more simple and satisfactory than the roundabout operation of first making a loan of £6,000,000, with all the Jewish cant of biddings and bonuses and premiums and discounts, and, after having borrowed the money, paying it to the Commissioners, in the shape of an annual grant of £1,200,000, dividends on stock purchased up, and an annual one per centum on capitals created since 1793? If your Sinking Fund yields you £6,000,000, annually, why not take this £6,000,000 for public use, instead of first borrowing a like sum, and then paying that like sum off with the £6,000,000, produced by the Sinking Fund? Oh, no! "that would *alarm* peo-"ple; that would *shake public credit.*" This, then, is the touch-stone of the system: to continue the operation of the Sinking Fund *we must go on paying interest on all the stock bought up, and to be bought up, by the Commissioners*; if, therefore, this continuation be absolutely necessary to the *preservation of public credit*, that credit must be destroyed, unless we continue to pay, as we now do, interest *on all the stock that ever was created.* When and how, then, is the debt to experience that *diminution*, with which, Sir, you thought proper to amuse the tame and stupid crowd, who were listening to you from the galleries? No, no, Sir; it is not in this Sinking Fund; it is not in this system of paying taxes in order to purchase stock for ourselves, and then to raise other taxes in order to pay the interest of that stock to ourselves; it is not in this shifting from one pocket to the other; it is not in a set of legerdemain tricks worthy of Bartholomew Fair; it is not here that we are to look for relief, but it is in your *tax upon the Funds*; or, in other words, in that admirable *sponge*, which you are now about to apply to *one twentieth part of the debt.* This, as Sir Walter Reighleigh said when he was approaching the City of St. Thomas, "this is the true mine, my lads, and he's a "fool that expects to find riches from any "other!" This, to use your own words applied to the Sinking Fund, "this is an ope-"ration which carries with it the singular "advantage of *executing its purposes for our* "*relief in proportion to our pressure*;" for, the more expensive the war, the heavier, of course, will be the tax upon the Funds; and as all that part which becomes tax will no longer be debt, our relief will, as you truly observe, be expedited by our pressure! But, say the wiseacres of the City, there is none of the debt *sponged* off by this tax, which, however heavy it may become, will take only the *interest*, leaving the *principal* totally untouched; to which sapient observation you will, doubtless, reply, that, if they will but let you take the interest, they are perfectly welcome to do what they please with the principal. In short, Sir, that man must be afflicted with insanity or judicial blindness, who does not perceive, that to impose a direct tax of 5 per cent. upon the Funds is to wash away a twentieth part of the debt, which consists of those funds. You have, by calling this an *income* tax, a tax on *property*, &c. &c. succeeded in producing a confusion of ideas in the minds of the people, who, viewing the matter in the light in which you have placed it, seem to forget, that the tax on income and property is drawn from something which the party already has in his possession, whereas the

tax on the Funds is, in fact, *a portion of a debt due to him*, but which he has not received, and of which debt the State *is now about to pay him nineteen shillings in the pound.* And very good payment it is. It were to be wished that every Bankrupt would pay 19s. in the pound; and, if you should not make that rate good upon the principal, you have shown the honesty of your intention, by making it good upon the interest.—The truth is, Sir, and, if you have common sense, it is a truth that you must perceive, —the National Debt has arrived at that point, beyond which it cannot go, and, that terrific bugbear, a *National Bankruptcy*, the fear of seeing which has made this country submit to every species of wrong and of disgrace, is now actually making its appearance, unaccompanied with any of the dreadful effects, which base and interested men have endeavoured to persuade us it would inevitably produce This measure of taxing the funds, alias paying nineteen shillings in the pound on the interest, this year, in order to pave the way for the total, and the only practicable, extinction of the public debt, has my unqualified applause; because, I am fully persuaded, that either that debt, or the independence of this nation, must be speedily destroyed. A small public debt is no harm to any country, nor, merely in a *pecuniary* point of view, is a large one, or even an enormous one, any harm; but, not so in its *political* effects: there a great public debt, is a tremendous evil. This distinction, which has, within the last ten years, been so fatally illustrated in England, has, however, been too little attended to. Mr. Pitt saw the navigation, the commerce, the manufactures, all increase as the debt increased; the land became, year by year, better cultivated, the houses, the roads, the carriages, the clothing and food of the people, all grew finer and better; but, he did not perceive, that the wealth of the country, while it was, in consequence of having assumed a moveable quality, extending the commercial means and multiplying the comforts and elegancies of life, was, at the same time, from the same cause, and in the same degree, producing political decay: he did not perceive, that when a vast portion of the public property had so changed its nature as always to be instantly affected by political events, and always to bear, in value, an inverse proportion to the warlike exertions necessary to the honour and safety of the state; he does not seem to have perceived, that when the public debt had wrought this change in the interests and feelings of men, the state must of necessity fall, or the debt be annihilated. Such, however, is now the fact; and, the only objection I have to your statement, is, the miserable delusion which you still attempt to keep up, and which, if your attempt succeed, can be attended with no possible good, while it may do infinite mischief. Proceeding upon the maxim of Mr. Pitt, you represent our public debt as "*the best ally of the* "*enemy*;" and, therefore, say you, we will let the enemy see—What? Not that we are about to crush and annihilate this his "*best* "*ally*," but that we are going to raise the taxes within the year, in order to refrain from adding any more strength to this ally. But, Sir, I am happy to perceive, that, while you are talking of this foolish plan, while you really think you have adopted it, you are actually proceeding upon a wise one; that, while you think you are propping up the funds, you are, in truth, undermining their foundation.—Shall I be told, that I am here expressing a wish to see the *credit* of my country destroyed? Very like I may, but, Sir, far different are my wishes. I wish to see its true credit restored, by the annihilation of its false credit; I wish to see honourable sentiments succeed to selfishness and cowardice; and, if I am told of the miseries that this measure will bring upon those who are so unfortunate as to be stockholders, I deny that they will be a hundredth part so great as is generally imagined; because, as the extinction will not be effected all at once, people will sell out, in proportion as their apprehensions increase, and as those who have nothing but the funds to depend upon will be most timid, they will sell first: so that, at the "close of "the *market*," a market which, I trust, will never again be opened, the loss will be found to be pretty fairly distributed. Be the miseries, however, arising from this source, what they may, they certainly are inevitable; for, if the debt be not, somehow or other, annihilated, the nation must be enslaved, and then the annihilation comes of course. Horrid, therefore, as the sound of National Bankruptcy is to the ears of the selfish and the foolish, it must be borne; and their only alternative is, bankruptcy and freedom, or bankruptcy and slavery. This is what you should have told them, Sir: this would have discouraged the enemy a thousand times more than all your flattering prospects of commercial wealth, which wealth, were it a hundred-fold greater than it is, he well knows to be of no avail, as long as there exists a cause which impels so large a portion of the people to cry for peace on any terms.—I am, Sir, yours, &c.

WM. COBBETT.

Duke Street, Westminster, June 15th 1803.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HANOVER.—The reader will, doubtless, recollect, that, last week, while the newspaper editors circulated intelligence of the French troops having been stopped on the confines of the electorate, in consequence of remonstrances on the part of Russia and Prussia, and while the same sort of delusive nonsense was found placarded up, à la bulletin, at the gossiping places of the small politicians, we were giving it as our opinion, that no such remonstrance had taken place, and that the French were, at that moment in possession of Hanover, which she would "not only "plunder of its moveables, but would "confiscate all the public buildings, lands, "and other property, and would finally "sell the whole of it by auction." Sorry are we to perceive from GENERAL MORTIER'S dispatches (1), that we were so very near the truth. Hanover is, as we before observed, a rich prize. The estates of the House of Brunswick-Lunenberg are immense; the population of the electorate amounts to nearly a million of souls, and its net annual revenue is about 10,000,000 of rixdollars; but the part of the prize which the French most esteem, that which they are most in want of, and which they have seized on with the greatest joy and avidity, is, the *horses*, of which the electorate contains from thirty to forty thousand, fit for military service. — The proclamation of General Mortier, which we inserted in our last (2), breathes a little of the revolutionary spirit, and the terms of the convention are worded so nearly like those made by the marauders of the Directory, that one would almost think Mortier had borrowed a specimen from the history of Buonaparté's Italian campaign. Upon reading these public papers, how sweet to the supporters of the ministers must be the recollection of their assertions, at the time of the peace, relative to the disposition of France. Lord Hawkesbury said the French Government had "*publicly asked pardon of* "*God and man.*" (3) All of them were full of praises of the reformation produced in France, and that very sapient personnage, Lord Castlereagh, stated, that so far were the people of that country from harbouring any wild schemes of subverting our government, that "they considered it "*as a model*, and *felt for us that deference and* "*respect* which it was usual to entertain "under their ancient government."!!!! (4) General Edward Mortier does, however, talk most fluently of liberating the people of Hanover from a government which tramples under foot "all the principles of "the *rights of man*," and the Moniteur contains a very elaborate dissertation, the object of which is to prove, that the Hanoverians "*ought no longer to submit to their ty-* "*rants.*" This is the old style certainly, and, as Mr. Windham predicted at the time of the treaty, though Buonaparté is the enemy of Jacobins in France, he is the partizan of Jacobins out of France. There is no possibility of being angry, however, with the consul or his general: they are labouring in their vocation; and, with respect to Russia and Prussia, what right have we to complain of their conduct, as to any part of Germany? What right have we to talk of the treaty of Luneville, we, who have declared, that this country had nothing at all to do with that treaty? No; we looked quietly on, and saw the empire of Germany new-parcelled out: we never even remonstrated on the subject: we had made peace, and that peace was not, we said, to be disturbed for the sake of the continent: our maxim was to "*keep ourselves* "*to ourselves:*" and, now, behold, now that, in spite of all our baseness, we are forced into war again; now we are calling to the powers of the continent to interfere in our behalf!

THE KING OF SARDINIA.—The charge against our ministers, relative to this unfortunate monarch, has been, we perceive, since our last, brought forward by the Moniteur with still more seriousness than before. What we quoted then was from certain notes on the English parliamentary debates; but we now refer to an answer to the declaration laid before parliament on the 18th of May, which answer is very full on every point of complaint, and particularly on that which relates to the King of Sardinia. This answer is a very important publication: we shall examine it part by part, hereafter. In the mean time, we are sorry that the ministers use no means to contradict the statement respecting the King of Sardinia, which, if true, must sink this country to the lowest degree of infamy. Mr. Pitt, in defending the peace, said, "we *ought* to have restored the King "of Sardinia if we could, but that we "could not do it." The French say, that we *might* have done it, but that we *would not*, unless we could have done it without giving up Ceylon or Trinidada. And yet we have the conscience to look to the Continent for allies, and to Russia above all other powers, Russia who has always desired to see a provision made for the King of Sardinia!

GARBLED PAPERS.—In our preceding sheets, p. 821 and 886, we mentioned some of the principal circumstances relative to the

(1) See present sheet, p. 899. (2) See p. 867.
(3) See Reg. Vol. II. p. 1249. (4) Ibid, p. 1331.

garbling of the public papers laid before Parliament on the 15th of May. The charge is now, we think, fully established, with this addition, that the note of Count Alexander Woronzow, dated Petersburgh, 12th November, 1802, was also left out in the papers presented to Parliament. This was a very important note, because on it turned the whole of the negotiation respecting Malta, as far as Russia was concerned. In short, the keeping back of this note, together with the suppression of part of Lord Whitworth's note of the 10th of May, and the keeping back of Talleyrand's note of the 12th of May, all of them relating to the guarantee of Russia, and, indeed, clearly showing, that that guarantee might have been obtained, and that the want of it was only a pretext; this suppression, this shameful garbling, fully proves the insincerity of the ministers as to the cause of their retaining Malta.——We beg our readers to recollect, too, that, in laying the Maltese papers before the Parliament, they have, as we observed in our last number, withheld the *remonstrance*, which was the principal paper; though, by the negotiations at Amiens, an account of which Buonaparté has been so obliging as to publish, we perceive, that Lord Cornwallis produced this very paper *as a proof of the impossibility of restoring the Island of Malta to the Knights!* Why, then, was not this remonstrance communicated to Parliament amongst the other papers? It was called for. Mr. Canning moved for *all* these papers, and not for a part of them. But, the truth is, that the ministers give what they please and withhold what they please. They fear no responsibility. Mr. Pitt, after having done as much mischief as he could himself; after having broken down and subdued the parliament, put it under the insolent tyranny of his creatures, to whom he himself is now become an underling.

War of Necessity.—When we hear the ministry calling on the nation for sacrifices and exertions never before heard or dreamt of, when we see a budget planning the collection of 12 millions of new taxes to be raised annually, and when we have the prospect of seeing a military conscription, in virtue of which Englishmen will be placed in nearly the same situation that Frenchmen now are; when we hear, see, and anticipate, all this, we feel that it is all necessary, but we are, however, naturally led to ask the cause of it, and the wise Chancellor of the Exchequer gives us the answer. "The present contest is for the existence of this "country as a free state, and the question "*now* is, whether we shall maintain that "existence, or whether we shall abandon "the people of this land a prey to the "French, whether Great Britain shall continue her power and estimation in the "scale of nations, or make an item in the "catalogue of the conquests of France."—Very well: this is the cause of all our sacrifices and all our alarm. But, how comes this cause to exist now in a degree so much more great and fearful than before the conclusion of the last war? That war, with all our conquests in our hands, was going on without demanding any new and unheard-of sacrifices; that war, which was put an end to for the purpose of *husbanding our resources* and *providing for our security*, was going quietly on without any tax upon the funds, without turning the Bank into an excise-office, and without a military conscription.—We have had 381 days of peace, during which we have been more than 381 times reminded of its blessings, and particularly of its œconomy. Seeing, then, that the sapient Chancellor of the Exchequer, the disinterested Richmond Park minister, the clean-handed prosecutor of the Plymouth Tinker, has been all this while husbanding our resources, and seeing, that he has constantly asserted that those resources have been upon the increase from the hour the peace was made; seeing all this, one is impelled to ask, why *this war* should require sacrifices beyond all proportion *greater than those required by the last?* The answer is ready: the peace, the foolish, the disgraceful, and infamous peace of Amiens, has greatly changed our situation relative to that of our enemy; has made us much weaker and him much stronger.——"The peace," said Lord Castlereagh, "has been made *on principles of our "own security*, and, therefore, I think that ministers were right in not regarding the encroachments of France, upon the Continent, between the "Preliminary and Definitive Treaty, as sufficient "cause to break off the negotiation."—Where is the *security*, then? In the military conscription? Is that the security which it has brought us?—"We have gained the hearts of the people. We have gained Mr. Tierney and Mr. Sheridan, the latter of whom will fight the French *single-handed!*" Why, then, talk of a military conscription? Why afraid? You were not so afraid before the peace of Amiens took place. We had been at war nine years, without any assistance from the single-handed exertions of Mr. Sheridan, before that infamous peace was made, and the French never went to Hanover, never shut up the Elbe or the Weser during the whole time. These fatal steps, therefore, are owing, not to the war simply considered, but to the war *as growing out of the Peace of Amiens.*——And, shall not the makers of that peace be responsible for the measure? And shall they be allowed to conduct a new war, merely because they are likely to surpass all others in the baseness necessary to obtain another peace?——Such a nation, we seriously repeat it, such a nation must, and will, and ought to perish.

☞ Our Correspondents shall be attended to next week. We regret that we could not insert the first excellent article entire.

DEFENCE OF THE COUNTRY.

This being the topic which now engages the attention of all those, who have sense enough to perceive the danger to which their country is exposed, and who have, at the same time, a wish to preserve it, and courage to endeavour to accomplish that wish, we think it our duty to devote a considerable part of the present sheet to the speech delivered, on the subject, by MR. WINDHAM, whose counsel, if it had been followed before, would have prevented the evils with which we are now beset; and, if followed now, may yet prevent those evils from terminating in our subjugation.——The Speech which we are about to insert, was delivered in the House of Commons, on the 20th instant, in disapprobation of the plan, proposed by the ministers, for raising 50,000 men, in England, Scotland, and Ireland, by way of ballot, or military conscription. The plan, as described by the Secretary at War, was as follows. A body of 50,000 men, to be called *the Army of Reserve*, to be immediately raised by ballot, according to the following quotas: the counties of England and Wales, 31,000, London and the Tower Hamlets, 3,000, Scotland, 6,000, Ireland, 10,000. Whether the conscripts were to be allowed to find *substitutes*, or were, in case of not serving themselves, to pay a fine to the government, does not appear to have been determined on. The term of service was *four years*, with an extension, as to place, to any part of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey.—The officers, to be commissioned by the King, were to come from the half-pay list of the army, from amongst those *who had quitted the service for want of promotion*, from the Marines, from the East India Company's service, and, if all these sources were insufficient, as if this multifarious and motley groupe were not enough so, the remaining vacancies were proposed to be filled up by persons who served as officers in Volunteer Yeomanry Corps in Ireland, during the late rebellion, to which were to be added, if necessary, the officers of the Recruiting Staff, at the head of whom is GENERAL GRAEME, a person that the Secretary at War described as being "himself a "*host*," a circumstance at which, we trust, the nation must have heard with the most lively joy.—Such were the out-lines of the plan, to which Mr. Windham made the objections that will be found in his speech. It will be perceived, too, that he did not object to this plan without proposing another instead of it; and, it only remains for the public and the Parliament to determine, *which is the best.*

SIR,—The Honourable Gentleman has introduced this measure in a manner perfectly suitable to the solemnity of the occasion, and to the impression which such an occasion was likely to produce on his mind. I wish the measure itself had been equally suitable to the manner of its introduction, or to the circumstances out of which it has arisen. But, alas! it has fallen miserably short both of the occasion and of the expectation which I had allowed myself to form of it Instead of helping us out of our difficulties it serves only to confirm a most material part of them, and for the rest, to give us but very imperfect and inadequate assistance. This grand measure of which so much expectation has been raised, turns out, at last, to be nothing more than a mere addition to the militia, with all the evils incident to that system, perverted and misapplied as it has been for a period of several years past. In addition to 70,000 men raised or raising according to that system upon the population of Great-Britain, and of 18,000 so raised in Ireland, we are now to have 10,000 more for Ireland and 40,000 for Great Britain, making in the whole the number of 138,000, of which 18,000 (the original militia in Ireland), are to be raised by bounty in the first instance, and the rest to be raised by ballot, with the privilege of exemption from personal service, on the condition of finding a substitute. Does any man dream after this, that it is possible for Great Britain to have an army? The hope is utterly childish. The recruiting of the British army has, as every body knows, long stood still. An army not recruited must, by degrees, waste away. In spite of all the hopes, which some may indulge of transferring men hereafter by new bounties from

the force thus raised to the regular army,—a most uncertain and ineligible method,—the army must unavoidably stand still for the present, and one may venture to say, under the influence of such a system is not likely to be again put in motion.

This, therefore, is my great, leading, and fundamental objection to this measure, that it destroys all hope, now and hereafter, of a force truly regular,—that it completely cuts up the army. This it effects, not so much by the raising of so many men,—a measure which at the present moment I am not prepared to object to; but, by admitting the principle of substitution. That a compulsory levy cannot be made without a power of commutation of some sort or other, I am ready to allow. The grievance would be utterly intolerable. But I hoped, as the hon. gent. knows, that another mode might have been adopted, namely, that of commutation of service for a fixed fine; which fine should be paid not into the hands of the corps for the purpose of being laid out in providing a substitute, with all the effect which such an additional demand must have in raising the rate of the bounty, but should be paid to government, to be employed by them in any way they should think proper, or, if you choose to give it an appropriation, for the providing a recruit for the *army*. The great point is to abolish the present competition, under which it is impossible that the army can stand; and with this view, my meaning would certainly be, not merely to abolish this competition so far as it would arise from the body now proposed to be raised, but universally for the whole of the militia, old or new. There should be no recruiting but for the army. The militia, and every force raised by ballot should consist of nothing but the balloted men, so far as they would go. To insure the service of them, as far as I could, or as far as they were of a description to make their service desirable, I would impose a fine, greater or less, as might ultimately be thought right; but I would sooner leave the service incomplete, than, in order to complete it, introduce that fatal principle of substitution; wrong in a constitutional view if that were now worth attending to, but far more wrong and perfectly fatal from the effect which it must have of destroying all possibility of recruiting the army.

That it is the Militia system, extended as it has been of late years, and changed, as it is, in its nature and character, that has eat out the army, nobody can reasonably doubt. What is there in the condition of this country that should make it incapable of having an army in some degree, at least, proportionate to its population? or prevent its having now what it has had in all former times? That the Militia system, as carried on of late would and must prevent this, is perfectly obvious. I want to know what ground there is for concluding that there are any other causes, if these were removed, which must equally produce the same effect? When we say, therefore, that we can get no men for the army, the answer is that we have never fairly tried. Let the experiment be *bona fide* made. Abolish the competition: and in order to meet the effects of the change thus produced, begin now, what the H. G. says must be begun some time or other, and put your army on that new footing, which, without being necessary for its improvement; for I know not what improvement it wants; may be necessary to maintain its numbers. The first of these measures, as it has always appeared to me, is to change the condition of service from life to term of years;—a measure on which, if I cannot say, that military men are unanimous, I may safely say, that they are nearly so, and to which I certainly have never heard any objection that could at all be set in competition with the advantages to be expected from it. Its advantages indeed, if they really exist, are of that sort which must take place of every other consideration. The first merit of a book, says a great critick, is to make itself read. The first merit in the constitution of an army is to provide that it should continue an army.—Let the army, therefore, at this moment, and not at any time of future peace, and with a view to wars that may then be future, be put upon that footing, in which, in conjunction with other changes, it may hope to be recruited as it has heretofore been, and may release us from this dreadful and unheard-of state of being engaged in a war, without an offensive and disposeable force. With all the disadvantage which the very memory of the bounties heretofore given, will not fail to produce even when the bounties themselves, to this inordinate amount, shall be given no longer, I should not despair of seeing our army gradually restored, and the service again go on, as it did in all former times.

It is in conformity to these views that my judgment must be regulated upon the present measure. As a levy of so many men on the principle of ballot I may submit to it, government declaring it to be necessary, because the urgency of the case seems to leave me no option, and hardly time to consider the question. But as a ballot including the further principles of substitution, I must

formally protest against it: because it tends to produce effects, which no consideration of present advantage could, perhaps, justify the incurring: but which, likewise, in my opinion, render the measure perfectly ill-calculated to meet even the present danger. I may accept the ballot for the sake of the immediate force which it will produce, however disadvantageous I may think it in various other respects: but I must at least endeavour to disarm it of its chief mischief, by recommending that the terms of exemption from service should be a fixed fine, as I would, for the same reason, extend that principle to every other part of the Militia.

But here I must make my formal complaint of the government, which by its neglect, its delays, its total want of all foresight and precaution, has brought us to a state in which no pressure that is presented to us, can be fairly judged of. We are in straits in which we have no room to turn ourselves. The danger presses upon us so immediately, that we have not time to consider what is best: we must take up with what is first presented to us. Why has this measure been delayed to the present time? Why has it only now been discovered that a force of the sort now proposed would finally become necessary, and why, if such necessity was foreseen, has the time and manner of raising it only now been submitted to this House? Above all, why was the country reduced to its present defenceless state, immediately upon the signature of the Treaty of Amiens, in spite of what must have been obvious, one should have thought, to every common observer, of what the ministers now tell us, they themselves saw; namely, that the peace which they had made was no peace: but was open, at every moment, to such a rupture as that which has now happened. In this state did they think it right to dismantle our fleets, to reduce considerably our army, to discharge troops, which, in six weeks after, they wished to have back, or which if they did not wish to have back, as the H. G's gestures would seem to indicate, it is only a new proof how little they understood the real nature of their situation. All this was done for the miserable purpose of deluding the people with a false idea of the blessings, as they were called, of peace, and of the money they were to save by thus parting with all the means of safety.

Leaving these reflexions for the present, though I trust never forgetting them, let us return to the consideration of the measure immediately before us: and this, perhaps, we cannot properly judge of without taking into our view the larger principles on which measures of this sort must depend. We are in a new and unprecedented state of things, in which new dangers exist, and new modes of resistance must be resorted to if we would hope not to be overcome by them. If we proceed in the old beaten course, if we think that what saved us heretofore must be sufficient to save us now, our destruction is inevitable.

The great desideratum which we have to make good, the great problem which we have to propose to ourselves, is to find the means by which that natural force, which, in this as in all similar instances, is on the side of those attacked, may be so applied as to overcome the superior advantages of another kind which may be found on the side of the enemy.—If the enemy could bring with him an army not more considerable than that which we should have to oppose him, great as the object is at stake, much as I should advise that even in that case no precautions should be omitted, yet such is my confidence in the excellence of British troops, such are the proofs which they have given of their capacity to contend with and to overcome upon anything like equal terms the troops with whom they would have to deal, that even without those subsidiary aids, which yet it would not be right to neglect, I should feel perfectly at ease about the event.

But we are to calculate upon the supposition, a supposition far from inconsistent with the probability of the fact, that the enemy may be able to land an army in this country greater either than the whole of our regular force, or at least than that part of it which could immediately be collected to oppose them. The question then is, how shall this deficiency be supplied?—And here we have, as the foundation of our hopes, this leading fact, that in the case of every invaded country, but certainly of every invaded island, the physical force is always on the side of the invaded.—No country probably, was ever invaded by a force superior in number, to the portion of the inhabitants of that country capable of bearing arms. It certainly will not happen to us to be so. Were the enemy to find the means of putting on shore in different parts, a body of a hundred thousand men, a supposition not likely, but by no means to be rejected as impossible, the population of this very town would yield a force that ought to make no difficulty of contending with them.—There is no question therefore of the sufficiency of physical force: but, though we are abundantly satisfied of this truth, to a degree indeed that leads us often into a childish and boastful confidence, let us not overlook another truth, not less important and certain, that in the conduct of human affairs it

rarely the physical force which determines the event. If it did so, no country, as appears by what is just said, would ever fall a prey to invasion. Hanover would at this time be an independent country. It was not for want of inhabitants capable of bearing arms that that country yielded up without a blow, its laws, its government, its liberties, its property, to the handful of men, comparatively speaking, who marched against it under General Mortier. It is thus, in other instances. A battle is fought, a fortress is taken, and the country submits. If we have a mind to pursue this truth, in cases of a different sort,—by what means do all the governments of the earth subsist? By possessing the physical force? Quite the contrary; the physical force is always on the side of the governed. The government of every country, with all their establishments of senates and magistrates, and ministers and officers, and even with the armies which it may have at its disposal, is nothing, in point of numbers, compared with the inhabitants at large: yet thus weak in physical force, these governments are able, fortunately for the peace and happiness of the world, to hold in subjection those inhabitants, and that not only in countries where the general sentiment may be supposed to go with the government, and the submission of consequence to be voluntary, as in these happy realms, but in countries such as that of France at this moment, where of 50 or 60 millions or more, whom Buonaparté may have at his disposal, there are not probably so many thousands who really wish him well or submit to his government on any other principle than that of fear. This truth, therefore, the jacobinism of modern times chose as the foundation of all its operations, the scope and object of which was to apply the physical force of every country to the subversion of its government.

We are in circumstances, when we must prosecute a similar inquiry for a very opposite purpose; and must endeavour to find out how the physical means of a great country may be employed, not for the overthrow of its government, but to save itself from the incursion of foreign armies. And we may venture to say, that if these means can be gradually discovered and brought into use, the discovery will form an epoch in human affairs hardly less important, and certainly much more satisfactory, than that which was produced by the discovery above alluded to, of the art of overthrowing governments.

We are now in the state of being compelled to try what can be done towards effecting this great *desideratum*; in which if we cannot succeed better than has been done in most of the countries in Europe, in Hanover, in Holland, in Flanders, in Italy, in Switzerland, the fate of this country will hang on nothing but chance. We must form our judgment of the present measure by its tendency to carry those endeavours into effect.—The general course of the proceeding, in the minds of his Majesty's ministers, seems to have been this—A regular force, a force consisting of troops of the line is confessedly the best; but circumstances, and above all the urgency of the case, will not allow of this being obtained in time. Not being able therefore to obtain the best, you must do what the law directs in the case of evidence, you must get the next best. This next best is a Militia, or a force raised upon the principles now proposed. There will therefore be three species of force in the country, 1st. the Regulars, 2dly, the Militia, and 3dly, the Volunteers, and other corps of that description; and these being to be taken, in point of preference, in the order in which they are here enumerated, the Regulars being to be considered as better than the Militia, and the Militia than the Volunteers,—the masculine more worthy than the feminine, and the feminine than the neuter,—You must do in this, as all persons must do in similar circumstances, you must take the second when you cannot get the first, and the third when you cannot get either of the other two.

All this, so stated, is perfectly true. I am willing to admit, not only that the Regulars are better than the Militia, which no intelligent Militia officer will feel at all disposed to deny; but that Militia, on equal numbers, are better than any other species of force of an establishment still less regular.—But in the application of this to the support of the present measure there is a complete fallacy: for it is not what the option would be between these descriptions of force supposing them all before us, or, putting one out of the question, what would be the choice between the remaining two; but whether you will begin by raising that which you do not consider as best, and thereby produce a state of things in which to obtain the best shall be no longer practicable. From the language held about the comparative value of these objects you would suppose a course to be held the very reverse of that actually pursued; you would suppose the higher bounty given for the best force: and that it was only when hopes on that side were nearly exhausted, that you laid out your endeavours on a force confessedly less eligible,

But just the contrary. You give your fifteen guineas for service in the Militia; and ten or five for service in the army: and then you exclaim, that you are obliged to have recourse to Militia, because you can get no army.—This statement, therefore, when applied thus generally, can by no means be admitted. All that can be said is, that in the mode proposed, and by a continuance of the Militia system, you will, for a time, raise your men faster, and will, in the same time, produce a greater force. The question will then be, how far the superior quantity will compensate the difference of quality; and how far present advantages must be made to outweigh, in the actual circumstances, all consideration of objects, even of the highest consequence, in future.

In this view it may be necessary to say a word or two, on the difference that must, for ever, subsist between troops of the line, and every other species of troops serving upon the footing of a Militia. It is as little pleasant to me as to any other gentleman to be making comparisons, that can rarely be satisfactory to both parties, and to be marking perpetually to officers of the Militia, that, after all their zeal, all their intelligence, all their honourable sacrifices, all their meritorious exertions, and with all the well-founded vanity which they may feel at the success of their endeavours; a success far exceeding all that the founders of the Militia could ever have ventured to promise themselves; the service in which they have thus laboured, cannot, by the very nature of it, ever attain to all the qualities which belong to regular troops. It is no reproach to them that this should be so; because it is no reproach to any one that he cannot alter the nature of things; at the same time I do not say that the reflection may not be in some small degree painful: it may be painful to those who have done so much, to think that it should not be possible for them to do every thing; that they must find in the nature of the subject those limits which they do not find in their own zeal or talents.—The difference between the two services, is founded on the eternal difference that must subsist between troops, who always remain at home, and those who are placed from time to time in distant stations; between troops who have seen service, and those who, generally speaking, have not; between troops commanded by officers, who have never acted with them in difficulties and dangers, who have never shown, because they have had no opportunity of showing, their title to command by the valour which they have displayed, who can pretend to no experience, who can bring no authority from former reputation;—and troops, whose officers posses in themselves all these sources of ascendency, and all these claims to respect. There is, moreover, a sort of soldier character, arising from a thousand causes, and acquired insensibly in the course of regular service, which will easily be distinguished by discerning eyes, and will furnish in general a marked discrimination between the Militia soldier, and the soldier of the line. These circumstances must of course enter into account when we are regulating our choice between the two services, and founding our measures on the mixed consideration of numbers in each, compared with their respective qualities.—However confident I may feel that our Militia force will prove a most valuable part, should the enemy come, of the national defence, however certain I am that in the day of action Militia regiments will be found who will have distinguished themselves not less than the choicest troops we have, I can never say generally that a force of that description is to be put upon a level with that of the regular army.

I have been surprised, therefore, to hear it urged, that while a certain number of men must be kept at home for the defence of the country, it was a matter of indifference whether our army to that amount was composed of Militia or Regulars. I thought I had heard upon other occasions high hopes expressed of the security which the country must derive from the return of those veteran legions, who had so crowned themselves with glory, and established the military fame of the country, in Egypt and other places. But according to this idea, they could do no more for us than any other equal number of troops, who had never seen an enemy. But is even this the only difference between Regulars and Militia, between a disposeable and undisposeable force? Though the circumstances of the war may, at one time, require a force of a certain amount to be kept within the kingdom, the next moment may set a great part of it at liberty; and is it of no consequence that its constitution should be such as to make it incapable of availing itself of that liberty? Nay, if even that should be so, and that in point of fact the power of sending it abroad was one of which no use could be made, is it indifferent whether the enemy is apprized or not of that truth, and whether he is enabled to calculate his plans upon the previous knowledge, that the force existing in the country can, in no case, be sent against him? If the evils with which we have to struggle, if the dangers which threaten us are ever to end, it must be by some change, from with-

in or from without, which shall be made in that power which has sworn our destruction, and which, till she is destroyed herself, will never cease in her endeavours to accomplish it. And what must be the counsels, and what the situation of this country, if we are voluntarily to place ourselves in a situation, in which it shall be impossible for us to co-operate to the producing any such change, or the availing ourselves of it, if it should happen by other means? If such is our situation, or such are our ideas, there is no difficulty in predicting that we must ultimately perish

In every view, therefore, either of what is to be looked to hereafter, or is necessary in the present moment, I must condemn a measure, of which both the immediate effect, and final tendency, is to deprive the country of a regular army, that is to say, of the best means for home defence, and of the only means of effectual and finally successful war.—And here it may not be amiss to advert to another measure of less extent, but of the same general character, and which as far as it goes, is a revival of that system unhappily adopted in the beginning of the last war, and of the effects of which the army has not yet recovered; namely, that of raising men for rank. Notwithstanding all the modifications and temperaments introduced into it by the Honourable Gentleman, the effects of it, as far as the measure extends, will be much the same as in the former instance. No prohibitions will ever restrain officers placed in those circumstances, from giving more than the regulated bounty. In fact, it is notorious that they do give more, the effect of the measure therefore, in this respect, is only to add to the competition against the army already subsisting, and to raise the rate of bounty against the other recruiting parties; against the ordinary recruiting, you may say, of the same regiment. So that it can hardly be considered as adding a man to the army.—On the other hand, if money is not to be employed in raising these men, money I mean beyond the rate of bounty allowed by the regulation, then what are you to rely upon?—Upon a hope ten times more fatal in the accomplishment of it, in my opinion, than any effect likely to result from the increase of the rate of bounty; namely, that a certain number of British officers forgetting that delicacy of sentiment, and nice sense of honour, which so peculiarly marks the character of officers in our service, and makes them what they are, will become, what is called, able recruiters, that is to say, men versed and expert in the noble art of crimping, one of the most degrading employments, and most inconsistent with all upright and liberal feelings, that can well be conceived

Such is the state of the measures offered to us at last by his Majesty's government, in this most awful crisis of our affairs, with a view of averting the dreadful dangers with which we have to struggle. I have stated already the changes which I should wish to see introduced into these measures, and the course which I would pursue with respect to those parts of general defence of which we have here been treating. If a body of men must be raised by ballot, of which I do not care to give a decisive opinion, let the numbers be confined to the mere men balloted, and let the sums paid as penalties for exemption be laid out not for completing these corps, but for augmenting the recruiting fund for the service of the army.—Let the same be done for the Militia universally. If government have a mind to procure substitutes, in any instance, for the old Militia, let it take the providing these substitutes into its own hands, so as to see that no increase be thence made to what it should fix for the rate of bounty.—Let the condition of service in the army be changed so as to make the engagement for term of years instead of for life, with such increasing advantages held out, at the close of succeeding periods, (as well by certain privileges to be then enjoyed, as by bounties, and increase of pension,) as might be most likely to ensure a continuance of the service of the men once engaged.—To these changes should be added a total abolition of drafting, not silently introduced, and adopted merely in practice, but so declared before-hand, as that its benefits might be felt in the recruiting. In general, in this as in many other regulations that might be proposed, the maintaining, or rather the creating, an army would be my object, conceiving that even for purposes of mere defence, a small portion of truly regular troops, in conjunction with the undisciplined efforts of the country, may be set in balance against a very large proportion of troops imperfectly formed.

Thus far I have been considering only, what may be called the embodied force of the country. But will this force, increase it, constitute it, how you will, be sufficient? And must not a new and larger fund be resorted to, namely, that which will embrace all the strength, energy, zeal, talents, faculties mental and corporeal, of the country? If we think that we can be protected by any of the ordinary means of war, by trusting our defence to men, dressed as soldiers, and hired or compelled to defend us, bating the chances, by sea or otherwise,

that may interpose to defeat the enemy's projects in the first instance, we are little less than undone. This embodied force, be it good or bad, can go but a very little way. You cannot have it, if you wait to the last moment; to call it forth beforehand, to the necessary amount, would be an evil which the state of society in this country could never endure. This evil will be felt to a fearful extent in the present measure; without, at the same time, any adequate advantage being derived from it. The whole, indeed, of this measure is of that sort of which the examples are so numerous, and which are calculated more for show than use. We hear often of parliamentary grounds, and in cases where parliamentary grounds would seem to be something distinct from grounds of reason and common sense. In the same manner we meet occasionally with what may be called parliamentary measures: that is to say, measures which in skilful hands will make an imposing figure in a statement, particularly when addressed to persons wholly unconversant with the subject; but will never pass upon experienced and intelligent men, and will be found utterly to fail in practice: a sort of show-goods, such as will appear to sufficient advantage in a shop window, but will never bear the eye of a dealer, and will be found wholly unfit for wear. At all events, you must have recourse to other, and more extensive means. You must prepare the country: you must put the country in a situation in which its patriotic zeal, its native courage, its various and abundant energies may have a way to operate and produce their natural effects.

The general plan, which presents itself to me for that purpose, and on which a thousand others might be engrafted, according as circumstances varied, or future views developed themselves, would be instantly to distribute the country, or such parts of it as you wished immediately to prepare (for one merit, at least, of this plan is, that you may take as much or as little of it as you please) into small divisions of two or three contiguous parishes each, according to the population, stationing an officer in each, with a small deposit of arms and ammunition, and whose office it should be, in concert with all the zeal, intelligence, and influence which he might find in the neighbourhood, to train those who should voluntarily offer themselves, to such parts of military training as they would be alone capable of, and as are, after all, by far the most important. It would never enter into my idea, to introduce into bands of this sort any of the foppery of dress, or any distinctive dress at all; a ribband, or even a handkerchief round the arm, to distinguish those, who were receiving this instruction, from the crowd that might occasionally accompany them, is all that would be necessary. Those essential parts of military training, as they seem to be thought, a fife and a drum, the marching in rank and in file, the wheeling backwards, the eyes right and eyes left, whatever may be their value on other occasions,—a point that I do not presume to meddle with—must here, however reluctantly, be given up. Firing at a mark; learning, indeed, to fire at all, which, (thanks to the game laws) few of our peasantry are acquainted with; some instruction in the manner of cleaning arms; much instruction in the methods of lining hedges, firing from behind trees, retiring upon call, and resuming a new station; these are all the heads of discipline to which I should propose them to be exercised.

It is not, indeed, very well ascertained what proportion these may bear (a very deficient one, no doubt,) to the whole of what is required of soldiers; nor how far much of that which use and prejudice has taught us to consider as essential, might be dispensed with, though possibly not without some disadvantage, even in regular armies. It is not very clear, that troops in the Duke of Marlborough's time, were required in marching to move all of them the same leg at once. Much of the modern practice was introduced under the authority of the great King of Prussia, who adapted his system to his own mode of warfare,—the warfare of large armies in open countries,—and might himself possibly be aware, that many of its rules, though upon the whole desirable, were not of that importance which his less-informed imitators have since ascribed to them. The French, whose authority at this time it is not for Europe to dispute, have changed back much of what was then introduced, and have got nearer in some respects to what was the old practice, but more nearly perhaps to what was the practice in the late American war: and though with them the eternal difference between trained and untrained; between regular and irregular; (what are called irregular being with them perfectly regular troops in their own kind) between veteran and disciplined soldiers and hasty levies, is perfectly understood; yet the mode of warfare introduced by them countenances much more than heretofore, the utility of such armed and partially instructed bodies, as that which I have presumed to recommend.

The measure is, at least, good as far as it goes. It draws no man from his home; it

puts no man in a state of painful constraint; it stops no man in his business, so as to leave his family to distress or become a charge upon the public. It has the further merit of not interfering with any thing else, so as to prevent any man from entering the army, or navy, or militia, or serving the state in any other way.

Expense I would have none. The pay of the officer, the price of the powder consumed, the hire of the store-house for depositing the arms in cases where the parish church could not be made to serve the purpose, with such an allowance to the men, as was a mere equivalent for their lost time, these would be the whole, or nearly the whole, of the expenses incident to the plan, which certainly could not be thought objectionable on that score.

So much as to its negative merits. As to its advantages, it provides for a distribution of arms whenever the time shall come; and it prepares the people in a certain degree for the use of them. It fills the country with powder and ball: and it instructs those in whose custody they are placed, to what hands, when the emergency shall call for it, they may be entrusted to the greatest advantage and with most safety. The officer, aided by the leading gentlemen, by the clergyman, by the principal yeomen and others, and having continued intercourse with the lower orders, will soon be able to form a tolerable judgment of those on whom he may rely, upon such an occasion, and those, who from feebleness or otherwise are less worthy of such confidence. But the greatest, possibly, of all the advantages which I should be inclined to hope from this plan is, that most important of all preparations, the preparation of the mind. It seems to be almost the only way, (I must think the most effectual) in which they will be thoroughly impressed with a conviction of the danger. The present measure will, I confess, prove a powerful instructor as far as inconvenience goes: but, that is, at least, not the pleasantest way of conveying instruction. But the present measure will never instruct the people in this, that it must be on their own exertions, that they must depend for salvation. One main objection to the measure is, that its tendency is the direct reverse. In the other way, both a sense of the danger, and a knowledge of the means necessary to be employed against it, will be carried into every farm-house and every cottage. It will be the conversation of the village green, of the church porch, and what is not the least, perhaps, of the ale-house. Men will be turning their thoughts to what they can do upon the occasion, will be calling up the memory of former exploits, will be counting upon their newly acquired means and knowledge, and above all will be familiarizing their minds to the object. It is not to be told how much of military knowledge (which is nothing more than the application of common sense to situations, new indeed, but soon capable of being comprehended,) will spring up under this cultivation, in situations, where apparently it was to be least expected. An officer stationed in this way, if only by promoting military conversation, will become a source of instruction by no means to be despised. Every day of exercise or walk into the fields will be a sort of clinical lecture. If the officer be an intelligent man, and has seen service, he will soon find himself surrounded by people, who will have acquired under his instructions reasonably good military ideas, and have qualified themselves, should the occasion arise, to render him very useful assistance.

This sort of armed force, not confined, like the volunteers hitherto raised, to small troops in towns, and who (without disparagement be it spoken,) consist for the most part of persons, who from bodily force, habits, and situation of life, cannot generally be expected to support the fatigues of military service.—This sort of armed force, coextensive with the active population of the country, though it cannot of itself stop the march of an army, must produce an immense effect, aided by troops of yeomanry, whose utility will be very great, in co-operation with such resistance as we expect from forces of a different description. When we talk of the difference to armies acting in a friendly or a hostile country, we certainly do not suppose that difference to be less, because the hostile country happens to be prepared and armed.

But every preparation of this sort has hitherto, by his Majesty's ministers, been completely neglected. We are, for aught we know, within two months of invasion, and the measure now just brought forth, is the only measure except the calling out the Militia, which they appear to have thought of. But they do, it seems, immense things in secret. True dignity shows itself in calm! Why, Sir, what these measures can be, of which the country knows nothing, it is not very easy to comprehend; and therefore one a little distrusts the nature of this calm. There are different sorts of calm. There is the calm of confident and complacent hope, and the calm of despair. The calm of men, who having passed the first agitation of danger, have settled their minds to a determined

resistance to it; and the calm of those, who are only tranquil, because, from ignorance or insensibility, they are wholly incredulous of its approach. I wish the Hon. Gentlemen's calm may not be that of a wretched lodger, who, hearing a noise below, instead of manfully getting up to resist the robbers, only hides his head in the bed clothes, and hopes they may go off with their other booty without coming into his apartment.

Their secrecy too is altogether as whimsical an idea. They observe, I suppose, that Buonaparté is very secret; and judging him, as they well may, to be a great Captain, they conceive, by imitating his secrecy, that they shall appear to be great Captains themselves. But they forget the difference between attack and defence. A man who means to surprise his enemy does very right to keep his intentions secret; but it is not altogether so proper on the part of him who means only not to be surprised. An officer who was about to surprise a post, by a night attack suppose, would do very well not to tell his soldiers, whither he was leading them; but it would be odd, if the officer on the other side was to say to the next in command, 'I have intelligence that we shall be attacked to night; but remember this is only for yourself. Don't say a word to the guard; secrecy is the very soul of military operations.'—There is another rather material difference, that Buonaparté has nothing to do but to issue his orders with a certainty that they will be punctually obeyed, whether the army like them or not, whether they are called upon to execute them at a longer or shorter notice, or whether they have any conception or not of the general purpose which they are meant to answer.—But the army, here to be applied to, is the people of Great Britain, who, besides that, they may debate a little upon the orders which they receive, must act in a great degree from their own impulse and discretion, and who will never be brought to act at all, if they themselves are not previously made sensible of the danger.—I, for one, will not pay them so bad a compliment as to suppose that they are not fit to be trusted with this secret. I disclaim the notion, I renounce 'as impious and heretical' that 'damnable doctrine,' that to blind the people as to their true situation, to conceal from them the reality of the danger, is the only way to keep up their courage. If this is really their state, then is the country in a deplorable way indeed: but changed as the people of this country are, by a thousand causes, and under the influence of a sort of language, and policy which has prevailed for so many years, I will never believe, that they must be lulled into a false security, be exposed to all the dreadful dangers of a surprise, (the effects of which no man can calculate,) because, to show their danger would be to dismay them. How do we combine this with all the vaunting and high-flown compliments, which we are for ever paying them? Are they only brave, when they believe there is no danger? I reject the imputation. Their safety depends upon their exertions; and their exertions must be stimulated, as I am confident they will be stimulated, by a sense of their danger.

In addition to those exertions which the people themselves must make, and on which must rest our chief hopes, there is much that ministers themselves ought to be diligently employed about, but to which I much suspect no attention has been given. Every officer of note and character in the country ought to be called upon for his opinion: not an opinion given in conversation, and with an obliging acquiesence, perhaps, to the presumed notions or wishes of the person he is talking to, but such as must stand in evidence against him, and on which his military judgment and credit will be at stake. Innumerable measures of precaution are likewise necessary, and which would not be the less useful, because they would be attended with no expense or distress to the country. I do not object to the present measure on account of the expense or inconvenience which attend it, great as they will be. Whatever is necessary must be done, let the hardship be what it will. But I beg that we may not invert the proposition, as many are apt to do, and suppose that whatever is burthensome and oppressive, must therefore be efficacious. I suspect the present measure to be of that character: possibly in all its parts; but unquestionably I must object to it, in that part, which goes in the first instance, and finally, as I believe, to make it impossible for us to have an army.

NAVAL.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.

June 13.—LIEUT. ARCHBOLD, in the *Eling* off Cape Frehel, captured *L'Espiegle* privateer, manned with 12 men and armed with small arms, 18 days from St. Maloes.

June 14.—CAPT. OWEN, in the *Immortalité*, in company with the *Jaloux* and *Cruizer* sloops, chased *L'Inabordable*, schoon r, and *Le Commode* brig; each carrying 3 24-pounders and 1 8-pounder, on shore on the east part of Cape Blanc Nez, and after a heavy firing from them and the batteries, took possession of them.

FOREIGN.

Leghorn, June 1.—This city is declared in a state of siege by *Gen. Murat*, and all the English made prisoners of war.

Hanover, June 7.—The greatest quiet prevails in this city in consequence of the good treatment the inhabitants have received from the French army. The Elbe and the Weser continue open to neutral vessels, and are only shut against the British.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

HANOVER.—The Moniteur of the 17th instant contains an article, in the shape of a note on the English news, stating, that the council, to assist at which his Majesty came from Windsor on the 11th instant, was held on the subject of the convention between Gen. Mortier and the Hanoverian Regency. "An extraordinary courier," says the Moniteur, "carried this instrument for the sig-"nature of the King of England, the First "Consul insisting upon that, previous to "ratifying it himself."—And this is proclaimed all over the world! This cup of humiliation (God send it may be the last!) this act by which his Majesty is compelled to sanction, under his own hand and seal, the most disgraceful capitulation that ever was consented to by any army or any government upon earth, he owes entirely to the "*safe* politicians," who made, and who defended the peace of Amiens.—The Moniteur has an article dated Hanover, 7th instant, which abounds in abuse, or, at least, in sarcasm, on his Majesty's sons. It is hardly credible, that this can have been the language of the Hanoverians; but, it must be confessed, that the shameful manner, in which their country was surrendered, would sanction a belief in any act of baseness on their part. It is true, indeed, that the Hanoverians were shamefully abandoned by the British ministers, who, it is positively asserted, despised all the advice that was offered them as to the Electorate, for the fate of which they said, even to the last moment, that they saw no cause of uneasiness! God send, that their administration may cost their Master no other part of his dominions! Let us hope, that the Addingtons will not be so careless about Richmond Park as they have been about Hanover! Their "*family*" is not quite so ancient as that of Brunswick, which after that of Bourbon is the most ancient in Europe. France was lost through the imbecillity and selfishness of its ministers much more than through any other means; Hanover has been lost from a similar cause; and, while that cause exists in England, what man that loves his country can be free from apprehension?—At the time when the partition of Germany was going on, the English ministry seemed to rejoice at it. They said, in their hired prints, that it would prevent the return of war upon the Continent; and, we find, that, amongst all their lately conjured-up complaints, this does not make its appearance. They were, however, told, that Hanover, in case of another war, would instantly be seized on by the French: all that has now arrived was foreseen and foretold: they turned a deaf ear to it: they retained their places: who, therefore, but their dupes are astonished at the event? And who is there weak enough to pity those dupes?

FRENCH REMARKS ON THE BUDGET.—The Moniteur has also some remarks on Mr. Addington's budget, which may not be altogether uninteresting to that worthy person and his supporters.—On the passage where the wise minister speaks of the necessity of preparing for an arduous and even a protracted war, the Moniteur says, "If "his Britannic Majesty really intends to "accomplish the object of the war; that is "to say, 1. to keep Malta; 2. to make "France submit to the new public law in-"vented by England; 3. to make sure that "all the countries which the timid Mr. Ad-"dington shall think necessary to provide "for the safety of Great Britain, shall be "instantly given up to her, the war will be "much longer than this honourable man "thinks, with all his fore-sight."—One of the principal objects of the war, as stated by the wise man, in his budget-speech, and as repeated by both him and the Secretary at War, in the debate of the 20th instant, is to convince Buonaparté, or, to use the phrase of those prudent ministers, *the person at the head of the government of France*; to convince this person, that "it is hopeless "for him to contend with our finances, and "that it is not in his power to affect us in "that respect (1)."—To which Buonaparté laconically replies: "*Pay your Bank Notes* "*in gold and silver*, and then I'll believe "you, without your going to war."—If this saucy sarcastic fellow were here, Mr. Addington and Abraham Newland would tell him another story. If he were to present them a bank note of a hundred pounds, they would not, indeed, give him a hundred pounds in cash for it; but they would give him a hundred little notes; and, in order to convince him of their *ability* to pay in gold, were they not *restrained* by act of Parliament, they would show him (*through a glass case*) a great number of wedges of that precious metal, which wedges are kept with

(1) See Speech, Register, Vol. III. p. 912.

as much care as the guinea in the pocket of the Vicar of Wakefield's daughter.—The truth, is, that to state motives such as that held out by the minister, on the occasion alluded to, is consummately ridiculous. It may be proper to take measures to convince your enemy, that he cannot injure your finances; but publicly to hold out this as the object of your measures, must of necessity defeat that object. No; the true way of convincing your enemy, that his war upon your finances will be useless, is to state explicitly to the world, that you are not at all afraid of the consequences of what is called a national bankruptcy; for, while you endeavour to make people believe, that such an event *cannot possibly happen*, they will certainly think that you regard it, if it should happen, as *irretrievable ruin and destruction*; and, therefore, as you never can quite overcome their apprehensions, the best way is to be silent upon the subject, or to set the terrific bug-bear at defiance.—To Buonaparté's exultation at our approaching bankruptcy the answer is always ready: France has been a bankrupt; France has not paid her paper money in specie; yet France is not the weaker for that; France is in spite of her ruined finances, in spite of the long pamphlets of Sir Francis D'Ivernois and Mr. Rose, in spite of the longer speeches of Lord Mornington, Lord Auckland, and Mr. Pitt, in spite of the innumerable columns of figures which these noblemen and gentlemen have drawn up in battle array against her; in spite of all this, France is yet powerful, yea, much more powerful than she was before she experienced what is called a national bankruptcy. What ground, therefore, have the French to rejoice at our finances being about to undergo a similar operation?——Mr. Addington threw out a hint of his intention to subsidise some of the powers of the Continent: "It" (meaning his plan of finance) "will have a "still further effect, that of convincing the "other powers of Europe, that they may "safely join with us in the common cause "against the common enemy, for that the "resources of this country are such as to "give full security for the punctual dis-"charge of any engagement it may enter "into (2)."—To this the Consul, after enumerating some particular instances, replies: "Your faith is known. 'Till the genera-"tion, which now covers the Continent, "has totally disappeared, *not one of its "princes will ever make a common cause with "you.*"—If this remark be confined to the *present ministry*, there is every reason to believe, that it is perfectly correct; for, after the treatment of the Stadtholder, the King of Sardinia, and the Vendean Royalists, what prince, what people, or what party, will ever again repose confidence in the good faith of the "*safe* politicians" of England? This is one great reason why these men should be put out of their places. We want allies, and it is absolutely impossible that we should ever have them while the power of the state is committed to the hands of such people. Can any man believe, that the French Royalists will ever again hazard their lives for the men who offered to *banish* them out of Europe, merely to appease, to humour, Buonaparté, the very person against whom they had been fighting? No; every shilling that is put into the hands of such ministers, every soldier, every sailor, that is placed under their command, is an injury to the country instead of a good: it is robbing the country of those means, which, in other hands, might be employed for its salvation ——The sapient minister, in stating the grounds, on which he and his colleagues asked for supplies, said: "We ask assist-"ance, *not because we wish to go to war*, but "because *we are at war*, and we are at "war, *because we cannot be at peace* (3)."—This is, says the Moniteur, "a strange "manner of reasoning. All the world "knows, that the English ministers began "the war: they began it *because they could "not* (for reasons best known to themselves) "*be at peace*; and they continue it, *because "it is begun!* To what men is the fate of "nations sometimes committed!"

FRENCH ANSWERS TO THE ENGLISH DECLARATION.—The reader will, doubtless recollect, that there was laid before Parliament, on the 18th of last month, a paper, having the word DECLARATION at the head of it, in very large letters, but without a date, or any other signature than that of "EYRE *and* STRAHAN, *Printers to "the King's Most Excellent Majesty*;" so that, if this paper should be in existence some years hence, it may possibly lead persons to suppose, that these two gentlemen followed, at one and the same time, the calling of printers and that of ministers of state, a supposition which will be rendered the more probable by the appearance of MR. STRAHAN's name in the list of the Members of Parliament. This Declaration is, however, regarded as a declaration of war issued by his Majesty, the King of Great Britain, against France; and, as such, it has been answered in the Moniteur, first in an unofficial set of observations, and, since, in a

(2) See Register, Vol. III. p. 912.

(3) See Register, Vol. III. p. 914.

more full, formal, and official way, by some person acting under the immediate direction of the government. These two performances are executed with great ability, and, it must be confessed, with more candour than one had reason to expect. Every art is, indeed, made use of, in order to effect a refutation of the statements in the English Declaration; quibbling and sophistry are, too, occasionally called in to the aid of a bad argument, and, a considerable liberty is, as far as relates to the general conduct and disposition of France, taken with facts; but, upon the whole, the English ministry have no reason to complain of the course pursued by these writers, who have, at any rate, discovered much greater fairness than themselves.—The reason, however, for our mentioning these writings now, is, not so much to excite an inquiry into their nature and their intrinsic merits, as to stimulate the ministers to make *a public and professed reply to them.* Let it be recollected, that the Moniteur circulates in all the courts, and amongst all the politicians, of Europe. It is next to impossible, that he who reads these answers to the English Declaration, should not, until he sees them refuted, regard the declaration as replete with misreprentation and falsehood. That such publications call loudly for reply cannot be doubted, especially when it is considered, that their principal object and their direct tendency is, to render any future good understanding between England and the powers of the Continent utterly impossible. —Let not the ministers allege, that they are not bound to reply to the writers of newspapers. An article in the Hamburgh Correspondenten and another in the Moniteur, are, in the King's declaration, stated to be amongst the principal grievances that led to the war. Thus authenticated, thus clad with solemnity, it surely will not now be pretended, that the Moniteur is beneath the notice of an English ministry; and, therefore, we shall expect to see an attempt, at least, on the part of that ministry, to do away the charges which are thus circulating over the world to the injury and dishonour of their country and their Sovereign. But, should we be disappointed in this expectation; should they continue to show that contempt for the interests of their country and for the reputation of their Master which has hitherto been the leading characteristic of their actions, we shall think it our duty to lay before our readers the substance of the French publications, abovementioned, in order that they may be fully informed of the heavy charges, which the enemy has preferred, and which the ministers are suffering to circulate through the world, not only unrefuted, but totally undenied.

Income-Tax.—We have yet heard nothing to reconcile our minds to this impost. The mode of collection is odious and detestable, and leaves a man very little of what is truly called freedom. The "*precedent*" on which Mr. Addington said it was founded, was, we believe, by no means fortunate. In the reign of that sacrilegious and inexorable tyrant, Henry VIII, a tax of this sort was imposed by Cardinal Woolsey. The Londoners made a strong opposition to it, and the country absolutely rose against it, and caused it to be disowned by the king, who issued a general pardon to the revolters. Such a precedent, from such times, brought into practice now, clearly shows, that the spirit of the country, that all love of real freedom, is lost. Indeed, while a minister is reviving this hateful tax, it is an unbearable insult to the people to call on them to fight for their *constitution*, which, if it be not a mere nose of wax, if all the world has not been deceived as to its principles, must, in fact, cease to exist the moment the measure in contemplation is carried into effect. In answer to this we shall be told, that the present tax is in imitation of Mr. Pitt; and, had we subscribed to the infallibility of that gentleman, this might be a consideration of some weight; but we recollect parliamentary reform, the abolition of the slave trade, the abolition of tythes, the peace of Amiens, the mediation of Russia, and several other projects, and this recollection is by no means calculated to make us in love with an odious and despotic measure, merely because it originated with Mr. Pitt.—We object to the tax, not because it is oppressive in its quantity, but because it is, in its collection, vexatious and degrading to the last degree. Ten times the amount of this tax, levied on visible objects, would not, in our estimation, be a thousandth part so great a hardship as to be compelled to submit one's most private concerns to the inquest of a set of little upstart despots, called commercial commissioners.

Defence of the Country.—The project for raising an army of conscripts is now sufficiently understood, and, we believe, almost universally reprobated. A force is wanted; an additional force of 50,000 men is by no means too great, even for the mere purposes of defence; but, it is a *real* force, and not the name, the shadow of a force, that is wanted; it is an army of *soldiers*, and not an *armed mob*, that we shall stand in need of to repel an invading French

army.—Referring the reader to Mr. Windham's speech for information as to the mischievous effects which this system of conscription must have, as to the regular service as well as to the feelings and dispositions of the people, we shall confine our remarks to the mere organization of this heterogenous body, which the Secretary of War chooses to call the *Army of Reserve!* And, here, laying aside the editorial manner of speaking, let me ask this gentleman whether he really does believe, that, upon his plan, 50,000 men, will ever be raised and rendered fit for service. There are to be 50 battalions, each of 1,000 men, requiring, in the whole, 3,000 commissioned officers, 6,000 non-commissioned officers, and about 700 drummers. And, Sir, do you seriously believe, that these are to be found, now out of actual service in the United Kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland? Do you think, Sir, that 3,000 officers are to be got, and officers too fit to assist in that most difficult of all difficult matters, the organizing and training new corps? These officers are to come first from the Army Half Pay List, that is to say, from that list upon which officers have, very lately, been placed as a punishment for having encouraged their soldiers to thieve! No doubt there are many excellent officers upon this list; but is it a source to which the nation can look with great confidence? Next we are, it seems, to have recourse to officers who have *left* the army for *want of promotion*, just as a physician leaves his practice for want of patients, or, as the Addingtons, for instance, left the bar for want of clients. Many of these gentlemen, will, it seems, now "come forward in the service of their coun-"try!" After these come the marine officers on half pay, to whom there is, perhaps, no other objection than that they will most assuredly not be very proud of being huddled into the same corps with those already mentioned, and also with the officers to be picked up upon the shelf of the Company of Merchants trading to the East-Indies. When all these sources are exhausted, we are, as a pis-aller, to go to the officers of the late yeomanry corps in Ireland! And these, *these* are the men, who are not only to command, but who are to *pay*, clothe, feed, and train, this army of 50,000 men, composed of all classes of the community! These are the men, who are to exercise power, necessarily almost absolute, over respectable artizans, tradesmen, and farmers!—But, supposing for argument's sake, that there should be a bare possibility of finding a sufficiency of officers, against whom the conscripts would not mutiny before the end of the first fortnight, where are the non-commissioned officers to come from? There cannot be, to each battalion, less than 40 serjeants and 80 corporals, which, after deducting for staff and other extra duties, will not leave more than one non-commissioned officer to every 10 men, a proportion not great enough even in an old and well-disciplined corps, and much too small in a corps composed of raw, unruly, and, it is to be feared, discontented men. You *must* know, Sir, that, without this number of non-commissioned officers, I mean good, and, in some degree, experienced ones, the battalions cannot be, I will not say formed, drilled, disciplined, and rendered fit for service, but that, without the aid I am now speaking of, the men cannot be *kept together*, either on the march, or in camp, or cantonments, and hardly under the lock and key of a barrack. You will, I suppose, readily dispense with what is called *high discipline*; but the persons composing the "army of reserve," the army which is to be our last rock of defence, this dernier resort of a people, who, previous to the accursed treaty of Amiens, set the world at defiance; you certainly will not deny, Sir, that the persons composing this army, should be taught to stand in a straight row, to range themselves in rank and file, and to fire three deep without shooting one another in the poll? And, even this trifle, together with the art of marching, a battalion together, without treading each other under foot; even this, which will place them but one degree above an armed rabble, even this cannot be effected without the number, which I have already mentioned, of *experienced* non-commissioned officers. And where are these 6,000 non-commissioned officers to come from? The regular regiments? No: you never can intend to rob these skeletons of their very bones; unless, indeed, a part of this splendid project is to break up the army altogether. Besides, the regular army does not possess this number, nor a third part of this number of men, fit to be non-commissioned officers, exclusive of those who are already acting in that capacity, and who are greatly wanted in the recruiting and disciplining of their own corps. Two thousand, at least, of the non-commissioned officers, wanted for your army of reserve, must be able to read and write; they must be intelligent men, and must be worthy of being trusted with considerable sums of money. Where, then, Sir; pray where Sir, are these men to be found? Amongst the conscripts themselves? "If "the blind lead the blind, both shall fall "into the ditch." How can one of these

men, who hardly knows the butt from the muzzle of the musket, instruct another of them in the use of his arms? How is one single company to be formed? How can any one act be done preparatory even to the bringing of any ten men of this army upon parade? When the militia is called out, the soldiers find the skeleton ready to receive them: their adjutant, their *serjeants* and drummers are always in pay, and always ready to set instantly at work to train and discipline the men, as fast as they arrive; but, in the present instance, though you should find officers enough including adjutants, where are you to find 6 000 non-commisioned officers, including 100 serjeants major and the same number of quarter-master serjeants? The thing is impossible; not to *appoint* non-commissioned officers; not to call this footman a corporal and that tapster a serjeant; this is by no means difficult; but to find men qualified to perform the duties of these officers, duties absolutely indispensable, duties without the performance of which a corps cannot be *held together* for a single day, to find such men, in the number and in the time, necessary to carry your plan into effect, is utterly impossible.—Shall I be reminded of the atchievements of the *new levies* in France and America? These were, in the debate of the 6th instant, brought forward by you, in opposition to the opinion then given by Mr. Windham. Upon this subject, sir (as I cannot impute to you a wilful fallacy), I must regard you as totally ignorant. The new levies in France, those I mean who were opposed to the Duke of Brunswick's army, were very few indeed in proportion to the regular troops engaged in the same service; and, observe, that, by the regulations of the national guard, *the whole of the French people* capable of bearing arms, had been armed, and partly disciplined, for I believe more than *three years*, previous to the invasion of the Prussian army. During these years, the people, at all times of a military turn, had been gradually growing into soldiers. Every municipality had its mayor, who was at the head of the national guard, who supplied his men with arms and ammunition, and who generally went to see them parade, to march, and to shoot at a mark, which was the employment of the sundays and holidays. The people found themselves military cloths, not under any volunteer or yeomanry regulation, not by any sort of compulsion; but every one bought himself a coat as he wanted and could afford a new coat, and, it soon became to be regarded as a mark of dishonour in a young man not to be clothed à la militaire. There was not a village, there was no spot of importance enough to have a church, which had not its place of arms and its *drummer*, a personage by no means of little consideration when the object is to stir the spirits of a people and to give to those spirits a war-like direction.—Thus, Sir, was the whole active population of France became soldiers, long before the Duke of Brunswick entered the country; and, as to later epochs, the taste and spirit have been growing every day, more and more military: the young men of 1803, were only from 4 to 10 years old, when the national guard began; they have been raised up from their infancy amidst the clangour of arms, and have never heard any thing but military deeds stated as being worthy of emulation. They are, in a word, all real effective soldiers. *This*, Sir, is the nursery, from which Buonaparté draws his conscripts: how different is that from which yours are to be drawn! —— Then, Sir, as to the American army, the men composing it were, as you state, beaten at first, but that they finally triumphed. First, let me observe, that the *militia* of America, though, as I shall presently show, composed of men used to arms, never met the enemy except at the battle which terminated in the defeat of Burgoyne. On no other occasion could they be brought to the striking place; and, in several instances, they absolutely ran away. After the end of the American war, General Sinclair, in a battle against the Indians, was totally defeated, through the misbehaviour of the militia, of whom his army principally consisted, and who ran away, leaving not only their arms and their knapsacks, but even their *coats*, behind them!—But, the American army, you will say, "must have "been made up of raw and undisciplined "men, whether they were called militia or "not." It was; but the men were, as to their state of preparation for military service, very different, very much superior to those whom you will be able to collect by conscription. In London, it is said of a good man, that is to say, of a rich man, that he was "born with a silver spoon in his mouth," no unapt emblem, by the by, of the strange mixture of childishness, gluttony, and avarice, which prevails in that emporium of commerce; in America, they say of an active, sprightly, lucky man, that he was "born with an ax in one hand and a gun "in the other;" and, every one who has been in America knows, that, in the whole country, there is scarcely a man to be found, who has not, from the age of twelve years, or thereabouts, been in the almost daily habit of shooting. I never saw a farm house, I never saw even a labouring man's house,

without a gun in it, and I have much more frequently seen three guns in a house than one. Part of every countryman's *business* is to shoot. During the winter months the labouring man does, in great part, maintain his family by shooting; and, in fact, it is extremely rare to meet with an American, either in town or country, who would not, in England, be regarded as an excellent shooter at a mark.—To find men thus self-trained to a very essential part of military duty was a great advantage; and, then, Sir, I beg you to observe, that even these men were not taken by force, and enrolled, all at once, by thousands and tens of thousands. They were first called out, by mere invitation, to join in military exercise, in their several townships, or parishes, under the instruction of those officers and soldiers who had served in the war against the French; and, the very first out-set of GENERAL WASHINGTON, in the work of rebellion, was, a subscription of twenty guineas towards furnishing a drum and a drill serjeant to the inhabitants of his own parish in Virginia. When, therefore, the requisitions for the line (for the American army was composed of troops of the line) came to be made by Congress, to the several colonies, they found men already tolerably well prepared. They found them in as good a state, Sir, as your conscripts can possibly be in, at the end of a year or eighteen months drilling, even supposing that you should be so fortunate as to find persons capable of drilling them.——Leaving you now, Sir, to reconsider whatever part of your confidence has arisen from the examples of France and America, give me leave to advert to the new clause, which, it seems, it is your intention to weave into the Conscript Bill, and, in virtue of which the Conscripts are to be allowed *to volunteer for the regular service*. The gloomy prospect, which this qualification must give to the gentlemen, who will have the misfortune to command the Conscripts, Mr. Pitt attempted to brighten by suggesting a regulation that would prevent the men from leaving their officers at any moment they might choose. His plan was, to suffer the transfer to take place, only on three or four days in the year, and those days *not to be the same in every year*, not to be at *stated distances*, but to come upon the men like a thief in the night, to take them by surprize, and never to give them any certain intimation as to the precise time when they would be able to take vengeance on their officers. These days of transfer are not, in their recurrence, to resemble either fixed or moveable feasts; they are to be regulated by neither the Sun nor the Moon; but are to be a sort of Saturnalia, the times for celebrating which are to be determined by a newly-discovered species of State Lottery. But, did it not occur to Mr. Pitt, that, as the Conscript would know that four Saturnalia *must* take place in the course of one year, he would not fail, at all times, to calculate the average? Upon this average, he never could be more than three months from the day of revenge, and, do you, Sir, who know something of a military life, think, that those three months would, on the part of the discontented Conscript, be spent much to the advantage of his corps? —Never, no never, was there so mad a scheme! The battalions, if they should ever be got together at all, and should exist for a time under a provision like this, will present a scene, such, I venture to predict, as no man on earth ever yet set his eyes on.—No, if the Conscripts are to have leave to transfer their service, let them be under no shackles as to the time of doing it. Let them go whenever they please, or not at all; for, by keeping them three months after they are inclined to go into the line, you either make them unwilling and bad soldiers during that time, or you altogether do away the very inclination, of which it is your object to avail yourself.——And now, Sir, give me leave to say a word or two on the *dangers* of our situation. *You*, Sir, are not one of those, who hide their heads under the bed-cloths when they hear thieves breaking into the house; *you* do, indeed, talk largely, but your heart is in unison with your tongue; *you* are not one of those whose hectoring arises from a feeling similar to that which produces the noisy and incoherent song of the plough-boy, as he passes through the church yard at the witching time of night; *you* are not a Castlereagh, a Hawkesbury, an Addington, or a Wilberforce, and, therefore, I venture to state to you, as an opinion, resulting from long consideration united with the utmost anxiety for the preservation of my King and Country, that *if the present system of defence be persevered in*, this country will be subjugated by France. This, Sir, is no new opinion of mine: so long ago as the 9th of November last (6), when you and your colleagues were singing hymns of *peace* and *security*, I pointed out, and even detailed, the dangers, which at this moment exist. The words I then wrote I have only to refer you to, and when you have read them, I do not think, that, in the bottom of your heart, you will despise the observations

(6) See Register, Vol. II. p. 598.

which I have now presumed to make. The crisis is come: the siege of our island is begun; and, it now behoves us, to think, not only of the means of preventing a breach, but of the manner in which we shall act, *if a breach should be made*, whether we shall hazard all in a single battle between the sea-coast and London, or whether, leaving the gold and silver to the invaders, we shall still make a struggle for our liberties, and for the Crown of our Sovereign. Mr. Windham, for only alluding to this alternative, and that too, by way of comment on an opinion, relative to it, already stated elsewhere, has been charged with "*disheartening the country*," with "*creating* "*despondency*," with "*spreading alarm* "*amongst the people*;" and, which is not a little curious, this accusation is brought against him, at the very same moment that he is accused of *quixotism!* And is it, then, something so very dreadful to contemplate this alternative? Must we necessarily despond, because we regard the sacking of London as a *possible* event? Can we not look at this object, even in imagination, without expiring in a fit of despair? Lord Castlereagh tells the people, that "nothing "but baseness and cowardice in them *will* "*suffer the enemy to advance far from* "*the shore*." This is not correct, Sir. The enemy may advance far, very far from the shore without any baseness or cowardice on the part of the people. I *wish*, and I *hope*, that the enemy may not so advance, and the same wishes and hopes were expressly and clearly stated by Mr. Windham; but, if the enemy *should* advance into the country; if this dangerous case *should* arise, who do you think, Sir, would be the statesman most likely to save the country; he who would have no resource but bitter, unjust, and unavailing reproaches on the people; or he, who, even at the expense of the capital, would call on them and encourage them to defend the king and the kingdom?——But, Sir, whatever may be your opinion on this subject, how long soever the system of misrepresentation, with respect to Mr. Windham's opinions, may be persevered in, and however complete the success of that system, *events* will not thereby be controuled in their operation: they speak in a language that *must* be heard. I beg you to remark, Sir, how you and your colleagues have gone on in adopting successively, all those sentiments of Mr. Windham, which, at the time of his first uttering them, you have uniformly rejected with disdain. When, with that solemnity which became the occasion, and the forebodings with which his mind was oppressed, he described the treaty of peace as the death-warrant of the country; when he refused to put on his wedding garment, 'till he knew whether he was invited to a marriage or a funeral; in a short space after that memorable day, the ministerial news-papers recorded a witticism of Lord Hawkesbury, who, they informed the public, had facetiously said: "Come, Wind- "ham, do put on your wedding garment, "and go along with us to carry up the "address." In this manner, Sir, have all his sentiments been treated at first, but they have always been afterwards adopted, and always when *too late;* and this course, I greatly fear, will be obstinately pursued, 'till the monarchy of England follows the monarchy of France.—It has been said, Sir, particularly by you, that the treaty of Amiens has produced the salutary effect of uniting the people in a hearty and zealous *support of the present war*.—Where is the proof of this? In the *two* addresses delivered to His Majesty, from the cities of London and Dublin? Is it to be found in the *facility* with which the militia has been collected? Or in the law, now passing, for the purpose of *forcing* men to take up arms in *defence* of their own houses?—But, Sir, if you believe that the people will cheerfully pay the enormous taxes which the peace of Amiens has rendered absolutely necessary, and that they have entered on the war with a resolution to shed their last drop of blood rather than suffer the house and land in Richmond Park to be taken from Mr. Addington; if you do really believe this, you have adopted a great and most dangerous error, an error from which, if you repose in it but for a little while, you will be awakened by a voice, which will yield in terror to nothing but the last awful trump.—The truth is, Sir, that a general and deadly *indifference* pervades the land. The people still see the powers of the state in the hands of those, who for ten months peace, gave up the conquests won during ten years of war and of victory. The people cannot, the people will not, chearfully espouse any cause conducted by those men. While their property and their lives are at the mercy of persons by whom they have been so injured and disgraced, they must and they will regard themselves as the sport of party intrigue, and, so regarding themselves, they will be indifferent as to any and every political event.

☞ *All* Correspondents next week.

LONDON,

LONDON, June 25 to June 30, 1803.

EXTRACT FROM THE MONITEUR,

of 19th of June, 1803.

[It is of importance, at all times, and particularly at the present time, to know something of the sentiments of our enemy. The following article, translated from the French Official Paper, gives us, as to some very important points, that very useful knowledge, and, therefore, we beg leave to recommend it to the attentive perusal of our Readers.]

The only events which, at this time, merit great attention are the occupation of Hanover by the French troops, and two long debates in the British Parliament, the one relative to the conduct of ministers, and the other to the mediation of Russia. The question upon the conduct of the ministry has been decided, in a manner which acquired no difficulty to foresee. If we except the attitude taken by Mr. Pitt, who has not scrupled to avow his disapprobation of his *right honourable friends*, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and the indignation, or rather the pain which Lord Hawkesbury felt, and which he so clearly manifested to the House, we cannot discover that the true question was in any way entered upon.—Was it upon the good faith of the ministry that they were occupied? Was it upon their fidelity to their engagements that they were questioned? And upon the care with which they so scrupulously and religiously observed the treaty of Amiens? Upon this point no question was proposed, not one word was uttered. The debate was remarkable only for the ingenuity of Col. Bastard; *we want time to recruit our strength.* These words, which excited no animadversion, completely explain the conduct of the British government. Formerly, it was considered as an honour to be faithful to engagements. *Firma pacis fœdera* was formerly the greatest homage which the French nation acquired in Europe. It is true that some ancient nations became subject to the quality of *fœdifraga.*—Punic faith appears to have been bequeathed by the merchants of Carthage to the merchants of England.—That England had no other object in the treaty of Amiens than to gain time, is not the only avowal which was made in those debates. Lord Hawkesbury told us in the discussion of the motion on the mediation of Russia, that war was not the time for forming coalitions with convenience and advantage, and that one object of the treaty of Amiens was to prepare a barrier against the aggrandisement of France (1). He informed us, that since the signing of the treaty, to the present moment, no effort had been spared to form a strict alliance with Russia, which should have for its object no views of hostility towards any other power, but only measures necessary for a proper defence (2). Unfortunately they found that Russia would not consent to this *innocent* proposition, and war has therefore arisen.—Although Lord Hawkesbury has thus had a moment of

(1) He must candidly admit, that one circumstance weighed particularly on his mind with respect to the conclusion of the last peace, which was that of forming a barrier to the aggrandisement of France.

(2) From the signing of the treaty to the present time, no efforts have been wanting on the part of his Majesty's government to form a *close connexion* with Russia, having for its basis no hostility towards any power, and having only in view the necessary means of defence. Those means, have, however, failed; otherwise it is highly probable that the present crisis would not have arisen.

candour, we may believe that it was not in the Parliament, but in the interior of the Cabinet that he has manifested all his views. 'In engaging in the war,' he would have said, 'we give other nations a great example of provocation which they may be tempted to imitate. We weaken, towards France, that sentiment of admiration which her victories have created, and we reduce her from that high rank to which her valour and her successes have elevated her. Our boldness may awaken recollection, open wounds, sharpen resentments, and, perhaps, revive hopes. That we may not fail in the attainment of this great object, we will be in readiness to listen to the propositions of Russia: this is not the moment. Let us begin by offering to our sailors an easy prize of four or five millions, which France and her allies have trusted, in full security, upon the sea, millions which it will be easy for us to squeeze out of them by a loan when they have effected the great object of making the war popular; and then, whilst the gazettes are filled with accounts of our glory, we shall have all the time that will be necessary for listening to the propositions of Russia, to excite, if it be necessary, the interposition of some other great power, and thus, at the end of such an agreeable career of depredation and capture, make such a new treaty as may be convenient. It makes little difference to us in this new arrangement, whether we retain Malta or give it to Russia. We shall have made war against France with boldness, and have made her pay the cost. We shall have clipped the rising wings of her commerce; we shall, for a long time, have paralysed her industry; her commercial cities torn by the wounds which we shall have inflicted, will not for a long time dare again to hazard their industry and their capital upon the sea. Our preponderating activity will then be able to insult their timidity. We shall have established a supremacy upon the seas, which France, in the first moment of her prosperity will dispute with us.'——Lord Hawkesbury and the British Cabinet may amuse themselves as long as they please with these illusions. We are sorry to draw them out from such security. They must know, however, as Mr. Burke once told them, *that war, that Gorgon bristling with darts and serpents, is not a coquette to be sported with with impunity. When France wanted peace, you wanted war; now fear lest France should wish for war when it may be agreeable for you to wish for peace.*—Nothing is more singular than the language of all those famous statesmen. One wishes for a war vigorous and short; it must be directed towards *one single point*, another does not deny that the war should not be of long duration. One regards it as mere sport to chastise France; another does not conceal that it will cost his country long and painful sacrifices. One minister wishes to defend the whole country with Militia, another sees safety in nothing but troops of the line. Mr. Pitt is convinced that England *can do nothing offensive*; according to Mr. Windham, that nation alone is capable of defence, *who is able to attack*. There is no Englishman of any sense who is not astonished at the chaos of contradictory views and opposite plans. To every reasonable man, whether friend or enemy, the projects in agitation must appear nothing more than the conceptions of despair.—It is strange, that, amongst the numerous *friends of liberty*, there are none who are *alarmed at the increase of the troops of the line!* Formerly, the whole country was ready to rise in arms respecting the simple construction of barracks, now an immense army is voted and placed at the disposal of the Crown. The Secretary of War cited the example of the American militia, and of the French militia during their revolutions. He might also have cited La Vendée, and, in times more ancient, the example of the Swiss, and of the United Provinces. When the people are set in motion, when their most ardent and most powerful passions are roused, they are capable not only of great efforts, but of miracles; *but when a people naturally sluggish and indolent, accustomed to all the convenience of opulence, and to all the luxuries of civilization, is forcibly thrown out of all its habits, to support the whims of ministers; when a people of merchants is invited to leave their counters, and lead for whole years, the life of an hussar or a pandour, merely for the honour of possessing a rock, and of breaking a treaty solemnly ratified, we have some difficulty in believing that the ministers will attain the end which they propose.* The deputies from the Electorate of Hanover can now teach them what sort of confidence is to be reposed in hasty levies. How foolish are they who pretend to draw from the clouds of their brains that electric fire which sometimes forms great popular commotions. The insurrections which they are now provoking, may perhaps, be too effectually realised, *but it will be to destroy those who by a foolish war, have reduced them to the necessity of asking an ignominious peace.*

Whilst these great events are unfolding themselves, the occupation of Hanover will serve as a balance to the losses which our commerce must necessarily sustain at the commencement of the war. It must be a

very amusing recreation for the merchants of London, to see the ships of France arriving, month after month, to enrich their port. And it is but just that King George should defray from his own purse the expenses of this little amusement which he has given his subjects. It is not without some difficulty that he has reconciled himself to bear these injuries. Protected by his floating batteries at home, he hoped that the great powers of Europe, would have undertaken the protection of his continental possessions; the hundred voices of fame seemed to be the pledges of their security. 'Prussia, Denmark, and Russia,' it was said, 'would never quietly see the 'French enter Hanover, and thereby strike 'all the North of Germany with alarm, 'and violate the peace of a country pro-'tected by the Treaty of Luneville.' For these considerations all the fleets of Russia were ready to set sail, all her armies were waiting to begin their march. A Prussian army advanced on one side; its direction was known, and its general was named. These rumours were the most ridiculous absurdities. It would have been strange if those who had violated the Treaty of Amiens, could have retrenched themselves behind that of Luneville; it would have been strange if those who had declared war against the Republics of Italy and Holland, only because they were under the dominion of the chief of the French Republic, could have made those countries respected which were under the government of the King of England. We might have believed that England was not serious in proclaiming this hope, if the Royal proclamation for a *levée en masse*, and the arrival of one of the sons of the King of Great Britain to command it, had not established the certainty. The folly of these two circumstances are requisite to give the expedition of Gen. Mortier the appearance of a triumph, by giving the capitulation of the Hanoverian army the appearance of a defeat. We may observe, that this capitulation is the same as that which was signed at *Closterseven* in 1757, under the direction of the Maréchal de Richelieu. It was then stipulated under the guarantee of the King of Denmark, that the Hanoverian troops should not exercise any hostilities until the conclusion of the war. It is well known how that capitulation was violated after the battle of Rosbach. The celebrated Lord Chatham, the father of Mr. Pitt, decided that as the King of England had not ratified the capitulation, it could not be valid; and it was in consequence of that decision that the Hanoverians went from their lines, and went under the command of Prince Ferdinand to give the battle of Crevelt.—If the occupation of Hanover, which the folly of the British government has compelled us to call a conquest, possesses but little importance as a military achievment, it is at least, a source from which riches may be drawn. It is, however, a great military point. It is a great thing to have acquired fifty leagues more of that iron wall, so truely described by Mr. Windham, which now extends from the Mediterranean to the Baltic. The war at present is nothing more than playful pastime. When the English shall have finished their game of capture and depredation, and the French shall have completed their formidable preparations upon the whole extent of their coast, then will WAR commence, and a WAR which every thing declares will be TERRIBLE.

MR. BURKE'S LETTER.

The following is the fragment of the Letter from Mr. Burke to Dr. Laurence, which was read by the latter, in the House of Commons, on the 23d instant, during the debate on the Conscript Bill.——It was written from Bath in the spring of 1797, when an increased attack of the writer's disorder threatened the fatal termination of his valuable life, which soon after took place.

MY DEAR SIR,——The very first relaxation of my complaint, which gave me leisure and disposition to attend to what is going on, has filled my mind with many uneasy sensations, and many unpleasant reflections. The few of us who have protracted life to the extreme limits of our short period, have been condemned to see extraordinary things; new systems of policy, new opinions, new principles, and not only new men, but what might appear a new species of men. I believe, that they who lived 40 years ago (if the intermediate space of time were expunged from their memory) could hardly credit their senses, when they heard from the highest authority, that an army of 200,000 men was kept up in this island; that in the neighbouring island there were at least fourscore thousand more; but when he should hear of this army, which has not its parallel, what must be his astonishment to hear, that it was kept up for the mere purpose of an inert and passive defence; and that in its far greater part, it was disabled by its constitution and very essence, from defending us against an enemy by any one preventive stroke, or any operation of active hostility. What must his reflection be on

hearing, that a fleet of 500 men of war, the best appointed, and to the full as ably commanded, as this country ever had upon the sea, was for the greater part employed in acting upon the same system of unenterprising defence. What must his sentiments be, who remembers the former energy of England, when he is given to understand that these two Islands, with their extensive, and every where vulnerable sea coast, should be considered as a garrison sea town? What would he think if the garrison of so strange a fortress, should be such as never to make a sally; and that, contrary to all that has been hitherto seen in war, an infinitely inferior army may with safety besiege this superior garrison, and without hazarding the life of a man, ruin the garrison and the place, merely by the menaces and false appearances of an attack? What must his surprise be upon finding, that with the increases of trade, and balances unknown before, and with less outgoing than at any former time, the public credit should labour, even to the edge of a bankruptcy, that the confidence of the people in the security of their property, should lessen in proportion as all the apparent means of their safety are augmented? The last part of this dreadful paradox is to be solved but by one way, this is, by an obscure undefined sense which the people entertain, that the apparent means of their safety are not real, nor well understood, and that they confide in their government, more from their opinion that some sort of government should be supported, than from a conviction that the measures taken by the existing government for the public safety, are rational or well adapted to their end. Had it pleased God to continue to me even the late weak remains of my strength, I purposed to make this the subject of a letter, which I intended to address to a brother member of your's upon the present state of affairs; but, as I may never be able to finish it, I regard this matter of defence as so much the most important of all considerations at this moment, that it supersedes all concern of my bodily and mental weakness, and urges me by an impulse I cannot resist, to spend at least, my last breath in laying before you some part of the anxious thoughts with which I have been oppressed, and which more than any bodily distemper, has sunk me to the condition in which you know I am. I have no hand to write, but I am able to dictate from the bed on which I pass my nights and days. What I say may have no weight, but it is possible that it may tend to put other men of more ability, and who are in a situation where their abilities may be more useful, into a train of thinking. What I say may not be pleasing either to the great or the multitude; but looking back on my past public life, though not without many faults and errors, I have never made many sacrifices to the favour of the great, or to the humours of the people. I never remember more than two instances, in which I have given way to popularity, and those two are the things of which, in the whole course of my life, now at the end of it, I have the most reason to repent. Such has been the habit of my public life, even when individual favour and popular countenance, might be plausibly presented to me as the means of doing my duty the more effectually. But now, alas! Of what value to me are all those helps or all those impediments? When the damp chill sweat of death already begins to glaze our visage, of what moment is it to us, whether the vain breath of man blows hot or cold upon it? But our duties to men are not extinguished with our regard to their opinions. A country which has been dear to us from our birth, ought to be dear to us, as from our entrance, so to our final exit from the stage upon which we have been appointed to act; and in the career of the duties which must in part be enjoyments of our new existence, how can we better start, and from what more proper post, than the performance of those duties which have made occupations of the first part of the course allotted to us?

PUBLIC PAPERS.

Note.—Presented by Mr. Liston to Citizen Vander Goes, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, dated Hague, May 24, 1803.

Sir,—By order of my Court, I beg you to submit to the Batavian Government the following considerations:—The King is animated with the most ernest desire that the new war which has just broken out, shall not extend to the countries connected with France; and that it shall not involve in its calamities nations which have had no part in the events that have given rise to it. His Majesty, however, cannot adopt towards the Batavian republic the conduct which such sentiments would dictate to him, unless the French Government is disposed to adopt an analogous system.—If France will consent to withdraw immediately her troops from the territory of the republic; if she will release the Batavian government from the obligation of furnishing any succours whatever by land or sea; if, in short, she will permit the republic to observe a sincere and perfect neutrality during the continuance of the war; His Majesty will engage on his side to adhere with scrupulous exactness to a reciprocal neutrality, and in that case the vessels which may have been provisionally detained, shall be immediately released. But if unhappily the First Consul persists in determining to occupy the Batavian territory, and to convert the resources of the country into means of hostility and attack upon Great Britain, His Majesty will feel himself forced, by what he owes to the safety of his territories, and the dearest

interests of his people, to recur to those measures which Providence has placed in his hands to frustrate the designs of his enemies.—It will, however, be with a sentiment of the deepest regret that the King will see the Batavian government involved in a war, which must be as little conformable to their intentions as to those of His Majesty himself.—Receive, Sir, the assurances of my distinguished consideration.

Hague, May 24, 1803. R. LISTON.

Order of His Britannic Majesty in Council, for making Reprisals on the Batavian Republic, dated June 16, 1803.

At the Court at Windsor, the 15th of June, 1803, present, the KING's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

Whereas His Majesty's most anxious endeavours to preserve neutrality and peace between His Majesty and the Batavan republic have failed, and the Batavian republic has become engaged in measures of hostility against His Majesty and his subjects; His Majesty, therefore, is pleased, by and with the advice of his Privy Council, to order, and it is hereby ordered, that general reprisals be granted against the ships, goods, and subjects of the Batavian republic, so that as well His Majesty's Fleets and Ships, as also all other ships and vessels that shall be commissionated, by letters of marque, or general reprisals, or otherwise, by His Majesty's commissioners for executing the office of lord high admiral of Great Britain, shall and may lawfully seize all ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the Batavian republic, or to any persons being subjects of the Batavian republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the Batavian republic, and bring the same to judgment in such courts of admiralty within His Majesty's dominions, as shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance thereof: and to that end, His Majesty's advocate-general, with the advocate of the admiralty, are forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to His Majesty at this Board, authorizing the commissioners for executing the office of lord high admiral, or any person or persons by them empowered and appointed, to issue forth and grant letters of marque and reprisals to any of His Majesty's subjects, or others whom the said commissioners shall deem fitly qualified in that behalf, for the apprehending, seizing, and taking the ships, vessels, and goods belonging to the Batavian republic, or to any persons being subjects of the Batavian republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the Batavian republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said commission, as have been usual, and are according to former precedents: and His Majesty's said advocate-general, with the advocate of the admiralty, are also forthwith to prepare the draft of a commission, and present the same to His Majesty at this Board, authorizing the said commissioners for executing the office of lord high admiral, to will and require the High Court of Admiralty of Great Britain, and the Lieutenant and Judge of the said Court, his surrogate or surrogates, as also the several Courts of Admiralty within his Majesty's dominions which shall be duly commissionated to take cognizance of, and judicially proceed upon all and all manner of captures, seizures, prizes, and reprisals of all ships and goods that are or shall be made, and to hear and determine the same, and according to the course of Admiralty and the Laws of Nations, to adjudge and condemn all such ships, vessels, and goods as shall belong to the Batavian Republic, or to any persons being subjects of the Batavian Republic, or inhabiting within any of the territories of the Batavian Republic; and that such powers and clauses be inserted in the said Commission as have been usual, and are according to former precedents; and they are likewise to prepare and lay before his Majesty at this board a draft of such instructions as may be proper to be sent to the said several Courts of Admiralty in his Majesty's Foreign Governments and Plantations for their guidance herein; as also another draft of instructions for such ships as shall be commissionated for the purposes above-mentioned.

From the Court at Windsor, the sixteenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and three.——*Edward,—Ernest,—Adolphus Frederick,—Westmoreland, C. P. S.—Pelham,—Castlereagh,—J. H. Addington.*

FOREIGN OFFICIAL PAPERS.

Circular Letter from Chaptal, Minister of the Interior, dated Paris, June 11, 1803.

In the actual State of France, and with the kind of enemy that we have to combat, French bravery must remain inactive on the brink of the ocean, if numerous vessels do not furnish it the means of attacking its enemy.——It is then to the building of vessels that all your efforts ought to be directed; Commerce, Agriculture, Industry, will suffer the less for the execution being the more prompt——A Flat-Boat, of the first class, will cost 30,000 francs; that of the second, from 18 to 20,000; and that of the third, from 4 to 6000 francs.——Two feet of water are sufficient to float a boat unarmed; thus there are few places that may not execute an undertaking of this kind. ——These Boats will bear the name of the cities or departments that shall build them. The Government will accept with satisfaction from a ship of the line to the smallest transport boat.——If, by a movement as rapid as general, each department, each large city, will cover their stocks with boats, then the French army will go and dictate laws to the British Government, and establish the repose of Europe, the liberty and prosperity of commerce, on the only basis that can ensure their duration.——CHAPTAL.

Arreté of the First Consul, prohibiting the Importation of British Merchandize. Dated Paris, June 20, 1803.

ART. 1. Dating from the publication of the present decree, there shall not be received in the ports of the Republic any colonial produce coming from the English colonies, nor any merchandize coming directly or indirectly from England. In consequence, all colonial produce or merchandise coming from the English manufactories or English colonies shall be confiscated.——2. Neutral ships destined for the ports of the Republic, shall be furnished with a certificate of delivery from the Commissary or Agent of Commercial Relations of the Republic at the port of embarkation, which certificate shall mention the name of the ship and the captain, the nature of the cargo, the number of the crew, and the destination of the vessel; in that declaration, the Commissary shall certify that he has seen the loading completed under his inspection, and that the merchandize is not English manufacture, and does not come from England, nor from her colonies. A duplicate of that declaration shall be sent to the Minister of the Interior by the Commissary of the Republic, on the

day of the sailing of the vessel ——3. The captain, who, through forgetfulness of the form or through change of destination, shall not be furnished with a similar declaration, shall not be admitted into the ports of the Republic, but upon condition of loading in return French manufactures equal in value to the amount of his cargo. The Director of the Customs shall send to the Prefect of the Department the statement of his cargo, and that of the merchandise taken in return. Upon that statement, the Prefect shall deliver a permit of departure from the port.——4. The Minister of the Interior, of Foreign Affairs, and of Finance, are charged with the execution of the present decree.——BUONAPARTÉ.

American Consulate, London, June 27, 1803.

By an arreté of the French Government, of 1 Messidor (June 20th), no American vessels are permitted to carry merchandise of any kind, directly or indirectly, from this country to any port of the Republic. And all British manufactures, or British colonial produce, so carried, will be subject to confiscation.

PARLIAMENTARY MINUTES, *from p. 915.*

Tuesday, June 14.——LORDS.—Bills from Commons read.—Committee on Clergy Non-Residence Bill. After some debate between Lords Caernarvon, Ellenborough, and Auckland, Bishops of Norwich, Durham, Oxford, and St. Asaph, Duke of Richmond, and Lord Chancellor, some clauses agreed to, and some postponed.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Third report Highland Committee laid on table and ordered to be printed.—Bill for incorporating a Company to supply London with Fish read second time, and, after some conversation, referred to a Committee.—Report on Budget, after some debate between Lord Folkstone, and Chancellor of the Exchequer, brought up and read. Chancellor of the Exchequer gave notice of asking leave to bring in bills grounded on the resolutions; also, for consolidation of Excise, to-morrow, and army extraordinaries, Friday.—Orders of the day disposed of.—Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 15.——LORDS.—Counsel heard in appeal Thelluson *v.* Woodford. Postponed till Monday.——Southampton Ordnance Bill from Commons read.—Exchequer Bills bill read second time, and committed for to-morrow.—Committee on Foote's Divorce Bill, report ordered to-morrow.—Bills on table forwarded.——Adjourned.——COMMONS —Report on Malicious Shooting Bill. To be read third time to-morrow.——Report on Irish Ship Burning Bill. Ordered to be printed and read third time Monday.—Papers laid before the House on Income Duty of 1802, ordered to be printed.—Accounts respecting the importation of various articles from 1793 to 1803. Ordered.—Bill for suspension of Navigation Act read third time and committed for to-morrow.—Leave granted to bring in Bill indemnifying certain persons in Ireland.—Committee Ways and Means. Agreed that certain charges relative to the Militia of Ireland be defrayed out of the Land Tax and Consolidated Fund of that country. Postponed till Friday.—Irish Budget postponed till Monday.—Petitions against Woollen Manufactures bill presented.—Committee on Bribery Oath Bill. Report to-morrow. Ordnance Lands Bill passed.—Militia Transfer Bill reported and ordered for third reading to-morrow. Committee on report concerning Highlands of Scotland. Moved that £20,000 be granted for making Roads and Bridges in Scotland.——Committee on Consolidation of Excise. Report ordered to-morrow.—Report of Committee on East India Shipping Bill agreed to. Bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Bill for raising 12,000,000 l. for service of the year, on Annuities, brought up, read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—Bill for granting certain duties on Exports, Imports, and Tonnage brought up, read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—Committee on Custom Consolidation Bill —Adjourned.

Thursday, June 16.——LORDS —Committee on Exchequer Bills bill.— Committee on Chandos Peerage. Resolved, "That Rev. Mr. Brydges has "not made good his claim."—Committee on Clergy Non Residence Bill. Amendments proposed and new clauses added.——Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Mr. Coke of Nottingham took his seat.—Committee on Act of 42d of the King respecting Work-houses. Leave given to bring in a bill to amend said Act.—Committee on Irish Parsonage Bill. Amendments agreed to, after some debate and report to be received to-morrow. ——Leave given to bring in Bill concerning Scotch Roads —Woollen manufacturers Bill postponed to this day se'nnight.—Malicious Shooting, Irish Ship Burning, and Militia Transfer Bills passed.——Scotch Militia Bill read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—East India Shipping Bill read third time and sent to Lords.—Leave given to bring in Bill respecting the mercantile interest.—Mr. Whitbread moved for copies of the minutes and evidence taken at the dock-yards, during the late visit of the Commissioners; and also of their correspondence with the navy and victualing boards. After some debate between Chancellor of the Exchequer, Capt. Markham, Sirs W. Elford, C. Pole, A. Hammond, and F. Baring, Messrs. Courtney, Bastard, Harvey, and Sheridan, Admiral Berkley, and the Attorney General, the motion was withdrawn.—Leave given to bring in Bills to restrain the issuing of small notes in Ireland, to regulate the Corn trade between Ireland and England, and, to transfer seamen in the militia of Ireland to the navy. Bill for granting duties on Exports, &c. and Loan Bill read second time, and ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Orders of day disposed of.—Adjourned.

Saturday, June 18.——LORDS.—Committee on Clergy Non-Residence Bill. Considerable debate took place and various amendments were proposed. The speakers were the Bishops of St. Asaph, London, Oxford, and Durham, Lords Alvanley and Auckland, and the Lord Chancellor. Report ordered Monday.—Lord Hobart presented the following message.

"GEORGE R.—His Majesty thinks it proper to "acquaint the House of Lords, that for the more "effectual defence of the United Kingdom against "the avowed designs of the enemy, and for the "purpose of providing such means as may be best "calculated for a vigorous prosecution of the "war, his Majesty deems it important that a large "additional force should be forthwith raised and "assembled.—His Majesty recommends this sub-"ject to the consideration of their Lordships, "and relies with confidence on their zeal and "public spirit, that they will adopt such mea-"sures as upon this occasion shall appear to "them to be most effectual, and for carrying "the same into execution with the least possible "delay."——"G. R."—Ordered to be taken into consideration on Monday.—Adjourned. ——COMMONS —Irish Indemnity and Militia Officer Bill read second time and committed for Monday. ——

Excise Duty Bill read and ordered for second reading Monday.—Report of Committee of Supply on Army Extraordinaries agreed to.—Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered a message from his Majesty (see Lords) which was committed for Monday.—Tax on Property Bill, after some observations, read second time and committed for Monday.—Adjourned.

Monday, June 20.——LORDS.—Counsel heard in appeal Thelluson *v.* Woodford.—Surveys of Highlands of Scotland laid on table and ordered to be printed.—Lord Hobart concluded a long speech by moving "an address thanking his Majesty, for "his gracious message; that this House will "cheerfully concur with his Majesty in adopting "additional measures for the security, and for-"ward the same to the utmost of its extent and "abilities." After much debate between H. R. H. the Duke of Clarence, Lords Grosvenor, Caernarvon, Suffolk, Carlisle, Moira, Mulgrave, Limerick, Fitzwilliam, Grenville, and Sheffield, and the Lord Chancellor, and Duke of Richmond, the motion was unanimously agreed to.——Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Petition presented against Cotton Manufacturers Bill.——Committee on the King's Message. The Secretary at War, after a speech in which he detailed a plan for Military Conscription, moved an address similar to that in the Lords, which was carried unanimously. He also moved, "that bills be brought in for raising, in the most "speedy and efficacious manner, an additional "force for the security and protection of the "realm." A long debate ensued between Mr. Windham, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Mr. Pitt, Cols. Bastard and Wood, Sir W. Young, and the Secretary at War. Motion carried, and a Committee appointed to bring in the Bill.——In Committee of Ways and Means, Mr. Corry moved certain new taxes for Ireland.—Bill for taxing property read in Committee, and reported.—Highland Road Bill, and Irish Militia Transfer Bill read second time.—Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 21.——LORDS.——Several Bills brought from Commons.—Justice of Peace regulation Bill read second time.—Bills on table forwarded.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.——Leave granted to bring in a bill to extend the limits of the Southern Whale Fishery.—Petition presented against London Fishing Company Bill.—Irish Corn Bill reported and ordered for third reading.—Report of Committee on London Port Bill ordered to-morrow.—Irish Indemnity Bill and Subaltern Officers Bill reported and ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Report of Militia Pay Bill postponed till Friday.——Militia Adjutant Bill read second time and committed for Friday.——Reports of Committee on Medicine Duty Bill, and on Irish Seamen Bill, ordered to-morrow.——Irish Parsonage Bill passed.——Scotch Bridge Bill postponed——Property Tax Bill and Scotch Manufactory Bill read second time and committed for to-morrow.—Assessed Tax Consolidation Bill postponed.—Excise Duty Consolidation Bill committed.——Motion to commit St. James's Workhouse bill, after much conversation, negatived.—On motion of Mr. Calcraft an account of the number of Shipping, employed by the East-India Company. Ordered.—Report of Committee on Irish Budget brought up, and bills founded on the resolutions ordered to be brought in.——Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 22.—— LORDS.—Bills on table forwarded.—Several bills brought from Commons.—Loan Bill and some other bills which were ordered for commitment, passed through committees and ordered to be reported to-morrow.—On the question of receiving the report of the Clergy Non Residence Bill, some discussion took place between Lords Grenville, Alvanley, Roslin, Auckland, Grosvenor, and the Lord Chancellor, and the Bishops of London and St. Asaph. The Report was then received and some amendments agreed to, when the consideration was postponed till to-morrow.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Lord Stopford reported that his Majesty had made a most gracious answer to the address agreed upon on Saturday.—Foote's Divorce Bill read.—Report of the Committee on the petitions of the Irish Tanners brought up and committed.—Highland Road Bill postponed.—Irish Militia Transfer Bill brought up and ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Assessed Tax Bill recommitted, and report ordered for Monday.—Militia Subaltern Bill passed.—New Levy Bill brought up and read first time.—Report of Additional Customs Bill brought up, agreed to, and bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.——Committee on Personal Property Bill, report ordered for Tuesday.—Report of Medicine Duty Bill brought up, agreed to, and bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Report of Excise Consolidation Bill brought up, agreed to, and Bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.——Committee on Assessed Tax Bill, report brought up and bill ordered to be printed.—Committee of Ways and Means, report ordered for to-morrow.—English and Irish Corn Bill passed.—Orders of the day disposed of.—Adjourned.

Thursday, June 23.——LORDS.—Counsel heard in Thelluson *v.* Woodford: cause postponed till 11th July, when the judges are to give their opinions.—Committee on Bribery Oath Bill.—Committee on Justice of the Peace Regulation Bill, re-committed for to-morrow.—Committee on Clergy Non-Residence Bill, report ordered for to-morrow.—Adjourned.—COMMONS.—Edward Morris, Esq. took his seat for Newport Cornwall.—Sundry accounts of East India shipping laid on table.—Woollen Clothiers Bill postponed.—Committee on Highland Bridge Bill, report ordered for to-morrow.—Leave granted to bring in a bill for increasing the number of Militia Officers. Bill brought in, read, and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—Army of Reserve Bill, after a long debate between Messrs. Calcraft, Sheridan, and Elliot, Sir G. Heathcote, the Secretary at War, Messrs. Pitt, and Windham, Lord Castlereagh, Sir E. Coote, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and Sir W. Geary, was committed, read second time and ordered for Monday.——Message from Lords stating their assent to several bills.—Committee on Assessed Tax Consolidation Bill, report ordered for to-morrow.—Committee on Irish Corn Trade Bill.——Irish Militia Transfer Bill and Medicine Duty Bill passed.—Additional Excise Bill read second time, and committed for to-morrow.—Orders of the day postponed.—Adjourned.

Friday, June 24.——LORDS.—Royal assent given to 47 bills.—Several bills brought from Commons and read first time.—Bills on table forwarded.—Clergy Non Residence Bill passed, after considerable debate and some amendment.—Adjourned.—COMMONS.——Southern Whale Fishery Bill read second time.——Highland Road Bill reported and amendments agreed to.—East India Dock Bill recommitted for Monday.—Horse-hide Bill passed. Message from Lords agreeing to Bribery Oath Bill.—Report of Committee on Assessed Taxes agreed to and Bill ordered to be brought in.——Militia Officers Bill read second time and committed for Monday.—Accounts concerning Exchequer Bills

Ordered.—In Committee of Ways and Means, the Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that 1,052,333*l.* 6*s.* 8*d.* be raised by lottery. After some debate between Mr. Babington, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Messrs. W. Smith, Wilberforce, Vansittart, and Corry, motion carried. Report ordered for Monday.——Real property Bill postponed till Tuesday and personal till Monday. Considerable discussion took place on the Excise Duty Bill, between Mr. Plummer, Mr. Kinnaird, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir J. St. Clair Erskine, Mr Corry, Lord A. Hamilton, Mr. W. Dundas, Master of the Rolls, Secretary at War, Mr. Vansittart, and several other members.—Custom consolidation and Excise consolidation Bills passed.—Orders of the day disposed of.—Adjourned.

Monday, June 27 ——LORDS.—Counsel heard M'Lean *v.* Bethune.—Several bills brought from Commons.—Bills on table forwarded.—Highland Road Bill read and ordered to be printed.—Committee on Justices Regulation Bill.—Private business disposed of.—Adjourned.——COMMONS—Papers relative to prizes re-ordered.—Accounts relative to Freeholders in Ireland presented.——Southern Whale Fishery Bill and Militia Officers Bill read second time and committed for to-morrow.——Petition from the Clothiers of Yorkshire presented against the Woollen Bill.——Report of Committee on Lottery brought up, agreed to, and bill ordered to be brought in.—Considerable debate took place on the Army of Reserve Bill, between the Secretary at War, Mr. Pitt, Sir A. Young, Mr. W. Smith, Gen. Maitland, Mr. Vansittart, Mr. Sheridan, Mr. Kinnaird, Sir R. Buxton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Col. Wood, and Crawford, Mr. Erskine, Mr. Macnaghton, Mr. Windham, and several other members; and after many amendments, the bill was ordered to be printed, and considered on Wednesday.—Report of Committee on Excise Consolidation Bill brought in.—Committee on Irish Combination Bill.—Adjourned.

Tuesday, June 28.—LORDS.—Counsel heard on the claim of Sir Cecil Bishop, to the Barony of Zouch: postponed.—Bills before the House forwarded.—Bill for providing for the Widows of the Writers to the Signet in Scotland passed.—Private business disposed of.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Petition presented from the Hop Growers of Herefordshire.—Assessed Tax Bill ordered for to-morrow.—Scotch Militia Bill ordered for third reading on Thursday.—After some debate, the Southern Whale Fishery Bill was ordered to be engrossed.—The order for laying before the House, papers relative to prizes, &c. after a long discussion between the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Capt. Cochrane, Dr. Laurence, Sir W. Scott, the Advocate-General, and some others, was discharged.—Clergy Non-residence Bill postponed till this day three months, and leave given to bring in another.—Additional Excise Duty Bill passed after some debate.—Irish Additional Customs and Excise Duty Bill, Bank Note Bill, Militia Pay Bill read and ordered for second reading to-morrow.—Writ ordered for Stranraer, in the room of John Spalding, Esq. who has accepted the Chiltern Hundreds.—Committee on Irish Saltpetre Duty ordered to-morrow, and on Irish Revenue Regulation Bill, Thursday.—Committee on Scotch Army of Reserve Bill: report received and bill ordered to be printed.—Militia Officers Bill passed.—Militia Pay Bill postponed till Tuesday.—Report of Committee on Irish Workmen Combination Bill agreed to, and bill ordered for third reading to-morrow.—Committee of Ways and Means ordered for to-morrow.—Adjourned.

Wednesday, June 29.—LORDS.—M'Lean *v.* Bethune postponed.—Bills before the House forwarded.—Several Bills from the Commons read.—Militia Augmentation Bill ordered to be printed.—Adjourned.—COMMONS.—Petition from Hop Planters of Worcestershire laid on table.—Clergy Non-residence Bill brought in, read first and second time, committed and ordered to be printed: to be taken into consideration on Friday.—Southern Whale Fishery Bill passed. After some conversation, Woollen Bill postponed till Friday.—Army of Reserve Bill discussed and amended, and ordered for third reading to-morrow.—In Committee of Supply, 20,000*l.* voted for opening a navigation from the Western Sea, by Fort William to the Eastern Sea, by Inverness.—Irish Duty Bill read second time.—Committee on Saltpetre Bill: report ordered to-morrow.—Irish Workmen Bill passed.—Orders of the day disposed of.—Adjourned.

Thursday, June 30.—LORDS.—Counsel finally heard in M'Lean *v.* Bethune.—Bills before the House forwarded.—Private business disposed of.—Adjourned.——COMMONS.—Mr. Tierney took his seat.—Reports of Committee on Scotch Inland Navigation, and Saltpetre Duty, brought up and agreed to.—Irish Bank Note Bill and Irish Militia Pay Bill committed.—Leave given to bring in a bill 'for authorizing the billeting such troops of 'volunteer cavalry as should assemble for the 'purpose of training: to subject to military discipline such serjeants of those corps who received constant pay, as well trumpeters, drummers, &c. and for certain other regulations of 'volunteer corps.'—Army of Reserve Bill, after a long discussion between Mr. Johnstone, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Archdall, Lord de Blaquiere, Gen. Gascoyne, and Col. Crawfurd, underwent some amendments and was passed.—Orders of the day disposed of.—Adjourned.

FOREIGN.

Copenhagen, May 12.—An ordonnance has been published by his Danish Majesty, dated the 4th inst. for regulating the conduct to be pursued by the Danish merchant ships during the present war. Those sailing without convoy are ordered to deliver up their papers for inspection to any of the armed vessels belonging to the belligerent powers authorised to make such a demand.

Petersburgh, May 17.—The Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, lately held a chapter, with the consent of the Emperor, and appointed a deputation to compliment the Grand Master in the name of the Grand Priory of Russia, and to restore that part of the Archives which are in this city.

Constantinople, May 23.—ABDUL WAHAB, the Arabian Rebel, after having plundered Mecca, set out on his march for Medina.—The Capitan Pacha has sailed with a fleet for the Archipelago, to maintain the neutrality of the Porte in the Mediterranean.

Trieste, May 31.—A band of upwards of 2000 brigands infests the environs of Adrianople; and another of 1500 has besieged Varna.—*Ali-Pacha*, irritated at the refusal of the Government of Corfu to give up some of his officers, who being suspected of disloyalty had taken refuge there, seized three of those islanders, and put them to death. The Republic of the Seven Islands has in consequence declared war against him.

Florence, May 31.—Louis 1st King of Etruria died on the 28th inst. and, after having lain three days in state at the Palace of Pitti, was this day interred with great funeral pomp in the church of St. Lawrence.

Berne, June 7.—The Grand Council of the Canton of Berne has chosen M. JENNER and *M. Wittenbach*, as deputies to the Helvetic diet at *Fribourg*. The Canton of Schaffhouse has chosen *M. Pfister*, and *M. Stokar*.

Bremen, June 8.—The French who are in the environs of this city conduct themselves in such a manner as to give no reason to complain of their conduct. An embargo has been laid on all English vessels in this port and at Hamburgh. They continue to levy the customary toll on the Elbe, and neutrals are suffered to pass unmolested.

Genoa, June 9.—By arrivals from Cadiz, we learn that the Spanish ships of war under the command of Admiral *Alaba*, from the Phillippines, accompanied by another from Veza Cruz have entered Cadiz.

Antwerp, June 9.—This city has been laid under military execution, for not having furnished its contingent of conscripts.

Hanover, June 10.—Yesterday evening the principal Counsellor of Appeal, M. Von Ramdohr, and the Counsellor of Appeal, Von Hinuber, set out for Paris, as Deputies from the Hanoverian States, with dispatches of importance.—The Royal Arms have been taken down throughout the whole electorate.

Paris, June 22.—The First Consul, by an arreté dated the 20th instant, has prohibited the importation of British manufactures into the Ports of the Republic.—Offers of service, and voluntary subscriptions for ships and gun-boats, still continue to be made with great alacrity.——25th,—The First Consul set out this day on his journey to the united departments of the North.

Ghent, June 23.—The merchants of this City have voted 700,000 francs for the building of flat-bottomed boats and gun vessels.—Beauharnois, son-in-law to the First Consul, arrived here this morning. A detachment of Mamelukes has passed through Bruges on its route to Ostend.

DOMESTIC.

FROM THE LONDON GAZETTE.——*Council Office, Whitehall, June* 17, 1803.——His Majesty having been pleased to appoint George Earl of Dorchester to be Lord Lieutenant of the County of Dorset, a council was this day held at his Lordship's house, when his Lordship took the oaths appointed to be taken thereupon, instead of the oaths of allegiance and supremacy.—*War-Office, June* 16.——His Majesty has been pleased to appoint his Royal Highness Adolphus Frederick Duke of Cambridge, K. G. late Lieutenant-General in the Hanoverian service, to be Lieutenant-General in the army, by commission, dated the 24th August, 1798.—*St. James's June* 22,—This day Baron Belmont de Malcor had a private audience of his Majesty to deliver his letters of recall, and take leave of his Majesty, as Minister Plenipotentiary from his Serene Highness the Elector of Wurtembuig.—*St. James's June* 23.—This day Baron Belmont de Malcor had a private audience and took leave of Her Majesty, as Minister Plenipotentiary from His Serene Highness the Elector of Wurtemburg.—*Downing-Street, June* 25.—The King has been pleased to appoint Spencer Smith, Esq. to be his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of His Serene Highness the Elector of Wurtemburg.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Henry Watkin Williams Wynn, Esq. to be his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary at the Court of his Serene Highness the Elector of Saxony.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Spiridion Foresti, Esq. to be his Majesty's resident to the Republic of the Seven Islands.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Henry Savage Yeames, Esq. to be his Majesty's Consul-General in the Russian Ports in the Black Sea.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Waller Wright, Esq. to be his Majesty's Consul in the several Ports of the Republic of the Seven Islands.—The King has also been pleased to appoint Charles Denis, Esq. to be his Majesty's Consul at Civita Vecchia.—*Whitehall, June* 25.—The King has been pleased to grant the dignity of a Baronet of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland to George Hilano Barlow, Esq. a member of the Council of Fort William, in Bengal, in the East Indies, and the Heirs Male of his body lawfully begotten. —*Whitehall, June* 25.—The King has been pleased to order a Congé d'Elire to pass the Great Seal, empowering the Precentor and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of St. David to elect a Bishop of that See, the same being void by the death of the Right Reverend Father in God Doctor George Murray, commonly called Lord George Murray, late Bishop thereof; and his Majesty has also been pleased, by his Royal Sign Manual, to recommend to the said Precentor and Chapter the Reverend Thomas Burgess, Doctor in Divinity, and one of the Prebendaries of Durham, to be by them elected Bishop of the said See of St. David.—The King has also been pleased to order a Congé d'Elire to pass the Great Seal, empowering the Dean and Chapter of the Cathedral Church of Exeter to elect a Bishop of that See, the same being void by the death of the Right Reverend Father in God Doctor Henry Reginald Courtenay, late Bishop thereof; and his Majesty has also been pleased, by his Royal Sign Manual, to recommend to the said Dean and Chapter the Reverend John Fisher, Doctor in Divinity, and one of the Prebendaries of Windsor, to be by them elected Bishop of the said See of Exeter.

London, June 16th.—The contested election between Sir Thomas Turton and the Right Hon. George Tierney, for the Borough of Southwark, closed this day, after a poll of nine days. The numbers were for the Right Hon. G. Tierney 1573, and for Sir Thomas Turton 1492. Sir Thomas demanded a scrutiny.——21st. The parties intending to contract for the lottery waited on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to day; and, on opening the first paper, they declared all the lists to be the same, as no single party could venture to take the whole lottery, in the present state of the finances of the country, without exposing themselves to great risque and almost certain loss. The Chancellor of the Exchequer stated the price offered to be considerably below his expectations, and that unless they would give more he would raise the supplies another way. The bidding was then postponed to the 22d, when Mr. Bish offered him 15l. 8d. each for 70,000 tickets. The proposal was accepted, and Mr. B. has the right of raising the number to 80,000, which makes them 13l. 3s. 1d. each.——23d.—In pursuance of an advertisement for convening a meeting of the merchants, bankers, traders, &c. of London, who disapproved of the *Income* Tax, a very numerous meeting took place at the London Tavern yesterday, and after

some debate, the following resolutions were passed.—"That it appears to this meeting, that notwithstanding the opposition to the late Income Tax, it is proposed to revive it by a Bill now before Parliament.—That it appears to this meeting that the revival of that tax, will be highly dangerous and unconstitutional, and that the arbitrary and unconstitutional powers necessary to carry it into execution, under any modification, will, by outraging the public feeling, tend to endanger the peace of the community."——24th.—A general meeting of the West-India Planters and Merchants was this day held at the London Tavern, when certain resolutions were adopted, which were in substance, 'That although the duty of 20s. per cent. on SUGAR was tolerable under former circumstances, yet as the intercourse with the Continent is stopped, the markets are glutted, and the *growers* are unable to bear that tax. That the additional duty of 4s. which must fall on the planter will prevent them from shipping. That as this applies more particularly to the lower kinds of sugar, which go almost entirely abroad, it will amount to *prohibition* of that article.—That the proposed increase of 12½ on the customs and 50 per cent. on the excise of RUM, will be injurious to the demand for that article, and will, probably, be destructive of its object. That the West-India Proprietors, have cultivated their estates *to a loss for several years past*, in consequence of the pressure of those taxes and the additional price they have had to pay for every article obtained from this country. That from all these circumstances they were determined to submit their case to Parliament, and solicit relief.——29th.—The Livery of London held a Common Hall yesterday at Guildhall, to consider on the propriety of instructing the Members in Parliament for that City, to oppose the Income Tax, and after some debate, several resolutions were adopted to that effect.——The Southwark scrutiny ended yesterday, Sir Thomas declining any farther contest, but expressing his determination to petition Parliament. The High Bailiff then declared Mr. Tierney to be duly elected.—The following notice was stuck up at Lloyds: —'Last night Lord Hawkesbury communicated to the Foreign Ministers that his Majesty had determined that the entrance of the Elbe should be blockaded in the strictest manner.'

Distribution of the Naval Force of Great-Britain.

In port, fitting and with sealed orders, 96.—English and Irish Channels, 70.—Downs and North Sea, 53.—West-India, Jamaica, America, and Newfoundland, 54.—Cape of Good Hope, India, and Coast of Africa, 30.—Portugal, Gibraltar, and Mediterranean, 41.—Hospital and Prison Ships, 5.—Total in Commission, 343.—Others, 286.—Ordinary at different Ports, 244.

MILITARY.

On the 5th of June, GEN. MORTIER, after long and rapid marches entered the City of HANOVER, where he found 15 000 new muskets, 5000 pair of pistols, 60 new covered waggons with good horses, 100 pieces of artillery of different calibres, a bridge equipage for passing the Elbe, magazines well stored, and a foundry in the best state and well provided. The public chest, although not rich, will be sufficient for the maintenance of the French army in the Electorate. According to the different inventories which have been delivered, 500 pieces of artillery were taken possession of by the French at the Castle of *Hameln*; the field artillery, composed of 40 field-pieces and 200 waggons well equipped, at *Zell*; and, at various other places, more than 400 milliers of powder, 3,000,000 of cartridges, and 40,000 muskets which were in the different magazines. The returns of the Hanoverian army prisoners of war, state the infantry to be about 12,000 men, the cavalry more that 4,000, and the artillery upwards of 700.—Gen. FRERE, who occupies *Harbourgstane*, is on his march for *Cuxhaven* to intercept all the English on the *Elbe*; and Gen. RIVAUD, who occupies *Verden*, is charged with the same operation on the *Weser*.—The following is the distribution of the French troops in the Hanoverian territory:—In Celle and the surrounding country, 2000 infantry and 60 horse; at Lunenburgh, 750 infantry and 60 horse; at Velzen, 350 infantry and 60 horse; at Osnaburg, 1400 infantry and 130 horse; at Nieuburg and the adjacent country, 3000 infantry and 60 horse; Neustadt and the adjacent country, 1500 horse; Hanover, 1500 infantry and 200 horse, and 200 artillery men; Hameln, 1500 infantry and 400 horse; Harburg, 1500 infantry. In the whole 12,000 infantry, 2070 horse, and 650 artillery men.—There are also cavalry at Harburg and the vicinity; to which are to be added 4000 men in the Duchies of Bremen and Verden, with many other troops not in the above list.—French troops continue to arrive daily at Hanover, and are marched thence into the southern parts of the country to take possession of the different places in that quarter. The most exact military discipline is maintained, and some soldiers, who were convicted of excesses, have been shot.—The assembling of the army at *Deventer*, under the command of GEN. DESOLLES, which was suddenly countermanded, has again commenced and proceeds with the greatest expedition. The troops stationed in the department of the Lower Rhine are also on their march to join the army of GEN. MORTIER.

The French and Italian troops forming the army of Italy, which were on the Rubicon have passed the frontiers of the Pontifical States. A corps of 1500 arrived at Ancona on the 4th instant, and several detachments have lately passed through Bologna in different directions.

NAVAL.

June 5.—CAPT WILLIAMS, in the *Russel*, took and destroyed the French National

Brig *Betsey*, of 6 guns and 20 men, 50 days from Martinique, bound to Brest.——18th. Capt. Aylmer in the *Dragon*, in company with the *Endymion*, captured the French National Corvette *La Colomol*, of 16 guns and 65 men, 40 days from Martinique, bound to Brest.——24th. Lieut. Wright, in the *Albion* hired cutter, after a close engagement of 1 hour and 12 minutes, captured the French Privateer *Marengo*, of 4 guns and 26 men, 2 days from Cherbourg.

To the Rt. H. the Secretary at War.

Sir,—In the preceding number of this work, I took the liberty to address to you some observations on the bill, then before the House of Commons, for raising, by way of ballot or conscription, 50,000 men, to constitute what was to be called the *Army of Reserve*. With sincere pleasure I perceive, that many of the evils, which I apprehended from that measure, as at first proposed, are likely to be obviated by the very material alterations, which have been since made in the bill, and which have, indeed, almost totally changed its nature and its tendency.—But, Sir, before I enter on those further remarks, that this very important measure seems to call for, give me leave to state a few facts, which relate to the *marine corps*, and which, though they do not come immediately under the consideration of the particular department over which you preside, are closely connected with the defence of the country.

It has been asserted, and that, too, in a place where great care should be taken to avoid mistatements of every sort, that the corps of royal marines, is in such a state as to be perfectly adequate to all the purposes for which it is wanted. Sir, I assure you, and I assure the public, upon information as good as any that the Admiralty does, in my opinion, possess, that the marines, at all the divisions respectively, are quite insufficient, in point of numbers, to answer the demands from the fleet, without calling in the men employed on the recruiting service, a step which must inevitably cut off the possibility of augmenting the strength of the corps, or raising it from that skeleton state to which it was most absurdly reduced at the peace.—The madness (to give it the very mildest term) of causing this reduction must be evident to every one at all acquainted with the service in question. The establishment was, indeed, still left "*greater than at the close of any former war*;" but, this circumstance, though it may serve to quiet the conscience of the well-meaning Mr. Addington, and may tend towards furnishing an excuse for the cheering support which he receives from those, who, in the bottom of their hearts, must despise him, will not, I imagine, satisfy men who love their country, who wish to see it defended, and who have no party purpose to answer. Not only are we in a state of danger such as we never before dreamt of; not only do we, even upon the ancient principles of the service, stand in need of more marines now than at any period heretofore, but, the duty which the men of that corps have to perform on board, in consequence of the recent regulations of the Admiralty, is such as to require a considerable addition of strength, at the same time that those regulations greatly militate against the discipline and consequent force and utility of the corps. Lord St. Vincent, with that degree of judgment which appears to characterize all his measures, seems to imagine, that putting a red coat upon a man's back and sending him on board a King's ship, makes him a soldier; but, Sir, if this mode of proceeding be persevered in, I fear, that the country will, 'ere long, receive a stab in the part, where, of all others, she is most vulnerable, and that, too, at the very moment when she is, as to this point, reposing in the bosom of security. It is a notion, which has too long prevailed in the navy, that, all that is required of a marine, is, to load and fire his musket. But, Sir, I should think, from what happened in the Channel fleet, during the late war, that all officers of any reflection, must be now pretty well convinced, that every man of this valuable and honorable corps, ought to be *a well-disciplined soldier*, in which character is implied the training of the mind as well as the body; and, with all due respect together with a very sincere regard, for the troops of the line, I may add, that the marine stands in still greater need than they do of this mental discipline, as being constantly under greater temptation to wander from that regularity, without which a military force is dangerous to no one but him who employs it. Great care ought, therefore, to be taken, never, on any account, to embark marines, who are not fully qualified to discharge, in every point, the duties to be expected from a soldier in the most trying circumstances. But, Sir, in consequence of the low establishment, to which the corps has been reduced, this is become utterly impossible; and, from the practice, adopted by the present Admiralty, of ordering the marines to be embarked the moment the ship is put in commission, instead of embarking, as was formerly the usage, only a serjeant's guard, the men receive infinite injury, before the ship goes to sea, especially as some commanders of ships, taking advantage of this incli-

nation of the Admiralty, do, I am informed, employ the marines, thus embarked, in boats, although there has always existed, and still exists, an Admiralty order against it.—In order to render the marine corps equal, in discipline, to the troops of the line, it was necessary to keep up a very strong peace establishment. They should have had garrison duty assigned them at the different seaports, when disembarked; and, when on board ship, it should have been, and should now be, the duty of every captain of the navy, to keep, at all times, a very *strong guard* actually mounted, at sea as well as in harbour, instead of constantly employing the men to pull and hawl, as is at present the case, in almost every ship in the service. In consequence of this treatment, the marines are naturally led to despise the profession of a soldier; they become licentious, and are, in but too many instances (I speak the opinion of *all* the officers of the corps), ready to join in any mischief that is going forward. Whereas, by considering them as the safeguards of the navy, treating them with respect as a body, they might be trusted and relied on, in every emergency, and would, doubtless, on all occasions, prove themselves worthy of that confidence, which some commanders have, with great propriety, reposed in them.—A promotion is, it seems, *at last*, to take place in this corps; but, must not every one agree, Sir, that this measure is very tardy? One must be a Jew or a stockjobber not to conceive what the marine officers must feel, in viewing the extensive promotions, which have taken place in every other corps, while they have obtained nothing but what has arisen from the absolute necessities of the country, and for which, therefore, the gratitude they entertain, must be ascribed to the nobleness of their own minds, rather than to any merit on the part of the Government. In the artillery, where promotion goes in the same manner as in the marines, the subalterns of 1793 became captains three years ago, while subaltern marine officers, of the same standing, have not yet obtained a captain lieutenancy. For such neglect (not to give it a much harsher term) the epithet *royal* prefixed to the title of their corps, is a sort of compensation which can only tend to awaken reflections, far from satisfactory to those, whose situation demands something much more substantial than words.

Coming now to the principal topic of my letter, to wit, the bill for raising 50,000 conscripts, I think it right, first to shew, that I have long foreseen the present crisis, and that, I have ever been of opinion, that the danger was to be resisted by nothing but a *regular* force. From the moment the peace was concluded, I began my endeavours to impress this opinion on the minds of my readers: so long ago as the 5th of June, 1802, I observed, in speaking upon this subject, that "while the coast of France glis-"tened with bayonets, while she had an "army of 300,000 men, ready to employ "against any and every part of our domi-"nions, the Sheridans and Wilberforces "would willingly leave us not a soldier at "the disposal of the crown; would wil-"lingly rest upon a body of militia, confined "within the bounds of our island, a dispo-"sition perfectly conformable to that *de-*"*fensive system*, which seemed to have been "adopted by ministers, and which, if well "followed up, would, in a few years, reduce "this kingdom to a mere factory." (1) It has not, Sir, required *years* to realize the dangers which I apprehended. Again on the 30th of October: "We look for hope in "any thing but our exertions. '*Is Philip* "*dead? No, but he is very sick.—What is it* "*to you, whether Philip be dead or not? Were* "*Philip to die to-morrow, your cowardice* "*would raise up another to supply his place.*' "—Insurrections in Switzerland, plots in "Holland, changes in the ministry in Rus-"sia, discontents of the generals in Paris, "any thing, but what depends upon *our-*"*selves*. If we are driven from all these "sources of hope, and are obliged to look "at home, we fly to our manufactures, and "commerce, and constitution, to our 'cre-"dit, capital, and confidence;' and, if these "should fail us, our last resource is our "'salt water girdle,' and the 'wooden "walls of old England.' We never think, "we will never think, we are afraid to think, "about fighting the French upon the coasts "of Suffolk or Sussex; but we must think "about this, and we must do it too, and do "it with success, or we must become slaves "to Buonaparté. 'The treaty of Amiens, "the whole treaty of Amiens, and nothing "but the treaty of Amiens,' has severed us "completely from the continent, and has "left the French empire, consisting of se-"venty-five millions of souls to fall upon us "with its undivided weight. Great and ter-"rible as it is, we must meet it; it may "crush us, *but we cannot get out of its* "*way*." (2) — On the 9th of November, 1802, I was still more circumstantial—"We "cannot make a fortified place, we cannot "make a septagon or an octagon of our

(1) See Register, Vol. I. p. 667—I beg to recommend the whole article for perusal, at this time.

(2) See Register, Vol. II. p. 571.

" island, covered by horn-works and half-
" moons; surveys of the coast may serve to
" excite fear amongst ourselves, and mirth
" amongst our neighbours on the continent,
" and may, moreover, afford occasion for a
" few decent and profitable jobs; but, my
" Lord, rely upon it, that if this our coun-
" try is to be defended, if this 'dear little
" island, this precious diamond set in the
" silver sea,' is not, at last, to be rifled by a
" host of the most desperate, rapacious, im-
" pious and bloody villains, that ever dis-
" graced the human shape, it must owe its
" deliverance, under God's providence, to
" the *hearts* and *arms* of *disciplined soldiers*.
" The sleek-headed shop-keepers and ma-
" nufacturers may hug themselves with the
" thoughts of their 'salt water girdle' and
" of 'the wooden walls of old England,'
" and your Lordship may feel equally snug
" behind your triple rampart of 'capital,
" credit, and confidence;' but, here, upon
" this land, the French will come, and
" here we must fight them, and beat them
" too, or surrender at discretion. In our fleet
" there is, indeed, great hope, but at best, it
" is only a *hope:* whatever depends, even in
" the smallest degree upon the winds is any
" thing but *certain*. To be in a state of defence,
" therefore, we must have an *army*, an ef-
" fective, *disciplined* army. *Without this*
" *species of force, we shall be in continual*
" *alarm and continual danger*. Do you think,
" my Lord, that Buonaparté, or his succes-
" sor, will ever cease to *menace* our coast?
" No; from this very hour, till some dread-
" ful battle has been fought on the land of
" England or Ireland, we shall never expe-
" rience one moment's repose, one moment's
" real peace." (3)—There is, then, Sir, no-
thing *new* in the principle of the opposition, which I have thought it my duty to make to the raising of 50,000 *more militia-men*, as the conscripts would, in reality, have been, if they had been formed into corps as was, at first, evidently intended.—Much has been said about *slandering* the militia: I have heard them slandered by nobody: I have heard it asserted, that they are not, and cannot be, fit to meet an enemy such as we have to contend with; and, this is a truth which will be denied by nobody, except, perhaps, some few militia officers, who are actuated much more by personal vanity than by any well grounded confidence in the corps, of whose reputation they would fain have us believe they are so jealous.—The conduct of the militia, during the last war, has been cited, on several occasions, in contradiction to opinions, similar to that which I entertain; and, this was done in a more positive manner, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, on the 23d instant, by way of refutation of the opinion of Mr. Burke, as stated in a letter from that gentleman to Dr. Lawrence, which letter had, in the debate I alluded to, been read by the latter. (4) The minister, while the minister of peace, but now the minister of war; this war-minister said, that, in a little time after Mr. Burke's opinion was thus committed to paper, events arose, which proved it to be totally unfounded; whereupon he referred, by way of proof, to the conduct of the militia-men, who were employed in foreign expeditions, particularly in Egypt. Now, Sir, either the war-minister meant to argue upon a fallacy, or he was in a state of profound ignorance as to the subject, on which he thought proper to speak. At the time when part of the militia were taken into the regular corps, many of them had been seven, and none of them less than two years, embodied. The expedition to Holland might, I am willing to allow, have furnished no very fair opportunity for trying them; but, even several months after their return from that expedition, the Duke of York, in a letter to Mr. Dundas, gave it as his opinion, that these same men would not be fit for actual service, without two months drilling. And, as to Egypt, Sir, where the British army gained so much honour, the militia drafts could do but very little, since all the regiments containing them were left by Sir Ralph Abercromby at Malta, Minorca, and Gibraltar, and never landed in Egypt, till after the 21st of March, 1801; that is to say, till after all the fighting was nearly over, till after the Invincible Standard had been taken by my poor friend LUTZ, whose bravery the ungrateful British Government may yet, in time of need, look for in vain. Besides, if the corps serving in Egypt had all contained a considerable number of men drafted from the militia, what would that make in favour of the militia system? These men were, previous to their service in Egypt, become regulars: they had so become for more than *two years*, a time much more than sufficient for the discipline of recruits, in a regular regiment: so that, if the militia drafts, who served in Egypt, had not been as good soldiers as the rest of the British army, it would have argued, that they not only acquired no military qualities in the militia, but that they acquired those of an opposite description.—I do hope, then, Sir, that the Parliament and the nation will not, for the sake of flattering a dozen or two of holiday militia officers, be

(3) See Register, Vol. II. p. 598.

(4) See page 966 for this Letter.

any longer insulted with these pompous panegyrics on the deeds of the militia *in Egypt*, a country where a militia-man never set his foot.

Since I began writing this letter, Sir, the Conscript-Bill has been read a third time and passed by the House of Commons; and, though it may yet be somewhat short of my wishes, as to one point or two, I cannot help giving it my hearty applause, and, I do really believe, that, if enforced in a wise manner, it will not only greatly contribute towards our present salvation, but will provide the means of bold offensive operations, and will be the foundation of a system that will rescue this country from the shameful state, in which it has long been placed, with respect to military force.—Some persons are afraid, that the mixing of the Conscripts along with men raised for general service, will be attended with great inconvenience and danger. I apprehend none from it, if proper regulations are adopted; and, I most sincerely hope, that the same measure, to a certain degree, at least, will take place as to the old militia.—The thing having been done, the good having been obtained, it may seem invidious to say any thing about the persons who obtained it; but, justice to Mr. Windham, Mr. Elliot, and Dr. Lawrence, demands that the public should know and remember, that every thing which this bill has of good has been introduced, in consequence of their having, contrary to you and your colleagues' express desire, insisted upon discussing it in its early stages.—What was Mr. Windham's objection to the bill? Why, that it dry-nursed the army, that *it exhausted the source of recruiting for the line:* "unques-"tionably," said he, in the conclusion of the speech in which he first opposed it, "I "must object to it, in that part, which goes "in the first instance, and finally, *to make it* "*impossible for us to have an army.*"—This speech awakened the attention of the Parliament and of the public; the advice of military men was found to be with Mr. Windham; the public joined its voice, and the feeble foolish project was abandoned. The Conscripts are now, much to their own comfort, as well as to the good of the service, and of the country, to be placed under the command of officers and non-commissioned officers already embodied; they are, (to make use of the happy recruiting phrase,) now about to enter into *present pay and good quarters* at once, and are not to be left straggling about bleating for serjeants and corporals to show them how to use their muskets; in a word, they are to go *to fill up*, in the first instance, and afterwards *to augment*, the companies and battalions of the line; which is the very object that Mr. Windham wished to accomplish, and which must be infinitely better for the men themselves.——You and your colleagues have, indeed, said, that *you intended* to introduce the provisions, of which I am now approving; but, Sir, what will you be pleased to permit us to regard as evidence of your *intentions?* I should suppose, that a bill, proposed to the parliament to become a law, especially after that bill had been *printed*, might be fairly considered as such evidence. When this was styled a "tardy and *indigested* measure," great was the resentment of the solemn and pompous Mr. Addington; but, Sir, if you had *digested* the measure, if you had made it as good as it was in *your* power to make it, to whom but Mr. Windham has the country to ascribe the alterations, seeing that from him came the opposition to it, an opposition which was, too, in the first instance, received with every mark of disapprobation by the ministry and their regular supporters? The bill was not only read a first and second time, but it was recommitted a second time, that is, it was *twice read*, and *three times committed*, before the "well digested" measure assumed the shape, in which it finally passed, before it became something totally different from what it was at first.——"It was your "*intention*" to make it what it now is! Where, again I ask, where, Sir, are we to look for the evidence of this intention? At the second reading not a single word was said by you or your colleagues about *ordering the Conscripts to join the regiments of the line*; on the contrary, you cheered Mr. Pitt's famous project for drawing them out into the line by means of certain Saturnalia, *in the course of each year!!!* "Mad, mad as "the winds!" said I to a person who stood beside me, in the gallery, when Mr. Pitt broached this project, which, thank God, has now been completely swept away amongst all the other showy nonsense of the plan. There are, however, I perceive, some persons who are attempting, not only to draw a veil over Mr. Pitt's defeat in this instance, but to give him the exclusive honours of the victory. Lord De Blaquiere, in the debate of the 30th instant, gave all the credit of the alterations in the bill to Mr. Windham; but, this speech has been so reported by the True Briton, as to lead its readers to believe, that his Lordship's praises were bestowed on *Mr. Pitt*; and, in another part of the same paper, it is said, that Mr. Pitt, "by the aid "of his counsels IMPROVES *every plan for* "*the national defence.*" Upon reading this, one cannot help recollecting the conduct of

the Highland Society relative to the *Invincible Standard!* Mr Pitt, so far from proposing any thing to *improve* the Conscript-Bill, defended it in its original state, both in its principles and its provisions; and, what is well worthy of remark, he began his defence of it by stating, that he not only approved of it, but that he approved of it FOR THE VERY REASONS, *on which Mr. Elliot* (who spoke before him) *founded his opposition!* This opposition did, however, at last, prevail; the mad scheme of raising *fifty new battalions*, with *new* commissioned officers and *no* non-commissioned officers, was rejected; and now, behold, Mr. Pitt is complimented for *improving* the plans of national defence! Mr Pitt does, in fact, seem to understand very little about military matters; and mere eloquence is less likely to carry men away upon a topic like the present than upon any other: when their property and their lives are at stake, they do not content themselves with the *sound* of a speech. In time of peace, Mr. Pitt might easily persuade some of his hearers, that a broomstick is a better weapon of defence than a musket; but, when the enemy is hourly expected, speech so employed must necessarily fail of success.

Before I conclude, Sir, I cannot but advert to the charge of "*creating despondency*," which was brought against Mr Windham, because he described the country in great danger from invasion, and because he gave it as his opinion, that London ought not to be regarded as the sole object to be defended: as to the former, it has been repeated, it has been rung in the ears of the ministers, by a very high military authority, and the latter has been fully corroborated by an Irish member (strange to tell!) amidst the plaudits of the "*safe* politicians," amidst the cheers of the *candid* Mr. Addington, who had, on a former occasion, worked himself into a foam in condemning the same sentiments, conveyed in almost the very same words, by Mr. Windham! The reason for this distinction is evident enough; and, if the catastrophe did not threaten to be so tragical, I should consider much of what is now going forward as a most excellent farce.——Apropos of farces: Pray, Sir, what is become of that gallant gentleman, who reproached Mr. Windham with underrating the courage of the country, who rejected with disdain the base idea of our being unable to fight France single-handed, and who, from his valorous language on that occasion, has been exhibited, by the famous historical painter, Mr. Gillray, as defeating the whole French army with a dagger of lath? Pray, Sir, what is become of the far-famed "*English feeling*" of this gentleman, that feeling, which (for what reason doth not appear) was, the other evening, so highly extolled by Mr. Pitt? What is become, Sir, of all this "English feeling?" I hope it is not an epitome of the feeling of the nation, and that this latter will *grow weaker and weaker as the enemy approaches?* Every word that this gentleman has uttered, during the progress of the Conscript Bill, has had a tendency to check it, to shackle the best part of its provisions. He has not, indeed, *opposed* it; but, he has, in no one instance, *supported* it; and, were he hereafter to be accused of having assisted in making the law, he has taken care to provide ample materials for exculpation! So much for "*true English feeling!*"—As to Mr. Fox, his conduct stands in need of no comment. It is exactly what I expected. *He has never uttered one single syllable against Buonaparté or against Republican France.* To *oppose* the measures of defence would not be quite convenient; and so he and his brother *patriot*, Mr. Grey, are now retired for the purpose of enjoying the uninterrupted indulgence of their "true English feeling," and of being prepared to behold, with dignity and calm, ... which *way the cat jumps!* These facts ought to be remembered.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

June 30, 1803. WM. COBBETT.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

The room we have to spare will hardly suffice for a bare enumeration of the topics, on which we wished to enter.——The *French Decree*, relative to English manufactures, will not prevent the sale of those manufactures, even in France itself. War never has, and never will, for any length of time injure this branch of trade.——*Mr. Liston's Note* to the Dutch government has been remarked on by the Moniteur, without much force of argument, it is true, but with enough to satisfy the people of the Continent, who are ready to believe any thing against this country, and for which, indeed, they cannot be blamed, after our scandalous conduct towards the King of Sardinia, together with the *garbling of the state papers*, lately laid before Parliament.

Chaptal's circular letter to the maritime prefects has been followed by *addresses delivered to the people, from the pulpit*, in every church in France, exhorting them to rise as one man, for the purpose of exterminating the English nation. These addresses have been prepared by the *bishops* of the several districts, whence the editors of the London pa-

pers, and particularly those of the Morning Post and the Oracle, have taken occasion to level a most venemous shaft against *all* the French Bishops, which have, at any time during the revolution, resided in this country. "*The French Bishops*," say they, "are "putting up prayers for the success of the "French arms against England: *those very* "*Bishops*, who, a few months ago, were "FED and protected by *us*. They are now "praying for an Usurper, though they took "the oath of fidelity to their lawful King." —Never was there a more false, base, and detestable charge. Out of *seventeen* French Bishops who have enjoyed an asylum in England, only *five* have yielded to the temptation of putting an end to their hardships by accepting the amnesty of Buonaparté; and, be it observed, that, during the last cession of Parliament, this very Morning Post, echoed the sentiments of MR. JONES, the famous parliamentary laughing-stock, who wanted the pittance of all the French emigrants to be cut off, in order *to starve them into an acceptance of that very amnesty!* As to the conduct of the *five* Bishops, we do not attempt to defend it: it would take much, we hope, to make us submit to a person who should usurp the throne of our Sovereign: it would require still more, we hope, to tempt us to commit apostacy; but, if any thing could possibly justify this double infamy, it would be to escape from the imputation of being "FED" by the editors of the Morning Post and the Oracle.—The order, which, it appears, the ministers have given to block up the mouth of the Elbe, is most assuredly *just*, and, as far as we can see at present, it is politic. Indeed, it is the very measure, which we, towards the close of the last war, recommended as to all those "*neutral*" places, which contained *French garrisons*, or which were *in a state of submission to the commands of France*. Nothing can be more clear, than that all places, which are either unable or unwilling to protect the neutrality of British ships and goods, are, either from force or inclination, *in a state of hostility to Britain*, and, being in such a state, are liable to be treated as enemies.—We may be well assured, that the French will make a dreadful out-cry about this; but, if they find that we fear their out-cry, they will not cease to make it. Clamour costs them very little; they have used it with astonishing success; but, as to the matter between them and us, it is now a mere question of *strength*. He who is strongest and fights best will come off victorious.

FUNDS FOR JUNE.

	5	7	8	9	10	11	13	14
French.....								
5 per Ct. Con....	48 7/8	48 5/8	48 2/8	48 1/8	48 1/8	48 2/8	48 5/8	48 3/8
	15	16	17	20	21	22	24	
	49 1/8	48 8/8	48 9/8	48 9/8	48 9/8	49 0/8	49 0/8	49 5/8
English.....	9	10	13	14	15	16	17	20
3 per Ct. Red.....	57 4/8	58	57 3/8	57 1/4	56 3/8	55 7/8	56 3/4	56 3/4
Omnium. *Discount*	..	..	..					
	21	22	23	24	27	28	29	30
	56 4/8	56 3/8	56 4/8	56 5/8	55 5/8	55 7/8	..	55 7/8
	2 4/8	2 4/8	3	3 4/8	3 4/8	3 2/8	..	3 4/8

BREAD, for these three last weeks, has remained at 9¾ the Quartern Loaf.

☞ An unforeseen accident has prevented us from publishing a supplementary sheet this week, and has, thereby, compelled us, once more to exclude our correspondents, for which we are extremely sorry; but, we trust, that having stated the true cause of the omission, we shall meet with their indulgence.

*** The *Apology for the Emigrants*, by the CHEVALIER TINSEAU, has been published, and we beg leave to recommend it to the attention of all our Readers. It exhibits the best picture of BUONAPARTÉ that ever yet was drawn, and contains some interesting anecdotes, which we have nowhere met with.

☞ The present sheet closes Vol. III. of this Work. The Supplement to it will appear very shortly, and, will contain all the usual articles, together with several very important ones, which will, we imagine, be found in no other publication, in this country. We have been careful to make a complete selection of historical documents respecting America, down to the close of the last session of Congress, which ended in March last.——The Parliamentary Debates for the present session will be found very perfect, and most conveniently arranged; and, upon the whole, we trust, that so useful a volume, of its kind, never before issued from the press.

LONDON,

SUPPLEMENT TO VOL. III.

PUBLIC PAPERS.

PAPERS *relating to the Negotiations carried on between Great-Britain and France, between the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, 25th March, 1802, and the recal of Lord Whitworth from Paris, 12th of May, 1803, including divers Papers from the English Ministers at the Hague, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, Copenhagen, and Hamburgh; to which is added, an* APPENDIX, *containing offensive Papers, published by France, &c. &c. Laid before Parliament, by his Majesty's command, on the 18th of May, 1803.**

London, May 23, 1802.

No. 1.—*(Translation.)*—My Lord, The 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, which fixes the new organization of the Order of Malta, having prescribed various measures, to the execution of which it is necessary that the two principal contracting powers should concur, the First Consul has named General Vial as minister plenipotentiary to the Order and Island of Malta, for the purpose of concerting with the person whom his Britannic Majesty shall appoint for that purpose, respecting the execution of the arrangements agreed upon in the late treaty. General Vial will set out on his destination as soon as your excellency shall have informed me of his Majesty's intentions, and of the choice he may make. I have the honour to be, &c.

Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c. OTTO.

Downing-street, May 24, 1802.

No. 2.—Sir, In answer to your letter of yesterday, in which you communicate to me the nomination, by the First Consul, of General Vial to be minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic, to the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem; I have the honour to inform you that the King has been pleased to appoint Sir Alexander Ball to be his Majesty's minister to the Order. Sir Alexander Ball will shortly proceed to Malta, and will be instructed to concert with General Vial the necessary measures for carrying into effect the arrangements relative to that island, which are stipulated in the 10th article of the definitive treaty of peace. I have the honour to be, &c. HAWKESBURY.

M. Otto, &c. &c.

No. 3.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburgh, April 23, 1802.*—I hope very soon to be enabled to re-dispatch your lordship's last messenger with the answer of this government to the communications which I have made to them, in obedience to his Majesty's commands, respecting the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. In the mean time I must not conceal from your lordship, that there is great reason to fear that his Imperial Majesty will decline taking part in the proposed joint guaranty of the possessions and new constitution of the Order of Malta.

No. 4.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburgh, May 7, 1802.*—I have reason to hope that the first impressions that had been produced here by certain parts of the arrangement relative to Malta, have been removed, and that his Imperial Majesty may even be ultimately induced to guaranty the whole of that arrangement; provided that the steps which have been taken towards the election of a new Grand Master, according to the mode suggested by this court, be considered as fulfilling what is required on that head by the latter part of the paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens; and consequently that no new election for that office is to take place in the manner pointed out by the former part of the same stipulation.

Downing-street, June 5, 1802.

No. 5.—Sir, I informed you in my dispatch No. 10, that M. Otto had made an official communication to me, that General Vial was appointed by the First Consul minister plenipotentiary to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Sir Alexander Ball has been in consequence invested with the same character by his Majesty. He will proceed immediately to Malta, and he will receive instructions to concert with General Vial the best means of carrying into complete effect the stipulations contained in the 10th article of the definitive treaty. By the paragraph marked No. 1, in that article, it is stipulated:—"The Knights

* The *Messages* to Parliament, the divers *Proclamations, Declarations, Instructions,* &c. &c. relating to this subject, will be found under their proper heads, by referring to the Table of Contents, at the head of the present volume.

" of the Order, whose langues shall continue " to subsist after the exchange of the ratifi- " cations of the present treaty, are invited " to return to Malta as soon as that exchange " shall have taken place: They shall there " form a General Chapter, and shall proceed " to the election of a Grand Master, to be " chosen from amongst the natives of those " nations which preserve langues, if no such " election shall have been already made " since the exchange of the ratifications of " the preliminary articles of peace."——The object of this paragraph was, that in the event of an election having taken place subsequent to the exchange of the ratifications of the preliminary articles of peace, and antecedent to the conclusion of the definitive treaty, that election should be considered as valid; and though no mention is made in the article of the proclamation of the Emperor of Russia, soon after his accession to the throne, by which the Knights of the Order were invited to assemble, and to proceed to the election of a Grand Master, the stipulation in question evidently referred to the contingency in consequence of that proclamation. You will inform the French government, that his Majesty is ready to consider the election which has lately taken place at St. Petersburgh, under the auspices of the Emperor of Russia, to be valid, according to the stipulation in the 10th article. His Majesty has no other object in the whole of this transaction, than that the 10th article of the treaty may be fairly executed; and that the arrangement may be carried into complete execution with as little difficulty as possible. As the 13th paragraph in the 10th article stipulates that the governments of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, should be invited to accede to the arrangements respecting Malta, it is desirable that the French government should instruct, without delay, their ambassadors or ministers at Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin, to make, conjointly with his Majesty's ministers at those courts, an official communication, desiring the accession of those powers to the arrangements relative to Malta in the definitive treaty; by which it is provided, that the independence of the island, and the other stipulations, shall be under the guarantee of those powers, in conjunction with his Majesty, the French government, and the King of Spain. I have the honour to be, &c. HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq. &c. &c.

No. 6.—*Extract of a dispatch from Anthony Merry, Esq. to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, June* 17, 1802.—I have now the honour to transmit to your lordship, inclosed, copy of an answer which reached me last night, (though dated eight days back), from the French minister, to the note verbale which I delivered to him, containing his Majesty's propositions respecting the execution of some points of the arrangements relative to Malta, contained in the 10th article of the definitive treaty of peace. You will find the entire acquiescence of this government to those propositions, expressed in a very satisfactory manner.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 6.)—His Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary has the honour to transmit herewith to Citizen Talleyrand, minister for the foreign affairs of the French Republic, the " note verbale" of the communication he has been ordered to make to him by his government, who are desirous that the proposals it contains may be acceptable to the French government; and they may be assured, that the British government, in making these proposals, have no other object in view than to facilitate, in the easiest manner, the execution of the treaty of Amiens, and to act in this respect in perfect harmony with the French government. Mr. Merry has the honour to renew, on this occasion, the assurances of his high consideration for M. Talleyrand.

Paris, 8th June, 1802. ANT. MERRY.

The citizen minister for foreign affairs will find inclosed a list of suffrages obtained from several priories of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, for the election of a Grand Master, which has been received from St. Petersburgh by the British government, with the notice that these priories have agreed amongst themselves, that his holiness the Pope shall select (pro hac vice), from amongst the candidates therein specified, the person who is to fill the post of Grand Master. His Britannic Majesty on his part is willing to consider an election so made as valid, according to the stipulations of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. His Majesty, therefore, is ready to acknowledge, in quality of Grand Master, the person whom the Pope shall think proper to fix upon, from amongst the names contained in that list. His Majesty has no other end in view in this, than to see the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens duly fulfilled, and the arrangement it contains executed with as little difficulty as possible. It is stipulated by the 13th paragraph of the same article, that the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian governments, shall be solicited to accede to the said arrangement. The British government is of opinion that it might be proper for that of France to send, without delay, instructions to their ministers at Vienna, Petersburgh, and Berlin, to make conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's ministers a communication to those powers, in which they should

be invited to accede to the arrangement respecting Malta, by which the independence of the island, and the other stipulations relative thereto, are placed under the protection and guarantee of those powers, conjointly with their Britannic and Catholic Majesties, and the French Republic.

Translation of Note referred to in No. 6.—The undersigned, minister for foreign affairs, has the honour to transmit to M. Merry, his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, his answer to the note verbale which he addressed to him on the 8th Prairial. He doubts not that his Majesty's ministers will see in this answer a new proof of the constant dispositions of the First Consul to come to an agreement with the English government, for the securing and facilitating the execution of the respective clauses of the treaty which has re-established peace between the two states. The undersigned has the honour to renew to M. Merry the assurance of his high consideration,

C. M. TALLEYRAND.

Paris, 20th Prairial, Year 10.

[The minister for foreign affairs of the French Republic has received the communication which has been made to him by his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, of the list of the candidates nominated by the votes of the different priories to the Grand Mastership of the Order of Malta; and he has submitted to the First Consul the proposal concerted between the priories of the Order, and approved by his Britannic Majesty, of submitting (pro hac vice) to his Holiness the choice among the proposed candidates. The First Consul has no other object in whatever relates to the Order of Malta, than to see the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens duly executed, and to remove all the obstacles which might render that execution tardy or difficult. He moreover desires equally with his Britannic Majesty, that France and England should act in concert, in order the better to secure the independence and the organization of the Order of Malta. He therefore consents that the choice of its Grand Master, from the candidates proposed by the votes of the priories, should for this time be submitted to his Holiness. As to the 13th paragraph of the same article, respecting the accession of the powers, the First Consul thinks with his Britannic Majesty, that the powers should be invited to give their consent to the arrangements agreed upon; and the French ministers at the courts of Austria, Russia, and Prussia, shall consequently receive orders to take, conjointly with his Britannic Majesty's ministers, the necessary steps for obtaining the accession provided by 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

Paris, 10th Prairial, Year 10.

Paris, June 4, 1802.

No. 7.—My Lord, I had occasion to see M. Talleyrand yesterday afternoon, for the purpose of introducing to him, by appointment, some English gentlemen, previously to their presentation to-day to the First Consul. Having gone first alone into the minister's cabinet, he said, that he had been directed by General Buonaparté, to represent to me several circumstances which stood very much in the way of that perfect reconciliation and good understanding between the two countries and their governments, which it was the First Consul's sincere wish to see re-established, in order that such obstacles might be removed before the arrival in London of the French ambassador; because, although the circumstances in question had already produced a very disagreeable effect, whilst only M. Otto, as minister, had to witness them, they would acquire a great addition of force if they should still exist when the ambassador should be present; and since the First Consul had given orders for General Andréossy to proceed to his destination with as little delay as possible, he wished that I should take an early opportunity to give an account to your lordship, of the observations which he was charged to make to me. After a preface to this effect, M. Talleyrand proceeded to state to me, that the accounts which M. Otto had transmitted to me of the disgust and inconvenience which he could not but feel and experience at meeting frequently at his Majesty's court, and at other places, the French princes, and some French persons still decorated with the insignia of French orders which no longer existed; and at seeing the countenance and support which continued to be given in England, to what he termed the ci-devant French bishops, as well as to other persons (he here mentioned Georges) inimical to the present government of France, had affected so strongly the First Consul, and were in fact so calculated to prevent that system of cordiality which he was anxious to see established, that it was incumbent upon him to express his wish, that his Majesty's government might be disposed to remove out of the British dominions, all the French princes and their adherents, together with the French bishops, and other French individuals whose political principles and conduct must necessarily occasion great jealousy to the French government. He continued to observe, that the protection and favour which all the persons in question continued to meet with, in a country so close a neighbour to

France, must alone be always considered as an encouragement to the disaffected here, even without those persons themselves being guilty of any acts tendingto foment fresh disturbances in this country; but that the government here, possessed proofs of the abuse which they were now making of the protection which they enjoyed in England, and of the advantage they were taking of the vicinity of their situation to France, by being really guilty of such acts, since several printed papers had lately been intercepted, which it was known they had sent, and caused to be circulated in France, and which had for object to create an opposition to the government. I cannot, my lord, do better than refer you to what you will have read in the French official paper of the day before yesterday, under the article of Paris, for the exact text of M. Talleyrand's discourse upon this subject; which he concluded by saying, that he thought the residence of Louis XVIII. was now the proper place for that of the rest of the family, and that I might add this suggestion in my report to your lordship. I answered the French minister, that without any reference to you, I could assure him, that the practices of the French residing in England, of which he complained, had not been encouraged, nor would be countenanced by his Majesty's government; which was as sincerely disposed to cultivate harmony and a good understanding between the two countries, as he had represented the First Consul to be; but that I could by no means say how far they would be disposed to adopt the measures which he had intimated to be General Buonaparte's wish that they should pursue, in order to remove so effectually, every thing which might not perhaps be considered equally by them, as giving just cause of offence or jealousy to France. M. Talleyrand did not rejoin upon the matter; but asked me when I proposed writing. Upon my replying I should lose no time, he said, that if I should write as to-day, he would avail himself of the opportunity to convey a letter to M. Otto. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) A. MERRY.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

Downing-street, June 10, 1802.

No. 8.—Sir, Your dispatches of the 4th instant were received on Monday night, and have been laid before the King. The account given in that dispatch of the conversation which passed on the 3d instant, between you and M. Talleyrand, respecting the French princes and their adherents, would have afforded here considerable surprize if his Majesty's government had not in some degree been prepared for it by information which had been previously received: from the manner, however, in which this subject has been mentioned to you, it is important that you should take a proper opportunity to explain, candidly and fairly, to the French government, the line of conduct which his Majesty feels it to be his duty to pursue in this very delicate business. His Majesty would certainly consider it inconsistent with both the letter and spirit of the treaty of peace, between him and the French Republic, to encourage or countenance any projects that might be hostile to the present government of France. He is sincerely desirous that the peace which has been concluded may be permanent, and may lead to the establishment of a system of good understanding and harmony between the two countries. With these sentiments he is disposed to employ all the means in his power to guard against any circumstance which can have the effect of disturbing the tranquillity that has been so happily restored; and he certainly expects that all foreigners who may reside within his dominions, should not only hold a conduct conformable to the laws of the country, but should abstain from all acts which may be hostile to the government of any country with which his Majesty may be at peace. As long, however, as they conduct themselves according to these principles, his Majesty would feel it inconsistent with his dignity, with his honour, and with the common laws of hospitality, to deprive them of that protection which individuals resident in his dominions can only forfeit by their own misconduct. The greater part of the persons to whom allusion has been made in M. Talleyrand's conversation with you, are living in retirement, and his Majesty has no reason whatever to suppose that since the conclusion of peace they have availed themselves of their residence in this country to promote any designs injurious to the government of France. I have the honour to be, &c.

Anth. Merry, &c. &c. HAWKESBURY.

Paris, June 17, 1802.

No. 9.—My Lord, I have the honour to acquaint your lordship, that I have executed the instructions given me by your secret and confidential dispatch (No. 14), in consequence of the communication from M. Talleyrand, which I transmitted in my Number 28, respecting the residence of the French princes, and other French persons in his Majesty's dominions. In delivering my answer on this business to the French minister, I took care to express, in the strongest manner, the assurances which your lordship has authorized me to give of his Majesty's sincere desire that the peace which has happily been concluded should be permanent, and that it should lead to the establishment of a

system of harmony and good understanding between the two countries; and that, as his Majesty's conduct would, in every respect, be guided by those sentiments, he of course would not tolerate, much less encourage, any proceedings on the part of persons within his dominions, which might be hostile to the present government of France: which assurances might, I trusted, be sufficient to tranquillize and satisfy the First Consul, without recurring to the measures which had been intimated to me, and which could not but be considered as inconsistent with his Majesty's dignity and honour, as well as with the common laws of hospitality, which he could not but observe towards foreigners in his dominions, until they should have forfeited that protection by their misconduct. M. Talleyrand expressed to me in reply, that the First Consul had solicited no more than the British government itself had, at the time, demanded of France, when the Pretender was in this country, and then had been practised between other governments under similar circumstances: that he could not see any humiliation in the measure which he had intimated to me; that he could assure me it had not been suggested with any such idea; and that he could only repeat, that the adoption of it would be in the highest degree agreeable and satisfactory to the First Consul, and be considered by him as the most convincing proof of his Majesty's disposition to see a cordial good understanding established between the two countries; concluding his answer with a request that I would report it to your lordship. I rejoined upon the subject by observing to the French minister, that even without adverting to the serious consideration of the King's dignity and honour, the feelings of the people of England were to be taken into account on the occasion: that he must be sensible the relative situation, hitherto, of the two countries, especially in regard to trade, afforded his Majesty's subjects no room to reap those advantages which were common to, and which were always expected from a state of peace, and that it therefore appeared to me that the First Consul would equally give a proof of his disposition to see harmony and a friendly intercourse re-established between the two nations, by not repeating his wish upon a matter which would operate in the strongest manner against such an approximation and reconciliation of sentiments, were it even only to come to the knowledge of his Majesty's subjects. *I am happy, my lord, to say, that M. Talleyrand shewed no warmth, or any very marked eagerness, in his manner of replying to my communication;* and that our conversation on this head terminated with the last remarks I made to him, when he changed it to another subject. I have the honour to be, &c. ANTH. MERRY.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

Portman square, July 25, 1802.

No. 10.—*Translation.*—My Lord, I transmitted, some time ago, to Mr. Hammond, a number of Peltier, containing the most gross calumnies against the French government, and against the whole nation; and I observed, that I should probably receive an order to demand the punishment of such an abuse of the press. That order is actually arrived, and I cannot conceal from you, my lord, that the reiterated insults of a small number of foreigners, assembled in London to conspire against the French government, produce the most unfavourable effects on the good understanding between the two nations. Even though the first article of the treaty of Amiens had not provided for the maintenance of that respect, which two independent nations owe to each other; the general maxims of the law of nations would formally condemn so revolting an abuse of the liberty of the press. It cannot be believed, that the law can give more latitude to a libellist than to any other individual, who, without declaration of war, should permit himself to violate the duties of good neighbourhood. The offence in question is so much the more serious, as its object is evidently to disturb the harmony which subsists between the two governments. It is not to Peltier alone, but to the editor of the "Courier François de Londres," to Cobbett, and to other writers who resemble them, that I have to direct the attention of his Majesty's government. The perfidious and malevolent publications of these men, are in open contradiction to the principles of peace, and if it could ever enter into the mind of the French government to permit retaliation, writers would doubtless be found in France, willing to avenge their countrymen by filling their pages with odious reflections on the most respectable persons, and on the dearest institutions of Great Britain. The want of positive laws against these sorts of offences cannot palliate the violation of the law of nations, according to which peace should put a stop to all species of hostilities; and doubtless those which wound the honour and reputation of a government, and which tend to cause a revolt of the people, whose interests are confided to that government, are the most apt to lessen the advantages of peace, and to keep up national resentments. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) OTTO.

To his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, Minister and Secretary of State for the Foreign Department.

Downing-street, July 28, 1802.

No. 11.—Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter on the subject of the last number of Peltier. It is impossible that his Majesty's government could peruse the article in question *without the greatest displeasure*, and without an *anxious desire* that the person who published it should suffer *the punishment he so justly deserves*. The calumnies, however, to which his Majesty's government, and many of the best subjects in this country, are frequently exposed in the public prints, must necessarily convince all foreign governments of the difficulties which exist in a constitution like that of Great Britain, in preventing the abuse which is often unavoidably attendant on the greatest of all political benefits; and though publications of this nature are, as they certainly ought to be, by the law of England, subject to punishment, it is often difficult to prove the guilt of an individual so satisfactorily as to obtain the judgment of a court of justice; and the inconvenience which arises from prosecution, unless there is a reasonable prospect of success, is frequently sufficient to deter both the government and individuals from undertaking it. In the present case I have thought it my duty to refer the article in question to his Majesty's Attorney General, for his opinion whether it is or is not a libel, according to the construction of the law of England, and whether it is such a libel as he would, under all the circumstances, recommend for prosecution. As soon as I receive his report, I shall have the honour of communicating it to you. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) HAWKESBURY.

M. Otto, &c. &c.

No. 12.—*(Translation.)*—*Note.*—The undersigned minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic having submitted to his government the letter which his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, minister and principal secretary of state of his Britannic Majesty, did him the honour of writing under date of the 27th July, is directed to offer the following observations:—If the British government tolerates censures upon the acts of its administration, and the personal abuse of the most respectable men, it does not suffer even the slightest attempt against the public tranquillity, the fundamental laws of the empire, and the supreme authority which arises from them. Every nation is, moreover, at liberty to sacrifice any advantage whatever in its interior, in order to obtain another to which it attaches a higher value; but the government which does not repress the licentiousness of the press, when it may be injurious to the honour or the interests of foreign powers, would afford an opportunity for libellists to endanger the public tranquillity, or at least the good understanding that forms the basis of it, and whenever such serious injuries are continued in a regular and systematic manner, doubts must arise as to its own dispositions. The particular laws and constitution of Great Britain are subordinate to the general principles of the law of nations, which supercede the laws of each individual state. If it be a right in England to allow the most extensive liberty to the press, it is a public right of polished nations, and the bounden duty of governments to prevent, repress, and punish, every attack which might by those means be made against the rights, the interests, and the honour of foreign powers. This general maxim of the law of nations has never been mistaken without paving the way for the greatest divisions, *and has even furnished in England a plausible pretext to those who have written volumes to prove the necessity of the last war against France.* Are these men now desirous of presenting to the Consular government a weapon which they have wielded with so much address? And can they flatter themselves that the authority which has signed the peace has not power to maintain it? By the first article of the treaty of Amiens, the two powers agree to afford no protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them. But the greatest of all injuries doubtless is, that which tends to debase a foreign government, or to excite within its territory civil and religious commotions; and the most decided of all protections, is that which places under the safeguard of the laws, men who seek not only to disturb the political tranquillity of Europe, but even to dissolve the first bonds of society. The undersigned minister must moreover observe, that this is not a question respecting some paragraphs, which, through the inadvertence of an editor, might have been accidentally inserted in a public print; but it is a question of a deep and continued system of defamation, directed not only against the Chief of the French Republic, but against all the constituted authorities of the Republic, against the whole nation, represented by these libellers in the most odious and degrading terms. It has even been remarked that many of these prints contain an appeal to the French people, against the government and fundamental laws of their country. If these observations apply to the English writers, who, for these three months past, have deluged the public with the most perfidious and unbecoming publications, they are still more applicable to a class of foreign calumniators, who appear to avail themselves of the asylum offered them in England only for the purpose of the better

gratifying their hatred against France, and undermining the foundations of peace.—It is not merely by insulting and seditious writings, evidently published with a view to circulation in France, but by other incendiary papers distributed through the maritime departments, in order to excite the evil-disposed or weak inhabitants to resist the execution of the *Concordate*, that the implacable enemies of France continue to exercise hostilities, and to provoke the just indignation of the French government and people. Not a doubt exists of these writings having been composed and circulated by Georges, and by the former bishops of France. These men can no longer be considered but as rebels against both political and religious authority; and after their reiterated attempts to disturb the good understanding between the two governments, their residence in England militates openly against the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace. The meetings likewise which have take place in the island of Jersey, and the odious plots which are there framed, in spite of the representations which the undersigned minister has already taken care to make on this subject, also demand immediate measures to be taken by a government, the neighbour and friend of France. Other persons (attached, by recollections never to be effaced, and by regrets too long fostered, to an order of things which no longer exists in France) find themselves daily implicated by the plots of those who pretend to serve them. A sense of their own reputation will without doubt lead them to avoid a focus of intrigues, with which they ought not to have the least connection. Peace happily re-established, the mutual desire of the two governments to render it solid and lasting, and the general interests of humanity, require that all these causes of dissatisfaction should be done away, and that his Majesty's ministry should, by frank and energetic measures, manifest their disapprobation of all the attempts made to produce new divisions. The undersigned has in consequence received especial orders to solicit—

1st. That his Majesty's government will adopt the most effectual measures to put a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publications with which the newspapers and other writings printed in England are filled.

2d. That the individuals mentioned in the undersigned minister's letter of the 23d July last, shall be sent out of the island of Jersey.

3d. That the former Bishops of Arras and St. Pol de Léon, and all those, who like them, under the pretext of religion, seek to raise disturbances in the interior of France, shall likewise be sent away.

4th. That Georges and his adherents shall be *transported* to Canada, *according to the intention which the undersigned has been directed to transmit to his government at the request of Lord Hawkesbury.*

5th. That, in order to deprive the evil-disposed of every pretext for disturbing the good understanding between the two governments, it shall be recommended to the princes of the House of Bourbon at present in Great Britain, to repair to Warsaw, the residence of the head of their family.

6th. That such of the French emigrants as still think proper to wear the orders and decorations belonging to the ancient government of France, shall be required to quit the territory of the British empire.

These demands are founded upon the treaty of Amiens, and upon the verbal assurances that *the undersigned minister has had the satisfaction to receive in the course of the negociations, with regard to a mutual agreement for maintaining tranquillity and good order in the two countries.* If any one in particular of these demands does not proceed so immediately from the treaty concluded, it would be easy to justify it by striking examples, and to prove how very attentive the British government has been in times of internal fermentation, to remove from the territory of a neighbouring power those who might endanger the public tranquillity.—Whatever may be the protection which the English laws afford to native writers and to other subjects of his Majesty, the French government knows that foreigners do not here enjoy the same protection; and that the law, known by the title of the *Alien Act*, gives the ministry of his Britannic Majesty an authority which it has often exercised against foreigners whose residence was prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain. The first clause of this Act states expressly, that any order in council which requires a foreigner to quit the kingdom shall be executed under pain of imprisonment and transportation. There exists, therefore, in the ministry a legal and sufficient power to restrain foreigners, without having recourse to the courts of law, and the French government, which offers on this point a perfect reciprocity, thinks it gives a new proof of its pacific intentions, by demanding that those persons may be sent away, whose machinations uniformly tend to sow discord between the two people. It owes to itself and to the nation at large, (which has made it the depository of its power and of its honour), not to appear insensible to insults and to plots during profound peace, which the irritation of open war could not justify, and it is too well acquainted with the conciliatory dispositions of the British ministry, not to rely

upon its efforts to disperse a faction equally the enemy of France and England. The undersigned minister seizes this opportunity to present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage of his respectful consideration. (Signed) Otto.

London, 17th August, 1802.

Downing-street, August 22, 1802.

No. 15.—Sir, I send you the copy of a letter which I received some days ago from M. Otto, together with a copy of an official note inclosed in it. I have informed M. Otto, that you would receive instructions to enter into explanations with the French government on the several points to which it refers. It is impossible not to feel considerable surprize at the circumstances under which it has been thought proper to present such a note; at the stile in which it is drawn up, and at the complaints contained in it. Whatever may be the general dispositions of the French government towards this country, supposing them to be as hostile as they have been at any former period, or even more so, it would appear so contrary to their interest to provoke a war with us at the present moment, that I am inclined to ascribe their conduct, in the whole of this business, more to temper, than to any other motive; but whether their conduct is to be referred to temper or to policy, the effects of it may still be the same; it is therefore become of the utmost importance that a frank explanation should be made of the line of conduct which his Majesty has determined to adopt on reasons of the nature of those to which this note refers, and of the motives on which it is founded; and it is to be hoped that such an explanation will have the effect of putting an end to a course of proceeding which can lead only to perpetual irritation between the two governments, and which might ultimately tend to the most serious consequences. The first consideration that naturally arises on this transaction, is that of the peculiar circumstances under which the note of M. Otto has been presented. It cannot be denied that some very improper paragraphs have lately appeared in some of the English newspapers against the government of France; it cannot be denied likewise, that publications of a still more improper and indecent nature have made their appearance in this country, with the names of foreigners affixed to them. Under these circumstances the French government would have been warranted in expecting every redress that the laws of this country could afford them; but as, instead of seeking it in the ordinary course, they have thought fit to resort to recrimination themselves, or at least to authorize it in others, they could have no right to complain if their subsequent appeal to his Majesty had failed to produce the effect that otherwise would have attended it. Whatever may have been the nature of the prior injury, they have in fact taken the law into their own hands: and what is this recrimination and retort? The paragraphs in the English newspapers, the publications to which I have above referred, have not appeared under any authority of the British government, and are disavowed and disapproved of by them; but the paragraph in the Moniteur has appeared in a paper avowedly official, for which the government are therefore considered as responsible, as his Majesty's government is responsible for the contents of the London Gazette. And this retort is not confined to the unauthorized English newspapers, or to the other publications of which complaint is now made, but is converted into, and made a pretence for a direct attack upon the government of his Majesty. *His Majesty feels it beneath his dignity to make any formal complaint on this occasion;* but it has been impossible for me to proceed to the other part of the subject, without pointing your attention to the conduct of the French government in this respect, that you may observe upon it in the manner it deserves. The propositions in M. Otto's official note, are six in number; but may in fact be divided under two heads: the first, that which relates to the libels of all descriptions, which are alledged to be published against the French government; the last, comprehending the five complaints which relate to the emigrants resident in this country. On the first, I am sure you must be aware that his Majesty cannot, and never will, in consequence of any representation or any menace from a foreign power, make any concession, which can be in the smallest degree dangerous to the liberty of the press, as secured by the constitution of this country. This liberty is justly dear to every British subject. The constitution admits of no previous restraints upon publications of any description; but there exist judicatures, wholly independent of the executive government, capable of taking cognizance of such publications as the law deems to be criminal, and which are bound to inflict the punishment the delinquents may deserve; these judicatures may take cognizance not only of libels against the government and the magistracy of this kingdom, but, as has been repeatedly experienced, of publications defamatory of those in whose hands the administration of foreign governments is placed. That our government neither has nor wants any other protection than what the laws of the country afford; and though they are willing and ready

to give to every foreign government all the protection against offences of this nature which the principle of their laws and constitution will admit, they never can consent to new-model their laws, or to change their constitution, to gratify the wishes of any foreign power. If the present French government are dissatisfied with our laws on the subject of libels, or entertain the opinion that the administration of justice in our courts is too tardy and lenient, they have it in their power to redress themselves by punishing the venders and distributors of such publications within their own territories, in any manner that they may think proper, and thereby preventing the circulation of them. If they think their present laws are not sufficient for this purpose they may enact new ones; or, if they think it expedient, they may exercise the right which they have of prohibiting the importation of any foreign newspapers, or periodical publications, into the territories of the French Republic. His Majesty will not complain of such a measure, as it is not his intention to interfere in the manner in which the people or territories of France should be governed; but he expects, on the other hand, that the French government will not interfere in the manner in which the government of his dominions is conducted, or call for a change in those laws with which his people are perfectly satisfied. With respect to the distinction which appears to be drawn in M. Otto's note, between the publications of British subjects and those of foreigners, and the power which his Majesty is supposed to have in consequence of the Alien Act, of sending foreigners out of his dominions, it is important to observe that the provisions of that act were made for the purpose of preventing the residence of foreigners, whose numbers and principles had a tendency to disturb the internal peace of his own dominions, and whom the safety of those dominions might require in many instances to be removed, even if their actual conduct had not exposed them to punishment by law. It does not follow that it would be a warrantable application of such a law to exert its powers in the cases of individuals such as those of whom complaint is now made, and particularly as they are liable to be prosecuted under the law of the land, in like manner as others have been in similar cases, at the instance, and upon the complaint of foreign governments. The second general head, which includes the five last complaints, relates to the removal of some of the French emigrants resident in this country. His Majesty entertained hopes that the explanation furnished on this head in my dispatch No. 14. would have proved satisfactory, and would have precluded the necessity of any farther discussion on this subject. The French government have upon several occasions resorted on this part of the subject to precedent, and have particularly rested on the demand formerly made by this country, that the person then called the Pretender, should be sent from the French dominions. It is important that the differences between these two cases should be stated. When James the Second abdicated the throne, and left this country, he retired with his adherents to France; and though in the war which immediately succeeded that event, the French government adopted his cause as their own, no stipulation was made at the Treaty of Ryswick, that he should be sent from that country, nor was any subsequent demand ever made to the French government to this effect; but he was suffered to remain at Saint Germain, in the neighbourhood of Paris, surrounded by his family and friends, till the time of his death. It was not till after his demise, when Lewis the Fourteenth, in direct violation of the treaty of Ryswick, had acknowledged his son as King of Great Britain, that a different course of proceeding was adopted by the British government; and in the treaty of peace signed at Utrecht, which put an end to the war which had been carried on, on account of the Spanish succession, an article was inserted to prevent the Pretender from residing in any part of the French dominions. The demand which was subsequently made for the removal of the Pretender from a town which was situated in the centre of these dominions, was founded on this article of the treaty, which was in fact one of the conditions of the peace; but both the article in the treaty and the demand were confined to the Pretender personally, and were not extended to any of his family, or to any of his adherents. After his removal, many of his adherents continued to reside in France; many persons resident in this country, who were attached to the cause of the Pretender, and had promoted the rebellion in his favour, and who were consequently attainted for high treason, sought refuge in France, and were permitted to remain there till their death, without any application ever having been made by the British government for their removal. The Duke of Berwick, the natural son of James the Second, who from his principles and talents was the most dangerous man to the interests of this country and the Protestant succession, continued to be a general in the French armies, and though descended from the King, an Englishman and an emigrant, it was not required

that he should be sent out of France. In the present case, there is no article in the treaty of peace, by which his Majesty is bound to send from this country any Frenchman whatever, except on account of the crimes specified in the twentieth article of the definitive treaty, and in consequence of the proofs therein required having been adduced. In the present case, it cannot be pretended that his Majesty has ever given the slightest countenance to the cause of the royalists in France against the present government, since the period when he acknowledged that government; and if there were not these important differences in the two cases, they would be totally dissimilar in the only remaining point; for in the case of the House of Stuart, as has been already stated, notwithstanding the violence of the times, and the danger to which the Protestant succession was really exposed, this strong act of authority was confined to the person of the Pretender; and the individual who must be recognized in that character by the French government, and whose case can alone bear any similarity to the former even in this respect, is not, and never has been within his Majesty's dominions: other precedents might be adduced on this subject; but it is not necessary to state them, as the foregoing are sufficient. With respect to the complaints in detail under the second head.—Upon the first, you may inform the French government, that the emigrants in Jersey, many of whom had remained there solely on account of the cheapness of subsistence, had actually removed, or were removing previous to the representation concerning them in Mr. Otto's note, and that before your explanation with Mr. Talleyrand can take place, there will probably not be an emigrant in the island. To the second complaint, which relates to the Bishops of Arras and Saint Paul de Leon, and others, his Majesty can only reply, that if the facts alledged against them can be substantiated; if it can be proved that they have distributed papers on the coast of France, with a view of disturbing the government, and of inducing the people to resist the new church establishment, his Majesty would think himself justified in taking all measures within his power for obliging them to leave the country; but some proof must be adduced of those facts; and such proof must not be that of their having in a single instance, viz. in reply to the Pope's mandate, published a vindication of their own conduct, in refusing to conform to the new establishment, a proceeding in which they would be justifiable on every principle of toleration and justice; but it should shew that they have since availed themselves of their situation in this country to excite the people of France against the authority of that government, whether civil or ecclesiastical. On the third complaint, which respects the removal of Georges, and those persons supposed to be described as his adherents, Mr. Otto must have mistaken me in what he supposes me to have said on that subject. His Majesty is, however, very desirous to obviate any cause of complaint or uneasiness with respect to these persons; *and measures are in contemplation, and will be taken, for the purpose of removing them out of his Majesty's European dominions.* On the fourth complaint, respecting the princes of the House of Bourbon, I can only refer you to my former answer. His Majesty has no desire that they should continue to reside in this country, if they are disposed, *or can be induced to quit it;* but he feels it to be inconsistent with his honour and his sense of justice to withdraw from them the rights of hospitality, as long as they conduct themselves peaceably and quietly; and unless some charge can be substantiated of their attempting to disturb the peace which subsists between the two governments. With respect to the fifth complaint, which relates to the French emigrants wearing in this country the orders of their ancient government; there are few if any persons of that description in this country who wear such orders. *It might be more proper if they all abstained from it;* but the French government could not persist in expecting, that even if it were consistent with law, his Majesty could be induced to commit so harsh an act of authority as to send them out of the country on such an account. I have thus stated to you his Majesty's sentiments on the several points contained in Mr. Otto's note. You will take an early opportunity of communicating these sentiments to the French government, and of accompanying them with the arguments and explanations above stated. And if it should be desired, and you should be of opinion, that it was likely to produce any good effect, there is no objection to your putting the substance of what you shall have stated in writing, and of delivering it to the minister for foreign affairs, as a memorandum of your conversation. Upon the general tone and style of Mr. Otto's note, it is important to observe, that it is far from conciliating; and that the practice of presenting notes of this description, on any motive or suggestion of personal irritation, cannot fail to have the effect of indisposing the two governments towards each other, instead of consolidating and strengthening the peace which happily subsists between them. That after a war, in which the passions of men have been roused beyond all former examples, it is natural to suppose that the distrust, jealousy, and other hostile feelings of individuals should not immediately subside, and under these circumstances it appears to be both the interest and the duty of the two governments, by a mild and temperate conduct, gradually to allay these feelings, and not on the contrary to

provoke and augment them by untimely irritation on their part, and by ascribing proceedings like those above noticed, to causes to which they have no reference. His Majesty has thus fully and frankly explained his sentiments, and the ground of his conduct. He is sincerely disposed to adopt every measure for the preservation of peace, which is consistent with the honour and independence of the country, and with the security of its laws and constitution. But the French government must have formed a most erroneous judgment of the disposition of the British nation, and of the character of its government, if they have been taught to expect that any representation of a foreign power will ever induce them to consent to a violation of those rights on which the liberties of the people of this country are founded. I have the honour to be, &c.

Anthony Merry, Esq. HAWKESBURY.

No. 14.—*(Translation.)*—*Note.*—General Vial, minister plenipotentiary of the Republic at Malta, having set out for his destination about the 20th of July, it is to be presumed, that he will soon be in a condition to enter into a concert with his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, on the evacuation of Malta, and of its dependencies. The three months, in which this evacuation should have taken place, are expired; and it being the intention of the two governments that the execution of the treaty of Amiens should experience the least possible delay, the First Consul would have been desirous that the two thousand Neapolitans who are ready to depart, could have been transported at an early period to the Island of Malta, to be in readiness whenever the evacuation shall be on the point of being effected. It appears, nevertheless, that Mr. Drummond, the English minister at Naples, has not been authorized by his government to facilitate this transport; and that the motive alledged by that minister was, that the stipulations which ought to precede the evacuation not being fulfilled, that evacuation could not yet take place. In communicating the above details to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, his Britannic Majesty's principal secretary of state for the foreign department, the undersigned is directed to observe, that the sending the two thousand Neapolitans to the Island of Malta cannot but be considered as a preliminary step, in order to accelerate the evacuation, as soon as the necessary measures shall have been taken by the respective plenipotentiaries; and that it does not in any manner prevent the subsequent concert on the details of the evacuation, conformably to the clauses of the treaty of Amiens. The undersigned is moreover directed to request the British ministry to give general instructions to his Majesty's plenipotentiaries at Naples, and at Malta, that the evacuation, and the other conditions of the 10th Article, may be executed without obstacle, and without these plenipotentiaries conceiving themselves obliged to refer to their government on each of the successive operations which should take place. The undersigned embraces this opportunity to present to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, the homage of his respectful consideration.

London, Aug 21, 1802. OTTO.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 15.—*Note*—The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Otto's note of the 21st instant. When the Neapolitan government notified to Mr. Drummond, the King's minister at Naples, that the 2000 troops which his Sicilian Majesty had selected to serve in Malta, were ready to proceed to their destination, that gentleman declined taking any step to facilitate their embarkation, till he should receive intelligence of the arrival of Sir Alexander Ball in that island, and till he should be informed that the commander in chief of the British forces had made suitable preparations for their reception. By the last advices from Malta it appears, that Sir Alexander Ball had arrived there on the 10th of last month, and that after having conferred with General Fox upon the subject, he had written to Mr. Drummond, that there was no impediment whatever to the immediate reception of the Neapolitan troops, and that their quarters would be prepared accordingly; the undersigned has the honour to state this to M. Otto as the most satisfactory answer which he can give to his note. It is probable, therefore, that the troops of his Sicilian Majesty are already embarked and on their passage; but to prevent the possibility of any unnecessary delay or misconception, the most explicit instructions will be immediately forwarded to Mr. Drummond on this subject. With respect to the other points in M. Otto's note, the undersigned can only repeat what he has before stated to him, that his Majesty is most sincerely desirous to see all the stipulations of the 10th article of the definitive treaty carried into effect with the utmost punctuality, and with the least possible delay. With this view he takes this opportunity of observing to M. Otto, that by the very last dispatches from the English ambassador at St. Petersburgh, the French minister at that court had not even then received any instructions from his government relative to the steps to be taken in concert with Lord St. Helens, for inviting the Emperor to become a guaranty of the provisions and stipulations of the article in question. The French minister at Berlin was in the same predicament. The undersigned, therefore, requests that M. Otto would have the goodness to represent these circumstances to his government, and to urge them, if they have not already done it, to transmit without delay to

their ministers at those courts the necessary instructions for bringing this part of the business to a conclusion. The undersigned requests M. Otto to accept the assurances of his high consideration. HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, Aug. 23, 1802.

No. 16.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Oct. 3, 1802.*—As soon as the Helvetic government had retired from Berne to Lausanne, the partizans of the antient federative system of the Swiss Cantons, who established immediately in the former city a provisional government, deputed a confidential to Paris, for the purpose of counteracting the measures of M. Stapfer, and of engaging the First Consul to suffer the inhabitants of Switzerland to settle their affairs amongst themselves. He was instructed in any emergency to address himself to the ministers here of the principal powers of Europe, and to solicit their interference and assistance in the objects of his mission. He reached Paris four days ago, and had reason to flatter himself, from the result of an interview which he had immediately with M. Talleyrand, that the First Consul would put no obstacle in the way of any arrangement which the Swiss might agree upon among themselves for the final settlement of their government; he was therefore much surprised to learn soon afterwards, that a change had taken place in the First Consul's sentiments, and his astonishment was complicated when he found that the latter had taken so decided and so unfavourable a part in the business, as that which is announced by a resolution published in yesterday's Moniteur, (which I have the honour to transmit inclosed), in the form of an address to the inhabitants of Switzerland. This person having, besides this public declaration, acquired some private information of its being the first Consul's intention to give the most immediate and vigorous effect to it, lost no time in addressing a letter to the latter, in which he took the liberty of stating that he must have been deceived by false representations, that his interference in the affairs of Switzerland was, as he was authorized to say, entirely unsolicited by the majority, and the best thinking part of the inhabitants; and that he had, therefore, to entreat of him, in the most earnest manner, to suspend the execution of his resolution until those explanations could take place, which he trusted might be the means of preventing the immense effusion of blood which would otherwise inevitably ensue. He at the same time addressed himself in the course of yesterday to me, as well as to the Austrian and Spanish ambassadors, and to the Russian and Prussian ministers, (not having gained admittance to Mons. de Cobenzel, nor to M. de Markoff or Lucchesini; he afterwards wrote to them), soliciting, in the strongest terms, an interference (jointly, if possible), on their part, with the French government, to endeavour to avert the impending evil. I naturally observed to him in answer, that the present state of political relations between the great powers of Europe afforded no prospect of his obtaining of their ministers at Paris, to adopt a concerted measure in favour of the object which he had so much at heart, and that of course I could not take it individually upon myself, without any express instruction from my government. He returned to me to-day, to acquaint me that he was not only as yet without a reply from any quarter, but had reason to fear that his prayers would not be listened to by the Austrian, Russian, and Prussian ministers; *he therefore conjured me to transmit them to his Majesty's government, from whom only his countrymen could have a hope of deriving any assistance in the terrible conflict which he knew they were determined to stand, and which would only cease by the extermination of every virtuous and brave man in the country.* He then put into my hand a note which he had drawn up in a hurry, and of which I inclose a copy. Whilst, my lord, it was out of my power to give him any encouragement to expect from his Majesty's government the assistance which his petition expresses, I have thought it my duty to lose no time in making you acquainted with a state of things which may shortly be attended with very important consequences.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 16.)—Translation.—Note.—So long as Switzerland was occupied by the French armies, the wishes of the people could never be freely manifested. The petty revolutions which took place in the government were the mere tricks of certain factions, in which the nation at large took but a very trifling interest. Scarcely did Switzerland think herself independent when she was desirous of returning to her ancient institutions, rendered still dearer to her by her late misfortunes, and the arbitrary acts of the government furnished her with the means of doing so. Almost the whole of Switzerland, with unexampled unanimity and moderation, shook off the yoke. The Cantons formed themselves into constituent bodies; and twelve of the thirteen Cantons of Switzerland sent their representatives to the Diet of Schwitz, in order there to organize a central power which might be acceptable to the neighbouring powers. The aristocratical Cantons renounced their exclusive rights; the Pays de Vaud was left at liberty to form its own constitution, as well as Thurgovia and the other new Cantons. The government having taken refuge at Lausanne, was by no means secure there, notwithstanding its regular troops; perhaps even at the present moment it no longer exists. Who would not have thought that according to the

stipulation of the Treaty of Luneville, which grants independance to Switzerland, and the right of choosing its own government, every thing was settled, and that this nation might see its former happiness and tranquillity revive? Who could have thought that the First Consul would have issued such a decree as that of the 8th Vendemiaire? Is an independant nation to be thus treated? Should Bonaparte persist in his determination, and the other powers should not interpose in our favour, it only remains for us either to bury ourselves in the ruins of our houses, although without hope of resistance, exhausted as we are by the colossus who is about to overwhelm us, or to debase ourselves in the eyes of the whole universe! Will the government of this generous nation, which has at all times afforded so many proofs of the interest it takes in the welfare of the Swiss, do nothing for us under circumstances which are to decide, whether we are still to be ranked amongst *free people!* We have only men left us:—the revolution, and spoliations without end, have exhausted our means: we are without arms, without ammunition, without stores, and without money to purchase them.

No. 17.—*Note Verbale.*—Lord Hawkesbury has received his Majesty's commands to communicate, through Mr. Otto, to the French government, the sentiments of deep regret which have been excited in his Majesty's mind by the address of the First Consul to the Helvetic people, which was published by authority in the Moniteur of the 1st instant, and by the representations which have been made to his Majesty on this subject, on behalf of the nation whose interests are so immediately affected by it. His Majesty most sincerely laments the covulsions to which the Swiss Cantons have for some time past been exposed; but he can consider their late exertions in no other light than as the lawful efforts of a brave and generous people to recover their antient laws and government, and to procure the re-establishment of a system which experience has demonstrated, not only to be favourable to the maintenance of their domestic happiness, but to be perfectly consistent with the tranquillity and security of other powers. The Cantons of Switzerland unquestionably possess, in the same degree as every other independent state, the right of regulating their own internal concerns; and this right has moreover, in the present instance, been formally and explicitly guaranteed to the Swiss nation by the French government in the Treaty of Luneville conjointly with the other powers who were parties to that engagement. His Majesty has no other desire than that the people of Switzerland, who now appear to be so generally united, should be left at liberty to settle their own internal government without the interposition of any foreign powers; and with whatever regret his Majesty may have perused the late proclamation of the French government, he is yet unwilling to believe that they will farther attempt to controul that independent nation in the exercise of their undoubted rights. His Majesty thinks himself called upon by his regard for the general interests of Europe, and by his peculiar solicitude for the happiness and welfare of the Swiss nation, to express these his sentiments with a frankness and sincerity which he feels to be due to his character, and to the good understanding which he is desirous of preserving with the government of France.

Downing-street, October 10, 1802.

M. Otto, &c. &c.

Downing-street, October 10, 1802.

No. 18.—Sir, his Majesty having deemed it expedient, that a confidential person should be sent at the present moment to Switzerland, in consequence of the communication which he has received from the Swiss confederacy, through their representative at Paris, I am commanded to inform you that he has made choice of you for that purpose. It is of the utmost consequence, considering the nature of the business with which you are entrusted, that you should lose no time in taking your departure from hence, and that you should make every practicable exertion to arrive on the frontiers of Switzerland with as little delay as possible. You will inform yourself there what is the actual residence of the government of the Swiss confederation, to which you will immediately repair. Having taken the proper means to obtain a confidential interview with the persons who may be entrusted with the principal direction of affairs, you will communicate to them a copy of the note verbale which I delivered to M. Otto, and which is herewith inclosed; and you will take every opportunity of impressing upon their minds the deep interest which his Majesty takes in the success of their exertions. You will state to them, that his Majesty entertains hopes, that his representation to the French government may have the effect of inducing the First Consul to abandon his intention of compelling the Swiss nation by force to renounce that system of government under which they had so long prospered, and to which they appear to be almost unanimously anxious to return. In this event his Majesty will feel himself bound to abstain from all interference on his part; it being his earnest desire that the Swiss nation should be left at liberty to regulate their own internal concerns, without the interposition of any foreign power. If, however, contrary to his Majesty's expectations, the French government should persist in the system of coercion, announced in the proclamation of the First Consul, inserted in the

Moniteur of the 1st instant, you will, in that case, inform yourself, by every means in your power, of the disposition of the people at large of the Swiss confederacy, and particularly of those who have the direction of their affairs, and of those who possess the greatest share of influence amongst them, to persevere in the defence of their rights, and in the maintenance of the system they have adopted. You will likewise enquire into the means of defence of which they may be possessed, and of the probability of their being exerted with success. You will on no account encourage them to persevere in active measures of resistance which they are not themselves desirous to adopt, or which they may believe are unlikely to be ultimately effectual. If, however, you should find that the people of the Swiss confederacy are generally determined to persevere in the maintenance of their independence, and of their right to return to their ancient system of government; and if you should be of opinion that from the union that subsists amongst the people, and from their zeal and enthusiasm in the cause in which they are engaged, they are finally resolved at all hazards to resist the threatened attempt of the French government to interpose by force of arms, in the settlement of their internal concerns; you will then immediately communicate, in confidence, to the Swiss government, that either in the event of a French army having entered the country, or in the event of your having reason to be convinced that a French army is actually advancing for that purpose, his Majesty has authorised you to accede to their application for pecuniary succours. I have furnished you with a cypher and decypher that you may have it in your power to correspond with his Majesty's ministers at Vienna and Munich, if you should think it advisable; and as it is highly probable that the armies of the Swiss confederacy may be inadequately supplied with arms, ammunition, or provisions, and may be desirous of procuring supplies thereof from the neighbouring countries, you will use your utmost endeavours to give them every facility for this purpose. You will be very particular in informing me of the numbers and situation of any Austrian corps in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, and of the probability of their advancing in any event into the Swiss territory. As it is of great importance that his Majesty's government should be regularly informed of the events which may be passing in Switzerland, and of the dispositions that may prevail there, you will endeavour to ascertain the most safe and expeditious mode of conveying your letters which will avoid their passing through any part of the French Republic. As it is possible that previous to your arrival in Switzerland the present state of affairs may have undergone a decided alteration, either in consequence of the submission of the Swiss Cantons, or of any compromise having taken place as to their internal concerns, it will be proper that, in that case, you should take up your residence in such a situation as you may think most convenient in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, of which you will give me the earliest intelligence, and there wait for his Majesty's further orders. I am, with great truth and regard, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

Francis Moore, Esq.

Constance, October 31, 1802.

No. 19.—My Lord, I have the honour to inform your lordship that I arrived here on the 22d instant, and that having received this evening authentic information of the submission of the Diet of Switzerland, assembled at Schwitz, to the French arms, I lose no time in dispatching the messenger Shaw, with this intelligence; from which your lordship will perceive that it only remains for me to obey that part of my instructions by which I am directed, under such circumstances, to take up my residence in the neighbourhood of Switzerland, and there to await his Majesty's further orders. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) FRA. MOORE.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Downing-street, November 25, 1802.

No. 20.—Sir, I have duly received your several letters by the messenger Shaw. As from the present state of Switzerland your continuance in the vicinity of that country appears to be no longer necessary, you are at liberty to return to England as soon as it may suit your convenience. I am, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

Francis Moore, Esq.

No. 21.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Liston to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Hague, 12th October*, 1802.—A few hours after I had sent off my last dispatch to your lordship, (on Saturday, the 9th of this month), the French ambassador, M. de Semonville, waited upon the President of the government of state, and informed him that he had just received, by a courier from Paris, orders to inform the government of this country, "Que le Premier Consul avoit appris, avec autant de surprise que d'indignation, que des personnes avides de révolutions vouloient de nouveau troubler le repos dans la Batavie, en abusant même pour cet effet de noms respectables; et que le Premier Consul, comme allié de la République, invitoit le gouvernement à prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour maintenir l'ordre des choses établi par la constitution." These were nearly the words read to me by the secretary of state, from a note in his own hand-writing, dictated to him by M. de Se-

monville, with a view to its publication, (and a translation was accordingly inserted in the Dutch official paper of the Hague on the 11th); but they fall very short of the language employed by the French minister for foreign affairs in his dispatches to the ambassador, and in the communication made by him to the Dutch chargé d'affaires at Paris, (who also sent a messenger to the Hague upon this occasion). In these M. de Talleyrand entered into considerable detail on the subject of the plots supposed to be formed in this country against the administration, mentioned the names of the chiefs, and ended by making an offer, on the part of the First Consul, to come to the assistance of the government (should circumstances render it necessary) with all his forces.

Hague, October 29, 1802.

No. 22.—My Lord, The recent attack made by Buonaparté upon the liberties and independence of the Swiss Cantons, has naturally made a strong impression upon the inhabitants of this country; and the public anxiety has been much augmented by certain symptoms in the conduct of the consular government, which seem to indicate an intention not to withdraw the French troops, which have been kept in the Batavian Republic for some time past, under the title of *auxiliaries*, and paid and maintained at the expence of the Dutch nation. These troops (amounting to between ten and eleven thousand men) were to remain here till the conclusion of the definitive treaty with Great Britain. It was afterwards formally promised on the part of France, that they should evacuate the territories of the Republic at the latest, on the expiration of the last French year (the 23d of September.) They accordingly began their march to the southward a few days before that period; and the government and the people rejoiced at the prospect of being finally relieved from a load which has become extremely irksome to them. But, on pretence that a great proportion of the corps were to be embarked at Flushing for Louisiana, and that there was a want of shipping for their accommodation, they took up their quarters on the frontiers of the country (at Bois-le-Duc, Breda, and Bergen-op-Zoom), where they still remain; and demands have continued to be made for their pay and maintenance. Hopes were, however, entertained from day to day, that their departure would take place; when, to the astonishment of the Batavian government, official notice was (last week) transmitted from France to the department of war at the Hague, (which has been charged with the support of these corps), that the First Consul has been pleased to appoint a new commander in chief (General Montrichard), and a new staff, for the auxiliary troops in this country; and the notice was given that government might provide for the pay of the officers in question. The administration appear resolved to oppose all the resistance in their power to this unexpected and oppressive extortion. An express has been sent off to the Dutch ambassador at Paris, charging him to claim, in the most urgent terms, the accomplishment of the treaties subsisting between the two Republics, and the fulfilment of the repeated and recent promises made by the French government upon this subject. And in case of the failure of this application, they talk of addressing themselves to the principal powers of Europe who had any share or influence in the conclusion of the peace, to intreat their intervention and good offices, with a view to the maintenance of the independence of the Republic. I have the honour to be, &c. ROB. LISTON.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 23.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury, to Lord Whitworth, dated November* 30, 1802.—His Majesty's government have learnt with some surprize from the communications from General Stuart, that that officer had signified to Colonel Sebastiani his inability to evacuate Egypt, until he should receive specific orders for that purpose. It is certainly true that no warrant has been transmitted to General Stuart, or to his predecessor the Earl of Cavan, for the evacuation of Egypt; neither was it considered to be necessary, in as much as his Majesty's government had already expressed their intention to General Stuart, in his instructions, that, except in a case of absolute necessity, the King's troops should remain in Egypt no longer than the month of July last. In all the instances of which places had been conquered by the King's forces, and of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name, it has been usual when they have been restored to the French Republic, or its allies, that the commanding officer should be furnished with a regular warrant under the King's sign manual, authorizing him to make such restoration. But the case of Egypt is different, as that country had never been taken possession of in his Majesty's name, as it had been actually restored to the Ottoman Porte, and as certain stations in it were continued to be occupied merely as military posts, until the means of removing the troops should be provided. It is probable, that in the present instance, General Stuart may have been misled by a doubt as to the extent of his own power, and by the opinion that he required a warrant to evacuate Egypt, similar to that which had been granted to officers who superintended the restitution of conquests of which possession had been taken in his Majesty's name. In order, however, to obviate any farther difficulties, instructions have now been sent to General Stuart directing him to re-

move the King's troops from Egypt with as little delay as possible, and information has been given to this effect to Gen. Andreossy.

No. 24.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburgh, July* 20, 1802.—I have since renewed my applications to this government on the business of Malta, and have some reason to hope that some impression has been made on the mind of his Imperial Majesty. The French Minister, however, has not yet received his instructions; and till they arrive, it will of course be impossible for me to take the requisite steps for bringing this affair to any satisfactory, or even positive issue.

No. 25.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord St. Helens to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburgh, August* 3, 1802.—I must not omit to acquaint your lordship, that although in order to prevent any further waste of time, I have thought it right to endeavour to obtain a definitive explanation of the intentions of this court, with relation to the proposed guaranty, I have not yet been enabled to demand it officially, according to the terms of the treaty of Amiens, as the French minister here is still without instructions authorizing him to join with me in that instance.

No. 26.—*Extract of a dispatch from the Hon. A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 18th July*, 1802.—On the 15th instant, M. de Champagny and I met at a conference at the Vice Chancellor's, to whom we presented our respective notes, copies of which I have the honour to enclose, marked A. and B.

(Inclosure A. referred to in No. 26.)—Translation.—The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary, has the honour to transmit herewith to the vice chancellor of court and state, a copy of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. He has, at the same time, the honour to acquaint his excellency that he has received orders from his court to invite his Majesty the Emperor and King, conformable to the 13th paragraph of that article, to give his guarantee to the arrangements stipulated therein. He therefore requests the vice chancellor of court and state, to lay this communication before his Imperial Majesty. The undersigned avails himself, with pleasure, of this opportunity to reiterate to his excellency the expression of his most distinguished consideration. ARTH. PAGET.

Vienna, 15th July, 1802.

(Inclosure B. referred to in No. 26.)—Translation.—The ambassador of the French Republic, on the invitation which has been given him by Mr. Paget, his Britannic Majesty's minister plenipotentiary and envoy extraordinary, hastens in conjunction with that minister, to communicate to the vice chancellor of court and state, the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, concerning the Order and Island of Malta, the sixth paragraph of which article places the independency of the Island of Malta under the guarantee of his Imperial Majesty, and several other powers of Europe. In taking this step, the ambassador, who has not yet received any orders respecting it, acts from the knowledge he has of the intention of his government to execute all the stipulations of the treaties it has concluded. The ambassador seizes, with eagerness, this opportunity to offer to his excellency the assurances of his high consideration. CHAMPAGNY.

Vienne, 26 Messidor, Year 10.

Count Cobentzel.

No. 27.—*Extract of a dispatch from the Hon. A. Paget to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Vienna, 22d August*, 1802.—I have the honour herewith to transmit to your lordship the emperor's act of guarantee and accession to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 27.)—Translation.—The Emperor and King having been invited by his Britannic Majesty and the First Consul of the French Republic, to accede to the stipulations contained in the 10th article of the treaty concluded and signed at Amiens on the 29th of March, 1802, (4th Germinal, year 10), respecting the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; and also to take under his protection and guarantee, conjointly with the other powers cited in the sixth paragraph of the said article, whatever was therein especially stipulated on the subject of the Island of Malta: and his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty having been at the same time informed that the two above-mentioned powers adopted on their part the concert which had been entered into by the two imperial courts, previous the exchange of the ratifications of the above-mentioned treaty of Amiens, to leave to the Pope the selection of a Grand Master from amongst the candidates nominated for that purpose by the priories of the Order. His Majesty the Emperor and King, desirous on the present occasion of exhibiting a fresh proof of his sincere friendship for his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and for the First Consul of the French Republic, has empowered and instructed his grand chamberlain and cabinet minister Count Francis of Colloredo, and his vice chancellor of court and state Count Louis of Cobenzel, to proceed in his name to the accession and guarantee of the stipulations of the 10th article of the afore-mentioned treaty; who, in virtue thereof, declare that his Majesty accedes, by the present act, to the stipulations contained in this ar-

ticle, with the clause herein-before referred to, respecting the mode of the next election of the Grand Master of the Order; and his Majesty specifically guarantees whatsoever is therein regulated, with regard to the independence of the Islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino. In witness whereof we, the plenipotentiaries of his Imperial, Royal, and Apostolic Majesty, have signed the present act of accession and of guarantee; have thereunto affixed the seal of our arms, and have exchanged it against the acts of acceptation, delivered in the name of his Majesty the King of Great Britain, and of the First Consul of the French Republic. Which acts of accession, of guarantee, and of acceptation, shall be ratified in the space of four weeks, or sooner, if it can be done.—Done at Vienna, the 20th of August, 1802.

(L. S.) FRA. COUNT OF COLLOREDO.
(L. S.) LEWIS COUNT OF COBENZEL.

No. 28.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August* 21, 1802.—Having opened the subject of your lordship's last dispatch, relative to the accession of this court to the arrangement stipulated in the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, to Mr. Bignon, this gentleman undertook very willingly to mention the same to his government, and has in fact already performed his promise. In several conversations with Mr. Bignon, in which I have occasionally remarked that nothing had hitherto been said to me here upon the subject of Malta, he has constantly affected the greatest indifference, and treated it as a business of too little importance to occupy the attention of the French government.

No. 29.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, August* 31, 1802.—Mr. Bignon received last night instructions from the French government, to invite the King of Prussia, conjointly with me, to accede to the guarantee of the independence of the Island of Malta, and of the other stipulations relating to that Island, which are contained in the 10th article of the definitive treaty of Amiens. Mr. Bignon sent to me immediately, and we propose to meet to-morrow for the purpose of preparing a note upon this subject, of which we shall each present a copy to Count Haugwitz.

No. 30.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Casamajor to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, October* 2, 1802.—My note upon the subject of the guarantee of Malta remains unanswered.

No. 31.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Jackson to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Berlin, November* 25, 1802.—At my first interview with Count Haugwitz, I told him that the only subject in suspense between our two courts, to which I need call his immediate attention, was that of the guaranty of Malta, on which an answer is still due from him. He adverted to what he had told Mr. Casamajor of the King his master having ordered a report to be made to him, on the state of the commanderies in Silesia, hinting, that this country took a very slight interest in the fate of the Island; and that he was countenanced in withholding its guaranty *by the example of Spain*. He, however, added, that the report in question had been made to the King, and that he only waited his Majesty's commands to confer with me farther upon the subject.

No. 32.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Garlike to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburgh, September* 17, 1802.—The French minister has at length been directed by his government to make, conjointly with his Majesty's minister here, a formal invitation to the Emperor of Russia for his Imperial Majesty's guaranty of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, which provide for the independence of the Islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, and of the other arrangements of that article.

No. 33.—*Extract of a dispatch from Sir John Borlase Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, dated St. Petersburgh, November* 18, 1802.—On the third instant I waited upon the chancellor with General Hedouville, when the note of invitation for his Imperial Majesty's guaranty of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, was presented by each of us. General de Hedouville entered into various reasons to induce the Russian government to grant the guaranty; the principal of which was to prove, that without the guaranty of Russia, either of the two powers, upon the first difference between them, would look upon themselves at liberty to seize upon the Island, which was only important in a military point of view; and the only alteration he should make in his invitation was, that the Island might be delivered up to the Neapolitan troops. He added, that the act of guaranty would not be considered as affecting the arrangement of any particular power with the Order, or of any alteration that power might wish to make in the baillages, or that part belonging to itself, *as Spain had already done*.

No. 34.—*Extract of a dispatch from Sir J. B. Warren to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Petersburgh, 25th November*, 1802.—The chancellor appointed yesterday evening for delivering to me, and to the French minister, the answer of the Russian government to his Majesty's invitation for his Imperial Majesty's accession to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 34.)—Translation.—Conditions upon which his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias is willing to accede to the Stipulations of the 10th Article of the

Treaty of Amiens.—I. The acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem over the Island of Malta, and its dependencies; the acknowledgement of the Grand Master, and of the civil government of the Order, according to its ancient institutions, with the admission into it of native Maltese. Upon this point, as well as upon every other that may relate to its interior organization, the legal government of the Order shall have the power to enact and prescribe such regulations as it may judge best calculated to promote the future welfare and prosperity of the Order.—II. The rights of the King of the Two Sicilies, as Suzerain of the Island, shall remain upon the same footing as they were previous to the war which is now terminated by the treaty of Amiens.—III. The independence and neutrality of the Island of Malta, its ports and dependencies, shall be secured and guaranteed by the respective contracting powers, who shall mutually engage to acknowledge and maintain that neutrality in all cases of war; whether between each other, or between any of them and any other power, not excepting his Sicilian Majesty, whose rights of suzerainty shall not extend so as to enable him to cause a departure from the neutrality of the Island, as guaranteed by the present act.—IV. Until the Order shall be in a situation to provide, by its own resources, for the maintenance of its independence and neutrality, as secured by the preceding article, as well as for the defence of their principal residence, the different forts shall be occupied by his Sicilian Majesty's troops, who shall send a sufficient force for the defence of the Island and its dependencies, the number of which shall be agreed upon by his said Majesty and the two contracting powers, who shall take upon themselves conjointly, the expence of maintaining the whole of the said troops, so long as the defence of the Island shall continue to be entrusted to them, during which period the said troops shall be under the authority of the Grand Master and his government.—V. The present additional act shall be considered as forming an integral part of the treaty of Amiens, the same as if it had been inserted therein, word for word, and shall be executed in like manner.—VI. Their Majesties the Emperor of all the Russias, the Emperor of the Romans, the King of Spain, the King of the Two Sicilies, and the King of Prussia, shall be invited to accede to this act as guarantees.

COMTE ALEXANDRE DE WORONZOW.

Paris, January 27, 1803.

No. 35.—My Lord, I have to report to your lordship the purport of a conversation I had on Tuesday last by appointment with M. Talleyrand. He had invited me some days ago for this purpose. The communication he had to make to me related to two points, both equally important, as he said, to the maintenance of good harmony between the two countries; with this difference, however, that the one originated with himself, and was dictated by his anxiety to do away every thing which might feed the mutual irritation of the two countries; and the other by the express order of the First Consul. That which came from himself related to the English newspapers, against which he pronounced a most bitter philippic, assuring me that the First Consul was extremely hurt to find that his endeavours to conciliate had hitherto produced no other effect than to increase the abuse with which the papers in England continually loaded him. He expatiated much upon this topic, and endeavoured to establish a fact, which I assured him a reference to any one newspaper in Paris would instantly refute, that during four months not a word of provocation had appeared in any French journal, which could justify a retort from those published in England. For the rest he advanced nothing but what has been said on more than one occasion to Mr. Merry, and reported by him to your lordship. I was, however, given to understand, that the First Consul was in fact highly incensed, and the more so, he was pleased to say, as it came from a country of whose good opinion he was so very ambitious. In my reply, I could but go over the old ground, and endeavour to make M. Talleyrand understand—first, that whatever was said in the English papers might be considered but as a national retaliation for what was published in the French papers—secondly, that what was *officially* published here was by no means so in England—and thirdly, that although the government possessed a controul over the press in France, the English government neither had nor could have, unless they purchased it at the same price, any whatever in England. Upon this he endeavoured to prove to me, that there were papers in England attached to different parties, and went over their names and supposed connections with great precision; and that consequently his Majesty's ministers might so far controul those at least which depended upon them, as to prevent their inserting that abuse which must be considered as having their sanction. I endeavoured to explain to him what the influence was, which he supposed ministers to possess in England; that it amounted to nothing more than a preference which your lordship for instance might give to one paper rather than to another, by sending to it any articles of news which it might be wished to make public; but that your lordship's influence went no further; and that if the editor of such a paper conceived it more for his interest to continue to write after his own fancy and uncon-

trouled, than to be the publisher of such occasional articles, in that case all influence was at an end. I told him, that if he had remarked any abusive article in any paper of such a description, it was natural and fair to conclude that it did not depend upon government to prevent it. He persisted in his opinion, that his Majesty's ministers might keep certain papers in order, as I did in assuring him, that until the First Consul could so far master his feelings as to be as indifferent to the scurrility of the English prints, as the English government was to that which daily appeared in the French, this state of irritation was irremediable. I told him however, that I would report the substance of this communication to your lordship, although I could assure him that your lordship could add nothing to the explanation which had been given, and in such detail by Mr. Merry from your lordship. M. Talleyrand, with great solemnity, required of me to inform him, and this by the express order of the First Consul, what were his Majesty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta. He again on this occasion made great professions of his sincere desire to set aside every thing which could interrupt the good understanding between the two governments; adding, that it was absolutely necessary that the French government should know what it was meant to do, when that clause in the Treaty of Amiens, which stipulates the cession of Malta, should be fully accomplished. He said that another Grand Master would now very soon be elected; that all the powers of Europe invited so to do, with the exception of Russia, whose difficulties it was easy to remove, and without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, were ready to come forward; and that consequently the term would very soon arrive, when Great Britain could have no pretext for keeping longer possession. I informed him that I would report his conversation to your lordship, and would have the honour of communicating to him your lordship's answer as soon as I could receive it. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Downing-street, February 9, 1803.

No. 36.—My Lord, in answer to your excellency's dispatch of January 27, relative to the inquiry made of you, by the French government, on the subject of Malta, I can have no difficulty in assuring you, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negociated with reference to the actual state of possession of the different parties, and of the treaties or public engagements by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession, and of engagements, was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to in an official note by the French government, viz. that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the Continent. This is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded with reference to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe, since that period; if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guaranteed by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the annexations which have been made to France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of the French government, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waived the pretensions he might have a righ to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect the true intent and spirit of the 10th article, the execution of which, according to its terms, had been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul. A communication to your lordship would accordingly have been prepared conformably to this disposi-

tion, if the attention of his Majesty's government had not been attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. It is impossible for his Majesty to view this report in any other light than as an official publication; for without referring particularly to explanations which have been repeatedly given upon the subject of publications in the Moniteur, the article in question, as it purports to be the report to the First Consul of an accredited agent, as it appears to have been signed by Col. Sebastiani himself, and as it is published in the official paper, with an official title prefixed to it, must be considered as authorised by the French Government. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against the officer who commanded his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter, insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and as such as would warrant his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction, which on occasions of this nature, independent powers in a state of amity have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace, concluded between his Majesty and the French government; and his Majesty would feel that he was wanting in a proper regard to the honor of his crown, and to the interests of his dominions, if he could see with indifference such a system developed and avowed. His Majesty cannot, therefore, regard the conduct of the French government on various occasions since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, the insinuations and charges contained in the report of Colonel Sebastiani, and the views which that report discloses, without feeling it necessary for him distinctly to declare, that it will be impossible for him to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he receives satisfactory explanation on the subject of this communication. Your Excellency is desired to take an early opportunity of fully explaining his Majesty's sentiments as above stated, to the French government. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency, Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

No. 37.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, February* 17, 1803.—I have the honour to acquaint your lordship that I saw M. de Talleyrand on Tuesday last, for the purpose of carrying into effect your lordship's instructions of the 9th instant. I began by telling him that I had nothing new to communicate to him; but merely to confirm officially that which I had already from myself premised. I did not however pass over with the same indifference, the arguments with which your lordship has furnished me. I recapitulated them all; the principle on which the treaty of Amiens was founded; and the right which naturally arose from that principle, of interference on our part for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation, for any essential differences which may have arisen in the relative situation of the two countries. I instanced the cases, beginning with Italy and concluding with Switzerland, in which the territory or influence of France had been extended subsequent to the treaty of Amiens. I represented to him that this principle of compensation had been fully and formally admitted by the French government, in the course of the negotiation at Amiens. I then told him that notwithstanding the indisputable right which his Majesty might have derived of claiming some counterpoise for such acquisitions, instructions would have been given me, by which I should have been empowered to declare his Majesty's readiness to carry into effect the full intent of the 10th article of the treaty, if the attention of his Majesty's government had not been roused by the official publication of Colonel Sebastiani's report to the First Consul. It was useless to recapitulate the particulars of this very extraordinary report; but I appealed to him whether it was not of a nature, exclusive of the personal allusions it contained, to excite the utmost jealousy in the minds of his Majesty's ministers, and to demand on their part every measure of precaution. I concluded with the distinct declaration, that it was impossible for his Majesty to enter into any further discussion relative to Malta, unless he received satisfactory explanations on the subject of the First Consul's views. M. de Talleyrand in his reply, did not attempt to dispute the drift of my argument. He admitted, with an affected tone of candour, that the jealously we felt on the score of Egypt, with a view to our possessions in India, was natural. But he could not admit that any thing had appeared in the conduct of the French government in justification of the alarm we expressed. After repeating what he had said to me in a former conversation, on the subject of Sebastiani's mission, which he asserted to be *strictly commercial*, he expatiated at great length on the sincere desire of the First Consul to maintain inviolable the peace which had been so lately concluded; adding, that the situation of the French finances was such, that were not this desire of peace in the First Consul an effect of system, it would be most imperiously dictated to him by the total impossibility in which this country found itself of carrying on that extensive state of warfare, which even a partial rupture would naturally lead to. He expressed great surprize, therefore, that any suspicion should attach, when the means of disturbing the public tranquillity were, as must be

well known in England, so completely wanting; and desired to know what was the nature and degree of satisfaction which his Majesty would require. On this I told him, that I could not pretend to say by what means those apprehensions, which the conduct of this government had raised in England, were to be allayed; but I could assure him, that in the discussion of them, we should be animated solely by a sincere desire to be convinced of the truth of his assertions, since on that depended the peace and happiness of Europe. I took this opportunity of assuring him, that although, according to his statement of the situation of France, we might possess in a greater degree the means of supporting the expence of a war, since those means arose from sources which even a state of warfare did not dry up, yet such was his Majesty's sincere desire of maintaining peace, that nothing but absolute and unavoidable necessity would ever induce him to deprive his subjects of the blessings which they begin to enjoy.

Paris, February 21, 1803.

No. 38.—My lord, my last dispatch, in which I gave your lordship an account of my conference with M. de Talleyrand, was scarcely gone, when I received a note from him, informing me that the First Consul wished to converse with me, and desired I would come to him at the Thuilleries at nine o'clock. He received me in his cabinet, with tolerable cordiality, and, after talking on different subjects for a few minutes, he desired me to sit down, as he himself did on the other side of the table, and began. He told me, that he felt it necessary after what had passed between me and M. de Talleyrand that he should in the most clear and authentic manner, make known his sentiments to me in order to their being communicated to his Majesty; and he conceived this would be more effectually done by himself than through any medium whatever. He said, it was a matter of infinite disappointment to him, that the treaty of Amiens, instead of being followed by conciliation and friendship, the natural effects of peace, had been productive only of continual and increasing jealousy and mistrust; and that this mistrust was now avowed in such a manner as muſt bring the point to an issue. He now enumerated the several provocations which he pretended to have received from England. He placed in the first line our not evacuating Malta and Alexandria as we were bound to do by treaty. In this he said that no consideration on earth should make him acquiesce; and of the two he had rather see us in possession of the Fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. He then adverted to the abuse thrown out against him in the English public prints; but this he said, he did not so much regard as that which appeared in the French papers published in London. This he considered as much more mischievous, since it was meant to excite this country against him and his government. He complained of the protection given to Georges and others of his description, who instead of being sent to Canada, as had been repeatedly promised, were permitted to remain in England, handsomely pensioned, and constantly committing all sorts of crimes on the coasts of France, as well as in the interior. In conformation of this, he told me, that two men had within these few days been apprehended in Normandy, and were now on their way to Paris, who were hired assassins, and employed by the bishop of Arras, by the baron de Rolle, by Georges, and by Dutheil, as would be fully proved in a court of juſtice, and made known to the world. He acknowledged, that the irritation he felt againſt England increased daily, because every wind (I make use as much as I can of his own ideas and expressions) which blew from England brought nothing but enmity and hatred against him. He now went back to Egypt, and told me, that if he had felt the smallest inclination to take possession of it by force, he might have done it a month ago, by sending twenty-five thousand men to Aboukir, who would have possessed themselves of the whole country in defiance of the four thousand British in Alexandria. That instead of that garrison being a means of protecting Egypt, it was only furnishing him with a pretence for invading it. *This he should not do, whatever might be his desire to have it as a colony, because he did not think it worth the risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps, be considered as the aggressor, and by which he should lose more than he could gain, since sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish Empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte.* As a proof of his desire to maintain peace, he wished to know what he had to gain by going to war with England. A descent was the only means of offence he had, and that he was determined to attempt, by putting himself at the head of the expedition. But how could it be supposed, that after having gained the height on which he stood, he would risk his life and reputation in such a hazardous attempt, unless forced to it by necessity, when the chances were that he and the greatest part of the expedition would go to the bottom of the sea. He talked much on this subject, but never affected to diminish the danger. He acknowledged that there were one hundred chances to one against him; but still he was determined to attempt it, if war should be the consequence of the present discussion; and that such was the disposition of the troops, that army after army would be found for the enterprize. He then expatiated much on the natural force of the two countries. France with an army of four hundred and

eighty thousand men, for to this amount, it is, he said, *to be immediately completed*, all ready for the most desperate enterprizes; and England with a fleet that made her mistress of the seas, and which he did not think he should be able to equal in less than ten years. Two such countries by a proper understanding might govern the world, but by their strifes might overturn it. He said, that if he had not felt the enmity of the British government on every occasion since the Treaty of Amiens, there would have been nothing that he would not have done to prove his desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities as well as in influence on the Continent; treaties of commerce; in short, any thing that could have given satisfaction, and have testified his friendship. Nothing, however, had been able to conquer the hatred of the British government, and therefore it was now come to the point, whether we should have peace or war. To preserve peace the Treaty of Amiens must be fulfilled; the abuse in the public prints, if not totally suppressed, at least kept within bounds, and confined to the English papers; and the protection so openly given to his bitterest enemies (alluding to Georges and persons of that description) must be withdrawn. If war, it was necessary only to say so, and to refuse to fulfil the treaty. He now made the tour of Europe to prove to me, that in its present state, there was no power with which we could coalesce for the purpose of making war against France; consequently it was our interest to gain time, and if we had any point to gain renew the war when circumstances were more favourable. He said, it was not doing him justice to suppose, that he conceived himself above the opinion of his country or of Europe. He would not risk uniting Europe against him by any violent act of aggression; neither was he so powerful in France as to persuade the nation to go to war unless on good grounds. He said, that he had not chastised the Algerines, from his unwillingness to excite the jealousy of other powers, but he hoped that England, Russia, and France would one day feel that it was their interest to destroy such a nest of thieves, and force them to live rather by cultivating their land than by plunder. In the little I said to him, for he gave me in the course of two hours but very few opportunities of saying a word, I confined myself strictly to the tenor of your lordship's instructions. I urged them in the same manner as I had done to M. de Talleyrand, and dwelt as strongly as I could on the sensation which the publication of Sebastiani's report had created in England, where the views of France towards Egypt must always command the utmost vigilance and jealousy. He maintained that what ought to convince us of his desire of peace, was on the one hand the little he had to gain by renewing the war, and on the other the facility with which he might have taken possession of Egypt with the very ships and troops which were now going from the Mediterranean to St. Domingo, and that with the approbation of all Europe, and more particularly of the Turks, who had repeatedly invited him to join with them for the purpose of forcing us to evacuate their territory. I do not pretend to follow the arguments of the First Consul in detail; this would be impossible, from the vast variety of matter, which he took occasion to introduce. His purpose was evidently to convince me that on Malta must depend peace or war, and at the same time to impress upon my mind a strong idea of the means he possessed of annoying us at home and abroad. With regard to the mistrust and jealousy which he said constantly prevailed since the conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens, I observed that after a war of such long duration, so full of rancour, and carried on in a manner of which history has no example, it was but natural that a considerable degree of agitation should prevail; but this, like the swell after a storm, would gradually subside, if not kept up by the policy of either party: that I would not pretend to pronounce which had been the aggressor in the paper war of which he complained, and which was still kept up, though with this difference, that in England it was independent of government, and in France its very act and deed. To this I added, that it must be admitted that we had such motives of mistrust against France as could not be alleged against us, and I was going to instance the accession of territory and influence gained by France since the treaty, when he interrupted me by saying, I suppose you mean Piedmont and Switzerland; "ce sont des Bagatelles:" and it must have been foreseen whilst the negotiation was pending; "Vous n' avez pas le droi d'en parler à cette heure." I then alleged as a cause of mistrust and of jealousy, the impossibility of obtaining justice or any kind of redress for any of his Majesty's subjects. He asked me in what respect; and I told him that since the signing of the treaty, not one British claimant had been satisfied, although every Frenchman of that description had been so within one month after that period; and that since I had been here, and I could say as much of my predecessors, not one satisfactory answer had been obtained to the innumerable representations which we had been under the necessity of making in favour of British subjects and property detained in the several ports of France and elsewhere, without even a shadow of justice: such an order of things, I said, was not made to inspire confidence; but, on the contrary, must create mistrust. This, he said, must be attributed to the natural difficulties attending such suits, when both parties thought themselves right; but he denied that such delays could pro-

ceed from any disinclination to do what was just and right. With regard to the pensions which were granted to French or Swiss individuals, I observed that they were given as a reward for past services during the war, and most certainly not for present ones, and still less for such as had been insinuated, of a nature repugnant to the feelings of every individual in England, and to the universally acknowledged loyalty and honour of the British government. That as for any participation of indemnities, or other accessions which his Majesty might have obtained, I could take upon myself to assure him that his Majesty's ambition led him rather to preserve than to acquire. And that with regard to the most propitious moment for renewing hostilities, his Majesty, whose sincere desire it was to continue the blessings of peace to his subjects, would always consider such a measure as the greatest calamity: but that if his Majesty was so desirous of peace, it must not be imputed to the difficulty of obtaining allies; and the less so, as those means which it might be necessary to afford such allies, for perhaps inadequate services, would all be concentrated in England, and give a proportionate increase of energy to our own exertions. At this part of the conversation he rose from his chair, and told me that he should give orders to General Andréossy to enter on the discussion of this business with your lordship; but he wished that I should, at the same time, be made acquainted with his motives, and convinced of his sincerity, rather from himself than from his ministers. He then, after a conversation of two hours, during the greatest part of which he talked incessantly, conversed for a few moments on indifferent subjects, in apparent good humour, and retired. Such was nearly, as I can recollect, the purport of this conference. It must, however, be observed, that he did not, as M. Talleyrand had done, affect to attribute Colonel Sebastiani's mission to *commercial motives only*, but as one rendered necessary in a military point of view, by the infraction by us of the treaty of Amiens. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

P. S. This conversation took place on Fridry last, and this morning I saw M. de Talleyrand. He had been with the First Consul after I left him, and he assured me that he had been very well satisfied with the frankness with which I had made my observations on what fell from him. I told him, that without entering into any farther detail, what I had said to the First Consul amounted to an assurance, of what I trusted there could be no doubt, of the readiness of his Majesty's ministers to remove all subjects of discussion, where that could be done without violating the laws of the country, and to fulfil strictly the engagements which they had contracted, in as much as that could be reconciled with the safety of the state. As this applied to Malta and Egypt, he gave me to understand that a project was in contemplation, by which the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so effectually secured as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness, either with regard to Egypt or any part of the Turkish dominions. He could not then, he said, explain himself farther. Under these circumstances no one can expect that we should relinquish that assurance which we have in hand, till something equally satisfactory is proposed.

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Downing-street, Feb. 28th, 1803.

No. 39.—My Lord, Your excellency's dispatch, of February 21st, has been received, and laid before the King. I have great satisfaction in communicating to you his Majesty's entire approbation of the able and judicious manner in which you appear to have executed the instructions which I gave to you in my dispatch of the 9th instant. The account you have given of your interview with the First Consul, is in every respect important. It is unnecessary for me to remark on the tone and temper in which the sentiments of the First Consul appear to have been expressed, or to offer any observations in addition to those so properly made by your excellency at the time, upon several of the topics which were brought forward by the First Consul in the course of your conversation; I shall therefore content myself with referring your excellency to my dispatch to Mr. Merry of August 28, 1802, in which the subject of the complaints of the French government, respecting the freedom of the press, the emigrants, &c. are particularly discussed. I cannot, however, avoid noticing, that nothing approaching to explanation or satisfaction is stated to have been thrown out by the First Consul, in answer to the just representations and complaints of his Majesty, in consequence of the unwarrantable insinuations and charges contained in Colonel Sebastiani's report against his Majesty's government,—the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and his army in that quarter: but that, on the other hand, the language of the First Consul has tended to strengthen and confirm the suspicions which that publication was peculiarly calculated to excite. I shall now proceed to give you some farther instructions on the language which it may be proper for you to hold respecting the charge which has been advanced

against his Majesty's government, of their unwillingness to fulfil the treaty of Amiens. The treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution, on the part of his Majesty, in every article in which, according to the spirit of that treaty, it has been found capable of execution. There cannot be the least doubt, that Egypt is at this time completely evacuated. The delay which had arisen in the evacuation of Alexandria, was owing to accidental circumstances, the particulars of which were explained to you in my dispatch of the 30th November last; and I had every reason to believe, from the communication I had with General Andreossy on the subject, that the French government were perfectly satisfied with the explanation which he was authorized at the time to give them respecting it. With regard to that article of the treaty which relates to Malta, the stipulations contained in it (owing to circumstances which it was not in the power of his Majesty to controul), have not been found capable of execution. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the Court of Berlin with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories, in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to sequestrate the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories is restored to them; the non-election of a Grand Master: these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the Island, until some new arrangement could be adjusted for its security and independence. But when it is considered how greatly the dominion, power, and influence of France have of late been extended, his Majesty must feel, that he has an incontestible right, conformably to the principles on which the treaty of peace was negociated and concluded, to demand additional securities in any new arrangement which it might be necessary to make with a view of effecting the real objects of that treaty. And these considerations, sufficient as they might be in themselves to justify the line of conduct which his Majesty had determined to adopt, have received additional force from the views which have been recently and unreservedly manifested by the French government, respecting the Turkish dominions, and the islands in the Adriatic *(and which have been in a great degree admitted by the First Consul, in his interview with your excellency)*; views which are directly repugnant, not only to the spirit, but to the letter of the treaty of Amiens. From the postscript in your excellency's letter, it appears that a project was in contemplation, by which, according to the declaration of Mr. Talleyrand, the integrity of the Turkish territory would be secured so as to do away every cause of doubt or uneasiness either with regard to Egypt or to any other part of the Turkish dominions. His Majesty will consider the communication of such a project as indicating a disposition, on the part of the French government, to afford him explanation and satisfaction respecting some of the points which have been the subject of his representation. But after all that has passed, his Majesty cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the Island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects, which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c.

Paris, 5th March, 1803.

No. 10.—My Lord, I saw M. de Talleyrand yesterday, and acquitted myself of your lordship's instructions. I recapitulated the several arguments therein contained, dwelling particularly on the open avowal of the First Consul's views in Egypt; and concluding with the resolution of his Majesty not to withdraw his troops from Malta, until some security should be given, that by so doing his Majesty should not expose the safety of his own dominions. He heard me with great patience, and in answer endeavoured, as before, to convince me that there was no reason whatever for the apprehensions which we entertained. That it was true, the acquisition of Egypt had been, and perhaps still was, a favourite object of the First Consul, but that it was not so much so as to allow him to go to war for its attainment. I then told him that what had in a particular manner excited the attention of your lordship, in my last report, was the assurance he had given me of some project being in contemplation, whereby the integrity of the Turkish empire would be so insured, in all its parts, as to remove every doubt or apprehension. I begged him, therefore, to explain himself on this subject, which I conceived to be of the utmost importance; since it was only by such means that both parties could be satisfied. He then gave me to understand, that what he had termed a project was nothing more than what had been expressed in the First Consul's message to the legislative body, when he says, that there is a French ambassador at

Constantinople, who is charged to give every assurance of the disposition of France to strengthen, instead of to weaken, that government. I expressed a doubt whether this, or any other parole security, would be considered as sufficient in such a transaction. Hereupon he repeated the question—What then is the security which you require, and which the First Consul can give? This, I told him, must be the subject of the negotiation on which we were willing to enter; and I trusted that the French government would bring into it the same temper, and the same real desire to conciliate, which was manifested by his Majesty's ministers. M. de Talleyrand now informed me, that the First Consul had, five or six days ago, ordered instructions to be sent to General Andréossy, by which he was to require an immediate and categorical answer to the plain question—Whether his Majesty would, or would not, cause Malta to be evacuated by the British troops? That he concluded this communication was already made, and that he expected to learn the result of it in a very few days; adding, that all the First Consul wanted was to know precisely on what he had to depend. I could not help lamenting this precipitate measure, since it could answer no good purpose, and would only tend to introduce into the discussion ill-humour and offended dignity, in the place of dispassionate reasoning. I begged him, however, to be prepared, and to prepare the First Consul, to meet with more opposition to his will than he had been accustomed to on similar occasions. I told him, that his Majesty was willing to discuss the point in dispute with fairness and candour, but certainly never would be intimidated into acquiescence; and I repeatedly urged, that if he wished well to the peace of the two countries, he should prepare the First Consul for the consequences which might naturally be expected from this step, and thus prevent the effect of any sudden gust of ill-humour. He was unwilling to admit that there could be any chance of satisfying the First Consul short of a compliance with his wishes, founded as he pretended on good faith. Our conversation ended here, and I wait the result of General Andréossy's communication with the utmost impatience. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

P. S. In the interval between the writing and the transcribing the above dispatch, I have taken another opportunity of seeing M. de Talleyrand, and I am glad to find, that (for what purpose I know not) he had represented the instructions to General Andréossy as much more absolute and offensive than they really are. I found him to-day entirely disposed to give me another opinion, and to convince me that the First Consul, far from wishing to carry matters to extremity, was desirous to discuss, fairly and without passion, a point, which he admitted was of importance to both countries. He repeatedly assured me, that much as the First Consul might have the acquisition of Egypt at heart, he would sacrifice his own feelings to the preservation of peace; and henceforth seek to augment his glory, by improving and consolidating the internal situation of the country, rather than by adding to its possessions. *Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.* W.

No. 41.—*Note from General Andréossy to Lord Hawkesbury, dated March* 10, 1803.—*Translation.*—The undersigned ambassador and minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic to his Britannic Majesty, has received from the First Consul, express orders to require from the British government some explanations respecting the protracted occupation of the Island of Malta by the English troops. He had hoped that verbal communications would have been sufficient to have produced satisfactory expositions, by preparing the way for the mutual conciliation of minds and interests, a conduct which has been prescribed to him by his ardent zeal for the maintenance of harmony between the two countries, and of the peace of Europe, objects of the solicitude of the French government: but the undersigned thinks he can no longer delay complying with the instructions he had received, and he has therefore the honour of addressing the following observations to his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, which recal to recollection the spirit and the leading features of the verbal communications which he has previously made to him. By the conditions of the fourth paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the English troops were to evacuate the Island of Malta and its dependencies three months after the exchange of the ratifications. Ten months have elapsed since the ratifications have been exchanged, and the English troops are still at Malta. The French troops, on the contrary, who were to evacuate the Neapolitan and Papal states, have not waited the expiration of the three months which were granted to them to withdraw, and have quitted Tarentum, the fortifications of which they had re-established, and where they had collected 100 pieces of cannon. What can be alledged in justification of the delay in evacuating Malta? Has not the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? And the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under what pretext do those of England still remain there? Is it because all the power

enumerated in the 6th paragraph have not yet accepted the guaranty which is devolved upon them? But this is not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the island; and besides, Austria has already sent its act of guaranty: Russia itself has made only a single difficulty, which is done away by the accession of the First Consul to the modifications proposed, unless indeed England itself throws obstacles in the way, by refusing to accede to the proposals of Russia, which after all could not affect the engagements of his Britannic Majesty, who, according to the express conditions of the treaty, is to evacuate the island of Malta within three months, placing it under the guard of the Neapolitans, who are to garrison it, until the definitive arrangements of the Order are settled. It should therefore seem impossible, and it would be without example in the history of nations, were his Britannic Majesty to refuse to execute a fundamental article of the pacification, of the very one, which, in the drawing up of the preliminaries, was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to every other point. Indeed, the First Consul, who cordially relies on the intentions of his Britannic Majesty, and cannot suppose them to be less open and generous than those with which he is animated, has hitherto been unwilling to attribute the delay of the evacuation of the island of Malta, to any other than to maritime circumstances. The undersigned is, therefore, charged to require explanations on this point, and he is persuaded that the British ministry will be the more anxious to furnish such as will be satisfactory, as they must be sensible how necessary they are for the maintenance of harmony, and how important they are for the honour of the two nations. The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to Lord Hawkesbury the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) F. ANDREOSSY.

Portland-place, 10th March 1803.

Paris, March 12, 1803.

No. 42.—My Lord, The messenger Mason arrived yesterday morning early, with your lordship's letter of the 7th, informing me, that in consequence of the preparations in the ports of France and Holland, which, though avowedly intended for colonial service, might, in the event of a rupture, be turned against some part of the British dominions, his Majesty had judged it expedient to send a message to both houses of parliament, recommending, in terms void of offence, the adoption of such measures as may be consistent with the honour of his crown, and the security of his dominions, and at the same time such as will manifest his Majesty's disposition for the preservation of peace. I beg leave to return your lordship my thanks for having apprized me of this circumstance by a special messenger; I found, however, on going to M. de Talleyrand, at two o'clock, that he was already informed of it. He was just setting out to communicate it to the First Consul, and appeared under considerable agitation. He returned with me to his Cabinet, and though he told me he was pressed for time, he suffered me to relate the circumstance without interruption. I endeavoured to make him sensible that this measure was merely precautionary, and not in the least degree intended as a menace. I concluded my observations by repeating that it was merely a measure of self-security, founded on the armaments which were carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, remarking at the same time, that had not even these armaments been as notorious as they were, the very circumstance of the First Consul's determination to augment so considerably his army in time of peace, would have been a full and sufficient motive for such a measure of precaution. M. de Talleyrand now informed me that he was already acquainted with the business; that a messenger had that morning arrived, who had brought him a copy of the message, which he communicated to me. I could draw from him no reply whatever to my observations. He confined himself strictly to the assurance which he has so repeatedly made, that there was no foundation whatever for the alarm which was felt by his Majesty's ministers; that the First Consul was pacific; that he had no thoughts whatever of attacking his Majesty's dominions, unless forced to do so by a commencement of hostilities on our part; that he should always consider the *refusal to evacuate Malta as such a commencement of hostilities;* and that as we had hitherto hesitated to do so, he was justified in adopting the measures which might eventually be necessary. He disclaimed every idea of the armaments fitting out in the Dutch ports having any other destination than to the colonies, and concluded that for his part, he could not comprehend the motives which had necessitated a resort to such a measure on the part of his Majesty's government. He then desired leave to go to the First Consul, promising that he would let me know the result when we met at dinner at the Prussian minister's. He did not come there till near seven o'clock, and when we rose from dinner, he took me aside, and informed me, that although the First Consul had been highly irritated at the unjust suspicion which his Majesty's government entertained, yet he would not allow himself to be

so far mastered by his feelings, as to lose sight of the calamities which the present discussion might entail upon humanity. He dwelt much on this topic, and explained the measures to which he should be obliged to resort; he said that if England wished to discuss fairly, he wished the same; that if England prepared for war he would do the same; and that if England should finally determine on hostilities, he trusted to the support of the French nation in the cause of honour and of justice. It was in vain that I repeated that England did not wish for war; that peace was as necessary to us as it could be to France; that all we desired, and all that we were contending for, was security; that every thing proved to us that that security was threatened by the First Consul's views on Egypt; and that consequently our refusal to evacuate Malta, was become as much a necessary measure of precaution, as the defence of any part of his Majesty's dominions. To this kind of reasoning M. de Talleyrand opposed the moderation of the First Cousul, his great self denial, and his determination to sacrifice even the most favourite points to his sincere desire to avoid a rupture. M. de Talleyrand now told me, that, in order to facilitate my communication of the First Consul's sentiments, he would communicate to me a paper which he had that morning drawn up with him; that it was not to be considered as any thing absolutely official; that it was a memorandum to assist me, but such as I might, if I chose, transmit to your Lordship. I now inclose it. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Note verbale, referred to in No. 42.——Translation.—I. If his Britannic Majesty in his message means to speak of the expedition of Helvoetfluys, all the world knows that it was destined for America, and that it was on the point of sailing for its destination, but in consequence of his Majesty's message, the embarkation and putting to sea are about to be countermanded.—II. If we do not receive satisfactory explanation respecting these armaments in England, and if they actually take place, *it is natural* that the First Consul should march 20,000 men into Holland, since Holland is mentioned in the message.—III. These troops being once in the country, *it is natural* that an encampment should be formed on the frontiers of Hanover; and, moreover, that additional bodies should join these troops which were already embarked for America, in order to form new embarkations, and to maintain an offensive and defensive position.—IV. *It is natural* that the First Cousul should order several camps to be formed at Calais, and on different points of the coasts.—V. It is likewise *in the nature of things*, that the First Consul, who was on the point of evacuating Switzerland, should be under the necessity of continuing a French army in that country.—VI. It is also *the natural consequence of all this*, that the First Consul should send a fresh force into Italy, in order to occupy, in case of necessity, the position of Tarentum.—VII. England arming, and arming with so much publicity, will compel France to put her armies on the war establishment, a step so important as cannot fail to agitate all Europe.

The result of all these movements will be to irritate the two countries still more. France will have been compelled to take all these precautions in consequence of the English armaments, and nevertheless every means will be taken to excite the English nation by the assertion, that France meditates an invasion. The whole British population will be obliged to put themselves under arms for their defence, and their export trade will, even before the war, be in a state of stagnation throughout the whole extent of the countries occupied by the French arms. The experience of nations, and the course of events prove, that the distance between such a state of things and actual hostility, is unfortunately not remote. As to the differences, of which mention is made in his Britannic Majesty's message, we know not of any that we have with England; for it cannot be imagined that a serious intention can have existed in England of evading the execution of the Treaty of Amiens, under the protection of a military armament. Europe well knows that it is possible to attempt the dismemberment of France, but not to intimidate her.

Paris, March 14, 1803.

No. 43.—My Lord, The messenger Mason went on Saturday with my disparches of that date, and until yesterday (Sunday) I saw no one likely to give me any further information such as I could depend upon, as to the effect which his Majesty's message had produced on the First Consul. At the court which was held at the Thuilleries upon that day, he accosted me evidently under very considerable agitation. He began by asking me if I had any news from England. I told him that I had received letters from your lordship two days ago. He immediately said, and so you are determined to go to war. No! I replied, we are too sensible of the advantages of peace.—Nous avons, said he, déjà fait la guerre pendant quinze ans.—As he seemed to wait for an answer, I observed only, C'en est déja trop.—Mais, said he, vous voulez la faire encore quinze années, et vous m'y forçez.—I told him, that was very far from his Majesty's intentions.—He then proceeded to Count Marcow and the Chevalier Azara, who were standing together at a little distance from me, and said to them, Les Anglois veulent la guerre, mais s'ils sont les premiers à tirer l'Epée, je serai le dernier à la remettre. Ils ne respectent pas les Traités. Il faut dorénavant les

couvrir de Crepe noir.—He then went his round, in a few minutes he came back to me, and resumed the conversation, if such it can be called, by something personally civil to me. He began again.—Pourquoi des Armemens? Contre qui des mesures de precaution? Je n'ai pas un seul vaisseau de ligne dans les ports de France; mais si vous voulez armer, j'armerai aussi; si vous voulez vous battre, je me battrai aussi. Vous pourrez peut-être tuer la France, mais jamais l'intimider.—On ne veu droit, said I, ni l'un ni l'autre. On voudroit vivre en bonne intelligence avec elle.—Il faut donc respecter les traités, replied he; Malheur à ceux qui ne respectent pas les traités; ils en seront responsable à toute l'Europe.—He was too much agitated to make it adviseable for me to prolong the conversation; I therefore made no answer, and he retired to his apartment, repeating the last phrase. It is to be remarked that all this passed loud enough to be overheard by 200 people who were present, and I am persuaded that there was not a single person, who did not feel the extreme impropriety of his conduct, and the total want of dignity as well as of decency on the occasion. I propose taking the first opportunity of speaking to Mr. Talleyrand on this subject. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c. &c.

No. 44.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, dated March* 15, 1803.—I send your excellency a copy of the note presented to me by General Andreossy on the 10th instant, (vide page 57) and a copy of the answer which I have this day by his Majesty's commands returned to it.

No. 45.—*Note.*—The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his excellency the French ambassador of the 10th instant. In obeying the commands of his Majesty, by returning an official answer to this note, the undersigned feels it necessary for him to do little more than repeat the explanations which have been already given on more than one occasion by himself verbally to General Andréossy, and by Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, on the subject of the note, and of the points which appear to be connected with it. He can have no difficulty in assuring the French Ambassador, that his Majesty has entertained a most sincere desire that the Treaty of Amiens might be executed in a full and complete manner; but it has not been possible for him to consider this Treaty as having been founded on principles different from those which have been invariably applied to every other antecedent treaty or convention, namely, that they were negotiated with reference to the actual *state of possession* of the different parties, and to the *treaties* or *public engagements* by which they were bound at the time of its conclusion; and that if that state of possession and of engagements was so materially altered by the act of either of the parties as to affect the nature of the compact itself, the other party has a right, according to the law of nations, to interfere for the purpose of obtaining satisfaction or compensation for any essential difference which such acts may have subsequently made in their relative situation; that if there ever was a case to which this principle might be applied with peculiar propriety, it was that of the late treaty of peace; for the negotiation was conducted on a basis not merely proposed by his Majesty, but specially agreed to, in an official note, by the French government, viz. *that his Majesty should keep a compensation out of his conquests for the important acquisition of territory made by France upon the Continent.* That is a sufficient proof that the compact was understood to have been concluded in relation to the then existing state of things; for the measure of his Majesty's compensation was to be calculated with reference to the acquisitions of France at that time; and if the interference of the French government in the general affairs of Europe since that period: if their interposition with respect to Switzerland and Holland, whose independence was guarantied by them at the time of the conclusion of the treaty of peace; if the acquisitions which have been made by France in various quarters, but particularly those in Italy, have extended the territory and increased the power of France, his Majesty would be warranted, consistently with the spirit of the treaty of peace, in claiming equivalents for these acquisitions, as a counterpoise to the augmentation of the power of France. His Majesty, however, anxious to prevent all ground of misunderstanding, and desirous of consolidating the general peace of Europe, as far as might be in his power, was willing to have waved the pretensions he might have a right to advance of this nature; and as the other articles of the definitive treaty have been in a course of execution on his part, so he would have been ready to have carried into effect an arrangement conformable to the true intent and spirit of the 10th article; the execution of that arrangement, according to its terms, having been rendered impracticable by circumstances which it was not in his Majesty's power to controul. Whilst his Majesty was actuated by these sentiments of moderation and forbearance, and prepared to regulate his conduct in conformity to them, his attention was particularly attracted by the very extraordinary publication of the report of

Colonel Sebastiani to the First Consul. This report contains the most unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's government; against the Officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter: insinuations and charges wholly destitute of foundation, and such as would have warranted his Majesty in demanding that satisfaction which on occasions of this nature, independent powers, in a state of amity, have a right to expect from each other. It discloses, moreover, views in the highest degree injurious to the interests of his Majesty's dominions, and directly repugnant to, and utterly inconsistent with, the spirit and letter of the treaty of peace concluded between his Majesty and the French government. His Majesty's ambassador at Paris was accordingly directed to make such a representation to the French government, as his Majesty felt to be called for by imputations of the nature above described, by the disclosure of purposes inconsistent with good faith, and highly injurious to the interests of his people; and as a claim had recently been made by the French government, on the subject of the evacuation of Malta, Lord Whitworth was instructed to accompany this representation by a declaration on the part of his Majesty, that before he could enter into any further discussions relative to that island, it was expected, that satisfactory explanations should be given upon the various points respecting which his Majesty had complained. This representation and this claim, founded on principles incontestibly just, and couched in terms the most temperate, appear to have been wholly disregarded by the French government; no satisfaction has been afforded, no explanation whatever has been given; but on the contrary, his Majesty's suspicions of the views of the French government with respect to the Turkish Empire have been confirmed and strengthened by subsequent events. Under these circumstances his Majesty feels that he has no alternative, and that a just regard to his own honor and to the interests of his people, makes it necessary for him to declare, that he cannot consent that his troops should evacuate the island of Malta, until substantial security has been provided for those objects which, under the present circumstances, might be materially endangered by their removal. With respect to several of the positions stated in the note, and grounded on the idea of the 10th article being executed in its literal sense, they call for some observations. By the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the island of Malta was to be restored by his Majesty to the order of St. John, upon certain conditions. The evacuation of the island, at a specified period, formed a part of these conditions; and if the other stipulations had been in a due course of execution, his Majesty would have been bound, by the terms of the treaty, to have ordered his forces to evacuate the island: but these conditions must be considered as being all of equal effect; and if any material parts of them should have been found incapable of execution, or if the execution of them should from any circumstances have been retarded, his Majesty would be warranted in deferring the evacuation of the island until such time as the other conditions of the article could be effected; or until some new arrangement could be concluded which should be judged satisfactory by the contracting parties. The refusal of Russia to accede to the arrangement, except on condition that the Maltese langue should be abolished; the silence of the court of Berlin, with respect to the invitation that has been made to it, in consequence of the treaty, to become a guarantying power; the abolition of the Spanish priories in defiance of the treaty to which the King of Spain was a party; the declaration of the Portuguese government of their intention to sequestrate the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the property of the Spanish priories was restored to them,—these circumstances would have been sufficient, without any other special grounds, to have warranted his Majesty in suspending the evacuation of the island. The evacuation of Tarentum and Brundusium is in no respect connected with that of Malta. The French government were bound to evacuate the kingdom of Naples by their treaty of peace with the king of Naples, at a period antecedent to that at which this stipulation was carried into effect. The French government were bound likewise, by engagements with the Emperor of Russia, to respect the independence of the kingdom of Naples; but even admitting that the departure of the French troops from Tarentum depended solely on the article of the treaty of Amiens, their departure is, by the terms of the treaty, to take place at the same period as the other evacuations in Europe; namely, one month after the ratification of the definitive treaty; at which period both Porto Ferrajo and Minorca were evacuated by his Majesty's forces; whereas the troops of his Majesty were in no case bound to evacuate the island of Malta antecedent to the period of three months after the ratification of the definitive treaty: and even in that event, it must be considered as depending upon the other parts of the arrangement being in a course of execution. With respect to the assertion in the note, that the Neapolitan troops were to form the garrison of Malta, until the period when the arrangements relative to the order could be carried into effect, it will appear, by a reference to the article, that by the preliminary paragraph, the island was to be restored to the order upon the condition of the succeeding stipulations, and that it was

only from the period when the restitution to the Order had actually taken place, that by the 12th paragraph the Neapolitan troops were to form a part of the garrison. The undersigned has thus stated, with all the frankness which the importance of the subject appears to require, the sentiments of his Majesty on the note delivered to him by General Andreossy, and on the points in discussion between the two countries. His Majesty is willing to indulge the hope, that the conduct of the French government on this occasion may be influenced by principles similar to those which have invariably influenced his own. That as far as possible all causes of distrust, and every impediment to a good understanding between the two countries, may be completely and effectually removed, and that the peace may be consolidated on a secure and lasting foundation.—The undersigned requests General Andreossy to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

Downing-street, March 15, 1803.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency General Andreossy, &c.

Paris, March 17, 1803.

No. 46.—My lord, I called yesterday on M. de Talleyrand, to converse with him on the subject of what had passed on Sunday last at the Thuilleries. He had been since that day so fully occupied with his expeditions to different foreign courts, that I had no opportunity of seeing him sooner. I told him, that I had been placed by the First Consul in a situation which could neither suit my public nor my private feelings. That I went to the Thuilleries to pay my respects to the First Consul, and to present my countrymen, but not to treat of political subjects; and that unless I had the assurance from him, that I should not be exposed to a repetition of the same disagreeable circumstances, I should be under the necessity of discontinuing my visits to the Thuilleries. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that it was very far from the First Consul's intention to distress me; but he had felt himself personally insulted by the charges which were brought against him by the English government; *and that it was incumbent upon him to take the first opportunity of exculpating himself in the presence of the ministers of the different powers of Europe.* He assured me that nothing similar would occur. (Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Paris, March 18, 1803.

No. 47.—My lord, I received your lordship's dispatch, with its inclosures, this morning early; and I learnt at the same time that a messenger had arrived from General Andreossy to M. de Talleyrand; shortly after, M. de Talleyrand sent to desire I would call upon him, which I accordingly did. He told me that he had not only received your lordship's note to the French ambassador, but also the sentiments of the First Consul upon it, which he was desirous to communicate to me, before he re-dispatched the messenger. This he did, and I refer your lordship to the communication, which General Andreossy will make, according to his instructions, without loss of time. From the tenor of this note, it appears that this government is not desirous to proceed to extremities; that is to say, it is not prepared so to do; and therefore it expresses a willingness to enter on the discussion of the point, which appears according to their conception, or rather to the interpretation they choose to give to it, the most material. This of course is the safety of Egypt. On this the First Consul declares in the note, as M. de Talleyrand did repeatedly to me, that he would be willing to enter into any engagement, by which such a security as would fully quiet our apprehensions, might be given on the part of the French government. On the subject of Malta, the First Consul maintains that he cannot listen to any compromise; with regard to Egypt he is willing to enter into any engagement which may be thought sufficient. I told him that he had departed from the letter and the sense of your lordship's note, by confining the question to Malta alone. That note had comprehended other most important considerations. That the best method of bringing the discussion to a speedy conclusion, such as his Majesty's government appeared to wish, was to take it up on a broader scale. But that at the same time his Majesty's government would not refuse to lend itself to any thing reasonable which might be suggested. There was however, I told him, one distinction to be made in the situation of the two governments, in the discussion of this question. By our possession of Malta, France was not threatened, but the reverse was the case, should the access to Egypt be opened by its evacuation. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Downing-street, March 22, 1803.

No. 48.—My lord, Your excellency's several dispatches to No. 26 inclusive, have been received and laid before the King.—With respect to the subject of your excellency's dispatch of March 14, I have it in command to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you take the earliest opportunity to represent to Monsieur de Talleyrand, the surprise with which his Majesty has learnt the conduct which the First Consul had ob-

served towards your excellency in the instance to which that dispatch refers; and you will add, that as his Majesty has a right to expect that his ambassador should be treated with the respect and attention due to the dignity of the sovereign whom he represents, it will be impossible for you to present yourself on any days of ceremony to the First Consul, unless you receive an assurance that you will never be exposed to a repetition of the treatment which you experienced on the occasion. Although your excellency appears to have anticipated this instruction in one of your most recent conversations with Monsieur de Talleyrand, I nevertheless think it right to enable your excellency to state to that minister, the sense which the King entertains of this transaction. I am, with great truth and respect, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c.

Downing-street, April 3, 1803.

No. 49.—My Lord, I inclose to your excellency, for your information, copies of the official note delivered to me on the 29th ultimo by General Andréossy, and of the answer which, by his Majesty's command, I this day returned to that communication. I am, with great truth and respect, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

(Translation of inclosure referred to in No. 49.)—The undersigned general of division, ambassador and minister plenipotentiary from the French Republic, has laid before his government the note addressed to him by his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury. He has received orders to make the following answer to the observations therein contained. The object of this note appears to be to explain his Britannic Majesty's message; and to give some elucidations which had been demanded respecting the execution of the treaty of Amiens. The First Consul will not make any complaint relative to the extraordinary and unexpected assertions of this act issued by his Britannic Majesty. Not one of them is founded. His Britannic Majesty believes that his kingdom is menaced by preparations made in the ports of Holland and France. He has been deceived: the First Consul has made no preparation. There were, at the time of the message, but two frigates in the Roads of Holland, and but three corvettes in the Road of Dunkirk. How can his Britannic Majesty's ministers have been deceived on facts so evident? His Britannic Majesty's ambassadors at Paris and at the Hague have seriously to reproach themselves, if they have credited information so evidently false, and if they did not foresee that they thereby exposed their government to err in the most important deliberations. Was it not conformable to the usage practised among nations, first to demand explanations, and thus to take means for being convinced of the falsehood of the intelligence which the ministers might have received? Must not the least effects of the omission of this practice be, to bring on the ruin of families, and carry confusion, uncertainty, and disorder, into all the commercial affairs of both nations? The First Consul knows, both from his own sentiments, and judging of other people by the French, that a great nation can never be terrified. He believes that good policy and the feelings of true dignity ever inspire the sentiment of esteem for a rival nation, and never the design of menacing her. A great nation may be destroyed, but not intimidated. The second part of his Majesty's message consists of another assertion no better founded. His Britannic Majesty makes mention of discussions, the success of which is doubtful. What are these discussions? What official notes, what protocole prove the opening, the progress, the vicissitudes of a debate? Can a state of difficulties, which leads to an alternative of peace or war, spring up unawares without commencement, without progression, and lead, without distinction, to an appeal to arms before all the means of conciliation have been exhausted. In this case, the appeal has been publicly made before it could be known that there was room for misunderstanding. The termination of the discussions was announced before they had begun. The issue of a difficult discussion has been declared before it arose. What would Europe, what would both nations think, if they knew that these discussions, announced by his Britannic Majesty as so difficult to terminate, were unknown to the French government; and that the First Consul, on reading the message, could not comprehend the meaning of either of the declarations therein contained. He has also abstained from any ostensible step; and whatever may have been the clamour, the activity, the provocations of war, which have taken place in England since that message, he has given no orders, he has made no dispositions, no preparations. He places his glory, in an affair of this nature, wholly in being taken in an unprovided state. He will continue in this system of honest frankness, until his Britannic Majesty has reflected fully on the part he proposes to take. In Lord Hawkesbury's note, an opinion is expressed, that the French Republic has increased in power since the peace of Amiens. This is a decided error. Since that epoch, France has evacuated a considerable territory. The French power

has received no degree of augmentation. If his Britannic Majesty is determined to make war, he may alledge all the pretexts he pleases. He will find few less founded. As to the complaints made respecting the publications which may have appeared in France, they are of an order too secondary to be capable of influencing such a decision. Are we then returned to the age of tournaments? Motives of this nature might have authorized, four centuries ago, the combat of thirties; but they cannot, in this age, be a reason for war between the two countries. It might suffice in this respect to reply to his excellency, that no representation has been made by him on the subject to the government of the Republic; and that, if it was but justice to grant satisfaction, the First Consul had a right to expect that which was required by M. Otto, in his note of the 22d Thermidor last, upon grounds more serious and more just. Is it possible that the English ministry can have been ignorant, that ever since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens the English press has not ceased to spread through Europe the rage of war, the discredit of peace, and shameless and boundless outrages against every thing which is the object of the love and veneration of the French people? A few days after the ratification of peace, one of his Britannic Majesty's ministers declared that the peace establishment must be considerable; and the distrust excited by this declaration, made in parliament with as much bitterness as impropriety, furnished a commentary for the exaggeration and alarms which were circulated in despicable pamphlets, and in newspapers as contemptible as those libels. Since that time, these writers have found themselves invariably supported in their insolent observations by particular phrases taken from the speeches of some leading members of parliament. These speeches, scarcely to be exceeded by the news-writers themselves, have, for these eighteen months, tended to encourage insult against other governments to that degree, that every European must be offended, and every reasonable Englishman must be humiliated, by such unheard-of licentiousness. What if we connect with these sallies, proceedings more offensive and serious; the indulgence granted to French criminals, publishing daily outrages in the French language; the still more inexcuseable toleration extended to villains covered with crimes, and plotting assassinations incessantly, such as Georges, who still continues to reside at London protected, and having a considerable establishment; in a word, the little justice which has been shewn to all our representations—How are we to account for the publicity of the complaint which his Britannic Majesty has thought proper to make respecting some indefinite wrongs which he has hitherto thought unnecessary to bring before the First Consul? The First Consul has had cause to be convinced that all his representations on all these points were useless, and that his Britannic Majesty, regardless of the neighbouring powers, was resolved to authorize every thing within his dominions; but he did not on that account entertain a doubt of the continuance of peace, nor alarm Europe with the notification of war. He confined himself to this principle of conduct, to permit or prevent in France with respect to England whatever should be permitted or prevented in England with regard to France. *He has, however, expressed, and he again expresses his wish, that means should be adopted to prevent in future any mention being made of what is passing in* England, *either in the official discussions or in the polemical writings in* France, *as in like manner in the French official discussions and polemical writings no mention whatever should be made of what is passing in England.* Lord Hawkesbury mentions an article in a newspaper, containing the report of a French colonel. In serious discussions an answer on this point might be dispensed with; but it is neither a long nor difficult matter. A colonel in the English army has published a work in England, filled with the most atrocious and disgusting calumnies against the French army and its general. The lies it contains have been contradicted by the reception which Colonel Sebastiani experienced. The publicity of his report was at once a refutation and a reparation which the French army had a right to expect. On his arrival in Egypt, this officer, to his great astonishment, found the English army there, although they should have evacuated it, and the Turks prodigiously alarmed at the continuance of the English army, and at its relations with the natives in rebellion and open revolt against the Sublime Porte. He must have conceived that the treaties which connect us with the Porte, and by which we have guaranteed to it the integrity of its possessions, compelled us to unite ourselves with that power. It was natural to think that England meant to declare war from the instant she refused to execute the articles of the treaty. For after all, France is not reduced to such a state of debasement as to suffer treaties made with her to be executed or not at pleasure. Hence the researches made by this officer, as to the forces which were in Egypt, and as to the position occupied by the English army. But Egypt has since been restored to the dominion of its lawful Sovereign, and the idea of a rupture be-

tween the two nations, on account of the engagement contracted with the Porte, no longer exists. There remains, therefore, but one object worthy of fixing the attention of the two nations. The execution of the treaty of Amiens, as far as concerns Malta. His Majesty has engaged to restore it to the Order, and to entrust it to the Neapolitan army till the Order should be in a condition to guard it. His Majesty will reject all sophistry, every distinction, and every mental reservation which might be offered to him, to put in doubt the force and the validity of his engagement. His Britannic Majesty's equity, his conscience in this respect, are guarantees for the French Republic. Were it otherwise, what means in future would the two nations have for coming to an understanding? Would not all be chaos? This would indeed be adding another calamity to those which have menaced social order. The undersigned is directed to declare, in short, that the First Consul will not take up the defiance of war given by England to France; that as to Malta, he sees no subject for discussion, the treaty having provided for every thing, and settled every thing. The undersigned has the honour, &c. F. ANDREOSSY.

Portland Place, 8 Germinal, Year 11.

(29 *March*, 1803.)

(Inclosure referred to No. 49.)—The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the King the note of his Excellency General Andréossy, of the 29th of last month. His Majesty has been induced, by that spirit of moderation and forbearance which have invariably governed his conduct in every part of his communications with the French government, to abstain from making many observations, which the perusal of this note may naturally have suggested to his mind. His Majesty has perceived with great regret, that the French government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained; and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the Island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding; he has therefore judged it expedient to give instructions to his ambassador at Paris, to ascertain distinctly from the French government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained; or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanations upon the present state of affairs as may lead to an arrangement which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments. It is his Majesty's anxious desire, that by this mode of proceeding an end may be put to that state of suspense and irritation, which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity. The undersigned requests General Andréossy to accept the assurances of his high consideration.

HAWKESBURY.

Downing-street, April 3, 1803.

His Excellency Gen. Andréossy, &c.

Downing-street, April 4, 1803.

No. 50.—My Lord, It is become essential, that the discussions which have been for some time subsisting between his Majesty and the French government should be brought to an issue within as short a time as is consistent with the deliberation which must be given to objects of so much importance. The last note presented by General Andréossy, in the name of his government, in answer to my note of the 15th of last month, evades all explanation, and even all discussion, of the points on which complaint has been made by his Majesty. If the French government should seriously intend to persist in this course of proceeding, there can be no hopes of a successful termination to the present negotiation. It is important, therefore, that you should ascertain distinctly, in the first instance, whether they are disposed to enter into explanation on the points on which his Majesty has complained, and to come to such an arrangement as may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two countries; and for this purpose you will present a note to the effect of that which is herewith inclosed. It is possible that the French government may continue to evade all discussion on the points in question, and confine themselves to a categorical demand, that Malta should be immediately evacuated. In that case, it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should declare the impossibility of the relations of amity continuing to subsist between the two countries, and the necessity that you will be under of leaving Paris within a certain time. But if, on the other hand, they should shew a readiness to enter into discussion, and to give reasonable satisfaction and explanation, it is important that you should be informed, without loss of time, of the sentiments of his Majesty's government, as to what might be considered as an equitable adjustment of the differences between the two governments at

this moment. I have, therefore, by his Majesty's command, inclosed the project of an arrangement, which, under the present circumstances, would meet the ideas of his Majesty's government; which would afford security for those objects which are considered as endangered by the unequivocal disclosure of the views of the First Consul, and which, at the same time, might entirely save the honour of the French government. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, &c.

(First inclosure referred to in No. 50.)—The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary has received the orders of his court to make the following communication to the French government. His Majesty has perceived, with great regret, that the French government continue to withhold all satisfaction and explanation on the points on which he has complained, and that at the time when they evade all discussion on the subject of his representations, they persist in their requisition that the island of Malta should be forthwith evacuated by his forces. His Majesty can never so far forget what is due to himself, and to his people, as to acquiesce in such a course of proceeding. He has therefore commanded the undersigned to ascertain distinctly from the French government, whether they are determined to persevere in withholding all satisfaction and explanation upon the points on which his Majesty has complained, or whether they are disposed, without delay, to give such satisfaction and explanation upon the present state of affairs, as may lead to an arrangement, which may be calculated to adjust the differences at present subsisting between the two governments. It is his Majesty's anxious desire that by adopting this mode of proceeding, an end may be put to that state of suspense and uncertainty which must be so injurious to the interests of both countries; and that the two governments, actuated by the same principles of justice and moderation, may be led to concur in such measures as are most likely to conduce to their permanent tranquillity.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 50.)—*Heads of an arrangement to be concluded by treaty or convention between his Majesty and the French government.*—Malta to remain in perpetuity in the possession of his Majesty. The knights of the Order of St. John to be indemnified by his Majesty for any losses of property which they may sustain in consequence of such an arrangement. Holland and Switzerland to be evacuated by the French troops. The island of Elba to be confirmed by his Majesty to France, and the King of Etruria to be acknowledged. The Italian and Ligurian Republics to be acknowledged by his Majesty, provided an arrangement is made in Italy for the King of Sardinia, which shall be satisfactory to him.

No. 51.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 7, 1803.*—I received your lordship's dispatches of the 4th instant by the messenger Wagstaff, with their inclosures, yesterday evening; and shall probably in the course of the day have an opportunity of communicating to Monsieur de Talleyrand the note, which I shall translate for that purpose.

Paris, April 7, 1803.

No. 52.—My lord, Since writing the preceding dispatch, I have seen M. de Talleyrand, and communicated to him the inclosed note, which I trust your lordship will find as close a translation as possible, of that which I received from your lordship. He read it over with much attention, and when he had done he appeared to be in expectation of some other communication. Upon desiring he would explain himself, he said that he was in hopes I should have furnished him with the heads of those points, on which it was affirmed in the note that the French government had so repeatedly refused all explanation and satisfaction. I told him, that it would have been entirely useless to repeat what had been so often urged in vain; that he could not but know that the explanation required, referred to the conduct of the French government, and the system of aggrandizement which it had constantly pursued since the conclusion and in direct violation of the Treaty of Amiens, founded as it indisputably was on the state of possession of the two countries at the time; that with regard to the satisfaction, it evidently referred to the unjustifiable insinuations and charges against his Majesty's government, against the officer commanding his forces in Egypt, and against the British army in that quarter, contained in the official report of Colonel Sebastiani. He was by no means disposed to admit, that either of these cases could justify the assertion of the French government having refused explanation and satisfaction on the ground that no notice had been taken of these transactions but in a very cursory manner; nor had any explanation ever been required as to any particular transaction whether in Italy or elsewhere, and if it had, it would immediately have been given; and that the language of Colonel Sebastiani was not to be put in any comparison with that used by Major Wilson, in his account of the campaign of Egypt. I urged the difference of a common publication like that to which he alluded, and a report to the First Consul published

by him in his official paper. On this occasion M. de Talleyrand was disposed to call in question the authority of the Moniteur. In short the most ungrounded assertions were substituted for arguments; and amongst these, I cannot but place that so often repeated of the First Consul's having entirely given up all idea whatever of Egypt, consequently we could have no pretext for retaining Malta. He assured me for the rest, that he would communicate it this evening to the First Consul, and that to-morrow he should in all probability have a communication to make in return. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 52.)—Le soussigné, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plenipotentiare de sa Majesté Britannique, a reçu ordre de sa cour de communiquer ce qui suit au gouvernement de France. Sa Majesté a vû à regret que le gouvernement de France continue à refuser toute satisfaction et toute explication sur les objets dont elle a à se plaindre, et qu'en évitant toute discussion de ce qui fait le sujet de ses representations il persiste néanmoins à demander l'evacuation de l'isle de Malthe par les forces de sa Majesté. Sa Majesté sait trop ce qu'elle se doit à elle-même et à son peuple pour acquiescer à de pareils procédés. En conséquence elle a ordonné au soussigné de savoir distinctement du governement de France, s'il est déterminé à perseverer dans son refus de toute satisfaction et de toute explication sur les objets de plainte de sa Majesté, ou bien s'il est disposé à donner sans delai cette satisfaction et cette explication sur l'etat actuel des affaires de maniere à pouvoir conduire à un arrangement qui seroit de nature à ajuster les differens qui actuellement existent entre les deux gouvernemens. Sa Majesté desire sincerement l'adoption de ce moyen que mettroit fin à un etat de suspension et d'incertitude si nuisible à l'interêt des deux nations, et de voir que les deux gouvernemens agissant par les mêmes principes de justice et de moderation puissent s'entendre pour concourir aux mesures les plus susceptibles de leur assurer une tranquillité permanente. Le soussigné prie son excellence M. de Talleyrand d'agréer l'assurance de sa haute consideration.

WHITWORTH.

Paris, April 9, 1803.

No. 53.—My lord, In my conversation yesterday evening with M. de Talleyrand, I found him, after he had seen the First Consul, more disposed to contest the substance of the note which I had presented the day before, than to afford any further explanation. He said, that in order to proceed regularly, it would be necessary that the French government should be informed precisely what were the objects which had created such uneasiness, and on which it was alledged all explanation had been refused. That although this had, perhaps, been touched upon in general conversation, yet no specific charge had been adduced in such a manner as to demand a formal explanation. I told him that if the object of the French government was to protract the present state of suspence and uncertainty, that object might be answered to the extent indeed of a very few days, by forcing me to such a reference; but I must at the same time declare to him, that it could be productive of no advantage, and would serve only to provoke such a recapitulation of the system and conduct which France had pursued since the Treaty of Amiens, as would have all the appearance of a manifesto, every item of which would carry conviction to every individual in Europe; that it appeared therefore more likely to answer the end which both parties proposed, that of hastening the conclusion of an amicable arrangement, to take up the business on the basis which I should propose, and by which they would admit no more than what was incontrovertible, namely, that if the French government exercised a right of extending its influence and territory, in violation of the spirit of the Treaty of Amiens, Great Britain had, if she chose to avail herself of it, (which I was confident she would not do further than was necessary as a measure of security,) an undoubted right to seek a counterpoise. He did not seem inclined to dispute this position, but rather to admit that such a right did exist, and might be claimed in consequence of the acquisitions which had been made by France. On the point of satisfaction I found him much more obstinate. He said that the First Consul was hurt at the expression *(satisfaction)*, to which he gave an interpretation I had never understood belonged to it, as implying superiority; so that if the British government required satisfaction of the French, it arrogated to itself a superiority. I told him, what certainly must be understood by every one, that the demand of satisfaction implied that one party had been offended by another, and of course had a right to demand such satisfaction; that an inferior had an equal right with his superior to demand it; but in the case in question there was perfect equality, and consequently there was no offence to be found but in the conduct which rendered such an appeal necessary. The discussion of this point took up a considerable time without producing any thing decisive. We at last came to the main point of the business; and on this I cannot say any real progress has been made. M. de

Talleyrand repeated to me that the First Consul had nothing more at heart than to avoid the necessity of going to war, and that there was no sacrifice he would not make, short of his honour, to obtain this end. Is there, said M. de Talleyrand, no means of satisfying both parties; for at the same time that the First Consul insists, and will always insist, on the full execution of the treaty, he will not object to any mode by which you may acquire the security you think so necessary. You are not satisfied with the independence of Neapolitan troops; what others will answer the purpose? He then started the idea of a mixed garrison, composed of English, French, Italian, Germans, &c. He begged that I would refer once more to your Lordship, and submit the inclosed paper, which he drew up in my presence. I told him that we were only losing time by such a reference; that my instructions were positive, and had certainly not been sent me without the fullest consideration. I could not, however, refuse, what he so earnestly required; and your lordship will see by the paper how the matter rests after this conference. I will confess to your lordship, that my motive for consenting to forward this sort of proposal is, that supposing we should find the First Consul as obstinate as he now appears to be on the point of abandoning Malta to us in perpetuity, and that a temporary possession might be considered as the next best thing, something of this kind might derive from it. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in No. 53.)—The conversation with M. Talleyrand to-day has led us to this result: every thing which may tend to violate the independance of the order of Malta, will never be consented to by the French government. Every thing which may tend to put an end to the present difficulties, or be agreeable to the English government, and which shall not be contrary to the Treaty of Amiens, the French government have no objection to make a particular convention respecting it. The motives of this convention shall be inserted in the preamble, and shall relate to the respective grievances concerning which the two governments shall think it adviseable to come to an understanding with each other.

No. 54—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April* 14, 1803.—Since my last the negociation is at a stand, in the expectation, I suppose, of the answer which may arrive, to the overture which I communicated to your lordship on the 8th instant, and which is expected here to produce a good effect, notwithstanding the little hope I have given. To-morrow I shall, in all probability, be in possession of this answer from your lordship, and be enabled to speak still more positively.

Downing-Street, April 13, 1803.

No. 55.—My lord, his Majesty has received from his chargé d'affaires at Hamburgh, the most extraordinary account of the conduct of Monsieur Reinhard, the French minister at that place, with respect to a most gross and unwarrantable libel upon his Majesty's government. He has been assured that the French minister, having proposed the insertion of that libel in the official gazette of the town of Hamburgh, and the insertion of it having in the first instance been refused, the French minister went so far as to demand, in his official capacity, the insertion of that article by order of the senate. His Majesty is unwilling to believe that the French government could have authorised so outrageous an attack upon his Majesty and his government, and so daring a violation of the independence of a neutral state. It is his Majesty's pleasure, that you should communicate these circumstances to the French government, and state at the same time the impossibility of bringing the present discussions to an amicable conclusion, unless some satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty for the indignity which has thus been offered to him in the face of all Europe by the French minister at Hamburgh. I have the honour to be, &c. HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

Downing-Street, April 13, 1803.

No. 56.—My lord, your excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King. His Majesty has observed, with great satisfaction, the admission by the French government of the justice of his claim to some compensation in consequence of the increased power and influence of France, since the period of the conclusion of the definitive treaty. Although, under the circumstances of your conversation with M. Talleyrand, and particularly after the note verbale which he gave to you, it might have been expedient that you should have deferred presenting the project contained in my dispatch No. 7, in the form of a project, it is desirable that you should communicate without delay in some mode or other, the contents of that project, for the purpose of ascertaining distinctly whether the conditions are such as to induce the French government to give way upon the question of Malta. These conditions appear to his Majesty so well calculated to save the honour of the French government on the subject of Malta—if the question of Malta is principally considered by them as a question of honour—and at the same time hold out to them

such important advantages, that the success of the proposition is at least worth trying, particularly as the result of it might be productive of the most easy means of adjusting the most material of our present differences. With respect to the assertion so often advanced and repeated by M. Talleyrand in your last conversation of the non-execution of the Treaty of Amiens relative to Malta, I have only to observe again, that the execution of that article is become impracticable from causes which it has not been in the power of his Majesty to controul. That the greatest part of the funds assigned to the support of the order, and indispensably necessary for the independence of the order and defence of the island, have been sequestrated since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, in direct repugnance to the spirit and letter of that treaty; and that two of the principal powers who were invited to accede as guarantees to the arrangement, have refused their accession, except on the conditions that the part of the arrangement which was deemed so material relative to the Maltese inhabitants should be entirely cancelled. The conduct of the French government since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, gives his Majesty a right, which is now at length admitted by themselves, to demand some compensation for the past, and security for the future. Such compensation could never be considered as obtained by the possession of an island, which would entail a very heavy expence on this country;—and the degree of security which would be provided by these means, would only be such as his Majesty, under the present circumstances, is entitled to demand. I observe in the note verbale of Monsieur Talleyrand, he makes use of the expression, *the independence of the order* of Malta. If this is meant to apply to the order exclusively, his Majesty would be willing, for the preservation of peace, that the civil government of the island should be given to the order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying the privileges which were stipulated in their favour in the Treaty of Amiens; and that, conformably to principles which have been adopted on other occasions, the fortifications of the island should be garrisoned for ever by the troops of his Majesty. In the event of either of these propositions being found unattainable, his Majesty might be disposed to consent to an arrangement by which the island of Malta would remain in his possession for a limited number of years, and to waive in consequence his demand for a perpetual occupation, provided that the number of years was not less than ten, and that his Sicilian Majesty could be induced to cede the sovereignty of the island of Lampedosa for a valuable consideration. If this proposition is admitted, the Island of Malta should be given up to the inhabitants at the end of that period, and should be acknowledged as an independent state. In this case, his Majesty would be ready to concur in any arrangement for the establishment of the Order of St. John in some other part of Europe. You will not refuse to listen to any proposition which the French government may be disposed to make to you with a view to an equivalent security for those objects in regard to which his Majesty claims the possession or occupation of Malta; but the three propositions to which I have above alluded, appear, at the present moment, to furnish the only basis for a satisfactory arrangement; and you will decline receiving any proposition which does not appear to you to offer advantages to his Majesty as substantial as that which I have last stated. It is very desirable that you should bring the negotiation to an issue, if possible, without referring to his Majesty's government for further instructions, after the receipt of this dispatch; and if you should be of opinion, that there is no hopes of bringing it to a favourable conclusion, you may inform M. Talleyrand of the necessity you will be under, after a certain time, to leave Paris. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

Paris, April 18, 1803.

No. 57.—My Lord, I did not fail to put into immediate execution the instructions contained in your lordship's dispatch (No. 11.) on the subject of the libel inserted by the French Minister in the Hamburgh Gazette. I represented the outrageous and unprecedented conduct of M. Rheinhardt in such terms as it deserves; and fairly declared to M. de Talleyrand, that, until satisfaction shall be given to his Majesty for the indignity which has been offered him by the French minister in his official character, there could be no possibility whatever of bringing the present discussion to an amicable issue. M. de Talleyrand assured me, that the French government saw the conduct of M. de Rheinhardt in the same light as his Majesty's ministers, and that they could not be more surprised than the First Consul had been at seeing such an article inserted by authority; that an immediate explanation had been required of M. Rheinhardt, five days ago, and if his conduct had been such as had been represented, he would, doubtless, feel the effect of the First Consul's displeasure; and that, in the mean time, I might inform your lordship that he was completely disavowed. I told M. de Talleyrand, that, as the insult had been public, it would be

necessary that the reparation should be so also. He answered me again, that the First Consul considered M. Rheinhardt's conduct as so reprehensible, that every satisfaction might be expected. I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Paris, April 18, 1803.

No. 58.—My Lord, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's dispatches of the 13th instant. I saw Joseph Buonaparté immediately on the receipt of your lordship's dispatch; and without troubling your lordship with a repetition of the arguments I used to hasten the conclusion of the negotiation, amongst which I endeavoured to convince him of the importance of preventing the ultimatum which would inevitably follow the rejection of what I had to propose, I will briefly state, that on finding it perfectly impracticable to establish the principle of our keeping possession of Malta in perpetuity, I delivered to him in writing the second proposal I had to make. He did not fail to observe, that by this modification the difficulty which he considered as insurmountable was not removed; that although the Order was restored, it could not be considered as independent, and, in fact, Malta would belong to that power which had possession of the forts. I enforced the adoption of this plan by every reason which could serve to recommend it; but the possession in perpetuity was constantly urged as a difficulty which nothing could remove. Our conversation lasted near two hours. I confess that I gained no solid ground of hope that the project, which he assured me he would take to the First Consul at St. Cloud, would be adopted. But he said that he was not without hope that he might be authorized to propose to me the occupation of the fortresses for a term of years. It was my wish, that such a proposal should come from him rather than from me. I told him that I did not well see how such a tenure would suit us; but that I wished too sincerely to avoid the fatal extremities to which I saw the discussion was tending, not to give any reasonable proposal which might be made on their part every assistance in my power. This proposal originated with him, and was therefore received by me merely as a matter which I would refer to your lordship. If, however, I can bring the matter to an immediate conclusion, and without further reference to your lordship, on the principle of our retaining possession of the fortresses of Malta for a term of years not less than that pointed out by your lordship, and with the assurance that this government will not oppose the cession of the Island of Lampedosa, I shall have great pleasure in announcing to your lordship such a conclusion. I do not enter into a detail of the conversation which I had the same morning with M. de Talleyrand, immediately upon leaving Joseph Buonapart', as it differed in no wise from what I have above mentioned. He suggested also the possibility of coming to an arrangement on the ground of a temporary occupation, and I made him the same answer. Such is the state of the discussion at this moment. I am in expectation of hearing very shortly either from Joseph Buonaparté or M. de Talleyrand; and I am not without hopes that I may be able to announce to your lordship, that such an arrangement is made, as may answer his Majesty's expectations, in a very few days. Your lordship may be assured, that I feel the necessity of expedition. Were it less urgent, I might perhaps hope to bring the discussion to even a more favourable issue. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

(Translation of Inclosure referred to in No. 58.)—His Majesty will consent, for the sake of preserving peace, that the government of the Island of Malta shall be given to the Order of St. John; the Maltese enjoying those privileges which have been granted on former occasions. The fortifications of the Island shall be occupied in perpetuity by the troops of his Majesty.

Paris, April 20, 1803.

No. 59.—My Lord, I had hoped that the first extraordinary messenger I should have had occasion to send, would have been to announce to your lordship, that the differences between the two governments were adjusted on one of the modifications pointed out to me by my last instructions from your lordship. In this expectation I am deceived. I saw Joseph Buonaparté the night before last, before I had sealed up my dispatches of that evening to your lordship; but as all he said tended only to justify the hope I had given your lordship in those dispatches, I added nothing to them. He assured me positively, that I should hear from M. de Talleyrand in the course of yesterday morning, and that a meeting would be appointed in order to settle the term of years for which the First Consul might be induced to consent to the cession of Malta. It is true that he declared, that in order to gain his consent, it would be necessary to hold out the advantages which the British government was willing to offer in return, meaning the acknowledgments of the new governments in Italy. I told him that this offer was made only with a view to the possession of Malta in perpetuity; but after some conversation, I gave him to understand, that I would not refuse to admit

the demand, *sub sperati*, on the condition, that the cession should be made for a considerable term of years; that Holland and Switzerland should be evacuated; and that a suitable provision should be made for the King of Sardinia. He seemed to think there could be no difficulty in this arrangement; and I left him in the persuasion, that I should the next day, yesterday, or this morning, receive the summons from M. de Talleyrand, which he had given me reason to expect. I am sorry to say, that no such summons has been received by me, neither has any further notice been taken of the business. So that I feel, that I should betray the confidence your lordship may place in me, were I to delay any longer requesting, that I may be immediately furnished with the terms on which his Majesty's ministers would be willing to conclude, and which probably will not differ much from those above stated, in order that I may propose them in the form of an ultimatum; and that at the expiration of the period allowed for deliberation, I may be authorized not only to declare that I am to leave Paris, but actually so to do, unless in the intermediate time, the French government should accede to our demands. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Downing-street, April 23, 1803.

No. 60.—My Lord, Your excellency's dispatches of the 18th and 20th instant have been received, and laid before the King. It is necessary for me to do little more on the present occasion than to refer you to my dispatch of the 13th of April, in which I stated to you the several propositions on which alone, in the judgment of his Majesty, the differences between this country and France could be satisfactorily adjusted. If, upon the receipt of this dispatch, it shall not have been in your power to bring the negotiation to a conclusion on any of the propositions to which I have above referred, it is his Majesty's pleasure that you should communicate, officially, to the French government, that you have gone, in point of concession, to the full extent of your instructions; and that, if an arrangement, founded upon one of these propositions, cannot be concluded without further delay, you have received his Majesty's commands to return to England. His Majesty can only consent to relinquish the permanent occupation of Malta by his forces, on the conditions that the temporary possession shall not be less than ten years; that the authority, civil and military, shall, during that period, remain solely in his Majesty; and that, at the expiration of that period, the Island shall be given up to the inhabitants, and not to the Order; and provided likewise, that his Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the island of Lampedosa. It is indispensable that, as a part of this arrangement, Holland should be evacuated by the French troops within a short period after the conclusion of a convention by which all those provisions are secured. His Majesty will consent to acknowledge the new Italian states, upon the condition that stipulations in favour of his Sardinian Majesty, and of Switzerland, form a part of this arrangement. It is his Majesty's pleasure that, in the event of the failure of the negotiation, you should delay your departure from Paris no longer than may be indispensably necessary for your personal convenience; and that you should in no case remain there, after the receipt of this dispatch, more than seven days. I have the honour to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency, Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

Paris, April 23, 1803.

No. 61.—My Lord, As I heard nothing from M. Talleyrand, I called on him on Thursday, in order to learn the effect of the proposal which I had made, conformably to your lordship's instructions, on the basis of a perpetual possession of the forts of Malta, on re-establishing the Order in the civil government of the Island. He told me, that if I had called on him sooner, he should two days ago have communicated to me the First Consul's answer, which was, that no consideration on earth should induce him to consent to a concession in perpetuity of Malta, in any shape whatever: and that the re-establishment of the Order was not so much the point to be discussed, as that of suffering Great Britain to acquire a possession in the Mediterranean. I told him that I did not call sooner, because I had been given to understand that he would have himself proposed it to me, for the purpose of communicating the answer of the First Consul; and that it did not in any shape become me to put myself on the footing of a solicitor in this transaction. After some conversation, and finding (what I most sincerely believe to be the case) that the First Consul's determination was fixed on the point of a possession of Malta in perpetuity; I repeated to him what I had previously suggested to Joseph Buonaparté, the modification which I had to propose, namely, that, for the sake of peace, his Majesty would be willing to waive his pretensions to a possession in perpetuity, and would consent to hold Malta for a certain number of years to be agreed upon, on the condition that no opposition should be made on the part of the French government to any negotiation his Majesty

might set on foot with his Sicilian Majesty for the acquisition of the Island of Lampedosa. We discussed this proposal in a conversation of some length, and I made use of all the arguments which have been furnished me by your lordship, or which occurred to me in its favour. I begged him particularly to recollect that we were in actual possession of the object, and that therefore every modification tending to limit that possession, was in fact a concession on the part of his Majesty, and a proof of his desire to sacrifice to his love of peace the just claim which he had acquired in consequence of the conduct of France, and which had recently been admitted, of a much more considerable compensation and counterpoise. M. de Talleyrand did not seem disposed to dispute any of my positions, and I left him, I confess, fully impressed with the idea that the next day (Friday) I should find him prepared to treat on this ground, and that the only difficult point to be arranged would be the number of years for which Malta should be ceded to his Majesty. Your lordship will conceive my surprise, when on seeing him the next day, he told me that although he had not been able to obtain from the First Consul all he wished, still the proposition he had to make would, he trusted, be such as fully to answer the purpose. He then said that the First Consul would, on no terms, hear either of a perpetual or a temporary possession of Malta; that his object was the execution of the treaty of Amiens; and that rather than submit to such an arrangement as that I had last proposed, he would even consent to our keeping the object in dispute for ever: on the ground that in the one there was an appearance of generosity and magnanimity; but in the other, nothing but weakness and the effect of coercion: that therefore his resolution was taken, and what he had to propose was the possession we required of the Island of Lampedosa, or of any other of the small Isles of which there were three or four between Malta and the Coast of Africa; that such a possession would be sufficient for the object we had in view, which was a station in the Mediterranean as a place of refuge and security for any squadron we might find it convenient to keep in that sea. I suffered him to expatiate a considerable time, and without interruption, on the great advantages we were to derive from such an acquisition, as well as on the confidence which the First Consul reposed in our pacific intention in lending a hand to such an establishment. He concluded by desiring I would transmit this proposal to your lordship. I told him that I was extremely sorry indeed to find that we had made such little progress in the negotiation; that my orders were positive; that I could hear of nothing short of what I had proposed, neither could I possibly undertake to make such a proposal to his Majesty, since every word of my instructions (from which I certainly would not depart) applied positively to Malta, unless an equivalent security could be offered, and surely he would not pretend to tell me that Lampedosa could be considered as such; that the possession of Malta was necessary for our security, and was rendered so not from any desire of aggrandizement on the part of his Majesty, but by the conduct of the French government; and that so strongly were we impressed with the necessity, that rather than abandon it, we were prepared to go to war. That it was on this ground I must declare to him, that I could neither take upon myself to forward such a proposal as he had made to me, or indeed any thing short of what I had last proposed as a fair equivalent. That in so doing, I acted in conformity to his Majesty's views, who would most assuredly disapprove of my conduct, were I, by unnecessarily protracting the negociation, to add one day, or one hour, if it could be avoided, to the suspence and anxiety under which his own subjects and all Europe must labour at such a crisis; that I had hoped the French government, actuated by the same generous motives, would have acted in the same manner; that it might, by pursuing a contrary line of conduct, gain still a few days; but I must declare, that in a very short time I should have to communicate to him those very terms from which his were so wide, but to draw nearer to which was, perhaps the object of his negotiating, in the form of an ultimatum, which would at least have one good effect, that of bringing the matter to an issue, and the certainty even of war was preferable to the present state of indecision. To all I could say M. Talleyrand objected the dignity and honour of the First Consul, which could not admit of his consenting to any thing which might carry with it the appearance of yielding to a threat. I told him that it never could be admitted that the First Consul had a right to act in such a manner as to excite jealousy and create alarm in every state of Europe, and when asked for explanation or security, say that it was contrary to his honour or his dignity to afford either. Such arguments might perhaps do when applied to some of those governments with which France had been accustomed to treat, or more properly to dictate to, but never could be used to Great Britain; that his Majesty had a right to speak freely his opinion, and possessed also the means, whenever he chose to employ them, of opposing a barrier to the ambition of any individual, or of any state which should be disposed to threaten the security of his dominions, or the tranquillity of Europe.

Our conversation concluded by M. de Talleyrand's assuring me that he would report the substance of it to the First Consul in the even-

ing, and that probably he should have occasion to see me on the following day. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Paris, April 25, 1803.

No. 62.—My Lord, The conversation I had on Saturday morning with M. Talleyrand has produced nothing from which I can draw a more favourable conclusion as to the result of the negotiation, than when I last addressed your lordship. He told me, that although he had seen the First Consul the night before, he had nothing to add to what he had communicated to me on Friday; that the First Consul was determined not to give his consent to our retaining Malta, either in perpetuity or for a term, although of the two he would prefer the former tenure as the less repugnant to his feelings; that he was therefore ordered to repeat the proposal he had lately made me, of acceding to our demand of Lampedosa or any of the neighbouring islands; and that as our object was to obtain a settlement in the Mediterranean, he imagined that which we had ourselves pointed out would answer every purpose we might have in view. But, at all events, the First Consul neither could nor would relinquish his claim to the full execution of the Treaty of Amiens. To this I could only repeat what I had already said to him on the inadequacy of such a proposal, and of the impossibility in which I found myself to transmit it to your lordship. I lamented the course which the negotiation was taking, and that the First Consul should have so little regard to the dreadful consequences which must ensue, as to suffer them to be outweighed by a mistaken notion of dignity. And I added, that notwithstanding the acquiescence which he might have met with from others, the plea of its being incompatible with the dignity of the French government to give satisfaction or security, when both might with justice be demanded, could never be admitted by Great Britain. M. de Talleyrand heard every thing I could say with the utmost patience, notwithstanding he had nothing satisfactory to say, and seemed unwilling to break up the conference. He constantly brought forward the same inadmissible proposal, requesting that I would at least communicate it to your lordship. This I told him I could not refuse to do, since every thing which passed between him and me must of course make the subject of my reports to your lordship. I declared however, at the same time, that I should not think myself by any means authorized to suspend the execution of any instructions I might receive, tending to bring the negotiation to an issue, in the expectation of any change which such a proposal might produce. All I could do, and that I would certainly do, would be to communicate the ultimatum, if his Majesty should think proper to furnish me with it, confidentially to M. de Talleyrand, before I presented it officially to him, as minister for foreign affairs. He assured me that he should consider such a conduct as a further proof of my desire to conciliate, and that he could not yet forbear hoping that the differences might be adjusted. I repeated that if his hope was founded on the expectation of his Majesty's being induced to recede from his demand, it would be deceiving himself to cherish it. The remainder of the conversation turned on the calamities which would follow the failure of our endeavour to avoid a rupture. He insinuated that Holland, Naples, and other countries connected with Great Britain, would be the first victims of the war. I asked him whether he thought that such a conduct would add to the glory of the First Consul, or whether the falling on the innocent and defenceless would not rather tarnish it, and ultimately unite against him, not only the honest men in his own country, but every government in Europe. That it certainly would excite more detestation than terror in England, at the same time that it would serve to impress upon us still more strongly the necessity of omitting no means of circumscribing a power so perniciously exerted. I could not help adding, that although no act of hostility had actually taken place, yet the inveteracy with which our commerce, our industry, and our credit had been attacked in every part to which French influence could be extended, did in fact almost amount to the same, since it went to prove, in addition to the general system of the First Consul, that his object was to pursue, under the mask of peace, the same line of conduct in which the preceding governments had acted. I now trust entirely to the effect of the ultimatum, which will at least convince him that we are in earnest, and that he has nothing to expect from protraction. I shall not however, as I said before, make use of this officially, until I have tried its effect in a more conciliatory manner. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

The Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

P. S. Your lordship's dispatches of the 23d with their inclosures, were delivered to me by Shaw this evening at nine o'clock. I shall see M. de Talleyrand to-morrow morning; and I trust your lordship will not disapprove my following the line of conduct I had proposed, and which I have mentioned to your lordship, of informing him of the nature of

my instructions a few hours before I carry them officially into execution. W.

No. 63.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, April 27, 1803.*—I avail myself of the opportunity of a messenger passing through from Constantinople and Vienna, to inform your lordship of the state of the negotiation at this moment. I communicated to M. de Talleyrand the purport of my instructions of the 23d, yesterday at four o'clock. He immediately asked me if the possession of Malta was still insisted upon. I told him most certainly it was; and I repeated to him the particulars of the terms on which it was yet possible to conclude the business. That these were, the possession of Malta for ten years, during which period the authority, civil and military, was to remain solely in his Majesty, and that at the expiration of that term, it was to be given up to the inhabitants, and not to the Order; provided also, that His Sicilian Majesty shall be induced to cede to his Majesty the Island of Lampedosa; that Holland should be evacuated by the French troops within a month after the conclusion of a convention by which all these provisions shall be secured; and that his Majesty would consent to acknowledge the new Italian States, provided stipulations were made in favour of his Sardinian Majesty and of Switzerland. I had no sooner made known these conditions than M. de Talleyrand told me it would be perfectly unnecessary to delay the official communication; for, as the possession of Malta was still insisted upon, although for a term, the First Consul would not consent to them. I accordingly did repeat them to him in the manner he desired; when he told me that he comprehended perfectly what we required, but that in similar cases it was usual to state the demand in writing, and he desired I would give him a note upon the subject. I told him that I would repeat to him once more, or as often as he pleased, the express terms which I had stated to him, and that as my communication to him was verbal, I should of course be content with an answer in the same form. He consented at length to receive it, and to communicate to me the First Consul's answer as soon as possible. I desired that he would recollect that Tuesday next must be the day of my departure.

No. 64.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated April 29, 1803.*—My last letter to your lordship was of yesterday evening. This morning a person came to me whom I suspect of being employed by the First Consul for the purpose of ascertaining my sentiments, and told me that I should, in the course of the day, receive a letter from M. de Talleyrand, drawn up under the inspection of the First Consul, which, although not exactly what I might wish, was however so moderate as to afford me a well-grounded hope, and might certainly be sufficient to induce me to delay, for a short time, my departure. I told him that it would be a matter of great satisfaction to me to perceive a probability of bringing the negotiation to a favourable issue; and that I should be extremely sorry to spoil the business by any useless precipitation. But it must be recollected that I acted in conformity to instructions; that those instructions were positive; that by them I was enjoined to leave Paris on Tuesday next, unless in the intermediate time certain conditions were agreed to. Having received no letter in the course of the day, about four o'clock I went to M. de Talleyrand; I told him that my anxiety to learn whether he had any thing favourable to tell me, brought me to him, and in case he had not, to recall to his recollection that Tuesday was the day on which I must leave Paris, and to request that he would have the necessary passports prepared for me and my family. He appeared evidently embarrassed, and after some hesitation observed, that he could not suppose I should really go away; but that at all events the First Consul never would recall his ambassador. To this I replied, his Majesty recalled me in order to put an end to the negotiation, on the principle that even actual war was preferable to the state of suspense in which England, and indeed all Europe, had been kept for so long a space of time. From the tenour of his conversation, I should rather be led to think that he does not consider the case as desperate. Upon my leaving him he repeatedly said, *J'ai encore de l'espoir.*

Saturday Evening.—P. S. This day has passed without any occurrence whatever. The letter in question is not yet arrived.

No. 65.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated May 2, 1803.*—Another day has passed over without producing any change. I determined to go myself to M. de Talleyrand, and to deliver, instead of sending, the inclosed letter. I told him that it was with great reluctance that I came to make this last application to him. That I had long since informed him of the extent of the term which had been assigned for my stay at Paris, and that as I had received to this moment no answer whatever to the proposal I had repeatedly made, I could no longer delay requiring him to furnish me with the necessary passports for the return of myself, my family, and the remainder of the mission, to England. Upon this I gave him the letter, a copy of which I inclose, and on reading it he appeared somewhat startled. He lamented that so much time had been lost; but said that enough remained, if I was authorised to negotiate upon other terms. I could of course but repeat to him, that I had no

other terms to propose, and that therefore, unless the First Consul could so far gain upon himself as to sacrifice a false punctilio to the certainty of a war, of which no one could foresee the consequence, nothing could possibly prevent my departure to-morrow night. He hoped, he said, this was not so near; that he would communicate my letter, and what I had said, to the First Consul immediately, and that in all probability I should hear from him this evening. I thought it, however, right to apprize him that it was quite impossible I could be induced to disobey his Majesty's orders, and protract a negotiation on terms so disadvantageous to ourselves, unless he should furnish me with such a justification as would leave me no room to hesitate; and that I did not see that any thing short of a full acquiescence in his Majesty's demands could have that effect. He repeated that he would report the conversation to the First Consul, and that I should shortly hear from him. In this state the business now rests; I am expecting either a proposition or my passports, and am consequently taking every measure for setting out to-morrow night.

Paris, May 2, 1803.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 65.)—Translation.—Sir, When I had the honour on Tuesday last of communicating to you officially the last propositions which I was instructed by my court to submit to the French government, for the sake of removing the present difficulties, I had the honour to announce to you, that in case the First Consul should not consent to these propositions, I should find myself under the necessity of leaving Paris in eight days. We are nearly arrived at the end of this period, without my having received any answer to this communication. It remains for me only, therefore, to obey the orders of the King my master to return to him; and for this purpose I entreat you, Sir, to have the goodness to furnish me with the necessary passports. I seize this opportunity of renewing to your excellency the assurances of my high consideration. WHITWORTH.

His Excellency M. de Talleyrand.

No. 66.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Wednesday morning, May 4, 1803.*—Soon after I had dispatched the messenger the night before last, with my dispatches of the 3d, I received a communication from M. de Talleyrand, of which I inclose a copy, the purport of which was so completely short of every thing which could be satisfactory, that I did not think myself authorized to enter into any discussion upon it; and as early as I could on the following morning I returned the answer of which the inclosed is a copy. After this I concluded, of course, that there was an end to the negotiation. I had for some days past been preparing for my departure; every measure was taken for setting out at four o'clock this morning, and we were expecting only the passports which I had demanded, for the purpose of ordering the post horses. The day and the evening passed without the passports having been sent; and whilst we were deliberating on the motives of such a delay, about 12 o'clock at night, a gentleman who was with me received a communication which convinced me that it was not meant to give me my passports without another attempt, and I was, therefore, not surprized when about one o'clock I received the inclosed note from M. de Talleyrand. In this situation I am waiting the hour of rendezvous with M. de Talleyrand.

(First Inclosure referred to in No. 66.)—Translation.—The undersigned has reported to the First Consul the conversation which he had with his excellency Lord Whitworth on the 6th of this month, and in which his excellency announced, that his Britannic Majesty had ordered him to make, verbally, in his name, the following demands:—1st. That his Britannic Majesty should retain his troops at Malta for ten years. 2d. That the Island of Lampedosa should be ceded to him in full possession. 3d. That the French troops should evacuate Holland. And that if no convention on this basis should have been signed within a week, his excellency Lord Whitworth had orders to terminate his mission, and to return to London. On the demand made by the undersigned, that Lord Whitworth would, in conformity to the usage of all ages and of all countries, give in writing what he himself called the *ultimatum* of his government, his excellency declared, that his instructions expressly forbad him to transmit on this object any written note. The intentions of the First Consul being entirely pacific, the undersigned dispenses with making any observation on so new and so strange a manner of treating on affairs of this importance. And, in order to give a fresh testimony of the value which he attaches to the continuance of peace, the First Consul has directed the undersigned to make the following notification in the accustomed style and forms. As the Island of Lampedosa does not belong to France, it is not for the First Consul either to accede to or to refuse the desire testified by his Britannic Majesty, of having this Island in his possession. With regard to the Island of Malta, as the demand made respecting it by his Britannic Majesty would change a formal disposition in the treaty of Amiens, the First Consul cannot but previously communicate it to his Majesty the King of Spain, and to the Batavian Republic, for

contracting parties to the said treaty, in order to know their opinion; and besides, as the stipulations relative to Malta have been guaranteed by their Majesties the Emperor of Germany, the Emperor of Russia, and the King of Prussia, the contracting parties to the treaty of Amiens, before they agree to any change in the article of Malta, are bound to concert with the guaranteeing powers. The First Consul will not refuse this concert, but it belongs not to him to propose it, since it is not he who urges any change in the guaranteed stipulations. With regard to the evacuation of Holland by the French troops, the First Consul has no difficulty in directing the undersigned to repeat that the French troops shall evacuate Holland at the instant that the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens shall be executed in every quarter of the globe. The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his excellency the English ambassador the assurance of his high consideration.

CH. MAU. TALLEY[illegible]

Paris, ce 12 Floreal, An 11. *(2d May,* 1803.)

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 66.)—*Translation.*—The undersigned, in answer to the note which M. de Talleyrand transmitted to him yesterday evening, has the honour to observe to him, that the King has had no other motive in seeking to accelerate the proceedings of the negotiation, than to relieve as soon as possible the two countries the most interested, and Europe in general, from the state of suspense in which they are placed. It is with great regret that he perceives nothing in his excellency's note which can correspond with this intention, and consequently nothing which can justify him in delaying to obey the orders of his court. It remains, therefore, only to request the minister for foreign affairs to give him the means of obeying them, by furnishing him with the necessary passports for his return. It is, however, necessary for him to rectify a mistake which has crept into M. de Talleyrand's note. The undersigned did not say he was expressly forbidden to transmit any written note on the object of the discussion, but that he was not authorized to do it, and that he would not take that responsibility on himself. He avails himself of this opportunity to renew to his excellency M. de Talleyrand the assurances of his high consideration.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

Paris, 3d May, 1803.

Paris, May 3, 1803.

(Third Inclosure referred to in No. 66.)—*Translation.*—My Lord, Having to-morrow morning to make to you a communication of the greatest importance, I have the honour to inform you of it without delay, in order that you may not expect this evening the passports which you had demanded. I propose that you should call to-morrow at half-past four at the foreign department. Receive, my lord, the assurance of my high consideration.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 67.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Wednesday Evening, May* 4, 1803.—I am this moment come from M. Talleyrand. The inclosed note will shew your lordship, that the idea which has been thrown out is to give Malta to Russia. My only inducement for having undertaken to refer again to your lordship, is to avoid every reproach of precipitation. The difference will be but five days, and I have declared, that I see so many objections to the plan, that although I would not refuse their solicitation to send it, I could give no hope whatever of its being accepted as a ground of negotiation.

(Inclosure referred to in No. 67.)—*Translation.*—The undersigned has submitted to the First Consul his Britannic Majesty's ambassador's note of the 3d inst. After the last communication addressed to his excellency, it is more difficult than ever to conceive how a great, powerful, and enlightened nation, can be willing to take upon itself to declare a war which would be accompanied by such heavy calamities, and the cause of which would be so insignificant, the object in question being a miserable rock. His excellency must have been aware that the two-fold necessity of making an agreement with the guarantying powers of the treaty of Amiens, and of not violating a compact, in the execution of which the honour of France, the security for the future, and the good faith of the diplomatic intercourse between the nations of Europe, were so deeply interested, had imposed a law upon the French government of discarding every proposition diametrically contrary to the treaty of Amiens. Nevertheless the First Consul, accustomed for two months to make every species of sacrifice for the maintenance of peace, would not reject a mezzo-termino of a nature to conciliate the interests and dignity of the two countries. His Britannic Majesty appears to have been of opinion, that the Neapolitan garrison which was to be placed at Malta, would not afford a sufficient force for securing the actual independence of the Island. This motive being the only one which can explain his Majesty's refusal to evacuate the Island, the First Consul is ready to consent that the Island of Malta shall be placed in the hands of one of the three powers who have guarantied its independence, either Austria, Russia, or Prussia, with a proviso that as soon as France and

England shall have come to an agreement upon this article, they shall unite in their requisitions to engage the other powers, either contracting, or acceding to the treaty of Amiens, to consent to it. Were it possible that this proposition should not be accepted, it would be manifest not only that England never intended to comply with the terms of the treaty of Amiens, but that she has not been actuated by good faith in any of her demands, and that in proportion as France conceded one point, the British government advanced another. If this should be demonstrated, the First Consul will at least have given another proof of his sincerity, of his anxiety to devise the means of avoiding war, of his eagerness to embrace them, and of the value which he would place on their being adopted.

Downing-street, May 7, 1803.

No. 68.—My Lord, Your excellency's dispatches have been received, and laid before the King. The propositions which have been made to you on the part of the French government, and which have induced your excellency to delay your departure until the return of the messenger Sylvester, are in every respect so loose, indefinite, and unsatisfactory, and fall so far short of the just pretensions of his Majesty, that it is impossible that the French government could have expected them to have been accepted. During the whole of the discussions which have lately occurred, his Majesty has had a right to consider himself in the character of the injured party. No means have been omitted on his part to induce the French government to make a full and early explanation of their views, and to afford to his Majesty that satisfaction and security to which he considered himself to be entitled. It was in consequence of the apparent determination of the French government to evade all discussion on the points of difference between the two countries, that his Majesty was induced to state the grounds on which, according to his views, an arrangement might be concluded satisfactory to both governments; and he accordingly authorized your excellency to communicate the three projects which at different times I had forwarded to you. *Until the very moment* when your excellency was about to leave Paris, the French government have avoided making any distinct proposition for the settlement of the differences between the two countries, and when at the very instant of your departure, the French government felt themselves compelled to bring forward some proposition, they confined that proposition to a part only of the subject in discussion, and on that part of it, what they have brought forward is wholly inadmissible. The French government propose that his Majesty should give up the Island of Malta to a Russian, Austrian, or Prussian garrison. If his Majesty could be disposed to waive his demand for a temporary occupation of the Island of Malta, the Emperor of Russia would be the only sovereign to whom, in the present state of Europe, he could consent that the Island should be assigned; and his Majesty has certain and authentic information, that the Emperor of Russia would on no account consent to garrison Malta. Under these circumstances, his Majesty perseveres in his determination to adhere to the substance of his third project as his ultimatum: as, however, the principal objection stated by the French government to his Majesty's proposition is understood to be confined to the insertion of an article in a public treaty, by which his Majesty shall have a right to remain in the possession of the Island of Malta for a definitive number of years, his Majesty will consent that the number of years *(being in no case less than ten)* may be stated in a secret article; and the public articles may be agreed to conformably to the inclosed project. By this expedient, the supposed point of honour of the French government might be saved. The independence of the Island of Malta would, in principle, be acknowledged, and the temporary occupation of his Majesty would be made to depend *alone on the present state of the Island of Lampedosa.* You may propose this idea to M. Talleyrand, at the same time assuring him, that his Majesty is determined to adhere to the substance of his ultimatum. And if you shall not be able to conclude the minute of an arrangement on this principle, you will on no account remain in Paris more than thirty-six hours after the receipt of this dispatch. I observe by your dispatch, you did not consider yourself as authorized to deliver to the French government any note or project in writing. The words of my dispatch were, that you were to communicate the terms *officially*, which left it at your own discretion to communicate them verbally or in writing, as you might judge most expedient. You were certainly right in communicating them, in the first instance, verbally; but as so much stress has been laid by M. Talleyrand on this distinction, it is important that I should inform you, that his Majesty neither had nor has any objection to your delivering the inclosed project as an ultimatum, accompanied by a short note in writing. I cannot conclude this dispatch without recalling again your attention to the conduct of the French minister at Hamburgh, and referring you to my instructions, by which you should abstain from concluding the arrangement, unless you

have received from M. Talleyrand an assurance that his conduct would be publicly disavowed. I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) HAWKESBURY.

To his Excellency Lord Whitworth, K. B. &c.

No. 69.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, May* 9, 1803.—The messenger Sylvester is arrived with your Lordship's dispatch, No. 15, of the 7th of May. As soon as I received your lordship's instructions, I prepared a translated copy of the project furnished me by your lordship, and a short note with which it is my intention to accompany the communication. I then sent a person to Monsieur de Talleyrand, to know when I could see him, and I was informed that he was at St. Cloud. I soon after learnt, that he was gone there in consequence of the accident which happened yesterday to the First Consul. I understand that no bad consequences are likely to ensue, and that he is able to transact business. I cannot, however, expect to see M. Talleyrand before to-morrow morning. Although this circumstance may cause a delay of a few hours, your lordship may be assured, that the execution of those instructions with which you have furnished me, shall not be protracted. I shall leave Paris most assuredly, or have concluded a satisfactory arrangement, within the time specified by your lordship, reckoning from the moment of my being able to make an official communication, rather than from that of the receipt of your lordship's letter.

No. 70.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, May* 12, 1803.—The messenger Sylvester, as I mentioned in my last dispatch, returned on the 9th at twelve o'clock; and I wrote to M. de Talleyrand informing him of it, and desiring him to name an hour when I might wait upon him in order to communicate to him the purport of my instructions. To this letter I received no answer that evening or the following morning. Anxious to execute my orders, and to lose no time, I inclosed the project furnished me by your lordship, accompanied by an official note and a private letter to M. de Talleyrand, and sent it to the foreign department by Mr. Mandeville, with directions to deliver it to M. de Talleyrand, or in his absence to the *Chef du Bureau*. He delivered it accordingly to M. Durand, who promised to give it to his chief as soon as he came in, which he expected, he said, shortly. At half past four, having waited till that time in vain, I went myself to M. de Talleyrand; I was told that the family was in the country, and that they did not know when the minister would be in town. Half an hour after I had returned home, the packet which Mr. Mandeville had given into the hands of M. Durand, was brought to me, I believe by a servant, with a verbal message that as M. de Talleyrand was in the country it would be necessary that I should send it to him there. In order to defeat as much as depended upon me, *their intention of gaining time*, I wrote again to M. de Talleyrand, recapitulating the steps I had taken since the return of the messengers; and desired Mr. Talbot, the secretary of the embassy, to take it himself at nine o'clock at night, when I thought M. de Talleyrand would be at home, to his house at Meudon. He was, however, not at home. Mr. Talbot was told that he was at St. Cloud, were he had been all day, and that he would not be back until very late. He therefore left my private letter, with his name, and returned with the packet. It was my intention to have sent it on the following morning to the bureau, with orders that it should be left there; at one o'clock in the morning I received a note from M. de Talleyrand accounting for his not having been able to answer me sooner; and appointing me at twelve o'clock at the *Bureau des Relations Extérieures*. I went at the appointed time. He began by apologising for having so long postponed the interview, which he attributed to his having been the whole day with the First Consul. We then entered upon business. I told him that, limited as I was by your lordship's instructions, he could not be surprised at my impatience to acquit myself of my duty. I explained to him the nature of your lordship's observations on the proposal of the 4th, and that it was considered as on one hand impracticable from the refusal of the emperor of Russia to take charge of Malta, and on the other, as being wholly inadequate to his Majesty's just pretensions. I gave him the note in which this was expressed, and the project, on which alone a satisfactory arrangement could be framed. He read them with apparent attention, and without many remarks; and after some time he asked me if I felt myself authorised by my instructions to conclude with him a convention, framed on the basis of my project, or indeed extending that basis, since the first article of it would be the perpetual possession of Malta to England, in return for a consideration. I told him I most certainly was not authorised to enter into any engagement of such a nature, which would make the negotiation one of exchange, instead of a demand of satisfaction and security. To this he replied, that the satisfaction and security which we required was Malta, and that this we obtained. That the First Consul could not accede to what he considered, and what must be considered by the public and by Europe, as the effect of coercion, but if it were possible to make the draft palatable, did I think myself justifiable in refusing

to doso. I told him that acting in strict compliance with my instructions, I could have no need of justification, and that I came to him with the determination of abiding strictly by them. He contended, that by communicating a project, I merely stated on what grounds we would be willing to conclude; and that a counter-project, founded on the basis of giving us what we required, could not be refused a fair discussion. To this I urged the resolution of his Majesty's ministers, to avoid every thing which could protract the negotiation. That I saw no other means of acting up to those views, than by making my stand on the project at all events. I urged him repeatedly to explain himself more fully on the nature of the demand which he should make for Malta, *but he could not, or would not explain himself.* After much contest, it was agreed that the proposal should be submitted to me in the course of a few hours, and that I should determine on the line of conduct I might feel myself justified in pursuing, either to sign it, to send it home, or to leave Paris. The remainder of this day passed without receiving any communication from M. de Talleyrand. Upon this, I determined to demand my passports, by an official note, which I sent this morning by Mr. Mandeville, in order that I might leave Paris in the evening. At two, I renewed my demand of passports, and was told I should have them immediately. They arrived at five o'clock, and I propose setting out as soon as the carriages are ready.

(First Inclosure referred to in No. 70.) — Translation.—The undersigned, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to the French Republic, having transmitted to his court the proposal which was made to him by the minister for foreign affairs on the 4th instant, has just received orders to transmit to his excellency the accompanying project of a convention, founded on the only basis which his Majesty conceives, under the existing circumstances to be susceptible of a definitive and amicable arrangement. The minister for foreign affairs will not fail to observe to what degree his Majesty has endeavoured to conciliate the security of his interests with the dignity of the First Consul. The undersigned flatters himself, that the First Consul, doing justice to these sentiments, will adopt in concert with his Majesty an expedient so suitable for restoring permanent tranquillity to both nations, and to all Europe. The undersigned avails himself of this opportunity, to renew to his Excellency the assurance of his highest consideration. WHITWORTH.

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 70.) —Translation —Project.—I. The French Government shall engage to make no opposition to the cession of the island of Lampedosa to his Majesty by the King of the two Sicilies. II. In consequence of the present state of the island of Lampedosa, his Majesty shall remain in possession of the island of Malta until such arrangements shall be made by him as may enable his Majesty to occupy Lampedosa as a naval station; after which period the island of Malta shall be given up to the inhabitants, and acknowledged as an independent state. III. The territories of the Batavian Republic shall be evacuated by the French forces within one month after the conclusion of a convention founded on the principles of this projet. IV. The King of Etruria, and the Italian and Ligurian Republics, shall be acknowledged by his Majesty. V. Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French forces. VI. A suitable territorial provision shall be assigned to the King of Sardinia in Italy.

Secret Article. His Majesty shall not be required by the French government to evacuate the island of Malta until after the expiration of ten years. Articles IV. V. and VI. may be entirely omitted, or must all be inserted.

(Third Inclosure referred to in No. 70.)

Paris, May 10, 1803.

Translation.—Sir, In order not to lose an instant of so precious a time, I have the honour to convey to you the project which I have received from my court, with the note which accompanies it. I shall have the honour of calling on your excellency at any hour you may appoint, in consequence of the request I made yesterday. But in the mean while, you will be in possession of the contents of my instructions. I hope to God that they may be of a nature to insure the tranquillity of both countries and of Europe. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to your excellency the assurance of my high consideration. WHITWORTH.

To his Excellency M. de Talleyrand, &c.

(Fourth Inclosure referred to in No. 70.)

Paris, May 10, 1803.

Translation.—Sir, Having yesterday morning received some important instructions to communicate to you, I wrote to you that evening to ask your excellency at what hour I could have the honour to acquit myself of this duty. That letter has not been answered. At two o'clock this afternoon, I sent Mr. Mandeville, attached to the embassy, to the office for foreign affairs, in order to deliver to your excellency, or in your absence to your first secretary, a sealed packet, containing the papers which I had to communicate to you, and I added a second letter to your excellency. Mr. Mandeville delivered this packet into the hands of M. Du-

rand, who assured him, that it should be communicated to you without delay. At half past four, not having received any answer to my letters, I went to the foreign office, and I there learnt that you were in the country, and that it was not known when you would return to town. Half an hour afterwards having returned home, the papers which my secretary had taken and delivered to M. Durand were brought to me, with a message that I must send them to the minister in the country. In this state of things, since your excellency does not give me an opportunity of making you this communication, I have no other alternative than to give it in charge to Mr. Talbot, secretary to the embassy. He will have the honour to deliver to you the project of a convention, which, I hope, will serve as a basis to an amicable arrangement between our two governments. I have only to add, that the term of my stay in Paris is limited, and I must set out on my journey for England on Thursday morning, if the negotiation is not favourably terminated before that time. I request you, Sir, to accept the assurance of my high consideration. WHITWORTH.

(Fifth Inclosure referred to in No. 70.)—Translation.—It being impossible for the undersigned to delay any longer executing the orders of his court, he finds himself obliged to request the minister for foreign affairs to have the goodness to expedite the necessary passports for his return to England. He requests his excellency to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

(Signed) WHITWORTH.

Paris, 12th May, 1803.

No. 71.—*Extract of a dispatch from Sir George Rumbold, Bart. to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Hamburgh, March 29, 1803.*—Late last night it was determined that the Senate should be convened extraordinarily on this day, in order to consider of a requisition from the French minister, to insert in the Hamburgh paper a most offensive article, intended as a justification of the First Consul, and an attack on the measures of the British government. It is with great regret that I inform your lordship, that the Senate have judged it prudent to comply with this demand; and that the article will be inserted in the paper of to-morrow; it is now in the hands of the publisher for that purpose. It was the wish of the Senate that they might at least be allowed to omit or qualify the most offensive passages, but Mr. Rheinhardt said his orders were positive, for the *full and exact* insertion of the whole.

No. 72.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Hill to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Copenhagen, April 2, 1803.*—The French minister at Hamburgh received orders from his government to have inserted in the public papers of that city, an article which was sent to him, containing a commentary upon his Majesty's communication to Parliament, respecting the necessity of increasing the military forces of the country in the present circumstances. The Senate of Hamburgh consented with much repugnance to the insertion of this paragraph. The French minister desired that the same should be published in the papers at Altona; but the Danish magistrates said that they could not possibly permit it without an express order from this government. In consequence of this refusal, M. Daguesseau, the French minister at this court, received from his colleague at Hamburgh a copy of the article, with a request that he would solicit the permission of its publication in the Danish papers. To my knowledge he had no answer yesterday, and I have every reason to suppose that this government will shew the greatest reluctance in acceding to the French minister's request.

APPENDIX.

No. 1.—*Report made to the French Consul by Colonel Sebastiani, extracted from the Moniteur of the 30th of January, 1803.*

ON the 16th of September I embarked at Toulon on board the Cornélie; and on the 30th I arrived at Tripoli. I immediately wrote to Baron Cederstrom, the Swedish rear-admiral, as well as to the minister of the Pacha, to offer them my mediation to terminate the differences existing between the Swedish court and the regency. My mediation was accepted: the minister and the rear-admiral repaired to the commissarial house of France, and we entered on the negotiation. The two parties were far asunder; the Pacha demanded a considerable sum, and the augmentation of the annual tribute. He urged a treaty made two years ago by an envoy of the King of Sweden, which assured the payment of 245,000 heavy piastres, and of an annuity of 20,000; he added, that two

years of war had subjected him to extraordinary expences, and that he used great moderation in conforming himself to the treaty in question. M. de Cederstrom only offered in the name of his court, 100,000 piastres for the redemption of the Swedish slaves, who were to the number of a hundred and fifty, and an annuity of 5000 piastres. After much debate, I succeeded in making them sign a treaty which fixed the payment of the ransom at 150,000 piastres, and the annuity at 8000.—On the 1st of October I was presented with much pomp to the Pacha, who received me in the most distinguished manner. The exchange of the ratification of the treaty of peace took place, and the Italian Republic was formally acknowledged. I caused its flag to be hoisted on the commissarial house of France, and it was saluted by the frigate and the place with 21 guns.—It was not without difficulty that the Pacha consented to acknowledge that republic. He feared that all Italy was comprized in this new republic, and that, in consequence, he would be obliged to respect indiscriminately all the ships of commerce of that part of Europe:—this would destroy his marine. I gave him the necessary explanations, and particularly those which related to the object of his apprehensions, and he replied to me, 'Certainly I wish to be at peace with the Italian Republic, without too much injuring my interest; but if it were still more difficult, I would do it, since the great Bonaparte desires it.'—The Pacha of Tripoli is a brave and enterprizing man, the friend of France. The English have furnished succours to his brother, who is at present at Derue, without means or credit. His plan is to raise the country against the Bey. The political and administrative affairs of the regency are conducted by Seid-Muhammed-el-Deghais, minister of the Pacha. This man is full of sagacity, and has even some notions of European politics. He has been in France, and preserves for our country a predominant sentiment of affection. On the 2d of October I set out from Tripoli, and on the 16th arrived at Alexandria: the same day I waited upon General Stuart, commandant of the English forces by land and sea. I communicated to him the order of the minister for foreign affairs, which enjoined me to proceed to Alexandria, and if the English still occupied that place, to demand a speedy evacuation, and the execution of the Treaty of Amiens. General Stuart then told me, that the evacuation of the place would shortly be effected; but seeing that I insisted, and that I desired an answer less vague, he declared to me, that he had no orders from his court to quit Alexandria, and that he even believed he should pass the winter there. General Stuart is a man of *médiocre* talents: he has for his aid-de-camp a French emigrant, called the Chevalier de Sades, a man of talent, and an enemy of France, who has much influence over the general. I went the same day to see Khourchid-Ahmid, the Pacha of Alexandria and the Capitan Bey, commander of the forces of the Ottoman Porte. After the customary compliments, and some language agreeable to the Sublime Porte, I announced to them, that the agents of French commerce would assemble in Egypt. This communication gave them the greatest pleasure, and they did not conceal that they saw with grief the stay of the English in the country. I told them, that their stay could not be much longer, and that the general peace left no doubt of their approaching departure. On the 17th I visited the Cheik El-Messiry. The same day I also visited the Cheik Ibrahim Mufti. On the 18th I visited the Coupure du Khalidj, which has formed the Lake Mareotis. The current of the waters of the lake Madié is still very strong, and if the Porte does not make haste to re-establish this important canal, the overflows which take place on the little tongue of land that separates the two lakes, will render the opening so considerable, that it will be impossible to travel. I do not think that the Swedish engineer sent by the Porte to direct these labours, has the necessary talents. The formation of the lake Mareotis appears to have contributed to the salubrity of the air. The city has no other water than what it draws from the wells of Marabouf. This little fort I found guarded by an English and Turkish garrison, in order to protect the inhabitants who came to draw water. I employed the day of the 19th in perambulating the town, and receiving different individuals who came to visit me. On the 20th, I set out for Cairo, escorted by two Turkish officers, and six French soldiers, whom I had taken on board the frigate, but contrary winds obliged me to return to the port. The next day I was at Aboukir, where I passed the night. I profited by this opportunity to visit the fort, which is in a very ruined state. On the 22d I arrived at Rosetta, after having visited the fort Julien; I saw the same day Osman, Aga, and Duvanny of the town, as well as all the Christians who reside there. The 23d I was at Faoné, where I visited the commandant of the place, the Cadi, and the Cheiks; I received from the latter, and from all those whom I entertained, protestations of attachment to the First Consul. I passed the next day at Rafimanie, where I visited the Cheik Muhammed-Abou-Aly; the fort of the town is almost entirely destroyed. I visited on the 25th, at Menouf,

the Cheik Abdin, whom the First Consul had appointed Cadi. The other Cheiks of that town who came to visit me, held the same language as those of Faoué. I said to them, 'The First Consul loves your country much, he speaks of it often; he interests himself in your happiness; he did not forget you, and recommended you to the Porte. He has made peace with Europe, and this country will feel the interest which he takes, and the recollection which he has preserved of the poor Cheiks of Egypt.' Muhammed Kachef-Zourba Matzellem, who commanded at Menouf on my journey through that town, has been beheaded in consequence of being accused of communications with Mamelukes. The two forts of Menouf are destroyed. I arrived the same day at Boulak. I sent immediately Citizen Joubert to inform the Pacha of Cairo of my arrival. The next morning, the 26th, the Pacha sent 300 cavalry and 200 infantry, commanded by the principal officers of his household, to accompany me to him, amidst a great many discharges of artillery. Having arrived at the Pacha's, I said to him, 'Peace has been concluded between the French Republic and the Sublime Porte; the ancient relations of amity and commerce have been re-established, and I am charged by the Great Consul Bonaparté to assure you of his benevolence, and to announce to you the arrival of commissaries of the French commerce in Egypt.' The Pacha answered me, 'The benevolence with which the First Consul has honoured me, penetrates me with gratitude, and his commercial agents shall meet here the most friendly reception.' I proceeded then to the house which the Pacha had prepared for me. I received the same day the visits of all the principal men of the country, and of the Copt Intendants. On the 27th I again repaired to the Pacha, with whom I had a long conference. I spoke to him in these words: 'The First Consul takes in you, and the country which you govern, a very lively interest, and desires to contribute to your happiness; he has charged me, therefore, to offer you his mediation, in order to make peace between you and the Beys.

The Pacha thanked me warmly and sincerely for the interest which the First Consul took in his behalf, but he protested to me, that he had the most positive orders from his court, to make a war of extermination upon the Beys, and not to enter into any arrangement with them. I observed, that the unfortunate circumstances which had happened to the Ottoman troops (they had been beaten five times successively by the Mamelouks), rendered their position very critical, and that obstinacy exposed them to the loss of the province. He then communicated to me the order of the Porte, and I saw beyond a doubt that it was not possible for him to enter into any accommodation. I informed him that I intended to visit the different Cheiks of Cairo, and also Madame Murad Bey, and to inspect the environs and fortifications of the city. He ordered immediately that the guard which he had sent should accompany me wherever I wished to go, informing me that he would use every means in his power to render my stay at Cairo agreeable. The same day I commenced my visits, beginning with the Cheik Abdallah-el-Chescanoi, of the great mosque. As I was expected by him, he had assembled a considerable number of Cheiks. The conversation turned upon the interest which the First Consul took in Egypt, on his power, his glory, and on his esteem and benevolence for the learned Cheiks of Cairo. Their answers expressed their attachment to his person. He must have been a witness like myself to the enthusiasm excited at the view of the portrait of the First Consul, to form an idea of the exaltation of their sentiments. I have given it to all the principal Cheiks of Cairo, and of the towns where I have travelled. On the 28th I invited the Cheik Omar El-Berky, Prince of the Shirifs: he was ill, and I saw only his son. The Cheik Suleiman El-Fargoumy received me with much friendship, and assured me of his boundless admiration for the First Consul. The citizen Joubert and Beye have certified to me that the inhabitants of Cairo never testified so much attachment to France as on my arrival. When we pass along the streets, every body salutes us. Their astrologers make predictions every day as to what concerns the First Consul. On the 29th, I went to visit Madame Murad Bey: her intendant had already prayed of me that I would grant her an interview. I informed her, that the First Consul had charged me to interpose my mediation, in order to make their peace with the Sublime Porte; but that the Pacha had ordered that no negociation should be entered into. I employed that day and the following in visiting the citadel, the isle of Ro da Gizé Boulak, and all the other little forts which surround the city. The Turkish soldiers murmured to see me visit their forts, but I feigned not to hear them, and continued my course and my observations. On the 29th, in returning to Fort Dupuy, a soldier menaced me with his attagan; but as the inhabitants of the city testified highly their indignation against him, I did not stop at his menaces, and continued my route. A moment afterwards Mustapha Oukil, one of the chiefs of the city, passed before me on horseback. In passing, he reproached my guides

with marching before a Christian, and above all, before a Frenchman, and menaced them with the bastinado after my departure. I could not be silent under such an insult; and upon my return I sent Citizen Joubert to the Pacha, to make my complaint, and demand a prompt redress. I declared to him that I expected this man would come publicly to me to ask my pardon, place himself at my disposal, and implore my pity. He found that Mustapha was greatly protected by the Pacha, and wanted to arrange it otherwise; but I persisted by declaring formally to the Pacha, that if this reparation was not made in the manner in which I demanded it, I should instantly depart, and immediately write to Paris and Constantinople to state my complaint. This declaration produced all the effect which I expected; and Mustapha, alarmed, came on the following day to me, conducted by Rosetti, and he publicly asked my pardon, and put himself at my disposal. I told him that my first intention had been to cut off his head, and that I only gave him his life at the solicitations of the Pacha and M. Rosetti; but if in future he should ever insult the French, or those in their suite, his destruction would be inevitable. This affair, which was instantly spread throughout the whole city, produced the best effect. The same day an attempt was made to excite the Albanese against me. Two letters from Rosetta, written by English Protegées, assured that there had been seen upon the coasts of Naroli a French fleet of 300 sail; that we were marching against Constantinople, and that my visit to Egypt had no other object but to deceive them, and blind them to their dangers. I made the merchant come to me who had received the letter: I made him give it me—I instantly sent it to the Pacha himself, telling him that this absurd news was spread to occasion disorders, and to endeavour to alter the good understanding which existed between France and the Sublime Porte; and I guaranteed the falsehood of it with my head. The Pacha had discovered the snare, and did not fall into it. He even communicated to me a letter from General Stuart, which he had just received, and to which was joined an order of the day, of the First Consul, when he commanded the army of Egypt. This order of the day was dated in August 1799, and recalled to the recollection of the Egyptians, that Constantinople was tributary to Arabia, and that the time was now come to restore Cairo to its supremacy, and to destroy the Eastern empire of the Ottomans. General Stuart begged the Pacha to consider the spirit of that order, and to judge from it of our attachment, and of our peace with the Turks. I was indignant to find that a soldier of one of the most polite nations of Europe should degrade himself so far as to instigate assassination, by means of such an insinuation—the Pacha treated me with the greatest politeness, and the English at Cairo were witnesses of the attachment of that city to the French. I received a deputation from the Monks of Mount Sinai, whom I recommended to the Pacha: I wrote to their superior, to assure them of the friendship and protection of the First Consul. The Monks of the Propaganda at Cairo, whom I placed under the national protection which they enjoyed before the war, celebrated a *Te Deum* for the prosperity of the First Consul. I assisted at this ceremony, at which all the Christians of Cairo were present. The evening before my departure (the 2d of November) I had another interview with the Pacha, and recommended all the Christians of Cairo to his protection, as well as the Turks, who, during the residence of the French in Egypt, were connected with them. He not only promised to respect them, but even to treat them with bounty. On the 3d, I set out in a conveyance of the Pacha's, in order to repair to Damietta. The Pacha ordered me to be escorted to Boulak, with the same honours that I received on the day of my arrival. I had written to Captain Gourdin, to repair to Damietta with the frigate, in order to convey me to Syria. On the 5th I stopped a short time at Simenoud, and afterwards at Mansoura, where I saw the commandant of the city and the Cheik Esseid-Muhammed-El-Chenaoni, who came to see me, as well as all the other cheiks. I spoke to them in the same manner as the other cheiks of Egypt, and received the same promises of attachment. The Tower of Mansoura is destroyed. The same day I arrived at Damietta. The next day I went to Ahmed-Pacha Behil, a creature of the Grand Vizier's; he returned my visit the same day. He conducted himself perfectly well to me during my stay in that city. On the 7th I went to visit the fort of Lesbe and the towers of Bogaz. They have not continued the works of that fort, which is in a bad state: those of Bogaz are in a good condition. There is a garrison of 200 men in the fort and in the towers. On the 8th I received the visit of Hassan Toubar: his influence over the inhabitants of Mensale is still the same. On the 9th I went to Senenie, where I saw the Cheik Ibrahim-El-Behlout, he who behaved so well to the French under the orders of General Vial, when they were taken and imprisoned. The First Consul had exempted his village from all contributions. I saw all the chieks at Damietta, particularly Ali Khasaki, whom the First Consul had invested

with a pelisse: he is possessed of great credit, and is much attached to the French. There are at Damietta two Christians, who are men of merit, and may be very useful to us: they are M. Bazile and Don Bazile. They are possessed of good information, have very considerable fortunes, and are very highly respected. In Egypt, chiefs, merchants, people, all like to talk of the First Consul; all offer up prayers for his happiness. All the news which concerns him spreads from Alexandria or Damietta to the Pyramids and the Grand Cataracts with astonishing rapidity. On the 14th the frigate arrived at Bogaz from Damietta: I immediately set out for Acre, at which place I arrived on the 19th. The 20th of November, in the morning, I dispatched Citizens Joubert and Legrange to Dgezzar-Pacha, with a letter, in which I stated to him, that peace being concluded between France and the Porte, the relations of commerce should be re-established on the footing they stood before the war, and that I was charged by the First Consul to confer with him on these objects. I begged of him to answer me in writing, if he was inclined to treat with me. In some hours the messengers returned: Dgezzar had received them coldly. He expressed his desire to see me personally, but was unwilling to write. Every body advised me not to see him, without an assurance written by himself; but this he appeared unwilling to do: but notwithstanding this cautionary advice, and his obstinate refusal to write, I determined to repair myself immediately to Acre. I repaired to the house of the Commissary of the Seven Isles. Very soon after, the Drogoman of the Pacha, informed of my arrival, came to conduct me to the Pacha, who received me in an apartment where he was unattended, and which was without any other furniture than a carpet. He had on one side of him a pistol with four barrels, a small air-gun, a sabre, and a hatchet. After enquiring as to my health, he asked me, whether I was not persuaded that our end is pre-ordained in heaven, and that nothing could change our destiny. I answered that I believed, as he did, in predestination. He continued to speak for some time on that subject. "I perceived, however, that he affected a degree of simplicity, but that, at the same time, he wished to pass for a man of wit, as well as for a just man. He repeated several times, 'It is said, that Dgezzar is barbarous: this is false; he is but just and severe. Request of the First Consul not to send me, as commissary of commercial relations, a lame or a blind man; because such a person would be sure to say, that Dgezzar had made him so.' Soon after he said, 'I desire that the commissary you may send shall reside at Seide, as that is the most commercial port in my dominions: besides, it is not necessary he should reside here, where I shall be myself the French commissary, and shall take care that your countrymen be well received. I highly esteem the French. In stature Bonaparte is small, but he is nevertheless the greatest of mankind. I know that he is greatly regretted at Cairo, where they wish to see him again. I made a few observations on the peace between France and the Porte; to which he answered, 'Do you know why I have thus received, and feel so much pleasure at seeing you? It is because you come unauthorized by a *Firman*, and without any orders from the Divan. I have the greatest contempt for its blind Vizier. They say that Dgezzar is a Bosnian, a man of straw, and cruel to excess; but nevertheless, I can stand the ordeal. I was once poor. My father had nothing to bequeath me but courage. I have achieved my own elevation by dint of exertion. This, however, does not make me proud, and Dgezzar, perhaps, will soon finish his career; not that he is old, as his enemies report, (he then performed some of the manœuvres of the Mamelukes, in their mode of rising their arms, &c. which he really executed with surprising adroitness and agility), but because, most likely, God will have it so. The King of France, once so powerful, has perished. Nebuchadnezzar, the greatest of all kings, was, when his time was come, killed by a fly, &c.' He made several other observations in this strain, and afterwards spoke of the motives which induced him to make war upon the French army: from the whole of his demeanour it could easily be seen, that he wished to be on good terms with the First Consul, and that he stifled his resentments. The following is the apologue, which he used to demonstrate the causes of his resistance. 'A black slave,' he said, 'after a long journey, in which he had suffered the greatest privations, arrived at a little field of sugar canes: he stopped therein, and indulged himself in partaking of the delicious liquor they afforded; and at length was determined to remain on the spot. Very soon after, two travellers, who had followed him, came up. The first said to him, Salamalle (the mode of wishing health). The devil take it, answered the black. The second traveller then approached, and enquired why he had answered in such a way to so good a wish. I had very good reason for it, replied he; if I had answered in a friendly manner, the man would have entered into conversation with me, and afterwards sat down beside me; he would have partaken of my refreshments, and finding them desire-

able, would have endeavoured to obtain exclusive possession.' I recommended to the favourable attention of Dgezzar the Christians and the convents at Nazareth and Jerusalem: he assured me that he would treat them with much regard. I did not forget the Mutuales, and received the same assurance in their behalf. Dgezzar frequently observed to me, that his word was, with him, more sacred than treaties. Our conversation was interrupted for some moments by a kind of military music, which he performed in a very agreeable style. The palace of Dgezzar is built with much taste and elegance; but, in order to arrive at the apartments, a number of turnings are necessary. At the foot of the staircase, however, is situated a prison, the gate of which is allowed to be open from noon till evening. I saw a number of the unfortunate inhabitants. In the courts I observed twelve field-pieces well mounted, and in admirable order. Never did I encounter a sight more hideous or repulsive than that of the minister of Dgezzar, whom I met in going out. The Pacha had caused one of his eyes to be put out, and his nose and ears to be cut off. I saw in the town more than a hundred individuals in the same state. On beholding the domestics of Dgezzar, and even the inhabitants of Acre, one would imagine himself in the resorts of brigands ready to assassinate. This monster has imprinted the mark of his atrocious character upon every thing within the limits of his power. I had an opportunity of seeing, while at Acre, the Procurateur of the Propaganda, as well as that of the Holy Land. Of the former, and of the Commissary of the Seven Isles, I collected some information concerning the present state of Syria, and the fortifications of Acre, of which I had seen but a part: I was not suffered to visit them. The Procurateur of the Holy Land is grateful to the First Consul for the protection he had afforded the monks. He assured me that my recommendation to Dgezzar would be very useful. He hinted to me Dgezzar's earnest wishes to be on good terms with the First Consul. It is certain that the former behaved very well to the crew of a French vessel which put into Acre shortly before my arrival. Dgezzar occupies all Palestine, with the exception of Jaffa, where Aboumarak Pacha has been besieged nearly five months, by a force of 9000 men. This operation prevents Dgezzar from carrying on hostilities with the desired vigour against the Emir of the Druses, who, for the space of a year, had paid him no tribute. Tripoli is tranquil at present: it is different at Aleppo, whence the Pacha has been driven. Damascus is in open rebellion against the Porte; not only has the Pacha of the Divan been expelled, but the Aga, who commanded the citadel for the Turks, has been delivered up by the soldiers to the insurgents, who have decapitated him. Tripoli is now under a rebellious Pacha, who is a creature of Dgezzar; who has lately ordered him to protect the pilgrims from Mecca. In a word, all Syria is with Dgezzar, and the Ottomans are as much detested here as in Egypt. The Mutuales live peaceably in their villages; they have, however, been obliged to retire from the borders of the sea. Aboumarak is now at the last extremity: this man is equally inconsiderate and cruel, and is surpassed only by Dgezzar. The Christians are even more in dread of him, and tremble for their future situation. The monks of the convent of Jaffa have withdrawn to Jerusalem. The 21st November I quitted Acre. As the winds were unfavourable to a voyage to Jaffa, I set sail for Zante, where I arrived the 4th December. I landed the same day, but the ship's company were put under quarantine. I repaired to the house of the French commissary, escorted by the officers of health. I soon learned that the Isle and the Republic were split into different parties, and that even the tranquillity of the place was threatened. I assembled the members of the constituted authorities, and the principal persons of the town, at the house of the governor, M. de Calishipode. After having represented to them the interest which the First Consul took in their welfare, I induced them to lay aside that spirit of party which distracted them, and to wait without passion, and in silence, the new constitution. These few words were received with enthusiasm, and all of them exclaimed, 'France for ever, Bonaparte for ever!' These cries were reiterated on my going out by more than 4000 men, who followed me to the door. The governor and the Russian commandant were alarmed at it; and I learned by the French commissary, on the following day, that two of the leading men were sent to prison, but that, on his solicitations, and fearful of my reproaches, they were set at liberty in the course of the night. I went to the Conciergerie, and had the governor brought there. I spoke to him strongly on the irregularity of his conduct: he was alarmed, and promised that he would look upon those who cried out, 'Live the First Consul!' as good citizens, and in future treat them as such. As he sent, in the course of the night, a courier to his government, and I had reason to believe he had made a wrong report, I immediately wrote to the Charge d'Affaires of the Republic at Corfou, to inform him what had passed, and that I was setting off for Messina. I do not stray from the truth in

assuring you, that the islands of the Ionian Sea will declare themselves French as soon as an opportunity shall offer itself.

English Army in Egypt.—That army, commanded by General Stuart, consists of 4430 men. They wholly and exclusively occupy Alexandria and the neighbouring forts. The Turks, who formed the garrison of some of these forts, have been removed. Lately the English general has occupied Demanhour with 100 infantry and 100 horse, under the pretext of curbing the Arabs. The English have made no necessary works for the maintenance of the forts; the palisades are almost entirely destroyed, and the branches occasioned by the rains have very much damaged all the new fortifications. They occupy none of the works which are beyond the line of the Arabs, and all the redoubts which existed at the departure of the French army are destroyed. The Pacha of Cairo furnishes to the English army corn, rice, wood, and provisions, without any payment. The consumption is treble what it should be: they commit great waste. A great misunderstanding reigns between General Stuart and the Pacha.

STATE OF THE ARMY.

Dillon's regiment—emigrants -	450
British chasseurs—ditto - -	550
Role's regiment—Swiss - -	600
Wetteville's regiment—ditto -	680
The 10th regiment of infantry—English	600
The 61st regiment infantry—ditto -	650
The 88th regiment infantry—ditto -	400
Dragoons of the 26th light—ditto -	350
Artillery—ditto - - -	150
Total -	4430

The Turkish Army.—Muhammed, Pacha of Cairo, who has taken, it is not known why, the title of Viceroy of Egypt, does not command the troops in person. Muhammed Aly-Serr-Chersme, who had the command since my arrival, was killed before Gaza; they are now under the orders of Jussef Kiahia. Tair is Pacha of the Arnaoutes, who compose the greatest part of this army, amounting to about 16,000 men. They from time to time receive reinforcements. Chourchid-Ahmed, a Pacha of two tails, is at Alexandria with 600 men, who occupy no fortification. This Pacha is, as one may say, a prisoner with the English. The Turkish army consists of 7640 men, and that of the Arnaoutes of 8500, making a whole of 16,140. It is useless to add, that this is not an army; they are men ill armed, without discipline, without confidence in their chiefs, and enervated by excessive debauchery. The chiefs are in every thing like their soldiers; ignorant even of the first principles of the military art; and uniformly actuated by the love of wealth, they think of nothing but of obtaining it, and of finding the means of carrying it off in safety. Six thousand French would at present be enough to conquer Egypt.

Army of the Mamelukes.—The army of the Beys is composed of 3000 Mamelukes, of 3500 Arabs of the tribe of Ababde of Chark, and of 3500 of the tribe of Binialy. Muhammed Bey Elfy married the daughter of the Cheik of the first, and Maarzouk Bey, son of Ibrahim Bey, the daughter of the Cheik of the tribe of Binialy. The power in this army is divided between Ibrahim Bey, who is the chief, Eley Bey and Osman Bey, who has succeeded Murad Bey. Their head-quarters are at Djergé. They have 80 French deserters, which form a small corps of artillery. To the present time they have beat the Turks in every action, and the Egyptians prefer them to the Osmanlis. The whole of Upper Egypt has submitted to them.

Syria.—Acre. The body of this place has been repaired; the port has been covered with a small horned work, and the tower of the angle by a half-moon. They have likewise made a small fleche, in front of the palace of the Pacha. All the works are well kept. The weakest part is that towards the sea, and particularly the point which defends the entrance of the port. The forces of Dgezzar are at present 13 or 14,000 men, of which 9,000 are employed at the siege of Jaffa. Jerusalem and Nazareth are occupied by the troops of the Pacha of Acre. The Naplonsains serve against Aboumarsk.—*Jaffa.* The Vizier, after the taking of Egypt, caused the body of the place to be re-constructed, which is at present in a very good state. Aboumarak, Pacha of Palestine, who defends this place, has a garrison of 4000 men. Gaza is occupied by 400 troops of Aboumarak. The Emir of the Druses has refused to Degezzar his annual contribution, and has raised a respectable armament. The Pacha waits till the fall of Jaffa to attack him. The English wished to interfere as mediators between the Emir and Dgezzar, but the last refused their mediation. The Porte has, at this moment, little connexion with Syria.

(Signed) HORACE SEBASTIANI.

No. 2.

Paris, 3 Ventose, Feb. 22.

ACTS OF THE GOVERNMENT.

Decree of the Government of the 21st February.—The government of the republic decrees, that a view of the present situation of the republic shall be carried to the legislative body by the messengers of the government,

and also the same be inserted in the bulletin of the laws.

(Signed) BONAPARTE, First Consul.

By order of the First Consul,

(Signed) H. B. MARET, Secretary of State.

VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE REPUBLIC.

Events have neither frustrated the wishes nor disappointed the expectations of government. The Legislative Body, on resuming its labours, has the satisfaction of finding the republic strengthened by the union of its citizens, more active in its pursuits of industry, and more confident in its prospects of prosperity. The execution of the Concordat, from which the enemies of public order still ventured to conceive criminal hopes, has almost every where produced the most beneficial effects. The principles of an enlightened religion, the voice of the sovereign Pontiff, the firmness and perseverance of government have triumphed over every obstacle. Mutual sacrifices have reunited the ministers of religion; enlightened reason, and cordial unanimity have revived the Gallican Church; and the happiest change has already manifested itself in the public morals. Every day produces a more perfect coincidence of opinion and of sentiment. Childhood is more docile to the instructions of parents, and youth more submissive to the authority of magistrates. The conscription goes on smoothly in those very places, where the mere name of conscription was sufficient to stimulate insurrection, and to serve the country is now become a duty of religion. In those departments which the First Consul visited, he every where received pledges, and observed proofs of a return to those principles which constitute the strength and the happiness of society. In the departments of the Eure, the Lower Seine, the Oise, the inhabitants proudly exult in the national glory. They are sensible to their full extent of the advantages of equality. They hail with blessings the restoration of peace; they receive with blessings the re-establishment of public worship. These are the tie that bind down every heart to the state and the constitution. It is the duty of government to cherish and direct these auspicious dispositions. Other forms of worship have been regularly organized. Consistories are formed of enlightened citizens, tried and acknowledged defenders of public order, of civil and religious liberty. Public instruction, that indispensible support of society, is every where sought after with eagerness and alacrity. Several lyceums have already been opened; already, as government had well foreseen, a number of private schools aspire to the rank of the secondary schools. The whole body of citizens shew their conviction that there can be no happiness without the light of education; that, without talents and information, there can be no equality but that of misery and servitude. A military school is opened to receive the young defenders of the country. Soldiers, they will learn to support the life of camps, and endure the fatigues of war. By long habits of obedience they will be trained up to the art of commanding, and they will bring to the armies courage and discipline, united with talents and with knowledge. In the lyceums, as well as in the military school, the youth of the departments, newly incorporated with the republic, will live mingled without any distinction with the youth of old France. From this confusion of minds and manners, from this communication of habits and of dispositions, from this commixture of interests, of projects, and of hopes, will spring up that fraternity, which of several nations will make but one people, destined by their position, by their courage, and by their virtues, to form the centre of union, and the example of Europe. The national institute, which has its ascendancy over public instruction, has received a more useful direction, and henceforward will exert a more active influence over the national character, over the language of the country, and over the arts, sciences, and literature. In order to insure the stability of our infant institutions, in order to remove from the eyes of the public the spectre of discord which appeared to them in the periodical return of elections to the supreme magistracy, the friends of the country called for the consulate for life to be granted to the first magistrate. The people upon being consulted answered to their call, and the senate proclaimed the will of the people. The system of lists of eligibility could not resist the test of experience, and the force of public opinion. The organization of the senate was incomplete. The national justice was left to be administered by tribunals without harmony, and without dependence on each other. There was no authority to protect or to reform them; no tie of restraint to subject them to one common discipline. In fine, there was wanting to France a power to reclaim justice itself, the power of granting pardon. How often these twelve years past has that power been implored! How many unfortunates have fallen the victims of an inflexible sternness with which wise men reproached our laws! How many criminals have been acquitted through a false indulgence, because our punishments were too severe! A senatus consultum has restored to the people the exercise of those rights which the Constituent Assembly had acknowledged; but it has restored them surrounded with precautions, which preserve

the people from errors or precipitation in their choice; with precautions which guard the influence of property, and the preponderance of enlightened talents. Should the first magistracy become vacant, the duties and the proceedings of the Senate are traced out for such an emergency: forms of certain operation guide the wisdom and the liberty of their choice; and the quick decision of that choice deprives ambition of the means of conspiring, and anarchy of the means of destroying. The cement of time will every day consolidate, more and more, this tutelary institution. It will be not only the term of all disquietudes, and the object of all hopes, but likewise the fairest recompences that can be held out to public services and public virtues. Justice embraces all the tribunals with one common bond. They have each their subordinate station and their censor: they are always free in the exercise of their functions; always independent of power, but never independent of the laws. The privilege of granting pardon when the interest of the Republic requires it, or when circumstances prescribe indulgence, is entrusted to the hands of the First Magistrate; but it is only confided to him under the guard of justice itself; he is to exercise it only under the eyes of a council, and after having consulted the severest oracles of the law. If institutions may be appreciated by their effects, never was any institution more important in its result than the organic Senatus Consultum. From that moment the French people began to confide in their destiny; property began to reassume its former value, and speculations of distant view to be multiplied;—until that moment every thing seemed to float in uncertainty. The present moment was cherished; the next was a subject of alarm, and the enemies of the country continued to cherish hopes. Since that moment they are reduced to impotence and to detestation. The island of Elba has been ceded to France; that acquisition gives her a mild and industrious people; two fine ports, a productive and precious mine: but being separated from France, it could not be intimately united with any of her departments, or subjected to the regulations of a common administration. Principles have been made to bend to the necessity of circumstances; exceptions have been established for the Island of Elba, which its position, and the public interest prescribed. The abdication of the sovereign, the will of the people, and the necessity of existing circumstances, had placed Piedmont under the power of France. Amidst the nations that surrounded it, with the elements that composed its population, Piedmont was unable to support either the weight of its own independence, or the expences of a monarchy. United to France, it will reap the benefits of its security, and its greatness; its laborious and enlightened citizens will exert their industry and their talents in the bosom of the arts, and under the shade of peace. Security and tranquillity prevail in the interior of France. The vigilance of the magistracy, the severity of justice, and a gendarmerie vigorously appointed, and directed by a Commander, grown grey in the career of honour, has every where impressed terror on the minds and the attempts of the brigands. Private interest has raised itself to a sentiment of public interest. Citizens have not shrunk from attacking those whom they formerly dreaded, even when they were chained down at the foot of the tribunals of justice. Whole communes have taken up arms and destroyed the brigands. Foreigners envy the security of our public roads, and that public force, which, though often invisible, is always present, attend on their footsteps, and watch for their protection, without any necessity of imploring its aid. During the course of a difficult year, amidst the exigencies of a general scarcity, the poor looked with confidence to the care of government. They supported with courage the privations which necessity imposed: and they received with gratitude the succours which they were taught to expect.—The crime of forgery is no longer encouraged by the hope of impunity. The zeal of the tribunals appointed to prosecute and punish it, and the just severity of the laws have at length checked the progress of an evil which threatened both the public treasure, and the fortunes of individuals. Our cultivation daily improves, and defies the most boasted agricultural systems of Europe. In every department are to be found enlightened farmers, who afford both instruction and example. Premiums have been held out for improving the breed of horses; and similar encouragements are proposed for the improvement of wool by the introduction of a foreign breed of sheep. Zealous administrators are every where occupied in tracing out and revealing the richness of our soil, and in disseminating the useful plans and the happy results which experience daily discovers. Our manufactures multiply and receive new spirit and improvement. While they emulate each, they will soon, no doubt, become the rivals of the most renowned manufactures of foreign countries. Henceforth there will be nothing wanting to their prosperity but capitals less dearly purchased. But capitalists begin already to give up the hazardous speculations of stock-jobbing, and devote their attention to the improvement of land and the pursuit of useful enterprizes. More than twenty thousand workmen, who were dispersed throughout Europe, have been recalled by the attention and by the favours of Government,

and will soon be restored to our manufactures. Among our manufactures there is one which is almost peculiar to France, which Colbert kindled up by his genius. It was buried under the ruins of Lyons: Government has exerted all its endeavours to extricate it. Lyons is again restored to splendour and opulence; already do its manufactures impose a tribute on the luxury of Europe. But the principle of their success is to be found in the luxury of France itself; it is in the changefulness of our taste, and the mutability of our fashions, that foreign luxury must look for its aliment, it is it that gives motion and life to an immense population, who, without that encouragement, must lose itself in corruption and misery. There will soon be at Compiegne, there will soon arise on the confines of La Vendee, a number of Prytanees, where our youth will be brought up in habits of industry, and instructed in the mechanical arts. From that source our dock-yards and our manufactories will one day draw inspectors to direct their labours. Fourteen millions arising out of the barrier tax, and ten millions out of the extraordinaries, have been employed during the year 10 in improving the public roads, in keeping up the old communications. New communications have also been opened. The Simplon, Mount-Cenis, and Mount-Genevre, will soon open a triple and easy access to Italy; a high road will lead from Genoa to Marseilles; a road is chalked out from Saint Esprit to Gap; another from Rennes to Brest, through Pontivy. At Pontivy establishments are to be raised which will have a powerful influence over the public mind of the departments of which cidevant Britanny was composed; a canal will introduce into it new sources of commerce and prosperity. On the banks of the Rhine from Bingen to Coblentz, a necessary road is cut through inacessible rocks. The neighbouring communes associate their labours to the sacrifices of the public treasury, and the people of the other bank, who ridiculed the folly of the enterprize, are astonished and confounded at the rapidity of the execution. A great number of workmen are employed on the canal of Saint Quintin. The canal of Ourcq is opened, and soon will Paris people enjoy the benefit of its waters, and the salubrity and the embellishments which they promise. The canal intended to unite the navigation of the Seine and the Saone, of the Danube and the Rhine, is almost entirely finished as far as Dole, and the public treasury already receives in the increased price of wood, to which that canal opens the approach, a sum equal to that which it has furnished for the continuance of the work. The canals of Argues, Mortes, and the Rhone, the draining of the marshes of the Lower Charente, are begun, and will open up new channels to commerce, and afford new lands for cultivation. Works are going forward for the reparation of the dykes of the Isle of Cadsand, of Ostend, of the Cotes du Nord, and the re-establishment of the navigation of our rivers. This navigation is no longer given up solely to the labours and the cares of government. The owners of boats plying on these rivers have already felt that it was their patrimony, and they fix on themselves the taxes by which the works are to be kept in proper repair. On the ocean forts are erecting to cover the roads of the isle of Aix, and to protect the vessels of the Republic. Every where funds are raised for the reparation and improvement of our ports. A new bason and locked sluices will terminate the harbour of Havre, and will form an excellent port for the commerce of La Manche. A company of pilots is formed to secure the safe navigation of L'Escaut, and to free foreign pilots from the danger to which an unknown navigation must expose them. At Antwerp labours are begun, which will have the effect of restoring to its commerce its ancient celebrity, and the government has in contemplation a plan for forming canals to unite the navigation of the Escaut, the Meuse, and the Rhine, to give to our docks those materials of wood which grows in our own soil, and to our manufactures a perfection which the manufacturers of other countries dispute with us on our own territory. The islands of Martinique, Tobago, and St. Lucie, have been restored to us with all the elements of prosperity. Guadaloupe, reconquered and pacified, returns to cultivation. Guiana rises from a long protracted infancy, and assumes a flourishing appearance. St Domingo had submitted, and the author of its troubles was in France.—Every thing announced the return of prosperity, but a cruel malady delivered it up to new miseries. At length the scourge which desolated our army has ceased its ravages. The forces which now are on the island, and those which will speedily arrive from our different ports, guarantee the prospect of its speedy return to peace and to commercial pursuits. Vessels are setting sail for the isles of France and Re-union, and for India. Our maritime commerce is seeking to renew its ancient connections, to form new relations; and by these efforts it gains new strength. Already happy experience and wise encouragements have reanimated a spirit for engaging in the fishery which was long the patrimony of France. Commercial expeditions still more important are formed or projected for the West-India Colonies, the Isle of France, and the East Indies. Marseilles resumes in the Mediterranean its antient ascendancy. Chambers of commerce have been restored in the cities where they formerly existed. New ones

have been established in those places, which, by the extent of their operations and the importance of their manufactures, have appeared to deserve them. In these associations, formed by persons whose situation entitles them to the honour of choosing the members, the spirit, as well as the science of commerce will revive. There its interests will be developed, inseparable from the interests of the state. The merchant will there learn to place, in preference to riches, the consideration which honours them, and before the enjoyments of a vain luxury, that wise economy which fixes the esteem of his fellow-citizens and the confidence of strangers. Deputies, chosen from the different chambers, will discuss, in the presence of government, the interests of commerce and manufactures, and the laws and regulations which circumstances may require. In our forces, by sea and land, instruction and the love of discipline are sedulously inculcated. Responsibility becomes more rigid in our military corps. An economical administration has succeeded to the dilapidating system of contracts. The soldier, better fed and better clothed, understands economy, and his savings, which he throws into the common stock, attach him to his standard as well as to his family. Every branch of our finances becomes more productive. The collection of direct contribution is less rigorous with regard to the contributors. In the year six it was reckoned that about fifty millions were in the hands of the collectors of taxes, and payments were three or four years in arrear. At this moment the sum in the hands of the collectors is not above three millions, and the contributions are paid even before they are due. All the rules which have been made, and all the plans of administration which have been formed, give a produce still increasing. The rules applicable to the registering of commercial transactions is productive to a degree, which attests the rapid movements of capital and the multiplicity of business which is transacted. In the midst of so many signs of prosperity, the excess of the direct contributions is still made a ground of complaint. The government has learnt from every one versed in the principles of taxation, that the surcharge consisted chiefly in the inequality of the mode in which the taxes were imposed. Measures have been taken, and are carring into effect, to ascertain the real inequalities which exist in the different departments. In the course of the year 12, regular and simultaneous operations will have ascertained what is the relation which ought to exist betwixt the contributions of the different departments, and what in each department is the just rate of the land tax. The moment that a certain result has been fixed, the government will give orders for those alterations which justice requires. But in the course of this year, and without waiting for those results, it will propose an important diminution in the land tax. Innovations are still proposed in our financial system; but every change is an evil, if it cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated that certain advantage would result from it. The government will seek from time and from discussions, weighed with all possible care, the maturity of these projects which inexperience often hazards; which they support by those past examples, the memory of which has been almost effaced from the public mind, and on the financial doctrines of a nation which, by unnatural and exaggerated efforts, has broke through every measure of public contribution and expenditure. With an increase of revenue which no one ventured to calculate, extraordinary circumstances have led to wants which it was impossible to foresee. It was necessary to reconquer two of our colonies, and to re-establish in all the power and the government of the mother country. It was necessary, by means sudden and too extended to admit of rigid economy, to procure subsistence for the capital and several of the departments. At least, however, the success of the government has been equal to its efforts, and after these vast exertions, resources remain henceforth to guarantee the capital against the return of want, and to disconcert the projects of monopoly. In the methodized statement of the minister of finance, will be found a general view of the annual contributions and the different branches of the public revenue, what was their amount during the last year, what prospect of amelioration existed; whether from the mode of administration or the progress of public prosperity, what have been in the different departments of the ministry, the elements of expenditure during the year ten; what are the sums still remaining to be paid for that and former years; what resources exist to cover them, whether arising from outstanding arrears of taxes, or from the extraordinary funds appropriated to pay off the debts contracted in these years, and which have not yet been exhausted; what is the actual amount of the public debt; what has been its increase, how it has been diminished by natural causes, and how its extinction has been effected by the sinking fund. In the account of the minister of the public treasury will be seen a statement of the receipts, the payments of the year ten; what belongs to the different branches of the revenue; what is chargeable in each year and on each part of the administration. The

united accounts of the two ministers will form a complete table of our financial situation. The government hold up with equal satisfaction the picture which it presents to its friends and its detractors, to citizens and to foreigners. After authorizing the foreseen expence of the year 12, and appropriating the necessary revenue, objects of the greatest interest will occupy the attention of the Legislative Body. It is necessary to introduce a change into our system of coinage. The custom-house duties must be reorganized, so as more effectually to check the progress of contraband trade. It is at length essential to give to France that civil code so long promised and so long expected. Above all, projects of laws have been formed under the observation of government, and matured in conferences where commissions from the Council of State and the Tribunate were animated only by the love of truth and regard for the public interest. The same sentiments, the same principles will guide the deliberation of the legislators, and secure to the republic the wisdom, and the impartiality of the laws which are adopted. On the continent, every thing offers us pledges of repose and tranquillity. The Italian Republic, since the proceedings at Lyons, has been daily strengthening itself by the more intimate union of the people of whom it is composed. The happy harmony among the authorities by which it is governed, its internal administration, its military force already give it the character and the attitude of a state long established; and if wisdom preserve them, they guarantee to it a destiny of uninterrupted prosperity. Liguria, placed under a mixed constitution, sees at its head, and in the bosom of its authorities, all those of its citizens, the most estimable for their virtues, by their illumination and their fortune. New shocks have convulsed the Helvetic Republic. The government owed its support to neighbours, whose repose was essential to the repose of France, and it will use every exertion to ensure the success of its mediation, and with it the happiness of a people whose position, whose habits, and whose interests, make it the necessary ally of France. Batavia successively takes possession of the colonies which the peace restored to her. She will ever remember that France must ever be her most useful friends or her most destructive. In Germany the last stipulations of the treaty of Luneville are carrying into effect. Prussia, Bavaria, all the secular princes who had possessions on the left bank of the Rhine, will obtain on the right bank suitable indemnities. The House of Austria finds in the bishopricks of Salzburgh, Aischtett, Trent, and Brixen, and the greatest part of Pau, more than it had lost in Tuscany. Thus, by the happy co-operation of France and Russia, all permanent interests are conciliated, and from the bosom of that tempest which seemed ready to overwhelm it, the Germanic empire, that empire so necessary to the equilibrium and the repose of Europe, rises more powerful, composed of elements more homogeneous, better combined and more adapted to the circumstances and opinions of the present age. A French ambassador is at Constantinople, charged with renewing and fortifying the ties which attach us to a power which seems to be threatened with destruction, but which it is our interest to sustain and to support the foundations by which it is upheld. The British forces are still in Alexandria and Malta. The government had a fair right of complaint, but it has received intelligence that the vessels which are to convey them to Europe are already in the Mediterranean. The government guarantees to the nation the peace of the continent, and it is permitted to entertain a hope of the continuance of maritime peace. This peace is the want, as well as the desire of all nations. For its preservation, the government will do every thing compatible with national honour, essentially connected with the strict execution of the treaties. But in England, two parties maintain a contest for power. One of those parties has concluded peace, and appears desirous of maintaining it. The other has taken an oath of eternal hatred to France. Hence that fluctuation of opinion and of counsels which prevail.—Hence that attitude, at the same time pacific and menacing. While this contest of parties continues, measures of precaution are what the government is called upon to adopt. Five hundred thousand men ought to be, and shall be ready to undertake its defence, and avenge its injuries. Strange necessity which miserable passions impose on two nations, whom interest and inclination mutually prompt to the cultivation of peace. Whatever success intrigues may experience in London, no other people will be involved in new combinations—the government says, with conscious pride, that England alone cannot maintain a struggle against France. But we have better hopes, and we believe that in the British cabinet, nothing will be listened to but the counsels of wisdom and the voice of humanity. Yes, doubtless, the peace will daily be more consolidated. The relation of the two governments will assume that character of good-will which is suitable to their mutual interests. A happy repose will bury the recollection of the long calamities of a disastrous war, and France and England, re-

dering their happiness reciprocal, will deserve the gratitude of the whole world.

The First Consul (Signed) BONAPARTE.
By order of the First Consul,
The Secretary of State, H. B. MARET.
Paris, 25 Brumaire, 10th Year,
(17th November, 1802).

No. 3.—*Translation.*—I forwarded to you, citizen, a series of questions, concerning which I am desirous of having your answers. You will have the goodness to place them opposite the questions on the same sheet of paper, doubled in two, similar to the one which I have the honour to send to you. I shall be obliged to you to send me this paper as soon as possible, without, however, suffering your too great haste to be prejudicial to your accuracy. If you are doubtful upon any point, you will have the goodness to mention it. You will probably find no difficulty in consulting with some well informed merchants or clerks in the custom-house, who you think may have it in their power to give you some positive information, and you will declare the sources from whence you have drawn that information. You will not consider this business as forming a part of your official correspondence. You must not number it, but you must content yourself with putting at the top of it, as in the projet which I enclose to you, *Private Correspondence.*

(Signed) CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.
To Citizen Fauvelet, at Dublin.

No. 4.—*Translation —Private Correspondence.—Questions.*—1. What number of vessels have entered and cleared out of the ports within your district within each year from 1792 to 1801 inclusive? 2. What is their tonnage or their admeasurement in sea tons of 2000 4 P? 3. Under what flag do they navigate? 4. From whence they come? 5. Whither bound? 6. With what merchandize freighted? 7. What was the price of freight to the principal ports of Europe, each sea ton of 2000 4 P. S.? 8. What French productions are most in request in the market of the town where you reside, as well as of the other considerable towns in your district? 9. What is the merchandize which can be exported to France with greater advantage from the said markets than from any other? 10. What are the course of exchange, and the current prices of merchandize, from three months to three months from the year 1792 to 1801? 11. *You are required to furnish a plan of the ports of your district, with a specification of the soundings for moor'ng vessels.* 12. *If no plan of the ports can be procured, you are to point out with what wind vessels can come in and go out, and what is greatest draught of water with which vessels can enter therein deeply laden?* 13. What are principal commercial houses? If the heads of these houses are foreigners, you are to point out of what country they are; and in all cases you are to state with what countries they are principally connected, and what is their chief line of commerce. 14. What is the usual course of exchange? 15. Whether there is a public bank, and what is its organization? 16. Whether there are any insurance companies, public or private, and what are their customs and rules, and the prices of insurance, for European and long voyages? 17. In case there exists any other public establishment which relates to commerce, you are to give every possible detail concerning it, especially in whatever regards manufactures and fisheries. 18. You are to point out the relative conformity of weights and measures with those of France, ancient and modern, as soon as you shall have obtained practical and exact information on those points. 19. You are to add to all this the most extensive information, as well general as particular, which you may be able to obtain from authority, especially with regard to commerce, and particularly respecting false accounts of purchases and sales of different merchandizes, in order to ascertain the expences, rights, and local customs, in cases of purchases and sales. 20. Whether there are any fairs in your district; what species of traffic is carried on there, and to what amount?

No. 5.—*(Translation.)—From the Hamburgh Correspondenten of March 30, 1803.—The following article is inserted by desire.*

Paris, March 15.

For some months a war of newspapers and of the press has been kept up between France and England. This seemed merely the dying embers of an extinguished conflagration; the last consolation of a desperate party; the food of some low passions and a few hungry scribblers. The French government was far from attaching importance to such matters. Notwithstanding some difficulties in the complete execution of the treaty of Amiens, they still believed they might rely on the good faith of the British government, and directed their attention solely to the re-establishment of the colonies. Relying upon the sacredness of treaties, they securely dispersed the remains of the French naval force, which had been given a prey to the English fleet. In this situation, suddenly appeared a solemn message from the cabinet of St. James's, and informed all Europe that France was making considerable preparations in the ports of Holland and France; an address was voted by parliament, promising to the King of England such extraordinary means of defence as the security of the British empire

and the honour of the three crowns might require. From the sudden appearance of this message, people doubted whether it was the effect of treachery, of lunacy, or of weakness. Let any one cast his eye over the ports of France and Holland, where he will find only detached naval preparations destined for the colonies, and consisting only of one or two line of battle ships and a few frigates. On the other hand, let him look at the ports of England, filled with a formidable naval force; on such a review one could be tempted to believe that the message of the King of England was mere irony, if such a farce were not unworthy the majesty of a government. If one considers the influence of factions in so free a country, one might suppose that the King of England had only had the weakness to yield, if weakness were compatible with the first quality of a king. In short, no rational motives remain to which it can be ascribed, except bad faith—except a sworn enmity to the French nation—except perfidy, and the desire of openly breaking a solemn treaty, for the sake of advantages which will be maintained, and the sacrifice of which the honour of France and the faith of treaties forbid. When a man reads this message, he thinks himself transported to the times of those treaties which the Vandals made with the degenerate Romans, when force usurped the place of right, and when, with a hasty appeal to arms, they insulted the antagonist they meant to attack. In the present state of civilization, there is a respect which a great monarch, which a polished people owe to themselves, were that respect no more than to seek a plausible pretext for an unjust war. But in this instance every thing is precipitate, and repugnant to decency and to justice. An eternal war would succeed a dreadful contest; and the more unjust the attack, the more irreconcileable would be its animosity. Such a novelty will doubtless excite the disapprobation of Europe. While even the English, whose national pride had not entirely blinded them, sighed at this prospect, did the TIMES call the peace of Amiens an armistice, and in doing so, passed the severest satire on the government it defended; and the rapid fall of the national funds is the first prelude to the misfortunes which may follow as the revenge due for the wound given to all social rights. The French are less intimidated than irritated by the threats of England. They have neither been dispirited by their reverses, nor elated by their victories; in a war to which there appeared no termination, they saw all Europe confederated against them. Their constancy, their courage, and the prompt activity of their gover ment, brought it to a conclusion. *This* war would have a different object; France would contend for the liberty of the states of Europe, and the sacredness of their treaties; and if the English government be determined to make it a national war, perhaps her boasted formidable naval strength would not be sufficient to decide the result, and to secure the victory. The French, strong in the justice of their cause, and in the confidence they repose in their government, do not dread the new expences and new sacrifices which such a war might render necessary. Their system of finance is more simple and less artificial than that of London, and so much the more solid. It all lies in their soil and in their courage. On the first news of the English message, all eyes were turned to the cabinet of the Thuilleries. As most trifling motions received a character of importance, its most unpremeditated words were eagerly caught up. Every one impatiently expected the assembly for the presentation of foreigners, which Madame Buonaparté holds once a month. Every one was prepared to draw some inferences from it. It was as splendid as usual. The First Consul made his appearance, and said on his entrance, to the English ambassador, who was standing beside M. Markoff, "We have been at war for twelve years. The King of England says that France is making immense naval preparations. He has been led into an error. In the French ports there are no preparations of any magnitude. The whole fleet is gone to St. Domingo and the colonies. With regard to the ports of Holland, to which the message likewise alludes, there are only the preparations for the expedition under General Victor, and all Europe knows its destination is for Louisiana. The King says farther, that between the cabinets of Paris and London differences continue. I know of none. It is true that England ought to have evacuated Malta, and Malta is not evacuated; and as his Britannic Majesty has bound himself by the most solemn treaty ever entered into, it is impossible to doubt of the speedy evacuation of that island; and," added the First Consul, "those who would attempt to frighten the French people should know, that it is possible to kill, but not to intimidate them." During the course of the evening, when the First Consul happened to be near M. Markoff, he said to him, half aloud, "that the British ministry wished to keep Malta for five years more. Such a proposal was insulting, and no treaties should be entered into which it was not resolved to observe." At the conclusion of the assembly, when the English ambassador was about to retire, the First Consul said to him, "Madame the Duchess of Dorset has spent the unpleasant

part of the year at Paris. It is my sincere wish that she may also spend the agreeable season. But if it should happen that we really must go to war, the responsibility is exclusively with those who deny the validity of their own contracts, since they refuse to observe treaties which they had concluded." These words of the First Consul require no comment. They explain completely his present opinions, his past conduct, and his resolution for the future. It is sufficient to compare them with the tergiversations, the duplicity, the evasions, and the message, of the English government, in order to be enabled to decide on the justice of the dispute.

Corfu, January 2, 1803.

No. 7.—My Lord, In my letter of the 10th ultimo, your lordship will perceive that I inserted the arrival of the Cornelia French frigate at Zante, and that Horatio Sebastiani harangued the people of that island. At that time I was not in possession of his exact oration, but since then the delegate of Zante transmitted his speech to the senate of Corfu; a copy of which I beg leave to submit to your lordship's attention. Monsieur Romieu, the French minister here, communicated to the Prince of the Senate, that the First Consul of the French Republic had taken under his protection the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman churches of this Republic; and on the 19th December wrote to the Vicar General of Corfu to inform him of the same; a copy of which permit me to inclose for your perusal. From the proceedings of the French commissary here, and those of the other islands, together with the disposition of the natives, I am afraid that this Republic will be a constant theatre of French intrigue. The aforesaid commissaries occasion Count Mocenigo and this government an infinite deal of trouble.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) SPIRIDION FORESTI.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

(First Inclosure referred to in No. 7.)—Translation.—Horace Sebastiani, Chief of Brigade of a Regiment of Dragoons, and Envoy of the First Consul in the Levant. To his Excellency the Delegate of Zante.—Sir, The First Consul Buonaparté has charged me to visit these islands which compose your Republic, and to assure the inhabitants that he takes a lively interest in their prosperity. I know that the difference of political opinions divides this rising Republic into various parties, and that without the wise measures taken by your government, its tranquillity will be destroyed. I could wish you to make known to your administrators and fellow citizens how much the First Consul wishes to see a stop put to those intestine divisions which afflict these islands. Your political independency has been guaranteed by France, Russia, and the Sublime Porte. These powerful nations, united together by the bonds of the truest friendship, are occupied, in concert with your most enlightened and most virtuous fellow citizens, to give you a form of government suitable to your situation and the genius of your inhabitants. Wait with confidence and moderation the result of these important operations, and be assured that you will see the end of your ills and the beginning of your prosperity. All exaggerations of political opinions are inimical to the general prosperity: absolute democracy, always tempestuous, sacrifices to vain chimeras the security, the property, civil liberty, and, in short, all that constitutes the happiness of a state; aristocracy which is not moderated is always tyrannical, and the elevation of a small number of families, is preferred to talents and to virtue. In order that a government may be prosperous, it is necessary that it should have in its formation a happy combination of the advantages of different forms of government; the power and promptitude of monarchy, the vigilance and intelligence of aristocracy, and the vigour and elevation of democracy; that the citizens may find the security enjoyed under the first, the tranquillity of the second, and the equality of rights fixed by the laws which are found in the third. Recollect that the man who forms a part of society only preserves the liberty of doing that which is not prejudicial to the rights of others; and that equality only consists in the exact execution of the laws, and in the protection which they afford to every member of the political body. As the quarantine prevents communication, I beg you will communicate this my letter to all the authorities, and also to the principal inhabitants. I avail myself of this opportunity to assure you of the sentiments of esteem and consideration which I entertain for your person.

(Second Inclosure referred to in No. 7.)

Translation.

Liberty. *Equality.*

Corfu, 29th Frimaire, 11th Year of the French Republic.

The Adjutant Commandant Romieu, Commissary General of Commercial Relations, and Chargé d'Affaires to the Republic of the Seven Islands, to the Vicar General of the Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Churches at Corfu.—Mr. Vicar General, I hasten to inform you, with the greatest joy, that I have just received the express orders of my government to place the church of the Roman religion in the Republic of the Seven Islands under its special protection. I make this communication to the Prince of the Senate. This proof of the

good-will of the French towards this church, will be a powerful motive, Mr. Vicar General, for addressing, through the faithful in your communion, the most ardent vows to Heaven for the prosperity of the French Republic, and the preservation of the lives of its Consuls, in the same way as the Roman churches practise in the French Republic. With the most distinguished consideration, Mr. Vicar General, I have the honour to salute you. (Signed) A. ROMIEUX.

A true copy,
Spiridion Foresti.

ADDITIONAL PAPERS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE NEGOTIATION WITH FRANCE: LAID BEFORE PARLIAMENT AT DIFFERENT TIMES.

Papers, No. 1 to 22, inclusive: Ordered to be printed, May 20, 1803.

No. 1.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, June 17th, 1802.*—In your lordship's dispatch, No. 3 of this year, to Mr. Jackson, you gave instructions to that minister to endeavour to procure the release of the British sloop Fame, which had been seized by the revenue officers at Cherbourg, in consequence of her having entered that port by stress of weather. The master of that vessel, and a person deputed by the proprietors at Jersey, arrived lately at Paris for the purpose of defending the suit, which has been carrying on to procure her liberation. I had, in consequence of their application to me, reminded the French minister verbally of this business on two or three occasions: but those remonstrances having produced no effect, and sentence being about to be pronounced on the last appeal in the cause, I sent him a representation in writing, of which your lordship will find a copy inclosed; and in which I considered that it might be serviceable to insert some observations upon the law of the French Republic, which gave occasion to the seizure, upon the manner of its execution, and upon the propriety of its being repealed and modified now that the two countries were happily at peace.

No. 2.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, June 23d,* 1802.—I have the honour to transmit to your lordship inclosed, copy of an answer, which I received two days since from the French minister, to the note which I delivered to him on the 25th May, communicating to him that his Majesty had, in conformity to the 14th article of the definitive treaty of peace, taken off the sequestrations upon the property of French citizens in his dominions, and expressing that he did not doubt that the French government would be equally ready to render the same justice to such of his Majesty's subjects as have property in France.

No. 3.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, July 5th,* 1802.—I transmit inclosed copy of an answer which the French minister has given to the representation which I lately delivered to him, respecting the seizure of the British sloop Fame packet, at Cherbourg.

No. 4.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Aug. 4th,* 1802.—I am sorry to have learnt by an answer, which I have received from M. Talleyrand, and of which I transmit a copy inclosed, that the representation which I made to that minister (inclosed in my No. 31) on the subject of the seizure at Cherbourg of the British sloop Fame Packet, has failed in its effect, either of procuring the release of that vessel, or of drawing forth some favourable explanation in regard to the law which gave occasion to her detention.

No. 5.—*Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Sept. 20,* 1802.—My Lord, I received, the evening before last, by the ordinary post, the honour of your lordship's separate letter of the 13th of this month, transmitting to me copy of one from Messrs. Houtham and Moir, on the subject of the seizure, in a French port, of the British brig Jennies, William Muckle, master: and directing me to take the necessary steps for obtaining redress for the owners of the vessel and cargo. I have lost no time in representing this case to the French government, as your lordship will see by the copy which I have the honour to transmit, inclosed, of a letter which I have addressed on the subject to M. Talleyrand; but I am sorry to observe, that there can be little hopes of any redress being obtained in this instance, since none has been produced by the repeated remonstrances which were made in the still stronger case of the vessel (the Fame Packet) belonging to Jersey, which was only forced into a French port by stress of weather; whereas the ship now in question came designedly to the port of Charante with prohibited goods aboard, contrary to the law of the republic, (which unfortunately

still continues in force) confiscating every vessel and cargo where British manufactures shall be found. Your lordship will perceive, that I have availed myself of this opportunity to recall to the French minister the observations which I made to him, on a former occasion, upon the effects, so prejudicial to the British trade, and to a friendly intercourse between the two countries, which must necessarily arise from the rigorous execution of the law in question. I have the honour to be, &c. ANT. MERRY.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 6.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, Oct.* 18, 1802.—I inclose copy of an answer, which I have received from the French minister, to the representation which I made to him on the 27th of last month, on the subject of the capture of the British ship Porcher, by the French privateer the Bellona; in which he states, that the necessary orders will be given for justice to be done to the proprietors of that ship. I at the same time forward herewith a list of passports which I have granted to persons going to his Majesty's dominions, between the 2d and 15th of October.

No. 7.—*Copy of a dispatch from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. Merry, dated Downing-street, May* 20, 1802.—Sir, Various reports having been received in this country, of strict prohibitions being inforced with respect to the admission of British commodities and manufactures into France, and of very rigorous restrictions being imposed on British vessels entering the ports of that country; I have to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you transmit to me, without delay, the most detailed and accurate statement which you can procure on those points; and that you take an early opportunity to impress upon the French ministers, the necessity of some understanding being established between his Majesty's government and that of France, on the subject of the commercial intercourse between the two countries. As it is probable that you may be uncertain, as to the course that you should pursue in supporting claims, which subjects of his Majesty may bring forward for the restitution of property which they possessed in France previously to the war; I have to signify to you the King's pleasure, that you acquaint the French ministers, that his Majesty has, in conformity to the 14th article of the definitive treaty of peace, taken off the sequestrations upon the property of French citizens in his dominions; and that therefore his Majesty's government doubt not that the French government will be equally ready to render the same justice to such of his Majesty's subjects as have property in France. I am, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

Anthony Merry, Esq. &c.

No. 8.—*Copy of a note from Mr. Merry to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, May* 24, 1802. —*In Mr. Merry's No.* 18.—*Note.*—Le sousigné ministre plenipotentiaire de sa Majesté Britannique a reçu les ordres du roi de communiquer au citoyen Talleyrand, ministre des relations extérieures de la Republique Françoise que conformement à l'article 14 du traité definitif de paix, sa Majesté a fait lever les sequestres qui avoient été mis pendant la guerre sur les propriétés de tote espèce appartenantes aux citoyens François dans ses etats. Sa Majesté ne doute donc pas que le gouvernement de la République Françoise ne soit également prompt à rendre la même justice aux sujets de sa Majesté qui ont des propriétés en France. Il est necessaire que le sousigné ait l'honneur d'observer dans cette occasion au citoyen ministre que plusieurs sujets du roi ont été mis sur la liste des emigrés François, si cette circonstance peut servir d'obstacle a ce que ces individus rentrent de suite dans leurs propriétés, le sousigné ose se flatter que le gouvernement François ému des principes de justice qui le gouvernent, pourra juger apropos d'adopter une mesure générale qui leveroit sur le champ cette difficulté. Le sousigné a l'honneur, &c.

ANTHONY MERRY.

Au Citoyen Talleyrand.

No. 9.—*Copy of a note from Mr. Merry to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, June* 15, 1802.—Citoyen Ministre, Mon predecesseur Mons. Jackson, a eu l'honneur de vous adresser une representation au mois de Janvier dernier, par ordre du gouvernement Britannique, au sujet de la detention au port de Cherbourg du Batiment Anglois nommé "Fame packet," Capitaine de Gruchy; et moi, citoyen ministre, j'ai eu aussi l'honneur de vous rappeller de bouche cet objet, vous informant en même tems que le tribunal de cassation alloit prononcer la dessus, attendu que le gouvernement François n'ayant pas interposé son autorité pour relacher le batiment, le capitaine s'est vu dans la necessité de pourvoir à sa defense par la voie ordinaire de la justice. L'apperçu, citoyen ministre, que j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre ci joint et que m'a remis le Capitaine de Gruchy lui même qui se trouve depuis quelques jours à Paris, expose les circonstances principales de cette affaire dans son etat actuel. Il en resulte que le batiment en question, forcé par le mauvais tems de chercher un abris dans la rade de Cherbourg, y a été detenu et ensuite confisqué par une premiére sentence, par l'effet

d'une loi, passée en tems de guerre et au moment de sa plus grande rigueur, qui déclare confiscable tout navire au dessous de cent tonneaux qui s'approcheroit des côtes de France à la distance de quatre lieues avec des marchandises prohibées à son bord. Prohibition dans laquelle etoient et sont encore comprises toutes les marchandises Anglaises. Qu'il me soit permis d'observer dans ce lieu que, vû la proximité des côtes d'Angleterre à celle de la France, et la necessité ou les batimens Anglois doivent se trouver continuellement d'approcher de celles-ci, la loi susdite, si elle doit subsister et être executé, aura immanquablement l'effet de produire des contestations journalieres entre les deux gouvernemens. Pour ce qui est du cas dont il s'agit maintenant, j'ai appris citoyen ministre par les procédures qui ont eu lieu qu'il appartient à la douane de décider si la relache d'un batiment sur les côtes de France a été forcée ou non, et qu'elle a à son profit la moitié des saisies qui se feroient d'où il resulte que la douane dans des cas pareils est en même tems juge et partie. Tout parait prouver que la relache du Fame packet dans la rade de Cherbourg a été forcée: mais d'après les circonstances de la loi, et de la maniere de son execution, que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous exposer, il ne peut rester aux proprietaires du batiment et de la cargaison aucune esperance de les sauver dans le dernier appel qu'ils viennent de faire au tribunal de cassation, qui va prononcer incessamment sa sentence, a moins que le gouvernement François ne juge àpropos d'interposer son autorité et d'appeller à lui même la connoissance de cette affaire. Les sentimens de justice qui guident le Premier Consul, ainsi que les ministres de la Republique Françoise, doivent m'inspirer une pleine confiance d'obtenir de leur part l'attention que j'ose interpeller dans cette occasion. Leur sagesse et leur bienveillance leur dicteront jusqu'où il pourra convenir de révoquer, ou de modifier, en tems de paix, une loi emanée d'un etat de guerre, et qui doit necessairement causer des inconveniences les plus grands au commerce Anglois. J'ai l'honneur, &c. A. MERRY.

Au Citoyen Talleyrand, &c.

No. 10.—*Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Merry, dated Paris, le 29 Prairial, An dix.—In Mr. Merry's No.* 34.—Monsieur, J'ai reçu la note que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'addresser le $\frac{5 \text{ Prairial, An } 10}{25 \text{ Mai, } 1802}$, concernant la levée des séquestres apposés sur les propriétés des sujets de sa Majesté Britque et l'application qui a été faite a plusieurs d'entre eux de la legislation sur l'emigration. Je me suis impressé d'en donner communication au ministre des finances en l'invitant à appeler l'attention du gouvernement sur l'objet de votre demande. J'aurai l'honneur de vous informer de la décision qui aura été prise à ce sujet aussitôt qu'elle me sera connue. Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma parfaite consideration. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

à Monsieur Merry, &c.

No. 11.—*M. Talleyrand to Mr. Merry, dated Paris, le* 12 *Messidor, An dix.*—Monsieur, J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que je viens de réiterer au ministre des finances l'invitation que je lui avois deja faite en Pluviose dernier, d'aprés la recommendation de Mons. Jackson, de se faire rendre compte de la confiscation du batiment Anglois Fame pack t, dans la rade de Cherbourg, et de prendre les ordres du Premier Consul relativement à l'application existante de la loi du 4 Germinal, an deux. Je l'ai prié de me faire connoître la decision prise-aussitôt qu' elle m'aura été envoyée, je m'empresserai de vous en faire part. Agrécz, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute consideration.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

à M. Merry, &c.

No. 12.—*Copy of a note from M. Talleyrand to Mr. Merry, dated Paris,* 12 *Thermidor, An* 10.—*In Mr. Merry's No.* 49.—Monsieur, J'ai l'honneur de vous prévenir que le ministre des finances, en réponse à la lettre par laquelle je lui ai donné communication de votre dernière note concernant l'affaire du Fame packet, Capitaine Gruchy, vient de me mander qu'il a fait son rapport au Premier Consul sur la sasie de ce batiment dont il parait recounu que le cargaison était composée de marchandises prohibées, et que d'après son etat actuel le Premier Consul a decidé qu'il fallait laisser le cours à la justice. Recevez, Monsieur, l'assurance de ma haute consideration. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

à Monsieur Merry, &c.

No. 13.—*Apperçu fidèle de l' Affaire du Capitaine de Gauchy de Jersey contre la Régie des Douânes de Cherbourg.*—Le 19 de Decembre dernier le Capitaine de Geuchy commandant le batiment Fame packet, met à la voile du port de Southampton en Angleterre, pour se rendre à Jersey avec un chargement consistant en farine, orge grille pour les troupes de la garnison, et en diverses autres marchandises pour les habitans de l' Isle. Il avoit pris à son bord 25 passagers, qui etoient des femmes des enfans, des negocians, et des officiers venant joindre leur regiment entre autres un lieutenant de la marine royale. En quittant le port de Southampton, il est obligé de donnez un acquit à caution comme sa gargaison doit être dechargée dans un port Anglois. Dans les premieres moments sa navigation est heureuse, mais le 20 Decembre le vent passe tout à coup au S. S. W.

grand frais, il souffle avec une force effrayante et des le soir même il est battu pa la plus violante tempête. Craignant alors de passer encore une nuit sur la mer, il se decide à entrer dans le port le plus voisin. Comme il se trove dans une situation à gagner le port de Cherbourg il fait route pour cet endroit pensant que les préliminaries entre l'Angleterre et la France lui permettoient d'y entrer en toute sureté, d'autant plus que plusieurs de ses passagers étoient fort malades il ne pouvoit leur donner aucun secours. Il arrive sur la rade Cherbourg le soir du 20 Decembre, etant à l'Ancre, le capitaine va à terre pour faire son rapport à la douâne; il n'y est pas admis, sous pretexte qu'il na pas un courtier, il en trouve un et se rend de nouveau à la douâine, on refuse sa declaration parce que dit-on la loi du 4 Germinal an 2 defend à tous navies du dessous de cent tonneaux d'approcher des côtes de France à la distance de quatre lieües avec des marchandises d'Angloises. Le capitaine est donc cité par la regie de Cherbourg devant le tribunal de valogne, et les juges prononçant contre lui souivant toute la rigueur d'une loi portée dans des tems de guerre et de la calamité. Le capitaine appelle de ce jugement au tribunal de coutances qui le condamne encore, mais informe la disposition du tribunal de première instance qui l' avoit condamné à six mois d'imprisonnement, l'affaire est actuellement devant le tribunal de cassation et va être jugée sans delai. La loi citée entraine les plus funestes consequences pour les navires qui font le commerce d'Angleterre, aux Isles de Jersey puisque tous ces navires sont au dessous de cent tonneaux, et qu'il leur est impossible de ne pas passer dans le rayon de quatre lieues, le rât d'Auvigny, se trouvant dans ce rayon, cequi expose à des grands inconveniens la garnison et les habitans des Isles, qui sont approvisionnés par ces navires. La douâne de Cherbourg est tellement convaincue elle même que le navire étoit destiné pour Jersey qu'elle vient de renvoyer à notre Gouverneur Monsieur le Général Gordon, un Paquet à son addresse qui se trouvoit dans ce navire.

31 *Juillet* 1802.

No. 14.—*Copy of a Letter from Mr. Merry to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, 20th September* 1802.—*In Mr. Merry's separate of 20th September* 1802.—Citoyen Ministre, C'est avec peine que je me trouve de nouveau dans le cas d'avoir à réclamer contre les effets de la loi de la Republique Française qui déclare confiscable tout bâtiment qui entre dans un port de France avec des marchandises prohibées—(prohibition qui s'étend encore à toutes celles qui sont de manufacture Anglaise)—quoiqu' elles soient destinées pour un autre port. Le brig Anglais nommé *Jennies*, capitaine Guillaume Muckle, fut fretté en Angleterre pour porter du charbon de terre au port de Charente en France, ainsi qu'une petite quantité de marchandises Anglaises au port de Cadiz en Espagne d'où il devait rapporter un chargement de vin. Arrivée à Rochefort le Capitaine fit sa déclaration à la douane de tout ce quil avait à son bord, tout pour le port de Charente que pour celui de Cadiz, et il a offert de déposer dans la douane, jusqu'à son départ, les marchandises qui étaient destinées pour l'Espagne, en cas que cette précaution fut jugé necessaire. Mais malgré ce procédé franc et candide de sa part, qui prouve evidemment qu'il n'avait aucun dessein de faire la contrabande, et que les effets prohibés étaient réellement destinés pour un pays étranger, les officiers de la douane ce sont refusés à admittre sa déclaration et ont saisi le bâtiment en virtu de la loi susmentionnée.—Les armateurs et les proprietaires du chargement s'en étant plaint au gouvernement Anglais, je viens, citoyen ministre de recevoir les ordres de ma cour, de vous réprésenter cette affaire, ainsi que d'avoir l'honneur de solicitor auprès de vous le prompt elargissement du bâtiment et de la cargaison, auquel l'on espère que les sentimens de justice et d' equité qui guident le gourvenement Français pourront la décider à se préter vû que l' innocence du capitaine est prouvée par la circonstance de l'offre qu'il a fait de déposer les marchandises prohibées, á la douane jusqu'au moment de son départ. Au reste je prendrai la liberté, citoyen ministre, de vous rappeller dans cette occasion les observations que j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de vous exposer dans une autre sur les effets prejudiciables qui doivent nécessairement resulter au commerce Anglais, ainsi qu'à la communication amicale entre les deux païs, de la continuation en tems de paix d'une loi qui a amanée d'un etat de guerre, et encore dans un moment de sa plus grande fureur. J'ai l' honneur, citoyen ministre, de vous renouveller les assurences de ma haute considération.

A. MERRY.

An Citoyen Talleyrand, &c. &c.

No. 15.—*Copy of a letter from Mr. Merry to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, 14th October,* 1802.—*In Mr. Merry's No.* 80.—Citoyen Ministre, Le batiment Anglais nommé Nancy, Capitaine Allen Richardson, est parti des ports de Angleterre pour Rotterdam en Holland, avec une cargaison composée de différentes marchandises étrangères que avaient été prises sur des batimens ennemis pendant la guerre et vendues en Angleterre sous caution que les acheteurs ont donné de les exporter. Ce batiment se trouvant déjà sur la côte de Hollande y a essuyé un gros tems

qui est survenu des avaries, et entre autres celle de la perte de son beaupré, ce qui lui a obligé de se refugier au port de Flessingue. Il y est entré vers le milieu du mois Juillet de cette année, quand un détachement des troupes Françaises, commandé par des officiers, s'est rendu abord et s'est emparé du vaisseau et de la cargaison, sans que le capitaine ait pu savoir la cause de cette saisie. Le vaisseau y est detenu encore. Les circonstances de cet evènement, si elles sont en effét telles que le capitaine et les proprietaires les ont réprésentées au gouvernement Britannique, semblent lui donner une qualité hostile de la part des officiers Français qui paraissent avoir voulu faire prise du batiment au lieu de lui accorder l'asile, l'hospitalité et le sécours, auxquels il pouvait s'attendre dans le port d'une puissance maintenant en paix avec l'Angleterre. Dans le cas actuel il ne s'agit pas de marchandises Anglaises (si le capitaine aurait tenté de les introduire par contrebande—ce donc il n'a pas même été accusé)—puisque toutes celles qui si trouvent abord du Nancy sont d'autres pais, qui. n'auraient pas pu être importées en Angleterre que comme prises sur l'ennemi, et quoiquélles eussent été du cru, ou des manufactures d'Angleterre l'arrivée forcée du batiment semblerait les exempter de l'application de cette loi de la Republique Française qui condame encore toute production du sol, ou de l'industrie de la Grande Bretagne. C'est d'aprés les ordres de ma cour, citoyen ministre, que j'ai l'honneur de vous representer cette affaire, et de réclamer auprès de vous non seulement le prompt elargissement du susdit bâtiment, avec sa cargaison, mais qu'il soit fait justice aux propriétaires pour les pertes qu'ils ont essuyées par la detention de leurs effets. Le gouvernement Anglais ne doute aucunement que les sentiments d'equité qui guident celui de la république ne le disposent à acceuiller favorablement ces démandes, pourvu qu'il n'y ait aucun crime constaté contre le capitaine. Je saisis avec empressement, citoyen ministre, cette occasion pour avoir l'honneur de vous renouveller les assurances de ma haute consideration. A. MERRY.

Au Citoyeu Talleyrand, &c.

No. 16.—*Copy of a Note from Mr. Merry to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, 22d October, 1802.—In Mr. Merry's separate dispatch, October 25th, 1802.*—Citoyen Ministre, Il vient de se presenter un nouveau cas où un batiment Anglois a sente d'une maniere bien frappante les effets de la loi de la République Françoise qui confisque tout navire abord duquel l'on trouveroit la moindre chose qui fut de fabrique Angloise. Le brig George, commandé par le Sieur Jean Newham, est entré dans le port de Charente au commencement d'Aout de cette année pour prendre un chargement d'eau de vie, destiné pour Londres, n'ayant abord autre chose que son l'est, et les provisions necessaires pour le voyages. Les douanniers n'ont donc pas pu trouver autre chose de quoi se saisir que des ustensiles de la chambre du capitaine (qu'il ne croyoit pas devoir declarer) tels que des assiettes de faience, quelques verres et quelques couteaux et Fourchettes d'auir, dont la quantité de chaque espèce pour ne pas en faire le détail, peut tres facilement se mesurer par le prix de 4 livres sterlings, ou 96 livres de France, que le tout ensemble avoit couté au capitaine, y compris deux lampes qui éclairoient sa chambre. Voila, citoyen ministre, ce qui a suffi pour ce sujet du Roi ait subi toutes les rigueurs de la loi du 10 Brumaire, an cinq de la Republique, qui porte confiscation du batiment ainsi que d'autres peines. Et voici un cas où l'Angleterre auroit pris tout un changement des productions de la France, tandis que cette puissance ne permet pas à un capitain Anglois qui vient chercher ces productions de se servir abord de son vaisseau des ustensiles de son propre pays. Falloit-il donc, que pour pouvoir entrer dans un port de France il fit venir d'avance de ce pays des assiettes, des verres, des couteaux et des fourchettes? ou si cela seroit impossible voudroit on l'obliger a manger sur les planches de son vaisseau et avec ses doigts? Ceci paroit incroyable. Il est pourtant verifié par le fait. Puisque, citoyen ministre, les representations que j'ai déjà l'honneur de vous adresser sur des cas a peu pres semblables n'ont produit aucun effet, je ne pourrois pas m'attendre a une meilleure reussite dans une demande que je ferois dans le cas actuel: mais vous sentirez, citoyen ministre, combien il est de mon devoir de vous le faire connoitre. J'ai l'honneur, &c. A. MERRY.

Citoyen Talleyrand, &c.

No. 17.—*Copy of a dispatch from Mr. Merry to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, October 25th, 1802.—Separate.*—My Lord, John Newham, the Master of the British brig George, delivered to me a report last week of that vessel, which had been freighted to come to Charante in ballast, to convey from thence a cargo of brandy from England, having been seized at that port by the French custom-house officers, because the different articles which they found in the master's cabin for use of his table, such as plates, knives, forks, and glasses, (the cost of which, when new, he decl red to have been altogether 4*l.*) were of British manufacture, and because he had not made a declaration of them at the custom-house. He acquainted me moreover that his vessel had been con-

demned, in consequence of that seizure, by two sentences of the French tribunals in the department where Charente is situated. I thought it my duty, my lord, to lose no time in stating so violent a proceeding to the French minister; and I delivered to him accordingly, the day before yesterday, the representation, of which the inclosed is a copy, taking that opportunity to remind M. Talleyrand of the former remonstrances which I had delivered to him on subjects of a similar nature, and renewing verbally on this occasion, the observations which I had then had the honour of expressing to him in writing, upon the continued rigorous execution, in time of peace, of the French law which had taken place at a moment of the greatest heat of the late war. The minister confined his answer to me, to an assurance that he would cause an enquiry to be made immediately into the case, which I had now laid before him. I have the honour to be, &c.

ANTH. MERRY.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 18.—*Copy of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, 10th May, 1803.—Separate.*—My Lord, With regard to the numerous memorials and representations, which I have had to make to this government, in behalf of those of his Majesty's subjects, who have suffered by the detention and confiscation of their vessels and property in the ports of France, I have only to observe, that they have, with the exception of one or two instances, remained unanswered: I trust therefore no blame can attach to me, if my endeavours to carry into effect your lordship's instructions on this head have not been more effectual. I have the honour to be, &c. WHITWORTH.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 19.—*Copy of an Instruction from Lord Hobart to Lieut. General F. Dundas, Lieut. Governor and Commander of his Majesty's troops at the Cape of Good Hope, dated the 17th October, 1802; dated Downing-street, Oct. 17, 1802.*

Sir, Circumstances having recently occurred, which render it adviseable to delay the restitution of the Cape of Good Hope to the Batavian government, I am to signify to you his Majesty's commands, that you should retain possession thereof until further orders. It is, however, extremely desireable, that, in the execution of this instruction, every circumstance should be avoided which may be calculated to excite jealousy in the Batavian government, or to create an apprehension of its arising from an hostile motive.—N. B. *The above instruction received at the Cape on the 31st December, 1802; and acknowledged in General Dundas's dispatch of the 3d January, received in Downing-street on the 18th March.*

No. 20.—*Copy of Instructions from the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, one of his Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State, &c. to Lieut. Gen. Francis Dundas, Lieut. Governor and Commander of his Majesty's Forces at the Cape of Good Hope; dated Downing-street, the 16th November, 1802.*—Sir, I have the honour to acquaint you, that, notwithstanding the instructions which, by the King's commands, I communicated to you on the 17th ult. it is his Majesty's pleasure, in the event of the East India ships originally destined for the conveyance of the troops, being at the Cape when you receive this dispatch, that you do give directions for their immediate embarkation, with orders for their departure for India without delay. Under an impression, however, of the probability of those ships having sailed without the troops, I am to acquaint you, that other ships have been substituted for that service; but that I am apprehensive it will be at least one month before they can leave this country. I am also to signify to you his Majesty's pleasure, that you do proceed forthwith to the execution of your former instructions for the complete evacuation of the Cape. The utmost cordiality subsisting between his Majesty's government and that of the Batavian Republic, you will observe the most conciliatory conduct in all your proceedings with the officers belonging to that republic. I have the honour to be, &c. HOBART.

To Lieut. General Dundas, &c.

No. 21.—*Copy of a Letter from Mr. R. King to Lord Hawkesbury, dated London, May 15th, 1803.*—My Lord, In the present critical posture of affairs, I lose no time in communicating to your lordship, for his Majesty's information, that a treaty was signed at Paris on the 30th day of April past, by the plenipotentiaries of America and France; by which the complete sovereignty of the town and territory of New Orleans, as well as all Louisiana, as the same was heretofore possessed by Spain, has been acquired by the United States of America. In drawing up this treaty, care has been taken so to frame the same, as not to infringe any right of Great Britain in the navigation of the river Mississippi. I flatter myself that this communication will be received with satisfaction, and regarded as a new proof of the disposition of the United States to observe towards his Majesty a spirit of amity and confidence, important at all times, and more especially so in present circumstances, to the harmony and mutual prosperity of the two countries. I avail myself of this occasion to renew to your lordship the assurance of dis-

tinguished consideration, with which I have the honour to be, &c. RUFUS KING.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 22.—*Copy of a Letter from Lord Hawkesbury to Mr. King, dated Downing-street, May 19th*, 1803.—Sir, Having laid before the King your letter of the 15th of this month, in which you inform me, that a treaty was signed at Paris on the 30th of last month, by the plenipotentiaries of America and France, by which the complete sovereignty of the town and territory of New Orleans, as well as of all Louisiana, has been acquired by the United States; I have received his Majesty's commands to express to you the pleasure with which his Majesty has received this intelligence, and to add, that his Majesty regards the care which has been taken so to frame this treaty as not to infringe any right of Great Britain in the navigation of the Mississippi, as the most satisfactory evidence of a disposition on the part of the government of the United States, correspondent to that which his Majesty entertains, to promote and improve that harmony and good understanding which so happily subsist between the two countries, and which are so conducive to their mutual benefit. I have it also in command to assure you, Sir, that the sentiments which you have expressed in making this communication, are considered by his Majesty's government as an additional proof of that cordiality and confidence which you have uniformly manifested in the whole course of your public mission, and which have so justly entitled you to the esteem and regard of his Majesty's government. I desire you to accept the assurances of the distinguished consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c. HAWKESBURY.

Rufus King, Esq. &c.

Presented May 20, 1803.—*(Referred to in Mr. Foresti's letter to Lord Hawkesbury of Jan.* 2, 1803.*)*—A French frigate commanded by an officer of that nation, whose name is not known, arrived this day in our Roads. On board this vessel was embarked Citizen Horace Sebastiani, calling himself envoy from the First Consul to these parts. On the same afternoon he attempted to land with the officers, but as they had arrived from Egypt, four guards of health were placed over them. He demanded a conference with the government, assuring our delegate regent, that he was commissioned by the First Consul Bonaparte, to communicate to all orders of persons in the Seven Islands, the attachment and respect of the First Consul, his desire of seeing all the people happy and contented, whom he would endeavour to inspire with veneration for the laws, respect for the existing government, and obedience to its commands. In this designing manner he extorted a consent from the delegate, that a few merchants and noblemen should be invited to the palace; which being done, it appearing that Mr. Antonio Martinengo was absent, he was sent for by Vice Commissary Renaud from the house of his friend Strapodi, and, immediately on his arrival at the palace, was presented to the French envoy Sebastiani, and recommended as opulent, possessing influence, a good man, and the friend of the people. Sebastiani made him a short compliment, and then began his discourse by saying, "*That the First Consul had begun to give a political existence to these islands; that the vicissitudes of war and the distance of reinforcements were preparing for them another destiny; that he feels the warmest interest for their inhabitants, who would be rendered happy, if they would adopt such a system as would be most analagous to that of France;* that internal dissentions, and false principles, had for a moment taken from them the liberty of giving their own opinion about their constitution; but that, by a different conduct, they might in future possess that liberty; that the nobility might aspire to the offices of government on the ground of property, since it procured them a superior education, but that they ought not to pretend to establish, on a plea of birth, those privileges which should result from education, virtue, and property; that the people ought not to exclude the nobility merely because they were born in that sphere; that a spirit of general concord ought to recal tranquillity among the three classes of the nobles, the plebeans, and the mercantile class, which is the best; that they ought to avail themselves of the favourable situation of the country which gives the means of procuring, by commerce, wealth, and future opulence; that so seductive an object, exposed to the view of continental Greece, might rouse up that ancient ardour and national enthusiasm for liberty, by which the Republic of the Seven Islands will become a power superior even to its own expectations; that states have the same stages as the life of man, and therefore that it is not wonderful if, during their infancy, the errors of childhood should prevail in them; that if they are averse to the care of the French nation to maintain the happiness of those islands even by her own forces, (not subject to the outrages of fortune), the First Consul, in concert with the Emperor of Russia, will know how to establish by force an appropriate constitution for the Seven Islands; that lastly, he recommends to them to make known to the people these friendly sentiments of Bonaparte, directly communicated to them by him his immediate organ." He said

something respecting the Emperor of Russia, but very coolly, and added also, "That until the change of the present government, it will be necessary to obey the laws, however defective they may be, to respect its ministers, and obey their orders." When this speech was ended, Peta, the ex-superintendant of the Cernides, cried out, "Long live the First Consul Bonaparte." The Russian commandant, who was present, remained silent at these proceedings, and feeling himself thus betrayed, he testified his disapprobation by his silence. The French envoy, as he left the palace in crossing the square, was huzza'd and applauded by the most ill-disposed of the people, led away by the bad example of all the former and present officers of the republic. He went into Mr. Renaud's house, and then returned on board his own ship. He enquired for an express for Cephalonia, where he wished to send advices of his intended destination. The delegate could not deny him permission to land, because he would have assumed the right of doing so of his own authority, and he thought, if in this case he had had recourse to the Russian force, he might have disturbed the peace which exists between the Emperor of Russia and the French Republic. He wished to have opposed such a studied harangue, but had he done so, the French envoy would have thought himself authorized to have gone out and have made it in the middle of the public square, and on a holiday, when the people were intoxicated with wine, and the remains of a spirit of democracy now reviving, by which a disastrous scene might have followed. These are the reasons which induced the delegate to chuse the lesser evil, more particularly so because he had not any instructions for his guidance in such unexpected occurrences. The Russian commandant regards this affair as an outrage against his sovereign, and he would have been sorry to have witnessed such a scene, had he not been obliged to do so.

Presented May 20, 1803.—*Instructions to Lord Whitworth, dated Downing-street, Nov.* 14, 1802.—My Lord, I take the first opportunity of communicating to your excellency, for the regulation of your conduct, the instructions which his Majesty is pleased to give you on such points as may become subjects of discussion between his Majesty and the French government; and to desire that you will endeavour to conform yourself to them in all your conversations with the French ministers. You will lose no proper opportunity of expressing his Majesty's earnest solicitude for the preservation of the peace which subsists between the two countries; his disposition to do every thing in his power for that purpose which is consistent with the honour of his crown and the interests of his dominions; and his regret at any circumstances which may have arisen to interrupt that harmony and good understanding which are so important to the welfare and happiness of both countries. You will, however, state most distinctly his Majesty's determination never to forego his right of interfering in the affairs of the continent, on every occasion in which the interests of his own dominions, or those of Europe in general, may appear to him to require it. This right his Majesty possesses in common with every other independent power; it rests upon general principles, and does not require the confirmation of any particular treaty. It is nevertheless important that you should observe, that the circumstances which led to the conclusion of the last peace, and the principles upon which the negotiation was conducted, would give his Majesty a special right to interpose in any case which might lead to the extension of the power or influence of France. In the communications which took place between the two governments previous to the signature of the preliminary articles, his Majesty proposed, as the basis of negotiation, that if the French government would not relinquish the continental acquisitions which they had obtained from other powers in the course of the war, his Majesty would claim the right of keeping a part of his conquests, as a compensation for the important acquisitions of territory made by France upon the continent. This principle was formally recognized by the French government in an official note in the following words: "Cependent on reconnoit que "les grands evénemens survenus en Europe, "et les changemens arrivés dans les limites "des grands etats du continent, peuvent "autoriser une partie des demandes du gou- "vernement Britannique." The terms of the treaty of peace were negotiated in conformity to this basis; and it appears, therefore, clear, that the then existing state of possession and engagements as respect the continent, were the foundation of the peace itself, and that his Majesty has therefore an undoubted right to interpose in consequence of the treaty in every case in which the state of possession may appear to him to have undergone any material alteration, or in which the engagements which were then subsisting had been violated to the prejudice of his Majesty, or of the other powers of Europe. You will proceed to observe, that the annexation of Piedmont to France, since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, makes a most material difference in the state of the fixed and permanent possessions of France: that the renunciation of the dutchy of Parma in favour

of France, a circumstance which was concealed at the time of negotiating the peace, and which is become of the greatest importance from its furnishing an additional instance of that system of *secret cession* which is totally inconsistent with any system of security for Europe, makes a most essential difference likewise in the relative situation of the two countries: that at the time of concluding the peace, the French government were bound by the most sacred engagements to respect the independence of the Helvetic and Batavian Republics, and to allow the people of those countries to choose whatever form of government they might think proper: that the violation of this right in the Swiss people, and the invasion of their territory, notwithstanding the representation which was made in their favour by his Majesty, makes a most material alteration in the state of engagements contracted since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, and adds most considerably to the influence and power of France, to the prejudice of a state which was then acknowledged as independent: that the conduct of the French government to the Batavian Republic was no less objectionable: that the independence of this republic was acknowledged, both by the treaty of Luneville and by the treaty of the Hague of the year 1795: that by the treaty of the Hague, the French government were permitted to keep a garrison in that country *only* till the time of general peace: that by a convention signed in August, 1801, the French troops were to remain there till the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace between Great Britain and France: that the French troops have not, to this period, evacuated the country; and that the First Consul is represented lately to have declared, that in the event of any differences amongst the people of that country on the subject of their internal government, he would march with his whole army to suppress them: that this is an obvious violation of the independence of the Batavian Republic; and that his Majesty would have a peculiar right to interpose on the present occasion, as he consented to make numerous and most important restitutions to the Batavian government in the treaty of peace, on the consideration of that government being independent, and not being subject to any foreign controul. It is unnecessary for me to recommend to your excellency to make these representations with moderation and temper. You will attend very particularly to any explanations which may be given to you respecting them; and you will engage to report such explanations to his Majesty's government.

I have the honour to be, &c.

HAWKESBURY.

PAPERS RESPECTING THE RESTITUTION OF CERTAIN CONQUERED PLACES, ORDERED TO BE PRINTED, MAY 23, 1803.

Copy of his Majesty's Order for the restitution, to the French and Batavian Republics, of the following islands or settlements:—Cape of Good Hope, Martinique, Tobago, St. Lucie, Deseada and the Saints, Pierre and Miquelon, Curaçao, Surinam, Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo, St. Eustatius, St. Martin's, Goree, conquests in East Indies.

GEORGE R.—Trusty and well beloved, we greet you well: whereas a definitive treaty of peace has been signed at Amiens on the 27th day of March last, by our minister plenipotentiary, and those of the French Republic, his Catholic Majesty, and the Batavian Republic: and whereas it is stipulated by the third article of the said treaty, that we shall restore to the French Republic and her allies, namely, his Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic, all the possessions and colonies which belonged to them respectively, and which had been occupied or conquered by our forces in the course of the war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon: and it being further stipulated, in the twelfth article of the said definitive treaty, that the evacuations, cessions, and restitutions stipulated for by the present treaty, except where otherwise expressly provided for, shall take place in the continent and seas of Africa, within three months after the ratification of the present definitive treaty, which ratifications were exchanged on the 23d day of April last: and it being stipulated by the 13th article of the said definitive treaty, that in all the cases of restitution agreed upon by the present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty, and that all the works which shall have been constructed since the occupation shall remain untouched, our will and pleasure is, that you do, pursuant to the stipulations above recited, deliver, or cause to be delivered to such commissary or commissaries as shall be named and authorized on the part of the Republic to receive the same, the of with the fortifications thereof, in the state in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty, leaving untouched the works which shall have been constructed since the occupation: and for so doing this shall be your warrant. Given at our court at St. James, the day of May 1802, in the 42d year of our reign.

To our trusty and well-beloved governor of the of or to the officer com-

manding our troops in the said settlement, and to all others whom it may concern.

By his Majesty's command,
(Countersigned) HOBART.

Copy of an instruction from the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, to the governors of, or officers commanding at Surinam, Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo, Martinique, St. Lucie, Tobago, Curaçao.

Dated Downing-street, Oct. 17, 1802.

Sir, Circumstances having occurred, which render it advisable to delay the restitution of the of to the Republic, I am to signify to you his Majesty's commands, that you should retain possession thereof until further orders. I have the honour to be, &c. HOBART.

To the Governor of

Copy of an instruction from the Right Hon. Lord Hobart, to the Governors of, or Officers commanding at Surinam, Demerara, Berbice and Essequibo, Martinique, St. Lucie, Tobago, Curaçao.

Dated Downing-street, Nov. 15, 1802.

Sir, I have the honour to acquaint you, that, notwithstanding the orders, which, by the King's commands, I communicated to you on the 17th ult. it is his Majesty's pleasure, that you do immediately proceed to the restitution of the settlement of to the government; in conformity to the directions you have already received for that purpose. I have the honour to be, &c.

HOBART.

To the Governor of

Papers No. 1 *to* 3, *inclusive, presented May* 24, 1803.

No. 1.—*Dated London, May* 20, 1803.—My Lord, I have the honour to inclose to your Lordship an official note which I received from Monsieur de Talleyrand on the day of my departure from Paris, and my answer. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

Rt. Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 2.—*Note from M. Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth, dated Paris, 22d Floreal, An* 11. —*Translation.*—The undersigned is charged to signify to his excellency Lord Whitworth, his Britannic Majesty's ambassador, that the First Consul having in the note of the 14th of this month made a proposal that the island of Malta should be put into the possession of either of the three guaranteeing powers, namely Russia, Austria, or Prussia, it would be insufficient to evade this proposition by pleading the refusal of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia to accept the trust, since the intentions of their Majesties the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia in that respect remain to be ascertained. That moreover, the assertion contained in his excellency's note of the 20th of this month, as expressed in the following terms, "*by the refusal of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia to listen to it,*" is directly contrary to the guarantee which his Imperial Majesty has formally offered on condition of making some trifling alterations that the First Consul has no difficulty to adopt, but which he knows that the English ministry have refused, with a view, without doubt, at the time, of the strange pretension of keeping Malta. That moreover this assertion is in absolute contradiction to the assurances which the First Consul has received from Petersburgh since his Britannic Majesty's message has been known there, and which have lately been renewed to him by an authentic communication which Count Markoff made yesterday of the intentions of his court. From whence it results, that it is impossible to reconcile the last communication made by his excellency Lord Whitworth with the fresh confirmation which has just been acquired of the dispositions of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia; and that one cannot help believing that his Britannic Majesty, when better informed, will himself hasten to give to his excellency instructions differing from those which he has received and communicated in the name of his government. The undersigned seizes this opportunity to renew to his excellency Lord Whitworth the assurance of his high consideration. CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

à son Excellence, &c.

No. 3.—*Note from Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, dated Paris, May* 12, 1803.—*Translation.*—The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which the minister for foreign affairs sent to him this day, and he will not fail to transmit it to his court. In the mean while, he requests the minister for foreign affairs to send him the passports which he required of him. He seizes this opportunity to renew to his excellency the assurance of his high consideration. WHITWORTH.

Au Citoyen Talleyrand, &c.

Papers No. 1 *to* 6, *inclusive, respecting the continuance of the French Troops in Holland, ordered to be printed, May* 25, 1803.

No. 1.—*Extract of a Dispatch from Mr. Liston to Lord Hawkesbury, dated the Hague, November 5th,* 1802.—The anxious apprehensions under which the Dutch government have for some time laboured, have been in some measure calmed by the accounts received to-day from different quarters. Their ambassador at Paris has transmitted a copy of a nervous and well-written memorial, presented by him to the minister of foreign affairs (in consequence of the instructions lately sent from

hence); and he informs the Secretary of State, that he received the most positive assurances from M. de Talleyrand, that it was by no means the intention of the First Consul to encrease the number of French troops in the Batavian Republic, or to march back those now upon the frontiers into the interior parts of this country: that, on the contrary, it was his fixed determination to withdraw the whole as soon as the proper arrangements could be made for that purpose.

No. 2.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Liston to Lord Hawkesbury, dated the Hague, November 12th*, 1802.—Whatever may be the resolution of the First Consul, respecting the final evacuation of the Batavian Republic by the Troops of France (a subject on which this government remains in a state of doubt and uncertainty) there seems reason to suppose that a certain portion of them—the 17th and 74th Demi-Brigades of Infantry, amounting to about four thousand men,—are to be embarked at Helvoet Sluys, and transported to Louisiana, under the direction of General Victor, who has been appointed to the chief command in that new colony.

No. 3.—*Extract of a dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, Paris, 13th Dec.* 1802.—The Batavian ambassador, Vos van Steinvick, has been instructed to make a representation, couched in the strongest terms, against the conduct of this government, with regard to the French troops which continue to be quartered in Holland. Your lordship well knows, how long, and how anxiously, the Batavian government has been expecting to be delivered from this burthen.

No. 4.—*Dispatch from Lord Whitworth to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Paris, December 13th*, 1802.—My lord, your lordship will learn, by my former dispatch of this date, the step which is to be taken by the Dutch ambassador, for procuring the evacuation of the Batavian territory by the French troops. I cannot flatter myself that any direct interference on my part, would, under the present circumstances, assist in promoting this important object—And I know that the Dutch ambassador entirely coincides with me in this opinion. I have however, invariably, held a language on this subject, conformable to the general instructions which I received on my departure from London. I have the honour to be, &c.

WHITWORTH.

The Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 5.—*Extract of a dispatch from Mr. Liston to Lord Hawkesbury, dated the Hague, 11th January*, 1803.—The negociations between the secretary of state and M. de Semonville, respecting the continuance of French troops in the southern garrisons of this Republic, have been carried on with uncommon activity for the last few days; and this morning M. de Sparre, Son-in-Law to Madame de Semonville, set out for Paris, carrying with him the ambassador's report of the result of their conferences. The Dutch government, though they appear to be devoted to the idea of the independence of their native country, have adopted the opinion, that it is, upon the whole, wiser to yield to the wish of Bonaparte, to continue for a limited time small garrisons in some of the frontier towns, than by an obstinate resistance to draw on this Republic the fate of Switzerland.

Papers No. 1 and 2, respecting the Guarantee of Russia, ordered to be printed, May 26, 1803.

No. 1.—*Copy of a Letter from Lord Hawkesbury to Sir John Warren, dated Downing-street, January 29th*, 1803.—Sir, your excellency's dispatches, to No. 21, inclusive, have been received and laid before the King. I send you now inclosed the official answer to the note of the chancellor Count Woronzow, relative to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens—it has been delivered to Count Simon Woronzow, the Russian ambassador at this court. In communicating this note, you will express, in suitable terms, how sensibly His Majesty feels the friendship which the Emperor of Russia has manifested to him on this occasion, in his disposition to concur in the arrangements relative to the island of Malta—and how sincerely His Majesty regrets, that it is not in his power to acquiesce, without condition or explanation, in every thing that His Imperial Majesty has proposed on the subject. His Majesty however trusts that, when all the circumstances are taken into consideration which bear upon this important subject, the Emperor of Russia will be satisfied, that the line of conduct which has been adopted by His Majesty, is such as a regard to good faith and to the interests of his dominions have rendered necessary. The only material difference, between the arrangement proposed by the Emperor of Russia for the Island of Malta, and that in which his Majesty is willing to concur, relates to the stipulations in favour of the Maltese inhabitants. It is important that your excellency should impress the Russian government with the conviction of the services rendered by the inhabitants of Malta to his Majesty and to the common cause, at the time when the French were in possession of the island. That, for nearly two years, they maintained a state of constant and active hostility against the French: that several thousands of them perished in this state of hostility; and, that these efforts were made at a time when they could receive assistance from no other foreign power: that the attachment evinced by the Maltese to his Majesty, during

the blockade, and their loyalty to him since he has obtained possession of the island, gives them a peculiar claim to his protection, and a right to expect, that, in the future arrangements for the island, some advantages should be stipulated in their favour: that, independent of every consideration of good faith, your excellency well knows that the Maltese inhabitants, if attached to their government, are equal to the defence of the island; and that every motive of policy, therefore, as well as of justice, renders it expedient to endeavour to conciliate their affections. These circumstances being premised, you will state, that the objection which, it is conceived, has had most weight with his Imperial Majesty, is that stipulation in the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, which, at the time that it establishes a Maltese langue, requires no proof of nobility for admission into that langue: that such a stipulation is considered as leading to the establishment of a plebean langue, totally inconsistent with the spirit of the institution of the Order. His Majesty is extremely desirous of devising means by which this objection shall be obviated, and the interests of the Maltese adequately consulted. The proofs of nobility, which have been required for other priories, have been various; and the power of the Pope to grant dispensations, has been admitted to exist: if, therefore, *actual nobility* was made the indispensable condition of admission into the Maltese langue or priory, the objection, which is at present made to this part of the arrangement, would, in a great degree, if not wholly, be removed. As, however, the number of persons who would be capable of admission into the Order, in consequence of such a regulation, would be very limited, it appears reasonable, that some further stipulations should be made in favour of the inhabitants of Malta; and it may be proposed to revive, under such regulations and modifications as may be judged expedient, the national council which formerly existed in that island, which should form no part of the Order, but which should have a share in the government of the island, and a deliberative voice in all its internal concerns. A body of this description could not be considered as in any respect derogatory to the ancient institution of the Order, and would be conformable to what existed within the island till within a very very few years. It is for the purpose of obtaining information on these points, that instructions will be sent to Sir Alexander Ball; it being impossible, after all that has passed, to bring the negotiation to an issue, without some communication with the principal inhabitants of Malta. His Majesty relies on your zeal in giving effect to these instructions, and in your endeavours to reconcile the Russian government to the objects of them. The events which have happened since the conclusion of the definitive treaty; the unbounded ambition which has been, and still is, manifested by the French government; might have justified his Majesty in bringing forward new demands, and in even claiming the appropriation of Malta, as some counterpoise to the acquisitions made by France since the treaty of peace; but the moderation with which his Majesty has been actuated in all his concerns with foreign powers, and his anxious desire that the peace of Europe may, if possible, be effectually consolidated, has induced him to forego those claims which the increased and increasing power of France might have justified him in advancing; and as every stipulation in the treaty of Amiens has been in a course of execution on his part, with the exception of the tenth article, he is desirous of shewing his disposition to concur in an arrangement which may be conformable to the spirit of the article; if such an arrangement can be rendered consistent with the honour of his crown; and if it effectually provides for the object of the tenth article: the independence of the Island of Malta. I am, with great truth and respect, &c. HAWKESBURY.

His Excellency Sir John Warren, &c.

No. 2.—*Copy of a Note from Lord Hawkesbury to the Vice-Chancellor Count A. Worozoff, dated Downing-street, Jan. 29, 1803.*—The undersigned, his Majesty's principal secretary of state for foreign affairs, has laid before the King, the note of the chancellor of his Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, together with the projet of the articles inclosed in it, which was delivered to his excellency Sir John Borlase Warren, in consequence of the invitation made by his excellency and the French minister, in the name of his Majesty and the First Consul of the French Republic, to his Imperial Majesty to accede, as a guaranteeing power, to the 10th article of the definitive treaty of peace, signed at Amiens on the 27th day of March last. It has been his Majesty's sincere and constant desire, that the stipulations of this article, as well as every other part of the definitive treaty of peace, should be carried into complete effect; and as circumstances have arisen, since the conclusion of the treaty, which render it impracticable to execute the tenth article according to the terms of it, and which have made fresh stipulations necessary, that means should be found, by amicable negotiation, of accomplishing an arrangement, which may be deemed conformable to the spirit of the treaty, and to the intentions of the contracting parties at the time of concluding it. His

Majesty attaches the greatest importance to the accession of the Emperor of Russia to the 10th article of the definitive treaty; not only on account of the security which the guarantee of his Imperial Majesty would give to the independence of the Island of Malta, but likewise from a desire to obtain his Imperial Majesty's sanction and concurrence, with respect to the arrangements stipulated in that article. His Majesty has invariably manifested the same disposition. As soon as he learnt the proceeding, which had been adopted at St. Petersburgh, in consequence of the proclamation of the Emperor of Russia for the election of a Grand Master, he proposed to the French government to join with him in declaring, that, as contracting parties to the treaty of Amiens, they were ready to acknowledge that election to be valid, and to recognize the person who might be named by the Pope out of those who were chosen by the priories in Russia, and whose names appeared in the list that was then published, to be Grand Master of the Order of St. John. In conformity to the principles which governed his Majesty's conduct on that occasion, he is perfectly ready to adopt the suggestion of his Imperial Majesty, for the conclusion of a supplementary convention to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens; and he has no difficulty in declaring his entire acquiescence in the second, third, fifth, and sixth articles, contained in the projet delivered to Sir John Warren; his Majesty entirely concurs likewise in that part of the first article, which relates to the acknowledgement of the sovereignty of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem over the Island of Malta and its dependencies. With respect to the other part of the article, which refers to the advantages stipulated in favour of the Maltese; his Majesty is extremely anxious that means may be devised of reconciling the views of the Emperor of Russia, relative to the Order of St. John, with the attention, which a regard for the honour of his crown renders due to the interests and wishes of the Maltese inhabitants, and with the indispensable object of the 10th article of the treaty of peace, that of providing effectually for the independence of the island; and he trusts that such an arrangement may be found not inconsistent with the spirit of the original institution of the Order. His Majesty will lose no time in giving instructions to Sir Alexander Ball, to take measures for obtaining the information which may be necessary for enabling his Majesty to form his determination on this subject. His Majesty trusts that that part of the fourth article, which relates to the number of Neapolitan troops, will be judged unnecessary, when it is understood that, with a view to the execution of the provisions of the treaty of Amiens, measures have already been taken for raising a Maltese force of 2000 men, which, together with the 2000 at present in the island, will form an adequate garrison for its defence. His Majesty, however, entirely agrees with the Emperor of Russia, in the necessity of providing adequate funds for the support of this garrison; and, as the property of the Spanish priories has been sequestered since the conclusion of the definitive treaty, to which treaty his Catholic Majesty was a party, he thinks it indispensible, that the property of those priories should be restored to them; especially as the Portuguese government have lately declared their intention of sequestrating the property of the Portuguese priory, as forming a part of the Spanish langue, unless the priories of Spain are reinstated in their former possessions. As those sequestrations have been carried into effect since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, and as it is highly important to secure, under any circumstances which may happen, a revenue adequate to the maintenance of the civil and military government, and of the independence of the island, his Majesty adopts, from a conviction of its necessity, the suggestion of the Emperor of Russia, that whatever sum may be requisite for that purpose beyond the ordinary revenue, shall be provided by an equal contribution on the part of his Majesty and of the French government; and in default of payment by either of the parties, it shall be at the option of the other party to contribute the whole. His Majesty has thus stated, without reserve, to his Imperial Majesty, his sentiments on every part of this important subject, and his readiness to agree in such modifications of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, as may be found not inconsistent with the spirit of it; as may be compatible with the interests of all the parties concerned, and which, his Majesty trusts, will therefore prove satisfactory to the Emperor of Russia.

HAWKESBURY.

Papers No. 1 to 8 inclusive, respecting Commercial Commissioners from France: Ordered to be printed June 1, 1803.

No. 1.—*Translation of a Letter from Mr. Otto to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Portman-square, May 23, 1802.*—My Lord, his Britannic Majesty's government having often manifested to me a desire to concert some particular arrangements for the establishment or the maintenance of several relations of commerce between the two nations: I have the satisfaction to inform your excellency, that the First Consul, penetrated with the same sentiments, and having a particular de-

sire to consolidate the relations of friendship so happily re-established between the two nations, has determined to send without delay to London, Citizen Coquebert Montbret, who has lately resided at Amsterdam with the character of commissary general of commerce. He has received orders to repair to London, as soon as possible, to co-operate with me on every thing relative to this important negociation; and I am particularly directed to assure the British government, that the First Consul desires to conduct it promptly to a termination mutually advantageous. I have the honour to be, &c. OTTO.

Right Hon. Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

No. 2.—*Copy of a letter from Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, dated Downing-street, May* 24, 1802.—Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday, and to inform you, that his Majesty's government have learnt, with peculiar satisfaction, the disposition of the First Consul to conclude some arrangement with respect to the commercial intercourse between this country and France. Whenever Mr. Coquebert Montbret shall arrive, I shall be happy to enter into an immediate negociation on this important object, in concert with you and that gentleman; and I trust that, by our conjoint exertions, we shall be enabled to bring it speedily to a conclusion reciprocally beneficial to both countries. I have the honour to be, &c. HAWKESBURY.

M. Otto, &c.

No. 3.—*Translation of a letter from M. Otto to Lord Hawkesbury, dated London, June* 24, 1802.—My Lord, I have the honour herewith to transmit to you the original commission appointing Citizen Coquebert Montbret commissary general of the commercial relations of the French Republic at London. I request you to give to this act the accustomed formalities, in order to enable Citizen Coquebert freely to fulfil his duties, on the condition of perfect reciprocity towards the person whom his Majesty may think fit to send to France with the same character. I have the honour to be, &c.

OTTO.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Inclosure referred to in No. 3.—Translation of M. Coquebert Montbret's commission as Commissary General for commercial relations at London.—In the name of the French people.—The First Consul of the Republic having appointed Citizen Charles Stephen Coquebert Montbret, to the post of commissary general of the commercial relations of the French Republic at London; orders him to repair, without delay, to his destination, there to exercise, conformably to the laws, the functions with which he is intrusted;—enjoins all French merchants, captains, masters, owners, and seamen, as well as all other Frenchmen residing within the said district, to acknowlege Citizen Coquebert Montbret in the post conferred upon him in the name of the French people, and to give him an account of the navigation, and destination of their vessels, and of every thing which may relate to the service in which he is employed. For which purpose they are to exhibit their license, clearances, passports, and are punctually to conform themselves to all the regulations he may require. The First Consul moreover enjoins the minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic at London, to apprize the government of Great Britain, of the appointment of Citizen Coquebert Montbret, and to require their approbation thereof, as commissary general aforesaid, in order that he may freely exercise his functions, without any lett or hindrance whatever; offering perfect reciprocity towards all those who shall be in like manner recommended to him.—Given at Paris, at the national palace of the Consuls, under the seal of the French Republic, the 30th Floréal, year 10.

The First Consul of the Republic,

BONAPARTE.

By order of the First Consul,

The Secretary of State, HUGUES B. MARET.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs,

Ch. Maur. Talleyrand.

No. 4.—*Translation of a letter from M. Otto to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Portman-square, Sept.* 15, 1802.—My Lord, I have the honour of transmitting to your excellency, the original commission appointing Citizen Chépy vice-commissary of commercial relations in the islands of Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney. I beg you will have the goodness to annex the exequatur in the usual form to it, and to return it to me. I have the honour to be, &c. OTTO.

His Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, &c.

Inclosure referred to in No. 4.—Translation of the commission of Citizen Peter Chépy, as Vice-Commissary of commercial relations at Jersey, &c.—In the name of the French Republic.—The First Consul of the Republic having appointed Citizen Peter Chépy to the post of vice-commissary of commercial relations of the French Republic in the islands of Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney, orders him to repair without delay to his destination, there to exercise, in conformity to the laws, the functions with which he is entrusted;—enjoins all merchants, captains, masters, owners, and seamen, as well as every other Frenchman residing within the said district, to acknowledge Citizen Chépy in the post conferred upon him, in the name of the French people, and to give him an account of the

navigation and destination of their vessels, and of every thing which may relate to the service in which he is employed. For which purpose, they are to exhibit to him their license, clearances, passports, and are punctually to conform themselves to all the regulations he may require. The First Consul moreover enjoins the minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic at London, to apprize the British government of Citizen Chépy's appointment, and to require their approbation thereof as vice-commissary aforesaid, in order that he may freely exercise his functions, without any lett or hindrance whatever; offering perfect reciprocity towards all those who shall in like manner be recommended to him. Given at Paris, in the national palace of the Consuls, under the seal of the French Republic, the Thermidor, 10th year.

The First Consul of the French Republic,

BONAPARTE.

By order of the First Consul,

Hugues B. Maret, Secretary of State.

Ch. Mau. Talleyrand,

Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 5.—*Copy of a Note from Lord Hawkesbury to M. Otto, dated Downing-street, Sept. 18th*, 1802.—Sir, I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 15th instant, inclosing the commission of Mr. Chepy as vice-commissary of commercial relations, on the part of the French Republic, for the islands of Guernsey, Jersey, and Alderney. I desire you to be assured, that his Majesty's government have uniformly been, and continue to be, solicitous to see the commerce between this country and France renewed upon a just and equitable footing: it has therefore afforded them sincere concern to learn, that their disposition in this respect has not as yet been met by a corresponding disposition on the part of the French government; but that the commerce of his Majesty's subjects, in the ports of France, is in a very uncertain and precarious state, and is exposed to numerous vexations and difficulties. Under these circumstances, his Majesty is under the necessity of postponing the recognition of any commercial agent of the French Republic within his dominions, until some commercial arrangement, either definitive or provisional, can be agreed upon by the two governments. The expectation of receiving more satisfactory information upon this important subject, has hitherto induced me to defer returning an answer respecting the commission of M. Coquebert Montbret, as commissary general of commercial relations on the part of the French Republic. But having been disappointed in that expectation, I request you, Sir, to consider the determination of his Majesty, as stated in this letter, to be equally applicable to M. Coquebert's nomination. I desire you to accept the assurances of the high consideration with which I have the honour to be, &c.

M. Otto, &c. HAWKESBURY.

No. 6.—*Translation of a Letter from M. Talleyrand to Gen. Andreossy, dated Paris, 9th Nivose, An* 11. *communicated by the latter to Lord Hawkesbury, in answer to a verbal Representation, which had been made by him to the French Ambassador.*—I received with your letter of the 2d of this month, citizen ambassador, copy of a circular letter, and of a series of questions that I had directed to several commissaries of French commercial relations, residing in foreign parts; and this letter is merely in reply to that part of your's which relates to this circumstance. You inform me, that the passages underlined are those which appear to have excited the mistrust of the English government, by whom my packet was opened. You will readily have observed, that the part of my letter which was the most strikingly underlined, was the close of it, wherein I recommended the commissaries not to consider the task I required of them as forming a part of your official correspondence, but to write at the top of their answers, *Private Correspondence*. To enable you to judge of my motives, and to give every satisfaction to Lord Hawkesbury, if you think it of sufficient importance, it will be sufficient to tell you, that the informations I am desirous of collecting, are intended for the completion of a work in the nature of that intitled, the "*Balance of Commerce*." This object forms no part of the labours of any of the branches of the department for foreign affairs; it is entirely the business of men of letters. The questions which I have put, are with a view to verify the information already obtained by other information; and the commissaries of commercial relations are better qualified to furnish me with it, than any one. This trifling matter forms no part of their ordinary employment; and for that reason is not classed with their communications, which ought always to be made in the regular form. My design rather is to enforce the execution of it, than to allow a departure from it. This is an invariable principle with me. But the mere reading of my letter, and of the questions annexed thereto, sufficiently prove how fastidious it would be to attach to them any greater importance than what is due to a work strictly literary: and I was so little desirous of avoiding their publicity, that I at first entertained the idea of having them printed. I have the honour to salute you.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

No. 7.—*Minute of a verbal Communication from Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossy, dated Jan.* 11, 1803.—Lord Hawkesbury informed the French ambassador, that, in consequence of the representations which had been

made on the subject of the French commissaries of commercial relations, by his Majesty's government, it was their determination, not to allow those persons to execute any of the functions assigned to them by their respective commissions, nor to proceed to the nominal places of their destination; and in the event of their attempting to proceed thither, to direct them to quit the King's dominions. In order, however, to obviate the necessity of having recourse to these measures, his Majesty's government trusted that the French government would, of their own accord, direct these persons to return to France.

No. 8.—*Memorandum: June 1st*, 1803.—No order to quit his Majesty's dominions was sent to any of the persons stiling themselves "commissaries of commercial relations," except to M. Chepy, at Guernsey.

Papers No. 1, 2, *and* 3, *respecting the Maltese Deputies and M. Chépy; ordered to be printed June* 6, 1803.

No. 1.—*Translation of a Letter from the Maltese Deputies to Lord Hobart; dated Upper Berkley-street 1st March*, 1802.

The deputies sent on the part of the extraordinary congresses held at Malta and Gozo, consisting of the heads of battalions and representatives of the several villages, have the honour to lay before Lord Hobart, minister of his Britannic Majesty for the department of war, the following memoir, conformably to the instructions which they received from their constituents, the 9th November, 1801.

My Lord, It is with the most lively grief and the utmost surprise that the Maltese people have been informed of the severe and unmerited fate which awaits them, in the return of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem to the islands of Malta and Gozo. The defection and treachery of which that Order became guilty, will form an æra in the annals of the world, as striking as that which now replaces us under its despotic dominion, notwithstanding that it betrayed us to an army unfaithful to its promises and engagements. The judgment which posterity will pronounce upon this transaction, will be no panegyric on the age in which we live; and we anticipate the complaints and the reproaches which our latest descendants will direct against us, if a base timidity should induce us to be silent before the just and magnanimous tribunal, at which we have the benefit of appealing. We refrain from alledging the motives, which would justify our resentment towards the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. The blood that has been shed; the deaths of twenty thousand of our fellow citizens, in consequence of the greatest distresses; the expences incurred during the first months of the revolution, for the support of our battalions, and the loss of six millions of crowns, sufficiently refute the atrocious calumnies with which the author of the *Answer to the Manifesto of the Priory of Russia* has endeavoured to load us. The falsehood confutes itself; since it was notorious to every one, that the plan of the invasion of Malta was projected at Paris, and that it was entrusted to the first Knights of the Order resident at Malta. They continually received letters written in cypher, without exciting any alarm either in the late Grand Master de Rohan, or in the Grand Master Hompesch. After these irrefragable facts, judge, my lord, whether the Maltese people will see, without astonishment, and with indifference, the authors of their misfortunes returning into their country, to dispose of their interests? If we ourselves were willing to keep silence, the ashes, still warm, of those who died to free and conquer their native land, would cry out to us more effectually to defend our rights and the cause of truth. Yes, my lord, we dare to affirm, that the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem cannot be re-established in Malta, without invading the just rights of the august descendants of Charles the Fifth, and the rights of the Maltese, and exposing the latter to new convulsions. The Maltese people, distinguished of old for their fidelity by their ancient sovereigns, have been equally distinguished in these late times by their energy and their love for justice. They easily sacrifice their resentments, but they require that their sacrifices should be acknowledged. In proof of which, my lord, permit us to recall to you, the quiet submission which the Maltese displayed in the capitulation made by the English general with Monsieur Vaubois. Our blood, our labours, our rights, and all our interests, were either forgotten or despised. We beheld, with an exemplary calmness, commanding respect in those who witnessed it, the French lay down their arms upon the glacis, only to load themselves with the remainder of our spoil; so that the faithful and virtuous Maltese was reduced to a condition to envy the lot of the guilty and rebellious. Would we could withhold from our descendants, the knowledge of a capitulation, which wounded our rights and rendered us unhappy! It is true, that the presence and the wisdom of Captain Ball, to whom we then preferred our complaints, contributed much to the alleviation of our distresses; but as subsequent events have neither seconded our expectations or our wants, we cannot conceal from you, my lord, the unfavourable impressions which the preliminaries of peace have given us, of a government, to which

we have always been desirous to prove our attachment, our fidelity, and our preference. We know, my lord, that it is not for us to influence political transactions. Nature has destined Malta to be determined by relation to its position and its strength, and not to decide on its own arrangements. But it is, nevertheless, for policy to consider its numerous population. Russia, France, and all the other powers of Europe, are too just and too enlightened to condemn the conduct of the Maltese, in their opposition to the re-establishment of an Order, which, by its tyranny, treachery, and corruption, is for ever incapable of inspiring confidence, or of conciliating the minds of the people. If, therefore, my lord, the people of Malta are doomed, by inevitable and imperious circumstances, to endure the pain and affliction of being separated from the empire of his Britannic Majesty, and if the tranquillity of Europe demands that the islands of Malta and Gozo should be placed in a condition of neutrality, we entreat you, my lord, in the name of our constituents, and of every thing most dear and sacred among men, in the name of the rights of nations and of justice, to beseech his Britannic Majesty to vouchsafe to employ his efficacious and powerful mediation with the other powers, in order that the islands of Malta and Gozo may be left in the enjoyment of their independence, under the mutual guarantee of Great Britain and France, and not be treated as a conquered country after that their inhabitants have spilt their blood and exhausted their substance in its defence. You must be sensible, my lord, that, in our quality of deputies, we could not avoid submitting to your excellency the wishes and the intentions of our nation. In citing a part of the crimes of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, we have not merely sought to give vent to our feelings, but to justify, in the face of the whole universe, our eternal opposition and vigorous resistance to it, should it ever dare to appear again amidst our hearths, still wet with the blood which it has caused to flow. Deign, my lord, to employ your credit with his Britannic Majesty, in favour of justice, of truth, of humanity, and of a nation worthy of a different fate; and accept, if you please, the homage of the most respectful devotion, with which we have the honour to be, my Lord, &c. &c.

Le Marquis Testaferrata.
L'Abbé Emanuel Ricaud.
L'Abbé Pierre Mallia.
Ph. Castagna, Lieut. des Villes, &c.
Antoine Mallia, Jurat du Goze.
Michel Cachia, Representant.

No. 2.—*Letter from the Maltese Deputies to Lord Hobart, dated April 2*, 1803.—See Cobbett's Register, Vol. III. p. 867.

No. 3.—*Minute of the Measures taken respecting M. Chépy.*—On the 14th of November, 1802, a letter was written, by Sir George Shee, under Lord Pelham's direction, to General Gordon, commanding at Guernsey; which stated, that his Majesty had refused to allow any of the persons stiling themselves "commissaries of commercial relations," to exercise any of the functions appertaining to that office within his Majesty's dominions. On the 5th of February, 1803, General Gordon was instructed to represent to Mr. Chépy, that as none of the commissaries of commercial relations had been permitted to proceed to the places of their destination, and that some of them had actually returned to France, it would be advisable for him also to repair to that country. On the 9th of March following, General Gordon was directed to order Mr. Chépy to quit Guernsey without delay, if he had not already taken his departure from it.

OFFICIAL PAPERS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE PRELIMINARY AND DEFINITIVE TREATIES, AND THE LATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN GREAT-BRITAIN AND THE FRENCH REPUBLIC.

Published by Order of the French Government.

Part I.—The Preliminaries of London.

AS soon as the changes which took place in France, on the 18th of Brumaire, were established, the sole desire of the First Consul was to give peace to the world; and he was anxious to determine on the means of doing it. The most direct, appeared to him to be the best. He could not believe, that, after eight years of a war, the result of which had destroyed the hopes of those who had undertaken it, those powers which had been most determined in the contest, did not feel the necessity of terminating those calamities which seemed to have no decisive point, and were without the promise of any adequate compensation. He imagined, that a false dignity, and the prejudices attached to old political systems, might hinder the belligerent parties from advancing the first propositions;

and as the pacification of Europe depended upon their being made, he did not hesitate to do it. He accordingly addressed letters to the Emperor and to the King of England. The letter of the First Consul to the King of England was conceived in the following terms:

Paris, 5th Nivose, 8th Year.

Being called by the wishes of the French nation to fill the chief magistracy of the republic, I considered it becoming me, on taking possession of my charge, to make a direct communication of this circumstance to your Majesty. The war which has, for eight years, ravaged the four parts of the world, ought not to be eternal; and surely some means might be employed to come to a right understanding on the subject. How is it possible that the two most enlightened nations of Europe, and whose power and strength are more than sufficient to secure their own safety and independence; how can they sacrifice to ideas of vain glory, the welfare of commerce, interior prosperity, and every comfort of domestic life! How is it that they are insensible to the truth, that peace is the first of our wants, and the first object of our glory! These sentiments must be familiar to the heart of your Majesty, who reigns over a free nation, and whose only object is to render them happy. Your Majesty will perceive, that in this overture I have no other object than to contribute efficaciously, and for the second time, towards a general pacification, by some prompt measure, and an entire confidence, disengaged from those forms, which, however necessary they may be to disguise the dependence of inferior states, do not conceal any thing, in the stronger governments, but the mutual desire to deceive. Both France and England, by a misapplication of their strength, may yet for a long time, and to the distress of mankind, retard its dissolution: but I do not hesitate to assert, that the fate of every civilized nation is attached to the termination of a war which embraces the whole world.

BONAPARTE.

There was surely every reason to expect, that an overture so frank, so sincere, and so conformable to the interests of the two countries, would receive a direct and favourable answer: but the British government, instead of meeting the question of peace fairly, and acceding to the offers which had been made for a negotiation, entered upon a justification of the war, and enveloped herself in recriminations which it was necessary to combat, though at that moment no hope could be entertained of a discussion begun with such an opposition of opinion. The answer of Lord Grenville to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the note which accompanied it, were expressed in the following terms:

London, Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

Sir, I have received and presented to the inspection of his Majesty the two letters that you addressed to me. His Majesty, seeing no occasion to depart from the forms so long established in Europe on the business which is transacted between different states, has commanded me to return you, in his name, the official answer which is inclosed in this note. I have the honour to be, with high consideration, &c. &c. GRENVILLE.

Downing-street, Jan. 4, 1800.

The King has given frequent proofs of his sincere desire for the re-establishment of a permanent tranquillity in Europe. He has not been, nor is he now engaged in any contest from false notions of glory. He has had no other views than to maintain, against all aggression, the rights and happiness of his subjects. It is for these objects that he has hitherto contended against an unprovoked attack: it is for the same objects that he is compelled to continue the contest; and he entertains no expectation that he can remove this necessity by entering into a negotiation with those, whom a new revolution has so lately invested with power in France. In fact, from such a negotiation, the desirable object of a general peace can receive no advancement, till it is clear and evident that those causes cease to operate which originally produced the war, have since prolonged its duration, and which, more than once, have renewed its effects. This system, whose predominant influence France has just reason to consider as the cause of her present misfortunes, is also that which has enveloped the rest of Europe in a tedious and destructive war: and of a nature unknown for a long succession of years to civilized nations. To extend this system, and to exterminate all established governments, the resources of France have from year to year been lavished and exhausted, in the midst of unexampled distress. Owing to this undistinguishing spirit of destruction, the Low Countries, the United Provinces, and the Swiss Cantons, those antient friends and allies of his Majesty have been sacrificed. Germany has been ravaged; and Italy, though snatched from its invaders, has been the theatre of frequent pillage and disorder. His Majesty finds himself under the necessity to maintain a difficult and burthensome contest, to secure the independence and existence of his kingdoms. And these calamities are not confined to Europe alone, but are made to reach the most remote parts of the world, even to countries so far removed by their situation, as well as their interest, from the present contest, that

its existence was probably unknown to those who are on a sudden involved in all its horrors. While such a system predominates, and the blood and treasures of a populous and powerful nation are lavished to support it, it has been proved by experience, that there is no other way to guard against it, but by open and decided war. The most solemn treaties have only prepared the way for new aggressions: and it is to this determined spirit of resistance alone, that is to be attributed the preservation of what yet remains in Europe, of private property, of personal liberty, of social liberty, and the free exercise of religion. In his vigilant attention to the preservation of these essential objects, his Majesty cannot place a confidence in the simple renewal of general professions, announcing pacific dispositions. These professions have been again and again published by all those who have successively directed the resources of France towards the destruction of Europe; and even by those whom the actual governors of France have declared, from the beginning, and at all times, to be incapable of maintaining the relations of peace and amity. His Majesty will experience a very sensible pleasure, when he shall perceive that the danger which has so long threatened his own dominions and those of his allies, exists no more; when he shall be convinced that resistance is no longer a matter of necessity, and when, after such a long succession of crimes and misfortunes, he shall see better principles predominate in France: in a word, when those gigantic projects of ambition, and restless plans of destruction, which have brought into doubt the existence of civil society, are no more. But the conviction of such a change, how agreeable soever it might be to the wishes of his Majesty, must be the result of experience and evidence of facts. In the mean time, the most natural and the best security for the reality and stability of this change, will be found in the re-establishment of that race of princes, who, during so many ages, knew how to secure the internal prosperity of the French nation, and maintain its exterior respect. Such an event would, at the present moment, and in future, remove all obstacles which have been opposed to the negotiation for peace, it would assure to France the incontestible enjoyment of its antient territory, and give to all the other nations of Europe, by calm and peaceable measures, that security which they are now compelled to seek by other means. But, desirable as such an event may be for France, and the whole world, his Majesty does not exclusively attach to it the possibility of a solid and durable peace. His Majesty does not pretend to prescribe to France the form of its government, nor in what hands it shall depose the necessary authority for conducting the affairs of a great and powerful nation. His Majesty looks only to the security of his own states, of those of his allies, and of Europe in general: whenever he shall be convinced that this security may be obtained in any way whatever; whether it results from the interior situation of the country, whose interior situation caused the original danger; whether it proceeds from any other circumstance which leads to the same end; his Majesty will embrace with ardour the occasion of concerting with his allies a plan ofgeneral and immediate pacification. Unhappily, to the present moment no such security has existed: no pledge of those principles which ought to direct the new government; no reasonable motive to judge of its stability. In this situation, it remains only for his Majesty to pursue, in concert with the other powers, a just and defensive war, which his zeal for the happiness of his subjects will never permit him to continue beyond the necessity to which it owes its origin, or to conclude on any other conditions but those which, in his opinion, will contribute to secure to them the enjoyment of their tranquillity, their constitution, and their independence. GRENVILLE.

The French minister replied by a note, in which he combatted and disproved all the allegations of the British government; and which he concluded by renewing the formal proposition of a negotiation, and the offer of passports necessary to carry it into effect.

Paris, 28 *Nivose*, *An* 8.

The official note, dated Nivose 28, an 8, addressed to the minister of his Britannic Majesty, having been offered to the consideration of the First Consul of the French Republic, he remarked with surprise, that his Britannic Majesty relied on an opinion of the origin and consequence of the existing war, which is not altogether correct. So far from France having provoked it, from the very beginning of the revolution she has solemnly proclaimed her love of peace, her indisposition to conquest, her respect for the independence of all governments; and it is not to be doubted, that solely occupied with her own interior affairs, she had avoided to take part in those of Europe, and remained faithful to her declarations. But, by an opposite disposition, as soon as the French revolution had blazed forth, almost the whole of Europe leagued for its destruction; the aggression was in a state of operation long before it became public. Internal resistance was excited; opponents were received with favour; their armed re-unions were encouraged; their secret plots were tolerated; their extravagant de-

clarations were supported: the French nation was outraged in the persons of its agents, and England set the example in this particular, by the dismissal of the minister which she had accredited. In short, France was attacked in her independence, in her honour, and in her security, long before war was declared. It is to the projects of subjection, of dissolution and dismemberment, which have been prepared against her, and the execution of which has been frequently attempted and pursued, that France is entitled to impute the evils that she has suffered, as well as those which have afflicted Europe. Such projects, though they have been for a long time without example in such a powerful nation, could not fail to bring on the most fatal consequences. Assailed on all sides, the republic was obliged to direct on all sides the efforts necessary for its defence; and it was for the support of its independence that she has employed the means which were in her power, and the courage of her citizens. While she perceived that her enemies combined to despise her rights, she depended upon the energy of her resistance; but no sooner did they renounce the hope of seizing them, than she manifested a desire for peace; and if her endeavours have not always been efficacious, if in the midst of those circumstances which the revolution and the war have successively produced, the preceding depositaries of the executive authority in France, have not always practised moderation in the same proportion as the nation displayed its courage, it must be attributed to the fatal animosity with which the resources of England have been lavished to consummate the ruin of France. But if the wishes of his Britannic Majesty, as he assures us, accord with those of the French Republic, and are for the establishment of peace, why, instead of making an apology, does he not do his utmost to terminate it? and what obstacle is there to prevent a reconciliation, whose utility is general and acknowledged, above all, where the First Consul of the French Republic has personally given so many proofs of his eagerness to terminate the calamities war, and of his disposition to maintain a rigid observance of treaties already concluded? The First Consul of the French Republic cannot doubt that his Britannic Majesty will acknowledge the right of nations to change the form of their government, since it is the exercise of that right by which he holds his crown: but he cannot comprehend on what view of this fundamental principle, on which the very existence of political societies depend, the minister of his Britannic Majesty has been able to adopt that conduct which tends to interfere in the interior concerns of the public, and which is not less injurious for the French nation and its government, than it would be for England and his Britannic Majesty, as it might excite a disposition towards that republican system, whose forms were adopted by England in the last century; or operate as an exhortation to recall to the throne the family whom birth had placed on it, and a revolution compelled to descend from it. If, at no very distant period, and when the constitutional system of the republic possessed neither the force nor the solidity which it can boast at the present moment, his Britannic Majesty thought proper to propose conferences on the subject of peace, why is he not eager to renew negotiations to which the present and reciprocal state of affairs promises a rapid progress? On all sides the voice of humanity and the people implore the termination of a war already distinguished by such great disasters; and whose prolongation threatens Europe with an universal shock, and irremediable evils. It is then to arrest the course of these calamities; or that, at length, their terrible consequences should be imputed only to those who provoked them, that the First Consul of the French Republic proposes to put an immediate end to hostilities, in agreeing to a suspension of arms, and in naming, on both sides, plenipotentiaries who shall repair to Dunkirk, or any other town, not less conveniently situated for the rapidity of their respective communications, and who shall labour without any delay in re-establishing peace and a good understanding between the French Republic and England. The First Consul offers, on this occasion, to give the necessary passports.

CH. MAU. TALLEYRAND.

This note was followed by the ensuing reply from the English government:

Downing-street, 20th January, 1800.

The official note transmitted by the minister of foreign affairs in France- and received by the undersigned the 18th of the current month, has been submitted to the King. His Majesty cannot avoid expressing the impression he felt, observing that in this note, the unprovoked aggressions of France, which are the sole cause and origin of the war, are systematically defended by those who now govern it, under the same injurious pretexts by which they were originally attempted to be disguised. His Majesty will not enter into a refutation of allegations which are not generally developed, and which (inasmuch as they relate to the conduct of his Majesty) are not only in themselves altogether devoid of foundation, but equally contradicted both by the interior evidence of events, from which they spring, and by the formal testimony given at the time, by the government of France it-

self. With respect to the objects of the note, his Majesty must refer to the answer which he has already given. He has exposed, without reserve, the obstacles which, in his judgment, deprive the present moment of all hope of desiring any advantage from a negotiation. The motives to treat which are brought so forward, and on which so much confidence is placed in the French note, the personal dispositions which are there said to prevail for the conclusion of peace, and the future preservation of treaties, the power to affirm the effect of the dispositions which are supposed to exist, the solidity and continuance of the newly-established system, after such a rapid succession of revolutions; all these things are points which cannot be known but after the test which his Majesty has already required, the result of experience, and the evidence of facts. With this sentiment of sincerity of frankness and solicitude, for the very necessary establishment of peace, his Majesty has pointed out to France the most certain and prompt means to attain this end; but he has declared in terms equally explicit, and with the same sincerity, that he does not entertain a wish to prescribe to a foreign nation the form of its government; that his thoughts are alone directed to the surety of his own states and of Europe; and that at the first moment when, in his judgment, he can satisfactorily look forward, in any manner whatever, to attain the essential object, he will manifest an earnest desire to concert with his allies, the means of an immediate and general negotiation, for the re-establishment of the general tranquillity. His Majesty adheres firmly to these declarations, and it is only upon such bases, thus established, that his duty to maintain the security of his subjects, will allow him to renounce that vigorous system of defence, to which, under the favour of Providence, his kingdoms owe that security of their possessions which they at present enjoy. GRENVILLE.

There was now no occasion to continue this negotiation, since England did not conceal her intentions of waiting for those interior changes which she foresaw in France, before she would listen to overtures of peace. It was absolutely necessary, therefore, to continue the war: a general armistice between the French and Imperial armies was concluded in the month of Messidor. The preliminary articles of peace were even signed at Paris, between France and Austria, by the minister for foreign affairs on one part, and General St. Julien on the other: but England wishing still to retain Austria in her alliance, and entertaining the hope that, from the suspension of hostilities, she might extract some means of continuing the war, endeavoured to break the negotiations began at Paris, and to destroy the effect of the preliminaries signed by General St. Julien. To attain this object, England demanded to take a part in the negotiations; and Lord Minto presented at Vienna a note, which the Austrian minister immediately forwarded to Paris, and which is conceived in the following terms:

Vienna, 9th August, 1800.

The undersigned envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty has not failed to transmit to his court, all the communications which have been made to him, by order of the Emperor, by his excellence the Baron de Thugot, relative to the correspondence which has taken place between his Imperial Majesty and the French government, respecting the overtures of peace. The undersigned is, in consequence, charged to testify the satisfaction that his Britannic Majesty has derived for this mark of confidence on the part of his Majesty I. and R. The undersigned does not delay, after the authority he has received, to declare, that his Britannic Majesty being anxious to give to the Emperor and to all Europe, the most evident proofs of his cordial and perfect union with his Majesty I. and R., and the value he attaches to the constant preservation of the good understanding and intimate friendship which are so happily established between their crowns and people, is disposed to concur with Austria in the negotiations which may take place for a general pacification: and to send his plenipotentiaries to treat of peace in concert with his Majesty I. and R., as soon as the intention of the French government to enter into a negotiation with his Britannic Majesty shall be made known to him.

MINTO.

The First Consul, though he might have mistaken the intention which dictated this tardy measure, gave it a very favourable interpretation. But to prevent the admission of England into the negotiations with the Court of Vienna, from being the occasion of delay, he required that England, before it became an integral part in a general negotiation, should previously agree to a suspension of hostilities with France, as was the case with Austria. This proposition was expressed in a note sent from Paris to Citizen Otto, commissary for the exchange of prisoners, and which he was to deliver, announcing at the same time, that he was furnished with the necessary powers and instructions to negotiate and conclude the proposed armistice. The terms were as follows:

London, 6th Fructidor, An 8.

His Imperial Majesty having communicated to the government of the French Republic, a note from Lord Minto, envoy ex-

traordinary and minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty at the court of Vienna, by which note it appears to be the desire of his Britannic Majesty to see the war terminated which divides France and England, the undersigned is specially authorised to demand of the Ministers of his Majesty further explanations on the proposition transmitted by the court of Vienna; and as it appears impossible that, at the moment when Austria and England should take a common part in the negociations, France should be under a suspension of arms with Austria, and remain in a state of hostilities with England, the undersigned is equally authorised to propose that a general armistice should be concluded between the armies and fleets of the two states, adopting, with respect to places besieged or blockaded, measures similar to those which have been adopted in Germany; as at Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsbourg. The undersigned has received from his government the necessary powers to negociate and conclude this general armistice. OTTO.

This note occasioned great emotion in the British cabinet. Before an official answer was given to citizen Otto, M. George, Commissioner of the Transport Office, was sent to him, to ascertain his powers, and to enter upon a preliminary discussion with him on the elements of the negociation. It was in these conferences that M. Otto stated, that the negociations for peace would be held at Luneville; and repeated, that the British plenipotentiary would be admitted to them as soon as it was agreed that there should be a suspension of arms between France and England; which should be founded on that now existing between France and Austria, and be reduced to the following conditions:

Article 1. There shall be a suspension of hostilities between the fleets and armies of the French Republic and those of Great Britain. 2. The ships of war and all trading vessels of both nations shall freely navigate without being subject to any visit, and follow the usage established before the war. 3. After the 10th Fructidor, all the vessels of both nations which may be taken shall be restored. 4. Malta, Alexandria, and Belle Isle, shall be assimilated to Ulm, Philipsbourg, and Ingolstadt; that is to say, that all trading vessels, neutral or French, may take provisions thither. 5. The fleets which block Brest, Cadiz, Toulon, and Flessingue, shall re-enter into the ports of England; or, at least, keep cruising from the view of the coast. 6. English officers shall be dispatched directly to the three admirals who respectively command in the Mediterranean, the fleet before Malta, and the blockade of Alexandia. They shall traverse France to arrive the sooner at their destination. 7. Spain and the Batavian Republic are comprised in the present armistice.

This proposition certainly bore sufficient testimony of the most open and liberal dispositions towards a prompt conciliation: but it appeared that the British government had not at that period, the design to enter seriously into negociation, and that its only object was to gain time for Austria: for citizen Otto having insisted on an official answer, received the following note from Lord Grenville:

Downing-street, 29th August, 1800.

M. Otto having informed his Majesty's government that the proposition made by the court of Vienna to fix at Luneville, the conferences for the proposed negociation respecting a general peace had been acceded to by the French government, nothing remains at present but to express the consent of his Majesty to that proposition; and to declare in consequence, that a person duly authorised will be sent to Luneville by order of his Majesty, to unite himself with the Plenipotentiaries of Austria and France, as soon as the passports for such a minister and his suite shall be received; provided that the French government should be disposed to make the necessary engagements, that the Plenipotentiary of his Majesty shall enjoy full liberty to communicate without restraint, and in the usual manner, by a courier with this country and those of his Majesty's allies.—As to the proposition for a general armistice by sea and by land between Great Britain and France, the King would rejoice at the moment, when he could with propriety adopt any measure whose immediate effect would be to put an end, at least for some time, to the calamities of war: but an armistice, applied to naval operations, having not in any instance been concluded between Great Britain and France, in the course of their negociations for peace, or before the actual signature of preliminaries, consequently, a similar step cannot be considered as necessary to negociations; and from the disputes which would inevitably arise respecting its execution, there is every reason to fear, that it would serve rather to obstruct than facilitate the success of those efforts which the two governments might make for the restoration of peace. Besides, it must be considered that the circumstances which accompany a naval war, are evidently not of a nature to admit of those nicely balanced arrangements, which are so readily established with regard to military operations, where the latter are suspended by a convention. It appears, then, at all events, to be premature to enter even into a discussion on this question, till, from the course of negociations, it may more clearly appear, that a satisfactory result may follow. But at all events, there can be

no positive decision on this point, till the French government has explained in what manner the principles of those regulations adopted in the German armistice, with respect to France, in an actual state of blockade, are applicable to the ports and maritime arsenals of France, and its allies, actually blockaded by his Majesty's squadrons; so that stipulations analogous to those which have been made in regard to the military positions occupied by the armies in Germany and Italy, might be fairly applied to the maritime forces of the respective powers. GRENVILLE.

Thus, by this note the British government announced its intention of sending a plenipotentiary to Luneville; but, in the mean time, refused to agree to the proposed armistice. This arrangement was not admissible, and citizen Otto was charged to assign his reasons by this note, which was sent to him from Paris:

London, 17*th Fructidor*, *An* 8.

The undersigned, having communicated to his government the note dated the 29th of August, which his excellency, Lord Grenville had transmitted to him, is directed to submit to his excellency the following observations: The preliminaries of peace had been concluded and signed between his Imperial Majesty and the French republic, the intervention of Lord Minto, who demanded that his court might be admitted to take part in the negociations, has prevented their ratification by his Imperial Majesty. The suspension of arms which took place on the continent, in the hope of a speedy peace, between the emperor and the Republic, will cease in effect the 24th Fructidor, since the Republic had sacrificed to the hopes of an immediate peace the immense advantages which it had derived from its victories. The intervention of England renders the question of peace with Austria so complicated, that it is impossible for the French government to prolong any further the armistice on the continent; unless his Britannic Majesty consents to render it common between the three powers. If then the Cabinet of St. James's continues to make common cause with Austria; and if its desire to engage in the negociation be sincere, his Britannic Majesty will not hesitate to adopt the proposed armistice. But if this armistice be not concluded before the 24th of Fructidor, hostilities will be renewed with Austria, and the First Consul will not consent with respect to that power, to any thing short of a complete and separate peace. To answer the explanations required relative to the armistice, the undersigned is directed to make known to his excellency, that the places which it is proposed to assimilate to those of Germany, are Malta and the maritime towns of Egypt. If it be true that a long suspension of arms between France and England would be unfavorable to his Britannic Majesty, an armistice on the Continent would be of essential disadvantage to the French Republic; at the same time a maritime armistice would be, to the French government, a pledge of the zeal of England to concur in the re-establishment of peace; and a continental armistice would convince the English government, that the efforts of France were sincere; and as the position of Austria is now become such as to require a prompt conclusion, the three powers would find, in their distinct interests, predominating reasons to consent without delay to those sacrifices, which may be reciprocally necessary to produce the speedy conclusion of their general and solid peace, which is the wish and hope of the whole world. OTTO.

The reasonings of this note were explicit, and the consequences demanded reflection. If England did not consent to sign a special armistice with France, that which existed with Austria, and was about to expire, would not be renewed. Austria, having no further means of resistance, must yield, and the peace would be concluded between France and Germany, without the intervention of England. The British government was sensible of the danger, but whether it did not receive a sufficient impression, or whether it thought that it had done enough, in manifesting for the court of Vienna, the appearances of an active friendship, without being found to give any further proofs; and contented itself with presenting, at the conclusion of a note extremely diffuse, the contre-projet of an armistice, from which none of those advantages would result to France, which she had a right to expect as a compensation for those which Austria would derive from the continental armistice: the note and the contre-project were conceived in the following terms:

Downing-street, 7*th September*, 1800.

The undersigned has had the honour to lay before the King the official answer of the French government, which he received from M. Otto on the 4th instant; and also the project of of an armistice communicated on the same day. The spirit of that answer is unhappily but little consonant with those appearances of a conciliatory disposition which had before been manifested. If it be really practicable in the present moment to restore permanent tranquillity to Europe, this object must be effected by very different means than those of such a controversy as that paper is calculated to produce. Some reply is, however, indispensably necessary to the assertions there advanced, which if now passed

over might hereafter be considered as admitted. The articles which an Austrian officer charged with no such commission, was persuaded to sign at Paris, do indeed appear to his Majesty but little calculated to terminate the calamities of Europe. But whatever be the tendency of the conditions which the French government has here specified, there can be no pretence for representing them as preliminaries concluded by Austria, or annulled by the intervention of his Majesty. The engagements by which the courts of London and Vienna have agreed not to treat except in concert with each other, were concluded before there was any question of these pretended preliminaries of peace. And the first intimations which his Majesty received of their signature were accompanied by the express declarations of his ally, that they were wholly unauthorized, and must be considered as absolutely null. The French government could indeed expect no other determination to be taken by his Imperial Majesty. The want of all powers or instructions for such a treaty, on the part of the Austrian officer, was at the time distinctly notified by him to those who treated with him, and is declared even on the very face of the paper which he signed. With respect, therefore, to the supposed demand of his Majesty to be admitted to those negotiations, nothing more is necessary to be said. The note delivered to M. de Thugot by Lord Minto, sufficiently explains the part which his Majesty is really disposed to take in any negotiation which may be regularly set on foot for general peace. The King has always been persuaded that the result of such a negotiation can alone effectually re-establish the tranquillity of Europe. Experience has confirmed this opinion; and it is only from the conviction of its truth that his Majesty has now been induced to waive his strong objections to the first proposal of a naval armistice, and to enter into the discussion of the conditions on which it may be established. His Majesty, judging from the experience of so many former negotiations, considers such an armistice as in no degree likely either to expedite or facilitate an arrangement of the direct interests of Great Britain and France. He views it in no other light than as a temporary advantage which it is proposed to him to yield to his enemy, in order to prevent the renewal of continental hostilities, and thereby to contribute to the conclusion of a general peace. And on this ground, notwithstanding the many disadvantages which he is sensible must result to this country from such a measure, he is resolved to give to his allies and to all Europe this new pledge of the sentiments by which he is actuated; provided that his enemies are disposed to regulate the conditions of such an armistice, as far as the nature of the case will allow, in conformity to the obvious and established principle of such arrangements. This principle is, that the respective position of the two parties should remain during the continuance of the armistice such as it was at its commencement; and that neither of them should by its operation acquire fresh advantages or new means of annoying his enemy, such as he could not otherwise obtain. The difficulty of doing this with the same precision in the case of naval operations, as by land, has already been adverted to in a former note; and it constitutes a leading objection to the measure itself. But the French projet, instead of attempting to remove or lessen these difficulties, departs at once, and in every article, from the principle itself, although expressly recognized and studiously maintained in the continental armistice which is there referred to as the foundation and model of this transaction. It is proposed, in effect, that the blockade of the naval ports and arsenals of the King's enemies should be raised; that they should be enabled to remove their fleets to any other stations, and to divide or to collect their force as they may judge most advantageous to their future plans: the importation both of provisions and of naval and military stores is to be wholly unrestrained. Even Malta and the ports of Egypt, though expressly stated to be now blockaded, are to be freely victualled, and for an unlimited period, in direct contradiction to the stipulations of the German armistice respecting Ulm and Ingolstadt, to which places it is nevertheless professed to assimilate them; and this government is expected to bind itself towards the allies of France even before any reciprocal engagements can be received from them; while, at the same time, all mention of the King's allies is, on the other hand, totally omitted. To a proposal so manifestly repugnant to justice and equality, and so injurious not only to his Majesty's interests, but also to those of his allies, it cannot be expected that any motive should induce the King to accede. The counter-projet which the undersigned has the honour to transmit to M. Otto, contains regulations in this respect more nearly corresponding with that principle of equality on which alone his Majesty can consent to treat. Even those articles are, in many important points, and particularly in what relates to the actual stations of his Majesty's squadrons, very far short of what his Majesty might justly demand from a reference to the general principle above stated, from analogy to the conditions of the continental armistice, or from the relative situation of naval force; and a confidence is re-

posed in the good faith of his enemies, which, although it can never be claimed in transactions between belligerent powers, his Majesty is, nevertheless, willing to hope he shall not find to have been misplaced on the present occasion. If M. Otto is empowered to accede to these stipulations, a proper person will immedsately be authorized to sign them on his Majesty's part; if not, he is requested to transmit them, without delay, to his government.

GRENVILLE.

COUNTER-PROJET.—It having been agreed that negotiations for a general peace shall be immediately set on foot between the Emperor of Germany, his Britannic Majesty, and the French Republic, and an armistice having already been concluded between the forces of his Imperial Majesty and those of the French Republic, it is agreed that an armistice shall also take place between the forces of his Britannic Majesty and those of the French Republic, on the terms and in the manner following: that is to say—Art. I. All hostilities, both by sea and land, between the forces of the two contracting parties, shall be suspended, and shall not be renewed until after fourteen days notice given of the termination of the armistice. This notice, in so far as relates to the parts of Europe north of Cape St. Vincent, must be given by one of the two governments to the other, and is to be reckoned from the day in which the same shall be received by the government to whom it is given. In the Mediterranean or other parts of the world, the notice must be given by the respective commanding officers. But in case of the renewal of hostilities between Austria and France, the armistice between Great Britain and France is likewise to be considered as terminated, so soon as such renewal of hostilities shall be known to the officer commanding the British forces: except only in so far as relates to prizes of merchant vessels, which shall be regulated by the third article of this convention. II. Orders shall immediately be sent by the two governments to their officers in the different parts of the world, to conform themselves to this agreement; sea-passes shall be given to the ships which are to carry these orders; and his Britannic Majesty's officers to be sent for that purpose through France, shall be furnished with the necessary passports and facilities to expedite their journey. III. All prizes made in any part of the world, during the continuance and operation of the armistice, by any officers having actually received due notice of this agreement, shall be restored; and generally, whether such notice shall have been received or not, all prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve days (to be reckoned from the exchange of the ratifications of this convention), shall be restored: and the same periods shall be allowed in this respect for the other parts of the world, as were stipulated by the 22d article of the preliminaries of the last peace." IV. Malta, and the maritime towns and ports of Egypt, shall be placed on the same footing as those places which, though comprized within the demarkation of the French army in Germany, are occupied by the Austrian troops: consequently, nothing shall be admitted by sea which can give additional means of defence; and provisions only for fourteen days at a time, in proportion to the consumption, as it shall be ascertained by commissaries to be named for the purpose, who shall have power to establish the necessary regulations for giving effect to this stipulation, conformably to the principles of the 4th article of the convention concluded between the Austrian and French generals in Germany. V. The blockade of Brest, Toulon, and any other of the ports of France by his Majesty's fleets, shall be discontinued; and all British ships shall be instructed not to interrupt or obstruct the trade or navigation of any ships sailing to or from the coasts of France, except in the article of naval or military stores, which are not to be brought thither by sea during the present armistice. None of the ships of war now stationed in the said ports respectively shall, before the renewal of hostilities, be removed to any other station. VI. The allies of the two parties shall severally be at liberty to accede to this armistice, if they so think fit; provided that they also engage to observe a like armistice, on conditions similar to those here specified, towards such of the allies on the other side as shall also accede to it. The periods or terms to be fixed for the commencement of the armistice in the different quarters of the world, as with respect to each of the said allies, are to be regulated in conformity to the stipulations contained in the 3d article of this convention as between Great Britain and France; and the said periods or terms are to be reckoned from the day on which the accession of such power to the armistice shall have been duly notified by such power to the party with whom it is at war. Such notification, duly authenticated by the government on whose part it is made, may either be transmitted directly by couriers or flags of truce, or through the channel of the two contracting parties, to each other reciprocally. The naval ports and arsenals of the allies of France are, during such armistice, to be placed on the same footing with those of France; and the notices which are to precede the renewal of hostilities, as well as all other matters relating to such armistice, are to be regulated

according to the terms of this convention. VII. This convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged within the term of ten days, or sooner, if the same be practicable.

To remedy the defects of this counter-projet, Citizen Otto was directed to present the following note, with a new projet for an armistice, in which the cabinet was studious to insert all the stipulations of the English projet, which were compatible with the interests of France.

London, 24th Fructidor, An 8.

The undersigned having transmitted to his government the note of his excellency Lord Grenville, dated the 7th of September, with the counter-projet which accompanied it, it appeared to the First Consul, that the armistice, as it was proposed by the British government, was so contrived, as not to offer any advantage to the French Republic; and, consequently, could not compensate to it for the serious inconveniences which would result to it from the continuation of the continental armistice. Whence it follows, that the counter-projet could only be admitted, as the question might simply be to settle the preliminaries of a particular arrangement between France and England, by a truce alike particular to the two states: but the effect of the proposed maritime truce, being intended to serve as a compensation to the French Republic for the continental truce, the former ought to afford it advantages equal to the inconveniences which it derives from the latter. The undersigned is therefore directed to make two proposals, of which his Britannic Majesty may choose that may appear to him most consonant to the interest of his dominions, or to his continental relations. The first is, that the projet for an armistice be drawn up and admitted in terms analagous to those which have been proposed by the ministry of his Britannic Majesty, but solely under the supposition that this armistice should be independent of the events of the continent, and relative only to a separate negotiation to be immediately opened between the two powers. The second is, that his Britannic Majesty should continue to make common cause with the Emperor, but that, in that case, he should consent that the maritime truce may offer to the French Republic advantages equal to those secured to the House of Austria by the continental truce. And with this view the comparison may be easily settled. By the continental armistice the Court of Vienna acquires the means of re-organizing its armies, of converting into men, arms, ammunition of every kind, the subsidies paid to it by England; of fortifying and victualling its places of the second and third line which were in a bad state, in consequence of the rapid march of the French armies having not been foreseen. Thus Asoppo, Palmanova, Venice, Verona, and Lintz, had been neglected; every day their fortifications are repairing. Ulm, Ingoldstadt, although blockaded, are improving their means of defence; and it is the armistice which procures to them this advantage; for at the moment when those places were invested, the enemy thought only of besieging ours, and consequently their own were not prepared for so early an attack. By the continental armistice, the impression made by the victories of the French armies diminish, their effects are weakened. Six months of repose would suffice to restore the moral and physical strength of the Austrian armies; to allow the conquered to recover from the impression of ascendancy acquired by the conquerors, and to make it necessary once more to regain that contingent superiority so well earned by the republic. It would also follow as a consequence of the continental armistice, that the kingdom of Naples, now a prey to every kind of calamity, and containing all the seeds of insurrection, might be re-organized, and furnish fresh resources to the enemies of France. It is by means of the armistice, in a word, that men are raising in Tuscany and in the marshes of Angona, that Austria is every where preparing new means of defence; that every where she is meliorating her position, which perhaps was desperate, whilst the advantages of the republic are diminishing or disappearing. The First Consul has already made to the love of peace a sufficiently great sacrifice of those advantages: if he should continue to derive no benefit from them, it would no longer be moderation, but weakness; it would no longer be the means of arriving at the conclusion of peace, but that of perpetuating the war. Perhaps in the judgment of statesmen, the French government may have already too long delayed to avail itself of the contingency which was favourable to it; but it has only done so upon the positive assurances which had been given to it of a speedy and separate peace. At this moment, when the two allied courts insist upon a joint negotiation and a general peace, the French government is too well aware that so complicated a work is not to be accomplished in a few days, and it ought to avoid putting itself in a position which would be diametrically opposite to the acceleration of the negotiations, by giving to the inimical powers, and principally to Austria, a real interest to prolong the discussions, in order daily to acquire the means of appearing with greater advantage in the field of battle, and

consequently with greater pretensions at the congress. It is with the view of avoiding, in part, so manifest an inconvenience, that France requires that the maritime armistice should be stipulated in such a manner as to be equivalent to the continental armistice, and as to place England, on its side, in the situation of being desirous of the conclusion of peace. The advantages which the republic can and ought to expect from the naval armistice are, the free navigation of her ships, and the facilities necessary for her communications with Egypt, the isles of France and Reunion, and with her American colonies: and although she should make use of it to send a few thousand men more to Egypt, do not the places belonging to the Emperor daily acquire, in like manner, fresh strength upon the continent? With respect to the victualling the harbours of the French Republic itself, internal means of circulation are not wanting; and this object is but of small importance to it. When the British government proposes that the harbours and places blockaded should only receive provisions for fourteen days, is it aware that the greater part of those establishments are still far from wanting provisions? and besides that, the season is drawing near, which, by rendering a naval blockade almost always illusory, makes the proposed favour quite useless. That if, besides, it be considered how little it is the interest of Great Britain, if it be sincerely desirous of peace, to prevent France from preserving and consolidating the small number which remain to her of foreign settlements, and how much England, by making new acquisitions of this nature, would augment still farther the uneasiness and jealousy of Europe; and the disposition which it evinces not to see with indifference the unlimited extension of the power and commerce of England, it will be acknowledged, at the same time, that the advantages to be derived to the French Republic from a maritime truce are admitted, that this truce would not be so very disadvantageous to England as her government appears to imagine. The undersigned is consequently directed to refer Lord Grenville to the double proposition contained in the present note. If a separate negotiation and peace be the object of the armistice, they may be agreed to in the form in which it is proposed by the ministry of his Britannic Majesty. If a joint negotiation and a general peace be the object, the armistice must be stipulated in the manner proposed by the French government, and as it will be subsequently detailed by the undersigned. OTTO.

PROJET.—In consideration of its having been agreed that negotiations for a general peace should be immediately opened between the French Republic and its allies, on the one side, and his Imperial Majesty, his Britannic Majesty, and their allies, on the other side, and the armistice which has already been concluded between the armies of the French Republic and those of his Imperial Majesty may be prolonged, if an equivalent armistice should be concluded between the forces of the French Republic and those of his Britannic Majesty, the two governments have agreed to conclude the said armistice upon the following conditions:—Art. I. All hostilities both by sea and land between the two nations shall be suspended, and shall not be renewed until after a month's notification prior to the end of the armistice. In all parts of the world the armistice shall not be broken without the express order of the contracting governments; and hostilities shall not be renewed until a month after the notification which may have been given by the general or commanding officer of one of the two nations to that of the other nation. II. Orders shall be immediately transmitted by the two governments to the commanding officers in the several parts of the world, directing them to act in conformity with this convention. Passports shall be given to the persons who shall carry out these orders: and the officers of his Britannic Majesty who shall travel through France for this purpose shall receive safe-conducts, and the necessary facilities for accelerating their journey. III. All prizes made in any part of the world, during the continuance of the armistice, by any officer having actually received the notification of this convention, shall be restored: and generally (whether this notification shall have been made or not), all prizes made in the Channel, or in the North Seas, after twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of this convention, shall be restored; and in regard to this object, the terms shall be fixed for the other parts of the world conformably to the stipulations of the 22d article of the preliminaries of the last peace; whence it results, that, computing from the day of the said exchange, all trading vessels of either nation shall have the power of putting out to sea, and of navigating freely as before the war. IV. Malta and Egypt shall be assimilated to the places in Germany, which, although blockaded by the French army, have been permitted to enjoy the benefit of the continental armistice. Malta shall be furnished with provisions for fifteen days at a time, at the rate of ten thousand rations per diem. With regard to Egypt, six French frigates shall have the liberty of sailing from Toulon, of unlading at Alexandria, and of returning without being search

ed, and without suffering any opposition during their passage, either from English ships, or from those of the allies of Great Britain. An English officer of rank shall, for this purpose, embark on board one of the frigates, and shall travel through France on his way to Toulon. V. The blockade of Brest, of Toulon, and of every other French port, shall be raised; and all British captains shall receive instructions not to interrupt the trade of any vessel either entering therein or going out thereof. No ship of the line, however, of two or three decks, actually at anchor in the said ports, shall be at liberty to go out before the renewal of hostilities, for the purpose of changing its station; but frigates, sloops, and other small ships of war, may freely go out and navigate; and in the event of their meeting at sea with ships belonging to his Britannic Majesty, they shall observe the customs established before the war. VI. The land forces in the pay of his Britannic Majesty shall not have the power of disembarking in any port of Italy during the continuance of the present armistice. VII. The allies of France, namely, Spain, the Batavian Republic, and Genoa, shall participate in the benefit of the present armistice. (If his Britannic Majesty insist upon including his allies in the armistice, they shall enjoy the same advantages with those of France). VIII. The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged, in the space of ten days, or sooner, if it should be possible.

The First Consul, who would suffer no means to escape that might lead to a conciliation, made a double proposition. If England wished to engage in the common negotiation with Austria, he required that she should accede to the armistice which was proposed to her, on the consideration that there was but this way to establish some resemblance between the respective relations of the contracting powers, and to communicate to each the desire and the necessity of coming to a conclusion. If, on the contrary, England preferred entering into a separate negotiation with France, the first Consul would accept the projet for an armistice presented by the British ministry. What could he do more? Did he not give a new proof of his conciliatory disposition in delaying for eight days the renewal of hostilities against Austria? So much moderation, attention, and even complaisance, had no other effect than that of producing, on the part of the British government, the following official answer:

Downing-street, 20th Sept. 1800.

The note enclosed in M. Otto's letter of the 16th instant, has been laid before the King. His Majesty has not seen in that paper any fresh suggestions on the subject of a naval armistice which can at all vary the answer transmitted to M. Otto on the 7th instant. Neither his Majesty's known engagements to his allies, nor his desire, so recently expressed, to contribute to the restoration of general tranquillity in Europe, will admit of his separating his interests from those of the powers with whom he is connected in the prosecution of the war; much less could he entertain the idea of consenting, for such a purpose, to any naval armistice; a measure which he has already declared to be totally inapplicable to a separate discussion of the interests of Great Britain and France. This proposal being, therefore, one which the French government must have known that his Majesty could not accept, the supposed alternative professed to be offered to his Majesty's choice, amounts to nothing more than to the simple renewal of a demand already rejected. No fresh inducement is stated which should now dispose his Majesty to consent to those conditions of armistice for joint negotiations which he had before considered as wholly inadmissible. From information received since the last communications on this subject took place, his Majesty has observed, with equal surprise and concern, that the orders for giving notice of the termination of the continental armistice must actually have been dispatched from Paris at the very time when the continuance of that armistice was proposed to his Majesty as the condition and inducement for a maritime truce: and if in addition to this circumstance his Majesty were to collect the present dispositions of his enemies from the tone respecting his conduct and views with which their recent communications with his allies are filled, the conclusion must be extremely unfavourable to the existence of any disposition to conciliation. His Majesty is, however, still willing to waive all reference to these considerations, and to regulate his conduct by the motives which he has already explained. He still looks, therefore, to a naval armistice on suitable conditions, as to a sacrifice which he may be induced to make in order to prevent the renewal of hostilities on the continent, and thereby to facilitate those joint negotiations for general peace which might perhaps be accelerated by such an arrangement, although they are by no means necessarily dependant on it. But when it is required that the extent of the sacrifice which his Majesty is to make should be regulated neither by any fair standard of equality, nor by the ordinary rules which govern such transactions; when, without any reference to the interests of his own people, he is called upon to proportion his concessions to the ex-

aggerated estimates which his enemies have formed of the benefits derived to his allies from the continental armistice; and when, on such grounds as these, conditions are insisted on which even these could not warrant, it becomes necessary to state distinctly that his Majesty neither recognizes this principle, nor, if he did, could he agree in this application of it. His Majesty is not, indeed, called upon to appreciate the relative advantages which the prolongation of the continental armistice might really afford to each of the belligerent powers; but even of those circumstances which are enumerated by the French government as exclusively advantageous to Austria, many are evidently beneficial to both parties, and are so nearly to an equal extent. If, during the interval of repose which has already elapsed, the Austrian armies have been re-established, recruited, and reinforced, France has not been inattentive to the same measures. If the subsidies which his Majesty has furnished are applied by his ally to the formation or transport of magazines, France has appropriated to similar purposes the rigorous contributions exacted from those countries which the existence of an armistice has not exempted from that calamity. The places in the rear of the Austrian army have been repaired; but the position of the French armies has also been strengthened; and even the blockaded towns may perhaps suffer more from the increased length of the blockade, than they can profit by any internal measures for improving their defence. Into other points of comparison his Majesty forbears to enter. No part of the varied successes of the continental war appears to him to entitle his enemies to presume on any ascendant over the spirit of the Austrian armies. But were the assertions of the French government in these respects better grounded than his Majesty conceives them to be, the principle itself would still be inadmissible. It is impossible that his Majesty can admit that compensation is to be demanded from him for the extent of those advantages, whatever they may really be, which his ally might derive from the continuance of the armistice; yet even such compensation is in a great degree offered by his Majesty. In consenting to a naval armistice on such terms as have already been acceded to on his Majesty's part, he has made considerable sacrifices, and placed within the reach of his enemies great and obvious advantages which their representation in vain endeavours to depreciate; he has thereby given to all Europe a strong pledge of his concern for the general welfare, and to his enemies a decided proof of pacific disposition. But to yield to the present demand, would be to sacrifice those means of present defence, and those pledges of future security, which have been acquired by such great and memorable efforts, and which he can never be expected to forego till the result of those negotiations, in which he has declared his readiness to concur, shall have crowned his endeavours for the happiness of his people by the restoration of safe and honourable peace.

GRENVILLE.

This note, so far from offering a suitable decision on the question of the maritime armistice, contained nothing but difficulties and assertions, which it was the duty of Citizen Otto to refute without delay, after the provident and detailed instructions that he has received from Paris. This was the object of the following note:

Hereford-street, 1st Vendimiaire, An 9.

During the whole course of the negotiation with which the undersigned has been charged, he has had cause to regret that the want of more direct communications with his Majesty's ministry has rendered it impossible for him to give to his official overtures the necessary explanations. This inconvenience is rendered still more striking by the result of his last communications, to which the note which he had the honour to receive on the 20th of this month is an answer. The first part of this note appearing to intimate a doubt respecting the sincerity of the dispositions of the French government to begin negotiations for a general peace, the undersigned cannot avoid entering into some details upon this subject, which will fully justify the conduct of the First Consul. The proposed alternative of a *separate* peace, in the event of his Majesty's not accepting the conditions for a general armistice, far from evincing a want of sincerity, furnishes, on the contrary, the strongest proof of the conciliatory dispositions of the First Consul: it is a necessary consequence of the declaration made by the undersigned the 4th of this month. In effect, he has had the honour to apprize the British ministry, that if that armistice be not concluded before the 11th of September, hostilities *will have been* renewed with Austria, and that in that case the First Consul will no longer be able, with regard to this power, to consent to any except a separate and complete peace. That armistice was not concluded at the date fixed upon; it was therefore natural eventually to expect *a separate peace with Austria*, and according to the same supposition, a peace in like manner *separate with Great Britain*, unless it is thought that the calamities with which a great part of Europe has been for eight years past oppressed, should be continued without other hope of termination than that of the complete

destruction of one of the belligerent powers. It is not therefore the French government which proposes to his Majesty to separate his interests from those of his allies; but having in vain attempted to unite them in a common centre, and finding them separated *in fact* by the refusal of England to lay down on the altar of peace some special advantages of which France had already made a sacrifice, the First Consul has given a fresh proof of his dispositions, by pointing out another means of reconciliation which the course of events will bring about sooner or later. In conformity with the advice which the undersigned had transmitted on the 4th of this month, notification was given of the cessation of the continental armistice at the term which had been fixed upon; but the counter-projet of the British ministry, dispatched by the undersigned upon the 8th of this month, having reached Paris on the 10th, and his Imperial Majesty having appeared to be convinced that his ally would not withhold his consent to an admissible armistice, the First Consul determined again to retard for eight days the renewal of hostilities. Orders were immediately dispatched to the armies of Germany and Italy, and in the event of those orders arriving too late in the last-mentioned country, and of the French generals having obtained successes in consequence of any military operation, they are ordered to resume that position which they occupied on the precise day on which hostilities were recommenced. The simple relation of these facts will, without doubt, be sufficient to prove that the French government never can have intended to cover, by pretended negotiations, a fresh attack upon Austria; and that, on the contrary, it has acted throughout this negotiation with that frankness and loyalty which can alone ensure that re-establishment of general tranquillity which his Majesty and his ministers have so much at heart. It would be in vain to look for proofs of a contrary intention in some expressions contained in the official communications of the French government to the allies of his Majesty; more especially if such proofs were attempted to be drawn from one of the last letters written to Baron Thugut, which the undersigned might have communicated himself, if he had found an opportunity. That letter would prove, that the French government, always a friend to peace, appeared to complain of the intentions of Great Britain only because it had every reason to believe them contrary to a solid system of pacification. The undersigned has entered into these details only because, on the eve of negotiations which may be entered upon, it is of importance to the councils of the two powers to be reciprocally convinced of the sincerity of their intentions, and because the opinion which they may have of that sincerity is the only pledge for the success of the negotiations. With respect to the second point in the note which the undersigned has had the honour of receiving, he is to refer to his letter of the 16th, in which he informed his excellency Lord Grenville, that he was directed to give *satisfactory explanations* relative to the principal objections of the British government to the proposed armistice, and entreated him, at the same time, to facilitate the means of verbal communications with the ministry. It was therefore difficult to believe that the French government would adhere, without *any modification*, to its first overtures; for in that case it would have been quite useless to solicit for an interview, in order to give satisfactory explanations. In speaking of the compensations requisite, in order to place the naval armistice upon a footing with the continental truce, his Majesty's ministry think that there is some preponderance in the balance settled by the French government. A formal discussion upon this point would undoubtedly be displaced, after the various successes of a war which has produced so many extraordinary events. It is difficult to doubt of the moral influence of those events upon armies, upon nations, upon governments themselves; and the deductions which may be drawn from it at present, appear to justify the opinion which the undersigned has felt it his duty to state. If there be any exaggeration in this opinion, it is shared with the enemies of the republic themselves, who have employed every effort to prolong the truce, and who have not scrupled to use the means of pretended negotiations in order to gain time. The preliminaries signed by Count de St. Julien, and disavowed by his court, are a memorable example of this; and the prolongation of the continental armistice must necessarily be considered as a sacrifice on the part of the republic, since every effort has been employed to extort its consent to it. But even whilst his Majesty's ministry admit the existence of this sacrifice, they formally declare that an analogous sacrifice cannot be expected to be made on the part of his Majesty. It certainly does not become France to judge how far his Majesty's engagements with his allies may counteract his inclination in this respect; but France appears to have certainly an undoubted right to demand the price of the sacrifice which she has made, and which she is still willing to make. The First Consul has given to Europe repeated pledges of his pacific dispositions; he has never ceased manifesting them to the cabinets interested in this contest; and even al-

though the hopes of the enemies of the French Republic should be excited by his moderation, it shall always be the sole guide of his actions. Notwithstanding this difference in the manner of viewing several questions accessory and preliminary to the proposed pacification, the undersigned cannot but congratulate himself on finding, in all the communications which he has hitherto had the honour of receiving, the same assurances of his Majesty's disposition to employ his efforts towards the re-establishment of the tranquillity of Europe, and he will neglect no opportunity of placing this disposition in its strongest light to his government. OTTO.

Lord Grenville replied in the following manner:—

Downing-street, Sept. 25, 1800.

It is by no means the wish of the British government to prolong a written controversy on the circumstances to which the first part of M. Otto's note of the 23d inst. principally relates; it is however necessary, in order to vindicate the accuracy of the former statement which the undersigned was directed to make, that the dates of those facts should, in reply to M. Otto's note, be more particularly detailed; but this will be done without adding any fresh comment upon them. The first proposal made to his Majesty, on the part of France, for a naval armistice grounded on that of the continent, was dated on the 24th of August. The notices for terminating the continental armistice were given by the French generals on the 27th and 29th of August; the orders for that purpose must therefore have been actually sent from Paris before the 24th. His Majesty's answer was transmitted by the undersigned to M. Otto on the 29th, the very day on which the last of the notices was given in Germany. That answer referred to the Austrian armistice as still existing; and it was not till the 4th of September that the first intimation was received here of the measures taken in Germany for giving notice of its termination.—With respect to the letter of M. Talleyrand to Baron de Thugut, to which M. Otto refers, it was also dated the 24th August. The French government, so far from being at that time entitled to consider his Majesty's intentions as hostile to the re-establishment of a solid system of pacification, was then actually in possession of the notification given in his Majesty's name, through his ally, of his readiness to concur in immediate negociations for that very purpose. It will be with real pleasure that his Majesty will see the conclusions which appeared to him to result from these facts disproved by the event. The best evidence which the French government can now give of the sincerity of its dispositions for peace, will be found in the facilities it may afford for expediting both the commencement and the successful termination of that negotiation into which the King and his ally the Emperor of Germany have already expressed their willingness to enter, and which can alone, by a general and comprehensive arrangement of the interests of all the parties concerned in this extensive war, afford to Europe the hope of solid and permanent tranquillity. With respect to the supposed case, in which it is stated, that France would not agree to treat with Austria but for a separate peace, the fortune of war can alone decide on the means of realizing such a pretension; but whenever it shall be insisted on by France, after the experience of what has already passed, it will afford to all other powers, not a presumption only, but the painful and decided conviction, that the French government has no real desire to put a final and conclusive period to the calamities of Europe. No man who considers the past events of this contest with attention, or who is capable of judging with accuracy of the present situation of affairs, can believe that, if the present war is to be terminated only by a succession of separate treaties between the different powers now engaged in it, any permanent or solid basis of general tranquillity could be established. As his Majesty has, in compliance with M. Otto's wishes, authorised a proper person to confer with him respecting the different proposals for a naval armistice, it is unnecessary to add any thing here on that subject. This step affords a new proof of his Majesty's dispositions to lend himself to every reasonable facility which can contribute to a general pacification, and every part of his Majesty's conduct will be found conformable to those dispositions. GRENVILLE.

The negociation relative to the maritime armistice must now be considered as, in a great measure, broken off; and, on both sides, an end was put to those discussions, which were rendered useless by the rapid succession of military events, as well as by the conclusion of a treaty of peace at Luneville, between France and the Emperor, 20th Prairial, An 9.—On the 29th of this month Citizen Otto transmitted, from London, the first account of the dismissal of Messrs. Pitt, Dundas, and Grenville. One of the first acts of the new ministry was to revoke the orders which had been issued against the fishing-boats, by their predecessors, which was the only answer given to the note sent by Citizen Otto, according to the orders of his Cabinet. It now appeared, that Messrs. Addington, Hawkesbury, and the other members of the new ministry, were disposed to

renew the negotiations for the restoration of peace so often broken off by their predecessors; and on the 29th Ventose, Lord Hawkesbury transmitted to Citizen Otto the following note :—

London, 21st March, 1801.

The undersigned has received the commands of the King, to communicate to the French government the dispositions of his Majesty immediately to enter on negotiations for the restoration of peace, and to declare that his Majesty is ready to send to Paris, or any other suitable place, a minister fully authorised to give every necessary explanation, as well as to negociate and conclude, in the name of his Majesty, a treaty between this country and France. HAWKESBURY.

The First Consul, whose dispositions for peace had not changed for a moment, eagerly received this overture; but, convinced more than ever, that, in the complication of interests which a war of eight years had so strangely perplexed, a pompous negotiation was not calculated to produce a prompt re-establishment of peace, he directed Citizen Otto to present the following note, in which he proposed, previously, to agree to a general suspension of hostilities, or even to preliminary articles of pacification.

12th Germinal, An 9.

The undersigned has communicated to his government the note of his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, dated 21st of March, 1801.—The First Consul retains his constant love of peace; and the undersigned is specially directed to communicate the lively satisfaction felt by the First Consul, on perceiving that the British Cabinet is at last disposed to put an end to the misery which, for eight years, has desolated Europe. The campaign is beginning: the fleets of his Britannic Majesty appear ready to carry war into the bosom of the Baltic; the continental powers are prepared to attack Portugal and Hanover. How can it be expected, that, amidst these warlike preparations, and these new causes of exasperation, a public negotiation could be successful, without agreeing to some preliminary principles? Would it not be more natural to precede a negotiation by a suspension of hostilities? or, if the obstacles to a suspension of maritime force are more difficult to remove, even than the re-establishment of peace itself, would it not, at least, be more suitable to come to a previous understanding on the basis of the latter? The undersigned has all the powers and instructions necessary to give Lord Hawkesbury the additional explanations which his excellency can desire. The First Consul will regard that as the most splendid day of his life, when the commerce of Europe will enjoy its prosperity undisturbed, which can arise only from the peace of the seas. OTTO.

Citizen Otto announced, at the same time, that he had received the instructions and powers necessary for either of the two negotiations which should be preferred. The answer of Lord Hawkesbury was conceived in the following terms :—

2d April, 1801.

The undersigned Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, does not lose a moment in acquainting M. Otto, that his Majesty feels a real satisfaction on learning that the sentiments of the French government for the re-establishment of peace are conformable to his own. From the manner in which the overtures of his Majesty have been received at Paris, he has every reason to hope that this desirable object will be obtained, for the mutual interest and happiness of both nations. As to the proposition of an armistice, which is suggested as a fair alternative, the difficulties foreseen in the note of M. Otto are of a nature to render them insurmountable, or, at all events, to occasion considerable delays: but the other proposition, an immediate, full and confidential communication, respecting the terms and preliminaries of peace, is entirely conformable to the wishes of his Majesty. The undersigned will be authorized, in a very few days, to enter into a negotiation with M. Otto; and he will receive the necessary powers to bring this important business to a very prompt termination. HAWKESBURY.

This note proves, that the British government acceded to the proposition for opening the negotiation on the preliminary articles; and the discussions for that purpose were begun on the 14th Germinal. The English minister endeavoured, at first, to bring forward all the former pretensions of his court; and some of the events which had taken place in the North of Europe (the passage of the English fleet into the Sound, and the unexpected death of the Emperor Paul I.) as having contributed to give confidence to the British cabinet. In his second conference, Lord Hawkesbury delivered to Citizen Otto, a sketch, without any signature, of the conditions which he proposed should form the preliminaries of pacification.

Aperçu, in the hand-writing of Lord Hawkesbury.—His Majesty proposes to the French government, to conclude peace, for itself and its allies, on the following conditions :—The French government will evacuate Egypt, and give it up to the Porte. His Majesty will restore, on his part, to France and its allies, the following conquests : — Pondicherry, Chandernagor, Mahé, Negapatam, Malaca, Amboine, Banda, Cochin, St. Marcou, the

Cape of Good Hope, on condition that it shall be a free port, Goree, Surinam, Curacao, Saint Lucia, the Saints, St. Pierre and Miquelon, Minorca. The Batavian Republic shall grant to the House of Orange an entire indemnity for the loss which it has suffered in its property. If authentic information should be received, previous to the signature of the preliminaries, of the evacuation of Egypt by the French troops, or of a convention concluded to that effect, his Majesty will not hold himself bound to subscribe to the above conditions in all their extent.

The First Consul ordered Citizen Otto to be informed, that he could consider these first propositions of the English minister only as a means of gaining time; that there certainly could be no idea of their being seriously discussed; that there was some difference between the fifth and the ninth year of the republic; that he would consent only to an honourable peace, founded on a just equilibrium of the different parts of the world; and that, with such a view of things, he could not leave, in the hands of England, countries and establishments of such immense weight in the balance of Europe, as those which she demanded. During several weeks, the discussions went on and extended to a considerable length. To give them more activity, the First Consul ordered Citizen Otto to deliver the following note to Lord Hawkesbury:—

Hereford-street, 12 Prairial, An 9.

The French government sees with concern, that, from the first overtures made by his Britannic Majesty, to enter on negotiations respecting peace, two months are passed away, without being able to fix the basis of a pacification so important to the two nations and all Europe. In the actual state of things, it cannot be presumed that certain military events, and, above all, the operations of some small armies, that bear so inconsiderable a proportion to the real and disposable force of the two countries, ought to influence, essentially, a measure whose object it is to produce a system capable of re-establishing peace, and securing its duration. The public declarations of the British minister have informed Europe of the determination of his Britannic Majesty, to labour in the work of a general pacification, without suffering himself to be dazzled by success, or disheartened by misfortune. These sentiments are participated by the First Consul, by his council, and the whole nation. They are equally animated with a sincere desire to put an end to the war, but without compromising, in any manner, the dignity and real interest of France. The chances of war, which from one moment to another may form a balance between two powerful nations, can no more influence the conditions of a maritime peace, than of a continental peace; and whatever may be the fate of forces employed upon the Nile, the Tagus, or any other quarter, it is incontestible that the pretensions and respective interests will remain always the same; and that the object of the pacification will be, invariably, to re-establish an equilibrium which at once embraces the possessions and the commerce of two powers in different parts of the globe. To attain this object, the French government, reckoning more and more on the sincerity of the British ministry, requests that the negotiations may take a more official character: and that the ministry will communicate to the undersigned, in writing, the propositions it proposes to make on the basis that his Majesty shall have thought proper to adopt, for the establishment of a definitive and general peace. The well-known firmness of the French government, and its means of defence, would be sufficient to set aside any condition that might be incompatible with the honour and the dignity of the republic; if even the principles of justice and moderation that the ministry of his Britannic Majesty has hitherto professed, were not to be considered as pledges of his sincere desire to shorten the negotiations by offers analogous to these principles. OTTO.

On a demand made to Lord Hawkesbury, that he would specify his propositions for the re-establishment of peace, he answered by referring to the *Aperçu* which he had given to Citizen Otto, in an early part of April; and, without particularizing the articles it contained, requested that the French government would also make known its propositions. His note is as follows:—

Downing-street, June 6, 1801.

The undersigned, first Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has laid before the King the note presented by M. Otto on the 1st inst. His Majesty has never ceased to preserve the sincere desire that he manifested at the commencement of the negotiation, to conduct to a speedy conclusion, the war which unhappily exists between the two countries. The delays which might take place in the course of the negotiation, cannot, on any account, be attributed to his Majesty: and if it was thought more convenient to carry on the necessary discussions by verbal communications, rather than by the more usual means of official notes, it was because that mode, proposed by the French government, was best calculated to bring the two countries to a full and clear understanding with each other. The undersigned has already, on several occasions, made M. Otto

acquainted with what appeared to his Majesty's government to be the most suitable means of negotiation, and on what conditions peace might be concluded. This basis can be established only on just and equitable principles, taking into consideration all the circumstances of the war, and the relative state of the belligerent powers at the moment of negotiation. His Majesty is so far from being influenced by any view of ambition and aggrandizement, that he would most willingly abandon all the conquests which have been made during the present war, on condition that the powers of the continent should recover the situation which they possessed before the commencement of hostilities in 1722. But if there should be an opinion that an arrangement of this nature was impracticable in the actual state of Europe, in this case his Majesty would be obliged to have recourse to some other principle equally just and reasonable; and he thinks that he has the right to expect, that the French government will acquiesce in his being justified, from the success of his arms, to retain a part of his conquests, from a sense of giving security to his dominions, and serving as a counterpoise to the important acquisitions of territory obtained by France on the continent. Conformably to this principle, the undersigned has remitted to M. Otto, the 14th of last April, a memorial, wherein were laid down, the terms to which his Majesty was disposed to accede as conditions of peace; and also, to give the most unequivocal proof of the justice and moderation of his views, and of his sincere desire for the return of tranquillity, his Majesty does not hesitate to declare, that he is not disposed to avail himself of the circumstances which have since presented themselves, though ever so important to the interest of his states, by asking for terms more advantageous than those that have been stated in this memorial: therefore, his Majesty refers again to this memorial, on the subject of those principles on which peace can be concluded between the two countries. If the French government has any propositions to make, different from those that have been mentioned, and which in its judgment may conduce to peace, his majesty is ready to give them the highest consideration. HAWKESBURY.

Citizen Otto received from his government the following note, which he inclosed as an answer to Lord Hawkesbury:—

26th Prairial, An 9.

The undersigned having transmitted to his government the note of his excellency Lord Hawkesbury, dated the 6th of June, is directed to address the following answer to him:—A just and honourable peace is the first wish of the French government: and, during twenty months, it has not ceased to manifest its dispositions to that object. In the month of Nivose, year 8, it proposed to the British government to treat of peace, and its proposition was repulsed. During the negotiations with Austria, the French government reiterated the proposition of a separate negotiation with England, and even of a general negotiation, if the court of London would put itself in the same position relative to France as the court of Vienna had done, by the preliminary conclusion of a maritime armistice, analogous to that of the continent, which was altogether in favour of Austria. This proposition was also rejected: and if at this moment, when the negotiation is opened between the two states, the British government participates in the wish for peace, it is very easy to give a proof of it, since it possesses, from its immense conquests, the pledge of a general peace. At the same time it must be said, that the sincere disposition to peace is not visible in the propositions presented by Lord Hawkesbury. Can the court of London, if it is sincere in its wishes for peace, and now that the allies are concentrating their means against it, pretend to preserve conquests, which she owes only to the disorders of the French revolution, and the efforts of the coalition? Nevertheless, it is acknowledged, that the great events which have happened in Europe, and the changes that have taken place in the boundaries of the great states of the continent, might authorize a part of the demands of the British government; but how can it demand, as an ultimatum, the keeping of Malta, of Ceylon, of all the countries conquered from Tippoo Saib, of Trinidad, Martinico, &c.? The undersigned is authorized to demand of Lord Hawkesbury, if, in case the French government should accede to the arrangements proposed for the East Indies by England, and should adopt the *status ante bellum* for Portugal, his Britannic Majesty would consent that the *status ante bellum* should be re-established in the Mediterranean and America? OTTO.

Until this period, England had affected to appear tranquil on the subject of Portugal, though the French and Spanish armies, united, had, in the space of a few weeks, reduced Portugal to the last extremity, and a negotiation had been concluded, in which the court of Lisbon was compelled to make the greatest sacrifices. In fact, the first treaty concluded at Badajoz had already imposed very rigorous conditions on Portugal, the principal of which were directed against England. Nevertheless, the First Consul refused to ratify this treaty, and made known

his refusal to England, declaring freely, that in the advantages gained over Portugal, he only sought for the means of compensation to offer England, in exchange for the restitutions she should make to the allies of France. This was the object of a note, addressed from Paris to Citizen Otto, and which he transmitted to Lord Hawkesbury. It was as follows:—

27th Prairial, An 9.

The war with Portugal having been pursued with ardour, and the province of Alentejo having been conquered by the Spaniards, the Prince Regent dispatched M. de Pinto with full powers to treat of peace. The negotiation was opened at Badajoz, between the ambassador of the republic and the Portuguese envoy. A kind of treaty was the result, whose principal stipulations were as follow:—That all the ports and roads in Portugal, as well in Europe as in the other parts of the world, shall be shut against English vessels, whether of war or commerce, and shall remain open to those of France and its allies, to the conclusion of a peace between France and England. That the limits of the two Guianas shall be determined in future by the river Arrawari, whose navigation, throughout its course, shall be common to the two countries. That the commercial relations between the two countries shall be fixed by a treaty of commerce; but that, in the mean time, the goods and merchandize proceeding from the soil and manufactures of each of the two countries, will be reciprocally admitted, without being subject to any prohibition or any duty but in common with similar goods and merchandize imported by other nations; that the French cloth shall be immediately introduced into Portugal on the footing of the most favoured branch of commerce. Further, this treaty contains the stipulation of an indemnity in favour of the French government.—But whatever may be the advantages which would result from this treaty, the undersigned is directed to make known to Lord Hawkesbury, that the instrument signed between the two plenipotentiaries respectively, will not be ratified by the First Consul, and will only be considered by him as a minute of conferences, and rather as a projet than a definitive treaty: at the same time, the First Consul, not to depart from the declaration made at L'Orient to M. D'Aranjo, that peace with the court of Lisbon would not be concluded, till the allies should be in possession of three provinces of Portugal, which might serve as a compensation for their colonies at a general peace. The undersigned must add, that in giving his orders to the French army to be prepared to continue the attacks of Portugal, the First Consul designed to avail himself of the submission of the Portuguese government, and leave the fate of this country to the British cabinet, who is called upon to decide it, by its answer to the last propositions which it has received, viz. if it will admit the *status ante bellum* for Portugal as an equivalent for the *status ante bellum* for America. The British government will not fail seeing, in the frankness of this measure, the desire to act with tenderness towards a feeble power, who, throughout the war, has acted no other part but that of an English province; and to avoid every thing which, by exasperating the two cabinets, would injure the negotiation entered upon by them, and would prepare for humanity new subjects for tears.

OTTO.

Lord Hawkesbury replied by the following note:—

Downing-street, June 25, 1801.

The undersigned, first Secretary of State to his Majesty for Foreign Affairs, has the honour to mention the receipt of two notes which have been forwarded to him by M. Otto, on the 18th inst. He shall abstain from making any reflection on the motives which prevented his Majesty from entering into the negotiation in the month of January, 1800, or on the circumstances which opposed his endeavours, during the present year, to obtain a general peace. The undersigned will, however, make some remarks on the negotiation in question. The French government appears to admit the incontestible justice of the pretensions of his Majesty to preserve a part of his conquests, by way of compensation for the great acquisitions of territory which France has made on the continent. His Majesty has already proved the moderation of his pretensions by the demands contained in the propositions sent to M. Otto. It cannot be doubted that his Majesty, in preserving every thing he has gained by his arms in the course of this war, does not overbalance the extent and importance of the acquisitions and influence of France on the continent. But his Majesty, animated by a sincere desire to re-establish peace, and by that spirit of moderation which can alone procure it, has declared his intention to make important concessions to France and its allies, and to keep those possessions only which it may judge necessary for the support and security of his states. M. Otto, by his first note of the 18th January, announces to his Majesty, that the French government is willing to admit the conditions proposed relative to the East Indies, and the *status ante bellum* for Portugal; provided his Majesty would consent to the *status ante bellum* for the Mediterranean and America. By the *status ante bellum* in the Mediterranean, his Majesty

understands that the French government wishes, on its part, not only that Egypt should be restored to the Grand Seignior, but that the integrity of the Ottoman empire should be secured. This proposition, extensive as it is, cannot in any way produce the results that it announces, nor re-establish the two nations in the *status ante bellum* in the Mediterranean. It would be also necessary that the French government should evacuate the country of Nice, and all the states of the King of Sardinia; that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should be re-established, and that the rest of Italy should recover its independence. If that cannot be, and that France is to preserve a part of the influence which she has lately acquired in Italy, his Majesty is legitimately authorized to keep the island of Malta, to protect the commerce of his subjects, and to watch at least over the interests of Great Britain in that part of the world. The proposition mentioned in the second note of the 28th inst. on the *status ante bellum* in America, as a compensation of the *status ante bellum* as relative to Portugal, appears to be unjust. The undersigned, in his note of the 14th April, has already regulated the concessions that his Majesty intended to make to France and his allies, with a view to assure to Portugal and the Ottoman Porte the *status ante bellum*, on the re-establishment of peace. But, although his Majesty is disposed to make every reasonable concession for the advantage of his allies, it cannot be expected that he will consent, for their sake, to make sacrifices which will be incompatible with the security of his kingdoms. Independent of all considerations of this nature, the proposition is in itself liable to objections, since the *status ante bellum* for Portugal cannot in any way be equivalent for the *status ante bellum* for America. His Majesty has made very important conquests in that part of the world, not only from France, but Spain and Holland. It cannot, therefore, be expected that his Majesty will restore all the conquests that his arms have made from several powers in America, as a compensation for the *status ante bellum* in Portugal alone: besides, it must be observed that the *status ante bellum* in America could not be produced by the restitution of the conquests which his Majesty has made there, without calling for a compensation to Great Britain, for the acquisition that France has made of the Spanish part of St. Domingo. His Majesty does not mean to avail himself of the incontestible right which he can claim from treaties of bringing into discussion this concession of Spain to France; but he cannot allow that it should pass unnoticed in regulating the conditions of peace. The undersigned, after having made such observations as the occasion requires, has, nevertheless, been directed by his Majesty to give an additional proof of the care he takes of the interest of his allies, and of his desire to bring the negotiation to a happy conclusion. For this purpose, the undersigned is authorized to promise, that when the French government shall have acceded to the propositions already made by his Majesty respecting the East Indies and the Mediterranean; and if it consents also that his Majesty shall keep in America, Martinico, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice, his Majesty will add to what he has already granted, the *status ante bellum* for Spain, in consideration of the *status ante bellum* for Portugal, and conclude peace on these conditions.

HAWKESBURY.

The conclusions of this note, then, were nothing less than that, if the *status ante bellum* was allowed to Portugal, his Britannic Majesty would allow the same to the King of Spain; that is to say, that of all the objects of which England proposes to retain, she only offers to give up Trinidad, being desirous of keeping Malta, Martinico, Ceylon, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice. This note was calculated to lessen, in a great degree, the confidence which the first Consul wished to have in the pacific declarations of the English minister. He directed Citizen Otto to transmit the following paper:—

21st Messidor, An 9.

The undersigned has submitted to his government the note of his excellency Lord Hawkesbury, dated 25th June. He has received orders to make the following answer:—It is with the most poignant grief that the First Consul perceives, on the perusal of this note, that all the measures hitherto taken by the British government by no means tended, as it had publicly declared, to obtain a prompt pacification between the two states. What can be expected of a negotiation which assumes such a retrograde character! By the note of the 6th June, and the explanations which accompanied it, Lord Hawkesbury had stated that his Britannic Majesty was disposed to restore all the acquisitions which he made from France and her allies, with the exception of Ceylon, of Martinico or Trinidad, and the island of Malta, with this modification with respect to the latter, that its port should be neutralized: and it is to be observed, that the conquests made by the allies in Portugal are reckoned as nothing in the propositions of Lord Hawkesbury, no more than the other compensations of the same kind that France might offer on the continent. By the note of 30 Prairial, the French government has proposed to abandon all the

conquests of the allies in Portugal: and by way of answer to this pacific proposition, the English government, in its note of the 25th June, demands, by name, Ceylon, Malta, Martinico, and, still further, Tobago, Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice; that is to say, that the proposition made by France to snatch Portugal from the horrors of a war, in which it has been involved by its attachment to England, will produce no other effect on the British government, than to make it retract a part of the restitutions to which it had consented. The conquest and occupation of several provinces of Portugal, will be the probable consequence of a measure so contrary to declared intentions, and so unfavourable to the success of the negotiation. Can it be believed that the French people are reduced to such a sad extremity as to sign a disgraceful peace? If, after eight years of war which has caused so much blood to be shed, after so many assurances of moderation, so many reciprocal protestations, the French people see themselves obliged to continue the war, is it to be doubted that it will find in its constancy, its population, and its strength, the means of repairing the losses which its allies and itself have, only in part, sustained by treasons, by the consequences of the revolution, and the efforts of continental nations? The First Consul cannot persuade himself that the British government will continue to prolong the calamities of war; or, which would be the same thing, would propose a system of peace which would not possess, in the highest degree, the character announced in the letters of Lord Hawkesbury, which would not be reciprocally just or honourable. OTTO.

This note occasioned the following reply from the English minister:—

The undersigned principal Secretary of State, &c. has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of M. Otto, dated 14th July; and he cannot express the surprise he experienced from the reading of it. The sincere desire of his Majesty for the restoration of peace was clearly manifested in the proposition that he originally made to attain that object; and in the progress of the negotiation he has been so far from increasing his demands, that, on the contrary, in his last proposition he has considerably diminished them. His Majesty deplores that, in the answer which has been received from the French government, he does not discover that spirit of moderation which has constantly influenced his own conduct. In the *memorandum* delivered by the undersigned to M. Otto, the 14th April, his Majesty stated the conditions to which he proposed to subscribe, to attain the great object he had in view. He offered to restore to France and his allies, Pondicherry, Chandernagor, Negapatam, Malacca, Amboine, Bande, Cochin, the Cape of Good Hope, Goree, Surinam, Curacao, St. Lucia, the Saints, Saint Pierre and Miquelon, Saint Marcou, and Minorca, provided that France would restore the only conquests that she made from the allies of his Majesty: and his Majesty, at the same time, declared, that in case the evacuation of Egypt by the French should precede the signature of the preliminaries, he should not consider himself as bound to adhere to these conditions in all their extent. On the 1st of June, a proposition was made by the French government, that the negotiation should assume a more official character; and in conformity to that wish, the undersigned transmitted to M. Otto the note of the 6th June. Although a very important change has taken place in the situation of this country; although a reasonable hope was entertained of a speedy and friendly arrangement with the powers of the north; although the success of the British arms in Egypt was then sufficient to justify an increase of requisitions; his Majesty still refers to his first memorandum of the 14th April, respecting the terms on which he was disposed to conclude a treaty of peace. The success of the troops in Spain and Portugal have since been represented by the French government as giving a right to demand additional restitutions on the part of his Majesty. The situation of Portugal had already been taken into consideration by his Majesty in the propositions which he had made 14th April. The change which some successes in that quarter might produce, cannot, in any degree, be compared to the advantages which have accrued to this country by the events already mentioned. His Majesty would then have been fully justified in adhering at least to his first propositions, but, from his invariable solicitude for the interest of his allies, and his sincere desire to facilitate the attainment of peace, the undersigned was authorized, in the the note of the 25th June, to offer, in addition to the restitutions which had been already proposed, the important island of Trinidad, and also the eventual assurance of the *status ante bellum* for Spain, as a consideration for the *status ante bellum* for Portugal. The French government has distinctly admitted, in the note presented by M. Otto 18th June, that which could not, indeed, be contested, that his Majesty was justified in retaining from his own conquests a compensation for the important acquisitions of territory that France has made on the continent. If the value and extent of these acquisitions are fairly estimated, and if it is considered that France

has availed herself of her recesses to retain Nice, Savoy, the whole of the Austrian low countries, and the countries to the left of the Rhine; if it is also considered what a large proportion of his conquests his Majesty has proposed to restore to France and her allies, the justice and moderation of his Majesty must appear evident to all the world, whether the possessions which he proposes to retain be considered relatively to the success of his arms, or, which is still more important, in a state of comparison with the augmented influence and power of France. In conformity to these sentiments, his Majesty has fixed on the terms on which he conceives that a just and honourable peace may be concluded. It is to these terms that his Majesty would still adhere, notwithstanding events highly favourable to the interest of Great Britain have taken place since the last communication with the French government. His Majesty then has a right to demand that the French government would be equally explicit. The undersigned is, in consequence, authorized to demand, that the French government will distinctly state to what part of the propositions of his Majesty its objections apply, and that it will communicate, with the same frankness which has marked the conduct of his Majesty, the conditions which, after a general consideration of the circumstances just mentioned, it may judge proper to conduct the negotiations to a prompt and happy conclusion.

This communication increased the embarrassments of the negotiation; and there was reason to apprehend, that, with these reciprocal recriminations, the business would terminate without coming to a right understanding. The First Consul, therefore, applied himself to give a new shape to the terms of the proposition; and Citizen Otto transmitted, by his order, an explanatory and categorical note, in which he clearly announced the conditions on which the First Consul was ready to sign the preliminary articles of peace.

4th Thermidor, An 9.

The undersigned has communicated to his government the note of Lord Hawkesbury, dated 20th July, and is directed to make the following answer:—The French government is forgetful of nothing that may lead to a general peace; because it is at the same time the interest of humanity and the allies. It is for the King of England to calculate if it is equally for the interest of his politics, his commerce, and his nation. If that should be the case, a remote island more or less cannot be a sufficient reason for prolonging the distress of the world. The undersigned has declared, in his last note, how much the First Consul was afflicted at the retrograde character which the negotiation had assumed: but as Lord Hawkesbury contested that opinion in his note 20th July, the undersigned proceeds to recapitulate the state of the question with the frankness and precision which such important affairs deserve. The question is divided into three points:—The Mediterranean, India, and America. Egypt shall be restored to the Porte. The Republic of the Seven Islands shall be acknowledged. All the ports of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean which have been occupied by French troops shall be restored to the King of Naples and the Pope. Malon shall be given back to Spain. Malta shall be restored to the Order; and if the King of England thinks it conformably to his interests as a preponderating power on the seas, to raze the fortifications, this clause shall be admitted. In India England shall keep Ceylon. The other establishments shall be restored to the allies, comprehending the Cape of Good Hope. In America every thing shall be restored to its ancient possessors. Portugal shall be preserved in all its integrity. Such are the conditions which the French government are ready to sign. The advantages that the British government will obtain are immense; and to pretend to greater, is not to demonstrate a wish for a peace reciprocally just and honourable. Martinico, not having been conquered by the British arms, but given up by the inhabitants into the hands of the English till France should possess a government, cannot be considered as an English possession. France will never renounce her right to it. Nothing now remains for the British cabinet but to manifest the part it will take; and if these conditions cannot satisfy it, it will be proved in the face of the world, that the First Consul has neglected nothing, and that he has evinced his disposition to make every kind of sacrifice to re-establish the peace, and to spare to humanity the tears and blood which will be the inevitable consequences of a new campaign. OTTO.

The First Consul consented, with extreme regret, that the English should keep Ceylon; nor did he dissemble the importance of the sacrifice; but he was convinced of its necessity; and he did not doubt that Batavia itself, deprived by treason of its finest colonies, and despoiled of all its commerce, was anxious, even at this price, to be restored to that state of safety which peace alone could obtain. But, by not insisting on the restitution of an establishment which rendered England absolute mistress of India, the First Consul owed it to his allies, and to himself, as chief of the French government, to claim the entire restitution of all the other islands

and colonies, which the fate of war, and still oftener treachery, had placed in the power of the English. It was essential to the maintenance of the pacification which so much pains were employing to establish that England should have its power extended and strengthened in Asia and America; but it could not be permitted that she should extend her commercial monopoly and maritime dominion over the Mediterranean, which, from the condition of the shores which surround it, should not be suffered to acknowledge such an influence. Lord Hawkesbury sent the following official answer:—

5th August, 1801.

The undersigned principal minister of his Majesty for Foreign Affairs, has laid before his Majesty the note presented by Citizen Otto the 26th of last month. His Majesty had every right to expect, that the unreserved and moderate propositions to which he was disposed to accede for the re-establishment of peace would have been favourably received by the French government, or at least in the plan of pacification which was offered, there would have been no essential difference. This expectation was encouraged by the repeated declarations made on its part of its disposition to enter into an equitable arrangement, and by its admission of the principle on which the propositions of his Britannic Majesty was founded. In the application of this principle his Majesty was not determined by views of ambition and aggrandizement, but by proposing to keep no more than a moderate portion of his vast acquisitions, he has been influenced by the desire of giving additional security to his ancient possessions. In no part of the negotiation has his Majesty framed new pretensions, and the assertion of M. Otto to that effect in his last note is wholly destitute of proof. His Majesty is convinced that no reasonable objection can be made by the French government to the substance of the conditions which he has proposed. He had, therefore, a right to expect that every proposition that might spring from it should be conformable to those principles which had been acknowledged as those were, which appear in his last communication. The assertion advanced in the note of M. Otto that Martinico had not been acquired by the arms of his Majesty, but placed under his protection by the inhabitants, is clearly erroneous. The terms of the capitulation will demonstrate that the acquisition of this important colony can be alone attributed to the efforts of the troops employed in that expedition. The French government has acknowledged that the acquisition of an island more or less, cannot be of sufficient importance to determine the fate of a negotiation on which those interests which are the dearest to humanity depend. The undersigned flatters himself that the French government will be guided by the same principles, and that the success of the negotiation will not be frustrated by a demand, on its part, of restitutions which the relative situations of the belligerent powers would not allow, and which its own example in regard to its conquests does not give it any right to expect, and which his Majesty does not consider as to accord with these principles on which alone an honourable and permanent peace can be concluded. In this view his Majesty is disposed to give a new proof of his moderation and sentiments; and he does not make any difficulty in declaring, that if the French government will admit of a reasonable arrangement, relative to the East Indies, in conformity to the principle which has been acknowledged as the true basis of the negotiations, his Majesty is ready to enter into further explanations relative to the island of Malta, and desires seriously to concert the means to form an arrangement which will render it independent both of Great Britain and France. HAWKESBURY.

This note could not be considered as answering the just expectations of the French government; but as the British government manifested a disposition to enter upon the important subject of Malta, the First Consul felt infinite satisfaction at this first appearance of an accommodating intention. Citizen Otto was directed to transmit the following note:—

20th Thermidor, An 9.

The undersigned did not delay a moment to communicate to his government the note of Lord Hawkesbury, dated the 5th August. It is with the sincerest satisfaction that the First Consul perceives in the last communication of the British government, that the negotiation begins, on its part, to assume a character calculated to inspire confidence, and to afford the prospect of a termination to those evils, which are the inevitable consequences of a war of so long duration. The re-establishment of the respective positions in the Mediterranean and the American seas, were the points on which there has not yet been a clear understanding. But his Britannic Majesty having consented that the island of Malta and its dependencies should be placed in such a position as to belong neither to France or to England, the sole obstacle is removed which the arrangements respecting the Mediterranean still continued to offer. And as to America, his Majesty having declared that he is not influenced by any view of ambition and aggrandisement; and that he wishes for an arrangement conformable to the

basis already admitted, that is, such as may lead to a peace, reciprocally just and honourable;—that he does not propose to keep but a moderate part of his vast acquisitions, and with no other view but to add to the security of his ancient possessions; it is impossible not to remark, that the ancient possessions of his Majesty in America have their central point in Jamaica, an extensive and opulent colony, strong from its position, but rendered impregnable by the accumulated works which render it superior to all attack: consequently, the ancient possessions of his Majesty in America do not require to be augmented in order to their consolidation, or to assure their means of defence. It is therefore reasonable to believe, that his Majesty will himself perceive, that to keep any of his new acquisitions in America, would be to assert, in the West Indies, the same absolute power which he already exercises in the East. Nevertheless the French government will not swerve from the dispositions that it has manifested; and it will not put the peace of the world in balance with the possession of an island, which being but of secondary consequence to France and its allies, and having been conquered by the arms of his Britannic Majesty, would be readily acknowledged to be necessary to the security of his ancient possessions. The undersigned is persuaded that these explanations cannot fail to appear to the British government, as smoothing the way towards a conciliation; and it becomes him to add, that his government encourage the hope that they will produce the happiest effects for the re-establishment of peace.

OTTO.

This note indicated, as the grand point on which it was necessary to agree, that an arrangement should be made for Malta, that it might not remain in the hands either of France or England.—Lord Hawkesbury replied by the following note:

14th August, 1801.

The undersigned has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of M. Otto of the 11th instant.—Although it is impossible to accord with certain observations contained in this note, he has experienced great satisfaction on the prospect it offers of a favourable conclusion to the negotiation. The arrangements in the West Indies appear to be an essential obstacle to the cessation of hostilities between the two nations. With the view of assuming his possessions in America, and of balancing the power of France and its allies in this part of the globe, his Majesty has proposed the liberal and just arrangement contained in his preceding communications. If the possession of Martinico by his Majesty appears nevertheless to be considered by the French government as an insurmountable obstacle to the return of peace, his Majesty may be induced to renounce his just pretension in this respect, on condition that the French government will consent to the following alternative:—In the first place, that his Majesty may keep in the West Indies, the islands of Trinidad and Tobago; and in this case, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice, shall be free ports. 2dly, That his Majesty shall retain possession of St. Lucia, Tobago, Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice.—The undersigned will not suffer himself to imagine that, after the concessions made by his Majesty, and the moderation that he has displayed in the course of the negotiation, the French government will raise any difficulty, but that it immediately authorise M. Otto to consent to one or other of the above propositions.

HAWKESBURY.

In this note Lord Hawkesbury took no notice of Malta; but in his private conversations with Citizen Otto, he agreed that it should be restored to the Order of St. John. Besides, as has been just seen, he desisted from the island of Martinico, on an alternative condition, which very much embarrassed the French government. If it had abandoned Trinidad, it would have occasioned a very considerable loss to Spain; but if, to save that island, it had sacrificed Demerary, Essequibo, and Berbice, it would have been making Holland bear the whole weight of the sacrifices exacted for the peace; it would have been throwing into the hands of England the whole commerce of the American continent: and striking at the power, as well as at the commerce of Spain, a blow which she would feel more sensibly than even the loss of Trinidad. The First Consul, notwithstanding the immoveable basis which had been so long established in France, that the peace ought not to cost the republic any particular sacrifice, would have preferred the abandonment of Tobago: but England would not be contented with that island; and it was in vain that Citizen Otto proposed even to add Curacao. In proportion as the negotiations approached towards their termination, difficulties multiplied; and the long conference of the respective plenipotentiaries on 20th Fructidor (the substance of which was reduced into writing) was not sufficient to remove every obstacle. It may be of use to relate it at large.

A written Account of a Conference held 20th Fructidor (7th September) between his Excellency Lord Hawkesbury, Minister and Secretary of State to his Britannic Majesty for the Department of Foreign Affairs, and

Citizen Otto, Plenipotentiary of the First Consul of the French Republic.

The French plenipotentiary having communicated to Lord Hawkesbury the *projet* of a preliminary treaty which had been sent to him by his government, and the English minister of state having taken the advice of his Majesty's council on the subject, the discussion was opened between the two plenipotentiaries, who agreed to proceed, article by article, on the said projet, and to set down in writing such observations as should arise in the consideration of it. The preamble being entirely conformable to the wish of his Britannic Majesty, Lord Hawkesbury observed, that, in one of the copies of the treaty, it would be necessary to put the name of his Britannic Majesty before that of the First Consul of the French Republic; which, being conformable to generally received customs, was consented to immediately by Citizen Otto. The articles relative to restitutions and compensations were afterwards the subject of a long discussion. The French plenipotentiary insisted on the enumeration of the conquests which the British government had engaged itself to restore, omitting those of them which, by the eventual definitive treaty, were understood to remain to Great Britain. He observed, that it was not in the power of the French government to dispose of any colony belonging to its allies: that it had already gone very far in not insisting on the restitution of all the colonies, and in promising that it would not oppose any arrangement by which his Britannic Majesty may obtain such or such possession in any future congress. This reasoning was strongly combated by Lord Hawkesbury, because, in procuring for the allies of France the restitution of a great number of colonies, which it would be impossible for them to re-obtain without such aid, it appeared to him that the First Consul ought to stipulate also the degree of compensation for such an advantage. It was answered, that the French government alone could judge of the extent of its rights and obligations to its allies; that, for example, having agreed with them to demand their reintegration, and not to dispose of any of their colonies without their consent, it could not, under any pretext, violate that engagement, in giving up any one of their possessions by the preliminary treaty. Without denying this conclusion, Lord Hawkesbury observed, that any engagements of France with her allies could not be binding on the English government; and that, if France was not authorized to stipulate completely in the name of her allies, it must necessarily follow, either that she had special powers from each of the allied parties, or that the peace was made with each of them separately; which would be contrary to the spirit and end of an actual negotiation for a general peace. Citizen Otto observed, that the compensation which was demanded at the expence of the allies of France, did not arise from any right whatever, and was really but an accessory advantage, which the First Consul had consented to leave to Great Britain, merely for the love of peace; that, in looking over the preliminaries proposed, all impartial men would find a sufficient system of compensation in the renunciation of Egypt, and in the reintegration of all the allies of his Britannic Majesty. This reintegration alone might be even considered as an equivalent for the reintegration of the allies of France; and the more so, as it is not in the power of Great Britain to do them so much injury as the First Consul can do to the allies of Great Britain, if the war should continue.—Lord Hawkesbury disagreed entirely with this mode of reasoning; and observed, that the only principle on which the British government had proposed to enter on the negotiation was, that his Britannic Majesty should keep a part of his conquests as a compensation for the immense acquisitions which France had obtained on the continent; that this principle had been admitted by the French government; that the compensation required ought to appear just to France, because the government was ready to consent to it; that he did not dispute the fundamentals of the question, but the mode; and that it was his duty to declare, that the British ministry could never present to the public a treaty which did contain at the same time both restitutions and compensations; that the mere omission of the objects to be preserved would give the treaty an equivocal sense, which the plenipotentiaries of the allies of France might turn to their advantage, by insisting, that these objects had not been abandoned, but referred only to an ulterior discussion; that, besides, such a mode of editing would be contrary to the style of all known treaties, and would draw on the minister the very just reproaches of the English parliament and the public.—Citizen Otto saw nothing in this new objection but two obstacles, very easy to be surmounted; one relating to the equivocal sense of the treaty, which would be rendered secure by a secret article, in which France would point out nominatively those colonies which she would consent to leave in the hands of the English; the other, respecting the opinion of the public, would be still less embarrassing, if they could agree, on both sides, to keep the preliminary articles secret till the signing of the definitive treaty. Lord Hawkesbury replied,

that he could not conceive how the secret could be kept at the congress; that as soon as the British plenipotentiaries should require from the allies of France the sacrifices secretly agreed on, those allies would not fail to implore the interference of France: that from thence the plenipotentiary of the First Consul would be obliged to declare himself in favour of the English pretensions, and consequently to discover the secret arrangement which have now been proposed: added to this, it was entirely against the custom of this country, to hide the preliminaries of a pacification so important, and that the ministry could not do otherwise than make it known. This discussion having been considerably prolonged without any success on either side, the two plenipotentiaries agreed to postpone the continuation of it to a future time, and to continue to debate on the subsequent articles. Art. IV. which concerned the restitution and the freedom of the Cape of Good Hope, was agreed to, with some observations on the form of wording it. Article VI. respected the island of Malta. This had not appeared to Lord Hawkesbury sufficiently explicit, as it did not contain the express condition under which his Majesty had determined to renounce the island of Malta, viz. that the Order and the Isle should be placed under the guarantee of another power; and he read to Citizen Otto the article of the counter-projet of the British government, by which Russia should be invited to take part in the arrangements which concerned Malta, and even to send and garrison the island, in quality of protector of the Order of St. John. Citizen Otto answered, that the First Consul did not refuse to admit Russia to be guarantee, but that, in the article proposed, there were several clauses which would produce delays, and retard, not only the conclusion of the definitive treaty, but even its execution, in what related to the time that would there be stipulated for the evacuations: besides, the Order of Malta appeared to exist in Russia; that, consequently, it would be useless to burden his Imperial Majesty with a protection which he had already formally avowed. Lord Hawkesbury thought, for his part, that a schism existed in the Order of St. John: and that it was important to determine, clearly, where and what this Order was, to prevent discussions which might take place after the conclusion of the treaty: that, besides this, his Majesty made too great a sacrifice in renouncing Malta, not to take every precaution in his power to prevent that important possession from coming eventually under the French government; that the proposition made tended to do away every motive of jealousy on the subject, in leaving the isle under the protection of a strong third government. Citizen Otto replied, that if his government consented to this expedient, and to the delay which would thence result for the evacuation of Malta by the English troops, it would be conformable to the rules of reciprocity that the kingdom of Naples and the Italian states should not be evacuated by the French till the moment that Malta should be so by the English. If such an arrangement should be agreed upon (replied Lord Hawkesbury), it would be but justice to limit the number of French troops in the south of Italy, and to proportion them to the number of English troops in garrison at Malta. This precaution appeared to Citizen Otto to be misplaced, as it was quite an impossibility that the French government would take advantage of those delays to exercise hostilities against Malta. Without any thing being decided on the mode of the evacuation of Malta, the plenipotentiaries agreed to wait the First Consul's answer on the subject, and then to renew the discussion. Article VII. relating to Egypt, was adopted, with some observations on the wording, which would appear in the counter-projet. Lord Hawkesbury remarked, that it would be proper to substitute to the title of *Grand Signor*, that of *Sublime Porte*, as more conformable to the etiquette of courts. Article VIII. which stipulated the integrity of the kingdom of Portugal, did not appear sufficient to Lord Hawkesbury: he proposed to substitute, for the word *Kingdom*, the words *territory and possessions of his Most Faithful Majesty*. This expression might weaken the arrangements made at Badajoz between France and Portugal, respecting the limits of Guiana; and Citizen Otto refused to consent to the alteration. Article IX. was agreed to by Lord Hawkesbury in substance: he only required that the Italian states should be evacuated by the French, at the same time that Porto Ferrajo should be so by the English. Citizen Otto replied, that he was authorized to accept of this proposition, on condition of the undermentioned reserve, that Lower Italy should not be evacuated by the French until the moment of the evacuation of Malta by the English. Article X. respecting the times of the respective evacuations, was adopted *verbatim* by Lord Hawkesbury, and inserted in the counter-projet of his court. Article XI. relative to the sending home of prisoners, gave occasion to serious discussions respecting a clause extracted from the preliminaries of 1683, which Lord Hawkesbury wished to add to the article proposed by the French government, and by which the two governments engaged to reimburse each other respectively for the advances made for the

support of the prisoners of their respective nations. Citizen Otto protested against this clause, as much too burthensome upon the French government, which, after having supported, at its own expence, during the whole war, the prisoners taken from the powers allied with England, would also have to pay for the support of its own prisoners. He observed, that the article proposed by France was entirely conformable to that of the treaty of Luneville; and in this respect he thought he ought to insist on a sort of reciprocity, founded on natural equity; and that, on the other hand, the voluminous correspondence which had been published concerning the maintenance of the prisoners, sufficiently proved that the law of nations did not at all justify this precaution of the English government, as, in his official letters, which were often very severe, Mr. Dundas relied only on an arrangement made with the Directory of the French Republic, and on its convenience; that the example of the last war, in which the number of prisoners was nearly equal on both sides, and in which France had not to maintain from sixty to eighty thousand prisoners belonging to the allies of Great Britain on the continent, could not be cited on this occasion; and that it would be so much the more painful for France to make a similar sacrifice, as, since the suspension of the arrangement made by the Directory, the greater part of the political writers of that country had published the strongest invectives upon the pretended indifference of the French government towards the prisoners of their nation; and that even the official letters which Citizen Otto had answered at that time, contained very serious inculpations on that subject: in fine, it would be sovereignly unjust to cause, at this day, the funds which Mr. Dundas had represented as a *generous sacrifice made to humanity*, to pass for a simple advance, but which was really nothing more than a compensation for the expence incurred in France, for the support of the English, Russian, Bavarian, Swiss, and other prisoners of the foreign troops in the pay of Great Britain.—Lord Hawkesbury observed, that what had taken place with respect to Russian, Austrian, and other prisoners, could not be admissible in this negotiation; that the article proposed by him was conformable to the treaty of 1783 and to that of 1763. Article XII. was adopted by Lord Hawkesbury, without any modification; and transcribed in the counter-projet of the British government. Articles XIII. and XIV. contained some documents relative to particular transactions, and to the civil law. Lord Hawkesbury had pre-informed Citizen Otto, that these articles had been submitted to the consideration of the High Chancellor of the Crown, who gave his opinion at the cabinet. Citizen Otto declared, that, agreeable to a dispatch which he had just received, it was particularly enjoined to him to include the allies of the republic in the dispositions of these articles under the condition of a just reciprocity for Great Britain. Citizen Otto having then proposed the discussion of the Articles XV. XVI. and XVII. respecting the new arrangements to be made for Newfoundland, and for the fisheries in general, Lord Hawkesbury declared, that, seeing the maritime superiority of Great Britain, it belonged to her, rather than to France, to take advantage of any arrangement which might be made on the subject of the fisheries; that nevertheless his Majesty, in order to accelerate the progress of the negotiation, renounced any advantage to which he might pretend on that head, and consented to restore this object to the footing it was on before the actual commencement of the war; that those objects being entirely foreign to his attributes, it would be impossible for him to discuss them without previously consulting the admiralty, the merchants and captains of ships, particularly occupied in the fisheries; that such a discussion would take up much valuable time, so necessary to the re-establishment of the repose of Europe; that, during a period of more calmness, it would be easy to return to objects of this kind, which were merely commercial, and really formed a part of the commercial treaty. Citizen Otto answered, that the English government were not of this opinion in 1783, because it had included in the preliminaries of peace the arrangements concerning Newfoundland and the fishery; and that those arrangements having, for a principal object, the preservation of good harmony between the two powers, it was in effect very easy to insert them in the preliminaries. Lord Hawkesbury replied, that the example even of 1783, ought to do away at this time all discussion of that kind, as the plenipotentiaries had been employed three months in discussing the articles which concerned Newfoundland; and that, without doubt, the discussion of the 15th, 16th, and 17th articles, would now require still longer time; that with respect to the disputes which might take place respecting the fishery, the treaty of 1783 appeared to him the best calculated to settle them, because, since that time, no complaint had arisen on the subject, the fishermen of both nations having been equally satisfied. —After resisting this conclusion as far as it concerned the French fishermen, citizen Otto observed, that there would be no inconvenience in discussing the 15th, 16th, and 17th

articles; being well persuaded, that, after a cool deliberation, they would appear to fulfil the object which they had in view; and that, farther, he was most specially enjoined to insist strongly on the adoption of those articles, on which the French government really put no value, but because they appeared essential to cement the peace between the two governments; and that, for this very reason, he looked on the refusal of the British government as an alarming presage for the future tranquillity of the fishery: that without doubt it would be easy to collect, in a few days, the opinions of the Admiralty, and the corporations which it might be necessary to consult, &c. Lord Hawkesbury persisted in his refusal, and supported it on the firm resolution of Council, and held to the arrangements made in 1783; and he required, on his side, the insertion of an article on this subject, conformable to that which had been proposed at Lisle by Lord Malmesbury. Citizen Otto was not at all authorised to admit this clause; and seeing that, for that time, there was no possibility of making any progress in the discussion, he adjourned it to another conference. Article XVIII. which related to the absolute freedom of the fishery, even in time of war, was considered by Lord Hawkesbury as incompatible with the interests of Great Britain, which, being the preponderating power at sea, as France was on the Continent, ought to be free, in time of war, to take, with respect to the fisheries, such measures as would appear most advantageous to her. It was to be observed, that the freedom enjoyed by the small fishing-craft and fishers at this time could only be considered in itself as an indulgence, founded on motives of humanity, and by no means as a right. Citizen Otto did not think that a preponderance either by sea or land could exclude those arrangements which tended to prevent such preponderance from degenerating into injustice or tyranny; he thought, on the contrary, that it was precisely the existence of such a preponderance that created the necessity of restraining it within the bounds of justice and equity; that consequently it would be honourable to the government which declared its maritime superiority, to establish itself, in time of war, the boundaries of its activity. War, answered Lord Hawkesbury, unfortunately brings with it the right and the obligation of doing all the injury we can to our enemy; and it is difficult for a nation to refuse the means of exercising this right in all its extent, as far as is reconcileable with the principles of the unalterable law of nations; that even if the demand of the French government in this article should be founded in justice, it is not of a nature to make a part of a treaty of peace, but rather of a treaty of commerce and navigation. Article XIX. was adopted verbatim by Lord Hawkesbury, with the exception of a clause, which admitted only the allies of the Republic to the congress. It appeared to him to be just, and founded on reciprocity, that the allies of his Britannic Majesty should be equally admitted if they should express a wish to that effect. This observation would have appeared incontestible to citizen Otto, if the allies of his Britannic Majesty had any thing to demand, or a sacrifice of any kind to make from the holding of the congress; but the preliminary treaty established completely their reintegration. Besides, France has treated separately with his most Faithful Majesty; and is also in a direct negotiation with the Ottoman Porte: it is then completely useless to bring into the congress two powers who have no reclamation whatever to make, no sacrifice to offer, and can only embarrass the negociations which it imports to the two powers to terminate with all possible promptitude. Lord Hawkesbury thought that probably the allies, and above all the Turks, would be disposed to place their interests in the hands of his Majesty, without sending Plenipotentiaries to the congress; but the King's Council having promised those powers not to make peace without their concurrence, and this demand being founded on an entire reciprocity between the two contracting parties, it was hoped that the First Consul would not oppose a measure which would be limited perhaps to a simple invitation.

Under those circumstances the Minister of Exterior Relations addressed the following letter to citizen Otto:

24th Fructidor, 9th Year.

Citizen, I answer your letter of the 21st Fructidor. The First Consul looks on it as necessary, either that you remit to my Lord Hawkesbury a note conceived in the terms I am going to inform you of, or that at least you will cause the contents to be inserted in the Protocol of your conferences; taking care to establish clearly that such are the precise and exact sentiments of the French government: you will judge of any thing which it may be thought better to do; in either case, here is what you ought to explain. The counter-projet remitted by Lord Hawkesbury, and the proces-verbal of the conference which has been held between him and you, having been laid before the French government, have produced important observations, which it is necessary to communicate. In the course of the negotiations, it has been established that the discussions, which have taken place between the two powers, are divided under the triple relation of Mediterranean, the East Indies, and America. Relative to the Medi-

terranean, the question is reduced to Egypt, and to the positions occupid by the French army on the coasts of the kingdom of Naples: besides for Malta and Mahon, it has been understood that all these countries shall be restored to the sovereigns who possessed them before the war. The sovereign of Malta was the order of St. John of Jerusalem. This order, by its institution, has been from time to time immemorial under the protection and immediate discipline of the Pope. If then it was found that the order, in its present situation, had found itself given up to dangerous dissensions, and to what the English Minister calls a schism, it is then to the intervention and the influence of the Holy See that it would be most natural for it to recur to cause them to cease; when even the restitution of the isle of Malta shall be in question, and the order under the guarantee of a great power, it cannot be understood that this power will maintain troops in the fortress of Malta, because this isle is sufficiently understood to be in a situation to defend itself, and that any material occupation of it by a foreign power would be an attempt at the sovereignty even of the order. In other respects, how can the re-establishment of peace between France and England be rendered subordinate to a condition which is found to depend on a third power. The most proper will be incontestibly to stipulate the pure and simple restitution of the island of Malta to the order of St. John without a guarantee, without foreign protection. If there must absolutely be a guarantee, and that of Russia be admitted, such guarantee ought not to be attended with any military force, nor any other protection than that which results from the treaty itself, just as it always took place in the system of the politics of Europe; and if by the results there should be any points to decide with respect to Malta, the discussions should be referred to the negotiations for the definitive treaty; and then, without doubt, it will be perfectly acknowledged that the evacuation of Malta by the English forces cannot be delayed beyond the month agreed on for the evacuations in Europe, without compromising even the benefit of the re-establishment of peace, and without announcing any essential pretensions opposed to what has been agreed on just to the present period. With relation to the East Indies, it is acknowledged, that the two contracting parties appear to agree on what is to be restored, and nothing more necessary but to understand each other, from the definitive treaty, on the relations to be established in India between the different European nations. In regard to America, we are persuaded that His Britannic Majesty feels himself sufficiently powerful in this country, and therefore will not require to enlarge his possessions. It cannot be believed, that, ruling without a rival in the Asiatic seas, he would wish to acquire the same exclusive preponderance in the American seas, yet the First Consul had declared that he would not, for an island of the second order, if there was but that obstacle, continue the misfortunes of war. The First Consul has not at all varied in his dispositions with regard to this object, but at present it is no longer an isle of the second order which the English government exacts; it is now two islands at once, Tobago and Trinidad. This colony, so important from its position, its riches, and its relation wit the continent of South America; and this immense acquisition does not satisfy him; he would also have Demerara, Berbice, Essequibo, and the principal inlets of the commerce of South America, should remain open to his vessels; a liberty which he proposes to render common, but of which England will have all the advantage. We may say that it would be impossible to expect such propositions; and that if they were sustained, they would destroy all that the dispositions announced on the part of the English government, and which they had given room to hope for, and to have seen the salutary work of peace immediately terminated; for, in fine, it is not when it has ceded all that is compatible with its honour, that a government can suffer new sacrifices to be torn from it; and the First Consul, treating in the name of the French people, will never subscribe to conditions in which the honour of the nation is compromised. It is prescribed to you, Citizen, to give a formal assurance of it.

CH. MAUR. TALLEYRAND.

Citizen Otto having converted into a note the instructions which this dispatch contained, was charged to add, in his conversation, that the First Consul having gone as far as honour would permit him, there was no room to hope that he would make one step more. And here we must observe, that in the conferences between Citizen Otto and Lord Hawkesbury, every time that the evacuation of Malta was mentioned, the English minister quibbled on the term, always adding, that the French troops should remain at Otranto till the moment in which the evacuation of Malta should be completed. Let the following note be read:

Downing-street, Sept. 22, 1801.

The undersigned, first secretary of state to his Majesty for foreign affairs, has the honour to make known to M. Otto the reception of his official note of the 19th current. He is

sincerely afflicted, that, after the concessions which his Majesty has shewn himself disposed to make for the re-establishment of peace, the French government has raised difficulties as new as they are unexpected. The undersigned, in the desire of obviating all useless discussions on the present state of the negotiation, explains freely the resolutions of his Majesty's government, on the different points which have prevented the signing of the preliminaries. 1. The 2d, 3d, and 4th articles of the projet presented by order of the French government, are absolutely inadmissible. His Majesty will never consent that the preliminary articles shall announce, on his part, the engagement to restore to France and to her allies, the conquests gained over them during the war, unless these same articles assure to his Britannic Majesty the compensations admitted as an equivalent for such restitutions. If the French government will not, or cannot, take this engagement for its allies, in favour of whom it stipulates, advantages of such importance, the undersigned is authorized to invite it to obtain of its allies, as soon as possible, the authority necessary for that object. 2. The arrangements relative to Malta. His Majesty has only consented, not to occupy that island, but on the express condition of its independence on France, as well as that of Great Britain. The only means to succeed in this, is to place it under the guarantee or protection of some power capable of supporting it. His Majesty will not persist in desiring to keep an English garrison in the island, till the establishment of the government of the Order of St. John. He will be ready, on the contrary, to evacuate it, in the time which shall be fixed on for taking measures of this sort in Europe, provided the Emperor of Russia, as protector of the Order, or any other power acknowledged by the contracting parties, will efficaciously take on itself the defence and safety of Malta. 3. Portugal. As the French government insists that the limits of French Guiana shall extend to the river Arawari; and as the Prince Regent of Portugal has confirmed the proposition, his Majesty will give his consent, provided that the integrity of all the states of his most Faithful Majesty in Europe will be guaranteed in every respect. 4. Demerara, Essequibo, and Berbice. If the French government accepts the arrangements that his Majesty proposes on the preceding points, his Majesty will renounce the pretensions he had formed, that the ports of these establishments should be open to the commerce and navigation of his subjects.—5. Tobago. From the disposition that his Majesty has shewn to get rid of every other difficulty, he cannot suppose that the French government will raise a new obstacle on the possession of the island of Tobago. It is an ancient property of his crown, the people are almost entirely English colonists, and it is not of any value or interest to France. The undersigned thus declares the opinion of the government of his Majesty upon the five points of difference which now remain to be regulated by the two countries. On examining the extent and importance of the territorial acquisitions made by France, and the conditions of the peace which she has concluded, with the powers despoiled of those advantages: on examining, on the other hand, the extent of the conquests of his Majesty, and the small portion of them which he keeps, it is not possible to doubt the moderation of his sentiments. His Majesty, however, is not less sensible of what he owes to the honour of his crown, and will never consent to conditions of peace, incompatible with the propriety and maintenance of the British empire. HAWKESBURY.

One paragraph in this note worthy of remark is, that in which Lord Hawkesbury formally declares, that the English garrison will not remain at Malta till the government of the Order of St. John is established; but that, on the contrary, it shall be evacuated within the time fixed for regulations of that kind in Europe, provided the Emperor of Russia, or some other power acknowledged by the contracting parties, undertakes the defence and security of Malta. To designate this power was the subject of discussion; but as the discussions did not produce a final agreement, the article was framed in such a manner as to leave it to the definitive treaty to specify the guaranteeing power. Some other points were also left to be decided by the definitive treaty. The preliminary articles of peace were at length signed 9 Vendémiaire; and it naturally follows, that every honest man who reads and meditates the official papers which are here offered to his attention, must acknowledge, that the constant moderation of the First Consul, and his solicitude to make and receive overtures of pacification, have been the principal cause of an event which is of such great importance to the tranquillity and happiness of Europe. It may be thought useful to insert a correct copy of the preliminary articles.

(Here follows the Preliminary Treaty, for which see Cobbett's Annual Register, Vol. I. Page 162; and for Part II. of these Papers, see p. 1857, of this Supplement.)

IMPOR-

IMPORTANT TRIALS.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICIARY HELD AT EDINBURGH, *Jan.* 6.—*The Court met for the Trial of* LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GEORGE MACKENZIE, CAPTAIN JOHN M'DONOGH, ENSIGN GEORGE LANIGAN, SERJEANT ANDREW MACKAY, AND SERJEANT ALEXANDER SUTHERLAND, all of the late regiment of the Ross and Cromarty Rangers, accused at the instance of Daniel Ross, and three other private prosecutors, with concurrence of His Majesty's Advocate, of being guilty of the murder of certain persons, named in the indictment, on the 4th of June last, in the streets of the town of Aberdeen. Lanigan did not appear; and the court pronounced sentence of fugitation against him. All the other pannels were at the bar, and the indictment being read over, they pled *Not Guilty*.

After the usual forms of the court a jury was sworn in, and witnesses were called to substantiate the charge.—Garioch, merchant in Aberdeen, said, on the 4th of June, between seven and nine in the evening, he saw a number of boys throwing dirt and wet straw at one another, and at the people on the streets, sometimes at the citizens, and sometimes at the military. About eight o'clock he saw Col. M'Kenzie going towards the barracks at the east end of the street. About the same time saw Capt. M'Donogh. Between eight and nine frequently saw M'Donogh on the street, and boys and men throwing dirt at him. At one time saw a boy throw a whole handful of dirt in his face, so that the one side of his face was quite covered with mud. About the same time saw Ensign Lanigan. Several minutes before nine o'clock saw the guard brought out by M'Donogh. About this time saw one of the town serjeants in the street; he appeared to be persuading M'Donogh to take back the guard to the guard-house. About nine saw M'Donogh with soldiers on each side of him go towards the Town-house. The soldiers were carrying arms.—About ten minutes after this he saw a party of about 30 come from the barracks and join the guard. Before, and at this time, he saw Lanigan running through the streets, and making thrusts at the people with his sword. He could scarcely call the people a mob at this time.. About a quarter past nine Lanigan was pulling one of the soldiers forward by the coat. The guard were running after the people with bayonets charged, and the people made no resistance; one or two of the guard fired at this time. He shortly after saw the whole regiment coming down from the barracks. M'Donogh had previously gone up to the barracks, and he returned with the men. When they came down one-third of the street, before they reached the guard-house, they were drawn up across the street. Witness then ran down to the street, and in the passage saw Serj. M'Pherson of the volunteers, whom he had desired to go to the provost and request the magistrates would come and take command of the military. He then returned to the window of the inn, and heard orders given by M'Donogh to prime and load. The men immediately, along the whole line, primed and loaded. The witness then saw from a window the soldiers farther down the street. They were in different parties, and firing. It was then almost ten o'clock. At one time he saw, while the soldiers were running in the streets, some of them run up to a man, who stood still, and they knocked him down, and struck him with the butt end of their muskets, and stabbed him with their bayonets. He was standing with his arms across, not doing any thing. Witness then went down to the street a second time, and saw one of the town serjeants, and sent again to the magistrates, desiring they would come out. Witness then went to the Town-house, and saw the provost and magistrates, and several other people with them. Witness said, good God, gentlemen, what are you doing here—why don't you come out? Before this, witness had seen two people fall on the street during the firing.—A boy fell at the west end of the plainstones. Witness thought the boy counterfeiting, as he did not think the military were firing ball. The other person fell nearly opposite the New Inn. Shortly after this the magistrates went out with the town serjeants. There was no firing after this. Most of the soldiers had gone to the east end of the street, and some of them went into a narrow lane. There was a serjeant behind the rest, whom the provost spoke to, and desired him to take the soldiers immediately to the barracks. He saw a serjeant, and the provost informed him that he was chief magistrate, and he must immediately make haste to the barracks. He answered, I am a soldier, and know no magistrates: upon which the provost gave him a blow with his batton, and said, will you obey that? After this they went all into the barracks.—After the first or second firing witness saw about a dozen of people throwing stones at the men who were standing at the guard-house. Being asked, what were the circumstances which occasioned disturbance that evening?—Witness answered, I consider that it was owing to the military having been insulted by the mob throwing dirt upon them. I mean both the officers and soldiers.—Dingwall, merchant in Aberdeen, said that near the guard-house, about 8 o'clock, he saw some town-serjeants, among the crowd, persuading M'Donogh to go to his lodgings. He appeared much agitated. After this witness saw M'Donogh haranguing the mob, sometimes in good humour, sometimes in bad, but saw no blows. He had his sword drawn most of the time, sometimes brandishing it, and sometimes under his arm. After this, witness saw Col. M'Kenzie very much intoxicated. He fell twice, and the other officers were supporting him. This made the boys laugh, at seeing the Col. fall, but nothing was thrown. M'Donogh then disappeared, and soon returned with the regiment, from the barracks, which he formed across Castle-street. M'Donogh had the command, and gave his orders very distinctly in these words: "With "powder and ball prime and load." This he repeated twice. A promiscuous firing then began at the north of the line. A brick-bat was thrown at one of the officers subsequent to the first firing.—Collison, merchant, Aberdeen, said

the mob might be about two or 300, mostly boys. He saw some of the soldiers coming from the barracks, loading as they were coming along. Witness and the others with him engaged to keep off the crowd from molesting the men, if M'Donogh would march them back to the barracks. The soldiers accordingly entered the lane that leads to the barracks, and were all out of sight, except two or three divisions, when the crowd gave a cheer, or derisive huzza. On this some person belonging to the military called out, "halt—front—charge," and instantly they came running back. There were no stones thrown at that time. Every body ran from them except one man, who was struck with the butt-end of the muskets, and also after he fell. By this time a number of others came up and continued firing irregularly, but they afterwards made two regular fires.—Copland, town-clerk depute, said, he was, between eight and nine in the evening called out of the Town-Hall, and met M'Donogh on the stairs, who said he had been insulted, and shewed a mark on his shoulder, where some dirt had been thrown. After some conversation ordered the serjeants to follow the capt. and seize whoever should insult him. The witness did not hear any firing till half an hour after this, when a message came to the magistrates, and informed them the military were firing in the streets; upon which they all got up, but witness got first to the street, where he saw the military drawn up in a regular line, and some of them firing. He had not gone far when he found himself surrounded by military with fixed bayonets, upon which he ran into a close, and looked about, and saw the provost and magistrates surrounded with military. The provost shewed the insignia of his office, and cried out, "I am the provoft of Aberdeen." Gibbon, writer, Aberdeen, said he was in the Town-Hall and sat close by one of the officers of the Ross and Cromarty regiment; thinks they made more free with the liquor than the rest of the company. Witness begged them not to ply the officer on guard with so much wine. One of the officers answered, "If the officer on guard is not able to do his duty I will do it for him."—Brown, late ensign in Ross and Cromarty Rangers, did not recollect whether the firing from the military or the throwing of stones from the crowd began first. He was standing close to M'Donogh, and is certain he gave no orders to fire, nor were any orders given, as he must have heard them. There was no firing till the men broke the line, and commeneed the irregular firing; if there had been any he would have heard it.—Cooper, serjeant in the 1st regiment of foot said he saw Sutherland walking through the street with a woman. The crowd fell upon him and the woman, and threw dirt and stones at them; he took his sword out of the belt to defend himself, and soon after a coporal's guard came and took him off. Witness saw M'Donogh and Mackenzie about six o'clock, on the street. The crowd began throwing dirt and dead cats at the capt. who turned round, and asked what offence he had given them? Witness said, in no rejoicing day can a soldier walk the streets of Aberdeen without being molested. When M'Donogh was attacked, he took off his hat, and spoke very mildly to them; witness saw him several times endeavouring to pacify them. When the men marched quietly off towards the barracks, the crowd followed them, throwing at them whatever came in their way, and damned them for Highland b——s, to go to their barracks. The men then left their officers, rushed into the streets, and began to fire. He saw a corporal cut with a knife by a butcher early in the evening.—Thomson, painter, of Aberdeen, said he was on the Castle-street, and saw John Ross shot on the plainstones. The party who fired were headed by a serjeant. Being asked, if he would know the serjeant he pointed out M'Donogh as being like the serjeant whom he saw. Witness saw the serjeants levelling their pieces, and directing them where to fire.—Affleck, late adjutant of the Aberdeen Volunteers, was in Castle-street twenty minutes after eight, when the soldiers were beginning to form across the street. Orders were given to prime and load, which was obeyed. They went through the motions very regularly; and witness was certain from the motions of the men, it was ball cartridge. People on the street were noisy, but did not observe stones thrown. Before the firing began, M'Donogh went into the crowd, and after he came back the firing took place. Shots and stones took place at the same time. About thirty shots were fired, and a number of people wounded where he was. Serjeant Mackay was very active. He was using every means to prevent the men from going to barracks. Witness told him, that he was acting improperly. He got into a greater rage, and made a spring at the witness, who seized him by the arm. Serjeant M'Kenzie then came forward and got Mackay pacified, and persuaded the men to go to the barracks, and Mackay then behaved well, and did all he could to get the men to go to the barracks. He was with the last division that fired. A rifleman, named Ross, was killed at that time.—Littlejohn, builder in Aberdeen, said he saw a great number of soldiers come from the barracks; M'Donogh was in the crowd endeavouring to pacify them. The soldiers were ordered to march back to the barracks, and were going away, but returned again and commenced firing. Witness spoke to M'Kenzie to take off the soldiers, but he refused. Mackay then came up, and was more violent, and much enraged.—He had before seen Mackay leading on the men. The crowd on the streets that day was not greater than usual, nor more riotous. Among the first things he heard was the crowd bidding M'Donogh order his men off. He answered if they behaved in a civil manner he would, but if they insulted him, he would attack them.—Hadden, of Aberdeen, saw Mackay in the evening coming out of the barracks, after all the firing was over. He desired him to return, but Mackay refused. Upon which he, the witness, shewed his chain, and told him he was the Provost of Aberdeen. Mackay replied, "You are no officer, and I "don't care for a magistrate." The witness then seized him, and forced him back to the barracks. The first account he heard of what was going on in the streets was brought to him by two gentlemen, while he was in the chair at the Town-hall. They informed him that there had been some disurbances in the streets with the boys. He instantly went out along with two of the magistrates. This was not five minutes after he got intimation of the affair. He that moment gave orders

to the town serjeants to go and seize the commanding officer on the streets, be he who he may. A firing took place before he got up, and two persons were shot while he was in the streets. He hastened on, and rushed in among the military; they were standing very thick, with fixed bayonets, which he was obliged to push aside to get through. At this time a number of them surrounded him and pointed their bayonets, so that he expected to be run through; but, upon shewing his chain, and informing them he was the Provost, they formed a guard of protection round him. After this he went to the Town-house to see what could be done, and M'Donogh was then brought there a prisoner.—The witness then went out to the streets again, and found the military had retired to their barracks, where he immediately repaired, as he had formerly stated.—Dickie, glazier, Aberdeen, was in Castle-street in the evening there was firing, which he endeavoured to avoid by going along the New Whynd. He was interrupted by a serjeant, who struck him with his sword in the scabbard. A private, who was with the serjeant, while the serjeant held him, stabbed him in the side.—He pointed out Sutherland as the serjeant. It was about nine o'clock when he was stabbed.—M'Donald, surgeon in the late Ross and Cromarty regiment, proved, that Mackenzie and M'Donogh were severely hurt by the mob, and that a grenadier was wounded in the back of his head by a gun-shot. M'Donogh's servant came to witness, and requested him to come and see his master, and with great difficulty he got to his lodgings, as one of the town's people attempted to knock him down with a large stone. Recollects six or seven were wounded, one with a sharp pointed instrument.—The evidence for the prosecution being closed, the witnesses for the prisoners were called. Ensign Haly, of Ross and Cromarty Regiment, said, that he left the Court-house with M'Donogh, and crossing the street, they were much annoyed by the mob pelting. M'Donogh expostulated with the mob in a conciliatory way. They went to the guard-house, and found the officer there much covered with filth, who soon ordered the guard to turn out. The capt. then took a file of men to accompany him to the Council Chamber. The lieut. col. went towards the mob, using conciliating expressions. The mob pressed round the lieut. col. and he appeared to be then in danger. The guard pressed into the mob to rescue the lieut. col. A violent pelting then commenced by the mob against the officers, and M'Donogh was entirely covered with filth. Witness took shelter behind a sentry box, the sentinel being forced from his post. The lieut. col. then ordered capt. M'Donogh to proceed to the barracks, and bring down the regiment to reinforce the guard. Witness went also, and found a party of the men drawn up, and M'Donogh at their head, in front of the barracks. Shortly after the greater part marched out. Witness went to Castle-street, and found the whole regiment drawn up in line. He then heard M'Donogh give this order—"Order arms, and stand "at ease." A great crowd were in the streets very riotous, and close upon the men. M'Donogh then took off his hat, went in among the crowd, and addressed them in very conciliatory terms. He wheeled them, and ordered them to countermarch. They began to do so, and witness ran on before them. He had not gone far when he heard a sudden shout from the mob. He turned round, and saw the soldiers rushing in all directions upon the mob. He heard no word of command. This was the first firing he heard. Serjeant Mitchell, of the Ross and Cromarty Rangers was in the barracks, and received orders to send a reinforcement to the guard. But learning from some of the men who came to the barracks that some of the officers were murdered in the town, he sent off a party. He then went himself, and met M'Donogh, who took the men to Castle-street; but they had scarcely arrived there, when there came a great force of the men from the barracks, in confusion. M'Donogh took off his hat and addressed the people. He then ordered the men to prime and load with cartridge. — He again went and spoke civilly to the people, and soon ordered them to shoulder arms. They were then marched back to the barracks, but did not hear M'Donogh give the orders to march. After this M'Donogh returned again to the people; the witness followed him into the crowd for fear of danger. The captain went forward, and spoke with some people. A great number of stones were then thrown, several of which struck the witness. —Corporal Little, of the 14th foot, saw a mob in the evening of boys and men who were riotous. Saw Sutherland, near the New Inn, attacked and struck with a stick. He was defending himself with a sword in the scabbard. His clothes were much dirtied. Saw M'Donogh struck on the neck in the street, and the mob were throwing dirt at him, and abusing every person they saw belonging to that regiment. This was before the reinforcement came from the barracks, and none of the guard fired until after the reinforcement came.—Macnah, late servant to M'Donogh, about nine went to his master's lodgings to receive orders, and there he heard there was a disturbance in Castle-street. He then went to Castle-street, and saw his master standing with his hat off addressing the crowd. Soon after a shower of stones came from the crowd. Witness, conceiving his master's life in danger, ran to him, and seizing his arm, led him away. In a short time he saw the soldiers abusing and striking an inhabitant. The capt. and witness immediately rushed forward to his relief. The capt. then cried out, "For God "Almighty's sake, men, return to your barracks;" but the men paid no attention to him, but began to fire. The capt. went in front of them, and with a loud voice called out, "halt." After firing some time two town serjeants appeared, and said to M'Donogh, "are you commanding officer?" He replied, "he was, but he could not command "them." The capt. was then made prisoner, and on his way to the Town-house he was much abused by the crowd. On the capt's. way to the Town-hall, while the crowd were abusing him, he said, "Ah, my good fellows, you little know "me, or you would not use me so."—Mackenzie, 42d regiment, late in the Rothsay and Cromarty regiment, at the time the firing commenced, was in the same section with Sutherland; saw him active to prevent some of the men from firing three or four times. Sutherland's sword was in his hand, but in the sheath. Heard him bid the men not fire, but return home. This was a little after nine o'clock, when the town's people were pelting them with stones, and when the military were beginning to fire, after they had broke their ranks, and about five minutes before he saw

Ross killed.—Robertson, sadler, in Perth, said, when the men came on at the charge, he saw Sutherland endeavouring to prevent them, and the same at the firing. The witness had presented to fire, when Sutherland stopped him, and struck up the muzzle of his musket with his sword. —Macdonald, of the 42d regiment, saw Mackay when the men were marching to the barracks, and again when some shots were fired—he was standing with his face towards the men, keeping them in their ranks. Fraser, of the 42d regiment, said he saw Serjeant Mackay prevent one of the men from firing after he had come to the present, by driving up the muzzle of his musket.—Col. L. M'Kenzie, late of the Ross and Cromarty fencibles, said he always thought Mackay a well behaved and sober man, of great humanity, and obedient to his commanding officer. Sutherland was one of the best behaved men he ever knew; he had only been three months in the regiment when he was promoted to a serjeantcy on account of his good behaviour. Witness has always known M'Donogh to be a man of honour and a gentleman, and esteemed him to be a man of humanity—he was in the Life Guards before he came to the Ross and Cromarty Regiment. — Lord Craig proceeded to sum up the whole evidence. His lordship recapitulated the leading features in the deposition of every witness, and minutely and candidly pointed out the bearings and tendency of the whole — The Jury returned their verdict Lieut. Col. M'Kenzie and Captain M'Donogh, *Not Guilty*. — Serjeants Mackay and Sutherland, libel *not proven*.

Trial of EDWARD MARCUS DESPARD, *for* HIGH TREASON. *February 7th*, 1803.

Charge of Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough to the Grand Jury, on the 21st of January. —After some introductory observations his lordship proceeded :—The law of this land, from the earliest period has, with an anxiety in a considerable degree proportioned, but, at present, from various causes, hardly adequate, to their supreme value and importance, watched over, and protected the life and personal safety of the sovereign. It has considered, in his instance, the mischievous workings and imaginations of the mind, the malignant purposes of the heart, when directed towards his destruction, and manifested by any act plainly done in prosecution of such purpose, and conducing to its execution, as equally criminal in their nature, and has rendered them equally penal in all their consequences, with the actual perpetration of the atrocious deed itself, which is the object of such imagination and purpose. —To investigate and ascertain the existence of such a purpose in the mind of the person charged therewith, and the nature and tendency of the acts done by him in the supposed prosecution of such purpose, and which acts are, in high treason, denominated "overt-acts," is at all times, the weighty care and duty of a jury, charged with the important function which you are called upon to exercise.— That should be deemed sufficient "overt-acts," of the particular head and species of treason, "of compassing and imagining the death of the king."—In other words, what acts amount to legal evidence of the existence of such a purpose, in the mind of the person charged therewith, has been occasionally, heretofore, the subject of dispute and controversy. Long, however, before the passing of the late statute of the thirty-sixth of his present Majesty, it had been judicially settled, by the most grave and revered authorities of the law, that all measures adopted for the deposing of the king from his royal state and dignity, all measures of force directed against his royal person, either for the taking possession thereof, or subjecting it to restraint and imprisonment, are impressed with the heinous character and stamp of this denomination of treason, and entitled to be received as the strongest and most cogent evidence thereof. — It has also been settled by the like high authorities, that any consultations and meetings of persons, in order to effect the above purposes, although nothing should be ultimately done, and although the whole scheme and plan should prove ineffectual and abortive, that any agreement or assent given to overtures or proposals of that kind are all competent overt-acts, of that species of high treason, which consists in compassing and imagining the death of the king. All pretence, however, for doubt upon a subject, which, from its superior importance, deserved to be cleared of any remaining shades of uncertainty, which might be supposed to obscure it, has been, for all succeeding times, distinctly removed and obviated, by the prudent provisions of the late statute of the thirty-sixth of George III. cap. 7, which, amongst other things, enacts, "that, if any person or persons whatsoever, during the natural life of the king (and for a limited time afterwards) should compass, imagine, invent, devise, or intend death or destruction, or any bodily harm, tending to death or destruction, maim, or wounding, imprisonment, or restraint, of the person of the king, &c. every such person or persons, so offending should be deemed to be a traitor and traitors, and should suffer and forfeit, as in cases of high treason." To compass and imagine, therefore, the imprisonment, or personal restraint of the king, is now, by the express letter of a clear and positive statute, placed as a substantive act of treason, upon exactly the same ground with the compassing and imagining of the natural death of the king, as that crime stands under the very letter and terms of the statute of the twenty-fifth of Edward III. itself. The same indeed may be said of all the other treasons, which are specifically enacted in the statute of the thirty-sixth of George III. and I only select, by way of instance, those of "compassing, imagining, devising, and intending, the imprisonment, and restraint of the person of the king," because it is probable, that the descriptions of treason I have mentioned, together with that of compassing and imagining

his death, will be those to which your attention will be more particularly called, by the evidence which will be submitted to your consideration. I have already stated to you, that such acts as sufficiently indicate an intention to commit any particular species of treason, and conduce to its execution, are properly overt-acts of high treason.—All overt-acts which are meant to be given in evidence against the prisoner, are justly and humanely required by the seventh of William III. cap. 3, to be expressly laid in the indictment against him, in order that he might thereby be apprised of the substance of the charge which he is called upon to answer; but the numerous particulars into which such a charge will unavoidably extend itself in point of proof, need not be detailed on the face of the indictment.—It is enough that the nature of the overt-act relied upon, be specified with reasonable and convenient certainty; and, when this is done, the various other circumstances, with which the overt-act is immediately and necessarily connected in point of fact, and the different means employed for effecting the same, need be no further stated. Indeed, the several other matters may properly be considered as being only so many parts, appendages, and results of that which is before stated, and as virtually included therein.—I have said thus much in respect to the form of alleging the overt-act in an indictment for high treason, with a hope of affording you some assistance towards clearly understanding the real substance and form of that indictment, which will be laid before you, couched, of course, in the technical language used on such occasions; and that you may also be the better enabled to judge whether it is accompanied by the competent kind and degree of proof, which ought to be adduced in support of it. I will further suggest, for your information, what the law requires on this head. In the first place, the law requires that the crime be tried by a jury of the county within which it has been, in the whole, or in part, committed. Some one overt-act of the particular species of treason, charged in the indictment, that is to say, of the compassing and imagining the death of the king, or of levying war against him, or the like, must be proved by some one witness, to have been committed within the limits of that county, in which the indictment is to be preferred, and, by a jury of which, the trial is to take place. For example, some meeting or consultation for the purpose of forwarding the objects of the treason, must be proved by some one witness, to have been held, or some other act done by the party or parties, meant to be affected thereby, at some place within this county. This is merely necessary for the purpose of investing you, the jurors of this county, with legal competence to enquire of the offence charged. When this proof is made out, any other act, in prosecution of the same species of treason, wheresoever committed, within or without this county, and by whatever witness proved, either the same or a different one, may be received in evidence without objection: I mean as far as respects the locality of such acts.—The law also requires, in the finding of indictments by the Grand Jury, in the first instance, as well as upon the trial of them afterwards by another jury, to whom that province belongs, that proof of overt-acts shall be made by the oath of two witnesses, either both of them to the same overt-act, or one of them to one, and the other of them to another overt-act, of the same species of treason. If, however, the overt-act charged should be "of any direct attempt," that is, of any attempt really made against his majesty's person, "whereby his life might be endangered, or his person suffer bodily harm," in that case, by the express provision of a late statute of the thirty-ninth and fortieth year of his present majesty, the person charged with such direct attempt, "may be indicted and tried in the same manner, and according to the same course and order of trial in every respect, and upon the like evidence, as if such person stood charged for murder." I am not, however aware, that any such direct attempt is likely to become the subject of consideration upon the present occasion.—It is unnecessary for me to suggest any thing further to you as to the frame of the indictment, or the number or nature of the witnesses by whom it is required to be supported. I will, however, trespass on your attention for a few moments longer, upon another subject, to which it has not been hitherto drawn. I mean, as to the probable nature and quality, and the proper legal effect of those acts and circumstances, which are about to be laid before you in evidence.—The evidence of accomplices, though unquestionably competent, is to be received and acted upon with a just and sober degree of jealousy and caution; and, unless the testimony derived from this source, be of such a nature as to carry internal evidence of its own truth along with it, or be confirmed by other evidence of a less-exceptionable description, it affords no safe and satisfactory ground for conclusions, by which the lives, fortunes, and honour of others, is to be materially affected. In weighing, therefore, the evidence of accomplices, a jury, charged with a determination of those important issues in their final and decisive result will expect to find such a degree of consistency in the testimony of each witness, such a degree of general conformity between the different relations of the several witnesses collectively taken, as to the nature, means, and objects of the conspiracies such a degree of confirmation from other collateral and concomitant facts and circumstances, and such a coincidence in the whole, with the main rules of ordinary probability, by which our belief is governed in other cases of a similar nature, as to render substance of the details, delivered by such witnesses, justly credible; and, if in the result, the substance of the facts related by the witnesses, shall appear to be such and so confirmed

as I have above described, juries will act upon them as deserving of that credit, which their own minds, proceeding with the salutary degree of caution and reserve I have already recommended, shall be induced to give them.—In applying these observations, you will bear in mind, that it is by another jury that the guilt or innocence of the persons accused, is ultimately to be decided; and that to you is only committed the charge of diligently attending and providing, in the first instance, that a reasonable and probable ground of guilt be made out, sufficient to warrant you in putting the persons charged therewith upon their trial by that jury, which is, in the last instance, and upon a full hearing of the evidence on both sides, to pronounce a final verdict of condemnation or aquittal.—At present, it is only necessary to add, in order to obviate any misconception on the subject, which might affect the discharge of your own immediate duty, that to refuse its due and proper degree of credit to testimony, drawn from the source I have alluded to, would be to render the crime of the conspirators, and the extent of the conspiracy, the effectual means of its own protection and impunity. A principle of distrust, in respect to the evidence of accomplices, pushed to so extravagant an excess, would be equally repugnant to the obvious dictates of common sense, and the ordinary rules by which criminal justice is administered.****— If the same desperate chance of ultimate and effectual success in the object of the conspiracy, shall, in your judment, appear to have preceded and accompanied this, which has attended many other dangerous and equally abortive treasons, you will, on that account, require a greater degree of evidence to prove the existence of a conspiracy, formed and nurtured under such apparently hopeless circumstances; but when such proof is made to your satisfaction, your diffidence, on this head, will perhaps be succeeded by other sentiments—by those of surprise and horror. Of surprise, at the extravagant boldness of the enterprise—and of horror, at the tremendous consequences which its success might have occasioned.—****—

On the 7th of February, the cause was opened by the *Attorney-General*, who was followed by *Serjeant Best* and Mr. *Gurney* in behalf of the prisoner, and the *Solicitor-General* for the crown. The pleadings being closed, and the examinations of the evidences concluded, lord Ellenborough proceeded to sum up, and after some prefatory remarks, spoke as follows:—The crime with which the prisonser is charged is the crime of High Treason, in respect of which he is charged with three distinct and substantive species and heads of that crime; one of them, viz. that of compassing and imagining to put the king to death, and the other two species and heads of treasons, viz conspiring, compassing, devising, and intending the imprisonment and restraint of the person of the king, and conspiring, compassing, &c. to deprive and depose the king from the style, honour, and kingly name of the imperial crown of this realm. Of each of these several species of treason, there are eight distinct overt-acts charged against the defendant, and the same kind and description of acts are specifically and successively charged and assigned in this indictment as overt-acts of each of these three several heads of treason. — The overt acts, or in other words the open deeds, by which the treasonable purposes imputed to the defendant are alledged to have been manifested and attempted to be carried into effect by him are: First, the conspiring to seduce certain soldiers named in the indictment from their duty and allegiance to his majesty, and to unite with the defendants in a traiterous attempt to subvert the government, and to destroy the king. Secondly, the conspiring to administer to certain persons oaths and engagements intended to bind them to become members of, and to assist in certain traiterous associations and confederacies formed for the purpose of subverting, by arms, the government, and deposing and destroying the king. Thirdly, the obtaining, procuring, and keeping in their custody cards and papers containing the form of oaths and engagements to the above effect, with intent to administer the same for the purposes above-mentioned. Fourthly, the actual administering of such oaths to certain persons for the same purpose. Fifthly, the meeting, consulting, conspiring, consenting, and agreeing, by laying in wait, and by attacking the person of the king, to assassinate, kill, and murder his majesty, and threatening, proposing, and consulting of the ways, manner, and means, and of the time and place of attacking his majesty, in order the more easily to assassinate and kill him. Sixthly, the meeting, treating, consulting, and conspiring, with force and arms to attack the Bank of England and Tower of London, and to raise insurrection, rebellion, and war against the king within the kingdom. Seventhly, the meeting, consulting, and agreeing to procure arms, ammunition, &c. in order the more effectually to attack and assassinate the king. The eighth and last overt-act, consisting in a similar conspiracy to attack the king when he should next go to meet the parliament; to attack and seize the Bank of England, the Tower of London, and the arms therein; that the conspirators should arm themselves therewith to destroy the king's force, and to stop and detain the mail coaches, as a signal and notice of their proceedings to other parts of the kingdom, and as an incitement to other traitors to raise and make insurrection, rebellion, and war within the kingdom.—The principal mischief intended to be effected, and the main object of the design imputed to the conspirator by this indictment, is, you will observe, the destruction of the person of the king, his restraint and imprisonment, or his deposal from his royal state and dignity; and all or some of these treasonable objects are stated to have been attempted to be effected by means of the various consultations, meetings, seduction of soldiers, and the like, which I have been detailing to you from the indictment, and which have been the subject of the evidence laid before

you. Before I state the evidence adduced on the part of the crown, in proof of the overt-acts laid in the indictment, which you already understand to mean certain open deeds of the party, done in prosecution of the treasonable purposes imputed to him, and manifesting the existence of such purposes, I think proper to state a word or two upon some of the topics which have been touched upon on the part of the defendant, as to the quality of the crime imputed to him, and as to the nature of the proof by which the charge thereof is supported. It has been urged that the crime consists only in words, and that words are not of themselves overt-acts of high treason. If it be said that loose words, referrable to no particular design, words merely calumnious, or seditious words, expressive of an irritated and angry mind, and of sentiments highly indecent and criminal in a subject towards his sovereign, but words neither indicating or conducing to the execution of any definite purpose of a treasonable kind on his own part, nor persuading or exciting others to concur in the execution thereof on theirs, I readily admit that loose words of this description are not to be conisdered as constituting overt-acts of high treason, and that it would be too much to infer from the careless, though highly blameable use of expressions of this kind, so mischievous and abominable a purpose as the destruction of the king. But if words of this kind are used at meetings held for the purpose of forwarding designs of a treasonable nature, and if they are addressed to persons with an intent to excite and to confirm them in the prosecution of measures which have for their declared object the assassinating or deposing of the king by force and arms, and where words are the immediate vehicle by which treasons, such as these, are communicated, and by which they are to be carried into full completion and effect, it never was, since the promulgation of law in this land, ever doubted that words of this nature, uttered for such a purpose, at such meetings and consultations, and being themselves the very instruments and means of exciting other persons to take part in measures which has for their end and object the personal destruction of the king, were in their very nature and essence the clearest and most absolute overt-acts of high treason that can be stated. This point never yet admitted of a doubt; it never was questioned—it never can be so.—Another subject has been discussed before you, respecting the credit due to the testimony of accomplices, which is certainly a matter of nice and delicate consideration. That an accomplice is a competent witness, and that, if he is believed, you may, upon his evidence, found the most important conclusions, there can be no doubt. You see him stand before you sworn as a witness: if he had not been competent, if he were a person standing under such circumstances as to be wholly unworthy of credit, it would have been a dereliction of duty on the part of us who sit here; it would have been a gross dereliction of duty in those, who have, on former occasions, occupied similar seats in other courts of criminal justice, when witnesses of the same description have been called before them, not to repel such witnesses at once from the book on which they were about to be sworn, and to tell the country that they ought not to be received:—but they are and always have been received. Their testimony, however, is to be received and acted upon with an attentive and scrupulous consideration of its merit and value: in each particular instance, they come sullied with some degree of contamination, by a participation in the very crime they impute to others; but the witness who comes thus *prima facie* contaminated, may be so confirmed by the consistency and clearness of his own narration, and still more by its conformity to and coincidence with the substance of the testimony delivered by others, not likely to have conspired with him in the crime itself, or to have had the means of concerting and colluding with him as to the matter of his testimony, and still more, if such a witness is found to be confirmed by a variety of collateral and independent facts and circumstances, involving the names, characters, and transactions of multitudes of persons, and if, at last, the whole of his testimony should appear to be broken in upon by no one fact of contrary testimony, during a discussion and hearing occupying so many hours as this has done, and in the course of which the names of so many persons have been brought forward as actors in very extraordinary scenes, described as having passed in so many places, I say, if the entire narrative as to persons, places, and things, not in itself inconsistent or improbable, should ultimately appear to be falsified in no instance whatever, in such case, a person originally standing under some degree of doubt and suspicion from the nature of his situation, and from the quality of his testimony, becomes, at last, entitled to be believed in the fullest manner, accredited and confirmed as he then is in the matter of his testimony, by such a body of collateral evidence, as I have, by way of supposition, assumed, and you may probably consider as having been given in the present instance. In the case of Charnock, one of the conspirators in the assassination plot in the time of William the Third, which has been cited to you by the counsel for the crown, Lord Holt says, that "conspiracies are deeds of darkness as well as of wickedness, the discovery whereof can properly come only from the conspirators themselves;" and that the evidence of accomplices "has always been allowed good proof in all ages, and they are the most proper witnesses, for otherwise it is hardly possible, if not altogether impossible, to have a full proof of such secret contrivances," and, he adds, "such discoveries are to be encouraged in all governments, without which there can be no safety." Besides the connexion and communication with the treason, it may be different in different individuals; in some it may be such as only to constitute a case of misprision of treason, or it may be treason, if the concealment of and apparent concurrence in the acts and proposals of

others was such, as to afford actual treasonable measures proposed. Such conduct would, in that case, implicate the person in the crime, as a principal in the high treason, and not merely as a party guilty of misprision, by concealing the objects of a traiterous conspiracy, after full knowledge of them.—But there is another class of persons, which cannot properly be considered as coming within the description, or as partaking of the criminal contamination; accomplices, I mean persons, entering into communication with the conspirators, with an original purpose of discovering their secret designs, and disclosing them for the benefit of the public. The existence of such original purpose on their part, is best evinced by a conduct, which precludes them from ever wavering in or swerving from the discharge of their duty, if they might otherwise be disposed so to do, as in the case of one who bound himself to his duty by an early communication to another; and received from him directions as to the steps which he should afterwards pursue, if he entered into and continued in the apparent prosecution of the purposes of the conspiracy; with this view and object he is not an accomplice, although, perhaps, a great degree of objections or disfavour may attach to him on other grounds, for certainly no person of very delicate feelings, would choose to go on from day to day, apparently forwarding the purposes of a conspiracy, in order that he might afterwards disclose it and bring the parties concerned in it to justice; but still, whatever may be the merit or demerit of this species of conduct on other grounds, it is not the case of an accomplice.—Having made these observations to you, as to the nature of accomplices and the circumstances under which accomplices may justly be considered as credible witnesses, and which observations you will of course apply, as far as they are justly applicable to the witnesses in question, believing their story, if it is consistent and probable in itself, and confirmed by the testimony of others, and still more, much of that confirmation be derived from pure and unsuspected sources, and disbelieving it if it be inconsistent, improbable, and unconfirmed by other evidence. — **** — Here his lordship having summed up the evidence proceeded.—This is all the evidence that has been given on the part of the prosecution. Gentlemen, you were very properly told that this case does not involve any question of law. I have already observed to you, upon the point that was made by the counsel for the prisoner, namely, that this was a case of treason, where the overt-acts proved consisted merely in words, and that mere words could not amount to an overt act of treason. If this evidence is true, besides the other overts-acts of meetings and consultations seduction of soldiers, administering of these unlawful oaths for the purposes of this conspiracy; the words were used as the means, instruments, and vehicles, for carrying the avowed treasonable objects of the parties into effect, by proposing, arranging, and settling a plan for seizing the Tower and the Bank in the first instance, and for assassinating his majesty, and overturning the constitution in the second.—To the observations made by the defendant's counsel respecting the testimony of accomplices, I have already adverted. It is singular enough that they expressly admit that a traiterous scheme and conspiracy did exist somewhere; but wish you to believe, the prisoner at the bar never concurred in, or was a party to such conspiracy. If there be treason, whose treason is it if it be not his? If he be not the traitor, who are the persons that are so? If the witnesses are worthy of credit to the extent of proving the existence of the treason itself, why are they not also worthy to be believed as to the persons of the traitors? The safer and more consistent course would certainly have been to deny, to their testimony, all credit whatsoever, either as it established the crime, or as it affected the supposed criminal. If indeed, they were unworthy of credit in the general course and habits of their lives, and have so demeaned themselves that they were not entitled to be believed upon their oaths, it was not only competent and highly proper for the prisoner to have called persons to prove that the witnesses produced against him were persons wholly unworthy of credit, and not fit to be believed upon their oaths. Persons tried for high treason being, in possession of the names of all the witnesses to be brought against them, for more than ten days before their arraignment, have ample and more convenient means of confronting or discrediting witnesses, than any other description of persons who are the objects of accusation and trial; with all these advantages of the law in his favour, no evidence of that kind however has been offered, or attempted to be offered, on the part of the prisoner, against any one of all these several witnesses; they stand therefore before you not impeached, or even attempted to be impeached, in the usual and ordinary way in which witnesses grossly unworthy of credit are, properly attacked and discredited. As to the objection that the bulk of the evidence given in this case proceeds from accomplices, it is certainly true, that the evidence in this case rests principally (as in some cases it does and must almost entirely) upon the evidence of accomplices. What was said by Lord Holt in the trial of Charnock, Keys, and King, in the state trials alluded to by the Solicitor General, comprises, in a few words, the good sense and the law upon the subject. "It is certainly," says Lord Holt, "a very hard matter, if not impossible, to discover crimes of this nature, if the "accomplices in those crimes shall not be allowed to be good witnesses against their fellow conspirators." And in answer to an objection of the prisoner, "that though an accomplice was a legal witness, he was not a "good one;" Lord Holt adds, "he is a very "good witness, if he be a legal witness, but "the credit of what he says, in all other cases, "must be left to the jury, who are judges of "the matter of fact, and of the credibility of "witnesses." In that case the three most, and I may say almost the only material witnesses,

were all of them, principal conspirators in the treason; though one of them, Pendercraft, drew back early, from a detestation of the intended measure of assassinating the king; and there was no such confirmatory evidence of persons not concerned in the criminal project, as has been produced upon the present occasion. You have had proof from several persons of their meeting at public houses; in one instance, the landlord of the Coach and Horses, in High-street, Whitechapel, who was present, confirms not only the circumstance of their being at his house, but various other particulars related by Windsor, as having passed on that occasion; and which are also further confirmed by the two soldiers, Campbell and Dean, who were also present, and invited by the prisoner to partake of the bread and cheese he had sent out for. Windsor and Emblin are most materially confirmed by the landlady of another public-house, who overheard those very extraordinary and marked expressions of the prisoner respecting his heart being callous, which you cannot have forgot. So that in this case, such of the witnesses as are properly accomplices, have been confirmed in a manner in which they have hardly ever yet been confirmed in other cases. Some of those who have been called accomplices, are not strictly speaking such. If Windsor entered into this scheme with the original purpose of making a timely discovery of the mischief, and that he did so, his immediate communication to Mr. Bownas, the advice he received from him for his conduct in the business, his subsequent voluntary communication to Mr. Stafford, his voluntary appearance at Union Hall the next day, his uncompelled discoveries appear very strongly to indicate; upon that supposition, I say, he is not strictly an accomplice. Though the concern he had in the business in continuing so long, and mixing so intimately, and fowarding with so much apparent good will and alacrity, the objects of the conspiracy, certainly exhibit him to you as a person of no very delicate character and feelings; and if the testimony he gives had been materially confirmd, as it has been, and if his general credibility as a witness upon oath, had also been impeached with effect, I should certainly have advised you to pause upon the testimony of this witness, and to think well of the degree of credit you ought to give it, before you believed it. Emblin receives, you will recollect, confirmation from Mrs. Plowman, as to the meetings at her house on the 12th of Nov. and the memorable language used by Col. Despard there, as well as Windsor does; and Emblin is neither contradicted or discredited in this, or any other part of his story. If then a treasonable conspiracy for the imputed purposes existed at all, and it is admitted that it did, who is the traitor if the prisoner be not the person. He is found in a society, which, from his former situation in life, his former character and habits, seems to have been most unfit for him, and ought certainly to have been most distasteful to him. An officer, heretofore, of considerable rank and command in his majesty's service, is found in daily conversation with soldiers of the lowest class, at public-houses of the meanest resort, in company with the commonest workmen and labourers, yet no account is attempted to be given of the reasons which brought him to these places, or mixed him in this extraordinary sort of society. What, it may be asked, led him to the Flying Horse, at Newington? What to the Oakley Arms? What to Tower Hill? What to the Coach and Horses, at Whitechapel? What induced him to sit down there with such men as Windsor, Winterbottom, the two soldiers, and Herron? What, to partake with some, and to offer to others, the humble fare he sent for upon that occasion? What honourable end or purpose could he aim at promoting by such degrading intercourse and connexions? If there were any end or purpose which he could safely avow, it was incumbent upon him to have shewn it in evidence to you. But has he explained in evidence, or even attempted to explain in argument, the motive of so extraordinary a conduct. Have his counsel offered one plausible excuse for his presence on these occasions. On the contrary, you are left without the shadow of a reason, apology, or excuse, suggested on his behalf, to resist the inferences naturally resulting from such a conduct as his, as well as you can. He affords you no assistance on this head, nor in any degree enables you to draw a more lenient and favourable conclusion from these facts, than what they seem to suggest to you. It would have been matter of great satisfaction to me, to have been furnished with some materials of explanation to lay before you on the part of the defendant, to account for all these apparent untoward circumstances, but I am furnished with none. The case, as far as I am able to discover, contains none. The only evidence offered on his behalf, is, as to his character, and that is, as applied to the particular point of time which it respects, as high and unexceptionable as can be given of any human being.—****—*Here his lordship stated the evidence which had been given in favour of Col. Despard's character.* — Now, Gentlemen, this is the whole of the evidence, on the one side and the other; the first thing necessary to be seen and attended to is, that there has been an overt-act of some one of the treasons charged in the indictment proved by some one witness to have been committed within the local limits of this county. The next is, that there be two witnesses to the same overt-act, or one witness to one, and another witness to another overt-act of the same species of treason. Now the meetings and consultations at these several places, and the transactions which passed there, if the witnesses to them are believed, are all spoken to by more than two witnesses, so that the competence and sufficiency of the proof to bring the case in point of locality of crime, and the number of witnesses necessary to proof it according to the requisition of the statute, are perfectly satisfied.—The only remaining question for your consideration is, whether you believe the evidence of Emblin, of Francis *, of Blades, and of Windsor, all or which

* *Francis*, in the course of his testimony states that on a certain day, conversing with Despard concerning the taking of the Tower, Despard

of them, as to any one of these meetings, conversations, or actings imputed by them to the prisoner at the bar. If you believe Windsor and Emblin, the guilt is made out beyond a possibility of question; if you have any hesitation about believing them, look at the confirmation which attends them. First, where is this person actually taken? He is taken at the very place, and in company with the very persons, at which and with whom, according to the account of these witnesses, he is in the habit of meeting, conversing, and consulting for these purposes; the men found with him are taken with this very furniture and apparatus of mischief about them, of which we have heard so much, I mean the printed copies of these abominable oaths; he is apprehended almost in the act and attitude of command, and the rest who where present in the act of obeying him. You recollect that when the officers came in he advises the company to go out of the room one and all; that he marches towards the door, and they all rise and follow him. In addition to these circumstances, you find those various circumstances of confirmation scattered through the evidence upon which I have observed already; in the instance of Windsor, you find that he, on the 12th of Nov. is introduced by Broughton to Col. Despard, at the Flying Horse, Newington; this meeting of these parties, and the circumstances attending it, are also proved by the landlady. The prisoner desires Windsor to meet him at the Tower, on Monday, the 15th of Nov.; he meets him, he goes to the Two Bells, at Whitechapel; this stands only on the evidence of Windsor himself, but as to the meeting on that day, and about the same time at the Coach and Horses, Whitechapel, he is confirmed by Walker, the landlord, and by Campbell and Dean, the soldiers, who are all totally unconnected with the conspiracy, and are perfectly indifferent witnesses; and they confirm Windsor substantially, and with no very material difference, as to all such facts and circumstances as happened there under their immediate notice and observation, so that if he is believed there is an end of the question, for then he, with any one of these other indifferent witnesses, constitute two witnesses to an overt-act of treason; if Emblin and Windsor are believed, there is *a fortiori* and end of the question, and the law, which requires two witnesses, either one to one overt-act and another to another overt-act of the same species of treason, or two witnesses to the same overt-act, will have been most abundantly satisfied. It will be for you to say what credit you give to the testimony of these witnesses, taking at the same time into your consideration the character that has been given of the prisoner, which if it had been given by the witnesses with full means of knowledge of all that belonged to it, down to a much later period of time, so as to be considered as exhibiting the continued and actual habits of life and conduct of this gentleman, he would have stood before you most strongly supported indeed against any imputation of disloyalty that could have been cast upon him. Whether any malignant change of disposition has been fatally wrought in him since the termination of his acquaintance with the noble lord and sir Alured Clarke, we know not; we can only look to the plain evidence of external acts, to the uncontradicted history of his recent conduct which is now before us. If you believe all the witnesses to be generally unworthy of credit, or if in the particular facts sworn to by them you cannot bring yourselves to believe Windsor and Emblin, Francis and Blades, notwithstanding the confirmation they have all received from so many various sources, then this person ought to be exempted from the consequences of the charge made upon him; but if you do believe them, I am afraid in that case, that as there is no doubt upon any question of law, so neither will there be much room for doubt upon any of the questions of fact, which are now fully left to you, for your consideration.

The jury withdrew and returned in about 25 minutes with a verdict of *Guilty*, but recommended the prisoner to mercy, on account of the high testimonials of former good character and eminent services.

KING'S BENCH.—THE KING *v.* PELTIER.—*Feb.* 21.

This was a prosecution brought by the Attorney-General upon information against the Defendant for a libel on Buonaparté. For more particular information respecting this curious trial, see different parts of the Register, referred to in the Index.—The cause was opened by the Attorney-General, who, after some introductory observations proceeded as follows.—For what brings me here now before you is this: I prosecute this publication as a libel, because, I say, it has a tendency to endanger the security, the tranquillity, and the peace of the country; that is the charge that brings me here; that is the charge that brings the defendant here. And, gentlemen, if I am right in stating, that the charge will be supported by this information; and if you should go along with me in thinking the defendant guilty of that charge, when the question shall come for consideration, what the punishment shall be on the person who is found guilty; if it should occur to my learned friend, from the instructions of his client, that the legal proceedings of the first Court of Justice in this country shall be made the vehicle of slander, shall be made the means of aggravating that offence, and giving greater weight and extension to the libel I prosecute, I think I should ill discharge my duty to the Public, that I should ill discharge my duty to the honour and the character of the English administration of law, if I did not press it to the consideration of the Court in inflicting that punishment; if I did not take the liberty to remind them, that they should take care, that where the proceedings of a court of justice were made the vehicle of that mischief they were intended to repress, the punishment inflicted should mark, not only to France, but to all the nations of Europe, and to the world, that a British Court of Justice will not, with impunity, allow its proceedings to become the means of such extended defamation.—* * *—This is not the prosecution of a publication, which may be laying before the world an historical narration of events which may have taken place in a neighbouring country, where those events may, or may not, be accompanied with circumstances, with just reflections on the conduct and characters of the persons who may have been the actors in the different scenes. This is not a prosecution meaning to bring to punishment the author of a narration of historical truth, which should not be complained of when written in the spirit of history, though it may give pain to others, if it be written with an

said "that nothing could be done that day, be-"cause *he expected money and news from France.*"

honest zeal, though even with some degree of freedom approaching to licentiousness. Nor is it a prosecution for a piece of flippancy, of insolence or impudence on those who are the objects of it, and on which account it might be treated with contempt. But it is the case of a prosecution bringing into notice a publication, which, as it seems to me, must be considered originally, and from the first, as a libel and defamation, that has defamation for its sole object, or at least for its best object, and its general object. The farther object of it, I think I shall satisfy you, is to excite the subjects of that magistrate whom our country recognizes, and with whom our country is at peace, to excite the subjects of that country to rebel against their chief magistrate, *de facto*, and farther to excite them to his assassination and to his murder.—That being the general object and character, which I ascribe to the publication I prosecute, I have to state to you, more particularly, that it is charged by this prosecution as having been published with the intention of traducing and defaming Napoleon Buonaparté; who is stated, as he is known to be, the First Consul and Chief Magistrate of France; between whom and this country, at the time of the publication, there was, and continues to be, peace and amity. That it was published with the intention of bringing him into hatred and contempt, not only with the subjects of this country, but with the subjects of his own; and for the purpose of exciting the subjects of that country to rebel against him, and to remove him from the situation of power, which he held; and farther, that it was published with the intention of exciting to his assassination and his death, and likewise with the intention of disturbing and interrupting that peace which exists between that country and this. With this intention it is charged to have been published; with this tendency it is characterized as having been published.—Having stated the outlines and nature of this case as to the state of the question on the law, I do not think I am at all called on to state any general principle of law which may apply, or at least strictly to define to what extent the government of a country, at peace with our own, may lawfully be made the subject of animadversion. I am not now called upon to lay down such a definition, but undoubtedly there are some broad distinctions on the subject. I have no difficulty in laying down this: for instance, I think no man can suppose that I mean to contend, that any publication professing to consider the conduct of a foreign government at peace with us, would be a libel; which, if applied to the government of our own country, would not be deemed to be such. Though the province of the historian be the detail of facts, yet if he introduced the fair discussion of the politician, or of the philosopher, on the facts and events he detailed, even this, unquestionably, published fairly and *bonâ fide*, and not as a cover for slander and defamation: such a publication I should certainly never think of deeming the subject of prosecution. But, if the case be this; if defamation be the sole object of this publication, and if the publication has the necessary, the direct tendency of exciting that degree of jealousy and hatred in the country to which the publication is directed against the country from which it issues, and to alienate the dispositions of that country from our own, and consequently to interrupt the intercourse of peace which subsisted between them, I think it is not likely any lawyer will stand up and say such a publication is not a libel, and that the author of it ought not to be punished; but even that is not this offence. The offence here charged to have been committed by the defendant is this, that his publication is a direct incitement and exhortation to the people of the French Republic to rise up in arms against their First Consul and Chief Magistrate, to arrest the power from the hands, in which, *de facto*, it is placed, and to take away the life of a man who presides over them. Is it possible we can have any difficulty in supporting this proposition, that such a publication is an offence against the law of this country?—* * * *—I stated to you, at first, what I conceived to be the object and tendency of this work; and now let me put it to you, whether you do not think, with me, this is a crime in this country? Whether the exhortation to assassination, in time of peace, is not a very high offence? If it were in time of war, I should have no difficulty in stating, that there is something so base, so disgraceful; there is something so contrary to every thing, that belongs to the character of an Englishman; there is something so immoral in the idea of assassination, that the exhortation to assassinate this, or any other Chief Magistrate, would be a crime against the honourable feelings of the English law. What effect, then, must it have, when, instead of being at war, we are at peace with that Sovereign. Do not let any idle declamation on that denomination impose upon your minds. Whether the present libel was directed against a monarch sitting on his throne, from long hereditary descent, or whether he is a person raised to this power by the revolution, from the choice of that country, or from any other cause, it makes no difference. He is *de facto* the Chief Magistrate, and is to be respected by those, who are the subjects of that country, who owe a temporary allegiance to him. He is to be respected as if his ancestors had enjoyed the same power for a number of generations.—* * * *.

The pleading being finished, and the evidence closed, Lord Chief Justice Ellenborough addressed the Jury in the following words:—The matter in issue includes three things: 1st, the fact of publication; 2dly, the truth of the allegations in the record; and 3dly, the nature, quality, and tendency of the papers themselves.—This information is filed against the defendant for several passages, that have been selected from the publication called the *Ambigu*, from the first and third numbers of that publication. Several of these papers have been read, first in the French language, and then in an English translation, the faithfulness of which does not appear to be materially impeached.—As to the first thing, the fact of publication that seems to be proved by the evidence of Mr. Deboffe, who published, and acted under the orders of Mr. Peltier, the defendant. It is unnecessary to detail the particulars, because it does not seem to be matter of contest, that he was the publisher under the orders of Mr. Peltier, and therefore he is liable, if these are libellous publications. That Napoleon Buonaparté was the Chief Magistrate and First Consul of France is admitted. And that the relations of peace and friendship subsist between us and the French Republic, and did so at the time of these publications, is also admitted. And, indeed, they were

capable of easy proof, if they had not. Their notoriety seems to render the actual proof very unnecessary.—The next, and only remaining material point for your consideration, is, the nature and quality of the publications themselves. It has been attempted by the learned counsel for the defendant to represent them as ironical and satirical papers, written as against some particular factions in France, and not immediately directed against the character and person of the First Magistrate of that country. It will be for you to say, on the fullest consideration of all the circumstances of this case, whether you are not satisfied these papers do contain matter reviling and highly reflecting on that considerable magistrate, and hold out a direct incitement and encouragement to assassinate his person.——Gentlemen, it is my duty to state to you, that every publication that has a tendency to promote public mischief, whether by causing irritation in the minds of the subjects of this realm, that may induce them to commit a breach of the public peace, or whether it may be more public and specific, and extending to the morals, the religion, or magistracy of the country—these are all cases of libel. But more particularly, as in the present case, by defaming the persons and characters of magistrates and others in high and eminent situations of power and dignity in other countries, inconsistent with amity and friendship, expressed in such terms and such a manner as to interrupt the amity and friendship between the two countries—every such publication is what the law calls a libel. Cases of this sort have occurred within all our memories. My Lord George Gordon published a libel on the person and character of the Queen of France; and another person published a libel on the late Emperor Paul, in both of which cases there were prosecutions. In the first case there was a conviction and punishment followed. The other case went the length of a conviction, and in respect to the legal effect of both these prosecutions, I am not aware it was ever judicially questioned. And therefore I lay it down as law, that any publication which tends to degrade, revile, and defame persons in considerable situations of power and dignity in foreign countries may be taken to be and treated as a libel, and particularly where it had a tendency to interrupt the amity and peace between the two countries. If any publication contains a plain and manifest incitement and persuasion addressed to others to assassinate and destroy the persons of such magistrates, as the tendency of such a publication is to interrupt the harmony subsisting between two countries, the libel assumes a still more criminal complexion.——Now let us look at the Ode which is attributed to Chenier. This is immediately prefaced by a declaration that he would collect all the materials he could employ on the edifice he was to raise to the glory of Buonaparté, such as should be suitable to his glory; so that his object seems to have been to libel the character of Buonaparté. It is not to be supposed these verses were written by Chenier. Such things often appear under feigned names; and it will be for you to say, whether these words do not import a direct incitement to the assassination of that Magistrate?—"Oh! eternal disgrace of France! Cæsar "on the banks of the Rubicon, has against him, in "his quarrel, the Senate, Pompey, and Cato; and "in the plains of Pharsalia, if fortune is unequal "—if you must yield to the destinies, Rome, in this "sad reverse, at least there remains to avenge "you, a poinard among the last Romans"—— Now, does not that express a lamentation, a wish, on the part of the person, that writes this, that they (the people of France) would use the poinard against the supposed oppressor and usurper of their government, which had been used with effect against Cæsar, the usurper of the Roman Government?——And, in another part of this publication, he says, "As for me, far from envying his lot, let him name, I consent to it, his "wo thy successor; carried on the shield let him "be elected Emperor. Finally (and Romulus recals the thing to mind), I wish, that on the "morrow he may have his apotheosis. Amen."——This is a direct wish, on the part of the publisher of this work, that if he should be elected Emperor of that country of which he then held the government, his death might be instantaneous, or that his destruction might follow on the next day. Every body knows the supposed story of Romulus. He disappeared; and his death was supposed to be the effect of assassination. Now this seems to be incapable of equivocation, if the words were equivocal, and could bear two constructions, I should advise you to adopt the mildest. But if these words can bear this sense and this only, we cannot trifle with our duty. We cannot invent or feign a signification or import, which the fair sense of the words does not suggest.——Gentlemen, upon the whole matter, on the best consideration I have been able to give these different publications, it appears to me, the direct an indirect aim and tendency of them (notwithstanding the very ingenious gloss, and colour, by eloquence almost unparalleled, by which they were defended), was to degrade and vilify, to render odious and contemptible, the person of the First Consul, in the estimation of the people of this country and of France, especially in the estimation of the people of France, and likewise to excite to his assassination and destruction. That appearing to be the immediate and direct tendency of these publications, I cannot in the correct discharge of my duty do otherwise than state, that these publications having such a tendency, in respect of a foreign magistrate, and being published within this country, and the consequence of such publications having a direct tendency to interrupt and destroy the peace and amity between the two countries, are, in point of law, libels. And in the correct discharge of your duty, I am sure no memory of past, or expectation of future injury, will warp you from the strength and even course of justice. But your verdict will mark with reprobation all projects of assassination and murder. Consider likewise, how dangerous projects of this sort may be, if not discountenanced, and discouraged in this country: they may be retaliated on the head of all those whose safety is most dear to us.——Gentlemen, I trust your verdict will strengthen the relations by which the interests of this country are connected with those of France, and that it will illustrate and justify in every quarter of the world the conviction, that has been long and universally entertained, of the unsullied purity of British judicature, and of the impartiality by which their decisions are uniformly governed.——*The Jury, without retiring from their box, immediately returned a verdict of Guilty.*

PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES,

FROM THURSDAY THE 3RD OF FEBRUARY *(the Day the Houses met after the Christmas Recess)*, TO THURSDAY THE 30TH OF JUNE, 1803, *inclusive.*

N. B. The Debates of that part of the session previous to the Christmas recess, will be found in the Register, Vol. II. from p. 1625 *to p.* 1800.—*Observe also, that the Debates only are inserted here, and that Minutes of the minor proceedings will be found inserted in the several preceding sheets of this volume.—See the Table of Contents for the several subjects and the speakers' names; also for the pages where to find the Minutes.—At the beginning of each debate, the Minutes of the proceedings of the day are referred to.*

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, Feb. 7. *(See Minutes, p.* 184.)

[BANK RESTRICTION BILL.] The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, pursuant to notice, rose to move for leave to bring in a bill to continue, for a time to be limited, the act which prohibits the issue of specie from the Bank. He stated, that it was with the utmost reluctance he submitted this proposition to the House, but the reasons which suggested it were too strong, and the necessity too urgent, to be resisted. That necessity, however, he hoped would soon disappear; and, notwithstanding the opinions which had gone abroad, and the new theories which, within the last year, had taken their rise from respectable quarters, and had obtained the sanction of some very intelligent persons, he (Mr. A.) anxiously and impatiently looked forward to the day, which he trusted was not far removed, when the Bank would be at liberty to resume its payments in specie. As to the grounds upon which the expediency of the restriction originally rested, he did not now think it necessary to discuss them, though he was fully persuaded of the wisdom which suggested, and the forcible considerations which led to that measure—still less did he think it necessary to enter into any inquiry respecting the sufficiency of the Bank to answer all the demands upon it. When such an inquiry was before instituted, the case was novel and extraordinary, and therefore to satisfy the public mind in the then state of Europe, and the prevalence of apprehension, was proper and necessary. But what was the result of that inquiry? Why, it removed even the possibility of suspicion as to the circumstances of the Bank; and what intelligent person could have ever entertained that suspicion? He was confident that at this instant there did not exist in any quarter a particle of doubt as to the solidity of the Bank; of course that could not now become a fit subject for inquiry, though it might be very strongly insisted on as an advisable preliminary to the motion he meant to propose. He observed, that many persons who originally condemned the Order of Council which produced the stoppage of the Bank, and who disapproved of the Parliamentary proceedings which followed, were yet at a subsequent period, from a sense of duty, adverse to the idea of suffering the Bank suddenly to resume its operation. Such was the case in the last session, when some of those Gent. concurred in the propriety of continuing the restriction, because the course of exchange was against this country. A similar reason, he remarked, prompted him on this occasion to move for a still farther continuance of this restriction. At present, the state of our exchange with Hamburgh was at par—with Amsterdam it was unfavourable. If then our disadvantageous situation, with regard to exchange, was last session considered a sufficient argument for this measure, he would appeal to the candour and good sense of the House, under the present circumstances of the country, when very little cash could be expected from Hamburgh, and none at all from Amsterdam; when, in fact, no influx of bullion from the continent could be immediately looked for, whether it would be expedient to allow the restriction to cease? He would also ask, as it was found necessary to permit the issue of country bank notes, whether the sudden issue of cash from the Bank would not produce a run upon the country banks, and a consequent run upon the Bank of England, which might be productive of the most serious consequences. From these considerations, as there was no return of bullion from the continent, he would rather submit to the inconvenience of continuing the restriction even longer than might be actually necessary, than risk the consequences of setting aside that restriction too soon. From motives of precaution, therefore, he brought forward this measure. He did not mean to underrate the inconveniencies which resulted from the stoppage of the Bank, but he would maintain that it were better to endure these inconveniencies, than to expose the country to the effects which were likely to arise from prematurely removing the restriction. He hoped, however, the period would soon arrive when the progressive advancement of our commerce would produce such a steady inclination of the exchange in our favour, as would enable us with perfect safety to permit the Bank to resume its payments in specie. The causes of the present state of exchange, a very little reflection would explain to the House, when it was recollected that the scarcity of the last three years had made it necessary for us to purchase a vast quantity of

grain on the continent, and that for this purpose not less than twenty millions of specie had been sent out of the country: when then such a drain as this, arising from a cause which was not likely soon to occur again, was combined with the drain of cash for the payment of our army and navy, it would be obvious that we should wait the operations of a flourishing commerce, to bring back some proportion of this vast amount of bullion, before we attempted to permit the Bank to issue specie. Upon these grounds he felt himself justified in proposing, "That leave be given to bring "in a bill, to continue an act of last session, for 'continuing the restriction on the payment in "specie by the Bank of England." He repeated his intention of opposing any motion for a committee to examine the affairs of the Bank, &c. because he saw no necessity for such a proceeding. He had already stated the distinct ground upon which he brought forward his motion, namely, the state of exchange, which was matter of public notoriety, and therefore required no committee to ascertain it, and the circumstances of the country banks; both of which formed the principal arguments for the adoption of a similar motion in the last session.

Mr. TIERNEY said it was naturally to be expected that he should be first to rise after the Rt. Hon. Gent. as such particular allusion had been made to his conduct and observations on a motion similar to that before the House, which the Rt. Hon. Gent. had brought forward in the course of the last session; and it seemed to be insinuated, that, in point of consistency, he (Mr. Tierney) was bound to support the measure now under discussion. He admitted that though originally hostile to the stoppage of the Bank, he thought that the peculiar circumstances of the country last session, rendered it inexpedient to take off the restriction; but those circumstances no longer existed, and he therefore objected to the motion of the Rt. Hon. Gent. without some previous inquiry respecting the Bank, and particularly upon the grounds stated. The matter was of too much importance to rest on such a basis; for, however familiar Gent. might be with the stoppage of the Bank, however loosely the subject might be talked of in conversation, or however little it might be thought of by those who were unconnected with commercial transactions, it was in the outset considered a prodigy, which in its consequences operated a change in the whole order of money transactions. He did not now intend to give any opinion whether the restriction ought to continue, or to be abolished altogether; but he wished to impress upon the House the propriety of careful deliberation on the necessity of previous inquiry. If there was a subject under the consideration of Parliament, which called for the most satisfactory explanation, certainly that now before the House was of that nature. The Rt. Hon. Gent. indeed had mentioned the state of the exchange; but was the House to have no other information but from his speech? How few were the Gent. of that House, whose habits or connexions gave them an opportunity of knowing any thing about the exchanges? The Rt. Hon. Gent.'s statement of the exchange with Hamburgh happened to be known to him (Mr. Tierney), but perhaps the same fact might not be known to many others of the House. The only document was the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s speech: was that, he would ask, sufficient authority to legislate upon? Could it be entered on the Journals, and go down to posterity to account for and justify the assent of the House to this extraordinary measure? Of the necessity of a committee of inquiry to satisfy the public mind, and to explain and vindicate the conduct of the House to the country and to posterity, he was firmly persuaded. He did not, however, propose to conclude with any motion to that effect, without first perceiving the temper of the House favourable to his views; for, though it appeared to him highly desirable, yet he would not wish to provoke the trouble of debate and division, if the sentiments of the House did not seem to coincide with his own. If they did, his proposal would be to pass the bill for two months, and to appoint a Committee in the interim, to consider how far it would be proper to continue the restriction farther, or to discontinue it altogether. Such was his idea; but the Rt. Hon. Gent. seemed to think that the Report of a committee six years ago was quite sufficient, though the House had no account whatever of the proceedings of the Bank ever since. It seemed to be considered of no consequence how their concerns had been since conducted: no one appeared to care whether the Bank had sufficient provision to answer its demands, or even whether the restriction had been actually profitable or injurious to its interests—whether it had diminished or increased the security of public credit. All these things ought to be known, but all was mystery. No other ground was laid for the motion, but that the exchange with Hamburgh was at par; and upon that naked fact it was proposed to do away that which scarcely any circumstance could warrant—namely, the right of the public creditor to convert Bank Notes into cash. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had confessed that he submitted this motion with reluctance, and he (Mr. Tierney) sincerely believed it, for he really thought that the Rt. Hon. Gent. had, a very short time back, no intention of proposing the continuance of this restriction: this he did not mean to assert from an affectation of any particular knowledge of the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s sentiments; but the conviction he felt in common with the House, of the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s intimate acquaintance with, and respect for, the order of the House, induced

him to imagine, from the notice of the continuance of this bill being only given twenty-one days before its expiration, that the motion did not originate in sound discretion and deliberative judgment of the Rt. Hon. Gent. himself, but was pressed upon him by the recommendation of others. He trusted, however, the House would not adopt this monstrous bill at a time when there was even no plausible pretext for it, when no money was likely to go out of the country, when no alarm prevailed in either domestic or foreign politics, when no fear of any sudden press on the Bank could be entertained. All that was mentioned in the shape of a reason, was, that the exchange was not at par: then, of course, no money would go out of the country. Were not these considerations sufficiently strong to urge the House to agree to an inquiry? Was it not material to shew the country what the Bank was doing? That it was preparing to open, and pay in specie; that it was ready to do so when Parliament should permit. The Bank Directors ought to shew that there was no danger in their responsibility. He was not unwilling to compliment the Bank Directors, but he would wish them to compliment the public, even as they did in 1797, when the original restriction took place, and when they published a resolution that they were ready, if political considerations permitted, to pay cash for their notes. This resolution did not precede the bill which sanctioned the Order of Council, and surely it would be but decent to give the country something like the same evidence upon this occasion. According to the Report of the committee of 1797, the proportion of cash and bullion in the Bank amounted to one million, when the Order of Council was issued; and some short time afterwards this sum was increased to six millions. Was it not now a fit subject for inquiry? What had become of this six millions if it was forthcoming to meet any exigency? and if it was, why should the Bank hesitate to resume their operation? They could not be afraid of a run upon them, for who could now think of any material advantage from hoarding gold? But the Rt. Hon. Gent. objects to their paying in cash, because the exchange is not at par. If the Rt. Hon. Gent. resolves to restrain the Bank while the exchange is at par, there are men of the highest intelligence and character, who are of opinion that the exchange will be kept up. But why should the Rt. Hon. Gent. indulge these fears? His late financial statement ought to sustain his confidence. He there describes the surplus revenue of the present year as one million, and that of the next year as two millions. Was not that sufficient to protect the Bank and public credit in any suitable emergency? If the rate of exchange, as it now stood, was really to be made an argument for the stoppage of the Bank, it would leave a very dangerous impression in the country; and, recollecting the circumstances, the people, upon the probable recurrence of such an exchange at a future day, would be apt to make such a run on the Bank, as might be productive of very serious consequences indeed. The reason which the Rt. Hon. Gent. advanced, could not surely be the suggestion of the Bank Directors: if so, it was very unworthy of them. They should not plead any little expense or trouble which might occur in procuring bullion, if they wanted it, as a reason against accommodating the public by paying their own notes, particularly after the vast sums they had put in their pockets. The public had a right to say to them, "You have been for the last six years reaping a productive harvest from our inconvenience; we only ask of you now to convert into cash the notes for which we have given you credit so long," and the Bank ought to be provided to answer this reasonable request. They could have no apology for declining it, unless incapacity; and he did not suppose that to be the case.—If the bill should pass, he, in his conscience, believed it to be entirely a matter of convenience. No Bank Director, he was confident, would go before a committee of that House (for he would not take a speech), and assert that the present state of the exchange would be a good reason for half an hour's farther delay in the issue of specie from the Bank. No Director could dare to say, at a time when trade was flourishing, profound peace prevailing, and no alarm whatever appearing, that the exchange being at par would be a sufficient ground for the motion before the House. He exhorted the Chancellor of the Exchequer to think on the necessity of allaying the opinions which were afloat in the country. Several factions agitated the public mind, and each had their literary advocates. One of these advocates, in defence of the system of his party, had lately written a pamphlet, intitled, "The Iniquity of Banking," and another immediately replied in a pamphlet, intitled, "Money an useless Incumbrance." Perhaps, added Mr. T. it would be very prudent in the House to step in between these disputants, and by the Report of a committee settle their opinions, and set the public mind at ease. Something ought certainly to be done to diminish, if not to put an end to the disgrace of a measure which injures our credit in the eyes of foreigners, and distracts the course of pecuniary dealings in our own country. The Hon. Member observed, that it had been much the fashion to regret the absence of a certain Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt), whom he always heard when he did attend the House with pleasure and attention, however he might differ with him in opinion. Now, upon this occasion he could not help regretting that Rt. Hon. Gent.'s non-attendance; for he was confident, were he in the House, he (Mr. T.) would have in him a most powerful ally. *(The Chancellor of the Exchequer shook his head.)* Mr. Tierney remarked, the Rt. Hon. Gent.

shakes his head upon this assertion; and, no doubt, that is all that will be got out of him. Strange, added Mr. T. when I mention the probable opinion of the Rt. Hon. Gent. I have alluded to, A shakes his head, and B gives a significant nod; but when I say that if that Rt. Hon. Gent. were here, he would be *consistent*, I hope I shall offend none of his friends; and I am confident that his consistency would urge him to support my opposition to this motion, if he should come down, and I most conscientiously think he will; for when that Rt. Hon. Gent. proposed this measure originally, he gave the House the most detailed reports to shew the grounds upon which his ideas of the necessity were founded. The Hon. Member concluded with observing, that he did not wish the Bank doors to be at once thrown open, without due deliberation; his desire was, that a committee should be appointed, composed of such intelligent persons as formed the original committee on this subject, many of whom were at present in the House, and who would be able to give such a mass of useful information to the country as would satisfy the public of the justice and policy of any measure founded upon it. If such a proceeding were not adopted, he was convinced the people would very naturally think the measure proposed by the Rt. Hon. Gent. rather an act of convenience than of necessity. The Bank would be condemned if they should lose the opportunity of this committee to vindicate their conduct, and the House would be set down rather as the blind followers, or suspected accomplices, of the Bank, than as the faithful guardians of the public interest.

Mr. Fox began by observing, that if the Rt. Hon. Gent. felt such reluctance as that which he expressed to bring forward the present proposition, and such anxiety to see the period arrive when a measure of that nature would be deemed no longer necessary, much more urgent reasons than those he had heard should, in his opinion, be adduced in its support. If, however, necessity, or a strong propriety, called for its adoption, he was not disposed to urge any objection to it: at the same time he should feel more satisfaction if there were laid before him sufficient grounds to justify his assent; and in that view he concurred with the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) who spoke last, in thinking that some inquiry should be instituted into the causes that gave rise to the continuance of the restriction, that it might appear whether they were of a nature to render the restriction necessary or not. The principal grounds on which the continuance of the su pension now seemed to be rested, were the state of the exchange between this and other countries, and the small quantity of bullion that of late had been imported. Was it then to be understood that whenever the state of the exchange was so unfavourable as to leave no room to expect the importation of bullion, a restriction should be put on the cash payments of the Bank? Such a mode of reasoning would, on the face of it, seem to go to establish it as a general axiom, that in all such cases the cash payments of the Bank should be suspended. To these reasons were added the great exportation of specie for corn, and on account of other circumstances connected with the war. If these additional reasons had any force, then the propriety of further continuing the restriction should not be made to depend so entirely on the state of the exchange. Perhaps even it might happen that the unfavourable turn of the exchange against this country, might be owing to the very restriction on the Bank: and as on this head doubts were entertained, that with him was a strong reason for recommending an inquiry, because a proposition for such an inquiry might, when under discussion, bring forth many opinions on the subject (it was opinions rather than facts which he was anxious the inquiry should produce), more especially of commercial men, and of the Directors of the Bank, whose pursuits and occupations enabled them to throw most light on such subjects. For his part, he could not pretend to much information on them, particularly on the causes that might influence the fluctuations of the rate of exchange between different countries. It was not into the conduct of the Directors of the Bank that the House should be anxious to inquire. They professed themselves to be ready to renew their payments in specie, if Govt. had no political reasons for preventing them from doing so. They were ready even now to resume their cash payments; and if they, as bankers, saw no danger or inconvenience in resuming them, was it not incumbent upon the House to inquire into the grounds of the political objection that was opposed to that resumption? For his part, he could not conceive a possible case where the restriction could be necessary or useful, when the Directors of the Bank declared themselves to be able and willing to pay in specie. If such a case existed, it should be made out, and for that reason he acquiesced with the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) in the propriety of some inquiry being instituted. His mind was far from harbouring any suspicions prejudicial to the Directors of the Bank; on the contrary, if any danger attended the opening of the Bank (and it was admitted that dangers did attend it), he was inclined to believe that to the caution, the prudence, and the discretion of the Bank Directors, it was owing that all those dangerous consequences had in a great measure been averted. When, therefore, the Bank Directors expressed no reluctance to recommence their payments in specie, must not the worst inferences be drawn, even from a suspicion that circumstances are such as to make it imprudent to suffer them to resume their payments? The House must surely recollect

how closely the credit of the Bank is connected with the credit of the country, and how much it therefore must depend upon the management of the Bank. The credit of the country was not likely before to be much affected by that management; for, while the Bank continued to pay in specie, if the Directors chanced to act improperly, the public were able to discover the impropriety of their conduct in the consequences to which it must have given rise; but now, as there was not the same check of honour on them as that by which other bankers were bound, the public had no longer the same security, and the whole of the credit of the country was made to depend upon the administration of men whose conduct was under the control of Govt. and who owe no responsibility to the country. When the public credit was so endangered, it was not surprising that an impatience should be expressed by the Rt. Hon. Gent. to get rid of the restriction: at all events, he must hope that a short bill only would now be proposed, and that time would be allowed to examine how far it should be prolonged. It might also be proper to inquire how far the state of exchange should be admitted as a criterion, whether the Bank should pay in specie or not. Allowing also that there might be some danger in taking off the restriction altogether, still might not some arrangement be adopted for paying a small part of the dividends and notes in cash? By adopting a gradual system of that kind, all danger from a sudden run might be avoided: but it is said, if the Bank renews its cash payments, the specie will be sent out of the country—that is very probable; but as long as there is a strong temptation to send guineas abroad, the most rigorous laws, even when most vigilantly enforced, will prove inadequate to prevent it. Neither can it be expected that the Bank Directors will serve the public at their own loss. They will not buy bullion, that the public may have money; they will not lose in purchasing it, that others may gain by sending it out of the country. But with regard to the fluctuations in the state of the exchange between this country and others, there was a circumstance which now occurred to his mind, if he rightly recollected it, which tended to shew that the state of the exchange does not always depend on the circumstances which are now supposed almost solely to affect it. In the year 1773 or 1772, when there was a great quantity of bad money in the country, the course of exchange was then also much against us; but he was informed, that when in the room of this adulterated money good gold was substituted, the consequence was, that the exchange turned almost immediately in our favour. As long as our currency continued bad, the exchange was against us; so is it now, because paper is not much better than bad gold; or, it is attended with the same inconveniencies. May it not therefore be expected, that as, in the former case, when our currency was meliorated, the course of exchange turned in our favour, so also, if the Bank now resumed its cash-payments, the same favourable circumstances might attend the change? This at least was a matter that well deserved to be inquired into: there were many other points to which an inquiry might be usefully directed, and he should not be sorry to see a motion made for instituting one.

Mr. BANKS felt rather undecided how he should act on the present occasion. If it was intended that the bill should go beyond a very short period, both the dignity of the House and the security of the public credit might require that some investigation should be made into the unnatural state in which imperious circumstances had for some time past placed the Bank. Since peace was now restored, and those circumstances no longer continued to operate, the House would no doubt be slow in acceding to such a measure as that now proposed, without very satisfactory grounds to justify them in adopting it. He was ignorant whether it was the intention of the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) to move for an inquiry, or not; but if that Hon. Gent. did not make the motion, he should feel it his duty, if the bill to be brought forward was not for a very short duration, to endeavour to dissuade the House from assenting to the measure, without such grounds as might fully satisfy them and their constituents of its necessity.

Lord HAWKESBURY would trouble the House with but a very few words. The only question now before them was, that leave be given to bring in a bill. When it came to the stage for filling up the blanks, then an opportunity would occur to discuss the time to which its operation should be limited, and to advance the reasons why a committee of inquiry should be appointed. But his principal object in rising was to endeavour to set right two Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox and Mr. Tierney), who seemed to view the arguments of his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Addington) in a different light from that he intended to place them in. These Gent. seemed to imagine that his Rt. Hon. Friend ascribed the necessity of the measure solely to the state of exchange between this and other countries. He did not understand him so. His Rt. Hon. Friend, in stating his opinion of the measure, looked back to the necessity which justified it at the time it was first proposed, and to the salutary consequences which its adoption had produced; and in that view he could not but applaud it as a wise precaution; but looking at it now generally and abstractedly, he could not but regard it as an evil, and he therefore felt anxious for the arrival of the period when the cash-payments might be safely resumed. He entertained nearly the same opinion; but what

added to his embarrassment was the difficulty of taking off the restriction after it was once imposed. His Rt. Hon. Friend had observed, that the restriction had been imposed and continued for many years, without any inconvenience having resulted from it; and this he was ready to ascribe, as the Hon. Gent. opposite to him (Mr. Fox) had done, to the excellence of the institution itself, and to the cautious and prudent conduct of the Gent. who administered its affairs. If, therefore, no inconvenience has as yet accrued from the restriction, would it not be wise to pause for a while, and look for the period when the removing of it may be attended with as little danger as possible? The Noble Lord then proceeded to enumerate the causes why the course of exchange was against this country, and why the quantity of its bullion was diminished. A great quantity of it was known to have been sent abroad, not only for the purchase of corn, but for the maintenance and use of the army and navy. The exportation of our bullion was then a matter of necessity; for the exchanges were then with regard to us reduced extremely low: but they are now improved, and may soon be expected to be at par. If, therefore, any inconvenience still remains that may be likely to arise from a premature change of system, is it not proper to look forward to a period when no obstacle may impede it? It was not upon any prospect of an unfavourable change that the present measure was grounded, but rather the delicacy of reverting to the old system without taking the advantage of a favourable moment. That moment was perhaps at no great distance, and prudence admonished that it should be waited for with patience. —As to the appointment of a committee of inquiry, he was not without his objections to it; and chiefly because its only effect would be to create alarms that might be extremely prejudicial. The appointment of such a committee might be necessary if any doubts were entertained of the sufficiency of the Bank; but on that point the most perfect satisfaction had already been afforded; and by consulting the papers now on the table, shewing the number of notes that have been issued at different periods, it may be easily seen whether the Directors of the Bank have abused the power intrusted to them. Where, therefore, is the necessity of a committee, the appointment of which might produce much mischief, and no real good? It might perhaps be proper, at a future period, to revise the whole system of our paper credit, but then that should be done merely with relation to that system itself, and without any reference whatever to the institution and conduct of the Bank. An Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) has observed, that in 1773 the course of exchange was against this country when our gold coin was of an inferior value, but that immediately after the recoinage, it turned round in our favour—but the fact is, that at that period the exchange was against us only in appearance, in substance it was in our favour. No inference can, therefore, be drawn from that circumstance, that restriction on the Bank is the cause of the unfavourable turn of the exchange, or that the exchange would turn in our favour, if that restriction were taken off. Although the restriction has continued, the course of exchange is altered considerably in our favour, especially for the last six months: for the fact is, the exchange was not affected by that restriction, but by the exportation of bullion, or rather by the causes that prevented the importation of it. Those causes will soon cease to operate, and we already see the course of exchange rapidly coming round in our favour, and we have every reason to expect that it will soon be at par, and place us in the same advantageous situation which we had before enjoyed. These were his reasons for discountenancing an inquiry, especially as a motion for it would be more in order when the bill was before the House.

Sir FRANCIS BARING observed, that circumstances wholly unnoticed or unattended to may have occasioned the unfavourable turn of the course of exchange against this country. Formerly, its fluctuations might be accurately calculated, and it might be easily ascertained how it stood between this and any other country; but the commercial as well as the political frame of Europe, was so dislocated and disjointed, that nothing now could be calculated to a certainty. The disadvantages we now laboured under do not arise from common causes, but from extraordinary and unexpected efforts to cramp and to counteract our commercial enterprises. Our credit, however, was never safer or sounder than at the present moment; and if the measure now proposed is to be adopted, it should be looked upon as a measure of propriety, not of necessity.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER confessed that at an early period of the session (as insinuated by an Hon. Gent. Mr. Tierney), he did not entertain the idea of proposing a further continuance of the restriction on the Bank; he did venture to hope that a favourable alteration in the course of the exchange would have relieved him from the performance of the painful duty which he this day came forward to discharge. If appearances continued to be the same which they were at the close of last year, and the beginning of the present, and the favourable change promised to be permanent, he should have abstained from the present motion; but while he said this, he desired to be understood by the House, not abstractedly to rest what he had advanced upon the state of the exchange, for many other circumstances concurred in the operation.—He thought it right to permit the country banks to issue small notes. Were the Bank to be opened, all these

notes would be tendered for payment, when a sufficient quantity of bullion was not in the possession of the Bank, and the run upon it would be unusually great. Indeed, from a variety of combined causes, the demand on the Bank would be extraordinary. Would, therefore, such a moment be a favourable one for discontinuing the restriction? or, from this view of the case, will it be contended that the state of the exchange is the sole cause for continuing it?—But an Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) has suggested the propriety of opening the cash payments of the Bank under some limited restriction. No doubt that Hon. Gent. is aware that in the former bill a power is given to the Bank to make partial payments of the dividends in specie, upon giving due notice of such payments to the House of Commons.—That Hon. Gent. is also of opinion that the Bank should not be restrained in paying small notes in specie; but does he bear in mind, that if the small notes were to be paid in specie, then the larger notes would be changed into small ones, and presented for payment in specie? by which means the whole effect of the restriction would be completely done away, for the one limited restriction must unavoidably frustrate the other. It has also been observed, that the Bank is ready and disposed to pay. Whether that was the case or not, what he proposed was not in compliance with, or in opposition to, any thing the Bank might wish for: as he had, on the present occasion, no communication whatever with the Bank, all he took their opinion upon was, the state of the course of exchange. Indeed the Bank had expressed no wish or opinion to him.—An Hon. Baronet (Sir Francis Baring) had adverted to a topic which well deserved the serious consideration of the House. The House, from what that Hon. Baronet had said, should imagine many reasons to themselves that would recommend the measure, but which it was unnecessary to explain. The storm that had agitated the commercial and political world, had not as yet subsided: but he trusted it would be soon laid in peace, and that the favourable moment was not far distant when more auspicious prospects might be opened. It was now his intention to insert a clause in the bill which he wished to bring in, leaving a power to alter it during the course of the present session, should circumstances favour its alteration or repeal, or to continue it in force for six weeks after the meeting of Parliament next session. He was averse to a committee—he saw no necessity for it; more important occasions had occurred where no committee was moved for. The charter of the Bank was renewed without any committee having been appointed to inquire into the state of its affairs. If any new grounds were adduced to shew the necessity for an inquiry, he was ready to listen to them; but he was aware of none that would not be liable to inconvenience. It might be proper, during the interval of the suspension, to take a wide, comprehensive view of the paper credit of the country; and not permit bad paper to be issued without any responsibility on the part of those who issued it—such a revision may or may not be deemed advisable. He did not pledge himself to any measure of the sort; yet if it was to take place, it should have no connexion with, or reference to the present state of the Bank; neither should it be now attempted, but at a period more favourable, and during the intervening time. He had now only to repeat that it was with reluctance and regret he proposed the present measure, but circumstances imposed it on him as a duty; and that duty, however painful, he must endeavour to discharge.

Mr. VANSITTART enumerated a variety of causes that at different times affected the course of exchange as it regarded this country, and observed, that the difficulty which the Spaniards experienced during the war in getting home the produce of their mines, was one of the principal reasons why we were in want of bullion. These obstructions now no longer prevented the conveyance of those treasures into Spain, and it was natural to expect that a great quantity of them would shortly find its way into this country.

No division took place.—Leave was given to bring in the bill.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, February 11.—(See Minutes, p. 247.)

[MILITIA.]—The SECRETARY at WAR said, he rose in pursuance of a notice to make a motion for leave to bring in a bill to alter the time for training the militia, from twenty-one to twenty-eight days in each year. He thought it necessary, upon this occasion, to state the reason why he proposed this alteration. When the militia was first formed into a regular system, in the early part of the reign of Charles II. it was enacted, that the militia should be exercised four times a year in companies, and once in battalions: that is to say, two days each time they were exercised in companies, and four days when they were exercised in battalions. As the art of war was not then brought to the degree of perfection to which it has since attained, this was thought sufficient time to train the men. The militia was at that time about 60,000 men. That system was continued from that time till the latter end of the reign of his late Majesty, when a plan was introduced by a Noble Lord, of whom no one could speak without feeling the highest respect (the Marquis Townsend), which was the foundation of the present mode of managing the militia. By the act which was then passed, the militia were ordered to be assembled twice in each year, to be exercised for fourteen days each time, or once for twenty-eight days. This system was found

perfectly well calculated to answer the purpose for which it was intended, and during the American war the militia were found ready and fit for service.—After the conclusion of the American war, when the country was exhausted by so long and expensive a contest, for two or three years the militia were suffered to remain without any new arrangement, and in a kind of state of uncertainty: they were not even called out to exercise. It was then thought necessary to reconsider the subject, and to make some alteration; but as economy was then an object peculiarly to be desired, the following alteration was proposed. The whole of the militia, amounting to 31,000 men, were not to be called out every year, but only two thirds of them, the other third neither receiving pay nor clothing. In this situation the subject remained till the breaking out of the late war. When other alterations took place upon the restoration of peace, Ministers thought it right to put it upon a good footing, and to unite the laws into one system, in order that they might be more clear and distinct; the militia was then augmented to 40,000 men; and it was ordered that they should be exercised once in the course of each year. But as this bill incurred a considerable expense beyond that which was incurred before, it was thought if they were exercised for twenty-one days each year, it would be sufficient, and that a considerable saving would be effected by such a reduction of the time. It had, however, been thought since, by persons the best enabled to form a judgment upon the subject, that, in points of this kind, economy ought not solely to be looked to, and that it would be necessary to exercise the militia for twenty-eight days. He should therefore propose to bring in a bill to make an alteration to that effect, and he was happy to state, that it would not be attended with any considerable expense, in consequence of the economical arrangements which had been introduced. The expense under the present plan was about 200,000*l.* a year. The additional expense which would be incurred by the adoption of the alteration he now proposed, would not exceed 18,000*l.* a year. He concluded with moving for leave to bring in a bill to increase the period for which the militia were to be called out to exercise, from twenty-one to twenty-eight days each year.

Leave was given to bring in the bill.

[BANK RESTRICTION BILL.]—The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER moved the order of the day for going into a committee on the bill.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL rose to move it as an instruction to the committee, that they should have power to alter the bill in one particular.—Some difficulties had arisen in the courts of justice upon the clause in the former bill, respecting tenders being made in Bank notes, on account of the impossibility of making an exact tender in Bank notes, of a debt in which there was a fraction of a pound: the amendment he meant to propose was, that where a person applied to be discharged upon common bail, he should make an affidavit of his having tendered the amount of the debt.—The motion was agreed to.—The House then resolved itself into a committee, Mr. P. Alexander in the chair.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, there was in the bill a clause to enable Parliament to repeal or alter it during the present session: he now proposed to fill up the blank with regard to its duration, with these words, "six weeks after the commencement of the "next session of Parliament."

Mr. BANKES said, he rose to suggest the propriety of proposing a shorter duration for the bill, and in doing so, he begged not to be understood as entertaining an opinion that the Bank ought now to resume its cash payments, nor did he mean to say that the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s motion might not, upon investigation, be perfectly proper; but the ground of his complaint was, that there had not been sufficient data laid before the House to enable them to decide upon the question. He confessed that he was in a state of uncertainty upon that subject, and so he supposed were other Members who had not better means of information than himself.—On a subject of so serious a nature as that which they were now discussing, the House ought to pause before they placed the Bank in such an unnatural situation, without having the least evidence that could be obtained upon the subject. In calling for inquiry and information he was not asking for any thing new and singular; because, when the measure was first proposed, it was submitted to the previous consideration of a committee. It was not thought that the secrecy of the affairs of the Bank ought to prevent them being laid before the House. But that was not all: in the same year, when the measure of the restriction was continued, another inquiry took place, and another report was made to the House. These inquiries were attended with the most beneficial effects with regard to the public credit of the country. He knew that the Reports to which he had alluded had given great satisfaction to the people of this country, with regard to the situation of the Bank and its solidity; and had prevented that alarm which would otherwise have been excited under such circumstances. After the restriction had been laid on, the events of the war, the alarm of invasion and other circumstances, rendered it obvious that the restriction could not be taken off during the war; and therefore as long as that lasted, it never was contended that any fresh matter ought to be laid before the House. But it was expected, that on the restoration of peace the

payments in cash at the Bank would be resumed, and that things would go on in their usual channel. At the conclusion of peace, however, the course of exchange was unfavourable to this country, and there were some other circumstances which rendered it at that moment unadvisable to take off the restriction; and undoubtedly if the cash payments had then been resumed, the country would in a great degree have been drained of its specie. No objection was therefore made to the last bill for renewing the restriction. We were now, however, come to a time when the course of exchange was no longer unfavourable to this country, and the House had heard with pleasure the flattering statement which had been made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer of the state of our commerce and finances. Could it be said, that under such circumstances there was any danger of money going out of the country if the restriction were taken off? He did not say that Parliament ought to direct the Bank immediately to resume its payments in cash; but he contended that there ought to be an inquiry, and some information laid before the House, before they continued the restriction for so long a period. There had been but two reasons assigned for the present measure: the one was, that the course of exchange was not in favour of this country; and the other, that there was a great number of small notes in circulation, both of the Bank of England, and of country banks. With respect to the course of exchange, he had already offered some observations to the House. With regard to the quantity of small notes in circulation, he begged to ask, whether that objection would not always continue until the restriction was taken off, because, until cash was put into circulation, its place must be supplied by paper? During the time that the restriction had subsisted, the exchange had been sometimes favourable and sometimes unfavourable to this country. But he begged the committee to consider what sort of a precedent they would give to future times, if they were to say, that upon such grounds as these the cash payments of the Bank were to be suspended, without inquiry or investigation. He confessed that it was with much pleasure he heard his Rt. Hon. Friend say, that he felt great reluctance in bringing on this measure, because it was only by reverting to our old mode that a solid system could be established, to which this country could look for prosperity. In the course of the former discussion upon this subject, something, but very little, was said about political considerations; but the inquiry which he wished to institute would not tend to discover any circumstances of that kind which it would not be proper to communicate to the House. If his Rt. Hon. Friend were to state, that there were circumstances of a political nature, which, in his opinion, rendered this measure necessary, he should have perfect confidence in that declaration, and would certainly acquiesce in the measure. Another objection that had been stated was, that the appointment of a committee would create alarm; but he confessed he could not see that the appointment of a committee to inquire into the subject could possibly create any alarm. He really believed that the Bank never stood higher in point of credit than it did when the Report to which he alluded was made, because it convinced the people of the solidity and wealth of the Bank. He had no doubt but that the Gentlemen intrusted with the direction of the Bank had discharged the trust reposed in them with the greatest ability and propriety: but the country had a right to know how the fact was; they had a right to know whether exertions had been made to place the Bank in a situation to resume its payments whenever Parliament should think it right to take off the restriction. He was the more anxious upon this subject, because it was obvious, that what they were now doing would form a precedent for future times; because it was probable that hereafter, in times of trouble and danger, cash payments at the Bank would be suspended, therefore it was very important that they should not afford a precedent of taking such an important step without due deliberation and information: for if such a measure as this once became a matter of indifference, and was resorted to without the most convincing grounds, the credit of the country would be lost. There were other dangers that might result from the adoption of a measure of this kind, of which, though he had no apprehension at present, yet it was right to be guarded against in future. If the Government and the Bank were to agree together to keep up the restriction longer than was necessary, a fictitious capital might be created to an almost unlimited extent, which would undoubtedly endanger, if not destroy, the public credit. He begged to be understood, that he was stating this merely as a possible case in future times, because he had not the slightest idea that any of his Majesty's present Ministers, or the Gentlemen intrusted with the direction of the affairs of the Bank, would be parties in an affair of this kind; but he must again repeat, that what they were now doing would be quoted as a precedent in future times, and therefore they ought to proceed in the most guarded and cautious manner. With respect to the inquiry which he wished to have instituted, he confessed he should not be sorry if it were made upon a very enlarged scale, and embraced not merely the subject in question, but the state of our trade. He was aware that such an inquiry could not be instituted upon the present occasion, because there was not sufficient time for it. He therefore should move, that the bill now proposed should continue to the 1st of May, instead of the time which had been

suggested by his Rt. Hon. Friend. In the mean time an inquiry might be instituted, even upon the enlarged scale which he had suggested. There was one observation made in a former debate, to which he had forgotten to allude; and that was, that there was no inquiry instituted when the Bank charter was renewed: but he really saw no connexion between the two subjects. The renewal of the Bank charter was a mere money bargain between the Government and the Bank, and was in no degree similar to the present measure; and therefore what was done upon that occasion could not be cited as a precedent now. He concluded with moving to insert the words "the 1st of May," instead of "six weeks "after the commencement of the next session "of Parliament."

Mr. PRINSEP said, he thought it his duty, as a Member of that House, to give his support to the proposed continuance of a measure from whence the greatest advantages had arisen. At the time the restriction first took place, it was considered as a severe stroke to commerce, but increased prosperity had been derived from an event which every man, at the moment of its happening, deplored.—(The Hon. Member was proceeding to discuss the subject at some length, when he was reminded by Mr. ALEXANDER, that the only question was as to time.) He was of opinion, he said, that no time should be limited for the discontinuance of the restriction. Many advantages had accrued from the restriction, whilst no evil had arisen out of it. He thought that the restriction did not affect the course of exchange, neither did the export of bullion. The Hon. Gent (Mr. Bankes) had not, he conceived, made a sufficient distinction between coin and bullion. With respect to the consequences said to result from the restriction, what difference was there between a Bank note and a guinea as to the articles of every description which it would purchase? He conceived that a great number of advantages had arisen from the restriction, and therefore he should support it.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he understood his Hon. Friend (Mr. Bankes) to ask, if there did not exist great doubts, whether or no there might be sufficient grounds for the proposed continuance of the restriction. He thought, that the ground he had laid down, when he proposed the continuation of the restriction, was fully sufficient; but his Hon. Friend seemed to think otherwise, and that the House ought not to continue the restriction for so long a period as had been proposed. His Hon. Friend had referred to the proceedings which took place when the restriction was first suggested. It was not necessary now to bring to the recollection of Gentlemen who were Members of the House at the period alluded to, when the circumstances took place. His Majesty's Government at that period thought it necessary to restrict the Bank from making payments in cash. This measure of course produced a strong sensation. What was the proceeding of the Rt. Hon. Gent. then at the head of the government? That Rt. Hon. Gent. considered it necessary that the country should be convinced, by an inquiry for that purpose, of the sufficiency of the Bank to fulfil all its engagements. And what was the result of that inquiry? Was there a question that the Bank was able to discharge all its engagements? If there was any doubt upon the subject, he confessed that his Hon. Friend had a right to make that doubt an argument for inquiry. The act restraining the Bank from making cash payments was renewed at the end of the session to which he had alluded. When a second inquiry took place, what was the chief end and object of that inquiry? To satisfy the anxiety of the public as to the situation of the Bank, which the result of that inquiry was completely calculated to effect. What were the proceedings in the succeeding session? The restriction was renewed, not merely for three or four months, but until six months after the ratification of peace: the House then adopted the measure for three years without any inquiry; the House being perfectly satisfied of the sufficiency of the Bank to make good its engagements, did not think any inquiry necessary. What were the proceedings of the House on this subject in the last session? He then stated to the House, that the course of exchange was unfavourable to this country, and that if the Bank was forced to resume its payments in cash, the consequence must be, that an increased quantity of specie would be sent out of the country. The same objection was then started as that now urged by his Hon. Friend. He stated at that period, that however it might be his wish to take off the restriction, yet there should be time given, that we might see how a variety of commercial circumstances might be adjusted, and until every thing got into its proper track, before the restriction was discontinued. The course of exchange had formed one of the arguments of his Hon. Friend, who had said that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had stated that the exchange was at par: he did not state that, but he had observed that the exchange between this country and Hamburgh was at par, but that it was not so with Amsterdam. He admitted, therefore, that our specie would not be exported to Hamburgh; but he doubted whether it might not be exported to Amsterdam. They were not, however, to consider the exportation of specie as the only effect of discontinuing the restriction upon the Bank; another consequence would result, which deserved serious consideration; that was, the sudden demand which would be made upon the country banks for the payment of their paper, which would of course create an increased demand

for specie upon the Bank of England from those banks, in order to enable them to discharge their engagements. His Hon. Friend had proposed to limit the restriction to the 1st of May, in order that an inquiry might take place in the mean time. His (the Chancellor of the Exchequer's) reason for proposing a more distant day, was not that Parliament should put it out of its power to take advantage of any circumstances that might arise favourable to the discontinuance of the restriction, because there was a clause in the bill by which Parliament might avail themselves of any opportunity of that nature; but thinking as he did, that there was little probability of their being enabled to gratify their wishes in that respect, he looked forward to the commencement of the next session for that gratification. To fix the period suggested by his Hon. Friend, would tend to excite a delusive expectation that the Bank would resume its payments in specie at that period; but even supposing the Bank was to purchase bullion, which they must do at a great disadvantage, still it would only give them a temporary advantage, as the whole of it would almost immediately find its way to the continent. He wished to wait till he saw the course of exchange steady and stable in favour of this country; because if the restriction was taken off too soon, it was highly probable that it must be shortly afterwards renewed. His Hon. Friend had said, he wished for inquiry; on the ground on which he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) rested the proposed restriction, he saw no reasons for inquiry, if, convinced as he was of the sufficiency of the Bank, he thought the public were not equally convinced, he would not only not rely upon his own conviction, but he would be the first to propose inquiry: the contrary, however, was the case. His Hon. Friend had said, that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had stated that opinions ought not to guide the House: on the contrary, opinions must guide the House; but it was the opinion of the aggregate body of its Members, and not the opinion of a committee. It was perfectly regular and proper to appoint a committee to inquire into facts, and report their opinion thereon; but to appoint a committee merely to deliver an opinion, was an anomaly which he had never heard of before. He should be extremely sorry that a committee should be appointed to inquire into the solidity of the Bank, because that would imply doubts of that solidity. His Hon. Friend had said, that a committee so appointed should enter into a large field of inquiry with respect to the general system of paper credit. If it was necessary to inquire into the state of paper circulation, he had no objection; but it was not necessary to connect that inquiry with the present bill, because it had no connexion with it; nor ought it to be coupled with the bill now before the House. His Hon. Friend had said, that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had stated that the Bank expressed no opinion upon the subject; his statement was, that the Bank expressed no wish upon the subject. His Hon. Friend had observed, that the committee, which he wished should be appointed, should ascertain whether the Bank had done their duty: he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) was convinced that it was the opinion of every one that the Bank had discharged their duty most exemplarily. The papers upon the table clearly proved that the Bank had taken no unbecoming advantage of the privilege which was the consequence of the restriction. Every one knew that paper was received according to its nominal value, and it afforded a source of consolation amidst all other difficulties. Every one knew, that in 1793, when a sudden deficiency of specie was experienced, a well-timed issue of paper gave a new spring to commerce, and prevented every unpleasant consequence which might have resulted from the circumstances of that period. When the issue of Bank notes at the present period, as appeared by the account upon the table, was compared with that of other periods, it would be found that the whole amount at present was 16,000,000*l.* which, with the exception of 4,000,000*l.* of small notes, was only 1,000,000*l.* more than was issued at the period preceding the restriction. His Hon. Friend had stated, that every one must lament the deficiency in the circulation of gold: undoubtedly one would wish to see a due proportion of gold and paper; but surely an equal importance ought to be attached to paper, since it must be considered as one of the primary sources of the increased prosperity of our commerce. Did his Hon. Friend think that the mere circulation of gold could make any favourable operation? No such thing: there must be an influx of bullion to give rise to those favourable consequences which were expected. His Hon. Friend had said, that the renewal of the Bank charter was merely a financial measure; but there could be no doubt that it was a measure of great importance to the interests of the community. His Hon. Friend had said, that he did not wish to see too close a connexion between the Government and the Bank; nor did he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer): but what circumstances had happened to induce his Hon. Friend to make that observation? The fact was, that the outstanding advances made by the Bank to the Government at the present moment did not amount to a million more than they were preceding the restriction. Convinced as he was of the necessity of the present measure, and that it ought to be continued until circumstances were more favourable to the discontinuance of the restriction, he could not agree to the motion of his Hon. Friend. It was necessary for the House to pause before they got rid of a

system, the inconveniences of which they knew, and substituted another for it, the inconveniences of which they did not know.

Mr. H. THORNTON made some general observations upon the great importance and extent of the subject under discussion. He seemed to think, that in one point of view the motion of his Hon. Friend opposite to him (Mr. B.) might have an advantageous effect: at the same time, he was fully aware of the great inconvenience which, under the present circumstances, would attend taking off the restriction; it might in a great degree operate as a notice, and raise an universal expectation of the immediate renewal of monied payments. The shock which this might give to paper credit may easily be conceived. He felt that the present was no time for the adoption of such a measure; neither would there be a sufficient interval for the necessary preparation allowed to the Bank. Notwithstanding he felt in this manner, he at the same time was impressed with a degree of parliamentary jealousy on the occasion, and he must say that all his doubts on the subject were not yet satisfied: however, he agreed with his Rt. Hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) in his great point, namely, that the Bank could not with perfect safety be opened, except the exchange was favourable to this country; but he was of opinion, that the first favourable season should be taken advantage of for opening the Bank, and he was not prepared to say that it was the duty of the House to wait for ever for it: the contrary, in a great degree, might be his opinion. The measure in question had been now continued for three or four years, and its continuance for another year was proposed. In this view of the case it may be important to consider, whether a favourable opportunity in that interval might not present itself. He then adverted to the consequences of too great an issue of paper, and the connexion of that circumstance with an unfavourable state of the exchange, with respect to which it unquestionably had a disadvantageous effect; and in this view of the question, an observation made by an Hon. Gent. had evidently a great deal of common sense in it. A moderate issue of paper in the country would have the effect of improving the state of the exchange; and he alluded to the duty incumbent on the country, not to distress or do any thing to impair the public credit: and in this view they seemed to observe an exact medium, which he conceived to be a leading cause why, notwithstanding Great Britain made a freer use of paper than any other country in Europe, it was able to maintain its public credit vigorous and unimpaired.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, after shortly complimenting the abilities of his Hon. Friend, and his superior intelligence on the subject in question, said, he had one observation to offer upon what had fallen from him relative to the effect of the restriction upon the exchange. His Hon. Friend must be aware, that at the periods in which the restriction originally took place, namely, in the years 1797 and 1798, the state of the exchange was highly favourable to this country; and that it was not until after the harvest of 1799, that the exchange became unfavourable; and he considered it as of material importance, that the public should be aware, that the course of exchange was by no means unfavourable during the whole time of the restriction continuing.

The question being called for, was then put, and the original motion agreed to.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, Feb. 17.—(See Minutes, p. 283.)

[BANK RESTRICTION BILL.]—Lord PELHAM rose, and moved the order of the day for the first reading of the "Bill restraining "the cash payments of the Bank of England "till six weeks after the meeting of the next "session of Parliament."

Lord KING said, that he looked upon the measure just proposed as one of great importance, and of an extraordinary nature; and he hoped the second reading of the bill would be deferred to a distant day: if not, he should deem it his duty to make a motion to that effect, and that their Lordships be summoned to attend.

Lord AUCKLAND said, that it might be necessary that certain papers should be laid before the House previous to the discussion which might be expected to take place on the measure now proposed. The accounts he alluded to were those which had, on a former occasion, been laid before Parliament; and if he now moved for their reproduction, it was not with a view to ground upon them any objection to the bill, of the expediency of which he was perfectly satisfied in his own mind; but because it might be proper to have them regularly on the table, in case any discussion hostile to the measure should be introduced, in the course of which he might have occasion to refer to the accounts. His Lordship then concluded with moving, "That there be laid "before the House an account of the amount "of the notes of the Bank of England in cir-"culation on the 1st of June, the 1st of Au-"gust, the 1st of October, and the 1st of De-"cember, 1802; and the 1st of February "1803, under the value of 5l."

The question was put on this motion, and agreed to.

The Earl of MOIRA said, that the measure now proposed was, under the present circumstances of the country, of so singular a na-

ture, and of such extreme importance, that he trusted it would not be further proceeded in without having strong and satisfactory reasons adduced to the House to furnish a ground upon which they might be justified in assenting to it. He conceived the adoption of such a measure at the present moment to be a strong and even a violent interference with regard to private property; and to be one likely to be attended with very serious consequences to the welfare and security of the nation at large. In order to ascertain the motives which induced Ministers to propose the measure, and the quarter from which it might be supposed to originate, he felt it to be his duty to move for a variety of accounts, which might contribute to give some insight into those motives, and afford some information and satisfaction to the House and the public, respecting the propriety of adopting the measure. The measure was brought forward by Ministers, either at the solicitation of the Bank, or from a conviction of its political expediency or necessity in the minds of Ministers themselves. These were points upon which their Lordships should have due and adequate information laid before them, before they could well attempt to decide on the merits of the question. Indeed, it was generally understood that the Directors of the Bank had on the present, as upon a former occasion, expressed their readiness and ability to resume their payments in specie, if Government would permit them so to do; and he saw no reason to entertain a doubt of the sincerity of that declaration on their part: but was it not necessary that Ministers should come forward with the grounds upon which they deemed the measure necessary or expedient, as upon those grounds alone the House and the public were to judge of the propriety of adopting it? The motions he had to make would tend to throw some light upon the question, and to guide the judgment which their Lordships would have to pronounce upon it. In order to satisfy the country respecting the state of the Bank, he should think it proper, in the first place, to move, "That there be laid before the House an "account of the outstanding demands on the "Bank, together with an account of the funds "in their possession (exclusive of the debt "due by Government to the Bank), applicable "to the discharge of the same, on the year "ending 5th of January 1803." With the same view he should next move, "That there "be laid before the House a comparative "statement of the quantity of cash and bul-"lion, and paper, in circulation in the year "1797, with a statement of the same as they "stood on the 5th of January 1803." The principal ground stated in another place for the necessity of continuing the restriction, viz. the unfavourable state of the exchange between this and other countries, he should next have occasion to animadvert upon, and call for proofs to substantiate that assertion. He should therefore have to move, "That "the proper officer do lay before the House "an account of the course of exchange be-"tween Hamburgh and London, as it stood "on the 1st of every month for twelve "months back, ending the 5th of January "1803." And here he could not forbear expressing his astonishment, that any such reason could ever have been advanced as justifying the adoption of the proposition now before their Lordships; for if any reason stronger than another could be urged why the course of exchange was against this country, surely it was the restriction on the cash payments of the Bank. This argument the Noble Lord illustrated, by supposing that if, for one hundred guineas, paid him at Hamburgh, he offered a bill to that amount in London, he should meet with no person to accommodate him with that sum on the terms he proposed; for though his draft might be equal to that sum in England for the purpose of acquiring whatever might be there purchased for Bank paper, yet it would not be the same to the Hamburgh merchant, were he to have occasion to send it to America. The restriction on the Bank was therefore an obvious cause of the unfavourable state of the exchange with regard to England. Other reasons, but they, perhaps, were industriously concealed, should undoubtedly be brought forward by Ministers to satisfy their Lordships before they could be prevailed upon ultimately to acquiesce in the present measure. Their Lordships had heard much of the very prosperous state of the finances, and the very flourishing condition of the revenue of the country. But if such an extraordinary influx of wealth, and such an exuberance of financial resources, could be justly boasted of, why should the course of exchange be against the country, or where could be the necessity of this restriction on the Bank? He was concerned to say, that on this point many suggestions occurred to him which might create a suspicion that the state of our resources was not exactly such as it had been represented, or that some miscalculation had inadvertently crept into it, which to him rendered it exceedingly obscure. He was inclined to believe the latter supposition; for otherwise it was not possible for him to understand many of the financial statements which had been brought forward as instances of the national prosperity; particularly those which related to the flourishing state of the consolidated fund, respecting which he should also have a motion to make. Upon a general view of the motives that could prompt Ministers to renew this measure at the present moment, he was at a loss to conceive how they could be screened from a suspicion of having some collusion with the Bank in

proposing it. The Directors of the Bank, so far from betraying any solicitude for the renewal of the restriction, have, on the contrary, expressed their willingness to take it off. The anxiety for its continuance must therefore rest solely with Govt. But why this anxiety on their part? Was it that they might enjoy the momentary and paltry triumph of appearing to meet the present exigencies of the state, without being driven to the usual expedient of a loan?—and, if so, have they succeeded in the attempt? By no means; on the contrary, they, in his mind, had recourse to a much worse expedient: they issued Exchequer bills on Exchequer bills to an unprecedented amount under similar circumstances of the country. They would now suppose us to be in a state of profound peace: he, however, must think our situation to be extremely doubtful and precarious, and perhaps not far from an open rupture. Yet what have they done? They have issued nearly triple the amount of Exchequer bills of what was issued at the close of the American war. The amount of Exchequer bills then issued was little more than five millions; now it is little short of fifteen; and by so doing they have deprived themselves of a resource in a time of peace, which every provident minister would have cautiously reserved and kept under his hand in order to provide for any sudden emergency, such as the country may now be threatened with. It was to this view of the question that he most earnestly entreated their Lordships to direct their attention, for to him it appeared one which called for their Lordships' most serious consideration: and here too it might be suspected that a collusion between Government and the Bank principally might be traced. Ministers might expect that the Bank would be more eager to take up the Exchequer bills than to pay their own notes, since Ministers were encouraged to issue them to such a large amount, holding out to the Bank at the same time the prospect of a renewal of the restriction as an encouragement to their granting this accommodation to Government. There were other accounts which might afford additional information on these points, particularly "An account of "the state of the Consolidated Fund, and of "the sums paid out of the same on the 5th "January, 1803." Also "An account of the "price of standard gold at the same period." When this information was duly before the House, he trusted their Lordships would be fully enabled to form an accurate idea of the propriety of assenting to the present measure; for, without the production of more cogent reasons for its adoption than had hitherto come to his ears, he could not conceive how their Lordships could be prevailed upon to agree to what must appear to the public, and be felt by the country, as a violent interference with respect to private property, and a strong violation of the public faith. In a future stage of the bill he should deliver his sentiments respecting its tendency more at large: at present he should content himself with moving, "That the accounts he had "alluded to be laid before the House." The Noble Lord then concluded with moving for the first account, viz. that of the "Outstanding demands on the Bank, and of the "funds applicable to the discharge thereof, "exclusive of the debt due to the Bank by "Government."

Lord Pelham observed, that the Noble Earl, in whatever view he might consider the general tenour of his observations, had spoken fairly out, and was so far entitled to praise on the score of candour; for his own part, he should be as explicit: and first he observed, with respect to the suggestions of the Noble Earl, as to the grounds of the measure now before the House, it was by no means proposed at the instance, or in consequence of the application of the Bank. It was purely a measure of Government; his Majesty's Ministers, under all the circumstances of the case, having deemed it advisable to propose a continuance of the restriction on the payment in specie at the Bank. He could with equal truth assure the Noble Earl, that it was neither the result of any compact nor connivance between Government and the corporation in question, but proceeded *bonâ fide* on the grounds he had stated. With respect to following the Noble Earl, even in his observations upon the subject regularly before the House, it was not his intention, as the information called for at either side of the House, was not yet before them. The second reading of the bill would afford a regular opportunity, and the attendance, in all probability, would be fuller than at present. Other points adverted to by the Noble Earl, were obviously unconnected with the regular subject of discussion. A few observations, however, in the present instance, he felt himself called upon to make. The Noble Earl had frequently alluded to the unfavourable state of the exchange, and seemed to assert that that circumstance was in consequence of the restriction. The recollection of plain facts would overthrow this position—their Lordships would doubtless recollect generally, as he was not then able to speak particularly as to dates, &c. that at the time that very necessary and salutary measure first commenced by the Order of Council, and soon afterwards became a legislative provision, and indeed for some years after, the course of exchange was favourable to this country, and that it was not until these latter years of scarcity, when it was necessary to send specie and bullion out of the country to procure supplies of corn, that the exchange became unfavourable to Great Britain. With respect to these motions, the tenour of which seemed at least to call the validity of the Bank in question, he felt it his duty to oppose

them; they were at best unnecessary. The inquiry in the first instance proved the strength and stability of the Bank, and its power and inclination to meet and answer abundantly all demands whatever against it. Surely, then, on the ground taken by the Noble Earl himself, who had repeatedly insisted that the Bank was now in more favourable and prosperous circumstances than at the time when the measure was originally proposed, the production of such papers must be totally unnecessary. In short, such a proceeding could not possibly be productive of any good effects, whatever it may of a contrary nature. To some of the others, when modified, so as to be rendered practicable, or less troublesome to those who were to be concerned in furnishing or making up the accounts, the Noble Secretary of State seemed to entertain no objection.

Lord AUCKLAND objected to the motions in question, precisely on the same grounds. They were at best unnecessary, as the former inquiry afforded full proof of the solidity of the Bank, and its ample powers to discharge all claims upon it. He did not affect to speak particularly; but the result of the inquiry was, taking them in round sums, that the outstanding notes and claims upon the Bank amounted to about 13,000,000*l.*; that its assets were 17,000,000*l.*, independent of the debt of 11,000,000*l.* for which Govt. was responsible to them. In consequence of this appearing, every man in the country was easy on that score; the general anxiety was at once relieved. The Noble Earl even insisted that the situation of the Bank was since greatly ameliorated. Then why institute an inquiry? In addition to what had fallen from his Noble Friend, as to the causes of an unfavourable course of exchange, he had to suggest, that the large remittances of cash in various ways, as payment of subsidies in particular, amounting to an aggregate of between 30 and 40 millions, in a great degree contributed to it: these remittances were not yet wholly made—those pecuniary accounts were not yet quite wound up. When they were joined to the consideration of the growing commercial property and increasing wealth of the country, there was every reason to suppose the course of exchange would return to its accustomed favourable course.

A sort of explanatory conversation then ensued between the Earl of Moira, Lords Pelham and Auckland, and the Lord Chancellor; in the course of which the Noble Earl declared, he was not tenacious of his two first motions, and had no thoughts of pressing to a division upon them. On these the question was afterwards put, when they were negatived by the House. The others, which respected the course of exchange, at given periods between this country and Hamburgh, the amount of the issue or outstanding notes on the 25th day of every month in the last year, and on the other topics relative to the subject before the House, were either agreed to, or, in consequence of some satisfactory explanations given by the Noble Secretary of State, withdrawn by the Noble Earl.—The documents moved for by Lord Auckland were ordered accordingly.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, Feb. 21. [*See Minutes, p.* 284.]

[DISMISSAL OF MR. MARSHALL.]—Sir WILLIAM ELFORD spoke as follows: Sir, I rise in pursuance of the notice I had the honour of giving to the House some time ago, to submit to its consideration a motion, which has for its object an inquiry into the causes of the dismissal of Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright of his Majesty's Plymouth dock-yard; and into other circumstances in the conduct of the Board of Admiralty. Although I shall not have any improper motives publicly assigned for the part I am now taking, because it is unparliamentary so to do, I am particularly anxious that no suspicions of that nature should rest in the mind of any Honourable Member; and I therefore trust I may be permitted to say a word on that subject before I proceed.—It might occur to Gentlemen, that, as I have the honour to be one of the representatives of the borough of Plymouth, and this transaction took place in that neighbourhood, I may be influenced by some considerations of local politics; I can assure the House, however, that of Mr. Marshall I knew nothing (except by character) until the last summer;—that I know none of his connexions, nor has he, to my knowledge, any kind of intercourse with, or relation to any one person whom I have the honour to represent: neither, Sir, am I guided by any considerations of personal enmity to the honourable members of the Board of Admiralty; I can have no private enmity to them; nor, if I had, would it, if I know myself, influence my conduct here. I shall speak of them as public men, and shall advance nothing injurious to their feelings, beyond that which is necessary to establish certain facts which regard them in their public characters. Neither am I influenced by any view of factious opposition to his Majesty's government, a principle on which I never have acted, and trust I never can act. These are the motives by which I am not influenced; those which do guide me are, first, to vindicate the character of one of the most meritorious, most skilful, most zealous, and most injured men this day existing in his Majesty's dominions; and which becomes the more necessary, in consequence of what fell from an Hon. Member and a Noble Lord, whom I have not the honour of knowing, in this place, some time ago, relative to Mr. Marshall; the first of whom asserted, in unqualified terms, his undoubted-

delinquency, and the latter, from worthy and kind motives I am sure, first asserted his conviction of his innocence, and a few days afterwards a belief of his guilt; which latter was inferred from Mr. Marshall's not having taken steps to justify himself, and having submitted quietly to his fate. This inference, I trust, I shall completely do away before I sit down. The other motive is to make some strictures on certain acts of the Board of Admiralty, which I consider as, equally with this, injurious to the public service. I never address this House without very considerable agitation; which however, much as I experience it at present, would be still greater, did I not feel that the task I have undertaken is not one which requires any great talents or knowledge; that it will consist in little more than a statement of facts, which will enforce their own inferences; and that I shall therefore have to trouble the House with little of argument, and with few observations beyond those which will be necessary to explain such circumstances in Mr. Marshall's case, as are of a professional or technical nature. I shall state nothing as a positive fact but what I know to be so; and nothing as a reputed one but what I firmly believe such; being always open to correction, should I advance any thing which is not well founded.—In Feb. 1802, a committee of the Navy Board, consisting of Sir William Rule, Mr. Gambier, and Mr. Tucker, late Secretary to the First Lord, went to Plymouth dock, to examine into the conduct of the late master caulker there, against whom some charges had been exhibited. During the course of his examination, there appeared some circumstances which induced them to ask certain questions of Mr. Marshall, Mr. Lugger the Clerk of the Survey, and another officer of the yard; and they were informed that they might write to the Board in explanation. Mr. Marshall (and I believe the others) did so; but, as there was no specific charge against him, he could only guess what was the nature of the suspicions entertained, and therefore made the best explanation a man under such circumstances of uncertainty could do *.

Sir, I have no means of knowing what report was made to the Board of Admiralty by the Commissioners of the Navy; but I have a right to infer that it was not such as would possibly warrant the dismissal of Mr. Marshall, because I know, that in point of fact, when his dismissal was announced, some commissioners of the navy made strong representations of his eminent services, professional skill, and general character, which however availed nothing, and he and the others were dismissed in a month afterwards, without being formally accused, without being heard in their defence, and without any regard to a most useful and meritorious service of more than thirty-seven years of his life. The first intimation of his most unexpected disgrace was given him by his successor's going into his house, and shewing him the warrant of his appointment by which he was superseded. I believe it will be admitted, that some estimate may be formed of a man's conduct and character by the degree of estimation in which he is held by the neighbourhood in which he resides. Now, Sir, there was an opinion very prevalent, and I fear too well founded, that great depredations had been committed in his Majesty's dock-yards; and therefore the predisposition of the public was rather to rejoice in the dismissal of any

* Honourable Sirs,—You having been pleased, on your late visit to this yard, in consequence of the examination which took place in the several departments, to signify that the respective officers should each for themselves address you on the subject, and explain by writing, the cause of the several particulars that you had reason to be displeased with; I therefore humbly beg leave to acquaint you, that with respect to the English timber not being stamped with the initials of the officer who attended the surveys, I can say with great truth, that I never knew the practice was discontinued till about the end of the year 1800. The English timber was always surveyed by my two assistants, taking week and week with the clerk officers. As soon as I discovered that it was omitted, I immediately gave directions for the practice being resumed, and appointed a man to assist the person, who complained that the duty was too hard for him (and which, I believe, was the cause of its being omitted, in the first place); and was continued till the new regulations respecting timber took place. With respect to the timber-book kept by my assistants, it appears by the records in my office, that it was never the practice to enter any thing more than the progressive numbers, with the date and names of the officers: that being a part of duty particularly appointed to them, I never interfered, unless they thought proper to call on me for my opinion, when on the surveys of the timber. With respect to the notes made by the foreman of the caulkers, and signed by me, I beg to refer you to my letter to your Honours, when here, dated the 5th inst. and a copy of my directions therein enclosed, given in my minute of the 14th Aug. last to the respective masters, foremen, &c.—It has given me very great concern to find, that, on investigation, the business has not been conducted so as to meet your approbation. All I can say is, that you may depend on my doing every thing in my power to cause the whole of the business in my department to be carried on to your satisfaction in future. I hope and trust that no intentional omission of duty can be imputed to me; I have endeavoured, through a long series of years, in the various stations I have filled in the service, to conduct myself as a good officer and an honest man: and I declare it to be the greatest pride of my life to be considered as such, and flatter myself that I shall have the happiness of being considered in that light by your Honours. I am, Hon. Sirs, &c. &c.

Feb. 1802. John Marshall.

Hon. Navy Board.

of the officers, as their disgrace might be attributed to a discovery of their collusion in such practices; but, notwithstanding this propensity, such was the effect of character, that all ranks and degrees of persons in the neighbourhood, convinced of their innocence, expressed only compassion for their unmerited disgrace, and indignation at those by whom it was inflicted. I can assure the House, that this was not one of those sudden and transient emotions, which are quickly excited, and soon subside; but that, after all the inquiry and investigation which that event has occasioned, the same sensation continues undiminished. It was demonstrated at the time, by the general and almost universal tokens of respect shewn to these unfortunate gentlemen by persons theretofore unknown to them, by officers of the navy and army, as well as by the inhabitants in general, paying them personal attention; and the same tokens of regard continue to be shewn to Mr. Marshall and Mr. Lugger, the only two who now reside there, to this very moment.—Sir, Mr. Marshall, on consultation with his friends what measures he ought to pursue in justification of his conduct, was strenuously advised to rest quiet for a time, in hopes that, when his character and meritorious services should be duly considered, his severe sentence would be reversed; but finding, after some months, no probability of such a result, he wrote a letter and memorial, of which the following are copies, to Lord St. Vincent *.——

Now here I beg to take my stand. Here is a letter from the First Lord of the Admiralty—from the head of that board by which

* MY LORD,—I most humbly take leave to address your Lordship on the subject of my dismissal from my late situation of master shipwright of his Majesty's dock-yard at Plymouth dock. Not having the honour of being personally known to your Lordship, I am induced to presume has, in a great measure, been the cause of my misfortune. Had your Lordship been a witness to the strict and constant attention I always paid to my duty, which many of the admirals and captains of the fleet have whose ships have been fitted and refitted at the ports I have served in, I flatter myself I should have experienced a better fate, and the honour of your Lordship's patronage and protection.——I have, my Lord, been favoured with very strong certificates from many admirals and captains of the fleet, expressive of their approbation of my conduct and abilities as an officer, which I have obtained only from a desire of making my real character known to your Lordship, and to endeavour to remove those unfavourable impressions, which, from the severe censure which has been inflicted upon me by the orders of the Rt. Hon. the Board of Admiralty, I am induced to believe, has hitherto not been known to your Lordship; and which if your Lordship would permit me to lay before you, and that you will take the trouble of perusing, I flatter myself you will see cause of considering my case in a more favourable light, and either restore me to my former situation, or grant me such relief as will afford myself and family a comfortable subsistence.——I was seven years, my Lord, master shipwright of Plymouth yard, during which time I never slept out of it more than two nights, except upon duty; and I beg to assure your Lordship, upon my sacred word, that my zeal for the promotion of his Majesty's service has ever been constant and unremitting.—I understand that neglect of duty has been attributed to me, inasmuch as not having caused (agreeable to the instructions of the Navy Board) the English timber to be properly marked, on the survey, and receipt of it into the yard; to which I humbly beg leave to observe, that, my avocations being so much engrossed, and taken up in the other various and urgent duties of my department, the survey of the timber had always been done by one of my assistants, and a clerk officer; of course I could not be accountable for an omission of that kind: but as soon as I discovered that it had been omitted, which was in the latter end of the year 1800, I immediately caused the marking to be resumed; and it has been correctly done from that time to the time of the late inquiry made by the Hon. Navy Board, of which they appeared satisfied.—I shall not trespass longer upon your Lordship's time, than to request you will favour the enclosed paper with a perusal, which contains an account of the various situations and services in which I have been engaged in his Majesty's service, and which is faithfully detailed. With mine and family's earnest prayers that your Lordship will take our situation into consideration, and grant us relief, I remain with all due submission, my Lord, &c. &c.

Plymouth Dock, JOHN MARSHALL.
June 17, 1802.

The Rt. Hon. John Earl St. Vincent.

MY LORD,—I most humbly beg to inform you, that I came into his Majesty's service in the year 1765, as an apprentice to Sir John Henslow, then belonging to Portsmouth dock-yard: I remained there under the patronage of Mr. Hunt, who was master shipwright, as a draughtsman, till the year 1775; I then went to Plymouth, on the appointment of Sir John Henslow, as master shipwright there. In 1776, I was made a quarterman, and appointed an overseer to the building a man of war at Messrs. Adams, Barnard, and Co. in the river Thames. In 1777 I was appointed to build a man of war at Mr. Barnard's at Ipswich; and after that another. In 1779 I returned again to Plymouth yard. In 1780 I was appointed to build a ship of war at Mr. Fisher's yard at Liverpool, and remained there till the end of the American war in 1783; in all which time I built seven ships of war: after which I returned to Plymouth yard, and was appointed foreman of the new works, and occasionally acted as purveyor till 1785, when I was appointed draughtsman to Sir John Henslow at the Navy office. In 1786 I was appointed by the Admiralty Board, master mastmaker of Deptford yard; and I was ordered to Liverpool on service to take up tenders; and in 1788 was appointed to go into the Grampian mountains, to survey, and report on, the forest of Glenmore, belonging to the Duke of Gordon; which service I performed very much to the satisfaction of the Navy Board, and every person concerned. In 1790, I was appointed builder's as-

Mr. Marshall was dismissed; in which are stated the grounds and charges on which that event was founded: it would be to accuse that Noble Lord of the grossest duplicity to suppose, that when his reply purports to be a statement of the causes of Mr. Marshall's disgrace, he had not enumerated them fairly and fully; and I have therefore a right to lay down the position, that these were the causes which operated on the mind of the Board of Admiralty to dismiss this long-tried and meritorious servant of the public; and that any proof of misconduct which subsequent investigations and scrutinies, by oaths, or otherwise (on which I shall say a word by and by), may have produced against him, even admitting for argument's sake only, that the grossest misconduct has been discovered, do, in fact, create no excuse whatever for this violent measure, although it might indeed have been a sufficient reason for not reinstating Mr. Marshall, in case he should have been acquitted on examination of those charges on which he was stated to have been dismissed.—Soon after the receipt of this letter, Mr. Marshall was informed, that the Boards of the Admiralty and Navy were expected at Plymouth; and he waited their arrival with that anxiety, which a man, conscious of integrity and injury like his, must naturally experience, until the due opportunity was afforded him of manifesting them, by that investigation into his conduct, which, as a British subject, and by all the analogies of the criminal jurisprudence of his country, he had a right to expect. After endeavouring in vain to obtain an audience of Lord St. Vincent, Mr. Marshall watched an opportunity to put a letter into his Lordship's hands *.——

sistant at Sheerness, under Sir William Rule; and in the same year I was appointed assistant to the surveyors of the navy. During my stay in that office, I was ordered to Greenock in Scotland, to a ship driven into the Clyde in distress; and once to Leith in Scotland, to take up, and fit out, transports for the troops going to Holland, when General Abercromby and Lord Adam Gordon gave me the strongest marks of approbation to Sir Henry Martin, the comptroller of the navy, for my perseverance and dispatch in fitting those ships; and I had the thanks of Sir Henry. On my return I was appointed master shipwright of Sheerness yard; and in 1795 I was appointed to Plymouth dock-yard. I have been thirty-seven years in his Majesty's service; and I can say with great truth, that his Majesty has not a servant that has acted upon purer principles, more careful of his Majesty's stores, or more conscientious in the discharge of his duty; and it is the only comfort in my very great distress, that I have that character from all ranks of people that know me. Had I been idle, neglectful, wanting in abilities, or dishonest, I should have deserved my fate.

To which the following reply was made by his Lordship:—Sir, The Board gave full consideration to your services, which were duly represented by the Navy Board, but found it impossible to pass over the total dereliction of your duty, which appeared as well in signing extra notes for caulkers' and the painters' work, as in the circumstances you have stated; and every day's experience proves the material injury the public has received by the system formerly pursued in Plymouth yard. I am, Sir, &c. &c. St. Vincent.

Admiralty, June 22, 1803.

* My Lord,—On your Lordship's arrival at this place, I at first intended to solicit you to grant me a personal interview; but when I witnessed the multiplicity of weighty and important concerns which engaged your time and attention here, I deemed it no less respectful to your Lordship, than satisfactory to myself, to adopt this method of addressing myself to your most serious consideration. It would be impossible, my Lord, to enter into the details, and the reflections they suggest, of a case so peculiarly severe and afflicting as mine is, without previously trying to engage such a portion of your Lordship's calm and patient attention, as will ensure me a full and perfect hearing, in what I have now the honour to state to you, whether I remonstrate in the forcible language of conscious integrity, or give vent to the wounded feelings of oppressed innocence. Before I enter upon my justification afresh, I feel it my duty to offer to your Lordship my acknowledgments and thanks for the answer which you condescended to make to my letter to you of the 11th of June last; and I feel the more obliged for such an instance of your favour, as I am thereby enabled to ascertain, in some measure, the cause of that displeasure, and the nature of those imputations, which, after a faithful discharge of my duty for thirty-seven years to my King and country, have deprived me of my bread, and driven me in the decline of life, forlorn and destitute, surrounded with a growing family, to form new connexions, and open new avenues for earning my subsistence! But I will stifle the voice of complaint, and appeal to your Lordship's justice and humanity only —At the expiration of nearly four months from the time when I was dismissed, with every token of ignominious disgrace, from my official situation, as master shipwright of Plymouth dock-yard, ignorant of the nature of the accusation preferred against me, unconfronted with my accusers, unasked for my defence, I found myself charged, under three heads of culpability, by your Lordship, which I humbly beg leave to be allowed to meet and answer distinctly.—In the survey of timber brought into the dock-yard: being sensible of the acknowledged ability and general attention of my assistants, I committed to their trust, in conjunction with a clerk officer, the charge of surveying and marking all English timber received into the yard. (The foreign timber I always surveyed myself, consistent with the practice of former builders, and agreeable to the instructions of the honourable Navy Board.) It was not till the latter end of the year 1800 that I discovered, that the officers appointed to execute this duty had omitted to mark on the pieces the initials of their names, and the date of the time when they were received. Upon being informed of it, I lost not a moment in causing the usual practice to be resumed; and it was ever after punctually performed. Even in scrutinizing this omission, fraud or imposition was never imputed to those to whom this duty, though incom-

It would be an insult to the feelings of the House, were I to call their attention to the style and language of this letter, or to ask them, whether it appears to be written by a man who had been meanly pilfering and defrauding the public; or of one who, conscious

petently executed, was delegated; nor has malice or misrepresentation dared to suggest, that a false admeasurement was used, or that the public suffered any pecuniary injury from the negligence of the clerk officers and my assistants.—Respecting the charge of improperly signing extra notes for caulkers, I have only to reply, that during the period I was master shipwright of Plymouth yard, I strictly complied with the regulations laid down by the honourable Navy Board; treading in the steps of my predecessors, and the general approved practice of his Majesty's service.—When caulkers were ordered to work on board ships afloat, the foreman of the caulkers received his directions from the master caulker to make out extra notes for the persons so employed, agreeable to the board regulations; which notes, after being signed in that department, were brought to me for my signature, to authorize the clerk of the check to set off such extra labour, and to make out a victualling note, in order that the parties might receive their provisions aboard.—In the performance of this part of my duty I am not conscious of having failed to exert the utmost circumspection I was capable of, to prevent irregularity and imposition of every description; no stronger proof of which can be exhibited to your Lordship than my having issued an order (a copy of which I annex to this letter for your Lordship's consideration) in consequence of a single instance of supposed delinquency having been intimated to me. You will please to observe, my Lord, that with a view to impress, in the most forcible manner, upon the minds of those concerned, a sense of their duty, I required all the subordinate officers to put their signatures to the original order now in my possession, that no person might, at any future time, plead ignorance of its nature and extent.—From this period I never heard, or had room to believe, that any abuses existed in this department, until the investigation by the Navy Board took place: the result of which inquiry I did, and still do presume to think, attached criminality only to Mr. Pasco, the late foreman of the caulkers.—The third and last charge against me is, for having improperly signed extra notes for the performance of painters' work.—My Lord I challenge the records of office to produce any notes of this description with my signature affixed to them, except in those instances when the painters' work was executed by the carpenters of the ships making a demand for a supply of paint; in which case I complied with my instructions, by causing the proper proportions allotted for that purpose to be furnished to them accordingly.—To the existence of any abuse in this particular I am a stranger. In regard to painters' work, performed in the harbour by the painters of the deck-yard, or within the yard itself, I never, my Lord, in a single instance, failed to have my measurer present, to measure the quantum of work done, in order that the bills for it might be correctly made out. If, therefore, any omission or negligence be imputable to any person in conducting this branch of the public service, it cannot be attributed to the department over which I presided.—I have now, my Lord, I trust, replied completely and satisfactorily to all the charges exhibited against me in my late official capacity. But there is one point yet untouched. I have been informed, that, as the head of an office, I was responsible for *all* abuses, neglects, or omissions, committed by the subordinate officers of my department. Such a principle I seek not either to deny or resist. I claim, my Lord, only the liberal and honourable interpretation of it on my conduct. Let the magnitude, variety, and intricacy of the complicated operations, incident to my late official situation, be fairly estimated; let the period of time *(nine years of war)* in which I held it at Sheerness and Plymouth, be remembered; let those who commanded fleets and ships, dependant upon this yard for repairs and supplies of every kind, declare what were my exertions, and when I was ever known to shrink from the innumerable duties of my station. But why should I offer to your Lordship the certificates and expressions of esteem and approbation of subordinate officers, which are in my possession? No: to the head of the naval profession at once; to your Lordship's own testimony; to that of your noble predecessor in the command of the Channel fleet, Lord Bridport; and to your successor, Admiral Cornwallis, I dare to make my appeal, and with honourable confidence demand, when were greater or more unremitting exertions used to refit and supply the British fleet, than during the long and arduous period in which it blockaded Brest, when its wants and deficiencies necessarily fell principally upon Plymouth dock-yard. It is not in the arrogance of vanity, but in the honest consciousness of professional ability, undeservedly degraded, that I dare to challenge comparison with those for whom I have been displaced, whether in the details or grand outline of my duty as a shipbuilder, and the director of the operations of a great naval arsenal.—I cannot take leave of your Lordship, without again imploring your undivided attention to a case, which, when considered in all its parts, has been punished with a severity beyond all former example. I am no stranger to the generosity of your Lordship's disposition towards the unfortunate, nor to the justness of the principles which govern your conduct in your exalted official capacity. I claim an extension of those qualities to myself, only when my character, both for integrity and professional talent, shall have been investigated, and been pronounced upon: such an investigation I supplicate from your Lordship in its most unlimited severity of application. I have been taught to consider it as a general principle of my country, when palpable and direct delinquency did not mark the conduct of the accused: and I feel confident that Lord St. Vincent will not withhold it from me.—I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the most respectful consideration, your Lordship's most dutiful, &c. &c.

Rt. Hon John Earl St. Vincent, JOHN MARSHALL.
30th August 1802.

The order referred to in the letter is as follows:

The respective masters, foremen, &c. that are in the habit of making notes for extra, on occasions of dockings, undertakings, dinner-times, going to the Sound or Cawsand Bay, or for extra upon any occasion whatever, are hereby strictly enjoined not to put any persons thereon, but such as are actually on the spot, and employed upon the service for which the note or notes are made, as an investigation of that business is expected soon to take place; and should it be discovered that any persons have been allowed extra for services they have

of his zeal, his assiduity, his professional talents, and his undeserved disgrace, called on the justice of his country for redress. I trust, too, after having stated these letters, that no Hon. Member will infer guilt in Mr. Marshall, from any supposed failure on his part, to seek for justification of and inquiry into his conduct.—I have heard it rumoured, that the terms in which the before-mentioned order are conceived, admit of this construction, namely, that Mr. Marshall had been conniving at irregularities hitherto; but having heard they were to be investigated, he had given this caution to his associates. I hope and believe no such interpretation has ever been put on this order, because they can only have been the suggestions of the vilest minds. Had this been the case, surely he would not have given this public notice, but have put a stop to the practices referred to by private intimation; and least of all would he have sent this very order as a ground of justification to the First Lord of the Admiralty.—Although, in the letter I have just read, Mr. Marshall has explained his conduct in such terms as doubtless must be perfectly intelligible to the First Lord and Board of Admiralty; yet there are certain details which are requisite to render his defence understood by this House, which are of a professional and technical nature, and which I shall state in as few words as possible.—The first charge is, that Mr. Marshall omitted to mark the timber which was received into the yard, according to the directions of the Navy Board. Now, the practice pursued is as follows: when timber arrives at the yard, it is taken out of the vessels and spread on the survey ground, and examined by shipwrights, by boring and spotting; after it is so prepared, a time is appointed by the surveying officers, when all the defects are pointed out to the *shipwright officer* (that is, the builder or one of his assistants), who then pronounces what abatement (if any) shall be made for any defects, which is immediately marked on the piece, in order to fix the price per load; after which the whole is measured, and its contents cut on the butt and the sides; and then the labourer who attends, *strikes on the butt the initials of the name of the shipwright officer, and the date when received.* Now, the omission charged is in the last part of this process only. It has been the practice, for a great number of years past, in the Plymouth yard (and I believe in the others), for the master builder to receive the English timber, and for his assistants to receive all foreign timber; and this is sanctioned by the directions of the Navy Board. Now, *not a single, not a solitary instance of omission has been detected in the marking of the foreign timber received by Mr. Marshall himself*; and as soon as he found that this part of the process on the English timber had been neglected, which was, as stated in his letter, by accident, in the year 1800, he ordered it to be resumed, and it was continued to the day of his dismissal. Of this first charge, however, the House will, I am sure, see that he is completely acquitted. The second charge is, that he signed false caulkers' extra notes. Now, I beg leave to state, that when a ship arrives in the Sound or the Bay, which is to be repaired afloat, the carpenter of her makes an official report of the state of her defects to the builder; who, according as the case may require, orders one or more gangs of caulkers to be sent on board: these directions he gives to the master caulker, an officer in his own department, and subordinate to him; this officer selects the men; and it is the duty of the foreman of each gang to write a list of the names of his party on a piece of paper, which being signed by him is presented to the builder, who is required by the rules of the service to add his initials; without which, they could not be acted upon at the office of the clerk of the check. These are called caulkers' extra notes, and the use made of them is this: men sent on this employment are entitled to two advantages; first, to be victualled on board the ship where they are employed; and, secondly, to additional wages while they remain there. These extra notes, therefore, are produced at the check office, and a victualling bill is immediately made out, which being carried on board the ship by each gang, is delivered to the captain, and becomes his voucher for ordering them to be victualled. Now it appears, that some of these notes have been found, on examination, to contain one or more names of persons, who, not being actually on the service, have by these means received the emoluments arising from it; and as Mr. Marshall's initials appear on the notes, he is accused of being privy and consenting to this fraud on the public. On this subject Mr. Marshall was examined by the Committee of the Navy Board, and asked particularly by Mr. Commissioner Tucker, whether he had put his signature to these notes, and whether he had seen the caulkers go on board? To the first of which he answered in the affirmative; and to the latter he expressed his astonishment that such a question should be asked him; that it was his duty to give the orders, but utterly impracticable for him, amidst his various more important avocations, to see them all executed. Now I am sure the House will see the miserable futility of this charge, when they consider, that there is not a man at the head of any civil or military department or office in the kingdom, who is not officially obliged, almost daily, to sign papers and docu-

not performed, the consequences will be very unpleasant to the parties concerned.

13*th August* 1801. ROBERT DAVIES.

By order of the master shipwright.

To this he obliged all those whom it concerned, to subscribe their names, that no one might plead ignorance of its existence.

ments, the truth and correctness of which he can have no possible means of ascertaining, of his own knowledge; and for which, therefore, he must depend on the honesty and accuracy of those in office under him. Why, the Noble Secretary of State opposite to me, among the various documents to which he affixes his signature, might, by the treachery of his subalterns in office, be induced to sign a warrant for blowing up this House; but what is more in point is what I am sure the Rt. Hon. Gent. near him (the Secretary at War) well knows, and when he was an officer in a corps of militia must have often experienced: when the quartermaster has brought to him, as commanding officer, a weekly state of the expenditure of beer and bread for the regiment, which is to be authenticated by his signature, can it enter into the mind of any man, that any other responsibility attaches to him, than that which arises from this expression of his belief, that the statement is a true one; or, that he could himself have seen the bread and beer actually consumed? No, he must depend, and by his signature can only be construed to express his dependance, on the accuracy of the statement. Circumstances analogous to this also occur to captains in the navy, whose signatures are requisite to authenticate the accounts of many of their subordinate officers, for the accuracy of which they must also depend on the truth of those who present them; and the builders of the dock-yards are required to put their initials to these notes, the truth of the statements in which they have not a possibility of ascertaining; but are only expected to express, by this act, a belief in their accuracy. But although the builder has no means personally of detecting a fraud in this branch of his duty, that power exists in the clerk of the check, whose office is created for purposes of that kind, and for neglect of this very duty, his first clerk (the principal, Mr. Tucker, not being there) was suspended for four months, and afterwards restored by the Lords of the Admiralty, together with the pay accruing during the suspension. I trust, therefore, that of this charge against Mr. Marshall, he is completely acquitted. The third and last charge against him is, that he connived at a false admeasurement of painters' work. He has, in his letter to Lord St. Vincent, so fully exculpated himself on this head, that I shall only add two words to what he has there said. When painters' work is to be measured, a clerk from each clerk officer's department attends, and those on the part of the builder and clerk of the check, are persons appointed by the Navy Board, and called respectively builder's and clerk of the check's measurers; minutes are made by all these persons, in separate books, of the amount of the admeasurement, which operate as checks on each other: and on their general correspondence, a navy bill is made out for the payment of the work; in which the builder has literally nothing to do, unless he had grounds to doubt the integrity of his measurer, i which cas it would be his duty to interfere.—These, then, are the charges on which Mr Marshall was ignominiously dismissed from his office, after a faithful, zealous, and meriterious discharge of his duty for thirty-seven years; and this is the defence he would have made, had he been fairly and openly arraigned, and admitted to that privilege which British subjects are generally believed to enjoy, and which he himself so earnestly solicited, that of being heard in his defence, after he knew of what he was accused. But we shall be told of subsequent discoveries of delinquency; that when, some years before, he was builder at Sheerness, there was an office servant born on extra, or some miserable charge of that sort. The very scrutiny for past offences, after his dismissal, argues the badness of the cause which was to be so supported; but I again contend, that, had the foulest corruption been afterwards detected, it would form no palliation of the violence and injustice of the conduct of the Admiralty; but this, only for argument sake, as I should be glad to meet them on that ground also. I do not contend that Mr. Marshall is without human frailties: "let him that "is without fault cast the first stone." But this I will aver, that if, from the highest man in office, to the lowest, from the Rt. Hon. Gent. opposite to me, of whose honour and integrity no man thinks more highly than myself, to the head of the lowest department, persons are to be dismissed from their places on such grounds as those on which Mr. Marshall lost his situation, no one could stand for a single hour: and each day would witness fresh dismissals, until a new and more perfect set of beings could be provided to fill up the vacancies. But other attempts have been also subsequently made, by very extraordinary means indeed, to discover whether Mr. Marshall ever took any money for his recommendation of those persons who held subordinate situations in his department. In order to effect this, directions were given by the Board of Admiralty, that the Commissioners of the Navy should order the commissioners at the out-ports to administer oaths to all persons in the dock-yards (at Plymouth certainly, and I presume at the others), as to the following points—When entered, and in what station—when advanced, and to what station—sum or sums of money paid on entry or advancement—when and to whom paid? I hold in my hand a printed paper with the before-mentioned heads; one of which was presented to every person holding office, the columns of which he was ordered to fill up, and to take an oath before the commissioners to the truth of his statement. Thus at the very time that an application was made to this House, by the Hon. Gent. opposite to me, for leave to bring in a bill for the appointment of commissioners, with a power to administer oaths; at the very

time that a discussion on the propriety of granting such a power was pending; at the time that a proviso was suggested, by the first law officer in the kingdom, to prevent persons criminating themselves, and adopted by Parliament, to take away the most objectionable part of such a power, which in a great measure rendered it nugatory; at that very time, and subsequent to passing the act so limited, were the Lords of the Admiralty, through the agency of the Commissioners of the Navy, exercising, in the fullest extent, the administration of oaths to official men, uncontrolled by that proviso, and thus compelling those in subordination to them to disclose that which must to a certain degree tend to degrade, if not to criminate themselves. I do not give an opinion, Sir, that this was, or was not, a most illegal or unconstitutional proceeding; but of this I am sure, that it was one of the boldest measures, which, under such circumstances, could have been undertaken. I mean not by these observations to cast the least reflection on the conduct of the Commissioners of the Navy, for whom generally, in their public conduct and private character, I have the greatest respect; nor on the conduct of the commissioner of the Plymouth yard, to whom I particularly alluded; he acted under orders which it was his official duty to obey.—But what was the result of this severe scrutiny into the means by which places or advancement had been obtained, as it regarded Mr. Marshall? Although it seems he might have pleaded precedent for the practice, not one solitary instance of his ever having taken a shilling for his recommendations or appointments was found against him.—That Mr. Marshall was not venal and corrupt, therefore, the above investigation fully proves. Of his moderation, his liberality, and disinterestedness, as well as of his skill and ingenuity, the following circumstance will convince the House: about six months before he was dismissed from his employment, he invented a machine, by which a very great improvement was made in cutting the screws used in lifting and launching ships, and in other operations in the yard: by these means a nut and screw could be cut in thirteen minutes, which in the old mode required nine or ten hours manual labour, and in a much more perfect manner; as is generally the case where machines are so applied. His friends earnestly pressed him to obtain a patent, to secure to himself the profits of this very important discovery. This was his answer: "No—I am a servant of the public, and "they have a right to the fruits of my talents "and my skill." It may be said, that the Board of Admiralty are not aware of this beneficial discovery, or that it was made by Mr. Marshall; but I have to inform the House, that, when their Lordships were at Plymouth, they were shewn this machine; they saw its operation, were told by whom it was invented, and gave a minute, directing it to be used in all his Majesty's dock-yards. One might have thought, that their Lordships would have been glad of an excuse—would have been happy in the pretence thus afforded them, of making some amends for the injury they must by that time be convinced they had done. No; while the public are thus deriving such benefits from this discovery, neither reward nor even acknowledgment has been made to the liberal and injured inventor*.—There are several

* Of the character which Mr. Marshall has sustained among those whose professional talents, high rank, and necessary intercourse with him for many years past, have enabled them to form a just estimate, the following certificates will evince:—These are to certify, that Mr. John Marshall, late builder of Plymouth yard, when I fitted out the Leda, in the beginning of this war, at Deptford, which ship was repaired and fitted by contract, Mr. Marshall was then surveyor of the navy's assistant, there being then only one surveyor; and I can firmly attest, that he acted with such equity and justice, both to the contractors and to his Majesty's service, that it did him the highest credit, both as a man, and in his official capacity.—He also docked the Terrible at Plymouth, when he was builder there; and also refitted the Dragon, and altered the whole of her magazine; and I can confidently avow, that since I have been in his Majesty's service, I never met with a man, who could possibly pay a more strict attention to his duty than Mr. Marshall; I never recollect going into the dock-yard, but I saw him very attentive to his employment; and as far as I may be allowed to judge, I think him a very able man in his profession.—Given under my hand, this 8th day of October 1802.—At Plymouth.

GEORGE CAMPBELL.

These are to certify, that Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright at Plymouth yard, has always given me much satisfaction, by his exertions in refitting his Majesty's ships Robust, Formidable, and Mars, several times at Plymouth; he has always been highly spoken of by captains of the ships that were under my orders in Cawsand Bay, as a zealous, good, and deserving officer; which I think he truly merits, and beg to recommend him as such.—Given under my hand, at Plymouth, this 17th day of August 1802.

EDWARD THORNBROUGH.

I do hereby certify, that Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright of his Majesty's dock-yard at Plymouth, has given me much satisfaction, by his exertions in fitting the Windsor Castle several times at Plymouth; he has been equally highly spoken of by several of the captains and officers of the navy; and strongly recommended by them, as a zealous, good, and deserving officer, which I think he highly merits; and beg leave to recommend him.—Given under my hand, at Portsmouth, this 8th day of June 1802. A. MITCHELL.

These are to certify, that during this war I have fitted out at Sheerness and Plymouth; at both which places, Mr. John Marshall was then master shipwright, who always gave me the fullest satisfaction in his department; and I ever looked upon him as a very zealous, active officer.—Given under my hand, this 20th day of May 1802. ROBERT CALDER.

These are to certify, that Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright at Plymouth yard, always conducted himself to my perfect satisfaction, in refitting the several ships belonging to the Channel Fleet, under my orders in Cawsand Bay, particularly the Prince and Prince George, where my flag was hoisted. I have the greatest

others, with which I do not trouble the House; but I must not omit the two following, because they are from two officers of high rank and character; who commanded as port admirals, at Plymouth, during the whole service of Mr. Marshall as builder; and who must be enabled to form a most accurate judgment of his whole character and conduct †.—There is another, which although in substance a certificate, being in form of a letter, I do not feel myself at liberty to read; but I have authority to say, that the Noble Viscount, by whom it is written, and whose name, if mentioned, would command the highest respect, entertains similar sentiments of the professional skill, zeal, and general character of Mr. Marshall, with those of the other eminent and distinguished officers who have afforded testimonials to those points. It is a maxim in the English law, that where slight offences are proved, and where the evidence of higher crimes is doubtful, character shall have a preponderating weight in the scale of justice; what then ought it to have here, where small offences have not been proved, and high ones only imputed, without any evidence adduced in support of them? And I might here, therefore, safely rest Mr. Marshall's case, did I not think I should do him injustice, if I omitted to mention some circumstances which occurred a little previous and subsequent to his dismissal, from which that transaction derives much of its colour and complexion; and from which that rooted opinion has been formed in the mind of the public, that the vacancies created by the dismissal of Mr. Marshall, Mr. Lugger, and another officer, were rather made for the sake of those by whom they were to be filled up, than on account of any proved delinquency in those who were dismissed. I repeat, that this opinion is generally entertained by that part of the public whose local knowledge and observation enable them to form a judgment on that subject. One might reasonably have concluded, if it was judged necessary by the Lords of the Admiralty to make so severe, so novel, and so terrible an example, as to dismiss from their employments, without any provision, men who, with the highest reputation certainly, and, I believe, with the greatest integrity, had served the public for upwards of thirty years; that a regard for their own characters, and an anxious attention to the honour of the country, as to its public justice, would have induced their Lordships to place such persons in the vacancies so created, as, according to the routine of office, and the reasonable expectations of official men, would have succeeded to them had they been occasioned by death, promotion, or superannuation. But what was the case here? It had invariably, hitherto, been the wisdom and policy of the government, never to place any man as a builder in his Majesty's yards, who had not been qualified for that most important situation, by an education similar to that described by Mr. Marshall of himself, in the memorial of his various services, which I had the honour of reading to the House. Such, with little variation, were the education of Sir John Henslow, of Sir William Rule, whose eminent services, as surveyors of the navy, need no encomiums of mine; such, in short, had been the progress of every master shipwright or builder, without one single exception, until the present occasion, when Mr. Tucker, brother to Mr. Commissioner Tucker, was taken from a merchant's yard, and placed as builder's assistant at Plymouth. I must here particularly call the attention of the House to dates, as they are very important. This appointment took place on the 25th of July 1801 *. Mr. Tucker had

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confidence in his abilities as a shipwright, and always considered him as a valuable and worthy man; doing credit to those who appointed him.—Given under my hand, this 20th day of May 1802.

CHARLES COTTON.

These are to certify, that Mr. John Marshall, master shipwright of Plymouth yard, during several years I commanded different ships of his Majesty, and have refitted at that port, has ever given me the highest satisfaction in his department; and I have considered him a very zealous and superior officer, both in the science and executive line of his profession; and, according to my opinion, he constantly performed the duties of his office with much advantage to his country and great credit to himself, so as to claim the universal approbation of every officer who has had the honour of knowing him.

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Portugal Street, Grosvenor Square, May 29th, 1802.

† Although the abilities and uniform conduct of Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright of his Majesty's dock-yard at Plymouth, were conspicuous and acknowledged by most, if not by every officer, whose ships were refitted at that port, during a period of more than four years that I commanded there; and not a single complaint was ever made to me, of want of exertion to promote his Majesty's service in the master shipwright's department; and therefore my testimony seems to be unnecessary; yet, as it has been deemed of consequence, in regard to his future pursuits, I have no hesitation in declaring that I consider him to be as able an officer as ever served in that capacity, and his whole time and mind devoted to the duties of his public employment; and in his private life, he appeared to be sober, uniform, and regular.—Given in London, this 13th day of May 1802. R. KING.

These are to certify, that Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright of Plymouth yard, during the three years I have had the honour to command the said port, has given me the highest satisfaction in his department: and the unanimous voice of the officers that have refitted at this port does him equal justice. I have no difficulty in declaring that I think him a very superior officer, both executive and scientific; and that he has, during my command, performed the multifarious duties of his office with great credit to himself and advantage to his country.—Given under my hand, at Plymouth Dock, this 30th day of April 1802. THOMAS PASLEY.

* On the 24th of July 1801, the day before Mr. Tucker's appointment, Mr. Marshall received an ano-

many years before served his apprenticeship in the King's yard; at the expiration of which, without having served in any subordinate office whatever, he went into the merchant's service, and remained there until the above period: when he was brought from thence, and placed at once in the important situation of builder's assistant, over the heads of all those persons who for a number of years had been in progress towards situations of that degree, and who founded their just and reasonable expectations of succeeding to them, on the practice of former Boards of Admiralty. After remaining seven or eight months in the situation of assistant, Mr. Marshall was displaced, and Mr. Tucker made builder—builder of one of the first, if not the very first yard in the kingdom; a proceeding without a single precedent in the history of the dock-yards. At that very time, a senior assistant to Mr. Tucker was Mr. Sippins, a gentleman who had been more rapidly advanced than usual, through subordinate offices, to that situation, in consequence of his superior skill and talents, and more particularly for his discovery of a most ingenious, safe, cheap, and expeditious mode of repairing the keels of men of war in dock, for which the sum of 1000*l.* had also been assigned him. This gentleman, however, although on the spot, and with such pretensions, was, with various others, passed by for Mr. Tucker. At the same time the other two vacancies, created by the dismissal of Mr. Lugger, clerk of the survey, and the storekeeper, were filled up, not by persons acquainted by previous education with the duties of those offices, but by Mr. Kitto, late purser to one of the honourable gentlemen opposite to me, and by Mr. Salt, who had, I believe, been purser to another honourable member of the Admiralty. I state these as facts, but beg to be understood as not intending to cast any reflections on Mr. Kitto and Mr. Salt; whom I believe to be perfectly worthy and respectable men. Of Mr. Lugger, whose hard case I know not from himself, but from public report only, I have already spoken: his exemplary and unimpeached character I have long known. Of the other gentleman if I do not speak, it is only because I know not his case, and cannot, therefore, by my silence, be construed to mean him any disrespect. When it is considered what the education of builders has ever been—that after having been selected for their superior talents from a class consisting of a great many thousand artificers, they have always, hitherto, passed through various gradations and employments, before they have been considered as qualified for that most difficult and important situation; surely it might have been expected, that the Lords of the Admiralty would have paused before they ventured on the rash measure of displacing a man of Mr. Marshall's high character and talents, against the strong representations too, of most respectable members of the Navy Board, according to public report; and on the still more rash and unprecedented measure of placing in his stead a man whose whole time, except for a few months before, had been employed in building ships of a totally different construction from those erected in his Majesty's yards. The consequence of this proceeding was such as might reasonably have been expected: every one has heard of what happened to the Mars, one of the finest ships in the navy; the back of which was broken, by having been imprudently put out of the dock before she was sufficiently planked to support her weight. Merchants' ships, to which the new builder had been used, would not have sustained such an injury, under similar circumstances; because, being built fore and aft for burden, their weight is borne up more equally throughout on the water, than men of war; which being constructed for swift sailing, are sharp, and overhang at the head and stern; and their buoyancy being sustained from the centre, the ends preponderate, and produce the effect above alluded to, if not sufficiently secured by strong planking at the extremities.—Another proof of the ignorance of the new builder, or of something worse, may be gathered from the following circumstance: a report was made by him to the Commissioners of the Navy, that a large quantity of timber, received into the yard in Mr. Marshall's time for ship-building, consisting of 990 loads, or nearly 700 pieces, was so defective, as to be wholly unfit for that purpose, and to be good for nothing but carpenter's work. When the Admiralty and Navy Boards were at Plymouth, a survey of this parcel of timber was ordered to be made; and Sir William Rule, a gentleman eminently qualified, was appointed to that service, who, having spent two days in examining about two thirds of it, reported, that he had so far discovered not above five or six pieces which were not perfectly fit for ship-building; and as the two Boards were about to leave Plymouth, he either himself thought any further scrutiny into the circumstances of such a report unnecessary, or was ordered to pursue it no further, as their Lordships were probably satisfied. But, notwithstanding these instances, the new builder still continues to hold his office, nor has any punishment, as far as I can learn, been inflicted on him.—I could give various instances of the ill effects of departure from long-established practice, which, although not absolutely connected with Mr. Marshall's

nymous letter, dated Admiralty, 21st July 1801, with the London post-mark, and signed I a ah; in which it was stated, that a train was laid for the destruction of him, and other officers of the yard; that nothing but a powerful and respectful application to the King himself would save them. This letter was received seven months before any examination of Mr. Marshall and the other gentlemen took place.

case, I have a right to adduce as proofs of the inconvenience and danger of that rash system of innovation adopted by the present Board of Admiralty. It has been a practice, for a great number of years past, to assign apprentices to respectable and deserving men among the artificers in the yard, who instruct them in their respective arts, and who derive a profit from their labour during their apprenticeships. The mutual benefit, therefore, of instruction on one hand and of profit on the other, induced artificers earnestly to solicit for apprentices; and parents as eagerly to make interest to obtain that situation for their children. Thus a nursery for artificers was constantly kept up.—[Here an Hon. Member called Sir William to order, on the ground, that he was not keeping to the subject before the House. To which he replied, that if the motion he intended to submit to the House had been known, he should not have been called to order, which motion he begged leave to read; on which the Hon. Member said, had he known what the motion was, he should not have interfered, when the Speaker directed Sir William to proceed.]—The Lords of the Admiralty had chosen most materially to alter this arrangement. The apprentices are now bound to the builder, and by him assigned to the artificers, with a power, however, of resuming them, and giving them to others, as he shall see occasion. The profits also, arising to the masters, are so curtailed, that a quarterman derives no more benefit from two apprentices, under the present system, than he used to derive from one: having no additional profit, where the labour of instruction is doubled. The consequences of this innovation are extremely injurious and alarming. On the one hand, the masters are much less solicitous to obtain apprentices; on the other, parents, seeing the precarious situation in which their children would, under the new regulation, be placed, refuse to bring them forward: as a proof of which, advertisements have actually been for some time placed in the yards, for the purpose of obtaining apprentices. And thus this source of the supply of artificers for the King's and merchants' yards is in a great degree cut off. There are various other topics of a similar nature, on which I might enlarge, which have created a great disgust in the military and civil departments of the navy; but at present I shall refrain from entering into them, being sensible that I have already fatigued the House. I am aware, that from gentlemen on the other side I may hear some very strong assertions; but these I shall not consider as arguments. It may, indeed, be said, that I am in the same predicament; and that my own statements have consisted of strong assertions. I am ready to allow it: at the same time I think what I have advanced has been supported by strong, circumstantial, and collateral proofs; and there is this material difference in the assertions made by myself, and those which may be used on the other side: mine are not proposed to induce the House to come to a resolution on the merits of the case, but only to institute an inquiry into the truth of my statements; whereas those of other gentlemen will probably be urged to prevent any inquiry taking place. I may also be told, that this is not a case fit for the House of Commons to entertain; that it is not consistent with its functions and its usages to inquire into the causes of the dismissal of his Majesty's civil or military servants, which is one of his Majesty's undoubted prerogatives, without assigning any reason whatever.—I will not so far libel the country as to suppose it possible for a British subject to be oppressed and injured, without having any means of redress. I will not libel this House, by supposing it does not consider itself, not only as the representative, but as the guardian of the rights of the people. But if it should, indeed, be deemed inconsistent with the practice and functions of this House, to inquire into the cases of persons under circumstances like those of Mr. Marshall, there is one of its functions, which I am well assured it will never resign—that of inquiring into the conduct of Ministers, and persons in public offices. And therefore, although no one can be less inclined to dispute that most undoubted prerogative of his Majesty to dismsss his servants, without assigning his reasons for so doing; yet if it can be shewn that his Majesty, contrary to the known clemency, justice, and benevolence of his own mind, had been advised by any Minister to exercise this prerogative wantonly, capriciously, or unjustly, or having delegated this power, as in the instance before us, to the Lords of the Admiralty, they should so exercise it; it will not, I presume, be denied, that such Ministers, or such persons, are amenable to public censure. To this point one part of my motion directly tends: and on these grounds I cannot but express a strong hope that the House will consent to the appointment of a committee. Let me implore the Rt. Hon. Gent. opposite to me, not to set his face against an inquiry into a system, which has already been highly injurious; and must, if longer persisted in, be ruinous to the best interests of the country: and, lastly, I call on those hon. members of the Board of Admiralty themselves not to object to a motion, which, if they do not deserve the censure to which I have alluded, will afford them the opportunity of explaining and justifying their conduct. I beg leave, therefore, to move, "That a select "committee of this House be appointed to "inquire into the causes of the dismissal of "Mr. John Marshall, late master shipwright "of his Majesty's dock-yard at Plymouth, and "into other circumstances in the conduct of "the Board of Admiralty immediately or re-"motely connected with that event."

The motion was not seconded.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, Feb. 22.—(See Minutes, p. 284.)

[BANK RESTRICTION.]—Lord PELHAM moved the order of the day for the second reading of the bill "To continue for a further "time, to be limited, the restriction on the "cash payments of the Bank." In rising to make that motion, it was not, he said, his intention to detain their Lordships' attention for any length of time. The reasons, which, in his mind, justified the renewal of the measure, he had stated on a former occasion, and to what he had then urged but little now occurred to him to adduce in addition. He proceeded to take a cursory retrospect of the operation of the restriction since it was first imposed in 1797, down to the present time, and from that retrospect he thought himself warranted in asserting that no injurious consequences had arisen from it. Of the stability and solvency of the Bank, as no doubt was any where entertained, it was superfluous for him to bring forward any proof. Other reasons called for the continuance of the restriction, more particularly reasons of prudence and expediency. On a former day a Noble Lord (Moira) had asserted that the measure now under their Lordships' consideration must be either a measure of Government, brought forward by Ministers from motives which they imagined justified them in proposing it; or it was a measure suggested to them by the Bank, and proposed at the suggestion and for the convenience of the Directors. Nay, it was not very obscurely hinted by the Noble Lord, that the proposition might have been the result of some mutual arrangement and accommodation between Government and the Bank. To these observations he had only to repeat the same answer which he gave to the Noble Lord on the occasion already alluded to, viz. that the idea of renewing the restriction at the present moment originated solely with Government. Government had no communication, directly or indirectly, with the Bank, as a bank, upon the matter: upon the propriety of the measure the Directors of the Bank might have been consulted merely as individuals conversant with commercial affairs, and likely to be best acquainted with what might injure or promote the commercial prosperity of the country. It was indeed the general opinion of men best enabled to form correct notions on such topics, that the restriction on the Bank had proved highly beneficial to commerce, and to a wider extension of every sort of commercial convenience and facility. These, in concurrence with many other motives, have induced Ministers now to propose it anew. They see the course of exchange, which the very large remittances in specie for the purchase of corn in times of scarcity, for subsidies to foreign powers, and for the maintenance of our fleets and armies in distant stations, had occasioned to be so much against this country, now gradually turn in its favour; they see our trade and commerce gradually increasing and swelling into an extent beyond any former example; they have consequently just reason to expect that in a short time there will be such a reflux of bullion into the country as to make up for the enormous drain of specie which the imperious nature of the circumstances just enumerated had unavoidably drawn out of it. Did not, therefore, cautious prudence, did not sound policy call for a temporary continuance of a measure from which no mischief had accrued; but from which, on the contrary, much benefit had resulted? There were other statements made by the Noble Lord, to which also he might be expected to advert, more particularly of some inaccuracies which the Noble Lord imagined he had discovered in a late statement of the financial situation of the country made in another place. As he did not conceive these observations to be immediately connected with the question before the House, and as moreover it might not be in his power to rectify these inaccuracies, if indeed any such existed, he should abstain altogether from that discussion, trusting that their Lordships would feel with him the expediency of continuing the restriction for the reasons he had now and before alleged, and of the sufficiency of which he hoped their Lordships were fully convinced.

Lord KING declared himself of a very opposite opinion. He could by no means agree that any thing like adequate and satisfactory reasons had been adduced for further continuing the restriction on the Bank, under the present circumstances of the country. It was a measure which he could not but look upon as a very extraordinary one—a measure that encroached on private property, that violated public faith, and that put the whole monied property of the nation at the mercy of the Bank Directors. It was an infringement of the solemn and sacred compact which the Bank had entered into with the public when Government granted them a charter; and could their Lordships precipitately assent to such a measure without such reasons having been adduced for its absolute necessity as ought to amount almost to demonstration, and enforce the strongest conviction in their Lordships' minds? But where were the proofs of that necessity? Did the country now labour under that extraordinary pressure, arising from a variety of difficulties and dangers which were advanced in support of the first adoption of the restriction? On the contrary, was it not confessed to be in a state of the highest commercial prosperity? Where then could be the urgent necessity of its renewal in such prosperous times? what would be the effect of it, but the encouraging of an enormous issue of paper, which raised the price of every article, and must continue to keep the state of exchange unfavourable to

us? To prove that such must be the effect resulting from such a measure, the Noble Lord entered into a variety of comparative statements of the course of exchange at different periods between Hamburgh and London, and between Lisbon and London. These statements he principally took from a paper called the Price Current, which was published twice a week, and which was generally looked upon in the city as very accurate. According to these statements it appeared, that from the time the restriction was first imposed, the course of exchange began to turn against this country in various proportions to the quantity of paper in circulation. Previous to the laying on the restriction, the Bank seldom issued notes to more than the amount of ten, eleven, or twelve millions; but since that period, they issued to the amount of fifteen and sixteen millions. Hence the rise in the price of bullion; for it was justly remarked, that in proportion as paper was plenty, and therefore cheap, gold would be scarce, and consequently dear. The average amount of our circulating medium was about ten millions: that had been found fully sufficient to answer all the purposes of the country. When, therefore, an unnecessary addition was made to it of one, two, or three millions, there was a depreciation in the value of paper in the same proportion. But it was not merely on account of the inconveniencies arising from the measure that he objected to it: he objected to its principle, and to its being drawn into a precedent, which, he feared, would be the case whenever it might suit the convenience of Ministers or the Bank; and thus Parliament might be called upon not only to confide implicitly in Ministers, but also to place the same confidence in the Directors of the Bank. In this point of view he wished their Lordships to consider the measure; for, when thus considered, it appeared to him to be highly objectionable.

Lord SUFFOLK said he would trouble their Lordships with but one observation, and that was, respecting the encouragements which he expected the Noble Secretary of State would have held out for the improvement of agriculture. Unless a much larger tract of land was cultivated in that manner, we should be continually under the necessity of sending our specie out of the country for the purchase of corn. The small tracts of land that were yet enclosed, bore no proportion to what remained uncultivated; and, unless encouragement was held out for further enclosures, as our population daily increased, so would our want of a supply of grain: and as France would now be the nearest and the cheapest market, it would naturally be resorted to in preference to any other. What immense sums of our money must, therefore, find their way into France! the consequences of which he should leave to their Lordships' consideration.

The Earl of MOIRA was at a loss to see what he had to offer in addition to the statements he had made on a former occasion, which were confirmed by the papers now on their Lordships' table, but which had been scarcely once adverted to by the Noble Secretary of State. He perfectly concurred with the Noble Lord who spoke last but one, that, when the Bank issued paper to an extraordinary amount, their notes must virtually bear a discount, or suffer a depreciation, and the price of bullion must also rise in proportion. Gold was not sold for gold, but for paper; and its price would always be in proportion to the greater scarcity or plenty of paper, or to that against which it was exchanged. To the miscalculation in the statement of the Consolidated Fund, the Noble Lord again adverted; and persisted in his opinion, that there was evidently an error in it, though it might be wholly unintentional. Indeed, he was very little inclined to disapprove of any attempt to animate the hopes and uphold the spirits of the country, especially when it could be done on safe and certain grounds. He therefore felt backward to blame any overcharged colouring in the late statement of our financial prosperity; but he felt anxious at the same time to remind their Lordships, that when the delusion came to be dispelled, much more pernicious effects ensued in the public mind than when no expectation had been raised at all. He also wished to direct their Lordships' attention to the sacred nature of the compact, in which the Bank was bound towards all those who had intrusted their money to their integrity—a compact which carried with it as severe a responsibility, and as high a morality, as could be involved in any transaction between man and man. Was a compact so sacred lightly to be trifled with? When on a former occasion he hinted the possibility of a secret collusion between the Bank and Government, or some expectations of a mutual arrangement and accommodation, he was somewhat misunderstood by the Noble Secretary of State, who reminded him that there was a clause in the bill, prohibiting the Bank from making any pecuniary advance to Government beyond the amount of six hundred thousand pounds. He could assure the Noble Secretary that this was not the kind of accommodation which he had in his eye. The accommodation he had in view was, the facility which the Bank might afford Government for the issue of Exchequer bills, and which in reality have been issued to a most extraordinary amount. The Bank might be screened on one side by the continuance of the restriction, and be tempted on the other by the superior advantage of buying up Government paper of that description. Indeed, when this motive for

the renewal of the restriction occurred to his mind, he discovered a quality in the transaction which rendered it altogether uncongenial to his mode of thinking, and he was sorry that Ministers had advanced no sort of plausible argument to do away that unfavourable impression.

The Earl of WESTMORELAND contended, that the present question had nothing to do with the stability of the Bank, or the expediency of the original restriction. These points were long since satisfactorily settled; and he had only to say, that the sole result of the investigation which had in the first instance taken place was, if possible, to place the credit of the Bank in a still more unexceptionable point of view than it had previously been contemplated. The only question now was, with regard to the expediency of removing, at the present moment, a restriction, the beneficial effects of which have been already fully experienced. At the time when the restriction originally took place, the expediency of the measure did not originate from any idea of the inadequacy of the Bank to answer every just demand, but was the result of an extraordinary and unaccountable alarm, which gave rise to an unusual demand. It never was the intention of the establishment of the Bank that there never should be an issue of paper greater than, at a moment's notice, could be covered by an issue of cash. This, indeed, would be completely contrary to the very nature of such an establishment. It was only necessary that the funds of the Bank should bear a full proportion to the demands for which they might ultimately become responsible. That the resources of the Bank were completely adequate to every demand was questioned by no one, and therefore the question of continuing the restriction was simply one of expediency. On the principle of expediency, the restriction began in a moment when an extraordinary alarm was excited; and it was proper that when the Bank resumed its cash payments, no extraordinary demand should be created by precipitating the measure. Delay could be productive of no disadvantage, while a hasty renewal of the restriction might involve the Bank in very serious inconveniencies. His Lordship illustrated these topics with considerable force, and placed the argument arising from the state of exchange with foreign countries as applicable to this question, in a very prominent point of view.

Lord AUCKLAND took occasion to advert to an allusion made by a Noble Lord who spoke second in the debate (Lord King), who had asserted that the proceedings of the Bank of Ireland were not sufficiently characterized by prudence. Having taken a very active part in the establishment of that Bank, he thought it his duty to animadvert on this expression, and to state, that as it was a subject of general notoriety, that the proceedings of this establishment were marked by the most perfect regularity and propriety, Noble Lords were not justifiable in throwing out these loose assertions, without being prepared to submit a distinct case to their Lordships' consideration. After touching upon this point, his Lordship proceeded to argue on the question immediately before the House. He alluded particularly to what he had said on a former night on the subject of the course of exchange. He had then asserted, and he now repeated his observation, that it was not on the state of exchange that he rested his support of the continuance of the restriction. A consideration of much greater importance determined his judgment; this consideration was derived from a view of the state of the country in its relations with foreign powers. He would offer no decided opinion on the probable period to which the continuance of peace might extend. Ministers, he doubted not, would omit nothing in their power to preserve a good understanding with foreign states, but it was impossible to determine how far their exertions might be successful. Before the expediency of discontinuing the restriction on the payments of the Bank could be established, it was necessary to wait to see how far there was a prospect of the durability of peace. Already the course of exchange was assuming a more favourable appearance, and the continuance of peace could not fail to increase this advantageous operation. In the view of a permanent peace, our financial prospects, his Lordship contended, were of the most flattering kind, and it was agreeable to every principle of policy and expediency to wait for the operation of this financial prosperity before the restriction was precipitately withdrawn. His Lordship particularly called the attention of the House to the very large drain of cash from this country for the last ten years. He produced calculations to shew, that, during the few years previous to the original restriction in 1797, this drain had not amounted to less than 48 millions; and, including the drain which, from a variety of circumstances, had taken place during the last six years, the whole could not be estimated at less than 120 millions. Under such circumstances, policy required that the restriction should not be withdrawn till the operation of our financial prosperity began to be more fully experienced in the influence which it would necessarily produce in giving an advantageous turn to the course of the exchange, and the influx of bullion which it would create. In illustration of this position, his Lordship laid before the House a calculation of the amount of the annual revenue, contrasted with the expenditure. The former he calculated at 34 millions, and the permanent charges at 25 millions, leaving for the ordinary expenses of the year a surplus

of nine millions. He intimated that he should take an opportunity of bringing this part of the subject under consideration on a future day, when he hoped to be able to convince their Lordships that this prospect, so far from being exaggerated, fell short of what there was reason to anticipate. Having insisted a great deal at large on these topics, his Lordship concluded by voting for the second reading of the bill.

Lord GRENVILLE said a few words, with particular reference to what had been advanced respecting the financial state of the country. He declined at present entering into any discussion on the subject, but professed his readiness to canvass it at length, when it was regularly brought under discussion. Whatever the period of peace might be, and in his opinion it might be of very short duration, he trusted that the revenue of the country would be raised to a degree fully adequate to meet the expenditure; and that no speculations would be formed on views of the surplus of the revenue above the expenditure, which might ultimately be found erroneous and delusive. His Lordship placed this part of the subject in a very striking light; but concluded with again declining any minute discussion, till the subject came regularly before the House. The state of the finances of the country was one of the deepest interest; and he felt no ordinary degree of anxiety, that a subject so intimately connected with the salvation of the country, should be fully and fairly understood.

Lord SHEFFIELD said, he had not heard any argument which, in his opinion, could justify the risk of abandoning the Bank restriction at a crisis such as the present; nor had he heard any well-founded suggestion that mischief or inconvenience could arise from the continuance of it at this time. He conceived that neither the expediency of the original measure, nor the state of the finances of the country, were the question before their Lordships. The difficulty and delicacy of removing the restriction were foreseen at the time of imposing it; and as the difficulty, in consequence of the present very precarious state of Europe, is still greater than was expected, it cannot be thought prudent to hazard the relinquishment of the restriction just now, without some obvious necessity, or perhaps, till there is an influx of specie or bullion into this country, an event not improbable, which might enable us to remove the restriction with safety. Commercial intercourse in general is greatly deranged: we can draw no conclusions from any experience hitherto had; for there is no analogy between the present state of things, and that of former times. We all regret that the necessity of restriction ever arose; but even admitting some discredit may have taken place in consequence of the restriction, it will not be increased by the continuance of it until a more favourable period; but, on the contrary, the disgrace of the whole measure may be avoided; at least, we have the satisfaction of knowing that no real mischief or inconvenience has arisen from it. Notwithstanding all that had been asserted, he insisted that paper money had not been depreciated, nor has coin borne a premium in this kingdom, which he conceived to be the true criterion by which we should judge of the matter; for, when paper money is not depreciated, we know there is not too great an emission of that kind of currency; and he was disposed to consider a judicious increased issue of it as very advantageous, inasmuch as it enabled us better to carry on the great commercial transactions of this country; and if the event has helped to prove that immense quantities of gold coin in circulation are not absolutely necessary, this measure which we now regret, may in some degree become serviceable, by preventing hereafter, unfounded apprehension and alarm on such a subject. Scotland has improved in every shape, with scarce any coin, and has been greatly benefited by a plentiful issue of paper money; and we find that great quantities of coin or bullion give little public credit to France or Spain; and consequently it may be inferred that coin has little to do with public credit: and, in truth, the necessity of having immense quantities of gold and silver in an unproductive state, in those two countries, arose from the want of public credit. Holland, when she flourished most, depended almost entirely on her bank; and countries truly commercial, such as England and Holland, could not have carried on their extensive trade by any other means. A very great proportion of the wealth of England would be in an unproductive state if it were necessary to have a coin currency for all its commercial transactions; and without a plentiful issue of paper currency, we could carry on but a very small part of our present trade. He said, he scarcely comprehended the suggestion, that the unfavourable exchange against this country took place in consequence of the Bank restriction. It did not take place immediately on the adoption of that measure: even since that time, during a certain period, there has been a great influx of gold, and the exchange has latterly become much more favourable during the existence of the restriction. He observed, it was perfectly easy to account for the unfavourable exchange, by the great remittances to the continent; and, more especially, in return for the immense importation of grain, the value of which, if estimated according to the price at the British market, would amount to upwards of twenty-four millions in little more than two years; or, on an average of ten years, we have imported, of foreign corn, which we might have raised at home, to the value of at least four

millions yearly, not far short of the ordinary real balance of trade in our favour. As the importation of foreign corn diminished, the course of exchange became proportionably more favourable to us. It therefore seemed reasonable to suppose that the immense payments for foreign corn consumed more than the balance of trade in our favour; and it may be observed, that the payments for a very extraordinary importation of corn, in consequence of the scarcity of 1796, drained this country so much, as to become a principal cause of the Restriction Act in the spring of 1797: so that instead of imputing the unfavourable exchange to the Restriction Act, we must place it to its proper account, our own neglect and bad policy. We suffer quibbling objections to prevent a general enclosure and cultivation of the waste lands, and we neglect to remove the great discouragements to tillage. We do not give ourselves the trouble to examine our corn laws, which have been altered much for the worse within the last thirty years. He concluded by saying he wished it were in his power to do justice to this important subject. His object should be to remove prejudices arising from unfounded theories, and to relieve the public mind from apprehensions equally unfounded; and on this occasion, to shew that no inconvenience or disadvantage could possibly arise from the continuance of the restriction on Bank payments for the present; but that an untimely and abrupt discontinuance of it would be an unnecessary experiment, and, very possibly, highly prejudicial to the public.

The question was then put, and the bill read a second time.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, Feb. 23.—(See Minutes, p. 339.)

[ESTABLISHMENT OF HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF WALES.]—The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER moved the order of the day for resolving into a committee of the whole House, to take into consideration his Majesty's most gracious message, recommending the present situation of his R. H. the Prince of Wales to the attention of the House. On the motion being put for the Speaker's leaving the chair,

Colonel STANLEY rose to put one or two questions to Ministers, on the subject which was now to come under consideration. He expressed a desire to be informed, whether the incumbrances which at present affected the establishment of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, were to be removed by any new grant of the House; whether they were to be settled by a compromise; or whether, if any money was to be advanced, provision was to be made for its repayment? If his R. H. was to obtain assistance through the medium of a compromise, he could not help observing, that there was strong reason to believe that the greatest law authorities of the kingdom were divided respecting the legal validity of the claims of his R. H.; and there was no evidence before the House that any legal decision had taken place. If, on the other hand, it was understood that any incumbrances on the establishment of his R. H. were to be paid off by the three estates, he wished an express communication on this very subject, which had been made to the House on the 21st of May 1787, to be now read, and he begged the House particularly to attend to the language which was there held respecting the accumulation of future debts. (The message was read accordingly, and contained the passage the Hon. Member alluded to. It held out an assurance that means would be taken to prevent the accumulation of new debts.) After the message was read, the Hon. Member observed, that, notwithstanding all the deference he had for his R. H. and certainly no one had more, he had a public duty to perform, which was of the highest importance. He appeared there to watch over the interests of a very large county, which would contribute a great proportion of any additional burdens which might be imposed on the public. He therefore wished some explanation before he gave his vote for going into the committee.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER in reply observed, that the Hon. Gent. had put a question, an answer to which he no doubt expected from one of his Majesty's Ministers. The question was, whether it was not in consequence of a compromise, founded on the opinion given by the law officers of the Crown, on the subject of the claims of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, that the present situation of his R. H. was now recommended to the attention of the House? In answer to this question, he had not the least scruple in declaring, that any compromise of the nature alluded to, had no share whatever in now inducing him to submit a proposition to the House, not for paying off the debts of his R. H., for an ample provision was already made for this purpose, but with the sole view of enabling him to support an establishment distinguished by that dignity and splendour, the attainment and preservation of which could not be contemplated but with the deepest interest. He begged the Hon. Member to advert to what was the nature and what were the terms of his Majesty's most gracious message. It stated explicitly that his Majesty, having adverted to the period which had elapsed since the adoption of those measures which, by the wisdom of Parliament, were deemed expedient for discharging the incumbrances of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, and to the progress which had been made in

carrying them into effect, recommends the situation of his R. H. to their attention at the present moment. In the first part of this message, his Majesty did not allude in the most remote degree to any proceedings for liquidation of the debts. In the conclusion of the address there was as little allusion to the same subject, as his Majesty merely expresses his regret at suggesting any measure which might add to the burdens of his people; but thinks this a proper moment to recommend an establishment calculated to ensure the comfort and to uphold the dignity of so distinguished a branch of his royal house. This was the simple and precise object of the message. Those members of the House, therefore, who were prepared to say that no proposition relative to the present situation of his R. H., which in its effects will occasion an increase of the public burdens, might now contend that the House should not entertain the motion for going into the committee. Those on the other haud, who thought that the motion was one which ought to be agreed to, and he trusted a great majority of the House were of that opinion, would feel it their duty to vote for the Speaker's leaving the chair; and in the committee he flattered himself that he should submit a proposition of that nature which would not be liable to any serious objection, and would have the effect of giving validity to his Majesty's most gracious message. In the present stage of the business it was impossible to give any pledge relative to the nature of the proposition to be submitted, and therefore he was at a loss to account for the Hon. Member's opposition to the previous question. After the proposition was known, if it appeared to the Hon. Member one which ought not to be acceded to, he had then a very simple method before him, which was, by moving, that the Chairman do quit the chair. He trusted, therefore, that the House would not suppose that he meant any disrespect to them or the Hon. Member when he thus pointed out what was obvious by the regular mode of proceeding.

The motion for the Speaker's leaving the chair was then put and agreed to. The House accordingly resolved into a committee.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER then rose, and addressed the committee to the following purport:—The propositon which I shall have the honour of submitting to the committee, I still flatter myself, is of that nature as to meet with acquiescence and approbation. It is impossible to doubt that there exists in the mind of every one present, a disposition to promote, as far as is consistent with their duty to their constituents, the comfort and the dignity of his R. H. the Prince of Wales. It is impossible to doubt that every individual wishes to see a suitable degree of splendour in the establishment of the Heir Apparent to the throne. Those who in 1795 were concerned in proposing or supporting the arrangements which were then formed, were animated by the same sentiments of attachment and regard, and I myself was one of those who heartily concurred in the establishment made for his R. H.: but those who were principally concerned in that arrangement, formed it with reluctance and with regret. But in forming it they were guided by considerations paramount to all feelings of personal regard for his R. H., and a desire to see him in a situation which would have enabled him to support an establishment equal to his illustrious rank. Sure I am, Sir, that there is not an individual who would not now rejoice, that the measures which Parliament, but from considerations of justice and a sense of duty to creditors, would then have directed to be employed in enabling his R. H. to maintain the splendour and dignity which he ought to hold in the community, might now be directed to their original purpose. Before I submit the proposition with which I shall conclude, it will be material to refer to the propositions of 1795, respecting his R. H.'s future establishment; and this reference I shall endeavour to make, occupying as little of your time as possible. It will readily be recollected, that in that year, a message was delivered from his Majesty, recommending an extension of his R. H.'s establishment, adverting to incumbrances, which at that time existed, and stating the necessity of making some new arrangement, without, however, disclosing any particular system. My Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Pitt), who then presided over his Majesty's councils, on that occasion brought forward a proposition, embracing the future establishment of his R. H. and comprehending the arrangements which his marriage had rendered necessary. In the year 1740, he stated, that the settled establishment of the Heir Apparent was one hundred thousand pounds, exclusive of the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall. Considering the very material changes which had taken place in every article of expenditure, an establishment of a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds a year did not appear to him to be at all too great. This addition, indeed, many persons then thought excessive. One or two individuals indeed spoke of a smaller sum, and did not appear satisfied with the establishment enjoyed by the Heirs Apparent from the year 1740 up to that period. The proposition was, however, carried by a very large majority. After this previous point was settled, the subsequent part of the message came under consideration; and on this a far greater diversity of opinion prevailed. Some Gentlemen thought that no proposition for the payment of his R. H.'s debts should be entertained. Others contended, that other sources for effecting the payment ought to be resorted to; but the great object which my Rt. Hon. Friend had in view, was, to support the dignity, but at all events to maintain the credit

of the Heir Apparent. He therefore proposed, that sixty thousand pounds, together with the revenues of the duchy of Cornwall, should be appropriated as a fund for the extinction of the debt, with the interest which had accumulated or might accumulate, in the progress of the plan of extinction. The effect of this proposition was, that in twelve years the debt should be extinguished. No direct proposition was made; but a general wish was expressed, that, if possible, arrangements might be made to effect the payment in a shorter period. While the discussion was still undecided, while there continued the greatest contest of conflicting opinions, the House were released from the embarrassments in which they were placed, by a gracious communication from his R. H. expressive of his readiness to accede to any arrangement which the House might form for the better regulation of his establishment, and expressive of his anxious desire to have ample provision for discharging his incumbrances. (The message was here read on the motion of the Rt. Hon. Gent.) On receiving this communication, which so materially relieved the difficulties under which they laboured, the House immediately proceeded to give instructions to the committee appointed to prepare the bills, for making suitable provision to carry into effect the plan for the liquidation of his R. H.'s debts. It was the almost general opinion of the House, that the establishment of the P. of W. was by much too scanty; but the great object in view in the first instance, was the satisfaction of justice. It was to accomplish this object solely, that the resumption of the splendour and dignity suitable to his R. H.'s distinguished station, was for a time suspended, and that commissioners were appointed to the management of his affairs. Now, I shall ask those who have witnessed the effects of the operation of this bill, who have duly considered the situation to which its provisions have for eight years subjected his R. H. whether they can possibly have made up their minds to his continuing for four years longer subject to a degree of obscurity and retirement so little suitable to the feelings and the habits of the heir of a great empire? It will be necessary that I should shortly state the amount of the debt of his R. H. at the time the commissioners were appointed, that I should specify the sums which they have received, and that I should inform the House of the progress they have made in the extinction of the debt. At the time of the appointment of the commissioners, the debt was six hundred and twenty thousand pounds, exclusive of the interest, which had then accumulated, and the interest which might afterwards accumulate in the progress of the reduction. From the 10th of October 1794, up to the 5th of January in the present year, the sum received from the Exchequer has been four hundred and ninety-five thousand pounds, and in the same period ninety-seven thousand five hundred for the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall; making in all five hundred and ninety-two thousand pounds. When I state this, I beg the committee always to bear in mind that this is a sum not received by his R. H. from the public, but arising out of revenues managed by the wisdom of the commissioners. Now, on the other hand, let me direct the attention of the committee to the progress which has been made in the extinction of the debt. Of sums actually paid, and of debentures which have been issued, and are now in the hands of the creditors, the amount is about seven hundred and ninety-nine thousand six hundred and fifty pounds. (The Rt. Hon. Member made some minute calculations, through which we do not consider it necessary to follow him.) The sums now to be received out of the Exchequer, and the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall, which will be left free on the 5th of April next, amount to two hundred and thirteen thousand two hundred and fifty pounds. Now this being the general statement of the situation of his R. H.'s affairs, every member in the committee will be able to form an idea of the grounds of his Majesty's most gracious message. His Majesty being apprized of the progress actually made in the payment of the debt of his R. H. and being satisfied that provision has been made for its ultimate extinction within the period prescribed, has judged his R. H.'s situation no unimportant subject of your attention: and certain I am, that the more the subject is considered, the more will the expediency of giving it the most serious attention be apparent. Let Gentlemen recollect, that no less than eight years have been passed by his R. H. in a state of comparative humiliation, or at least in a state where he was necessarily secluded from many of the scenes and pursuits in which he felt the most powerful interest to engage. Let them reflect how great a sacrifice he has endured, even without an attempt to murmur at the arrangements which imperious necessity required. In 1795 the arrangements formed were founded in wisdom, and their beneficial effects have been fully experienced. They arose, however, in a very considerable degree, from the circumstances in which the country was then placed. A vote in favour of those arrangements did not bind those who gave it, that no alteration should be sanctioned till the whole twelve years were expired. No Member gave a pledge at that period for the vote he might give on the proposition which I am about to submit to the committee. The purport of this proposition is, that from the 5th of January 1803, the establishment of his R. H. shall stand on the same footing that it stood in 1795; or, in other words, that it should be a hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds a year, exclusive of the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall. I do not wish for any change

in the wise arrangements for the liquidation of the debts which were then formed. I wish for all the arrangements to suffer no interruption. I am desirous of the continuance of the same checks on any improper appropriation of the sums received for this purpose. The nature of my proposition is simply to move—That it is the opinion of this committee, that his Majesty be empowered to issue, annually, to his R. H. the Prince of Wales, a certain sum or certain sums not exceeding sixty thousand pounds, computing from the 5th day of Jan. 1803, to the 8th day of July 1806. Now, when it is considered that upwards of eighty years ago a hundred thousand pounds was assigned for the establishment of the Heir Apparent; when it is known that sixty years ago the Heir Apparent by the munificence and wisdom of Parliament—for, I say that in this they discovered at once their munificence and their wisdom—enjoyed a clear revenue of a hundred thousand pounds, independent of the revenues of Cornwall, and with no family establishment to support; when it is recollected that in 1795, a hundred and thirty-eight thousand pounds was not reckoned more than adequate to the suitable support of the splendour and dignity of the present Heir Apparent; when, I say, all the circumstances are taken into consideration, let me ask of the candour of every one who now hears me, whether he does not consider the proposition which I have submitted to the committee, moderate to a degree; that if it suggested any objection, would only give rise to an objection that it was not adequate to the end in view? It will not, I believe, be denied by any one, that within the last eight years there has been an extraordinary change in the value of money, and the means of decent subsistence. It is needless for me to enlarge on the importance of preserving in the situation of individuals holding a prominent place in the community, that degree of dignity which commands respect without being inconsistent with the principles of well-regulated economy. In the establishment of the Royal Family, this system ought to be particularly observed, and, perhaps at the present moment, taking an extensive view of the subject, it will be found that this establishment is, in proportion to their necessary expenditure, arithmetically small. When I contend for an ample establishment for the Heir Apparent, I do it on the general principles I have now avowed. The idea of compromise alluded to by an Hon. Gent. who objected to our going into the committee, I cannot too explicitly disclaim. I wish to say explicitly and unreservedly, that, if I had never heard a single word of petition of right, or of the opinion that was likely to be given on it from whatever quarter that opinion may come, I would have felt it my duty to support a proposition of the nature now submitted to the committee. It is on public grounds that I have brought it forward, and on the same ground it would have received my support if it had fallen to the lot of any other to have introduced it. While I speak of supporting the splendour of his R. H.'s establishment, I wish the idea I attach to this to be understood in a manner considerably different from those which are vulgarly entertained. The splendour of which I speak is not so much the exhibition of external show, as the possession of the means of commanding influence and ensuring respect. I wish him to have the means of acting as a munificent patron of improvement, a protector of literary merit, an encourager of those plans of national amelioration, in which the present, above all former ages, is productive. I wish him to be in a situation to receive those attentions which all are eager to pay him, in a style agreeable to the loftiness of his sentiments and the refinement of his feelings. I am anxious to see him forming with the nobility and gentry of the kingdom that connexion which ought to exist between the Heir Apparent and the most distinguished of those who will hereafter form the most illustrious branch of his subjects. On these grounds I conclude with submitting to the committee the proposition which I have thought it my duty at some length to explain.

Before the motion was put, some conversation took place across the table betwixt Mr. Fox and the Rt. Hon. Gent. respecting the revenues of Cornwall, as forming a branch of revenue beyond the sixty thousand pounds to be now voted. It was stated distinctly that they were to form a part of the revenue of his R. H. in addition to this sum.

Mr. HARRISON wished to know what was the amount of the debts of his R. H. not hitherto discharged?

The Rt. Hon. Gent. in reply, stated it to be somewhat more than two hundred and twenty-five thousand pounds.

The SOLICITOR GENERAL rose to say a few words on a subject of such importance and interest to every one animated with the principles of loyalty and love to his country. The Rt. Hon. Gent. said, that he had not now the honour to be in the service of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, yet he enjoyed an honour which he trusted he should never forfeit, and that was the honour of still retaining his R. H.'s confidence. It became his duty, therefore, on the present occasion, to explain to the committee the sentiments of his R. H. both with respect to the most gracious message of his Majesty, and the motion just now founded on it by his Rt. Hon. Friend. He had it therefore in command from his R. H. to declare his earnest desire to testify in the strongest terms the warmth of his gratitude to the Sovereign for the interest which his Majesty had at all times taken in his welfare—an

interest most powerfully marked in the message which was now under the consideration of the committee. As to the motion, he had been instructed by his R. H. to say, that he entertained a sanguine hope, not unmixed, however, with a considerable portion of anxiety, that it would meet with the approbation of the House. He himself had, on more than one occasion, been empowered to declare to the House the respect, the duty, and the gratitude of his R. H. for the kindness of his Royal parent, and his readiness to renounce every claim, however well founded he might reckon it, rather than engage in any contest which might be construed into a violation of filial duty and affection. The House, therefore, would be able to form some idea how grateful their approbation of the motion would be to his feelings, as it would enable him to forward the course of fair justice and legal right, of which not the smallest reasonable doubt could be entertained. Though, however, there was no doubt of the legal claims of his R. H. still the agitation of the question might have led to the most unpleasant consequences, and involved in it effects earnestly to be deprecated. These consequences the message, and the motion founded on it, happily counteracted. The harmony which had hitherto subsisted betwixt the Sovereign and his eldest son had been preserved uninterrupted; and he sincerely prayed that the same harmony might prevail to the last period of life. As to the grounds on which the proposition now before the committee was brought forward, he thought it but fair, in justice to his Rt. Hon. Friend, to declare that they were wholly of a public nature. Betwixt his R. H. and the Rt. Hon. Gent. there was no compromise of any description. When this proposition, as unexpected as it was unsolicited, was communicated to his R. H. no terms were imposed to prepare the way for its reception. When he stated, that the adoption of it by the House would not be succeeded by any further prosecution of his R. H.'s claims, he mentioned it as a spontaneous act on the part of his R. H. He concluded with a few very pointed observations on the decided opinion he had formed of the justice of the Prince's claims, the almost unavoidable circumstances which produced his embarrassments, and the strong claims which he now had to be delivered from that obscurity he retired to, and to which he for so many years had so honourably conformed.

Sir RALPH MILBANKE, in a short speech, which we could but very imperfectly collect, expressed his cordial approbation of the motion. The establishment now proposed to be assigned to his R. H. appeared to the Hon. Bart. rather liable to objection on the score of its inadequacy, than on the ground of its being more ample than the splendour and dignity of the Heir Apparent required.

Mr. HARRISON was a decided friend to any proposition which had for its object to free his R. H. from that state of comparative humiliation to which he had been so long a voluntary victim. He objected, however, to the mode in which the present proposition was produced. He had taken occasion to ask a question as to the amount of the unredeemed debts of his R. H.; and his object in doing so was to ascertain how far the just claims of his R. H. on the dutchy of Cornwall were adequate to their extinction. He did not wish that an idea should go abroad that his R. H. was coming forward with a new claim on the public, when the fact was, that the public was at this moment his debtor to a very considerable amount. His R. H. was not fairly dealt by, when what was a matter of right was construed into a grant originating in favour. From regard and good will to his R. H. he thought it no more than strict justice that this should be fully understood by the public; and that he should not be exposed to that prejudice which was inseparable from a supposed application for assistance, the result of which would be to increase the public burdens. The Hon. Member threw out some hints about the mode of procedure which he thought ought to be adopted, but made no specific motion. He was for the motion generally, but contended that the sixty thousand pounds to be assigned to his R. H. should be described as a part of the arrears due to him as Duke of Cornwall, and not a sum paid out of the consolidated fund of the country.

Lord CASTLEREAGH, in a short speech, supported the motion, going over the same grounds as those on which former speakers had insisted.

Mr. HARRISON spoke in explanation.

Mr. SHERIDAN admitted, that the proposition was equally satisfactory to the dignity of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, as it was consistent with the views of national economy. In the discussion of the question there were, however, two points, which did not seem to him to have received the consideration which they merited. He did not think that it had been admitted in a manner sufficiently explicit, that the Prince of Wales, so far from being indebted in this instance to the public, had made a generous, open, and magnanimous renunciation of a just claim. He sincerely loved the ease and the comfort of his R. H. but he loved his character and his honour more. He was a friend to the proposition as it really stood, not as an act of favour, but a matter of bare justice; but he was not at all ready to say, that if his R. H. had come a third time to Parliament with an application to discharge his incumbrances, he should easily have given his countenance to such an application. In admitting

such an application, he would have shewn none of the promptness of compliance which he now thought it his duty to display. But what was now the real situation in which his R. H. was placed? On a former session he had come with an application, not for new aids to discharge new incumbrances, but with a statement that certain arrears were due to him by the public, and that he was anxious that these arrears should be applied to the liquidation of debts of considerable standing. The House had entered on a mass of legal and general arguments, and the result of those arguments had been, that the subject could not be discussed by Parliament till it was ascertained whether there was not another tribunal to which his R. H. might apply for redress. In the interval an application is made to another tribunal: it is discovered that the Lord Chancellor is not the fit person to present a petition of right to the Sovereign, but that it is the office of one of the Secretaries of State. The petition of right is accordingly presented, and is about to be put into the proper train of decision. At this crisis Ministers step in with this offer, on which his R. H. honourably and magnanimously consents to suspend procedure till the result of the offer is known in Parliament. The Rt. Hon. Gent. however, would not hear of a compromise, as the Prince was still at full liberty to prosecute his claims. For his part, he professed to acquiesce in the proposition, because it was not a third application to be relieved from embarrassments, but a fair and honourable compromise of claims on the public. Gentlemen on the other side seemed to startle at this expression; they appeared alarmed at the idea of compromise, but he could not but rejoice that such an arrangement had taken place. Much inconvenience must have resulted from the legal prosecution of his R. H.'s claims. If a decision had been given against him, it would have been contended that these claims had all along been urged, merely with a view of more easily prevailing on Parliament to grant assistance in relieving him from embarrassment. If, on the other hand, the judgment had been in his favour, nothing would have been heard but endless declamations on the injustice of so long withholding what he had a right to demand on every principle of justice. These were circumstances to be deprecated, and he was happy that by a compromise they had been avoided. Though he had no doubt of the justice of his R. H.'s claims—against which, indeed, he had never heard of any thing in the shape of argument—yet he could not assert that his right was clear and undisputed. Law was not a subject on which it was justifiable to speak sanguinely. The House had not forgotten, that for six years a petition of his R. H. had lain in the pocket of a former Chancellor, before he could form any opinion of the expediency of presenting it to the Sovereign; and if the cause had now come on for trial, it was impossible to say how long it might have remained in that glorious uncertainty of the law, which some persons might consider as its defect, but which those better acquainted with the subject knew constituted its greatest glory. On the second point to which he had adverted at the beginning of his speech, the Hon. Member made but a few observations. When the House were told, that in consequence of this addition to the present establishment of his R. H. it was expected that he should resume that splendour which he had been compelled to lay aside, it was proper that they should know how far this expectation was likely to be realized. Were Ministers prepared to say, that there were no arrears in the establishment of his R. H. which the Commissioners were not authorized to discharge? The Hon. Gent. particularly alluded to the ten per cent. discount, terms which some creditors had refused in payment of their bills. He expatiated on the anxiety of his R. H. to act towards all his creditors with the most perfect honour; and trusted that he would never be compelled to compound their demands, instead of giving them full and fair payment. After dwelling at some length on these points, he concluded by repeating his approbation of the proposition which had been submitted to the committee.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER spoke in explanation: he was in more than one instance misunderstood by the Hon. Gent. who spoke last. It was his wish to be understood, that his arrangement had in view the same object which was in the contemplation of his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Pitt), when this subject was brought forward in 1795. At that time his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Pitt) proposed a grant of 620,000*l.* as a sum fully sufficient to guard against any possible outstanding claim against his R. H. When the Commissioners were appointed to take cognizance of these claims, they were allowed in addition to the amount of 650,000*l.* to enable them to discharge every debt that could be claimed against his R. H. the fairness and validity of which could entitle them to be liquidated; and those debts have in consequence been fully satisfied. When it appeared that the aggregate of the debts exceeded the sum of 620,000*l.* the Commissioners inquired into their validity, and carefully distinguished what was fair from what was fraudulent. The result they submitted to Parliament. Upon the whole, indeed, it appeared that the debts which were regarded as fraudulent did not amount to any thing considerable: yet there remained an excess, the cause of which he was not very willing, or perhaps unable, to explain. The demand of the creditors might rise, and did rise in effect, on account of the uncertainty and remoteness of the period at which they were to be paid. But no reproach could therefore be imputed to the Commis-

sioners; they availed themselves of every circumstance of which they could fairly take advantage; they proposed in payment to the creditors debentures of 100*l.* with an interest of 3 per cent. or debentures of 90*l.* with an interest of 5 per cent. They had their option which to choose, and they preferred the debentures of 90*l.* bearing an interest of 5 per cent. The reason of this preference he conceived to be the expectation the creditors entertained of the speedy return of peace, upon which event they hoped the debentures would sell at a premium. The Hon. Gent. next observed, that even under the circumstances held out by the present proposition, it would be impossible for his R. H. to resume his household with that dignity and splendour which were suitable to his rank. This he was not prepared to deny; but whatever delay intervened before his R. H. resumed his household, might arise from causes which would give his R. H. fresh claims upon the House, and should not be considered as the effect of the resolution now proposed. On the contrary, that proposition would accelerate the period of his resuming his household by three years and a half, while at the same time it would essentially contribute to increase his ease and comfort. This the House and the public would no doubt learn with satisfaction. But the Hon. Gent. next insinuates, that the present measure is intended as a compromise for the right of the Prince to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall. He disclaimed all idea of such compromise—he felt anxious, indeed, to prevent any further proceeding on the question of a petition of right. There were many of his friends around him who were well acquainted with that anxiety, and who were also well aware, that even if that question had never been agitated, yet it was his intention to have recommended the proposition on public grounds. It is also supposed by the Hon. Gent. that a difference of opinion has taken place between him and his Learned Friend respecting the right of his R. H. to claim the full amount of his arrears: he did not conceive that his Learned Friend (Mr. Sutton) had ever asserted that his R. H. had any claim to the full amount. The assertion was, that when of age he had a right to call for an account: on this point there was no difference of opinion. But if the full right had been admitted on the petition, how and where could judgment be executed? Where was to be found the royal property on which that judgment could lay hold? The question then was, not between the Prince and his Majesty, but between the public and his R. H. It was therefore referred to the consideration of Parliament: for if the Prince was supposed to possess funds of his own, Parliament could not be expected to furnish the means of paying his debts. He hoped, therefore, that no one would look to any residue that might remain of the arrears of the dutchy. Indeed his R. H. himself, when the question respecting his Majesty's civil list was laid before the House, expressed his reluctance, through his Learned Friend (Mr. Sutton), to set up any such claim. The Hon. Gent. adverted to other claims against his R. H. which had not been attended to by the Commissioners. This he could venture to say, that there was no claim which, upon due examination, had been found to be valid, which had not been satisfied by the Commissioners. Indeed, no claim could be brought against his R. H. since the arrangement of 1795, for no debt could be incurred since that period, without a violation of the act.

Mr. SHERIDAN, in explanation, said, that he meant no reflection upon the Commissioners: all he contended was, that no reason had been adduced to shew why the mode in which the debts had been paid did not argue a compulsory deduction of their amount. The debentures had been at a discount of 15 and 20 per cent. and the honour and feeling of his R. H. must be wounded at seeing his creditors suffer so material a loss. Indeed, with such feelings it was impossible he should be at his ease until that loss was made good. Notwithstanding the anxiety expressed by all sides of the House to see his R. H. resume a suitable establishment as speedily as possible, yet he must necessarily give up another year before he could answer the demands that still stood against him. Was this the return which he had a right to expect after the magnanimous sacrifices he has made to the public? And was he to be prevented from returning to that situation of splendour in which the House and the public were anxious to see him placed, merely because some debts remained unpaid, which if known must do the greatest honour to the principles and feelings of his R. H.?

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER further explained, and said, that he was ready to believe that it was highly honourable to his R. H. to delay resuming his household, until every claim which he conceived to stand against him had been fully satisfied. All he contended for was, that if this delay took place, it was on account of debts with which he was not acquainted; for he knew of no debt that had not been satisfied by the Commissioners. As to any loss that might have been incurred by a discount on the debentures, it was only that loss which attended a depreciation of the public funds. They may have sunk with the funds, but this was solely imputable to the management of those who held them.

Mr. FOX would trouble the committee but with a few observations on the present occasion. The part he took in the year 1795, when the establishment of his R. H. was under the consideration of the House, he re-

membered well, for nothing was more repugnant to his feelings than what he then assented to. But what was the question now? His R. H. had submitted to a severe retrenchment of his establishment for eight years (a severity of retrenchment, indeed, which was rarely exercised in private life); and now it was asked, whether it was fit to relieve him from that retrenchment for the four years to come? And how was that to be done? The claims of his R. H. to the arrears due from the dutchy of Cornwall, did not seem to be expressly admitted by the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Addington), yet that Rt. Hon. Gent. did seem to admit that his R. H. was entitled to call for an account of those arrears. If then the Prince had a claim to call for that account, and that it appeared to be an account of a large sum, surely Parliament should institute an inquiry how that sum had been appropriated, or why it should not be employed towards the liquidation of his R. H.'s debt? But the Rt. Hon. Gent. says, Of what avail would it be to institute such an inquiry? for even should the claims of his R. H. be substantiated, where was the royal property upon which to execute judgment? This again was a subject for parliamentary inquiry. Indeed, for his part, he never could reflect upon the subject, without feeling surprise and regret at the destitute and contemptible state in which the Royal Family were placed in this respect —*(A cry of Hear! hear!)*—and here the respectful manner in which his R. H. had conducted himself towards his Majesty should not be forgotten or pass unnoticed. But it seems that the measure proposed this day was not to be considered in the light of a compromise. The Rt. Hon. Gent. only says, that he is glad his R. H. consents to wave his claims, because the pursuing of them would place his R. H. not only in an awkward situation with respect to his Majesty, but also with regard to the public. How this should be it was not easy to discover. But in lieu of his claims, it seems his R. H. is to be placed on the same footing in which he stood previous to the arrangement of 1795. Some Gentlemen might think, indeed, that 125,000*l.* was a large income, even in such a situation as that of his R. H. He must beg leave to be of a contrary opinion. The House should not look to the different value of money at different times, when the revenue of the Crown was considered, and the increase which it might be proper to make in the civil list, and lose sight altogether of the same consideration when it applied to the affairs of his R. H. the Prince of Wales. Indeed, it seemed to be adverted to on all occasions, unless when it regarded him, to whose situation, however, it was most peculiarly applicable. He, for one, was of opinion that a fixed sum should be granted to the Prince and to his Majesty for the demands of the civil list; and that it should not be examined and reviewed every year, with a reference to the different value of money; or if this reference was made in the case of the one, so also was it fair to make the same reference in the case of the other. The proposition now was to restore the Prince to what he before enjoyed, viz. the sum of 125,000*l.*; but, after this resolution is agreed to, when is his R. H. to resume the style and magnificence which his rank requires him to maintain? His R. H. says it is not in his power to resume them immediately; with the motives that induce him to defer it the Rt. Hon. Gent. professes to be acquainted, but he does not choose to explain them. Among these motives may be the payment of foreign debts and other claims—claims which honour and principle acknowledge to be valid: but these, it seems, are not to be considered in the light of strict claims; his R. H. however, may think and feel otherwise. Neither, it appears, should he feel for those who lost ten per cent. on the debentures; their loss was imputable to their own mismanagement; for the Commissioners did not take off ten per cent. of their value; for they gave the creditors the option of debentures of 100*l.* bearing an interest of 3*l.* per cent. or debentures of 90*l.* bearing an interest of 5*l.* per cent. The Rt. Hon. Gent. says these debentures may have been at a discount at the time; but that was on account of the state of public affairs, and there was a great probability that after a time they would have borne a premium—that might very well be. There was a wide difference between a guinea and a debenture; and it is the value of any thing at the particular time that is to be considered as its true value. The creditors, it may be true, were not forced to deduct ten per cent.; but the terms held out to them were such as to induce them to take 90*l.* debentures, and that even while the debentures were at a discount. He was not prepared to say that all those who lost ten per cent. in the debentures had claims upon his R. H.; but he, and not Parliament, was the best judge of the matter. But the Rt. Hon. Gent. says his R. H. can have contracted no legal claims since the year 1795. The debts alluded to might not be what are called strictly legal, but honour might look upon them as fair claims. There again his R. H. and not the House, was the fittest person to judge. Under whatsoever aspect these claims might be viewed, they must be such in the mind of his R. H. as to prevent him from immediately resuming his wonted establishment. To his own prudence and economy it surely might now be left to distinguish what were his legal, what his promisable debts, and to judge of the time when it might be convenient to him to appear again in that state with which, from his rank and situation, he is expected to be attended. He should not be condemned to do at forty what he had done at the age of twenty—to enter upon an establishment to which his income was inadequate. The wisdom and liberality

of Parliament should guard him against such difficulties; from what they have lately witnessed, they should be induced to forget the past. It was evident that his R. H. had of late redeemed his character by the most prudential regard to pecuniary affairs, and by a system of economy which it is scarcely natural to expect in such a situation. What before was reluctantly, might now be joyfully, performed, and the House should no longer hesitate in hastening the moment when his R. H. might be restored to that state of splendour and magnificence, of which the circumstances of his birth and expectations should never be disrobed.

Mr. Fuller was of opinion that it was degrading his R. H. into the abject condition of a bankrupt, to permit his creditors to sustain a loss on their claims of 10 per cent.

Mr. Bankes contended, that the question that had been stirred on the present occasion should not be agitated without bringing it to some final decision. An attention to the claims of his R. H. by some was regarded as a matter of favour, by others as a matter of right. The House, indeed, did not know whether the claim had been preferred or not, and it might be wise in them not to come to a decision upon a matter on which they were not competent to decide; at least such a question was not now before them, and it would not be fair to debar his R. H. from a petition of right by the present motion, if he possessed such a right—neither would it be fair in his R. H. to make any such compromise in his claim. In this view he disliked the tendency of the resolution, and felt inclined to vote against it.

The question was now loudly called for, and the resolution was put and agreed to without a division.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, February 25.—(See Minutes, p. 340.)

[Establishment of the Prince of Wales.]—Lord Pelham called the attention of their Lordships to the consideration of his Majesty's most gracious message relative to the establishment of his R. H. the Prince of Wales. After a very few prefatory observations, his Lordship concluding by moving an address to his Majesty, the purport of which was to assure his Majesty that their Lordships would most heartily concur in any measures, the object of which was to promote the comfort, or to ensure the dignity of so distinguished a branch of his Royal House.

The Earl of Carlisle made a few remarks expressive of his readiness to concur in any proposition calculated to restore his R. H. to that situation of splendour and dignity which he had, with such honour to himself, so long consented to lay aside. He could not, however, help stating, that if any arrangement was to be made for this purpose, it should be one perfectly consistent with that high sense of honour, and that powerful love of justice, by which every part of the conduct of his R. H. was distinguished. It was not fair nor honourable that his R. H. by not having his claims settled to arrears in the duchy of Cornwall, to a much larger amount than would be sufficient to relieve him from every incumbrance, should be placed in the humiliating situation of a debtor of the public, instead of appearing, as he really was, their creditor to a large amount. His Lordship contented himself with throwing out these hints in this stage of the business, reserving the power of delivering his sentiments at length when the subject came to be discussed in a specific form.

Earl Moira assured their Lordships, in the name of his R. H. of his perfect readiness cheerfully to acquiesce in any arrangement which Parliament in its wisdom might adopt. On the subject of his R. H.'s claims, he declined at present offering any decisive opinion, more especially when he considered that the Noble and Learned Lord on the Woolsack was, from circumstances not unknown to their Lordships, prevented from stating his sentiments on this subject. After expressing his cordial approbation of any measures by which the situation of his R. H. might be improved and his feelings gratified, he finished by reserving a more detailed statement of his sentiments till a direct measure was offered for their Lordships' consideration.

The question was then put on the motion for the address, and carried *nemine dissentiente*.

[Finance.]—Lord Auckland, adverting to some observations which he had made on a former evening on the subject of the financial situation of the country, stated, that he had thought it his duty to examine what he had then held forth to their Lordships with considerable care, and the result of his examination had been, that what he then adduced was strictly correct. In consequence of what had fallen from a Noble Lord opposite (Lord Grenville), who was apparently disposed to doubt the accuracy of his statement, he was anxious that the matter should undergo a full and fair discussion. To have this subject brought fairly under their Lordships' consideration, he was therefore desirous that the documents by which his statements were to be substantiated should be laid on the table, and it was with the view of moving for their production that he now solicited their Lordships' attention. He did not wish that the discussion should be in any degree precipi-

tated, but he imagined, that about the middle of next week he might be able to bring the subject to a fair issue, and he should then move that the paper which he was now about to mention should be printed for their Lordships' use.—The Noble Lord, after this explanation, sat down with moving for "An "account of the permanent taxes and annual "grants for three years, ending the 5th of "January 1783;"—"An account of the du-"ties on bonded sugars;" and "An account "of the duties on malt and beer during the "same period."

A short explanation here took place betwixt Earl Moira, the Duke of Norfolk, and Lord Auckland.

Lord GRENVILLE expressed his high satisfaction at the honourable and candid mode of proceeding which the Noble Lord had adopted on the present occasion. It afforded him extreme satisfaction, that an opportunity was to be afforded of entering into a full and fair investigation of the financial state of the country; a subject at all times of the highest importance, but deriving new interest from the circumstances in which the country was placed. Nothing, his Lordship observed, could be more gratifying to his feelings, than that the statement of the Noble Lord respecting the financial resources of the country should be realized in all their extent. But he could not help observing that he had considerable doubts of the accuracy of that statement. The permanent charges on the consolidated fund had been stated at twenty-five millions, and the expenditure of the country at twenty-four. This, however, was by nearly four millions inferior to what he considered the real expenditure, even under the existence of a peace establishment, which made a difference to this amount betwixt the statement of the Noble Lord, and the real amount of the expenditure. He was happy that the matter was to be brought to an issue, for it was not a matter of light importance. The real resources of the country ought to be ascertained on clear and undeniable principles, and it was not fit that it should be left to vague speculation to decide what exertions we might be able to make in any emergency which might occur. The time which the Noble Lord had mentioned he thought was hardly adequate for that full consideration and inquiry which would be necessary to prepare their Lordships for fairly and advantageously entering on the discussion. Instead of proposing the discussion at the time that the motion was made for printing the papers, he thought it would be much more agreeable to parliamentary order that the papers should first be printed, and that a subsequent day should be appointed for taking them into consideration. There was also another point to which he begged leave to turn their Lordships' consideration. In the papers which the Noble Lord had moved for, there was nothing by which their Lordships might be enabled to compare the public receipts with the public expenditure. But if the discussion was intended to be conducted in a satisfactory manner, it was essential that they should be put in possession of every document by which a satisfactory opinion might be obtained. He would therefore suggest to the Noble Lord, while he moved for documents to exhibit a view of the amount of the national receipts, not to overlook those documents which presented a statement of the national expenditure, without which it was impossible to draw any conclusion on the subject.—In consequence of some private explanation betwixt the Noble Lord and Lord Auckland, his Lordship, in addition to his three former motions, moved for "An account "of the various charges on the consolidated "fund, during the same three years to which "the former accounts referred."

The motions were then successively put from the woolsack, and carried.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, Mar. 2.—(See Minutes, p. 341.)

[IRISH REVENUE.]—Mr. CORRY moved, that the House should resolve itself into a committee upon the Irish revenue acts, and that the several accounts which had been presented should be referred to the said committee.—Ordered.

The House then resolved itself into a committee, Mr. ALEXANDER in the Chair.

Mr. CORRY said, that having stated to the House upon a former occasion the subject matter which was now under the consideration of the committee, it would not be necessary for him to occupy much of the time or attention of the committee, by going very minutely into the subject. The object of the motion with which he should now trouble the committee, was to renew the grants of the revenue of Ireland, which were heretofore annual grants, which were so while the Parliament of Ireland sat, and which had continued to be so since the Union. It was his intention to move, that those duties which had hitherto subsisted should be continued. He had at different periods given notice, that he meant to propose to move, that these duties should be granted permanently, that is to say, without limitation, instead of granting them annually; and he should therefore now move, to continue them without any period of limitation. The reason why he proposed to make this alteration, and depart from the usual mode, was this; viz. for the purpose of providing a permanent fund to meet the permanent charges of Ireland; such as the interest of the debt, the provision for the sinking fund, and also several grants under acts of Parliament, from the commencement of his

Majesty's reign to the present time. These were all charges to which the consolidated fund was liable, without any annual grants. The case was different with regard to the particular services of each year; for them it was necessary to come to Parliament for provision every year, as in this country. But with regard to the national debt of Ireland, it had never yet been permanently provided for, though, upon the propriety of making such a permanent provision, he was sure there could not be two opinions in that House. If the committee should concur with him upon this occasion, then the interest of the national debt, and other permanent charges in Ireland, would, as in England, have a permanent provision. The other grants for which he proposed to make this kind of provision were also in their nature permanent. With regard to the duties which he now proposed to continue, they consisted of duties upon imports, upon exports, bounties, drawbacks upon the re-exportation of foreign commodities, certain duties upon tonnage, together with all the inland duties of every description. They were generally the same as had subsisted since the Union, and since the last Parliament of Ireland: he said generally, because there were some small differences, but not of a nature sufficiently important to render it necessary for him to go into detail upon the subject: but if the committee, or any Gentleman, wished to have any more detailed information upon the subject, he would give it with the greatest satisfaction. In some cases in these duties, where there were fractions of a penny, or of a farthing, they had been made up to the integer, but the difference was very trifling indeed. In the case also of licenses granted to persons to carry on certain trades, in some instances the duty of the license was raised; but he hoped it had been done with due consideration of the nature of the trade, and of its capability to afford it; and he had every reason to believe that they would not in any instance be found oppressive. With respect to drawbacks, to bounties, and to inland duties, they remained the same. He took this opportunity of stating, that with regard to the duties on home-made spirits, certain notions had gone abroad, and discussions had taken place; but he wished distinctly to say, that there was nothing in these resolutions which at all touched the subjects that had been so under discussion. He was sure that many Gentlemen who represented the other part of the united kingdom perfectly comprehended what he alluded to, and he was therefore anxious to make their minds easy, as well as those of their constituents, by declaring that the subject was not touched in the present resolutions; neither would it be brought forward without full notice being given. Mr. Corry proceeded to notice some other slight alterations which he proposed to make, such as placing two or three towns which, from their extent and population, were entitled to rank among the first towns, in that class to which they belonged, because the persons living in these towns paid more for their licenses than those who resided in smaller ones. With regard to the proposal made for repealing certain duties, he wished to state that his object was, to put all the duties into one act, in order that merchants might have before them, in one view, all the duties which they had to pay. The whole of the duties he should therefore propose to re-enact in one act of Parliament, with some very trifling alterations which he did not think it then necessary to occupy the time of the committee with detailing at length. There was some difference between the book of rates in England and Ireland; some articles appeared in the one which were not in the other, and sometimes the same articles went under different denominations in the two countries. He had endeavoured to assimilate them as much as possible to each other, because this difference might be productive of great inconvenience; for instance, if accounts were called for from the custom-houses of the two countries with respect to some articles, the accounts, for the reason he had given, would not agree. This inconvenience was not merely of a temporary nature; for the committee would recollect, that at the end of twenty years, by the compact of Union, a new view was to be taken of the respective wealth and abilities for contribution of the two countries; it was therefore a matter of the greatest importance that the accounts of imports and exports should be as accurately kept as possible; and for this purpose an uniformity of denomination was absolutely necessary. Another object which he had endeavoured to accomplish was, to reduce the duties, which in some instances were rated duties, and in others *ad valorem* duties, to one general rated duty. This would be a very great convenience to merchants, for whose accommodation he proposed this regulation.

After some conversation between Col. Vereker, Mr. Corry, Mr. Wickham, and Mr. Lee,

Colonel Bagwell said, it was certainly a question of considerable importance, whether certain duties should be appropriated for certain purposes. Undoubtedly the best security ought to be given to the creditors of the national debt, but he thought it necessary that the House should have further information with regard to the different duties and taxes which they were called upon to vote permanently. In the last session, the duties were voted all together, and it was now proposed at once to make them all permanent. He was by no means inclined to give any opposition to the measure, or to oppose any of the duties, but he really thought, that upon a question of so much magnitude some further time should be given for consideration, in order

that they might know what they were to vote. Some of the duties which it was proposed to continue were considered in Ireland as war taxes, and that they were consequently to cease on the termination of the war. Such, for instance, was the duty on windows; and there were some others, which, in his opinion, required examination before they were voted permanently. He hoped, therefore, that the Rt. Hon. Gent. would not press the resolutions at present, but that he would postpone them, at least, for a few days.

Mr. Corry said, that the Hon. Gent. had complained of the want of sufficient information, and had stated that the duties had been voted last session altogether. He begged, however, to observe, that every possible information had been laid before the House. In the two last sessions, and in the present one, accounts had been presented of the amount of the revenue of Ireland, and also an account of the permanent charges. The House was therefore in possession of the two species of information which were necessary, viz., the amount of the revenue, and the amount of the charges. By an account now upon the table, the Hon. Gent. would find the receipts of the exchequer of Ireland last year amounted to 3,320,000*l.* and the amount of the permanent charges, consisting of the different items to which he had before alluded, amounted to 2,581,000*l.* The Hon. Gent. knew that all the revenues of Ireland formed one consolidated fund, and that whatever excess there was after the payment of the permanent charges, was applicable to the current services of the year. There were already granted this year many services, exceeding the surplus that would remain of the revenue, after the payment of the permanent charges; so that the House was in complete possession of every part of the subject. The Hon. Gent. had stated, that some of the taxes which it was proposed to continue were considered in Ireland as war taxes, and that it was expected they would cease on the termination of the war, and had instanced in particular the duty on windows. Upon this subject the Hon. Gent. had fallen into an error. There certainly had been an attempt of some persons whose sentiments were extremely different from the Hon. Gent.'s (and indeed he ought almost to offer an apology for making any sort of comparison between them), he meant the Jacobins of Ireland, to represent this as a war tax; but certainly no such idea was thrown out when the tax was proposed; it was a provision for the largest loan that had ever then been made in Ireland. The Hon. Gent. might indeed recollect a regulation which was made for the collection of the tax, which was a war regulation. It had been the avowed object of many persons in Ireland to obstruct the public supplies in every possible way, to depreciate the paper of the Bank of Ireland, and to injure the national credit; and in order to prevent those persons from throwing off their shoulders their share of the general burden, a clause was introduced, which enacted that persons should pay the duty according to the number of windows which their houses contained at the time when the tax was laid on. This regulation was certainly a war regulation, and of course expired with the war.

Col. Bagwell said, it was by no means his wish to give any opposition, or to throw any impediment in the way of public business; but as it was a subject of very great importance, he wished the Rt. Hon. Gent. would defer the consideration of it for a few days, in order to give the Gentlemen who represented that part of the United Kingdom an opportunity of inquiring into the subject. Without entering at present into the subject, he wished to observe with respect to one tax, which appeared to him to be very unfairly laid on; he meant the tax upon leather: the tanners of this country (England) paid at the rate of one penny per lb. which was allowed as a drawback upon exportation to Ireland, and then the duty of one penny was again laid on in Ireland; but, from the mode of collecting the tax in Ireland, the Irish tanners, instead of one penny, paid about 2½d. or something more, per pound; and this he knew had excited considerable uneasiness and discontent. His object in mentioning these circumstances was not, he repeated, to throw any obstacle in the way of the business, but, if possible, to remove every ground of serious objection.

Mr. J. Latouche said, he concurred with the Hon. Member who spoke last, in hoping that a few days would be given for the consideration of the subject. There was one tax which he was instructed to oppose as a permanent tax, and that was the duty upon windows. The Rt. Hon. Gent. seemed to suppose the opposition to this tax proceeded from persons of dispositions not very favourable to the constitution; but he had a petition against it from one of the most loyal corporations in Ireland, the corporation of the city of Dublin.

Mr. Corry said, it certainly was not an object with him to hurry this business through the House, or to prevent a full discussion of every part of it; on the contrary, if there was one mode better calculated than another to afford the means of discussion and investigation, he should most readily consent to it; but he begged leave to remind Gentlemen, that the duties which it was now proposed to continue were the same as those which had been voted in the Parliament of Ireland. With respect to what had been suggested about the tax upon leather, he wished to say a very few words. Since this tax was originally laid on,

at the rate of one penny per lb. it had never been increased, and it was a trade which, like many others, was carried on upon a very small scale in Ireland, and was spread generally over the face of the country; the consequence of which was, that in the distant parts of the kingdom many of the tanners paid little or nothing to the tax; and those who resided in or near great towns, could not bring their articles to market nearly so cheap as those who were enabled to evade the duty. Knowing this to be the state of the trade, he had endeavoured to inform himself whether any plan could be adopted, which would secure the profits of the fair trader, and at the same time ensure the collection of the revenue. From the information of a tanner, who had been in a considerable line of business, and who was enabled to give him complete information upon the subject, he (Mr. Corry) was able to form a system, which, in his opinion, would secure both these objects. He then called together a meeting of the trade in the city of Dublin; they were at first extremely hostile to the system he proposed; but, after repeated discussions upon the subject, every man remained perfectly satisfied with the tax; to prove which he would mention a circumstance (which of course he should not otherwise allude to), the corporation of tanners voted him their thanks for his plan. The effect of this regulation was, that in the ensuing year the tax amounted to 52,000*l.* whereas in the preceding year it was only 18,000*l.* It was true, that in different parts of the country there were some murmurs upon the subject—he believed, in particular, from the city of Waterford. His Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Wickham) transmitted to him some information upon the subject, when he was on the point of embarking for England, which induced him to delay his voyage, and to send down to that city to request that deputation from the trade there might be sent up to investigate the subject with him, which offer they, however, declined. With respect to what had been said by the Hon. Gent. upon the propriety of delaying the discussion upon this question, he wished to observe to them, that this subject divided itself into two different heads; that they were now considering the propriety of laying on the duties, and that the proper time for discussing the mode of collecting them would occur in another stage of the business: as to any alteration which might be judged necessary in the mode of collecting the duties, if Gentlemen thought a delay upon this subject was necessary, he should have no hesitation in concurring in it. But with respect to the duties themselves, Gentlemen knew that they all expired on the 25th of March. It may be asked, why he did not introduce this measure sooner? This question he would answer, by asking another, namely, why it was that Gentlemen from that part of the United Kingdom did not appear sooner in their places? for he was particularly anxious not to bring forward a measure so important to that part of the United Kingdom, whilst so many of its representatives were absent.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he really hoped that Gentlemen would not press for any further delay. It would be remembered, that the preamble of this measure was discussed last session; that distinct notice was then given by his Rt. Hon. Friend, that the present proposition would be brought forward in the present session. It was in the contemplation of his Rt. Hon. Friend to have brought it forward previous to the recess; but he abstained from it, on account of the absence of so many Members who represented the other part of the United Kingdom; but he then gave notice, that he would bring it forward at an early period after the Christmas recess, and since then his time had been occupied in consequence of his being upon an election committee. The committee would recollect, that the Irish duties would cease on the 25th of March; the necessity of dispatch must therefore be obvious. It would also be recollected, that it was merely the resolutions that were before the committee, that the subject would again come before the House in the shape of a bill, in the various stages of which Gentlemen might state any objections that occurred to them. When he recollected that the grants for the permanent charges of Ireland were voted from year to year, he was really astonished how the credit of that country had stood so high as it had done for the last two years. The necessity of avoiding any unnecessary delay was obvious from a variety of considerations. Suppose the House should not be able to make the necessary ballots, and that the public business should be suspended for a few days, the consequence would be, that the whole revenue of Ireland would be in a state of abeyance. He therefore hoped that Gentlemen would feel the impropriety of proposing any unnecessary delay.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, Mar. 3.—(See Minutes, p. 343.)

[Militia training bill.]—Lord Hobart moved the order of the day for the second reading of the militia exercise bill; which being done, he observed he felt it unnecessary to take up the time of the House on the present occasion; the general subject, of which the bill formed a part, was well known to their Lordships, as it had undergone ample and repeated discussions in that House when it was last regularly before them. He would observe, that the bill now under consideration went merely to amend one clause in the general bill. It would be in their Lordships' recollection, that by the last bill the militia was

was to be called out, for the purpose of training and exercising, for the term of twenty-one days; the bill in question was simply to extend that term to twenty-eight days. In the first instance, the lesser interval was considered as adequate, and the longer term was regarded as objectionable, principally on the score of expense. However, on maturer deliberation, it was found expedient, and, upon the whole, deemed advisable to extend the term for the purposes he had mentioned to the space of twenty-eight days: this being all the bill proposed to do, he should no longer detain the House, but merely move, "That "the bill be now read a second time."

The Duke of MONTROSE considered the bill as one of the utmost importance, and highly worthy of their Lordships' serious consideration. It was not his intention to oppose the second reading, but he thought it necessary not to allow the present opportunity to escape without submitting to their Lordships a few remarks which naturally suggested themselves on the motion for the second reading of a bill of the nature of that now before the House. In the present circumstances in which the country was placed, he could not help considering the proper training of the militia as a matter intimately connected with the preservation of our national freedom and independence. It was impossible that the very great change which had taken place in our situation relative to foreign powers should have escaped their Lordships' attention. A nation, which for ages had been our constant rival, had received a prodigious accession of strength from the acquisition of many populous nations, united as a branch of its population, or attached by the bonds of intimate alliance. The military character of this rival power had acquired new vigour, and all its resources were under the direction of a bold and adventurous chief. Of the character of this chief he had no intention at present particularly to speak; and while he adverted to this subject, he wished Noble Lords to understand that he was not arguing on the supposition of a speedy rupture. He saw nothing in the circumstances of the two countries which induced him particularly to anticipate such a rupture; but every dictate of policy and expediency required additional precautions in the measures calculated to guard against any unforeseen and unexpected renewal of hostilities. He had already said that it was not his intention particularly to descant on the character and views of the chief magistrate of France. At the same time he thought it fair to observe that he was known not to be particularly scrupulous in the choice of the means to which he resorted for the accomplishment of his views. When our situation was considered with reference to these circumstances, he conceived that there could not exist the smallest difference of opinion as to the necessity of keeping up a much larger military establishment than had ever been maintained or judged requisite in any former period of our history. This, indeed, his Majesty's Ministers had felt in its proper extent; and, with the conviction of this necessity, they had proposed, and Parliament had voted, the support of a peace establishment much more extensive than had ever been previously maintained. While he contended for the necessity of this increased establishment, and the expediency of keeping up a large effective military force, it was not because he entertained any dread of the ultimate consequence of any invasion which might be made on our coasts, wherever or at whatever period that invasion should take place; but it was essential that the country should be in that state of preparation, and should have such a disposable military force, as should enable us to meet invasion at once, however remote the quarter might be where the landing was attempted. On this account he was anxious that some other plan for the training of the militia, more effectual than that now proposed by the bill, should be adopted. When he considered what proportion of the time allotted for training the militia was exhausted in marching to the places where the training was to take place, and how many days intervened when the training was necessarily discontinued, he could not help thinking the period proposed by the bill was too short. For the correctness of this opinion the Noble Duke appealed to those Noble Lords who were professionally attached to the army, as well as to such of their Lordships as, from patriotic motives, had taken an active share in the training of the militia during the late war, whether the period which the bill prescribed for the training of the militia henceforth to be raised, was not inadequate to the purpose in view. He had himself no particular plan to propose, but he submitted to their Lordships whether the addition of twenty-eight days more, during which one third of the militia might be trained, would not be productive of the most beneficial effects. Of the militia so trained, one third only would be occupied in rotation; and by the adoption of this expedient, a large proportion of the regular military force would be left applicable either to a sudden descent on an enemy's coast, or to the undertaking of some expedition in a distant quarter of the world. These were points of very great importance, at no time to be neglected, but peculiarly necessary to be attended to in the present situation of the country. Only these grounds of objection occurred to him against the plan which he now suggested. It might be urged, that any farther extension of the time allotted to the training of the militia would create a very large additional expense, would be productive of much inconvenience to the officers, and would withdraw a great proportion of active, laborious citizens from

domestic occupations, at a time when their services might be particularly wanted. To the first of these objections the answer appeared to him simple and satisfactory. When it was considered that the whole expense of the training of the militia at present did not exceed two hundred thousand pounds, and that if a third of them were trained for double the period, an expense of only sixty thousand pounds more would be incurred, he could not allow this consideration of expense to have any weight: as applicable to the expenditure of so great a nation as this was, it was perfectly trifling. The second objection he viewed as equally unworthy of attention: Gentlemen, acting as officers of the militia, would only have to submit to an additional attendance of twenty-eight days, and that would only happen once in three years. This surely was no very serious inconvenience; but even admitting it to be much greater than it really was, it would be paying Gentlemen a bad compliment, whose situation called on them to act in the capacity of militia officers, to suppose that they would not, with the greatest alacrity and cheerfulness, submit to inconveniencies far greater, with the view of rendering so essential a service to their country. A sacrifice of this nature, and one of far greater magnitude, was indeed what their country had a right to demand. As to the objection drawn from the inexpediency of withdrawing a large proportion of the laborious classes from their ordinary occupations, he admitted that it was entitled to consideration: but it applied, though in a less degree, to the extension of the period of training which the bill proposed. The Noble Duke repeated the observation with which he introduced his speech, that it was not by any means his wish to oppose the second reading of the bill, and it was the farthest from his view to embarrass any of the measures of Government. He placed the greatest confidence in Ministers, and for many of them he entertained the highest possible respect and esteem. What he had now taken the liberty of throwing out had arisen from his anxious wish that every thing connected with the safety of the country might be placed on the most respectable footing; and if not at present, at least during the next session of Parliament, some arrangement of the nature which he had suggested would occupy the attention of Ministers. He was the less anxious at the present moment to press any measure on the acceptance of Government, as, from the vast number of militia which had been kept up during the war, a large disposable force could now, if circumstances required it, be easily procured.

Lord Hobart, on the part of Ministers, thanked the Noble Duke for the hints which he had thrown out for their consideration. They certainly were well deserving of attention, as indeed every thing was that fell from so respectable a quarter. Ministers were fully aware of the important change which had taken place in the situation of this country relative to foreign powers; and so far as the question of the augmentation of a military disposable force was concerned, ample provision had been made during the last session by the vote of a peace establishment, of a nature adequate to protect us against any sudden danger. The militia during last war had been found of essential service, and it was with the view of rendering their services still more efficient than the present bill had been framed.

After a few words in explanation from the Duke of Montrose, the bill was then read a second time, and committed for next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, Mar. 4.—(See Minutes, p. 402.)

[Prince of Wales's establishment.] —Mr. Calcraft said, that before he entered on the short statement with which he meant to preface the proposition he held in his hand, he thought it necessary to declare, as he had done on a former night, that he never had any communication on the subject with the illustrious personage to whom it alluded, nor with any other person, save one. However delicate the subject might be, he trusted that the method he should adopt in bringing it forward was such as would not be objected to by any person of any party whatever. The message which had lately been presented to the House he considered as the language of the Minister, though it was called the message of the Crown, and in that were involved matters which he thought of the greatest consequence, as they related to a subject so important, as that of keeping up the splendour and dignity attached to the high station of the Heir Apparent of the monarchy of this country. Sorry he was, that what had been done in consequence of that message was not effectual, so as to enable the illustrious personage alluded to in it to resume that dignity and splendour immediately, of which he had been so long deprived. To enable him to do this, was his object in bringing forward the present proposition; and the mode he intended to pursue in doing so, was to move for a committee to inquire into the extent of those claims which at present embarrass his R. H. and prevent him from resuming that exalted rank and station which it was so much to be lamented he had ever been obliged to relinquish. He expressed the utmost confidence that the House would do every thing necessary towards so desirable a purpose; and when he considered his Majesty's message, he was certain that it went further than the mere voting such a sum as does not put the Prince one jot nearer to the resumption of his dignity than he was before. An Hon. Gent. (Mr. Erskine) had, on a for-

mer night, on opening this business, said that his R. H. was satisfied. He was at all times willing to take that Hon. Member's assurance; but, as a Member of Parliament, he should not think himself justified in taking the assurance even of the illustrious personage to whom he alluded, in a case of so peculiar a delicacy and so unusual an importance as the present. Feeling, as he did, the pressing necessity of the Prince's resuming that state and dignity which belonged to his exalted situation, it was much better the House should go a step further than it had yet done, by adopting the proposition he had to offer, than suffer his illustrious character to be liable to imputations, which there were too many would be ready to throw on it, if, after the sum voted in consequence of the message, he still continued in that state of privacy in which he had already so long remained. If it should be supposed there was any question of delicacy in instituting an inquiry into the Prince's affairs, he was certain the Commissioners, in 1795, went infinitely farther than he intended to do. There doubtless was no mode of compelling a disclosure of the state of his R. H.'s affairs, but if the committee was appointed, and any objection was made from that quarter, he and the House would have the satisfaction to know, that they had gone as far as they could, and done every thing in their power to expedite the wishes of his Majesty to the fullest extent, and as early as possible. For his own part, he should not have undertaken the business, but that he thought he saw an anxious desire in the House on a former night to emancipate his R. H. immediately from those embarrassments with which he was at present surrounded. While Ministers were continually holding forth, and while the House rejoiced to join them in congratulations to the country on the flourishing state in which it now stands, the rank, the splendour, and dignity of the Heir Apparent ought not to be overlooked. If we were to be splendid in our national establishment, if we prided ourselves on the magnitude of our undertakings, and on the extent of our improvements in arts, arms, manufactures, and commerce, is the Prince of Wales alone, said the Hon. Member, to live in a parlour of his palace, and be known to the people of this country only as a dignified personage in private life? He could not suppose the House would longer endure such an idea. This was not a personal question by any means. The public at large was interested, and deeply interested, in this illustrious personage, who is the Heir Apparent to the monarchy, being speedily restored to that high rank and dignity in which it is their pride and glory to see him. In bringing forward this measure, he could assure the House that he did not mean the smallest disrespect to any human creature. He could not but feel for the situation of the illustrious personage to whom his proposition alluded, who, with so much honour to himself, had, by the communication he had made to the House, candidly acknowledged, that notwithstanding his Majesty's paternal kindness, and the liberal disposition of the House, he could not resume the rank and splendour attached to his dignified station, till certain debts which he thought himself bound in honour to pay were discharged. As an independent Member of Parliament, he thought it his duty to appeal to the House to stand forward at once, and extricate his R. H. from those embarrassments, and thus enable him to resume immediately that splendour and dignity which it was the evident wish of his Majesty's message he should do, and which he was certain it was also the wish of a great majority of that House that he would do. He should not therefore longer trespass on the time of the House than to read his motion, which he did to the following purport:—

"That the House, anxiously desirous to give "full effect to the important objects contained "in his Majesty's most gracious message of "the 16th of February, do appoint a select "committee to inquire into the embarrass-"ments of the Prince of Wales, and into the "most effectual means of relieving them as "speedily as possible, in order to enable his "R. H. to resume the splendour and dignity "attached to his exalted station."

Mr. Erskine said, the Hon. Gent. who had made the motion had adverted to what he had said on a former night. On that night he came into the House by accident, and on his entrance he found an Hon. Member, who held an official situation under the Prince of Wales, reading in his place to the House the communication which his R. H. had thought it his duty to make to them. After that Hon. Member had performed the duty imposed on him, the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down gave notice of the motion he intended this day to bring forward; and he then, as a servant of his R. H. thought it his duty to state to the House that the Prince had expressly assured him he was perfectly satisfied, both with the gracious intentions of his Royal Father, and the liberal proceedings of Parliament, though he thought it a duty incumbent on him to state to them, that he could not for some time resume that splendour and dignity they were desirous he should do. At the same time he thought it necessary to add, that the motion, of which the Hon. Gent. had given notice, was altogether unknown to the illustrious personage to whom it related; because, as that notice had been given so immediately after the communication from his R. H. had been read, it might have been conceived by the public, had nothing been said of it, that it was made with the Prince's privity, and he would then have seemed to be at variance with that satisfaction which he expressed himself to have felt at the proceedings

of Parliament. He made this declaration now, he said, to shew why he had acted as he did, in order that it might not be thought that he meant to discountenance the motion. Proud as he was, and ever should be, in possessing the confidence, and acting as the servant of the illustrious personage to whom the present motion alluded, he had still a higher character to support, that of a Member of Parliament; and as such he thought it necessary to give his reason why he had not spoken on the subject of his Majesty's message. His Majesty did not ask any specific sum, but left it to the House to decide for the interest and advantage of so near and dear a branch of the Royal Family. The Rt. Hon. Gent. who was the organ of the Crown, in bringing forward the measure, had acted with that moderation which did him the highest honour, as it shewed his desire to comply with the wishes of his Majesty, and at the same time to make the pressure on the people as light as possible. He did not think it proper to give any opinion at that time on the subject. It does, however, now distinctly appear, that what is done will not be effectual. The present motion was no censure on his Majesty's message, nor any criticism on the conduct of Ministers; if it had been either of these, he should think himself bound to vote against it. His Majesty says, by his message to the House, Enable me to give that which will restore dignity to the Prince of Wales; and the House assured his Majesty, by their address, that they were ready to do so. The sum, however, voted is not sufficient for the purpose, and the Hon. Member who makes the present motion is desirous to remedy the defect. This, therefore, is not a proposition from Ministers, but from an independent Member of Parliament; and its design is to shew our desire to support the monarchy. It is only to say, We desire to give your Majesty more than you ask; in order to keep up the splendour of the Prince, we desire to add to that sum which your Majesty's Minister has asked and obtained from the liberality of Parliament. Suppose the Rt. Hon. Gent. had asked any specific sum, perhaps it might have roused the recollection of some Members, and induced them to revert to the expenses of the war, and other burdens, which certainly pressed on the people. He rose thus early, in order to shew, that in the present motion there was no hostility to the message. He was sure the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s disposition towards the Prince was not limited by the proposition he had brought forward, but that if Parliament chose to add to that sum, he would be as glad as any one to see the Heir Apparent relieved from his embarrassments. For his own part, he was happy to think that this business would be finally settled, without the claims of the Prince having been brought forward. On this head, he had never said that those claims would amount to any specific sum, but what he had asserted was, that the Prince of Wales was entitled to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall from his birth. This doctrine had never been contradicted by any lawyer in that House, and had received the tacit assent of Lord Ellenborough, who was then Attorney-General. It was clear that the reason of that grant was for the sustentation and dignity of the Prince of Wales, independent of the King. With regard to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall, they had been received by his Majesty's Ministers, and it was no matter whether the amount was ascertained to be any particular sum: the fact was, that whether the public was indebted to the Prince or not, this was undeniable, that we have now a Prince of Wales, at the age of forty, who has been no burden on the public. The sum granted in consequence of the message was such as the House thought proper for any Prince of Wales. The Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, on a former occasion, stated that his Majesty's message had no connexion with the Prince's claims. The great object he had in view in troubling the House on the present occasion was, to remove all idea that the Prince has any concern or interest in the present motion; and he assured the House that he had no other anxiety on his mind than an ardent wish that the public should not suppose that the Prince had received the bounty of the House, and not acted according to its intentions in granting it, by immediately resuming the dignity and splendour which were the immediate intention of the grant.

Mr. Fuller said, he had no doubt but that our wise ancestors, in their wise institutions, meant to make the Prince of Wales independent of his father. What does the Hon. Gent. who made the motion ask?—only that the embarrassments of the Prince be inquired into by a committee of the House. What had been the effect of the deductions made by the Commissioners? They had tended to accumulate the present debts, which the Prince thought himself bound in honour to pay. He was astonished to see any reluctance shewn to so fair a proposition as that now under the consideration of the House. He was certain, had these items, which had been struck off by the Commissioners, been submitted to a jury of the country, they would have been universally allowed. He begged pardon for having expressed himself with considerable warmth; his feelings would not allow him to speak otherwise, when he reflected that he was arguing in favour of the most elegant, manly, and accomplished Prince in Europe.

Sir Robert Buxton said, that he should be extremely happy to see the Prince resume the splendour and dignity to which his rank in the state so fully entitled him; but he then spoke

as a representative of the people, and it behoved him as such to be very cautious how he imposed any additional burdens on them. It had been said that we were not now in a state of war; but are we not, he asked, in a financial situation very similar to that of a state of war? No taxes have yet been taken off, except the income-tax, and in lieu of that others have been imposed, which weighed very heavy on the body of the people, particularly the window-tax. He then asked if this was a time to be laying additional burdens on the people?—He desired the House to look at the present situation of France, to consider the immense army she kept up, and the gigantic exertions she was making to render herself the arbitress of the whole of Europe. No man wished more for the high establishment of the Royal Family than he did; but he thought the Prince would do himself more honour by giving up the trappings of royalty at this moment than by resuming them. For these reasons he was so thoroughly convinced of the impropriety of the present motion, that he thought it his duty to move the previous question.

Mr. Curwen observed that the proposition met with his hearty concurrence. He was as unwilling as any man to give his countenance or support to extravagance in any situation, however elevated; but he thought it unworthy the character or spirit of any Member of that House, to suppose for a moment that any man could entertain the most distant idea of withholding his support to the becoming state and dignity of the Heir Apparent to the throne of the British empire. With this view he should support the motion for a committee of inquiry, that those in the secret might come forward and explain what was the obstacle which prevented his R. H.'s immediate resumption of his state and dignity; that they might state what was the amount of the sum which occasioned the postponement of an object so much the wish of every man, he might say, in and out of that House, the splendour and dignity of the Prince of Wales.

Mr. Hilliard said, that his R. H. had certainly acknowledged, with a gratitude which becomes every son to his father, the kind attention of his Majesty in sending his most gracious recommendation to this House; and he had thanked the House for their liberality towards him; but he also had declared that he would not immediately resume his dignity. He would wish to see the Heir Apparent to the crown of this united kingdom, placed in a situation in which he has not been since the year 1787.

Mr. Johnstone stated, that he felt himself bound to object in the most decided manner to the motion. At the same time he yielded to no man in respect for the Prince, whose many noble and amiable qualities he acknowledged: but he did not consider himself at liberty to consult his feelings in the disposal of public money at a period when forty millions annually were raised from the subject, when even that enormous revenue was inadequate to the expenditure; and when, above all, we could only consider ourselves as preparing for another great and arduous struggle, which was to decide even our existence as a nation. When new burdens were to be imposed on the public, he expected that it would be shewn what was the correspondent benefit which the public was to derive. And though he felt that to maintain in due splendour all the branches of the Royal Family was essential to the true interests of the country, he must contend that no arguments were stated to prove the necessity of revoking those arrangements which Parliament, after great deliberation, had adopted in 1795. At that period a considerable ferment, a considerable degree of jacobinical spirit prevailed; and therefore it might have been argued that it would be dangerous to abridge the Prince of any part of that splendour, which certainly has its effect on the multitude: but now the whole people were united in loyalty to the King, affection for the Prince, and attachment to the constitution; and what they chiefly desired to behold in the Royal Family was, a sensibility of the many burdens with which they were oppressed. But other Gentlemen talked of the rights of the Prince resulting from the dutchy of Cornwall. This question was discussed in 1795, when relief had been solicited from Parliament, and it then was the duty of the Prince to urge his right, or rely on the generosity of the public. He had chosen the latter; and it was not fair, after experiencing the liberality of the country, to renew the claim of right. On this, however, he was not inclined to insist, especially as in the last year the Prince was desired to present his claims to legal discussion. Why was not that discussion brought to an issue? No difference could arise between the King and the Prince, as was stated: for the revenues having been applied to the public service, the public was answerable, and the King had no more to do with the suit than with any other in which he was made defendant in the way of form. But there existed another very good reason why the suit should not be prosecuted: that it could produce nothing; for, admitting the Prince entitled to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall from the hour of his birth, the amount was 234,000*l.* Now during the 12 last years of his minority, there had been issued

by regular payments - - - -	£.128,000
Extra payment - - - - - -	50,000
Half of 32,000*l.* paid jointly to the Duke of York and himself - -	16,000

Allowing that the expenses of the

first nine years of his minority were 5000*l.* per annum, which could scarcely be too much, as 6000*l.* was now allowed for the Princess of Wales - - - - - £.45,000

the whole expenditure was 259,000*l.* to be set against a receipt of 234,000*l.* during the Prince's minority. But was this all? There had been paid 60,000*l.* on his coming of age, 219,000*l.* in 1787, and 52,000*l.* in 1795, beyond the fixed and regular allowances: so that on the whole there were payments to the amount of 570,000*l.* to be opposed to a claim of 234,000*l.* He stated these facts because he considered the people of England insulted when they were told that his Highness had made a sacrifice by condescending to accept between 2 and 3000*l.* If that measure was adopted, it proceeded from the generosity and liberality of the nation, for no claim of right did exist. It was fit and proper the public and the House should know the true state of this question, and he was conscious he had discharged his duty in stating these facts.

Mr. Henry Lascelles said, it was with sincere regret he heard that his R. H. could not immediately resume that state and dignity which belonged essentially to his exalted station. The people in the country could not understand the nature or legality of his claims on the dutchy of Cornwall, and he could wish that question had been decided, and not held over the House *in terrorem*.

Sir William Geary said his R. H. possessed a more elevated mind than to make any indirect application; it was therefore unnecessary for any Member to declare that the present Motion was submitted to the House without the privity or consent of the Prince of Wales. But he felt himself bound by his duty as a Member of Parliament, to support the monarchical part of the government, and upon the same principle he thought it equally requisite that he should give every support in his power to the immediate resumption of that state of splendour and dignity which should belong to the Heir Apparent to the crown. He had been told that the Prince of Wales could not immediately resume his becoming splendour; but, in his opinion, the Hon. Member said, we should do it, we should enable him immediately to resume, for our own sake, whatever it might cost.

Mr. Dent said, he believed it was the wish of the House and country at large, that the Prince should resume that style of magnificence which should attach to this exalted personage.

Mr. Burdon was as anxious to promote the dignity of the Royal Family as any other Member in that House: but he had heard something said of debts of honour: these claims were directly against the letter and spirit of the regulation of 1795, and he thought it contrary to the manly spirit of that House to insist on inquiry. He should therefore vote for the previous question.

Mr. Tierney said, that he felt no degree of sorrow that the present discussion had been brought forward; but was, on the contrary, happy that this opportunity was offered of delivering his sentiments on the subject. When the Report of the committee on his Majesty's message was brought up, he, among other Members, was desirous of offering his opinion; but the House were told that they were pledged to go up to St. James's with the address on his Majesty's providential escape at three o'clock, and all discussion was therefore precluded. He could not help remarking on the impropriety of bringing forward the Report on a subject of such magnitude on the day when the House being under the necessity of waiting on his Majesty at a particular hour, were prevented from fully and fairly canvassing the merits of the proposition contained in the Report. All the accounts were now on the table, and an opportunity now offered itself of fairly considering the subject. In the remarks which he had now to offer, he might view himself as a Member who had been absent from any previous proceedings on the subject, and who was left to gather all his information from the Journals of the House. In what situation would such a Member then find himself placed? On the Journals of the House he would find a message from his Majesty, recommending the present condition of his R. H. to their attention, and expressing his confidence that they would make such arrangements as would secure the comfort and support the dignity of so distinguished a branch of the Royal Family. He would find this message followed up by a proposition on the part of Ministers, professing to have this object in view, and on the same Journals he would see an official communication from his R. H. stating in the clearest terms, that if it was the object of the proposition to enable him to resume his dignity, it was not adequate for that purpose. Under these circumstances, and with this information, would it be in the least degree extraordinary, that a Member so situated should immediately agree to a motion for inquiry? Would he not be inclined to think that there was something wrong in this; something which required explanation? and would he not vote for the appointment of a committee, the object of which was to secure this explanation, before he consented to give his vote for a considerable grant of the public money? On such grounds he was disposed to give the motion of his Hon. Friend his most cordial support. In voting for the committee, he did not at all pledge

himself to vote for whatever sums might be found to be still undischarged; but as a Member of Parliament he wished to ascertain what the circumstances were which prevented the resumption of his R. H.'s splendour. The result of any inquiry into the nature or extent of those debts which either his honour or his justice called on him to discharge, he was far from dreading as likely to turn out unfavourable to his R. H.'s character. Instead of any thing unworthy of that high sense of honour by which his R. H. was so remarkably distinguished, he was fully convinced in his own mind that the explanation would only raise him in the esteem of the public. Possessing, as he did, the strongest attachment to the Prince, he should not support the motion for the committee, if he did not think that the result would be highly honourable to his conduct. For his part, he was so firmly persuaded of this, that he stated with perfect conviction, that even if the worst enemies of the Prince were put on the committee, they would discover no transaction of which he ought to be ashamed, or which could injure him in the estimation of the public. A great deal had been said about the increase of the burdens of the people, and some Gentlemen seemed extremely desirous of agreeing that any addition to the income of his R. H. the Prince of Wales was an addition to the burdens of the people. What was the state of the account betwixt his R. H. and the public, he professed not to know. This, however, he did know, that during the last session his R. H. did lay before the House a proposition for considering the amount of his claims, and referred them to their judgment. It was not then denied that an account ought to be taken: all that was contended for was, that this was not the competent tribunal; that the matter was one for the decision, not of the legislature, but of a court of law. In deference to this decision, his R. H. prepared a petition, which was laid before the Lord Chancellor, and the matter was put into a train of adjudication. It did not appear that his R. H. had discovered any unwillingness to proceed with the suit; it did not appear that he knew any thing of the unwillingness of Ministers to have the matter brought to a fair issue, or that he had made any application to them on his part, or submitted any overture for receiving 60,000*l.* as a condition of relinquishing all further proceedings. But when his R. H. had proceeded so far with his suit, when every thing announced a speedy determination, Ministers had stepped in with this proposition, as if they thought that his R. H. had sufficiently atoned for his offences. Twelve years were fixed on as the period of his probation; but exactly at the end of seven years and a half, when the amount of his claims on the public is about to be ascertained, when it is about to be determined whether such a sum was due to him as would enable him to resume his former dignity, a period is put to his state of humiliation, and a provision is assigned him without the smallest explanation of so extraordinary a change. Of the causes of this change he knew nothing; but he now appeared as a representative of the people desirous of some explanation. But how was this explanation to be obtained, unless by the medium of the production of papers, or the appointment of a committee of inquiry? This was the object of his Hon. Friend's motion, and therefore it should have his cordial vote. His Hon. Friend had stated with the greatest candour, that the motion was brought forward without the privity of his R. H. To state this, was indeed almost unnecessary, as his R. H. after the communication he had made to the House, could not come forward with any new application. When in consequence of a message from his Royal Father, a proposition was made for granting an annual sum of 60,000*l.* in addition to the income he now possessed, it was impossible for him not to accept of this offer with eagerness and gratitude. This was all perfectly natural; but the question next came to be, had any thing more satisfactory been arranged? Did Gentlemen who wished well to the monarchical part of the constitution, think that no occasional burdens were to be submitted to with the view of increasing its dignity and supporting its splendour? Were not the splendour and the dignity which the Heir Apparent was enabled to keep up, essentially connected with the honour and the dignity of the monarchy? One Hon. Member (Mr. Johnstone) had contended, that the Prince of Wales had obtained from the public at different times, upwards of 500,000*l.*; and that, therefore, to talk of the sacrifices which had been made by his R. H. was to offer an insult to the country. This, however, was an insult which might be very easily resented, and that was by shewing how the account betwixt his R. H. and the public actually stood. When the whole account came to be fully examined, he did not believe that almost any one of these statements would be found to be correct. Among the articles charged on the Prince to the public, were, the expenses of his education. This, however, was totally incorrect; as the expenses of his education were defrayed, not out of the consolidated fund, but paid from the civil list. The receipts from the dutchy of Cornwall were stated at 234,000*l.*; and to be deducted from this sum he allowed the 125,000*l.* which had been given for the payment of his R. H.'s debts. The sums expended on Carlton House he could not allow to be fairly placed to his R. H.'s account. If a Prince of Wales was to be maintained at all, it was proper that he should be maintained in a style suited to his rank and prospects. He was not to be turned out into the world without some ade-

quate provision. The whole amount of the sums which had been advanced for his R. H. being fairly considered, it would, he contended, be found, that he was the least expensive Prince of Wales who ever existed. If the accounts were fairly balanced, it would, he was persuaded, be found that 30,000*l.* was the amount of the whole of what had been advanced by the public by extraordinary grants. True it was, that his R. H. had an annual revenue of 125,000*l.* assigned to him in 1795: but this was what, from his rank and situation, he had an indisputable right to possess. If, in the year 1738, the grandfather of his R. H. enjoyed a clear income of 100,000*l.* 125,000*l.* would not be reckoned too ample in 1803, increased as was the price of every article of subsistence. He begged it to be understood that he did not speak from the knowledge of any incumbrances which existed on the establishment of his R. H.; but if a committee were appointed, and the result of their inquiries should be, that new incumbrances had during the last eight years accrued, this would not be matter of astonishment—it would rather appear the result of necessary causes. An Hon. Gent. on the floor (Mr. Fox) had on a former evening argued against the system of justifying incumbrances on the civil list, by considerations drawn from the depreciation of the value of money. In the general position which the Hon. Gent. laid down on this subject, he heartily concurred; but with the admission, that a depreciation to a very extraordinary degree had taken place within the last ten years, it was very hard that his R. H. should be the only individual to whom the benefit of such an argument was not to be extended. Economy was the perpetual theme from some Hon. Members, but the manner in which this economy operated was rather singular. These economical gentlemen had, without the least evidence, granted 60,000*l.* to his R. H. on the mere credit which they attached to the assertions of Ministers. They granted the money, but they would hear nothing of a motion for inquiry. This was a sort of economy very different from that which he had ever thought it his duty to preach or to practise. But had these scrupulous and economical Gentlemen never heard any thing of the increase of the salaries of persons in public offices during the few last years? He did not mention this with any view of objecting to the increase; for, whatever were the views of economy which he encouraged, he had on all occasions been an advocate for a liberal provision to those employed in the public service. Without, therefore, meaning to infer any ground of censure, he only requested Gentlemen who were so pathetic on the increase of the public burdens, to recall their recollection to a few of these examples of an increase of salary. He might just refresh their memories by selecting one out of many instances which might be produced. It would be recollected that the new office of Minister at War had been created in 1796, and that the salary of the Under Secretary of this department was fixed at 1500*l.* In four years after it was augmented to 2000*l.* which these Gentlemen would surely admit to be a considerable increase within so short a period. He had already stated that he was ignorant of what were the claims on the honour and justice of his R. H. which rendered the immediate resumption of his dignity impracticable. Among these might be debts due to individuals in foreign countries, the legality of which was not admitted in this country, or the deduction of ten per cent. made by the Commissioners, in the repayment of which he might conceive his honour implicated. If these were considered by the Prince as debts of honour, his determination to discharge them was surely laudable in the highest degree. He professed to know nothing of debts of any other description; but even if with an income reduced for these eight years, from 125,000*l.* to 60,000*l.* a year, there should be found an increase of a few thousand pounds annually above his revenue, he should find no difficulty in giving his vote for the payment of such sums. In giving such a vote, he should not be guided by indiscriminate liberality. While he was ready to admit the fairness of such an increase as arose out of causes, the operation of which every one experienced to a greater or less degree, he should, as a faithful representative of the people, feel it his duty to resist any extraordinary demand on the public. A long series of acts of kindness, on the part of his R. H. had impressed his mind with the warmest gratitude; but at present he appeared in the performance of his public duty. He stood up for the support of the dignity and splendour of his R. H. but he was to be the advocate of his dignity and splendour only so far as they were consistent with the duty which he owed to his constituents. A proposition had been made by Ministers for giving his R. H. an establishment suitable to his station; which, from an official communication, the House were assured was totally inadequate to the end in view. A secret, therefore, was in the possession of Ministers, respecting the causes which rendered it impossible for his R. H. to resume his dignity immediately after the additional grant was conferred. This secret the House had a right to obtain: and it was with this view that he sat down with giving his hearty assent to the motion.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer began by alluding to the proceedings which had taken place on the day when the Report on the message was received. A very simple explanation was necessary to shew that in these proceedings there was no fair ground of censure. If the Hon. Gent. had only re-

mained a few moments after the Speaker had resumed the chair, he would have heard that he had moved for receiving the Report on the subsequent day. This he had been induced to do from respect to his R. H. by avoiding all appearance of unnecessary delay. If, however, he had heard from any one Member any objection to receiving the Report on that day when the House was to go up with the Address, he certainly should have felt it his duty instantly to have yielded to this suggestion. If the Hon. Member had then wished to object, he had it fully in his power; and if he did not choose to urge his objection, then the fault was wholly imputable to himself. Having said so much on this preliminary topic, he adverted to the question immediately before the House. The Hon. Gent. who had introduced the motion, had stated that it was introduced without the smallest communication with his R. H. but was the unbiassed result of individual opinion. This was an assurance which was hardly necessary on the part of the Hon. Member. Knowing, as he did, the sentiments and feelings of his R. H. on this subject, it was impossible for him to conceive that he should have given the motion the slightest countenance or support. Knowing, indeed, the manner in which those sentiments and feelings had been declared, he needed no assurance of his R. H.'s total ignorance of the motion now submitted to the House. He had the satisfaction of stating in the most explicit manner, that every part of the proceedings which led to the proposition which had been unanimously adopted by the House, was unreservedly communicated to his R. H. and had been honoured with his unequivocal approbation. The account as it stood betwixt his R. H. and his creditors, had been prepared and submitted to his inspection. The propositions founded on it had been communicated, and his R. H. had declared that they perfectly accorded with his wishes. If, therefore, his R. H. had condescended to communicate any opinion on the subject of the motion, he had every reason to expect that he himself would not have been overlooked; and as no communication had been made to him, he was fully justified in concluding, that it was a motion to which his confidential friends would not be disposed to give their support. Proceeding to the more direct consideration of the motion, the Rt. Hon. Gent. adverted particularly to an observation made by an Hon. and Learned Member (Mr. Erskine), who spoke second in the debate, that the message of his Majesty ought to be amended, and that the House ought to carry their views further than the proposition of Ministers extended. The Hon. and Learned Member only did Ministers justice, when he declared that no Members in that House could be more anxious for the immediate restoration of the Heir Apparent to the dignity suited to his rank and situation in the community; and that every measure consistent with public duty would meet with their cordial support, if it had this object in view. He was not prepared to contend that the House could not entertain any motion which offered for their acceptance a proposition more extensive than that which was now the ground of a bill which was in its progress through the House. This, however, he had no hesitation in affirming, that any proposition for paying debts of his R. H. not included in the provisions of 1795, could not, consistently with the regularity and independence of Parliament, be received. Even if a vote for the appointment of the committee were now to pass, it was impossible that the House could stir a single step, or come to a single decision, with the view of raising money, without a previous recommendation from the Throne. He could state explicitly to the House, that he had, on the present occasion, received no such recommendation; and if the Hon. Gent. had moved for a committee to grant a sum for the payment of any debts contracted since 1795, he should have felt it his duty to have opposed it. It never was the intention of any one of his Majesty's Ministers to move for any proposition, the object of which was to provide for the payment of any debts due by his R. H. beyond those, the payment of which was provided for by Parliament. It was not that the Members of the House, or individuals, might not admire that high sense of honour, or of justice, which might induce him to make their payment an object indispensable previous to the resumption of his dignity; but in their aggregate capacity they could accede to no grant for this purpose, without compromising the dignity and the consistency of Parliament. Without this inconsistency the House could admit the validity of no debts contracted since that period, since to admit them would be to cast a suspicion on that steadiness of opinion for which, throughout his reign, the Sovereign had been distinguished; and to suppose that there were any debts not provided for by the act of 1795, would be to impeach the accuracy of the account then taken; but the accuracy of the account continued undisputed. As to the debts due to persons in foreign countries, he had only to say, that their validity had been already determined on, and they had been pronounced to be of a nature for which payment could not be demanded. With respect to all other claims, he had to state unequivocally, that they were wholly provided for, with the exception of one debt, which his R. H. had taken upon himself. Proceeding to the consideration of the claims of the Prince on the dutchy of Cornwall, he observed that he was not presumptuous enough to think that he possessed sufficient knowledge of the subject to enable him to form a decisive opinion. This, however, he

might be permitted to say, that they were held doubtful by some of the first law authorities in the country. The Noble Lord at the head of the law department of this kingdom had not yet pronounced a decided opinion; but as often as he had found it necessary to speak on the subject, his sentiments had been unfavourable. With regard to the opinion of the Noble Person presiding over the law department in Ireland, he would not now state what was his opinion: thus much, however, he could say with safety, that Gent. who contended for his R. H.'s right were not entitled to satisfy their opinion by the idea that such high authority was on their side. Having gone over these points, the Rt. Hon. Gent. reverted to some calculations relative to the amount of the supposed claims of his R. H. These did not at all differ from the accounts we have already given (see p. 1291 *et seq.)* in our detail of the proceedings on the consideration of the message. In conclusion he stated, that as there was every reason to think that his R. H. was perfectly satisfied with the proposition agreed to on a former night, and as the appointment of the committee might be productive of great inconvenience, he should strenuously resist the motion.

Mr. Fox expressed great surprise at hearing the present described as an indirect question. Of all the motions he had ever heard discussed in Parliament, the present appeared to him one of the most simple, and the most plainly deducible from his Majesty's message. If the motion was, however, conceived to be of this direct nature, it had been attempted to be got rid of in a very odd way, by resorting to an expedient which was confessedly indirect, and that was by moving the previous question. The Rt. Hon. Gent. who spoke last had started several objections to the motion. Of these objections the most striking were, that it was impossible to proceed in the inquiries which the proposed committee was to pursue, or at least to found any measure on the Report, without previously receiving the recommendation of the Crown. To this objection the answer was easy. The motion, in the first instance, had not any direct connexion with any grant for raising money. It was besides to be considered, that the general constitutional principle to which the Rt. Hon. Gent. had referred admitted of innumerable exceptions. In every session it was almost unnecessary for him to remind the House, that a variety of measures were adopted in consequence of particular motions, which in their consequences involved a grant of money; and this too without any previous recommendation from the Crown. The present motion was indeed one which obviously resulted from the words of the message. He did not pretend to quote the express words, but they generally conveyed the idea that such an establishment should be formed for his R. H. as would enable him to resume the dignity adequate to his illustrious station. For this purpose, the annual sum of 60,000*l.* had been proposed by his Majesty's Ministers. A communication from the Prince had stated that this sum was, in the present situation in which he was placed, incompetent to this object; and if Gentlemen, on this ground, thought the provision inadequate, he begged leave to ask whether, in inquiring into the cause of this incompetency, they were not following up and obeying the object and spirit of the message? On a former day, 60,000*l.* had been voted by the House for the re-establishment of his R. H.'s splendour and dignity. From the highest authority it had been stated to the House that this sum was inadequate, and therefore the House had a right to know what circumstances prevented the resumption of that establishment which was so much the subject of general desire and expectation. This, indeed, had been put in so clear a point of view by an Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) under the gallery, that it was unnecessary for him to trespass long on the attention of the House. In the message of his Majesty, the House were apprized of his anxious desire that his R. H. should, as soon as possible, be placed in a situation to resume his full establishment. The Prince had unequivocally stated, that certain circumstances operated as obstacles to the resumption of his dignity. What therefore was a more distinct right, or a more plain duty, than that the House should be apprized of the nature of these obstacles? Was it thus to be understood, that whatever the nature of these obstacles were, they were immediately to be removed, and that the Prince was, as a matter of course, to appear in all the splendour in which he ought to appear as Heir Apparent to the British throne? Certainly no such conclusion was fairly to be drawn. All that was contended for was simply, that every obstacle should be removed, if it could be removed by the Members of the House in a manner consistent with the exercise of their public duty. If the obstacles were of that nature which could be removed without materially adding to the burdens of the people, he should certainly feel strongly inclined to vote for discharging these incumbrances, though he would not go so far as a Rt. Hon. Gent. to whose sentiments he had particularly alluded. But what the real nature of the obstacle was he had not the means of discovering. A Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had said, that the House were not at liberty to suppose that these obstacles arose from the accumulation of any new debts, because the House had no right to presume that the amount of the debts of his R. H. was greater than described in the accounts prepared by the Commissioners in 1795. This seemed to him a most strange kind of assertion, and, with a very small de-

gree of ingenuity, it appeared easy to prove that it was fundamentally erroneous. The Hon. Gent. was, however, quite shocked at the idea. In 1795, the amount of the Prince's debts was calculated at 630,000*l.* and beyond this sum no one is to venture to estimate their extent. The language of the Rt. Hon. Gent. was singular. The House were now to be told that they were not even to suppose the existence of any excess beyond this estimate, and this too at a time when the existence of such an excess was fully ascertained. The existence of some difference betwixt the estimate and the actual amount was naturally to be accounted for. This was found in domestic economy, even in the smallest establishment. It was therefore not to be wondered at, that under the circumstances in which the amount of the Prince's debts was ascertained, an excess to an amount considerably beyond the original estimate should be found to exist. If, therefore, such an excess existed, on the face of papers and documents already before the House, it was not fit that speculation should be left continually at work on this subject. The whole of the business ought to be fully and unequivocally explained. As to the claims which his R. H. possessed on the public, a good deal had been advanced, in the course of the discussion to which the matter had given rise. On the subject of the right of the Prince to the arrears of the dutchy of Cornwall, the House had heard from a Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), that the preponderance of opinion was hostile to the right. But it appeared that a series of continual set-offs were the principal arguments against the right. Was it, however, to be tolerated, that if the matter had been brought to a fair discussion betwixt the Prince and his Royal Father, the claim of the expense of education might have been set up and successfully pleaded? Such a plea never could have proceeded from the real lovers of monarchy. The Hon. Member illustrated this part of the subject with his usual force of reasoning and trength of argument. He ridiculed the argument, that if the Prince's claims had been fully considered, they would have been found nugatory. The simple statement of the case was, that the Prince was anxious for the prosecution of his claims; that the matter was nearly brought to an issue, and at that moment Ministers had consented, by offering a considerable equivalent for the suspension of the process, though they knew that the party to which this equivalent was offered, had not the slighest chance of success in the prosecution of these claims. The conduct of the Prince on this occasion formed a striking contrast to every thing like a dishonourable compromise. Sensible of the importance of supporting an establishment suitable to his rank, he gratefully received the proposition which the House, in its liberality, had adopted. There was, however, another consideration not less important, and this his R. H. had attended to with still more scrupulous care. With thankfulness he had received the offer which the unsolicited liberality of Parliament had conferred; but it was equally due to his own character, and to the character of Parliament, to let the public clearly understand the situation in which their liberality would place him. He had cautioned the House and the public against the indulgence of expectations which at this moment it was impossible to realize. It was impossible to conceive any line of conduct more calculated to raise his R. H. in the opinion of every one capable of appreciating the excellencies of character. The Hon. Member, after dwelling a good deal on this idea, proceeded to state and to compare the various sums advanced in behalf of his R. H. at different periods. He shewed, that many of the incumbrances of his R. H. were the effect of unavoidable causes, and were the natural result of circumstances peculiar to his situation. At this period, when it was professedly the intention of Parliament to ensure the comfort and support the dignity of his R. H. according to the terms of his Majesty's message, it was essential that he should be fairly and honourably dealt with. If he was to be placed in that fair and unembarrassed situation every loyal individual so anxiously desired, it was but an act of common justice that the nature of the obstacles which obstructed this most desirable arrangement should be satisfactorily ascertained. He saw no better way of ascertaining their nature, than by the committee which had been proposed, and therefore it had his decided support.

Colonel Grosvenor warmly supported the motion, and earnestly hoped that something might immediately be done to enable his R. H. to resume that kind of establishment in which his birth, and the nature of the constitution, required him to be placed.

Sir W. W. Wynne was of opinion, that throughout the whole of the transaction his R. H. the Prince of Wales had been extremely ill used. He anxiously hoped that the Hon. Gent. who brought forward the present motion would exert his best endeavours to accomplish the object which it had in view. The plan proposed by the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer must, in his mind, prove inadequate to place his R. H. in that situation in which it seemed to be the general wish of the House and of the nation that he should be placed; for it should be recollected that the style and splendour of a Prince of Wales's establishment should be suitable to the dignity and grandeur of the United Kingdom.

Lord Stanley rose merely to put a question, Whether all the measures which were now brought forward by Ministers, respecting

the affairs of the Prince of Wales, had received the complete approbation of his R. H.? He, for one, understood it to be otherwise, or, at least, that some alteration, different from what he expected, had taken place in the manner in which the communication respecting his situation had been made to the House.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer declared that no alteration whatever, of a material nature, had been made in the statement which his R. H. had approved of. The only omission, if any occurred, was of some expressions contained in the communication of 1783, which were omitted because inferences might now be drawn from them, for which the present case left no room.

Mr. Erskine observed, in explanation, that he was wholly ignorant of the tendency of the Hon. Gent.'s motion, until it was stated to the House. The object of the motion seemed to him to be, that a committee be appointed to inquire into the amount of the sum which may be requisite to enable his R. H. to resume his household, and to offer that sum to his Majesty, in order that his Majesty might accomplish his wishes respecting the renewed establishment of his R. H. Upon this question he should give his vote as an independent Member of Parliament, and not as any way influenced by the situation which he held under his R. H. Much had been said about the opinion of our legal authorities respecting the claims of the Prince to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall during his minority. It happened that he was never absent, except once, when that question was under the consideration of the House; but he might venture to say, that no one professional Gentleman had given a decided opinion against the title of his R. H. to the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall; not even the Learned Lord who now so ably presides in his Majesty's court of law. But all these opinions, to whatever side they might incline, were wholly foreign to the present question. It was his opinion that the House should enable his Majesty to fulfil his paternal and Royal intentions respecting his son's situation; and that if the specific sum proposed was not sufficient to enable his R. H. to support and maintain his due dignity, the House should come forward and offer his Majesty the further means of accomplishing an object which his Majesty, the House, and the nation, seemed equally to have at heart.

Mr. Canning said, he was not disinclined to vote for the motion; but in voting for it, he did not intend to pledge himself to concur in the recommendation which might be suggested by the committee. His opinion might in a great measure depend upon the circumstances which the report of that committee might disclose. As to the question itself, whatever might be the opinion entertained by some Gentlemen, he could not help considering the Prince as completely passive in it. The proposal did not come from the Prince, but originated in the advice of Ministers. Whether, therefore, the application was ill timed or not, or whether it was consistent with the regulation of 1795, he should not now consider: he was desirous that a vote should be given on the present question, without looking backwards or forwards, but merely to the present question itself. The Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer has proposed a certain sum, namely, an addition of 60,000*l.* or 73,000*l.* to the income of his R. H. That sum is found inadequate to fulfil the object for which it was proposed, and here his doubts began; for he felt anxious to know what was the precise object to be obtained, and what was the amount of the sum requisite for its accomplishment. On this point he was not prepared to deliver an opinion; but when he was informed of the sum to be proposed, and of the object to which it was to be applied, then he might be able to say whether the object was worth that sum or not. All he now knew was, that the sum proposed was inadequate to the attainment of the object the accomplishment of which the House had in view. But until the precise amount of that sum was ascertained, he should not pledge himself to any particular measure.

Mr. Fuller, in explanation, very warmly espoused the motion, and assured the House that nothing should deter him from giving it his most decided support.

Mr. Golding expressed his conviction, that every means should be afforded to his R. H. to resume, as as soon as possible, the splendour and dignity suitable to his birth and rank.

Mr. Sheridan, after the manner in which this question had been deprecated, and the manifest indisposition that had been shewn on the other side to enter into it, thought it unnecessary to assure the House that it was not his intention to detain them long. Unquestionably if a division were to take place, he should vote for the original motion; but so little real difference of opinion did he see, that he could have no apprehension of coming to a division. There was but one object professed on both sides, and he was sure the manner of attaining that object, though it might, in the first instance, strike Gentlemen differently, would not ultimately be a cause of dissension. From the tardiness of the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), and those about him, to reply to the arguments of his Hon. Friend (Mr. Fox), he had reason to conclude that they were ready to do that justice to his R. H. to which he is undoubtedly entitled. His R. H. upon the gra-

cious intention conceived by his Majesty, and communicated to the House by his Majesty's message, with the advice of his law officers, adopted the resolution of abandoning his claims to the dutchy of Cornwall. There was no doubt but his R. H.'s advisers, as well as the one who had a seat in that House (Mr. Erskine), as the one who had not (Mr. Adam), had given his R. H. the advice most consistent with his dignity. But it was not for the House to consider that he did not go on the authority of private communications; he was bound as a Member of Parliament not to do so. Was there any reason to believe that his R. H. was indifferent to the restoration of his rank and state, or to the restoration to the same rank of that family which had shared in his obscurity? Let Gentlemen look to the communication made by his R. H. and they would there find it acknowledged that he was not indifferent. This was not information from private authority: the House had it from his R. H. himself; they had it on the face of their Journals. All opinions were therefore agreed as to the object that was to be attained. His Hon. Friend, if the form of his motion produced any difficulty, would, he was sure, not hesitate to change it to the shape that would be the least exceptionable. Let it be said that the House would consider of it. The Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had said his R. H. was in a situation in which it was not to be endured that he should continue one hour longer; that he was in a situation in which he could not have that interchange of hospitality with the noble families of the country, which it was most material that the Heir Apparent of the Crown should keep up; that he could not promote the arts, patronzie talent, or contribute to the advancement of those various laudable institutions for which the present time was so remarkable. The House appeared to feel as the Rt. Hon. Gent. did; but now, as something more was required to accomplish the object, was the feeling of the House and the Rt. Hon. Gent. to be altered? We were told that those things must be endured for which there was no remedy; but if there was a remedy, why should a great and confessed evil be longer endured? His attention to this subject had lately led him to look over what had been done in it in former times. He had found in the former debates a great deal of asperity, which he was sorry to find mingled with such a discussion. He was pleased to find that nothing of that kind had entered into the present discussion, with the exception of one Hon. Gent. (Mr. Johnstone), whose accuracy in figures had been complimented by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, though that accuracy had commenced in miscalculation, and ended in false inference. That Hon. Gent. declared himself sorry that a compromise had taken place: he, on the contrary, rejoiced at it, because much disagreeable consequence might result from the prosecution of the suit, and the legal advisers of his R. H. who would give no advice inconsistent with his honour. The Hon. Gent. conceived it an insult to the public to suppose that there is any balance due to his R. H. on the arrears. He was as little inclined to insult the public as the Hon. Gent.; but he could not conceive the public so irritable as to fly into a rage at being called on to enter into an account on a matter in which the best informed persons were of opinion that there was a large balance against it. He gave the public credit for more justice and less irritability than the Hon. Gent. The indelicacy of entering into such an account had also been mentioned. He knew of no indelicacy in it, except, indeed, in the set-offs which Gentlemen made against the revenues of the dutchy. Was the Prince to be told by his Royal Father, "It is true, I owe you a large arrear accumulated during your minority, but I have to deduct the expenses of your nursing and education: there is so much for your cradle, and so much for your coral, and so much for your pap, and so much for your books?" The whole of the indelicacy was in this: the Prince of Wales had shared the same education and the same maintenance which had been enjoyed by the Duke of York. They were both maintained out of the Queen's privy purse, and it was on the occasion of that maintenance that Parliament had made so large and liberal a grant for her Majesty's service. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Johnstone) said, that the settlement made in 1795 ought not to be changed, and that there was no reason why it should not be continued in 1803. That may be a good argument, but it came rather too late; it ought to have been advanced last week, when the original grant on his Majesty's message was proposed. The Hon. Gent. held his tongue then; and now, when his Majesty's message had recommended the object to the House, when the Chancellor of the Exchequer had stated that the object was so important and so desirable as to admit of no delay, when the House assented to the principle, and seemed to feel no other objection to the measure proposed on it, than that it did not go far enough, the Hon. Gent. came out with this argument, which went against the bill brought in on the resolution of the House in every stage. The Hon. Gent. adduced a curious reason for not doing more now than was done in 1795. He said it was particularly necessary that the Prince of Wales should keep up a greater state than in 1795, and have more trappings and Lords of the Bedchamber, &c. because there was then a great number of Jacobins in the country. Thus, Sir, said Mr. S. though we did not know it before, and I am afraid the doctrine will not find many adherents among us even now, the Jacobins are the greatest supporters of the splendour of the Royal Family; and as we are told in the fable of the two owls perched on a ruin, who

said to each other when the tyrant who caused the devastation passed by, "Long live King Massand, for while he reigns we shall have plenty of ruined villages;" so our Royal Family should say, "Heaven send us plenty of Jacobins, for they are the best support of our rank, and state, and dignity." An Hon. Gent. opposite (Mr. Cartwright), and the worthy Baronet near him (Sir Robert Buxton), said that trappings were of no importance, that virtue was every thing, and they deprecated the assumption of rank and state accordingly. He had no objection to this doctrine, if the system so early established, so invariably maintained, and handed down to us by our ancestors, was proved to be foolish. But let the rule be general, let not the splendour of one be curtailed, while that of another is extended. If, as a great man in this country (the late Earl of Chatham) had said, "Every feather of the royal bird aids his flight," though he should not go to the length that Noble Lord did, in saying, "that when they drooped, or were shed, the bird would fall to the ground;" yet all should be cautiously preserved. In order to bring this contending system home to Gentlemen's minds, let it be applied to the House—let it be supposed that the Speaker possessed sufficient dignity, and commanded sufficient respect by those virtues which it was acknowledged he possessed; let the chair be removed; let the other badges be stripped off; let that bauble (the mace) be taken away; let the fine house that was building for him, in which he hoped he would soon entertain the Members with his accustomed hospitality and splendour, be demolished; let the state coach be laid down, and instead of proceeding in it to St. James's, attended by a grand procession of Members in their private coaches, let him go on foot with the addresses, covered with a warm surtout, and honoured with the privilege of an umbrella in case of rain—*(Loud bursts of laughter.)* Let the Judges be conducted by no sheriffs, or sheriffs' attendants, to the assize towns; let the Chief Justice go down in the mail coach, and the puisne Judges content themselves with travelling as outside passengers.—*(A loud laugh.)* Let the Lord Mayor, instead of coming to Westminster Hall in the state barge, accompanied by the several companies in their state barges, let him come in a plain wherry, without any attendants; and instead of going back to feast on turtle at Guildhall, with the great officers of state, and foreign ambassadors, let him content himself with stopping on his way back, and taking a beef-steak at Dolly's chop-house.—*(Loud laughing.)* It was not easy to have done with citing instances in which the abridgment of their happiness, which foreigners admire, but which, according to these Gentlemen, are not quite simple and unnecessary in the Prince of Wales, may be effected with great saving to the public. The Prince of Wales was not indifferent to the resumption of his rank; he should be sorry he was, as he should not then have the high opinion of him that he had. The House may therefore well go a step beyond Ministers. It was no consideration that Ministers had done what they had, nor even that the Prince had abandoned his claims on the revenues of Cornwall in consequence. Let the House make its grant for the attainment of the object desired without reference to any of these things. The debts contracted since 1795 might, it was true, be brought forward as debts which the Prince of Wales ought to acknowledge, but which he should be sorry to make known. There would be that difference between money voted for these debts, and that voted on former occasions, that no person would claim it.—*(A laugh.)* There was the Landgrave's debt also, unless it could be supposed that he, like those creditors, contrary to law, would fly from payment, except it was clandestine.—*(A laugh.)* It surely would have been much better for the Commissioners, in the first instance, to have come to Parliament for an additional grant, when the original sum was found insufficient, rather than strike off ten per cent. indiscriminately. It could hardly be surprising that his R. H. should now wish to make amends for their inconsiderate deduction. He would hardly be suspected of having any interested view in supporting this motion; and certainly he would not be suspected by those who recollect the declaration he made at that time. But he thought it a weak thing, that after we had voted away 250,000,000*l.* for the support of the thrones of Europe, an object in which we failed, we should not give 100,000*l.* to maintain the dignity of our own, an object which we could not fail to accomplish.

Lord HAWKESBURY contended, that whatever might be the interpretation put upon the conduct of Ministers on the present occasion, it would evidently appear that it was actuated by no other motive but a strict regard to the duty which they owed to his Majesty, to the Prince, and to the public; and that if they did not concur in the present motion, it was because they did not imagine it to be calculated to accomplish the object which the House had in view. But these were not the points to which he was more particularly desirous to call the attention of the House. His object in rising was to observe on the manner in which some Gentlemen seemed to misunderstand his Majesty's message relative to the present question. There was nothing in that message that went to shew, that upon the sum of 600,000*l.* being granted to the Prince of Wales, his R. H. would be obliged, on the payment of that sum, immediately to resume his household, and the state and splendour that should accompany it. The words of the message warranted no such meaning: the message merely said, "That his Majesty having

taken into consideration the period which had elapsed since the adoption of those arrangements which were deemed by the wisdom of Parliament to be necessary for the discharge of the incumbrances of the Prince of Wales, &c. &c. recommends the present situation of the Prince to the attention of the House."—And again, that "Notwithstanding the reluctance and regret which his Majesty must feel in suggesting any addition to the burdens of his people, he is induced to resort, in this instance, to the experienced liberality and attachment of his faithful Commons, in the persuasion that they will be disposed to take such measures as may be calculated to promote the comfort and support the dignity of his R. H. the Prince of Wales." Now, in conformity to this Royal recommendation, Parliament had agreed to grant his R. H. the sum of about 70,000*l.* to relieve him from his difficulties, and to promote his comfort; but nothing appeared either in the message, or the proceedings of Parliament upon it, which made it a necessary consequence that the Prince should immediately resume his household. The Noble Lord then went into a defence of the measure proposed by his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Pitt), and adopted by Parliament in 1795, and contended that the present measure was grounded on the same principle. It was true, indeed, that his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Addington) was now desirous that his R. H. should be restored to the situation in which he stood previous to the arrangement in 1795; but with all the respect which was due to the feelings of his R. H. (feelings for which the House must entertain but one sense), yet was the House prepared to take cognizance of debts, with the nature of which the House could not be supposed to be acquainted? or rather, on the contrary, would not their wisdom dictate to them that they should not open any new account of any debts whatever? and in that opinion they surely would not press upon his R. H. the necessity of resuming his household, until these debts, which he felt to weigh upon his honour and justice, were fully discharged. This was the spirit and tendency of the measure now proposed by his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Addington) for the alleviation of the incumbrances under which his R. H. laboured; and he trusted the prudence of the House would direct them to adhere to the settlement of 1795, and not to open any new account for debts, of the nature of which they could not judge as Members of Parliament, and which should be left entirely to the honour and prudence of his R. H.

Sir John Wrottesley declared, that after the most minute consideration he could bestow on the merits of the motion, he could not support it unless some farther proofs were adduced to satisfy his mind. There appeared to him an ambiguity about the whole of the business which called for explanation. In whatever way he looked at it, he saw much subject for regret; and he was firmly convinced that another system should be adopted consistent with the dignity of his R. H.'s character, and the justice due to his claims. When it was contended in favour of the measure, that both his Majesty's Ministers and the Prince's servants were perfectly of the same opinion, he begged leave to say, that their agreement was not a satisfactory ground to induce the House to vote with them. He thought it his duty to oppose the previous question, and felt no difficulty in declaring that a further inquiry into a subject of so much importance was absolutely necessary.

Mr. W. Smith said, that he thought not only a great ambiguity, but a great contradiction (if he might be allowed to use the expression), existed in what had been said. It was his wish that an inquiry might be gone into. When Gentlemen talked of the Prince living in a proper style, they meant, of course, that he should live as became the Heir Apparent to the Crown. A Rt. Hon. Gent. not now in his place, had, on a former occasion, moved that the income of his R. H. should be 125,000*l.* a year. He had also, at the same time, moved, that 60,000*l.* a year should be applied to another purpose. For his own part, he thought that the true dignity and true comfort of his R. H. were inseparable. The Hon. Gent. concluded by stating, that it was better to examine the question as it really stood. He was against the previous question.

Lord Castlereagh said, that there were two grounds of objection to the inquiry: first, that it would be indelicate, because no distinct grounds had been stated from the Prince. The second was, that it was receding from the principle laid down by Parliament. His Lordship concluded by paying some very warm compliments to his R. H.

The question was very loudly called for. The House now divided.—For the previous question 184—Against it 139.—Majority 45.

List of the Minority.

Andrews, M. P.	Bagenal, W.
Aubrey, Sir J.	Barlow, F. W.
Amyatt, J.	Barlow, H.
Adair, R.	Boucherett, A.
Alcock, W. C.	Burdett, Sir F.
Acheson, Hon. A.	Barclay, G.
Baring, Sir F.	Bligh, T.
Bernard, T.	Bampfylde, Sir C.
Brogden, J.	Bouverie, Hon. E.
Birch, J.	Cartwright, W. R.
Beaumont, R.	Creevey, T.
Bunbury, Sir C.	Canning, Rt. Hon. G.
Bent, R.	Cowper, Hon. Spencer
Barclay, Sir R.	Calvert, N.
Butler, Hon. J.	Caulfield, Hon. H.
Butler, Hon. C.	Clephane, W.

Curzon, Hon. R.
Coke, T. W.
Carberry, Lord
Courtenay, J.
Dillon, Hon. H.
Dundas, Hon. L.
Dundas, Hon. C.
Dundas, Hon. G. H.
Dundas, C.
Dent, J.
Dupre, James
Erskine, Hon. T.
Elford, Sir W.
Falkiner, F. J.
Fox, Hon. C. J.
Fonblanque, J.
Fuller, J.
Fitzpatrick, Rt. Hon. R.
Folkstone, Lord
Forrester, Cecil
Fellowes, R.
Grosvenor, T.
Gower, Lord G. L.
Giles, D.
Graham, Colonel
Gunning, G.
Huntingfield, Lord
Hurst, J.
Hiliard, E.
Hughes, L. H.
Harrison, J.
Hamilton, H.
St. John, Hon. St. A.
Kensington, Lord
King, Hon. E.
Lemon, J.
Ladbroke, R.
La Touche, R.
La Touche, J.
La Touche, P.
La Touche, D.
Lubbock, J.
Lemon, Sir W.
Lenox, C.
Lambe, Hon. P.
Lawley, Sir R.
Macmahon, I.
Milbanke, Sir R.
Mathew, Lord
Milner, Sir W.
Monckton, Hon. E.
Madocks, W. A.
Manners, Lord R.
Manners, Lord C. S.
Milford, L.
Moore, G. P.
M'Dowall, Colonel
North, Dudley
Northey, W.
Noel, G. Noel
Newcomen, Hon. J.
Ord, W.
Osborne, J.
Obrien, Sir E.
Odell, W.
Oliver, C. S.
Paget, Lord
Porter, G.
Petty, Lord H.
Porchester, Lord
Palk, Sir L.
Palk, W.
Potter, P.
Paget, Hon. E.
Ridley, Sir M.
Russel, Lord W.
Ross, Sir C.
Richardson, S.
Stanley, Lord
Spencer, Lord R.
Sheridan, R. B.
Smith, T.
Smith, A.
Somerville, Sir M.
Somerset, Lord C.
Sibthorpe, H.
Shum, G.
Shakespeare, A.
Smith, W.
Tyrwhitt, T.
Tarleton, B.
Taylor, C.
Thellusson, C.
Thornton, T.
Tierney, G.
Vereker, C.
Vaughan, H. J.
Wrottesley, Sir J.
Wynne, Sir W. W.
Weston, C. C.
Willett, J. W.
Ward, Hon. J.
Wynne, C.
Walpole, Hon. G.
Wharton, J.
Wilkins, W.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, Mar. 7.—(See Minutes, p. 403.)

[Irish revenue.]—Mr. Corry moved the second reading of the Irish custom-duty bill.

Colonel Bagwell said, he was in general satisfied with the explanations which he had received from the Rt. Hon. Gent. upon the subject of these duties; but still there were points upon which he required some further information, particularly with respect to the schedule of duties: he wished to know whether they were the same as they were the last year?

Mr. Corry said, he was always happy to give any Hon. Member the fullest information in his power. Upon a former occasion, he had stated to the House the differences which subsisted between the duties contained in the present schedule, and in that of last year. One of the alterations which it contained arose from a wish, on the part of Government, to afford every possible facility and accommodation to the merchants. He stated, that some of the late duties were what were termed *ad valorem* duties, the others were rated duties; the consequence of which was, that merchants were obliged to make two entries of the articles they imported—that is to say, an entry according to the rate for the old duties, and according to the value for the new ones. Now, it was proposed in the present bill to convert the *ad valorem* duty into a rated duty for the convenience of merchants, who would now only have to make one entry. With respect to the duties upon drugs, they were in some instances raised, and in others reduced; and in cases where there were fractions of a penny, they were generally raised to the integral sum. With regard to the duties on licenses, they were, as he had before stated, in some instances raised. These were the principal alterations which were contained in the schedule; but he could not sit down without expressing his thanks to the officers employed in this business, for the exertions they had made on this occasion.

Colonel Bagwell thanked the Rt. Hon. Gent. for the explanation he had given, but said it was not altogether satisfactory: he wished to know what were the additional duties that were laid on. He understood that there was a great increase in the duty upon the distilleries.

Mr. Corry said, that the duty upon the licenses for rectifying spirits was in some instances raised from 2*l.* 10*s.* to 5*l.*

Colonel Bagwell said, he was then justified in asking for further time to consider this subject, because it appeared that some of the duties were doubled. The distilleries of Ireland were carried on to a very great extent, and were in very great perfection, particularly about the city of Cork, where they made brandy, rum, and even liqueurs, so as scarcely to be distinguished from those which were imported. The distilleries of Ireland were therefore a very material object. But there was another subject upon which he wished to say a few words, and that was with regard to the tax on windows. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had stated, that the regulations for the collection

of that duty were merely to subsist during the war, and that they were of course no longer in force. He had looked diligently over the different acts of Parliament enacting this duty, and he found that they had been regularly continued in all the acts, and therefore he conceived that they were now in force.

Mr. CORRY, in reply, stated, that the regulation to which he alluded certainly was not now in force. When the duty was first laid on, it was thought necessary to propose this clause for the collecting of the tax, because it was the avowed purpose of the discontented people in Ireland to adopt every means in their power to injure the revenue; but the clause containing these regulations stated, that it should continue in force for three years, provided the war should continue so long. The Hon. Gent. might therefore make himself perfectly easy upon this subject; but at all events, this bill had no reference to the mode of collecting the duties; that would be the subject of other bills, and when they were introduced, the fullest time would be given for examination.

[ESTABLISHMENT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES.]—The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER moved the third reading of the Prince of Wales's annuity bill.

Mr. KINNAIRD said, he wished, before the bill passed, to make a few observations; not that he wished to oppose the bill, for such were the sentiments he felt for the Royal personage to whom it related, that he wished it to pass with the greatest dispatch. He entertained an opinion upon this subject, he believed, in common with many Gentlemen in that House, and with many persons in the country, that the Minister, in bringing down the message, and in bringing in this bill, had made a very advantageous bargain for the country. But though that House ought certainly to take care of the interests of the people, they were also the protectors of the rights and interests of the Prince of Wales. He rose now for the purpose of stating, that although he voted for this bill, it was with a protest that he considered it as not doing above one half of what they were pledged to do by the answer which they had returned to his Majesty's message. He therefore protested against this bill being considered as a definitive arrangement upon the subject, because it did not satisfy the intentions of his Majesty, or of the Prince. He wished to explain what he meant by using that expression. The object of the message was, that such measures should be adopted as would promote the comfort and support the dignity of the Prince of Wales. Now this bill, though it would tend to promote the comfort, certainly would not support the dignity of the Prince of Wales. It would, in his opinion, have been more candid, if, when the Minister brought down the message, he had stated what the message of the Prince of Wales had communicated to the House, viz. that the measure now proposed would not enable his R. H. to resume his dignity: he protested, therefore, against the bill, as not being a sufficient answer to his Majesty's message. When he said the Prince was not satisfied with this measure, he did not allude to the personal feelings of his R. H. He meant that the friends of the Prince, that the public, were not satisfied with it. After the example of economy which the public had observed on the part of the Prince, he was sure they would feel gratified in seeing him restored to his proper dignity and splendour. He conceived that the public feeling was not satisfied, and that they called for something more than was proposed in the present bill. Upon these grounds he contended that the present bill was not sufficient, and therefore he laid in his claims not to be considered, when he voted for this bill, as precluding himself from voting for any further measure that might be brought forward.

Sir WILLIAM DOLBEN begged leave, before the bill passed, to submit to the House a motion which he intended to have made on Friday last, if the House had not adjourned so suddenly. He wished to suggest for the consideration of the House, whether, when they were making this provision for the Prince of Wales (of which he highly approved), they ought not to come to a resolution, which, in his opinion, would tend most essentially to support the dignity and comfort of his R. H. He was sure the Prince of Wales would never enjoy the outward splendour which it was proposed to restore him to, with that real and true comfort which he ought to do, unless his Royal consort had some share in that mark of attachment which the House was now about to shew to his R. H. He conceived there could be nothing improper in this proposition, because his R. H. had expressed himself ready to submit himself to the wisdom of Parliament, and had, with that noble ingenuousness which always marked his conduct, declared that he could not at present resume his dignity. The object of the motion which Sir William said he should submit to the House would be, to appropriate a small part of the annuity of 60,000*l.* a year, which it was proposed by this bill to grant to his R. H for the better establishment of her R. H. the Princess of Wales. His R. H. had supported his retirement from the proper dignity of his situation, in a manner that entitled him to general admiration; and he was sure that Royal personage would think that one of the first calls upon his honour would be, to take care that the Princess should have some share in the bounty of that House. She had also supported her retirement with the greatest dignity, and therefore

was fully entitled to that mark of respect and attachment which he now proposed to shew. In doing so, he was sure they would do that which would be agreeable to his Majesty; they would prove themselves the true friends of his Royal house, and also give the strongest mark of respect and attachment to the Prince of Wales. He should therefore propose a clause for appropriating a small part of the annuity of 60,000*l.* a year for the better establishment of the Princess of Wales. The sum he should propose to appropriate for that purpose, would be 6000*l.* a year: he was sure the adoption of that motion would be agreeable to the whole nation. He concluded with moving a clause to that effect, by way of rider.

Colonel Stanley said, he rose with the greatest pleasure to second this motion. Her R. H. had conducted herself, ever since her arrival in this country, in the most exemplary and meritorious manner. He hoped most sincerely that the House would adopt the motion, and that they might have an opportunity of paying their tribute of admiration for her conduct.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he hoped his two Hon. Friends would not persist in this motion, which he was convinced was made with the best motives. With respect to the virtues and conduct of her R. H. the Princess of Wales, there was, he was sure, but one sentiment in that House and in the country. But it was their duty to recollect what was due to the Royal person to whom this bill alluded, and whilst they were giving him a proof of respect and confidence, he hoped they would not imply, by adopting the motion now proposed, the possibility of their entertaining a suspicion of his conduct: for the adoption of this proposition would certainly imply a doubt of that which the House ought not to doubt. If, therefore, the Hon. Baronet would not consent to withdraw his motion, he should feel himself bound to oppose it.

Sir William Dolben said, if he thought the clause he had proposed tended to imply the least doubt of his R. H.'s conduct, he certainly would be the last man in the House to propose it. He had made the motion upon the ground, that his R. H. had thrown himself entirely upon the wisdom of Parliament; and he thought his R. H. had rather that this measure should proceed from a resolution of the House, than that it should be his own act. It was upon that ground, and because he received it to be a debt of honour due from that House to the Princess, that he made the motion.

Mr. Martin (of Tewkesbury) said, he approved the motion, and he was glad that there were Gentlemen who had spirit enough to bring it forward.

Mr. Sheridan said, he was surprised at the expression used by the Hon. Member, as he could not conceive that any spirit was necessary to bring forward this motion; he was also surprised that there had been introduced into this debate any thing like warmth of language or vehemence of gesture [Mr. Kinnaird had, while he was speaking, accidentally struck the Member who sat below him, on the head]. The House, he was sure, must feel the propriety of what had fallen from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he trusted that the worthy Baronet would withdraw his motion. An Hon. Member had stated, that the Prince was not satisfied with this measure, but he afterwards explained distinctly what he meant by that expression. The Prince was certainly grateful to the House for this mark of their bounty, and would be grateful for a further mark of it. With regard to the suggestion contained in this motion, he hoped there was no person in that House who supposed that the Prince would resume his dignity without the Princess; and he could assure the Hon. Member that a suggestion of that kind to the Prince was not necessary either from him or from the House; but as the Prince must now continue to apply the same sum of money to the discharge of his debts that he had done for some years, no increase could take place for some time. This, however, furnished another reason why Parliament ought to enable the Prince and Princess of Wales to resume their dignity.

Sir W. Dolben then consented to withdraw his motion, and the bill was read a third time and passed, and sent to the Lords for their concurrence.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, Mar. 9.—(See Minutes, p. 403.)

[The king's message.]—The order of the day for taking his Majesty's message into consideration being read,

Lord Hobart rose to move an address to his Majesty on the occasion. He observed, that he could not entertain the smallest doubt with respect to the motion which he should have the honour to submit to the House. He felt himself justified in anticipating the most perfect unanimity in the present instance. A communication is made from the Sovereign, that the most extensive military preparations were making on the coasts of France and Holland; and also, that important discussions were pending between his Majesty and the French government, the result of which was very uncertain. In such a situation, he could hardly believe himself justified in supposing

that a difference of opinion could prevail as to the line of conduct proper or necessary to be adopted. In a partial consideration of the subject, he by no means wished to disguise from their Lordships—indeed it was a point of which they must in general be well aware, namely, that there existed reasons for thinking that the state of certain of the French possessions abroad was such as might warrant or call for the preparations that were making by France, independent of any hostile designs which possibly might be harboured by her government; but they must also at the same time see and feel for the situation of their own country; and that, while discussions of the utmost importance are depending, they could not be justified in not taking those precautions which the security and honour of the country required. With respect to any detailed exposition of those discussions, he could hardly think that at the present time any thing of the kind could, with any shadow of propriety, be expected from him. He conceived it sufficient to say, in the present instance, that he saw no necessity for the discussions not terminating satisfactorily; at the same time, it must be perfectly obvious to the House, that it was the duty of Ministers to be prepared for the alternative. It was certainly the earnest wish of Ministers not to see the tranquillity which subsisted between the two countries interrupted; but they at the same time hoped that nothing would be wanting on the part of the country to enable them to maintain that tranquillity in a way consistent with the honour, the security, and the true interests of the British nation, the spirit, the energy, and the resources of which, he doubted not, would be successfully exerted on such an occasion as the present. Under these impressions, he would no longer detain their Lordships, but move an address to his Majesty on the occasion of his most gracious message. The Noble Secretary of State then moved the address, which was couched in the usual form, echoing his Majesty's message, and fraught with assurances of the cordial support of the House.

On the message being read from the Woolsack, and the question put,

Earl Spencer rose, chiefly, if not entirely, for the purpose of signifying his full approbation of the proposition just now made by the Noble Secretary of State. He anticipated with the Noble Lord the most perfect unanimity on the occasion, and felt with him cordially as to the right line and system of conduct which was proper to be pursued on such a crisis as the present. He also felt that in the relative situation of Great Britain and France, there existed circumstances, that, under whatever degree of uncertainty, called for the measures at length resolved upon by his Majesty's Ministers. The present crisis in which this country was involved, he held to be of that importance and magnitude, as to render him confident there was not a man in that House, or scarcely an individual in the country, who would not join in offering to spill the last drop of their blood, or to spend their last shilling, in support of its honour and its most essential interests: for his own part, after the uniform and decided opinions he had so frequently given, as to the relative situation of the two countries, it could be little expected that a firm and vigorous system of conduct should not meet his full assent and approbation He could not, however, at the same time avoid observing, that he should feel more satisfaction if the Noble Secretary of State had, not only for the satisfaction of the House, but for that of the public and the country, explained a little fuller the situation of the moment, and adverted to those circumstances which have produced such a sudden and marked alteration in the tenour and complexion of his Majesty's councils and measures. He would repeat, that his own opinions on these points had been long formed. He was perfectly satisfied that a system of conduct like that now resolved upon by Ministers, was that most likely to conduce to the preservation of peace, a wish in which all true friends to their country must unite. A system of firmness and vigour was much more likely to ensure the continuance of peace, than that line of conduct heretofore adopted by Ministers. Indeed, in his opinion, the only chance that now remained for the preservation of that blessing, was the effect of the measures now proposed: of concession, and attempts at soothing our late adversary, we had had too much. Had this line of conduct been adopted earlier, in all human probability no necessity for it would exist at the present moment. However, as matters stood, he hailed this first appearance of spirit and vigour in the national councils with joy and gladness, as the only means left for our salvation. He had at present nothing farther to offer; but upon an occasion of such great importance and magnitude, he could not give a silent vote, consistently with his feelings of duty, or the dictates of his conscience.

Lord Grenville said, he had but a few words to offer on the present occasion. He cordially agreed with what fell from his Noble Friend who spoke last; but, like him, the part he had always taken with respect to similar discussions, prevented him from giving a silent vote. He thought with his Noble Friend, that the adoption of the system now about to be acted upon was the only one that could preserve the blessings of peace to the country; he was likewise of opinion, that a system of firmness and dignity, if earlier acted upon, would have ensured the continuance of peace, and certainly have obviated the necessity of such an incipient system at present. It was, he was firmly convinced, only because such a system was not earlier adopted, that the continuance of peace was now questionable.

However, its adoption even now, would afford to the country the best chance for the maintenance of that blessing; but at the same time he had to observe, that the conduct of Ministers in the present crisis should be such, as to enable the country to feel and know its real situation; by which means, if the injustice of our adversary rendered it necessary to call forth the full powers and resources of the country, they could be used with the greatest vigour and effect. The reasonings of that day were warranted by the experience of the last eighteen months; they had seen the consequences resulting from a system of concession and meanness, in which all their attempts at conciliation only elevated the arrogance and the pretensions of the French government. If there was any chance remaining for the preservation of peace, it would proceed from the measures now resorted to; at the same time it was with regret he had to consider, that in consequence of the former conduct of Ministers, if we were now driven to the alternative of war, we should have to meet a state of war under many and great disadvantages. Cessions the most important and valuable had been made with a view to operations either of an offensive or a defensive nature: these considerations should not withhold his concurrence from the present motion; on the contrary, he rejoiced at this first appearance of sound political wisdom and vigorous determination on the part of Ministers; he hoped such a system would be acted upon with due energy and perseverance. Upon the whole, the motion had his hearty concurrence; and he was confident there could be no difference of opinion in that House on such an occasion. They were in the present instance simply called upon to concur in measures for strengthening the hands of the King with necessary powers, at a crisis wherein discussions of acknowledged importance and magnitude were pending, the result of which was known to be uncertain—they were called upon no farther. His Lordship concluded with expressing his hearty assent to the motion.

The Earl of Moira, in expressing generally his concurrence in the motion, observed, that his support was rather qualified by the seeming backwardness in the Noble Secretary of State, to give that degree of explanation which he thought necessary, and at the same time unexceptionable; there were of course certain reservations, and these proceeded chiefly upon the following grounds: First, they were by no means satisfied that the causes which induced Ministers to come as they now did, did not exist even long before: the conduct of the French government in many respects was well known. They were also unsatisfied whether the crisis said to be now arrived might not have been prevented or obviated if earlier taken up, and the attention of Parliament called thereto. At the close of the last session, no serious apprehensions from our late enemies were declaredly entertained by Ministers, though, notwithstanding these declarations, they thought it necessary to propose an increase of our establishment: at that time every thing was doing or done in France, as fully as at the present moment, when such serious apprehensions seemed to be entertained. They should be given to understand at least what it was that had thrown such a new colour on the pretensions of the enemy; what change there was in the situation of France, or in the tone held by its ruler. Some intimation of these should at least be given, in order to enable them to judge of the extent of the proceeding now going on. Perhaps to a certain degree these explanations might be declined, on the ground that speaking too fully out might give umbrage to the ruler of France: umbrage to that new Hannibal, who has sworn on the altars of insatiable ambition an eternal enmity to this country! He would ask, has this man never shewn any disposition to induce unfavourable sentiments and conduct, on the part of others, against this country? After expatiating some time on the manifest disposition of the First Consul of France against Great Britain, he contended that we should place ourselves on the defensive, but in a dignified attitude; that we should be prepared for the worst; that we should betray no marks whatever of despondency or dismay, but come forward manfully, and shew ourselves not afraid of the result of the alternative of war. A genuine and useful spirit should be shewn by our government, and not an empty parade of valour; for if the First Consul had really advanced so far in his system, as avowedly to render such precautionary measures necessary on the part of our government, he had lost all hope of its stopping there; their conduct in such case should be such, as in effect to appeal to the sense of the French nation against the ambition and injustice of its ruler; to let them fairly see and decide, whether, in consequence of the headstrong passions of one man, they would be willing again to plunge into all the calamities of war. The effect of such a line of conduct, if any thing of that kind could, would be to restrain the ambition of the First Consul, and to induce him seriously to pause before he should proceed to extremities. A decided tone and vigorous system of policy on our parts, would more than any other be likely to prevent hostilities between the two countries: such, in fact, as would have the effect, comparing little things to great, of preventing a quarrel between any two manly Englishmen—"On such terms I would wish to remain at peace; but set your foot on such a place, and I shall consider it as the signal for instant war!" Such a mode would best conduce to the preservation of peace, even with a country governed by the most despotic ruler. With respect to any important objects in a train of negotiation, he confessed it might

be improper now to inquire; but he hoped that information respecting those would, as soon as practicable, be laid before the House, as the people should, as soon as possible, be apprized of their real situation. Considering the subject in another point of view, and urging the policy of vigorous preparation, his Lordship observed, that we should not calculate upon the attempts of Buonaparté, according to those principles or motives of conduct which actuated any other man. We should make up our minds, as to the probability at least, of attempts upon this country; but for these we should be prepared; we should look the danger full in the face; and more, we should let our adversaries know that we are so determined. Their boast, "that England cannot contend single-handed against France," should not go unnoticed. Whatever purpose they might have against us was, perhaps, when we were encumbered with what they would call assistance. But how stood the fact? It was, that when we were single-handed with France we were always successful, and of this he thought his Noble Friends near him (Lords Nelson and Hutchinson) afforded a good practical illustration. But above all, our adversaries should be made to understand, that if contending with them in this country, we most confidently looked for signal and decisive success. In such a possible contingency, the safety of the capital should be especially looked to. We should not talk of the impracticability of invasion; we should consider the extent of coast possessed by, as well as the character of the adversary we had to contend with. Therefore, what was possible was practicable, and what was practicable we should consider as likely to be attempted. We should consider that in such a contest we should be playing our last stake. Such a contest should not be managed under a common-place system or official practice of war: if so, we were lost indeed! but the strength, the resources, the energies of the people and the country, should be called forth and fairly brought into action. The first object of the enemy in a descent, would doubtless be the capital: its security should be first looked to. A great and powerful army should be stationed between it and the coast; this he would wish to be understood; and so circumstanced, he was of opinion, the officer commanding the British force ought to lose his head if he did not come to an action with the enemy before they reached the capital. In such a crisis, the destruction of one army ought to be risked against that of the other. After dwelling upon these points, and urging the necessity of securing the capital especially from attack (among other ill effects of which, the temporary elation it might give to the few disaffected spirits should be guarded against), he again urged the superior policy of vigorous preparations, and a determination to be prepared for the worst; and, above all, to assume that tone and attitude which should convince the enemy that no invader that should set his foot in this country should be suffered to return to tell of his fate.

The Earl of Westmorland made a few observations upon the general subject. He contended, that Great Britain was of herself amply capable of asserting her honour, maintaining her dominions, and preserving her independence. In such a contest she needed no ally. Let republics court the alliance, or unite themselves to the Great Nation; the kingdom of Great Britain, under the auspices of its sovereign, aided by the spirit and resources of its people, would stand alone, and in a dignified attitude. It was then unnecessary, as well as obviously improper, to enter into the discussion of certain points adverted to by the Noble Earl, though in another point of view, the forbearance of that Noble Lord to inquire was highly entitled to approbation. He trusted that due confidence would be placed in Ministers on the present occasion, as it was but fair to deem of them that they would not rashly throw away those blessings of peace which they had so greatly exerted themselves to attain and secure. He could assure his Noble Friends that his Majesty's Ministers were as anxious for the preservation of those blessings as any men possibly could be.

Lord Auckland expressed his conviction that the steps lately adopted were not unadvisedly taken, and that no wish whatever was entertained by Ministers to plunge the country again into the calamities of war. He adverted to the colossal strength of France, and to the great extent of her continental possessions or influence, and scouted the principle advanced on the part of France, that Great Britain had no right to interfere in the concerns of the continent. There were several instances, as illustrated by his Lordship in argument, where that interference would be not only justifiable, but laudable. After commenting some time on the prosperous situation and circumstances of this country, and her ability, in every point of view, successfully to cope with France, his Lordship adverted particularly to the financial concerns of England, which, he observed, it was of late so much the practice to depreciate in France: it was to evince to the world, and to that country in particular, the unprecedented prosperous financial situation of this country, that he moved for the various accounts which were then before the House. To establish the positions adverted to, the Noble Lord entered into a variety of financial calculations, from which he deduced, that the country now possessed, after a discharge of debt, an income of not less than seventeen millions a year. This income, in consequence of various operations, was increasing from day to day; and a rapid progress was making in the liquidation of debt.

Added to these considerations was the immense territorial possessions of Great Britain, particularly in the East Indies, and which naturally increased the magnitude of her strength and resources. These were leading and important facts, which his Lordship observed, could not be too generally known, and with a reference to that publicity, he originally proposed the discussions he had alluded to.

After a few words in explanation between Lords Moira and Auckland, the question was put, the address was voted *nem. diss.* and the Lords, with white staves, ordered to wait upon his Majesty respecting the same.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, Mar. 9.—(See Minutes, p. 404.)

[The King's Message.]—The Chancellor of the Exchequer moved, that the order of the day for taking into consideration his Majesty's most gracious message be now read; which being done, and the message read by the Speaker, he moved, "That this "message be now taken into consideration."—Ordered.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then rose to propose an address in consequence of his Majesty's most gracious message, which the House had just heard read from the Chair; and he felt perfectly confident that the appeal which his Majesty had thereby made to the wisdom, the public spirit, the liberality, and the fortitude of his Parliament, had not been made in vain. There were two points to which his Majesty's message referred: that of military preparations on the coasts of France and Holland, and the discussion now subsisting between his Majesty and the government of France: either of those points, separately considered, would have required a great degree of vigilance and circumspection on the part of his Majesty's government; but both combined, required still more of their vigilance and attention. It had been stated to the House by his Majesty, that the preparations in the ports of France and Holland are avowedly directed for the purpose of colonial services. That, Mr. Addington said, it was possible, and he hoped probable, was the purpose of these armaments; but on the authority of his Majesty, it was also stated, there were discussions of great importance still subsisting, the result of which must, as it was obvious to the House, be uncertain; his Majesty had therefore made his gracious communication to the House; for the House must be aware, that, however inoffensive these armaments might avowedly be towards us, yet they might, under circumstances, be applied to another purpose, and which it was of the utmost importance to our interests to counteract. With respect to the discussion referred to in his Majesty's message, he trusted the House would not expect that he should enter into the nature, still less the detail of that discussion; but he had the satisfaction of thinking that the result of that discussion might be consonant to the true interests of this country; if, however, unfortunately such should not be the result, his Majesty, conscious of the goodness of his cause, had expressed a determination to refer to the great resources of the country, the wisdom of the councils, and the pride of the nation, in support of the honour of his crown and the essential interests of his people. If that unfortunately should be the result, the House might be assured they should be possessed of every topic which could cast light on every subject which might be desired to come under discussion, on the conduct of his Majesty's government, from the moment of the ratification of the treaty of Amiens to the present moment. With regard to the nature of the measures to be adopted in consequence of the present state of things, he was not disposed to enter, at present, into that subject; but it would readily occur to the House, that there should be some augmentation of his Majesty's naval force, and probably some increase to our internal security, for the latter part of which he had reason to imagine that an intimation would be made by his Majesty to his Parliament; that he had resorted for that purpose to the constitutional force, by embodying the militia. It would indeed be matter of regret, that those who had employed themselves during a long war, and had already done so much, should now be called on to make additional sacrifices; but he had no doubt, if requested on such an occasion, they were sacrifices which would be cheerfully made: but here he begged it to be understood, that all which was stated in his Majesty's message had reference to a system of defence, and was only matter of precaution. He was sanguine enough to hope, that on this day the House would give proof of an unanimous determination to enable his Majesty to adopt such measures as were essential to the true interests of the country. He should not propose to convey the sentiments of the House in terms by which any individual should be pledged or committed to any future measure, or by which the discretion of Parliament should be pre-engaged; but he trusted that whatever Gentlemen's sentiments might be on some of the measures of Government, either on the terms of the peace, or the supposed advantages of a state of war, yet that all would concur in supporting the motion he should have the honour of submitting to the House, the substance of which was to assure his Majesty, that he may rely on his Parliament in supporting his Majesty in such measures as may be necessary for the honour of his crown and the essential interests of his people. He then moved an address to the following substance: "That an humble address be presented to his

"Majesty, to thank his Majesty for his most "gracious message; to assure his Majesty "that his faithful Commons are impressed "with a full sense of this fresh proof of his "Majesty's unceasing attention to the welfare "of his people; that, under the present cir- "cumstances, they could not hesitate to con- "cur with his Majesty in thinking it expedient "to adopt additional measures of precaution "for the security of his dominions; that "though the preparations to which his Ma- "jesty referred were avowedly directed to co- "lonial service, yet as discussions of great "importance were still subsisting between his "Majesty and the French government, the "result of which might be uncertain, that "they partake of his earnest and unvarying "solicitude for the continuance of peace; and "that his Majesty might rely with confidence "on their exertions to enable his Majesty to "adopt such measures as circumstances might "require, for supporting the honour of his "crown and the essential interests of his peo- "ple."

This address being read, and the question put,

Mr. Fox said, that no vote had ever been given on any occasion, and particularly by him, in such complete and utter darkness as that which was now proposed. To thank his Majesty for his gracious communication, to concur with him in the support of the honour of his crown and the essential interests of his people, were propositions which it was morally impossible to oppose. The message stated two grounds: first, the ground of the armament in France and Holland: this was matter of fact, capable of proof, and therefore must be supposed to be correctly stated. The next was the ground of discussion: and here he was entitled to avail himself of what had been said by the Rt. Hon. Gent. in the opening of this subject to the House, which was, that the address did not pledge the House to any thing. His Majesty stated there were subjects of discussion: he did not give to the House the remotest hint what they might be, whether in Europe, Asia, Africa, or America; upon no part of which did he give any opinion whatever. He must assume, that whatever he stated to be of importance was of importance; but he had no means of forming his opinion upon it; he was left in a state of entire darkness. That they were ready to thank his Majesty for his gracious communication, and ready to join in any measures which might be necessary to support the dignity of the crown and promote the welfare of the people, were propositions in this address to which he gave his assent most readily; but not further, without some information. Having said this, he would add, that any one who would carefully examine the present state of the British empire, would feel there never was a period in which it was so essential to this country to avoid the calamities of war as the present, and therefore, if we were involved in war by any fault of Ministers, they would be more guilty than any other advisers or counsellors of this or any other country.

Lord Hawkesbury said it would not be necessary for him to trouble the House long upon the present occasion, he should therefore say but a very few words. In one part of his speech, the Hon. Gent. who spoke last had rather misapprehended his Rt. Hon. Friend; he meant, in the two objects he had stated, that of the preparations of armaments in the ports of France and Holland, and the discussion remaining between his Majesty and the government of France. The Hon. Gent. seemed to think his Rt. Hon. Friend had stated, that one of these grounds only was fit ground for this address, whereas what his Rt. Hon. Friend had said was this, that one of these grounds was sufficient for the circumspection and vigilance of Government, but that both combined, that was, the preparations and the discussion, called for something more, and required that Ministers should advise his Majesty to send the present message to the House, and to exert that caution and that vigilance. As to what the Hon. Gent. had said upon the address in the latter part of his speech, he agreed with him that the address did not pledge or commit the House to any thing. As to the subject of discussion which might at present be subsisting between his Majesty and the French government, he would repeat what his Rt. Hon. Friend had already stated. If this discussion should lead to war, it would be the duty of Government to lay before the House all the information it could, as to the causes of the war and the conduct of Ministers: he would go further, and say, it would be right, under the present circumstances, not to confine it to objects immediately depending, but he should wish most anxiously, that the whole conduct of Government, from the conclusion of the definitive treaty to the present moment, should be fairly laid before the House and the country. He was satisfied, on a review of that conduct, his Majesty's Ministers would have no reason to repent of it; and when that came before the House, he should be ready to enter into the discussion of the whole or any part of that conduct which any Gentleman in the House might think proper to require. Under the present circumstances, however, he thought no advantages could arise by entering into the measure of negotiation at present, or events that antecedently took place: that would now answer no useful purpose. The address, if it pledged the House to any thing upon it, might embarrass the House. The address pledged the House to nothing but that to which the House was ready to assent at all times, namely, to support his Majesty in main-

taining the dignity of the Crown and the essential interests of the country.

Mr. Windham assured the House he had no intention to claim its attention long. He agreed with an Hon. Gent. who spoke before him, that the House was put into rather an hard situation, because it was called upon to act in the dark: he did not think it was sufficient for the House to be told, that hereafter they shall be in possession of the ground on which the present proceeding was proposed. The House ought to be in a situation where it might have some knowledge of events in a crisis so considerable; the House ought to know something upon this subject, instead of proceeding upon a nullity of information; for upon this matter which now occupied its most serious attention, the House knew literally nothing: it was told only in general terms that exertions are necessary. The House indeed knew that very considerable armaments had been made, and a great change effected in the system of what was called peace. He must therefore enter a species of protest against the mode now adopted (the necessity being, in his opinion, such as to call for it, and requiring exertion), that the force proposed to be used should be used merely as defence: now all species of force might be so used, especially in the first instance; but it was here of the last importance, when great force was necessary, to know what that force was, because prudence might require force of different sorts in different circumstances: there was some that was in its nature defensive, and defensive only; that must be the case of the militia; but for the interpretation of the present vote, nothing more need be said than that the House concurred in it. They pledged themselves to nothing but that which had been already stated, and in that no man could have any difficulty. Here he should have ended, if it had not been for some observations made on the other side of the House. It was said on a former occasion by an Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox), that peace was his policy and first wish, said Mr. Windham, and that war was mine. "I am at present in no state to say, I can be in no state to say, whether war would be expedient or not; if it were necessary to come to an opinion, no conclusion could be drawn from the conduct of those who were the most vehement opposers of the peace, what their opinion would be now. That they should be supposed to be glad of what was now proposed, that they exulted in it, and would catch with impatience at any prospect of the renewal of the war, would be a conclusion as false in reasoning, as unfounded in fact." The very reverse was the fact; he who was a vehement opposer of the peace of Amiens, who had no reason now to alter the opinion he gave then, but abundant reason to adhere to it, might nevertheless not conclude now that war could be made with advantage: he might think otherwise, in proportion to the conviction of his mind at the time he opposed the peace. He might be the less ready to catch at war now than he was then, because he might be of opinion that we had lost the opportunity which might have been then afforded, and therefore persons entertaining the opinions which he did, would consider this as a very serious matter. An Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had often said, that no evils could be stated which were equal to the evils of war. He believed that it now began to be suspected, perhaps felt, that there were dangers in peace as well as in war, and they might go on as rapidly too in that state as the evils of war, and might lead a country into that state in which no war could stop them. Now he would beg leave to observe to the Noble Lord who spoke last, that there was a double responsibility attached to a minister, that of making an improper peace, and also that of making an improper war: the danger of the one might in some cases be equal to the danger of the other. Consigning this, as he did, completely to his Majesty's Ministers, he could only remind them of their responsibility, and that it applied to either side, the alternative of peace or war.

Mr. Sheridan said, that there was something very extraordinary in the speech of the Rt. Hon. Gent. who had just sat down. That Rt. Hon. Member had stated, that he might feel an extreme reluctance in agreeing to a war at present; that he had been a vehement opposer of the peace, and that by being so, he was necessarily reluctant to our now going to war. He understood the Rt. Hon. Gent by this to mean, that this country had, by agreeing to the peace, incapacitated itself from going to war. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had also said, that we were not now able to renew the war; he had even stated, that we were not now able to defend ourselves. Such language had certainly been held by the First Consul of France, but he did not expect to hear it re-echoed by any member of the British House of Commons. This country had observed great moderation and forbearance, in order to maintain peace; but if repeated insults and provocations rendered it necessary for us to go to war, single-handed as we were, yet he had the most perfect confidence that we should be able to convince France that we were capable of supporting our honour and dignity, and that each individual in this country would be ready to follow the illustrious example of his R. H. the Prince of Wales, in determining to forego every consideration of personal convenience or accommodation, when the interest of the country was at stake, and with fortitude and magnanimity to preserve the country in that state which he was sure had not been injured by our moderation.

Mr. Windham said, that the Hon. Gent. had imputed to him that which he had never

said, for he had given no decided opinion whether this country ought to go to war or not.

Mr. Canning gave his cordial support to the address, as it pledged the House to nothing but that in which all members were agreed. He was unwilling to suppose that Ministers, in the conduct of the discussions now depending, were exposed to censure; he wished to suspend his judgment till they had an opportunity of explaining to the House the circumstances of their conduct. Ministers had promised this explanation, which, indeed, was what the House had an undoubted right to demand. In the manner in which this assurance had been given, there was something on which he found it impossible not to animadvert. The House were assured, that if, unfortunately, the discussions now depending should terminate in hostilities, Ministers would feel it their duty to explain the whole cause of the negotiation: but no assurance was given of this explanation in the event of an amicable adjustment of the points in dispute; the House, however, had as clear and undisputed a right to explanation in the one case as in the other. The message from his Majesty had excited throughout the country the greatest anxiety and alarm; and the public, as well as the House, were entitled to be apprized of the circumstances on which the expediency and policy of such a proceeding was founded. He must be allowed to say, that a refusal to give such an explanation would be a striking evidence of the want of that good understanding which ought to exist between the people and the Government. On the part of the people there had been of late manifested a great degree of docility, a strong disposition to give Ministers credit for the purity of their intentions and the uprightness of their views. It was fit that this disposition should be met with something of a corresponding spirit of confidence and openness of communication. Ministers, however, seemed determined to act on a perfectly different principle: they appeared studious of mystery and concealment. The address was of the most interesting nature; it referred to subjects of the highest national importance. Nothing like confidence was to be seen, however, on the part of Ministers; they put the House and the public in possession of no one circumstance which might account for measures of new and extraordinary preparation. Never, he ventured to assert, was so important a measure proposed on the grounds which were made the foundation of the present address: alarm and anxiety were excited, and the grounds of this anxiety and alarm were carefully involved in obscurity. He should, however, support the motion, putting in, as he did, in the strongest manner, his claim to demand a full and satisfactory explanation of the grounds of the address at a subsequent period.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in explanation, alluded to what had fallen from a Rt. Hon. Member (Mr. Canning), who had stated, that no information had been promised to the House, except in the alternative of war, and that no communication would have been made but in that event. He begged leave to state, that he had given no pledge whatsoever; but this he would say, that whatever might be the event, he disdained the reserve which had been imputed to him, and that he never would withhold any communication from Parliament upon any subject relative to the public interest, which might be communicated with a due regard to that interest.

Mr. T. Grenville rose to make a few observations upon what had fallen from a Rt. Hon. Gent. respecting the answer which had been given by the Minister. He admitted that which he was sure was felt by every Member in that House, that upon such a subject as this there ought to be no dissenting voice; but a question had been put to the Ministers, whether, in any alternative except that of war, they intended to lay any information before the House? To this question the answer was, that no pledge whatever had been given upon the subject. Now he could not help observing, that the very mode in which this answer had been given, was a satisfactory justification of the Hon. Member who had put the question. Having said thus much, he begged to observe, that no man was more unwilling than himself to enter into any discussion whatever that could operate to retard, or even to throw a shade upon the resolution which had been proposed. He did feel a great deal of embarrassment on his mind as to the ignorance in which the House was placed on this occasion; for when Government proposed to the House an address, which the Rt. Hon. Gent. had described as containing no pledge whatsoever, yet the House must be supposed to be pledged in the customary manner to the facts to which they assented. He could not help remarking, that if on the one hand unanimity was felt to be so desirable, yet on the other the effect of it would be considerably lessened in the eyes of all mankind, if the present vote did not convey the tangible opinion of every man in that House: for so it must be when the House voted an address without any information respecting facts. With these few remarks he should conclude, assuring the House that there was no man in it more ready or eager than he was to carry up to the Throne the answer contained in the present address. His mind was certainly impressed with sentiments of great anxiety upon this subject, but he trusted that the measures now proposed would be of a nature to produce peace and tranquillity.

The Attorney General said he could not be surprised that any Gentleman who con-

curred in the vote should wish to lay in his protest against giving any pledge as to the future sentiments he might think proper to adopt. He thought nothing could be more reasonable, than that at a time when a message of this sort was brought from the Throne, and when the House was called upon to express its thanks for the gracious communication, those Gentlemen who were of opinion the statement was not sufficient to justify the war, should lay in their claim to express their sentiments, whatever they might be, on a future occasion; but he could not help thinking, that the House had no reason to deem itself hardly dealt with by information being kept back, when, in fact, no information had been called for, and when the question to be considered was only a communication from the Throne, stating there were certain measures which rendered it necessary for us to make defensive preparations and hold ourselves on our guard, and when it was expressly stated too, that a satisfactory communication would in due time be made to Parliament. The Hon. Member who had last spoken had said the message seemed to augur well, because it manifested a disposition to exertion; but he thought he might as well have spared that observation: it inferred, that no conclusion the House should adopt could be too violent. With respect to what had fallen from a Rt. Hon. Gent. behind him (Mr. Canning), he answered him a little prematurely, as to the disposition he had anticipated of his Majesty's Ministers withholding any communication upon the subject. There had been no disposition expressed by his Majesty's Ministers, that, in the event of war being unnecessary, no information would be laid before the House. Whether such information should be laid before the House, must depend upon circumstances. When it was pressed for, if it was withheld, it would be in the power of any Member to demand it; and the House, if it thought proper, would enforce its production. He would not prolong the debate, except by mentioning one circumstance. The Hon. Gent. he had mentioned seemed to have recurred to the opinion he had expressed respecting the calamities produced by the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace of Amiens, on the ground that it was calculated to promote a war; and that, in the event of this country going to war, we should be so crippled, that the circumstance of having had peace would be attended with the effect of rendering a future war more difficult. He wholly disagreed with him. He maintained that the opinion of the people at large, going along with the opinion of Government, upon a question so important as the present one, was infinitely more to be considered than the precise state of the proportion of military force referring to the period when peace was concluded. If it should ultimately turn out that this country should be obliged to renew hostilities, the Government, he had no doubt, would be able to state to the House, that those hostilities had not been provoked, and that they could not, by any proper, temperate, and honourable conduct, be prevented. If his Majesty's Ministers should lay before the House this state of the case, he was persuaded that the spirit of the country would be in unison with that which actuated his Majesty's Ministers; and that the absolute necessity of renewing hostilities, would give more strength, vigour, and energy to those which should be undertaken, than could possibly be imparted, by preserving the exact military position of a particular period. He trusted the House would think the question was left open to discussion, and that, whatever the measures of Government had been, they would be fully inquired into. He hoped that Parliament and the country would not be too fond of peace—an unstable delusive peace. He trusted that they would not be induced to think that nothing short of an attack on the country would justify hostilities. He flattered himself they would bring their minds temperately to the discussion of the subject, and to the consideration of—whether his Majesty's Ministers had acted wisely in taking the course they had done with regard to these points; he was persuaded there could be no material difference of opinion on general grounds; and, respecting the question immediately before the House, nothing else was proposed, than that, supposing the case to be exactly as it was stated in his Majesty's message, the House should pledge itself thus far and no farther; that it should admit it to be a case which justified military preparations, but nothing more. If afterwards it should appear, that the circumstances and situation of the country did not justify the present application, it would properly be a subject for future consideration. To give his Majesty an assurance of our determination to guard against surprise, was all that the House was at present called upon to do; he trusted, therefore, that there could be no reasonable ground of complaint on the one hand, and that on the other there would be no reluctance in giving further information.

Dr. Lawrence said, that the meaning of his Rt. Hon. Friend had been misinterpreted, when it was alleged that he professed himself to have been adverse to all peace, at the time when that of Amiens was concluded. He did not then oppose peace in general, but a peace that could be nothing better than war in disguise. He did not mean, that there was not the greatest strength in that unanimity of high spirit which it might be expected would not now be found wanting in the breasts of the whole people of this country. But he had opposed and regretted the peace of Amiens, because it never promised to end otherwise than in those events, on the unpleasing probability of which contemplation was this day fixed. It was not to be denied, that the spirit

of the people was not likely to shrink from any new difficulties of war which they might be now called to encounter. But neither could it be in reason affirmed, that they would have been now utterly destitute of that spirit if the peace of Amiens had not been concluded. If, in consideration that no specific engagement was made in the address, he should avoid to press, at this particular moment, for further information from Ministers; yet, if the discussions and preparations on which the message was founded, should end in a renewal of war, and if his Majesty's Ministers should come, as they of course must, to that House, for the supplies necessary in carrying it on, he would then expect the most unreserved communication of every document which could throw light upon the quarrel; and he should undoubtedly be disposed to enter into the fullest discussion of the wisdom of their conduct. He wished to know, if war must be resorted to, whether it was necessary to the safety and honour of the empire. His wishes were for peace, and he should therefore oppose equally an unseasonable war, and a war waged without that full energy which could alone command success. It was argued, that since, in the alternative of war being yet averted, Ministers did not now say that they would give no information of the causes of this alarm, therefore they were not to be at present blamed for not offering information as freely in the one alternative as in the other. But he thought it their duty, in either case, to offer that information which it was disrespectful to Parliament, and to the country, and for Ministers, not to offer, whenever they had to appeal to the good-will of both, in a case of so much magnitude. There might be some pieces of information which it were sufficient to give when the House should call for them; but there were undoubtedly others, as in the present instance, which it were highly unbecoming in Ministers not spontaneously, in all events, to bring forward. He concluded with expressing himself friendly to peace; but willing, upon due information, to grant the requisite supplies for war. For the address he would vote, as making no specific engagement.

The address was then unanimously voted, and it was ordered, that such of the members as were of the privy council should carry it up and present it to his Majesty.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, March 11. *(See Minutes, p.* 428.)

[AFFAIRS OF SWITZERLAND.] Lord MINTO rose, and called to their Lordships' recollection a notice which he had given, previously to the Christmas recess, of his intention to bring forward, as speedily as possible after that recess, a motion for inquiry into the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers respecting the affairs of Switzerland. That motion it was his intention to have brought forward in the course of the present week, but the intervention of important circumstances, already well known to their Lordships, circumstances prominently developed by his Majesty's gracious message to both Houses, pressed so much more urgently upon the entire attention of their Lordships, as totally to avert their eyes from all retrospective views, and to turn their regard to the prospect immediately before us. The plain path for Englishmen to pursue on this occasion, was so obviously chalked out by the animated and eloquent speech of a Noble Lord, a few evenings since (Lord Moira), that no man could mistake the great line of his duty to his country. Under such circumstances, he said, it was impossible to withhold his expressions of the perfect satisfaction he felt for the unanimous sentiments of both Houses of Parliament within doors, supported by the opinions, the fortitude, and the bold, manly, and patriotic sense of every class of the people without. Actuated by such a sense of our situation and our common duty, stimulated by sentiments at once so national, so animated, and so truly characteristic of Englishmen, there could remain no doubt as to the final issue of any conflict, into which the exigency of circumstances might, however reluctantly, force us; and in such a contemplation of the existing circumstances of our country, their Lordships, he was confident, would not impute to him any dereliction of his duty, if he now declined bringing forward the motion which he intended; at the same time, he congratulated the country upon the spirit and energy manifested by his Majesty's Government, on an occasion so interesting to the honour and the rights of the British nation.

[MESNE PROCESS BILL.]—Lord MOIRA moved the order of the day, for the second reading of the bill for the better prevention of vexatious arrests on mesne process. The order of the day being read accordingly,

Lord MOIRA rose, with a view, he said, of trespassing, as shortly as possible, on the attention of their Lordships, in explaining his objects under this bill, which he had introduced, after many years of deliberate consideration, as the best result of his own judgment on the subject. His main purpose in this bill, he said, was public justice between all the parties concerned; tempered, at the same time, with as much humanity as was consistent with, as well as indispensably necessary to, the administration of that justice, consistently with the spirit of British legislation and British jurisprudence. He had to express his sincere thanks to those law Lords, who, happily for this country, preside at present in the public administration of national justice, for the deliberate consideration and wholesome counsel, whereby they had favoured

him in his endeavours to bring this bill forward. To their wisdom, as well as to the collective sense of their Lordships, he would now submit it, describing, as briefly as possible, his views, under the several clauses it contained. His first principle was grounded on the quantum of debt for which a man may, as the law now stands, under the 12th of Geo. I. be arrested on mesne process, namely, a debt of 10*l.* Considering the very material change in the value of money from the period at which that bill passed and the present, and the great promptitude of creditors for small sums, and the low class of practitioners, by whom they are but too much influenced, to arrest their debtors for small sums, his Lordship thought that an increase of the sum from 10*l.* to 20*l.* could in no degree alter the spirit of the 12th Geo. I. though it should prevent many instances of cruelty and oppression, which it could never have been the purpose of that law to authorize. The next object was the sum of maintenance to be allowed by the arresting creditor to the imprisoned debtor. Than the principle of this regulation, as it stood now authorized by law, nothing in his Lordship's mind could be more just or reasonable. It was, however, exclusively appropriated to those debtors only who were detained under execution. But if a man was thrown into prison for a debt which he was alike unable to bail or to discharge, it was to all intents and purposes the same as if he had been held in execution; and therefore the Noble Lord could see no rational cause why the creditor in that case should not be obliged to afford some assistance to the unfortunate debtor whom he throws into prison, and deprives of all means to earn bread, as in the other. Certainly the raising of the sum which would warrant arrest from ten to twenty pounds, went considerably to diminish the evil as it now stands; but the principle in his mind was equally valid in the one case as in the other. The next principle of his bill was one, which he conceived highly necessary, to prevent oppressive and fraudulent arrests, and the adoption of which could never, in the slightest degree, impede justice. For instance: as the law now stands, nothing more is necessary to procure a warrant for the arrest and imprisonment of any man than swearing to a debt. Upon such an oath a warrant is issued, the man thrown into prison; and though the oath be absolutely false, and not one penny fairly due to the plaintiff, yet the arrested person has no alternative for his liberation but to pay the debt, or enter bail. If he does the former, he submits to injustice without any privilege of subsequent appeal; and as to the latter, he may be an utter stranger, with his pocket full of money, and ample estates in another country, yet he may remain imprisoned for many months until the issue of a suit is determined, without any certain mode of forcing the plaintiff to proceed, in order to accelerate the issue of such suit. Now, what his Lordship wished was, to enable the person arrested to pay into the hands of the sheriff, or some eligible officer, the amount of the debt and probable costs for which he should be arrested, and then be entitled to go at large until the debt should be fully investigated and fairly proved in law. It might be said that a man, for maliciously swearing falsely to a debt, for the purpose of embarrassing a man by arrest, is severely punishable in law; but such is the complicated nature of debt, under so many balances, counter-balances, and set-offs, as may be pleaded, that nothing would be more difficult to substantiate on a prosecution, than such a malicious swearing. The remedy which the bill proposed, however, he conceived with deference, to be a reasonable one for the evil he mentioned. On this ground, having barely mentioned his objects in the bill, he thought the committee would be the proper place for suggesting such emendations as to their Lordships should seem necessary; and for the present he would offer nothing farther on the subject.

Lord Ellenborough said, that certainly those Noble Lords whose more peculiar functions led them to the administration of the laws in this country, had many cogent objections to the alteration of those laws, where strong motives for such alteration were not made clearly apparent. His Lordship was, however, ready to acknowledge that there were some of the alterations proposed by the Noble Lord's bill on the existing laws between debtor and creditor, which were but just and reasonable, and might have a very salutary effect; that, for instance, which proposed an increase of the sum warranting arrest on the mesne process, from 10*l.* to 20*l.* on which subject he agreed in the principle laid down by the Noble Lord. But on that part where the Noble Lord proposed to increase the allowance from the creditor to his debtor in prison, beyond the present sum allowed by law, or to the debtor confined on mesne process, and not in execution, he could not so readily agree, as it would be rather hard upon the creditor who arrested his debtor in pursuit of redress, to be obliged to increase the debt and his own injury, by an extra subsistence to his debtor, who might stay in gaol capriciously, though in many instances able to pay; and with respect to the liberty which the Noble Lord wished to give the debtor arrested, of paying the debt, and the trivial costs incurred in the first instance by such arrest, and thus procuring his liberation, the person arrested had already that privilege under the law as it now stands, and may pay the sum into a court, or to a judge at his chambers, and thus procure his liberation.

Lord Alvanley observed, that there were certainly some points worthy of notice, and which, in his mind, called for remedy. On

the point last mentioned, certainly a man arrested, however fraudulently, by paying debt and costs in the first instance, would be entitled to his liberation. But then, in such a proceeding, he admitted the justice of the claim, and had by law no subsequent ground of appeal against its injustice; so that to be entitled to a fair trial on the merits of such claim, he had no alternative but to go into gaol, or enter bail to stand the issue—a thing which the almost universal objection which all men entertained to becoming sureties, even for their dearest friends and relations, rendered very often impracticable to men of good character and property. However, as the bill was to undergo a full discussion in a committee, a proper remedy might suggest itself on this point; but he trusted that discussion would not take place in the absence of the Noble and Learned Lord who usually presided in that House.

On the motion of Lord Moira, the bill was committed for Tuesday, under the supposition that the Lord Chancellor would then be in his place.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, March 11. *(See Minutes, p.* 428.)

[Supply.]—The order of the day was moved for going into a committee to consider further of the supply to be granted to his Majesty.—The House accordingly resolved into the committee, and Mr. Serjeant moved, "That ten thousand seamen be added to the "number now existing."

Mr. Francis rose to offer a few observations on the motion, and it is with regret we mention that the commencement of his speech was delivered in a tone of voice too low to be distinctly heard in the gallery. The vote which the committee were now called upon to accede to was one which involved considerations of the most important nature; and before any Member could, consistently with his duty, agree to it, some general explanation was due on the part of his Majesty's Ministers. It was of importance to the committee to have some information communicated respecting the situation in which the country was placed, the reasons which rendered such extraordinary preparations necessary, the character of those in whom the application of those preparations would be vested, the views they entertained in calling on the House to make preparations, and the degree of confidence to which, by their past conduct, they were entitled. He wished sincerely that the address on a former evening had passed without any observation. The discussion which had taken place had put the House in possession of no new information, and at its close Members separated as completely ignorant of the circumstances on which the address was founded, as before the motion was brought forward. While he called for explanation, he disclaimed all opposition or hostility to his Majesty's Ministers, and indeed he was the more entitled to demand this explanation, as he had hitherto given them his support, and had reposed confidence in their conduct. He had therefore at this moment a peculiar right to know whether circumstances existed to justify the continuance of this confidence. He had a right to be informed whether it was to the fault or the misfortune of Ministers that the present situation of the country was to be attributed. When the preliminaries of peace were first signed, and before the terms on which it had been concluded were known, he had been thankful for the termination of a disastrous war. With this sentiment he felt obliged to Ministers for the peace which they had concluded, viewing it merely as the deliverance from a war without object or end. When the terms of the peace were known, they had been strenuously objected to by Gentlemen, of whose talents it was impossible to speak without the greatest respect. He did not mean to say that these objections, separately considered, did not possess great weight; but, viewing the conditions of the peace, and connecting them with the consideration of the continuance of war, the sacrifices which had been made did not appear to him greater than the object deserved. With such views, therefore, he was still willing to give Ministers credit for the conclusion of peace. That the executive power had the full right of determining, in the first instance, on peace and war, was a doctrine which he by no means wished to controvert. This, however, did not by any means interfere with the right of the House to inquire how far the servants of the Crown had exercised their power in a treacherous manner, or preclude them from presenting an address to his Majesty for their removal, if they should be judged incapable of managing the affairs of the nation under perilous circumstances, connected with the maintenance of peace or the renewal of war. On these principles, he therefore ventured to ask, whether, when peace was concluded on terms involving considerable sacrifices, great as these sacrifices were considered, as the price of an object of anxious desire, and there was now reason to apprehend a renewal of hostilities, the House had not a fair right to be informed what, after all these sacrifices, was the return which was to be expected; what, for all these sacrifices, was the return which had been obtained? It was not peace, but the prospect of war, after every concession had been made as the price of tranquillity and repose. Were the House now to be told that they should obtain no explanation? Was the country to be brought into the perilous situation in which it was now placed, and was no account to be given of the causes by which this situation had

been produced? Till the House and the country were informed what the circumstances were which had led to this situation, he could not, consistently with his duty as a representative of the people, justify the present motion. As far as the defence of the country was concerned, there was no need of a recommendation from the Throne to induce the House to do what loyalty, unanimity, and harmony would have suggested. This was an object which, in the view of a threat of invasion from any quarter, the House would ever have in view, but they would more particularly consider it if that threat came from France. At a moment when that which is dearest was at stake, there was no room for difference of opinion, because every man in defending the country only consulted the means of his own defence. But had not the House and the country a right to have it made out that the conduct hitherto pursued by his Majesty's Ministers was unwise and impolitic; that improper concessions had not been made; that the country was not unnecessarily again to be plunged in war? Till the explanation was given, he could not, consistently with his public duty, continue the same confidence which he had formerly reposed. He did therefore hope that some explanation would be given by Ministers how far they meant to go with the preparations, the necessity of which they had stated. By agreeing to this vote without explanation, they would, in fact, say that the same Ministers, who had by the greatest sacrifices concluded a peace, were to be allowed to bring the country into a war, without affording the smallest information as to the grounds of the renewal of hostilities. He threw out these suggestions, not so much with the view of entering into any detailed discussion, as of engaging gentlemen of greater abilities to take up the subject. Ministers owed it to their own characters, to the House, and to the country, to shew that we were not brought into our present perilous situation by any fault on their part. Perhaps to their conduct the extraordinary preparations now called for were owing, and it was surely not fit that those who had brought the country into a situation where war was the only alternative, should pledge the House to the support of that war, without affording any information respecting the circumstances on which it was to be founded. This, he contended, was the clear law of Parliament. The present was not a moment rashly to plunge the country in war. It had already been seen what effect his Majesty's message had produced on public credit, and how much the prospect of a war, no one object of which was explained, would dishearten the people. At a time like the present, when every exertion might be necessary for the support of our independence, it was of high importance that the people should repose the most ample confidence in his Majesty's confidential servants. The least distrust of their capacity could tend only to dishearten the people, and to fill them with astonishment and terror. At a moment like this, when we might be called upon to struggle even for our existence as a nation, it was a lamentable consideration that the whole ability of the country was excluded from the Government. At the most perilous crisis in which the country was ever placed, we were deprived of the opinion, the advice, the talents of all those great men whose cordial co-operation was so essential to the salvation of the country. This language might give offence to many Members; but this was not a moment for an independent representative of the people to conceal his sentiments. It was necessary to speak out under the existing circumstances. If the ship sunk, then all would go down with the unskilful pilot. He wished to press these considerations on the attention of the House. They were considerations which he had not offered to the attention of the House without due reflection. He had viewed the subject with the greatest possible seriousness, and he had suggested what his anxiety for the safety and welfare of the country suggested.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer, in reply, spoke to the following purport:—I think it my duty, on the present occasion, to follow the same course which I thought it expedient to pursue when the motion for the address to his Majesty was under consideration. I then stated, that, under the present circumstances, any explanation was what I conceived the House had no reason to expect; and to this opinion I still adhere. At present I rise solely with the view of animadverting very shortly on the observations which the Hon. Gent. has made with the view of shewing the necessity of explanation. I confess that the arguments which the Hon. Gent. used in favour of the propriety of explanation, appeared to me, and I believe that they appeared in the same light to the House, totally inconsistent with the wish which he professed when he set out, that the address had been carried without any comment at all. I leave it to him to reconcile this opinion with the sentiments which he has on the present occasion expressed. The Hon. Gent. professes a desire that nothing which fell from him might be considered as designed to disturb the unanimity which prevailed when this subject was formerly before the House. Now, I ask, if prudential reasons existed which rendered any explanation inexpedient on a former evening, whether, acting on the same principle, his Majesty's Ministers ought now to give that explanation? If in the one case it was politic and expedient that concealment should be observed, it is impossible for any gentleman to shew that the same causes did not operate with equal force. The Hon.

Gent. had said, that at a crisis when we may be called upon to contend for our very existence as a nation, it is a matter of deep regret that the whole ability of the country is excluded from his Majesty's Government. I will readily allow for myself, and I believe I may take upon me to make the same avowal for my colleagues in office, that we feel in their utmost extent the difficult and arduous duties which we are called upon to perform, and are sensible of the responsibility we owe to the country for their due performance. This may be a very fair subject of observation to the Hon. Gent.; but I may be allowed to ask, on what principle it is that this Gentleman, who tells the House distinctly, that a Ministry enjoyed his confidence from which the whole ability of the country is excluded, should now bring forward against them the charge of weakness and incapacity? This is a sort of conduct which I leave the Hon. Gent. satisfactorily to explain to the House. I leave it to him to explain the reasons for withdrawing the confidence which he formerly reposed. On this part of the Hon. Gent.'s speech I shall not at present further enlarge, but proceed to make a few remarks on some other observations which he adduced.—The Hon. Member laid down the principles by which the declaration of peace or war is regulated with accuracy and precision. By the constitution of this country, this declaration is wisely made to rest with the chief magistrate. If, however, a peace inconsistent with national honour and safety is concluded, I admit most unequivocally with the Hon. Gent. that his Majesty's confidential servants are deeply responsible for the advice which they have given to their Sovereign. The Hon. Gent. has applied the general doctrine to the present situation of the country; and he has argued, that if by the misconduct of Ministers the country has been brought into its present perilous situation, they are deeply and seriously responsible for this situation. To this sentiment I am bound explicitly to assert, and I have no difficulty in saying, that if it can be shewn that his Majesty's Ministers have lost sight of the motives which induced them to recommend to his Majesty the conclusion of the treaty of peace which the Hon. Gent. himself, though in qualified terms, has applauded—if it can be proved that any of the principles which they have hitherto declared to be the guides of their conduct have been departed from, then I will allow to the Hon. Gent. that they have been guilty of a very serious violation of their duty to the House and to the country. But I aver that that step has not been taken by me or my colleagues in office, that no advice has been given respecting the discussions now depending betwixt the two Governments which did not originate from the most ardent desire of preserving the peace, and which was founded in the true spirit of peace. It is with the same views that Ministers thought it their duty to recommend to his Majesty to send to Parliament the message on which the present motion is founded. It was solely with the view of giving the greater probability to the continuance of peace that additional preparations have been recommended. In these preparations Ministers looked forward to the most likely means of bringing the points in dispute to an amicable adjustment. The Hon. Gent. however, insists on the right of the House to explanation. I do not mean at all to dispute the ultimate right of the House to a full and fair explanation on this subject. This right I have already over and over again fully admitted. I do contend, however, that the House have not a constitutional right to demand explanation at a moment when explanation would essentially injure the advantages which Government might derive from existing discussions. It is clear that if Ministers were now to yield to this call for explanation, they might lose most important advantages resulting from concealment, and at the same time give no satisfaction. The points on which different Members require explanation are various and discordant. One Member says, Let us not hazard a war, and therefore let Ministers shew us that their system is conciliatory. Another party are afraid of too much concession, and nothing will satisfy them but a full explanation, to prove that the national honour has not been compromised. What advantage, then, is to be derived from explanation, amid such contrariety of opinion? while, on the other hand, the inconveniencies of explanation under the present circumstances are obvious. It must be clear that when negotiations are pending which have given rise to considerable disputes, if they are brought to an amicable adjustment, this can only be accomplished by concessions on the one side or the other. I ask, then, would it be prudent that the nature of these concessions should, in the present stage of the business, be explained? I believe that a great majority of the House think with me, that such an explanation would be highly inexpedient. From what I now say, I beg, however, that no inference may be drawn to countenance the idea that Ministers have consented, or will consent, to any improper concessions. My observations refer solely to the prudential considerations which would, in the present circumstances, render any explanation highly impolitic and disadvantageous. As to the motion now before the committee, the Hon. Gent. does not object to it: he gives it his cordial acquiescence. He even goes so far as to say, that if the number of seamen proposed to be voted had been greater, he should have given the motion his support. His only objection is founded on the want of explanation, which, I think, has been satisfactorily shewn to be

inexpedient at the present moment. I repeat what I have already more than once distinctly stated, that I hold myself deeply responsible for the course which his Majesty's confidential servants have thought it proper to adopt; but never shall I deviate from the principles which I have laid down on this subject. I trust it will ultimately be found that in the hands of Ministers the security of the country will not be endangered, its rights curtailed, or its honour sullied. I trust that it will be found that no concessions have been made which they will not be able fully to justify by the combined desire of preserving peace and supporting the honour and the independence of the country. I know that in some Gentlemen this language may excite disgust; but if the period shall ever come, which God grant it never may, as it would involve the renewal of hostilities; if ever that time come, I hope the conduct of Ministers will stand fully justified. Whatever may be the result of this; whether Gentlemen shall or shall not be satisfied with such explanation as may be then given, I am ready to hear every objection, rather than violate that duty which prescribes to me the impropriety of affording any explanation of matters now in dispute betwixt the two governments.

Mr. Dent observed, that in the late war we had upwards of 130,000 men engaged in our sea service. The peace establishment had reduced the number to 50,000. The Rt. Hon. Gent. opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer, had proposed a vote of 10,000, leaving us an establishment of 60,000. Now, he should propose that instead of 10,000, we should have 25,000, which would give us a naval force of 75,000. This, he supposed, would be fully sufficient for any common exigency, and he would wish Ministers and the country to be safe beyond all possibility of doubt. As to the expression, "God grant that period may never arrive!" used by the Rt. Hon. Gent. he thought it liable to considerable objection. With respect to the outcry raised against this armament, and the consequent effect on the public funds, in his opinion the monied men had reason to complain if property fell 10 per cent. He had heard various reports as to the possibility of what was the cause of these discussions and these armaments. Whether the object was Malta, or whether it was Egypt, he did not wish to pry into the nature of these objects which Ministers had thought fit not to disclose. He thought them entitled to his confidence, and gave it accordingly. There was one point, however, which he could not help lamenting, that was, that we had now come to the eve of war, when we had given up almost every conquest, and we had returned several thousands of seamen to France; and, as far as he could learn, not a farthing of money had been as yet paid by their government to ours. In the fullest conviction of the propriety of the measure, and of the justice of its application, he should conclude with moving the amendment he had already mentioned, namely, "That instead of 10,000, we insert 25,000 seamen and marines in the vote now upon the table."

Mr. Fox. I cannot help feeling some degree of surprise at the language which my Hon. Friend who began the discussion, and the Rt. Hon. Gent. over the way, have used respecting the conversation which took place on the motion for the address, on which the present proposition is founded. I myself certainly began that discussion, but I do not feel that I was guilty of bringing out from any one Gentleman who spoke, a single sentiment or expression which could produce a feeling of rancour or animosity in France, in this country, or any other part of Europe. My Hon. Friend is unwilling to negative the present motion, though he is desirous of an explanation on the grounds on which it is proposed; and the Rt. Hon. Gent. is surprised that this explanation is demanded, when my Hon. Friend expresses his readiness to vote for even a much larger number of seamen, if such a number were necessary to the public service. I am as ready as any Member to vote for the proposed addition of seamen, on the principle that they are necessary for the public service; but I have at present no better ground for my vote than if 25,000, 100,000, or any other number of additional seamen had been proposed. My objection rests on this plain, constitutional ground, that as representatives of the people in the proper discharge of our duty, we have a right to have the causes of these increased preparations explained, and not be called upon to vote on the unlimited confidence which we choose to repose for a time in Ministers. I have always understood that the prerogative of the Crown to conclude a peace was clear and undisputed; and I can have no difficulty in agreeing with the sentiments which my Hon. Friend entertains on this point. I certainly do agree with him, that those who have counselled his Majesty to conclude any peace, are responsible for the merit of the terms of that peace, and are liable to censure if they appear inconsistent with the national honour and safety. I cannot, however, allow, that after the peace has been concluded, and after its terms have been canvassed and approved, if circumstances occur which render the continuance of peace impossible, Ministers are to be necessarily accused of having, by their conduct, produced these circumstances. With respect to his Majesty's right of declaring war, there was as little doubt in theory, but in practice a very important distinction existed. In this declaration might be involved every principle of a free constitution, every thing connected

with the property, nay, the very existence of the subject. The Sovereign might be ill advised, and experience had fully proved that this is not merely a possible case. The country might be plunged into a war, of which it was impossible to see either the equity or the necessity. It might be continued against the will of the Parliament or the people; and the whole, or part of every man's property might be wrested from him, if in practice this prerogative of the Crown were carried to all the extent which theory supposed. But such a construction of the prerogative strikes every one in a moment as monstrous: and while in theory we admit the power of the Sovereign to declare war, in practice and in substance we possess the privilege by which alone that declaration can be carried into effect. This privilege is founded in the means we possess of giving or withholding the necessary supplies. This has an operation to the prevention of war to a considerable degree, though it is only the privilege of the purse which we enjoy: this House must therefore be necessarily parties to every war. How is this to be done? Why, the mode of our becoming parties is simple. His Majesty all in cases states to us the grounds on which he has thought a declaration of war necessary; and he calls upon us to grant the supplies necessary for the prosecution of this contest. We all know that instances are not wanting in which the Sovereign has been compelled to relinquish a war, because Parliament, convinced of its injustice and ruinous effects, no longer afforded the supplies. I will not here determine how far the American war was put an end to by the voice of Parliament; but there is one striking instance in which a war was put an end to by the exercise of this constitutional power, and that was the instance in which the Parliament of Charles II. compelled that prince to relinquish the Dutch war. Now how does the case stand at present? and here I will rest my argument. We know that in practice armaments precede any official communication from the Throne, or any vote of supply; and I trust, that, if danger really exists, armaments are now going on with a rapidity correspondent to the emergency on which they are founded. The certain effect of the vote is only to make us direct parties to any war to which these armaments may be applied. What I object to then, is simply, that I have heard no grounds stated to justify any extraordinary preparation; and therefore I must, on constitutional principles, enter my protest against the mode of proceeding which has been adopted. The case of the Russian armament is one in which many persons were desirous to pursue a course similar to that now proposed to be adopted; but I do not think, when the consequences of that armament are considered, that the proceedings then adopted will be very likely to encourage imitation. I hope I may be allowed to reason hypothetically respecting the independence of Parliament in granting supplies for carrying on any war. I trust that we are not necessarily to be constantly guided by a spirit of humble docility, though our independence may appear more clearly in theory than in any cases of modern or recent experience. In whatever we choose to exercise our constitutional right, the possibility of its exercise will not be disputed. Possibly we might think that negotiation was preferable at a moment when Ministers had plunged the country in war; or, on the other hand, we might suppose, that measures of a more vigorous description would have done much more for the national honour than any negotiation: and how is our opinion to be expressed, except in withholding the supplies before we bind ourselves to become parties to a war? I therefore, for one, contend against the House of Commons being a mere echo, a mere docile receiver of whatever communication Ministers may think proper to make under the form of a message from the Throne. I do not wish to flatter Ministers when I say, that I believe that the preparations which have been recommended are founded on a firm and honest conviction of their expediency. I will not suppose that they would willingly, and without reference to any one object of advantage, take such steps if they did not imagine that they were essential to the interests of the country. Their interest, as well as their character, equally forbid me to suppose, that in this instance they are deceiving the House or the public. This I have no difficulty in stating generally, though I must add, that instances of the guilt to which I have now alluded, are not entirely unknown. But let Gentlemen recollect, that, with the best intentions in the world, Ministers are liable to error; and that what they conceive to be wise and politic, might, if explained, appear unwise and inexpedient. This I must only say, that we are totally without all means of forming any judgment. In the message of his Majesty, or in the speech of the Rt. Hon. Gent. there is not a single word stated by which I can venture to form any opinion of the points in dispute. A great deal has been said with the view of shewing, that, if a rupture should take place, it would be only the natural result of the treaty of Amiens. Now, I am one of those who hold a very different opinion; and without hesitation I say, that, if war does now take place, there is no necessity for supposing that it has the slightest connexion with that treaty, or that this was a treaty not fit to be concluded. I thought, and I have seen no reason to alter my opinion, that the treaty of Amiens was an eligible treaty; not eligible compared with other treaties, that under other circumstances might have been formed, but eligible as freeing the country from a most destructive war. Are

we to be told that Ministers dare to make no peace, because the unreasonable ambition of France may now drive us to the renewal of hostilities? Are we to be told that we were to wage warfare till we had obtained a satisfactory assurance on the part of the enemy, of a sincere desire to cultivate all the blessings of tranquillity in the true spirit of peace? No reasonable man will, I believe, hold so extraordinary an opinion as that which I have now stated. It may be further urged against Ministers, that since the conclusion of peace they have shewn too much forbearance, that they have acted too much in the spirit of concession. How far this charge is true, I have no means of determining, though there appears no reason to conclude that their disposition to conciliation has gone beyond a commendable desire to preserve the peace. If they have been guilty of such forbearance or concession as has in the smallest degree compromised the honour or safety of the country, unquestionably their conduct has been highly criminal; but this is no consequence of their having concluded the treaty of Amiens. But perhaps, we are to be told, that it was impolitic to make peace till we had a vigorous administration to support it. I certainly do not think that want of vigour in any administration is a sufficient reason for not entering into a war, if a legitimate cause of war exists. As an objection to the conclusion of peace, it is one of the most ridiculous and inconclusive that ever was brought forward. If Ministers have conceded too much, or done too little for the support of the honour of the country, they have incurred a very grave responsibility; but let not this be laid to the charge of the treaty of Amiens. If I am fond of that treaty, it is because it was the means of ridding us of incumbrance of the most oppressive kind; not that it freed us from connexion with allies, for allies we had none at the time it was concluded; but that it delivered us from the detestable and abominable principles on which the late war was conducted. I do sincerely hope that we shall hear nothing more of wars undertaken for religion and social order. I speak not disrespectfully of religion or of the blessings of social order; but I speak of that detestable hypocrisy which held forth these as the ostensible objects of contest, while we were all along fighting for ends of a nature totally different and opposite. I believe that such hypocrisy is for ever destroyed; and I trust that as long as a sentiment of justice, as long as a detestation of such base and infamous deception, shall be reprobated among men, such attempts to impose on a generous people must be held in eternal execration. If, unfortunately, we are to be doomed to a renewal of hostilities, I hope that the object of the war will be clearly and distinctly understood. Of what are the subjects which may eventually lead to such an unfortunate result, I profess to be totally ignorant. Whether they refer to the possession of Malta, the evacuation of Alexandria, or whatever other point of discussion they involve, I have no means of forming an opinion. I shall just say generally, that if our national rights are involved, if attempts have been made to lower that rank which we have been accustomed to hold among the states of Europe, and all attempts at amicable adjustment have failed, then I have no difficulty in saying, that a war, undertaken under such circumstances, would be just. Of the necessity and policy of such a war no man can for a moment doubt. But I know it is said that it is necessary to hold out to the people some ostensible object of war beyond what is the real object of contest: without this sort of language the national enthusiasm cannot be animated. This I hold to be a very false and a very pernicious doctrine. If a war is really necessary, I am convinced that no measure of this sort need be resorted to to animate the national spirit. False pretensions and high-sounding words do not appear to me to be likely to animate the energies of a people. Nothing, indeed, in my conception, so much dispirits a people called upon to make great exertions, as ignorance of the precise object of contest; and this ignorance was, I am fully persuaded, one of the leading causes of the evils which the late calamitous contest entailed on the country. After the experience of these calamities, no one would wish to go to war for a light object. On this point I shall speak in very plain terms. If war is unavoidable for great national objects, then I am convinced it will be sustained with a corresponding national energy; but at all events let that object be fairly and fully defined. Do not let us again involve the country in the same calamities which the want of a specific object has already made us so severely experience. It was the want of this specific object which made the people cold and uninterested through a great part of the late contest, so far as events on the continent were concerned, though loyal and unanimous in the defence of the country. I hope and trust then, that before Ministers call on us to be parties in another war, they will fairly explain the circumstances which have given rise to it, and the object for which it is begun. The Rt. Hon. Gent. opposite has said a great deal of the responsibility which attaches to Ministers from their present conduct; and in this I fully agree with him. He has said something of the reproach which he may have to encounter for too great liberality of concession. On this point allow me just to express my confidence, that he will never be induced by any fear of reproach to abandon a system of conciliation, so long as it is consistent with honour, and promises to lead to an amicable result. I shall not readily be

accused of endeavouring to influence Ministers to go to the opposite extreme. But while I am the advocate of conciliation, I shall never be the apologist of dishonour. My Hon. Friend has spoken of the present government as excluding the whole ability of the kingdom. On this point I wish not at present to enter: but I may be just permitted to say, that in the prospect of war, with such a man as Earl St. Vincent at the head of the Board of Admiralty, there would be little reason to dread the want of suitable preparation; and the signal naval triumphs of the late war afford us the best grounds to hope for future success. Of the merits of our land forces no man thinks more highly than I do. I am no military man myself; but forming my judgment on the opinion of those best qualified to speak on this subject, I believe that we have officers equal in skill and in courage to any officers in Europe. Of our troops, my opinion is not less favourable. I am convinced, that in any contest in which they might be called upon to engage, they would be found fully to support the character which they have so long maintained. Of what then should I be afraid in the event of the renewal of war? Of subjugation to France! The idea cannot for a moment be indulged. When, however, I consider the many vulnerable points in our situation—when I take a view of the whole state of the empire—when I look even to our financial resources, though in some points of view their appearance is flourishing—when I take all these things into consideration, I cannot but think the renewal of war is a most grievous calamity. Though for years we should on every occasion be successful, though every expedition should be crowned with glory, still prolongation, even of a successful contest, could not but be infinitely calamitous.—The Hon. Member, after a few more remarks, concluded by declaring that he should not vote against the motion.

Mr. Francis begged the permission of the committee that he might explain the sentiment which had fallen from him in the course of his former speech, and which had been alluded to by the Hon. Member who spoke last. He certainly did say, that "the whole ability of the nation was excluded from its councils;" but, at the same time that he said this, he wished it to be understood that he entertained the highest respect for both our army and our navy; it was not only the Noble Lord (St. Vincent) to whom his Hon. Friend had alluded; but he was convinced that there were many, very many men of the first ability in the country engaged in both these departments. He therefore did not intend that they should by any means be included in that general expression.

Mr. Burroughs declared that he thought it an outrage on the constitution for any Gentleman to demand or require any explanation at the present crisis. Ministers ought not, under the present circumstances, to disclose any information which, in consequence of their official capacity, they might be possessed of; it was contrary to their duty to do so. Other Gentlemen might entertain their particular objections to the measure now before the House; but, for his part, he thought it fit and proper to attend to the words of his Majesty's message. It stated that great armaments were preparing in the ports of France and Holland, and that at the same time important discussions are going on between their government and ours. Under such circumstances he thought it our duty to arm also; and the demand of 10,000 seamen appeared to him very moderate; so much so, indeed, that he was inclined to draw a very satisfactory inference from thence, and conclude that war was not inevitable. If Ministers had come forward with a demand to the amount an Hon. Gent. had just now proposed (Mr. Dent), of 25,000 men, he then should have taken alarm, and concluded that war was certain; but with this moderate supply he was perfectly satisfied, and he thought it the best ground for confidence in Ministers, that we see they are not disposed to leave the shores of this country, or of Ireland, in a defenceless state. We were not now engaged, the Hon. Gent. said, in actual hostilities; but if we were, we had this consolation, that we were not fallen or degraded as other nations were; we were still in a situation capable of exertion sufficient to resist the ambition or the baseness of any neighbour, however powerful he might be. He should now conclude with giving his most hearty assent to the vote upon their table.

Lord Hawkesbury next rose.—I agree, said he, with the Hon. Gent. who spoke last in much of what they have advanced on the present occasion. But I chiefly rise shortly to observe on the doctrine which the Hon. Gent. opposite to me (Mr. Fox) has endeavoured to inculcate. I perfectly acquiesce with him, indeed, in the general constitutional principle on which he seemed disposed to ground his observations; and differ with him only respecting the application which he has made of it. No doubt there is a wide difference between the prerogative of the Crown, when it is exercised in negotiating and concluding peace, and when it is exerted in preparations for and a declaration of war. In opening negotiations for peace, and in concluding them, the exercise of the prerogative of the Crown is unlimited; though it be competent afterwards for Parliament to canvass and consider the nature of the conditions upon which peace has been concluded, and to impeach Ministers and propose their removal from office, if the terms of the treaty betray incapacity on their part. But as the question of war involves a much greater magnitude of

difficulties and dangers, so should the House be placed (and in reality it so stands) in a very different posture respecting that momentous question. Most undoubtedly the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) is perfectly justified in asserting that the prerogative of this House in granting or withholding the supplies, should be held as sacred as that of his Majesty in declaring war; and though the House may not possess a negative on the act of declaring war, yet it most certainly can exert a practical negative on the continuance or the termination of a war, by granting or withholding the supplies necessary to its prosecution. This privilege of the House grows out of the nature of he constitution, and I hold it, with the Hon. Gent. as highly essential to the interests and rights of the nation.—As to the degree of information which, on points like the present, the House is entitled to call for on Ministers, I must now beg leave to offer a few observations. In cases like the present, where the objects in view are not brought to a conclusion, and where measures, simply of precaution, are proposed, Ministers may think it their duty not to afford more than what may justify the measure they bring forward. After the circumstances which called for that measure are brought to issue, then if the degree of information that has been afforded to the House appear insufficient, is it not in the power of the House to move an address to his Majesty for the production of additional and more satisfactory information?—The case of war is, no doubt, a case which *primâ facie* would justify Parliament in calling for all possible information: it is the duty, and the serious duty of Parliament to inquire into the grounds and causes of war, and cautiously to examine whether they be necessary and just. But in a case of peace, although the terms of that peace might not be looked upon as satisfactory, yet the same degree of information respecting the mode in which it was negotiated should not be insisted upon. Besides, the two cases differ materially from each other. The inconveniencies that may attend the one are much greater than what might ensue from the other. In the case of war, those inconveniencies are comparatively small: but in that of peace, after all differences and bickerings were amicably adjusted and composed, how serious might be the inconveniencies that would result from exposing to Parliament all the irritating circumstances that may have attended the progress of a negotiation, while no one adequate advantage or benefit could be expected from an uncalled for revealing of them? Neither am I here going so far as to say, that if peace should be the result, no information should be afforded respecting such an event. I merely contend, that such disclosures should be allowed much to depend on circumstances, much on the nature of the arrangement concluded, and much on the prudence of Ministers, respecting what might be proper for them to disclose. These few observations, I imagine, were called for upon the general principle, and the nature of the doctrine which the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) has laid down.—The House, I trust, will now indulge me in a remark or two upon the application of it; but first I must beg leave to advert to an expression which dropped from the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) in the course of his observations. The expression I allude to is that in which the Hon. Gent. seemed to insinuate, that by the vote given on the question now before the House, the House would be committed to approve a war. I here again am ready to repeat, that the House should not give its countenance to any war, unless it were in complete possession of the grounds on which that war was to be entered on, and thereby be enabled to judge whether it was just and necessary, or otherwise. But neither by the vote of this night, nor by that given on a former night on the question of the address, was the House by any means committed to support a war. Ministers called merely for the means of taking such precautions as prudence might suggest, while negotiations were subsisting, and while preparations were making on the part of one of the powers, which, on a contrary issue to that which was earnestly looked for, might be converted into means of hostile aggression. The same information was therefore not to be expected in the case of an armament, proposed under such circumstances, as if it was definitively intended for the resumption of hostilities. The Hon. Gent. in alluding to the Russian armament, seemed inclined to assimilate it to the present case; but the comparison I do not think very just. That was a question upon which a great difference of opinion prevailed, and the Hon. Gent.'s own reasoning upon it did not well apply to the present measure. Could a war between Russia and Turkey immediately affect our security? or rather, was not that armament intended to maintain the political balance of power? If that armament had no other object in view than the maintenance of the balance of power, and was embarked in for political reasons only, then perhaps I might say, let us have no war with Russia for such reasons. There have, however, been times and circumstances when a mere armament in the ports of a rival power (in the port of Brest, for example), though there appeared no adequate reason to suppose it to be intended for hostile purposes, yet I conceive it should induce Government to arm in like manner here; and how could such an armament be prepared without a message from his Majesty, such as has been brought down upon the present occasion? If then, in such a case, an armament is judged advisable, how much more expedient, or rather necessary, must it be to adopt a similar precaution, when not only a large armament is fitting out in the ports of a rival nation, but even while to that

circumstance is added a pending negotiation of considerable importance. For even although that armament should really be intended for its avowed purposes, yet if the negotiation ended in a rupture, would the House, in such a possible case, hesitate to vote the number of seamen now proposed, even as a measure of mere precaution? In that light alone it should now be viewed, nor would the vote of this night pledge Parliament to any thing farther. The subject would still be open to further inquiry and discussion, when further communications should be received respecting the progress or issue of the negotiation. Even my Rt. Hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) has also assured the House, that no attempt should be made to commit Parliament any further, without his previously having laid before them every possible information upon which to form a fair and accurate judgment of the case.—Now let me assure those Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox and Mr. Francis), that Ministers do not pretend to call for any greater degree of confidence than what the spirit of the constitution usually grants to persons in their situation, a degree of confidence which is generally afforded to Government, to whatever hands it may be intrusted; and no greater degree of confidence has any Ministry a right to demand than what is founded on the opinion Parliament entertains of their principles and conduct. All that I request or can expect on the present or any future occasion is, that Ministers be fairly dealt with, and that the House do not prejudge their conduct, unless, upon due examination and inquiry, they find we have forfeited their confidence. From the first hour we entered into office, we had severe difficulties to struggle with, and our best efforts have been eagerly exerted in performing our duty to our King and country. Whatever our conduct may be, we shall always be ready to explain it, and to lay before the House every possible ground by which that conduct may be judged, in the hopes that the circumstances attending it will be fairly considered, and that we may be permitted to stand or fall in the opinion of Parliament and the country. As to the proposed amendment, I do not well see how the House can possibly adopt it. It was usual enough for the House to agree to the number of men proposed to be voted; but there were few instances in which a greater number was proposed. If the present question was agreed to, our naval force would consist of 60,000 men; and if hereafter it should appear that a larger number was necessary, there would be no difficulty in increasing it.

Mr. Fox, in explanation, said, that he was happy to have the Noble Lord's concurrence in the constitutional principle he had advanced. When he said that the vote of this night would make the House parties to the war, he perhaps might have expressed himself more accurately by saying, that it would make them parties to the armament; and should the armament produce a war, then would not the House be indirectly, at least, parties to it? It is notorious that armaments are preparing in the ports of France and Holland, but their destination is not positively known; yet it may be proper to arm in consequence: but the House was not merely told of the existence of those armaments, but they were also informed that important negotiations were subsisting between the two countries; when, therefore, the discussion is coupled with the armament, the House is made a party not only to the armament, but is also called upon to sanction the importance of the negotiation with which it is connected. The Hon. Gent. in support of his opinion, that more information should be given before the House agreed to the vote, quoted two motions made by an Hon. Friend of his (Mr. T. Grenville) at the time when the Russian armament was proposed: the tendency of those motions was, that it was the duty of Parliament duly to inquire into those objects for which fresh burdens were to be imposed on the people. Did the House inquire sufficiently into the object that now called for fresh burdens on the country? If they did not, they deviated from the spirit of the constitution, which says, Do not vote away the money of the people without solid reasons to justify such a vote.

Lord Hawkesbury explained, and said, that if, on the mere ground of an armament on the part of a rival power, it was right to propose a proportionate armament on the side of this country, surely such a measure of precaution must be doubly necessary when the armament was connected with a negotiation which possibly might terminate in a rupture.

Mr. Elliott complained of the scarcity of information with which the House had been supplied. He was always willing to give every support in his power towards the defence of the country, whenever Ministers urged a sufficient reason, or the necessities of the country appeared to demand it; but he must complain of the sort of systematic darkness in which Ministers wished to keep that House. In former times the custom constantly prevailed, whenever such a vote was submitted to the House as that now upon their table, uniformly to afford the most full and satisfactory information as to the nature of the case, that they might judge whether it was such as properly required the vote proposed by Administration. Ever since the treaty of Amiens had been concluded, that House had not been put in possession of a single word of information as to the exterior relations of the country. The parliamentary history of the country justified him in the observation, that it was extremely improper and unwise to go on session after session, without such information as we had formerly been accustomed to receive when votes of men and money were demanded.

However, considering himself not pledged to any thing further than as a measure of precaution, he gave his vote for the measure now before the committee.

Mr. Canning began by observing, that the difficulty he felt in rising on the present occasion was greatly lessened by the speeches he had just heard. When he rose to express his sentiments on a former question (the motion on the address), it was by no means his intention to disturb the unanimity by which that question was carried: all he wished then was to obtain some information; but on calling for it he received for answer, which, no doubt, conveyed great news to him, viz. that he was at liberty to move for such papers as might afford him information. Information he should not now look for. He was now so situated, that there could be no doubt about his vote on the present question. When the country was stated to be in danger, he should not pause to ask in what kind of hands the reins of government were placed. He was ready and anxious to go as far as any man in endeavouring to place the country in a state of security; but if Ministers give no precise idea of the degree of the danger, how was the House enabled to proportion the means of defence? He should willingly vote for the number of seamen proposed by Ministers, or for any other means of defence the nature of our circumstances might require. Those means of defence are called for on two grounds stated in both parts of the address: one, the armaments in the ports of France and Holland; the other, the armament as connected with the negotiations now subsisting. His Noble Friend (Lord Hawkesbury) had observed that a mere armament, in a state of profound peace, was sufficient to justify a similar armament on the part of this country, without adducing any information in support of the measure, but the mere appearances. Agreed: but the case before the House was different. There were additional circumstances in the present case, which called for additional information; and when both were joined together, the necessity of information was still more urgent. On a former occasion, when the first expedition sailed from France for St. Domingo, how were those persons treated by Ministers who ventured to call in question the innocence and sincerity of Buonaparté's intentions? Were they not arraigned as endeavouring to create ill blood between the two countries? Now, however, the intentions of the First Consul may be questioned without dreading any rebuke from Ministers. They even go so far as to put doubts in the mouth of his Majesty respecting the destination of the armaments carrying on in the French ports. The armament at the present moment would no doubt be unanimously approved of as a measure of precaution; but as soon as the appearance or apprehension of danger passed over, some Gentlemen might think differently about it. Many who now cheerfully voted for it, would think it no longer necessary, if they found the French expeditions had sailed for their destination. He should not be of that number. It was not against invasion only that we should be prepared; we should be so armed—we should arm Ministers with a force to enable them to bring to issue those discussions which had long, too long been depending. They should be enabled to change a nominal and insecure repose into a real and solid peace. He was ready to confer any power on them by which they might convert doubt into certainty, mystery into eclaircissement. He was anxious to behold the treaty of Amiens consolidated—at length to be informed what the country had to expect, and when it was to enjoy the real blessings of peace, instead of being left in a situation worse than that of any war—a situation which had no name or example in history—a situation which exposed the country to a degree of agitation, anxiety, and alarm, greater than accompanied any war—a situation which had given a greater shock to public confidence and public quiet than any contest the country could possibly be engaged in. It was indeed to be hoped that a real peace might be obtained without the renewal of hostilities; but then it must be obtained by a firm tone, by vigorous measures, by cordial unanimity. But after being so long baffled and deluded, if Ministers should let the present opportunity escape from them, in what state would the country be left, but in that slumber which did not recruit her strength, but harassed her imagination with terrific dreams? If Ministers did not employ the resources of the country to rescue it once for all from so deplorable a situation, they would frustrate the object of the present vote, and disappoint the hopes which the House might be inclined to entertain from its unanimity.

Sir William Pulteney observed, that the country might be reluctant to enter into a war, of which the people could not perceive the precise object. But if once they were shewn and enabled to see that a war was unavoidable, they would cordially and unanimously determine upon a vigorous prosecution of it. An Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had said, that if the armament in the French ports alone was proposed as the ground of adopting measures of precaution, he should not call for any information to induce him to support the question; but when that measure of precaution had further in view a pending negotiation, then he conceived that some further information should be given to the House. He differed entirely from the Hon. Gent. on this point, for it must be injurious to all negotiations that unseasonable information should be called for or granted respecting them. If secrecy was not necessary on such occasions, why intrust the power of war or peace to the executive government? Producing information on such subjects, could only irritate—si-

lence and secrecy promoted pacification. Besides, Ministers were under an awful responsibility, and would they attempt to carry on a war, while the House had the power to say No, and refuse the supplies? Now, in his opinion, was the time to shew all Europe that this country was prepared for any alternative. He hoped, indeed, it was so prepared as to be enabled to meet any hostile attempt, not only with its fleets, but that precautions were also taken for its internal defence and security. That the country was not able to enter into such a contest, he could not agree with the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox). It was as able as ever; and since, to every considerate observer, it must appear that a struggle must come between England and France, it was better it should come now than hereafter. France was not so well prepared to meet it as some persons would imagine, while this country was never better able to enter the lists with her. It was obvious a struggle between the two countries cannot be far distant; it would be a terrible one, and must require all our united strength and best-combined exertions.

Mr. Trench said, he thought proper to make two observations to the committee: the one respecting a remark made by an Hon. Gent. (Mr. Canning) as to the words of his Majesty's message—"avowedly for colonial purposes." That Hon. Gent. has said, that such words being put into that most gracious communication, indicated a doubt of Buonaparté's good intention, which, perhaps, in all the circumstances, Ministers were not warranted in doing. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Trench) observed on this, that an enemy, or person having hostile intentions against the country, most certainly would not acquaint us with what was the nature of his designs; therefore, as we at present could only have their declaration upon the fact of the armament, of which, no doubt, his Majesty's Ministers have certain information, we could consider this as no other than the avowed purpose. The other was, with respect to a point in the speech of an Hon. Gent. opposite (Mr. Fox): he had declared, that he should not think himself nor the House committed as to the war, by the vote which he or they might give to the measure now submitted to their consideration: he (Mr. Trench) should go farther than him; he should say he did not consider himself pledged even to the armament, by voting as he now did for the supply, which was the object of the present committee; he considered himself as only pledged to a measure of precaution.

Mr. S. Thornton professed himself ready, not only to vote for the 10,000 seamen, but also to propose the means of raising them immediately.

Mr. Canning advised his Hon. Friend (Mr. Dent) to withdraw his amendment; observing, that, if he persisted in it, it might endanger that unanimity which was so very desirable on the present occasion.

Mr. Dent acquiesced, with the consent of the House.

The question was then put on the resolution, and agreed to *nem. con.*

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, Mar. 14.—(See Minutes, p. 428.)

[Prince of Wales's annuity bill.]—Lord Pelham moved the order of the day for the second reading of the Prince of Wales's annuity bill; which being read, the Noble Secretary of State observed, he deemed it unnecessary to trouble their Lordships at any length in the present instance. It was generally known to the House, that by the bill for the arrangement of his R. H.'s affairs in 1795, a portion of the aggregate then allotted him was set apart and vested in Commissioners, for the gradual discharge of his R. H.'s debts. The present bill proceeded from his Majesty's gracious message to both Houses on the occasion, and was meant in a great degree as an anticipation of the act of 1795, and by it the operation of that act for discharging the remaining debts in four years, was fully provided for. But his Majesty, desirous that so illustrious a branch of his Royal Family as the Prince of Wales, should be restored to that degree of state and dignity becoming his rank and station, had sent the communication alluded to to Parliament, and upon which the present bill was founded. With these observations, in the present instance, he should move that the bill be now read a second time.

The Earl of Moira said, he should detain their Lordships very shortly on the present occasion; but as he had the honour of being one of his R. H.'s council for the dutchy of Cornwall, he had authority to declare, that his R. H. felt the most dutiful and affectionate regard, first, to his Majesty, for his most gracious interposition, and to Parliament for its liberality on the occasion, as manifested by the present bill. However, he thought it necessary to state on the part of his R. H. that there still remained some claims upon him, which in honour and justice he felt it incumbent on him to discharge: for this purpose he should think it necessary to create a pretty large sinking fund out of the aggregate of his income, as it was the wish of his R. H. that those claims should be cleared off previously to his assuming that degree of state and dignity with which the public at large, and the Parliament, had expressed their wishes to see the Heir Apparent of the Crown invested. These claims were not of a secret nature; the public were aware of them; it was therefore unnecessary to go into a discussion of them

at present; but his R. H. thought it proper to have thus much stated, in order to avoid any imputation of unfairness on his part, of having, in the least, contributed to baulk the public expectation in seeing him immediately resume his full state and dignity. With respect to his R. H.'s claims on the revenues of the dutchy of Cornwall, from 1762 to 1783, he had, from the best legal advice, been satisfied of the validity of those claims, and accordingly instituted a suit for their recovery; but in consideration of his Majesty's royal interposition, and the liberal conduct of Parliament, with respect to the present bill, added to other considerations, which to the infinite honour of his R. H. had made a due impression on his mind, he had given directions to his law officers to drop the suit.

The Earl of Carlisle observed, it might be in the recollection of their Lordships, what he said on a former occasion relative to his intention to bring forward a specific proposition on the subject before the House. That intention might have remained, did not some very serious and important considerations induce him to depart from it. First, the satisfactory statement they had heard from the Noble Earl who last spoke, which may be regarded to a certain degree as coming from authority, should, with a reference to the respect and decorum which they all felt due to the illustrious personage in question, induce him to forego it. Another consideration, and which operated still more forcibly upon his mind, arose out of the great and important change in public affairs, since the interval alluded to—the magnitude and importance of the political communications made from authority to Parliament in the course of last week, should swallow up every inferior consideration, and primarily ingross the deliberations of both Houses. The country he regarded as in a perilous crisis:—the utmost vigilance both of Parliament and the Administration were requisite at present; the wisdom of the former, and the exertions of the latter, should be called forth to avert the danger. Under such circumstances, therefore, he was unwilling to take any steps that might tend ever so slightly to embarrass Ministers, or to divert their attention from the present posture of affairs; and so determining, he would support the bill.

The Earl of Darnley rose, principally to animadvert on an expression which had fallen from the Noble Earl who had just sat down. He would not, he said, admit the country to be in a perilous situation. Were the conduct of Ministers different from what it was, were they less alert and vigorous, did they remain supine, listless, and inactive upon their posts, then indeed the country might be said to be in such circumstances. But when they saw the Sovereign coming forward to his Parliament on the occasion, as they had done; when they saw that Parliament so cordially unanimous in the support of measures to strengthen the hands of his Majesty, and the public spirit so generally aroused as it was, the nation could not be said to be in perilous circumstances; on the contrary, their feelings should, instead of despondency, be those of exultation.

The Duke of Norfolk, in the course of his observations upon the subject, expressed his dissatisfaction at the measure which had been adopted, as falling short of the object professedly in view. He thought the Heir Apparent should be enabled, not only to live in ease and affluence, but to display a splendour superior to that of the richest private nobleman. He seemed impressed with these considerations so fully, that were it constitutionally regular to originate a bill of this description in their Lordships' house, he would be induced to propose the rejection of the present bill, in order to bring in one on the principles he had alluded to.

The Earl of Carnarvon spoke at some length, and in a certain degree took a similar ground with the Noble Duke. He strongly expressed his disapprobation of the bill, conceiving it not to be one formed upon the genuine principles adverted to in his Majesty's message; it was rather, he thought, in its operation and effect (with a reference to the arrears of the dutchy), a bill for paying off a part of the civil list debts, &c. Pursuing this line of argument for some time, he concluded with expressing his dissent from the bill.

Lord Pelham spoke in explanation at some length. He contended that the measure in question had nothing whatever to do with the civil list. The money alluded to by the Noble Earl had been wholly applied to state services. For his part, he highly approved of the course adopted. The Noble Secretary observed, that a direct interference on the part of Parliament in the concerns of the Royal Family was at best but an awkward thing. He thought all proceedings of that kind should always proceed from the latter quarter. In concluding, he expressed his approbation of what had been stated by a Noble Earl (Moira).

The Earl of Moira spoke also at some length in explanation, and scouted the idea of any thing of the nature of a compromise having taken place. With as little propriety, he observed, could the bill be considered as in any mode paying off the debts of the civil list, or of the Crown, as it had never been at any time or by any person considered, that the revenues of the dutchy, during the interval in question, had been applied to the private uses of the Sovereign, or to the purposes of the civil list, but that they had been applied to the public exigencies of state. Had it been a question between his R. H. and the Sovereign, Parliament, he observed, would have never

heard a word upon the subject; that illustrious personage knew his duty too well, and had too delicate a sense of his situation, to have troubled Parliament with any matters respecting his individual interests which could affect the quiet or repose of that illustrious family of which he was so distinguished a branch. The Prince's conduct, so far from being regarded in the light of a compromise, or wearing any appearance of it, should be, and truly is, regarded in the most dignified point of view, and as a spontaneous act of magnanimity on the part of the Prince, who never wished for the possession of those arrears, with any other view than to enable him to pay off those demands which he felt it incumbent upon him, in duty and in honour, to discharge.

The Earl of Suffolk shortly expressed his opinion, that, considering the comparative value of money at the different periods of making the arrangements for the establishment of his R. H. and those of his Royal grandfather, the income of the former should be double what it had been made.

The bill was then read a second time, and committed for next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 14. (See Minutes, p. 428.)

[Middlesex election.]—Mr. Sheridan moved, that Mr. Mainwaring, the Rev. Wm. Winkfield, and J. Wm. Knap, who have complained of an undue election for the county of Middlesex, should be ordered by the House to send in a list of the persons who have polled for Mr. Mainwaring, together with other objections to the sitting member; and that the sitting member be ordered to send a list of the persons who polled for him, on or before the 7th of April.

Sir Robert Buxton said, he thought the time mentioned by the Hon. Gent. was too short, for the preparation of the list now called for, as the committee would not sit till the 21st of May; he therefore did not think there was time enough to prepare the list.

Mr. Sheridan said, he never heard such a strange objection as the Hon. Gent. had just made; he did not see much difference as to the length of time, between the 7th of April and the 21st of May. It was now seven months since the election took place; he therefore thought that time enough had been granted to each party, to be ready with every thing connected with the Middlesex election.

Mr. Bragge said, it was a question of doubt with him, whether the merits of the Middlesex petition could be tried this session; and as an Hon. Gent. opposite to him had very properly observed, that the House could ballot but two committees a week, he thought the Middlesex petition could not, at all events, be tried till the 2d of June. He believed that the time generally allowed for the exchange of lists was a month. Under all these circumstances he thought the first of May a period that would not be objected to for the delivering the lists now moved for by the Hon. Gent.

Mr. Sheridan said, that Mr. Mainwaring's agent had called on Sir Francis Burdett's solicitor, who agreed to the 7th of April as a period for the delivery of the lists.

Mr. Fox observed, that he had understood from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, that only two ballots a week were to take place prior to the holydays, in consequence of many gentlemen having to attend the sessions and other public business, which rendered it inconvenient, nay, impossible for them to pay close attention to the business of that House, till after the holydays. The ballots, he understood, were then to go on as usual.

After a few observations from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the question was put, and the first of May was the time agreed to by the House for receiving the lists of each party.

[India budget.]—Lord Castlereagh moved the order of the day for the House going into a committee on accounts presented respecting the East India Company.

The House having resolved itself into a committee,

Lord Castlereagh said, that the committee would be aware that many of the observations which he had to submit to their consideration, respected the accounts which had been presented to the House last session. The accounts for the last year had not been received from India, otherwise it would have been his wish to have brought both the accounts under the consideration of the House at the same time. But as the House must wish to know the present state of the affairs of the East India Company, as they must be naturally anxious to know what measures the finances of the East India Company would enable them to take for the liquidation of their debt, he should now, with the permission of the committee, proceed to call their attention to the accounts which, as he had before stated, were laid upon the table of the House in the last session of Parliament. The affairs of the East India Company naturally divided themselves into two classes, viz. those abroad and those at home. Their affairs abroad were divided into three distinct heads, namely, 1st, the revenues and charges; 2d, the extent of, and provision for, the investments; and, 3d, the state of their debt and their assets. With

respect to the revenues, he would state them first upon an average of three years, compared with one year preceding; 2dly, he would make a comparison between the estimated amount and the actual amount of the revenue of the last year; and, 3dly, the estimated revenue for the succeeding year. He should therefore now proceed to state the revenues, charges, and estimates with respect to

BENGAL.

Revenues—Average 1798-9 to 1800-1		£.6,436,807
More than average last drawn		289,776
Estimated for 1800-1		6,339,203
Actual amount	—	6,658,334
More than estimate	—	319,131
Charges—Estimated for 1800-1	—	4,422,047
Actual amount	—	4,780,611
More than estimate	—	358,564
Deduct excess of revenue from excess of charge, the net revenue is less than estimated		39,433
And the net revenue for 1800-1 is		1,877,723

ESTIMATES 1801-2.

Revenues — — —		7,051,164
Charges — — —		4,582,201
Net revenue	—	2,468,963
Revenue estimated more than in 1800-1		392,830
Charges ditto, less ditto — —		198,410
Net revenue estimated for 1801-2, more than preceding year — —		592,240

The committee would observe from this statement, that the estimated charge for 1800-1, was 4,422,047*l.* and that the actual amount of the charge was 4,780,611*l.* making a difference between the actual and the estimated charge 358,564*l.* As the officers of the Company had always shewn great accuracy in making up the estimates, and had been particularly cautious not to mislead by overrating the revenue, he wished to explain to the committee, how it happened that there was this excess of the actual over the estimated charge, and to shew that there was no ground for impeaching the accuracy of the officers who had prepared the accounts. In the first place, these estimates referred to a period of war, and every body must be aware of the impossibility of strict accuracy and precision in estimates during the war. But in addition to this, he begged to state, that in the year to which he was alluding, the expedition to Egypt took place, which certainly was not in contemplation when the estimates were made; and from this circumstance there would be found a difference between the estimates and the actual charges in all the presidencies. He then proceeded to state the revenues, charges, and estimates with regard to Madras, but, in doing so, he begged to apprize the committee that the estimates and accounts related only to the old possessions annexed to that presidency; otherwise it would be impossible to make a comparison between its present and its former state; because, from the accession of territory and revenue, not only by the conquest of the Mysore, but by treaties with the Nizam, an average of the aggregate of the receipts would not constitute a fair mean of comparison with any former period. Having made this preliminary observation, he proceeded to state, that

The average of these revenues, from 1798-9 to 1800-1, was — —		£.1,035,068
Which exceeds the average on the years 1797-8 to 1799-1800 —		82,734
Estimated for 1800-1 — —		3,277,073
Actual amount	—	3,540,268
More than estimate	—	263,195
Charges—Estimated for 1800-1	—	3,765,913
Actual amount	—	4,293,310
More than estimate	—	527,397
Deducting excess of revenue from excess of charge, the net charge is, more than estimated — — —		264,202
And the net charge of the year 1800-1 is		753,042

ESTIMATES, 1801-2.

Revenues — — —		3,899,040
Charges — — —		4,559,311
Net charge	—	660,271
Revenues estimated more than actual, 1800-1		358,772
Charges ditto more than ditto		266,000
Net charge for 1801-2, estimated less than the preceding year — —		92,772

The committee would see from this statement, that there was a greater difference between the estimated and actual charge in Madras than there was in Bengal: this difference arose from two circumstances; first, because it was principally from this presidency that the forces were sent upon the expedition to Egypt, and secondly because there was a great interruption in the tranquillity of the southern provinces, occasioned by the Poligars, which caused much additional expense.—With regard to the revenues and charges of Bombay, he wished to observe, that the transfer of the Malabar province to Madras in July 1800, having greatly reduced the receipts at Bombay in the year 1800-1, an average on the gross collections of three years could not properly be drawn for a comparison. In this case it was also proposed to make an adjustment, and take the average, excluding the revenues of the ceded countries, which was,

From 1788-9 to 1800-1	—	£. 211,892

Which exceeds the average on the years 1797-8 to 1799-1800 —		£. 24,767
Estimated for 1800-1 — —		300,475
Actual amount — —		286,457
Less than estimate — —		14,018
Charges—Estimated for 1800-1 —		1,030,993
Actual amount — —		1,329,176
More than estimate — —		298,183
Add deficiency of revenue to the excess of charge, the net charge is more than estimated		312,201
And the net charge of the year 1800-1 is		1,042,719

ESTIMATES, 1801-2.

Revenues — — —		271,825
Charges — — —		1,185,308
Net charges — — —		913,483
Revenues estimated less than 1800-1		14,632
Charges ditto less than ditto —		143,868
Net charge estimated for 1801-2, less than preceding year — —		120,236

There then only remained Bencoolen and the other settlements.

Revenues of Fort Marlborough, on an average of three years, 1797-8 to 1799-1800, were		6,985
Charges ditto, ditto, —		106,197
Net charge — — —		99,212
Supplies from Bengal to Fort Marlborough, Penang, &c. estimated for 1800-1 —		82,360
Actual amount — — —		156,325
More than estimated — —		73,965
Supplies estimated for 1801-2 —		85,840

He then proceeded to take a general view of the statement he had made. The result of the year 1801 collectively was as follows:

Revenues—Bengal —	£.6,658,334	
Madras —	3,540,268	
Bombay —	286,457	
Total revenues		10,485,059
Charges—Bengal —	4,780,611	
Madras —	4,293,310	
Bombay —	1,329,176	
Total charges		10,403,097
Net revenue of the three presidencies		81,962
Deducted from supplies to Bencoolen		156,335
The difference is		74,363
Which being added to the interest paid on the debts At Bengal	£.746,184	
Madras	212,488	
Bombay	135,289	
		1,093,961
The deficit of revenue from the territories, &c. then is — —		1,168,324
Deduct the amount sales of imports		493,667
The remainder is the amount of the deficit, after allowing for the produce of the sales of the imports.		£.674,657
Amount advanced for the purchase of investments, payment of commercial charges, and in aid of China investment,		
At Bengal	£.897,691	
Madras	453,990	
Bombay	400,485	
Total advances for investment		1,752,136
Cargoes invoiced from India to Europe in 1800-1, with charges —		1,399,033

The result of the estimates for 1801-2, collectively, was,

Revenues—Bengal	£.7,051,164	
Madras —	3,899,040	
Bombay —	271,825	
Total revenues —		11,222,029
Charges—Bengal —	4,582,201	
Madras —	4,559,311	
Bombay —	1,185,308	
Total charges		10,326,820
Net estimated revenue of the three presidencies — — —		895,209
Deduct supplies to Bencoolen, &c.		85,840
The remainder		809,369
Deducted from interest on debts —		1,342,854
Shews the net deficiency of the revenues from the territories, &c. to be		533,485
Which deducted from the estimated amount of sales of imports — —		564,527
The remainder was		31,042

And this was the amount estimated to be applicable in the year 1801-2 to the purchase of investment, payment of commercial charges, &c. —Having gone through this general account, and having stated the magnitude of the deficit, the committee would not be surprised that the amount of the investments was not so great as it might otherwise have been expected.—The next subject which he wished to submit to the committee was the debts of the Company in India. They were as follow:

Amount stated last year —		£.14,640,402
Amount this year — —		17,674,532
Increase —		3,034,130
Debts transferred in the year —		81,888
Debts bearing Interest.		
Amount last year — —		12,301,570
Amount this year — —		15,135,354
Increase of debts bearing interest		2,833,784
Amount of interest payable by the accounts of last year — — —		1,082,042
Amount of interest payable by the accounts of this year — —		1,342,853
Increase of interest payable annually		260,811

Assets in India,		
Consisting of cash, goods, stores, &c. last year — — —	£.11,569,553	
Ditto, ditto, by present statement	12,113,923	
Increase of assets		544,369
Deduct		
Increase of assets from increase of debts, the state of the Company's affairs in India will appear worse by —		2,489,761

The next subject to which he called the attention of the committee was the home accounts of the Company.

Aggregate amount of sales 1801-2		9,155,987
Less than last year	£.1,167,465	
On the Company's goods alone	971,554	
Private goods —	77,367	
Neutral property —	118,544	
	1,167,465	
Sales on Company's goods, estimated at		7,119,400
Actually amounted to —		6,630,487
Being less than estimated —		488,913
The receipts on the sales of the Company's goods, estimated at — —		7,161,918
Actually amounted to — —		6,336,192
Being less than estimated —		825,726
Charges and profit on private trade estimated at — — —		100,000
Actually amounted to —		193,563
Being more than estimated —		£.93,563

The balance estimated to be remaining in favour on the 1st March 1802, amounting to 486,731*l.* would by the actual accounts have been considerably against the Company from the disappointment in the receipt on the sale of goods, and from deferring the disposal of the loyalty loan; but from some additional receipts on profit on private trade, and from Government for stores, &c. with postponement of the payment of the debt to the Bank, amounting to 800,000*l.* the balance the 1st March 1802, although the supplies to India and China exceeded the estimate upwards of 200,000*l.* still remained in favour to the amount of 168,759*l.* being less than estimated 317,972*l.*—The estimates for 1802-3 were as follow:

Receipt for sale of Company's goods — — —	£.6,500,600
From the small balance at the commencement of the year, and the extensive supplies required for India and China, also the expectation of liquidating the debt to the Bank, the balance against the Company on the 1st March 1803, is estimated to amount to	1,434,556

DEBTS AT HOME.

On 1st March 1801 — —		5,393,989
On 1st March 1802 — —		4,822,683
Decrease —		571,306

ASSETS AT HOME.

On 1st March 1801 — —		£.15,404,736
On 1st March 1802 — —		16,802,760
Increase —		1,398,024
Adding decrease of debts to increase of assets, the improvement of the home concern in this year is — — —		1,969,330

CHINA AND ST. HELENA.

Balance at China last year in favour —	£.1,226,079	
Balance at China by the present accounts —	1,019,551	
Decrease	206,528	
Balance at St. Helena on 30th Sept. 1799, in favour —	£.58,366	
Balance at St. Helena on 30th Sept. 1800, in favour —	77,852	
Increase	19,486	
Net decrease at China and St. Helena		187,042

GENERAL COMPARISON OF DEBTS AND ASSETS.

Increase of debts in India —		3,034,130
Decrease of debts at home —		571,306
Net increase of debts —		2,462,824
Increase of assets in India	£. 544,369	
Increase of assets at home	1,398,024	
	1,942,393	
Deduct		
Net decrease of balance in favour at China and St. Helena	187,042	
Net increase of assets		1,755,351
Deducted from the increase of debts would shew the state of the whole concern to be worse than at the conclusion of the last year in the sum of — —		£. 707,473

Which sum was subject to alteration on the final adjustment of the claims of the Company on Government, included in the home assets to the amount of 3,573,339*l.* making an increase in this year, under this head, of 900,899*l.* —Having gone through a general state of the affairs of the East India Company, both at home and abroad, comprising their revenues, charges, debts, assets, &c. he should now proceed to put the committee in possession of the best outline in his power of the prospective view of their situation. The best way that occurred to him of doing this, would be to state to the committee, first, the extent of the incumbrances upon the Company, then the extent of their means to meet these incumbrances; then the mode in which it was proposed to apply those means for the amelioration of their affairs, and the result that might fairly be expected from the adoption of these measures; and lastly, to state what was the expectation of the public from the Company,

either in the alternative of peace or war. In order to elucidate this subject, he had moved for these accounts, which would put the House in possession of all the material facts. And first, with regard to the incumbrances: the estimate of the revenue and charges had been prepared by the proper officers abroad, and also the interest of the debt; but there was no certified amount of the capital of the debt, he was therefore obliged to form the best estimate in his power. In order to prevent mistake, and to be as sure as possible, he would take the capital of the debt at the highest amount, and state it at 18,500,000*l.* which would completely cover the whole of the debt. Of this sum, as he had before stated, 16,000,000*l.* bore interest, the annual amount of which was 1,438,791*l.* This certainly was a most serious sum, and must necessarily be a most serious deduction from the income of the Company. But, great as it was, still it was a most satisfactory consideration, that if the state of the Company in 1793, with all the necessary increase of expense in the course of the war, was compared with its present state, there would be a corresponding increase in the assets of the Company, at least equal to the incumbrances incurred, so that the Company were in as good a state as they were at the commencement of the war. In considering the debt of the Company, the first thing that naturally occurred to the mind was the very high rate of interest which they paid for their debt; the interest amounted to very little short of 9 per cent. He stated this, in the hope that the committee would bear it in mind, while he adverted to what occurred to him upon another part of the subject. If the Company had no surplus revenue at all to apply to the liquidation of their debt, still there was another operation which they might have recourse to, and which would contribute very materially to that object, and that was the conversion of their Indian debt bearing the high interest he had stated, into an European debt. This would put the Company into the possession of a considerable fund for the extinction of their debt, because the difference of interest between an Indian debt, to the amount he had stated, at 9 per cent. and an European debt at 5 per cent. would afford to the Company a saving of about 5,380,000*l.* a year. He wished therefore that the committee would always bear in mind that there were applicable to the extinction of the debt not only the existing funds, but the saving to be made by this change in the nature of the debt. The present means which the Company possessed to meet their incumbrances must arise from their revenues abroad, and from their capital at home. The estimated revenues, according to the latest accounts which had been received, would be altogether 11,976,180*l.*; the estimated charges were 9,346,369*l.*; there would then remain a surplus of 2,729,811*l.*; from this, however, were to be deducted the commercial charges, the supplies to Bencoolen, and the interest of the debt, and there would then remain a net surplus of 1,053,582*l.* This surplus arose partly from an increase in the revenue, and partly from some reductions which have been made in the expenses. No reduction, however, had been taken credit for, which had not been actually accomplished, though there were others in contemplation which he hoped would be extremely productive. In adverting to this subject, it was impossible that the attention of the committee should not be turned to the Noble Person now at the head of the government in India, the Marquis Wellesley; and he would venture to say, that, high as his character stood upon other grounds, it would stand still higher when the measures he had adopted for improving the finances of the Company were considered; it would be found that the same energy of mind which carried him through the other difficulties which surrounded him, had particularly characterized his financial arrangements.—Having, however, mentioned the reductions which had been made, he wished that the committee should not entertain any apprehensions that they were such as would in any degree endanger the safety of our empire in India; and perhaps the best way to satisfy the committee upon this head would be, to state the amount of our army in India. It amounted to 24,000 Europeans, of whom 17,000 were King's troops. The native force amounted to 89,000 men; and the irregular force, including Lascars, to 10,000, making altogether an army of above 124,000 men. With such a force, there was no ground for apprehensions either from attacks from Europe or from contests in India.—His Lordship then proceeded to comment upon the commercial state of the Company, and contended, that nothing could shake them in the commerce of the East, because nobody would embark a large capital against a company that had so large a surplus revenue, which they must remit to Europe, and which must enable them to drive any competitor out of the market. With regard to the sum which at the last renewal of the Company's charter was to be paid to the public, the non-payment of it had only been occasioned by the war, but undoubtedly in the event of the continuance of peace, the payment would be regularly made. According to the act for the renewal of the charter, the appropriation of their surplus revenue was as follows: the first half million was to answer bills from India, the second half million was to be paid to the public, and the remainder was to go in extinction of the debt. The result of this statement would be, that after paying the public 500,000*l.* a year, there would remain a sum of above one million applicable to the reduction of the debt, independent of the measure to which he had before alluded, of the conversion of the debt. He wished here to observe, that it was not in contemplation to liquidate the whole of the

debt: it was proper, for many reasons, that a part of the debt should remain; one of those reasons was, that the natives should have an interest (independent of the advantages they have under our government) in the permanence of the Company. Supposing then the amount of debt to be reduced was 12,000,000*l.* and the sum applicable to the reduction to be 2,000,000*l.* a year, it would obviously be liquidated in six years, and the interest due upon the remainder, taking it even at 6 per cent. would be only 240,000*l.* a year. He presumed that the interest might, under these circumstances, be reduced to 6 per cent. and in the present state of the Company's affairs, they would not have occasion to raise any money for the first two years. He was aware that the committee might suppose that he was giving an exaggerated account of the affairs of the Company, but he would state the grounds of his calculation as applying to the alternative either of peace or war. His Lordship then entered into the following statement of the Company, and applicability of those means to the liquidation of their debts. He had before stated the surplus of their foreign revenue; he now came to consider their home surplus.

Four years average to March 1802 —		£. 366,874
Add net surplus abroad —	—	1,053,582
		1,420,456
Say net proceeds —	—	1,500,000

The proportional profits on an investment of four millions will be more.

DISTRIBUTION OF NET PROCEEDS:

Public participation —	—	500,000
Reduction of debt —	—	1,000,000
Proposed sinking fund to be applied each year		2,000,000
Till the capital in India bearing interest is reduced to —	—	4,000,000
Amount to be reduced —	—	12,000,000

Time required, six years.

Annual sinking fund to be constituted as follows:

From net proceeds as above —	1,000,000
From savings of interest and loans in Europe	1,000,000
Total	£.2,000,000

The sinking fund will operate as underneath, supposing the rate of interest to be gradually reduced, till it shall stand at 6 per cent.

Indian debt will be reduced April 1809 to	£.4,000,000
Interest — — —	240,000

The twelve millions paid off will have been supplied as follows:

Surplus from net proceeds for six years	6,000,000
Savings of interest in the same period	2,713,000
To be furnished from Europe —	3,287,000
	12,000,000

Of the sum to be furnished from Europe, not more than 2,000,000*l.* need be raised by loan; the repayments from Government for the Egyptian expedition, &c. will cover the remainder; and this sum subject to be reduced by any improvement of net proceeds which may happen, either in the revenues or commercial profits.—State of affairs at the end of six years:

Indian surplus, April 1809 —		£.2,250,000
Home surplus —	—	450,000
		2,700,000
Deduct—Public participation —		500,000
		2,200,000
Supposing two millions raised in aid of sinking fund, by adding to capital, deduct interest at 5 per cent. —		100,000
		2,100,000
Net proceeds, subject to ulterior appropriation, viz.—1-6th to proprietors to increase dividends —	—	350,000
5-6ths to be invested in the funds to counter-secure capital —	—	1,750,000
		2,100,000

The operation of the above appropriation until the year 1813-14, when the charter would expire, unless sooner renewed, would be to increase the Company's dividends annually, by one half, viz. 350,000*l.* and to accumulate, at 4 per cent. compound interest, during the five years, a guarantee fund of 9,485,000*l.*—In the event of war, the Indian surplus must be necessarily reduced. The reductions of charge since the peace amount per estimate to 783,000*l.* per annum. Allowing for a war establishment equal in extent to that at the close of the late war, there will still remain net proceeds 717,000*l.*—But to make the most ample allowance, take the war charges at 1,000,000*l.* there will still remain net proceeds 500,000*l.* applicable to the reduction of debt. —In this case the participation of the public would necessarily be suspended during war, and would revive upon the reductions resulting from peace.—With such a disposable surplus, provided the transfer of funds from Europe to India shall meet with no interruption in time of war, the contracting of fresh loans may not only be avoided, but a system of liquidation, upon principles similar to those above stated, be pursued even during war, though necessarily upon a reduced scale.—For executing the above measure, and for the extension of trade, the Company possess the following available resources:

May add to their capital two millions, at 220 per cent. —	—	£.4,400,000
More bonds may be issued with consent of Treasury —	—	1,000,000
		5,400,000
Suppose as above, raised for sinking fund		2,000,000
Remains for the extension of trade		3,400,000

Having gone through the whole of this statement with the greatest clearness and precision, his Lordship said, that although the continuance of peace must be to India, as it must be to this country, and to the whole world, the greatest blessing, yet if, contrary to our hopes and endeavours, we should be again plunged

into a war, he was sure there was no part of our empire better prepared to meet the alternative of war, than the India Company. They had now finished a war of ten years continuance; they had not only to contend against the European war, but they also had to contend with the powers of India. In fact, it might be said that they had been constantly at war since the first operations of Lord Cornwallis. All this they had done with unimpaired means, with undiminished resources. They had now an empire double in extent and in revenue; and although they had added ten millions to their debt, their means had increased in a corresponding ratio. If this was their situation in a period of war, what would have been their condition if in the enjoyment of peace? But their revenue had not only kept up in the manner he had stated, they had also provided against great and heavy establishments; they had made arrangements for more comfortable provision for the officers and troops on their establishment; they had also made an establishment for the better administration of justice; and all this had made an increase in their expenditure of near one million a year, a sum almost equal to the amount of the interest of their debt. This statement must, he was sure, be satisfactory to the public, and must shew that there was every probability of this country deriving a great and essential support from India, and that the Company would have the means, at no remote period, of paying to the public a sum of half a million a year, and of reinforcing the sinking fund with no less than one million and a half a year. This completely justified the statement of his Noble Friend, who had preceded him in the office he now held, and whose predictions would have been sooner verified if it had not been for the war in which this country was engaged. In the event of another war this country must, for a time, give up the annual half million which the Company was to pay; but still the Company would have one million a year applicable to the reduction of its debt, which, even upon the least favourable calculation, must discharge it in twelve years. Therefore, in whatever view the subject was considered, whether in the alternative of peace or war, there was no ground for alarm, but the most solid and well-grounded prospect of prosperity. He had thought it his duty to submit these considerations to the committee as subjects which they ought to understand; and if he himself understood the subject, the prospect was founded upon the most solid basis. If the peace continued, the public would next year obtain their participation of the Company's surplus revenue, and the Company would have 2,000,000*l.* applicable to the reduction of its debt. If war unfortunately took place, this country must forego for a time the half million a year, but the Company would still have one million a year for the liquidation of its debt. He should now move the resolutions; but if any Gentlemen wished for further time to consider the subject, the resolutions might be moved *pro forma* at present, and the discussion postponed to another day.—He then moved the first resolution.

Mr. Johnstone said, he should not trouble the House many minutes; he had to observe, that the Indian debt had greatly increased within a short time: on looking over the papers, he found that the Company were 700,000*l.* worse at this period than they were a few years back. He said, the money owing to them was to be considered as bad debts, which in all probability they never would receive. Some of the accounts contain very accurate statements, but many others of the accounts are very incorrect; and he would venture to say, that when the Company paid all their legal debts, they would find a deficiency of many thousands. The extraordinary revenue arose from the Company having such a desire for territorial possessions, which involved the Company in additional and unnecessary expense. The customs also came under his observation, which he very much disapproved of, as inimical to the prosperity of that country: he said, every article that was sold in India bore a heavy tax; the same species of tax was known in Spain, which had in some measure reduced the importance of the trade of that nation; but which tax Lord Cornwallis (whose policy was sound and brilliant) had repealed in India, from a thorough conviction of its ill effects to that country. The successive estimates of the state of that country prove that the expenditure has gone much farther than was expected. He stated that the trade of China had been more profitable to the country, than the trade of any other part of India. The Court of Directors had told the public, that the Indian debt had increased to 1,200,000*l.* which arose from their extraordinary disbursements, but which has been found to turn out a deficiency of 1,800,000*l.* He observed, that his Lordship had told us with great pleasure, that we have increased the Indian territories, by which we had received many advantages; but he was sure that we had reduced the consequence of the country. He said, that we had committed a breach of faith in India, and that we had been guilty of as much injustice in India, as the French had been in Europe. He concluded by saying, that the estimates presented to the House were far from accurate, and not to be depended upon.

Lord Castlereagh said, he did not wish to enter into a discussion on the subject tonight, nor did he wish the vote of the House till they had minutely examined the estimates laid before them; yet he could not help saying that the Learned Gent. had misconceived many parts of the estimates. His Lordship

then entered into a long explanation, which was only a recapitulation of his former statement, and concluded by saying, that when the resolutions were read he should be happy to hear any Gentleman address the committee on the question; and he should also be happy to give every explanation that could possibly be wished for.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he should not have said a word on the present subject, had it not been for an expression made use of by the Hon. Gent. who had just spoken. He had charged our conduct in India as a breach of good faith. The Hon. Gent. must allow him to complain of this statement, and of the time in which it was made—for it was a time when the subject to which the assertion referred could not be examined, and when therefore no correct opinion could be formed by an individual upon the subject; it was therefore to him a matter of regret that this assertion had been made: therefore he would ask of the House, and he was confident that he should not ask in vain, that they would keep their minds clear upon the matter, and free of bias, until they should have an opportunity of looking into all the circumstances of it, and this he was aware the House would do without any suggestion from him; but he stated this merely by way of caution to some individuals, because he knew that unfavourable impressions might be made, when bold though groundless assertions were advanced, affecting the characters of meritorious individuals, who had been zealously engaged in the service of their country. It was too much that they should be made to suffer in their character from a broad unfounded assertion; it was painful to suppose that they might be affected in this manner, and that they should, for a time even, be deprived of that which was a considerable part of their reward, namely, the approbation of their country; the whole of their conduct therefore ought to be left untouched, until they had an opportunity to explain it themselves, or by those who might derive information from them when they returned, when he had no doubt their conduct would do them honour: for these reasons he begged leave to object to the expression of the Hon. Gent. which stated that Great Britain was stigmatized with a breach of faith in India. He begged pardon of the committee for having called its attention aside upon this occasion for a moment, but it appeared to him to be a debt of justice to take care that no injurious impression should be made on the characters of gallant men, who had so bravely acted in the service of their country.

Mr. Hugh Inglis supported the conduct of the East India Company. He gave an account of the trade, public and private, for the last four years, and maintained that it was a great object to this country to preserve it in its present course, instead of suffering it to run into another channel. He thought it necessary also to do away false impressions, which might be made by unfounded assertions.

Mr. Francis objected to the statement of the Noble Lord who brought this subject forward that night, because the whole of it proceeded on estimates which contained many things that might or might not be made good; and also some false documents. He looked upon all estimates as no better than promises; and although he had no claim to infallibility, yet he possessed some experience upon this subject; but he should speak this night as a mere Member of Parliament, as if he had never been in India. Now these estimates were no better than promises, and he knew very well that promises had been held out from year to year; but the result was, that the affairs of the Company were always rather worse afterwards than when the promises were made. Nothing could be more distinct than that, on the renewal of the charter, 500,000*l.* a year was to have been paid by the Company to the public, upon which, however, no more had ever been actually received than the fruits of one year. The Noble Person who had the arrangement of these affairs formerly under his care (Lord Viscount Melville) had considered the affairs of India as if there had been no war to interfere in the arrangement; and now the Noble Lord could not make the difference he proposed in his statement as between war and peace, without deserting the system of his noble predecessor. The Noble Lord had said, that India would never be a drain on this country, but might afford it material support, in which he adopted the language of his noble predecessor; but it was not to be forgotten, that was a promise which had been held out for the last twenty years, but which had never yet been kept. So much of promises, and estimates, which were no better than promises. He then proceeded to take a view of the accounts which had been laid before the House on the part of the India Company, and contended they were extremely defective, and that the whole statement of to-night was fallacious, and therefore not to be relied on: he charged the accounts with having been fabricated for the purpose of imposing on the House and the public by making a false balance. He contended, that the capital stock of the East India Company ought to have been stated, which it was not. It was stated in the year 1793, and amounted to no less than 7,807,000*l.*; there was also a claim stated by the Company, amounting to 3,000,000*l.* which the Noble Lord himself said was of a nature that made it doubtful whether it would be allowed or not; so that this made the real state of the accounts of the Company 10,000,000*l.* more than it appeared on the face of the present statement. He con-

tended, that upon a fair statement of the accounts of the India Company, instead of a balance in their favour, it would be against them. He complained of these statements as contrivances to give to the House and the public a false view of the affairs of the East India Company, and that made him have recourse to his original proposition, that upon the subject of the East India Company's affairs, promises had been held out from year to year, which had never been realized.

Lord Castlereagh admitted, that it was fair that the accounts of the affairs of the East India Company should be examined; but the committee would recollect, that what was now before it was a comparison of the affairs of the Company at different periods, chiefly with a view of considering whether the war had injured their affairs or not, and comparing all the debts of the Company and their assets together. The Hon. Gent. had said that these accounts were made up with a view of giving incorrect information; and this, he said, was done by leaving out of the account the whole of the capital of the Company, which he stated to be above seven millions. There was no force in this objection; there could be no imposition upon any body by this, because it was known by every body what the amount of that capital was; and leaving out of the account that which was perfectly notorious, could answer no purpose whatever of imposition: and therefore, when the Hon. Gent. called this a false account, for the purpose of imposing upon the public, he was carrying the argument further than, upon reflection, he would be inclined to do. He took off from the account the whole of the note of the charge made as being due to the India Company from Government. Whether it was to fall on Government or on the Company, was a point hereafter to be determined; but it could only be stated in the way it had been. As to the result of the statement, the Hon. Gent. might make it for himself. It would stand thus debts in Europe, including the capital which the Hon. Gent. alluded to, amounted to 2,600,000*l*; debts in India, bearing interest, 16,000,000*l*.; assets in Europe were 17,000,000*l*.; in India, 11,000,000*l*.; making in all 28,000,000*l*. In this account there was no dead stock stated, though that was of great value; nor was this all the property of the Company, for it must be remembered, that they had great territorial possessions in India, besides what they derived under the sweeping clause of their charter; and therefore there was a vast mass of property in the Company, which was not brought to the credit side of this account; consequently the committee would clearly see, that this was not an account laid before them for the purpose of imposing a false balance in favour of the Company. The truth of the matter was this: that after discharging all their engagements, the Company will have one million a year, even in case of war, applicable to the reduction of their debts; and if there was another such company in this world, he should be glad to be informed where to find it.

Mr. Francis persisted in his former statement, and maintained that he was borne out by the accounts now upon the table.

Mr. William Dundas observed, that the manner in which his Noble Friend had opened this subject was so clear, that there was but little to go over in the accounts again; but something stated by the Hon. Member who spoke last called for an answer, and that which he should give should be very short. The Hon. Gent. said, that the account before the committee was false, inasmuch as it did not contain the capital stock of the Company. By this one would think there was some mystery about the matter, that there was something unknown about it; but instead of that, it was a matter of so perfect notoriety, that one of the clerks of the India House would laugh at any body that made a question upon it. Imposition was therefore impossible in this case. The Hon. Gent. had said that he was not infallible; he was glad of that assurance from himself, otherwise he could not have been bold enough to offer any answer to him. For want of that absolute infallibility to which the Hon. Member approached, he had, by the merest accident, omitted to take notice of one line which was at the head of this account, and in the very title of it: for it was stated to be an account of the affairs of the East India Company, "exclusive of their capital stock." And this was the account that was framed for the purpose of deceiving the public, by omitting that which they professed to omit; but this was the observation of an Hon. Gent. who was not infallible. As to what had been said upon the conduct of the Noble Lord (Lord Melville) who preceded his Noble Friend in this department, Mr. Dundas said that he had stood some time in the light of a parent to him, that any thing he could say of him must of course be accompanied by partiality, as well as veneration. That Noble Person stood upon his character in that House, and before the public, by whom he was well known, and he hoped esteemed. But the Hon. Gent. had said that that Noble Person had, for the last twenty years, held out promises which had not been kept on the affairs of the East India Company; that he had made no difference in his comparative statements between a time of peace and a time of war. In the first place, for twenty years he would not have made this comparative estimate as between peace and war at all, because for much of that time there was no war, nor did this comparative estimate commence until the year 1793, which was the period of the renewal of the charter of the Company: but

since that period, the Noble Lord alluded to had uniformly made a difference between the estimate in time of peace and that of war, and that the 500,000*l.* a year from the Company to the public could never be thought of until a time of peace; and yet the Hon. Gent. had roundly said that that Noble Lord had made no difference between peace and war in the statement of the affairs of the East India Company: but then this came from a Gentleman who was not quite infallible.

Sir F. Baring observed, that the Noble Lord who had brought forward this important business had speculated upon some topics in which he could not follow him; but the Noble Lord had an ardent mind, and took upon himself a burden which another had staggered under for many years. The Noble Lord who had so long had the superintendence of the affairs of the Company, had some time since published something of a political testament: he had stated that the Company, by great exertions in time of peace, might pay off one million annually. The Company had entertained an idea of doing this in a more vigorous manner, and instead of paying off one million, to pay two millions annually, and not to create one penny additional stock. The Noble Lord's predecessor, in his calculation for the thirteen years, never alluded to the 500,000*l.* participation of the public, which the Noble Lord this night promised to the public. He believed, that in a few years the public would have the gratification of seeing that paid, provided peace continued. His principal reason for rising was, to take notice of what the Noble Lord said respecting the increase of capital stock, or debt. That was a matter which the Court of Directors would receive with great reluctance; and by the attention which the Noble Lord paid to the affairs of the East India Company, he would observe, that great progress was made by them in the payment of their debts in India, without raising stock: but the mode proposed would be taking money away from commercial purposes, and applying it to the payment of political debts. The capital already in the service of the East India Company was fully adequate to the payment of their debts.

Lord Castlereagh said, he did not mean to express any opinion how far it would be proper for the East India Company to raise funds, by adding to the capital of the Company's debt. He had stated, that no more than two millions would be wanted, and that in the worst point of view there would be three millions applicable to the purposes of their commerce. He would not now enter into the question of whether it was expedient to refer to these resources for the payment of their debts; perhaps they might raise their credit by redeemable securities in Europe. The Company had no difficulty; for whether they added to their capital or not, they would in time of war, have one million, in time of peace two millions, applicable to the reduction of their debt annually, after providing for all their engagements.

Mr. Metcalfe proceeded to answer the observations of Mr. Francis: he said they were unfounded, and he defied that Hon. Member to shew wherein the statement now upon the table was false. He had abused all the India Company; he had said they had fabricated accounts, for the purpose of deceiving the public with a false balance: he would tell that Hon. Member that he had asserted this incorrectly; and he would tell him further, that every Member of the Court of Directors of the India Company was as incapable as he was of making out a false account for the public, or of imposing on any body. He denied this charge, and he told that Hon. Gent. that he could not prove it. He would also ask whether it was likely that this was a fabricated account on the part of the Company? Had it been fabricated, they would have made it in their own favour; whereas this was against themselves, and in favour of the public. He wished Gentlemen to take some care of what they said: that Hon. Gent. best knew why he made this attack on the Directors of the East India Company; but this he knew, it was no light matter to charge them with fabricating false accounts for purposes of deception. The Hon. Bart. who had lately spoken had differed in some points from the Noble Lord who had brought this subject forward; but then he had too much candour and liberality to charge the accounts as being false to deceive any body. The truth of the matter was, that the real situation of the affairs of the Company had undergone great alteration both at home and abroad. Now the reverse was the case; for abroad they had debts, and here they were rich. For the purpose of military operations, they were obliged to borrow money on very disadvantageous terms, and they had increased their bonded debt, which, in point of sound policy, ought never to have reached its present state; but the whole account was before the committee, and it was very hard to have it said that they fabricated any accounts: this was an assertion which he did not expect to hear from any Hon. Gent. of that House. Having passed over the accounts of the Company, he proceeded to take notice of the capital of 7,780,000*l.* which the Hon. Gent. had said was wilfully left out of the account: the fact was, that by an act of the Legislature itself this was guarantied to the Company at twelve millions, and therefore it would be wrong to state it in the account. There was here something which was the reverse of deception, for being guarantied to the Company at twelve millions, it was more in favour of the Company than the Hon. Gent. had stated, by the difference between that

sum and 7,800,000*l.* There was now a clear balance in favour of the Company, in comparison of the year 1793, of 2,200,000*l.* and upwards. He then proceeded to observe on the conduct of the Noble predecessor of the Noble Lord who brought this business forward (Lord Melville), whose whole conduct he approved highly, it being distinguished by the wisdom of an able and upright statesman. The Noble Lord now in the same department was treading in the steps of his most able predecessor, and, from the diligent application of his excellent talents, he might become his equal; more perhaps was unattainable. But there was much yet to be done in the subject of Indian politics; and if this pleasing prospect held out, the Company would be relieved, and the public have a participation of 500,000*l.* a year besides. Having said thus much on the general question before the committee, he must beg permission to say a few words on behalf of the proprietor of India stock, at whose risk India had been under great agitation, and quartered and divided, but yet preserved to the British empire. The proprietor had never received more than five per cent. for his capital, a sum with which no shopkeeper in London would be satisfied. He submitted whether or not it would not be wise to take the subject of India stock into consideration, and allow the holder eleven per cent. which he was convinced would be of ultimate advantage to the public. India never could be a drain upon this country, but might assist it abundantly. The granting of this eleven per cent. would raise the price of stock immediately. Having stated some advantages from this plan, he concluded with observing that India, under wise directions, might produce more advantage to this country, than it derived from all its other colonies together.

The question was then put and carried, and all the resolutions were voted *pro forma*. The House being resumed, the Report was received immediately.—Ordered to be taken into further consideration on that day sennight, and that the resolutions be printed.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, March 15. *(See Minutes, p. 427.)*

[Prince of Wales's annuity.]—The order being read for the committee on the Prince of Wales's annuity bill, the House accordingly resolved into the same, Lord Walsingham in the Chair.

On the first clause being read, and the question put,

The Earl of Carlisle rose and observed, that after his declaration of yesterday, respecting his intention not, under the present circumstances, to bring forward any distinct proposition on the subject, it could not be expected that he should have to trouble their Lordships with any detail thereon, the more especially as the bill was now before a committee of the whole House, in which stage of it no efficient alteration could be proposed. With respect to the subject, however, he would then state generally, that he retained those opinions upon which he had formerly avowed, that, with a reference to the present transaction in particular, he was of opinion the illustrious personage who was the object of it was as ill used as any man could be. The bill before the committee would be productive of those effects which would disappoint hopes held out, and frustrate expectations formed. Without adverting to the personal feelings of his R. H. upon such an occasion, it was now, he said, known that the public expectation of seeing him resume that state and splendour with which it was agreed on all hands the Heir Apparent to the Crown should be invested, would be entirely disappointed. He thought the question of the arrears of the dutchy of Cornwall should be legally decided; the general subject would then come before Parliament in a clearer point of view, and they would be the better able to judge what course to take. The bill before the committee would, he contended, not afford that relief to his R. H. which it professed: that illustrious personage would be left by it, at least for some time to come, in that degraded, nay, almost ignominious situation, in which for a considerable time he would be placed. His R. H. it appeared, was so circumstanced with respect to claims upon him, that the bill could not have even its proposed effect for at least one year and a half. Ministers had much better have waited until the period of the liquidation of those claims, when they could have effectually come forward; but though, notwithstanding he felt himself called upon to offer these general observations, yet his principal motive for troubling their Lordships was, to explain an expression which he made use of yesterday, which then seemed to make some impression upon a Noble Earl, and which appeared to be since, in some degree, misapprehended. Recurring again to the subject of his former animadversions, the Noble Earl observed, that the measure under the consideration of the committee was, like all the other measures of the present Administration, weak, inefficient, futile; in fact, a half-measure, inefficacious as to its object, and falling short of its avowed end. He then adverted to his language of yesterday: he had, he observed, expressed his opinion that the country was in a perilous state; and he would repeat, that the country, under all its present circumstances, was perilously situated: this idea, however, was provisional. We were to be regarded as on the eve of experiencing an invasion; at least, little less than such a state of things was to be in-

ferred from the tenour of the two Royal communications to Parliament. Thus circumstanced, and when it was considered that the guidance of the affairs of the country was left in the hands of the present Ministers, its situation could be truly said to be no other than perilous. The public, he asserted, did not look up with confidence to the talents and abilities of the present Ministers; the national spirit or the public energy could not be called forth or efficaciously exerted under their auspices. Were men of eminent talents and real abilities as statesmen, called to the guidance of affairs, the situation of the country would be diametrically opposite to that in which it was placed at present: from a state of dismay and despondence, it would pass to one of hope and exultation; public confidence and energy would revive, and we may bid defiance to all the efforts of France, and laugh her menaces to scorn. We may then say, in the concise but comprehensive language of the poet, "Come take!" which he feared we could not do at present. These were his feelings when he used, perhaps hastily, the expression that the country was in a perilous state: under its present rulers he feared it was; but under the guidance of those great characters he had in contemplation, its state would be full of well-founded hope and justly confident expectation.

Lord Pelham rose to answer some observations which fell from the Noble Earl, the greater part of which, however, were obviously irrelevant to the subject before the committee. With respect to the affairs of the illustrious personage who was the object of the bill, the Noble Earl seemed to be under some misconception, and in obviating which, the Noble Secretary was necessarily led into some detailed exposition of the affair, from the time when the first arrangements were made in 1795 to the present moment; which train of circumstances being already known to our readers, we deem it unnecessary to repeat them. By the operation of the bill of 1795, the debts of his R. H. would not, his Lordship observed, be liquidated before the end of four years, instead of the expiration of a year and a half, as misconceived by the Noble Earl. Much stress seemed to be laid on what fell from Noble Lords supposed to be in habits of communication with his R. H.; but he could state, that, as far as his own observation went, the Prince himself seemed to be very well satisfied with what was proposed by his Majesty's Ministers. The operation of the present bill was to restore to his R. H. the full possession of that income, which, after much deliberation and discussion, was deemed in the year 1795 to be sufficient for maintaining the dignity and splendour of the Heir Apparent. With respect to the other considerations to which the Noble Earl's observations were directed, he would only say, that assertions, however strongly made, did not amount to proof, and that the feelings and opinions of a whole country, or the public, were not to be collected from the sentiments of a few individuals. His Majesty's Ministers held opinions on that point very different from those held by the Noble Earl. He denied that they had forfeited or lost the confidence of the country. As one of those Ministers, he could say, that he had never courted the possession of the office he had then the honour to hold. It had been his lot to be placed in situations of great public trust and importance, in which situations, as well as in his present, he always exerted his honest endeavours to perform his duty to his Sovereign and to his country in a proper, fair, and unexceptionable manner. That he had filled offices of importance, in situations of extreme peril and danger, fully to the approbation of those by whom he was intrusted, he assumed no personal merit, for it was his duty so to act. The Noble Earl and the House should recollect, that at the time his Majesty's present Ministers were called to their offices, the country was in a state of unprecedented difficulty and peril; and the Noble Earl would do well to recollect the situation in which the country was left by those men of great abilities and eminent talents, when they had retired from their offices.

The Earl of Carlisle, in explanation, observed, that what he had said relative to the subject regularly before the committee, he merely offered as an independent Member of Parliament, actuated by no other motives than those arising from a sense of his duty to the public and the country. He had had no communication with the illustrious personage on the occasion, who, the Noble Earl repeated, had been ill treated in the present instance, and was, in effect, left by Ministers in that degraded and comfortless situation from which they professed to extricate him. With respect to what had fallen from the Noble Secretary of State relative to the situation of affairs at a former period, he deemed it then unnecessary to expatiate. Though a great deal, he observed, might in ordinary cases proceed upon presumption, yet when the safety and existence of an empire was at stake, such grounds of action should be exploded. With respect to the character and conduct of a certain great and illustrious man, which not only by him, but by the nation in general, was regarded with feelings of gratitude and admiration, he would aver of that great man, he meant Mr. Pitt, that he was the political saviour of his country. This great man was, with others, accused and suspected by Mr. Buonaparté of being concerned in the affair of what he called the infernal machine, for taking away his life. Of this accusation, he believed every honest man would acquit him; but there was another machine, he could not say an infernal, but a very mischievous one, which (so we under-

stood his Lordship) possibly he had some concern in, namely, the formation of the present ministry, whose conduct had abundantly compensated Buonaparté for whatever injury he might have sustained from the machinations he at first alluded to.

The Lord Chancellor answered the remarks of the Noble Earl shortly. He first observed upon the evident irregularity of the greater part of what had fallen from the Noble Earl. Upon the measure itself before the committee, he had applied the general expressions of weak, inefficient, and an half-measure; such as, according to the Noble Earl, were all the measures of the present miserable Administration of the country. However, with respect to the bill regularly under discussion, he would tell his Lordship and the committee, that it was such as Ministers, upon a full consideration of the subject, with a reference to the situation of the Prince himself, and their duty to the public, in which view of the subject that situation made a part, thought it advisable and proper to propose. That it was an half-measure, would be contradicted by the very tenour and spirit of his Majesty's message; and the Noble Earl should be aware that there was more real magnanimity and genuine spirit in firmly adhering, against the opinion of others, to a measure which, upon due deliberation, they decided upon as good and serviceable, than there was in leaning to what the precipitation of others may wish to be done. With respect to the general question of confidence to Ministers, he thought precisely with his Noble Friend who spoke second in the debate; and personally to himself he had to observe, that the favour of his Sovereign had elevated him to that situation which certainly he most coveted, but which at the same time he thought it his duty to his Sovereign, to others, and to his country, to accept of; and he hoped he had honestly and conscientiously performed his duty therein while he held it. With regard to the Noble Earl's explanation of his language of yesterday, he would only say, that he hoped the Administration had shoulders broad enough to bear that and even more. Much was said of the confidence of the country; but that Ministers were not destitute of it was plain, by the almost unanimous approbation of their measures, by that constitutional organ of the nation, the Parliament; those measures were founded in their sense of what they deemed the best interests of their country; and by the decisions of that Assembly, with respect to the wisdom or spirit of their conduct, they would wish to be judged, and not by the observations of individuals.

The clauses and provisions of the bill were then agreed to without further observation from the committee, and the House resuming, ordered the Report to be received the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, Mar. 15.—(See Minutes, p. 506.)

[Irish militia.]—The House resolved itself into a committee upon the Irish militia bill.

Mr. Wickham moved the insertion of a clause, authorizing the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to cause a sum, not exceeding four guineas, to be paid to each person enrolling himself in the militia of Ireland.

Mr. Elliot requested to know, whether this bill was intended to extend to every part of the militia of Ireland, or only to apply to a particular part of that country.

Mr. Wickham said this bill was brought in to authorize the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland to raise militiamen at four guineas, in consequence of the difficulty which had been experienced in getting persons to serve, when chosen by ballot; at the same time, it left the Lord Lieutenant the power to get them at a smaller bounty if possible: he however had the privilege to offer every inducement to persons to enter.

Mr. Elliot observed, that he thought it his duty to make a few observations on this bill before it passed into a law: he thought it would tend to subvert the recruiting service of Ireland. He was not an enemy to the establishment of a militia in that country. There was a practical difference between England and Ireland as to the formation of the militia. In this country, men are chosen by ballot; but in Ireland, it has been formed and conducted both by ballot and bounty. He thought, and indeed experience had taught him, that if a bounty of four guineas were given to induce men to enter into the militia, it would operate as a great injury to the recruiting service, particularly as so large a number of men as 40,000 were to be raised.

Mr. Wickham said he was sure that the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Elliot) had not taken the trouble to look over the bill, otherwise he would not now have made those observations on it. It was almost unnecessary to state the manner and method adopted in this country to raise militiamen, as every Gent. in the House knew there was but one; but in Ireland the same method would not effect the establishment of a militia: and he did not hesitate to say, that the militia had not been raised in that country by ballot. In Ireland it was the province of the Lord Lieutenant to procure militiamen in every way that was honourable

and just, and it was found from experience that the methods tried had been in some measure defective, which has given cause to the present bill, which bill will extend the power of the Lord Lieutenant to give a better bounty to persons who may be inclined to fight for the protection of their liberty and laws. The Learned Gent. had observed, that he was an advocate for raising the militia by ballot, and that he thought a bounty of four guineas would be hurtful to the recruiting service; but he would beg the Hon. Gent. to consider, that if the militia was raised by ballot, substitutes would be consequently got at a heavy price; by that means, men would sooner wait for offers of this kind than enter into the regular service. He was convinced that the present measure was calculated to benefit the militia force of Ireland.

Mr. ELLIOT said he did not think it a measure calculated to augment the militia of Ireland: he thought if men were not raised by ballot, they could not be raised at all.

The SECRETARY at WAR said he could not help complaining that the Hon. Gent. had thought proper to enter into an examination of the militia laws of Ireland, upon an incidental expense of this kind, particularly at the present moment, when every exertion was necessary to complete the force of the empire. Whether particular parts of the militia law were good or bad, it was now the duty of every man to make the best of it; and it was rather singular that the Hon. Gent. who was one of the first to sound the trumpet of alarm, should now take an opportunity of disheartening the public mind with respect to the public force. It would certainly have been more proper for the Hon. Gent. when the other bill was brought forward in December last, to come forward and to have stated his general objections to the measure; but he then sat perfectly silent, and did not offer one single objection: but now, when it was necessary to amend that bill in some particulars, the Hon. Gent. came forward with general objections to the whole of the system. The Hon. Gent. must know that the militia of Ireland had never been, nor could now be raised entirely by ballot. Why, then, did he not bring forward a bill to correct that evil? it had, however, been suffered to go on to the present time, and it was therefore necessary to make the best of it. The object of the present bill was only to enable the Lord Lieutenant to grant a greater bounty, if it should be found necessary, and to continue a bill which would expire in a short time, to the end of the year: and if the bounty did not exceed four guineas, it certainly would not materially affect the recruiting service, if, indeed, it would at all interfere with it.

Sir L. PARSONS said there appeared two points for consideration; the one was, whether the method adopted by this bill was constitutional? and the other was, whether the way of getting men by a bounty would answer the purpose of the country better than by ballot? He thought with the Gent. who preceded him, that the present bill would answer every purpose the country could wish for, and give a much greater satisfaction to the persons who served in the militia. He could assure the committee, that choosing persons by ballot very often rendered the officers very unpleasant, as they had frequently to associate with men whom they would not have taken among them, if such a bill as the present had been in force.

Mr. FITZGERALD said that he approved of the present bill, and thought it was a much better method of raising men than by ballot, as it would do away that trouble and expense which attended an individual in getting a substitute.

General TARLETON expressed his high approbation of the bill now under discussion, which would tend to facilitate the getting of men in Ireland. He well knew the state of the Irish militia, and was proud to say, he had the honour to command a regiment of militia in that country, who had given ample proof of their loyalty and affection to their King, and who were an honourable example of courage, and every requisite that can adorn the character of a soldier; and he hoped that the militia of every county in the empire would shew the same desire to protect it from the attacks of an enemy.

Mr. ELLIOT said he thought that four guineas was too great a sum to give for men, as it would add a very heavy expense to the country; with a less bounty the Lord Lieutenant might increase the militia to double the number mentioned in the bill. He could not but express his disapprobation of the measure, as he thought it would not tend to serve the country.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL of IRELAND said he could not but express his astonishment at the objections made by the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Elliot) who sat with him in another Parliament; and he must be permitted to call to the recollection of the Hon. Gent the time he perfectly agreed to the very principle he now reprobates. A bill went through the Irish House of Commons, granting the sum of six pounds to every man who would serve in the militia, and the Hon. Gent. never objected to the principle of that bill. The Gentleman well knew his statement to be correct. He observed, that there were several instances to prove the bad effect of a ballot; men got accoutred and

clothed, and then left their duty for the service of the rebel party.

Mr. Leigh said that the sum of four guineas would induce men to enter into the militia service, which was a much better way of getting them than by ballot. Many ill consequences had attended a ballot, and much confusion might attend it again.

Colonel Bagwell said that it appeared to him to be impossible to raise a militia by ballot; it had been proved an act of danger; the experiment had been tried, but without success: he said there were men who would rather enter into the recruiting service than the militia; and as the bounty was larger, the sum proposed in the present bill would not hurt the recruiting service.

The report was ordered to be received the next day.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, Mar. 16.—*(See Minutes, p.* 506.)

[Frivolous arrests.]—On the order for receiving the report of the bill for the better prevention of frivolous and vexatious arrests, &c.

The Earl of Moira observed, that he had an additional clause to propose, which was of that nature that could be introduced into the bill either in the present stage, or on the occasion of the recommitment of the bill, which he intended afterwards to propose for to-morrow. However, as he should probably be unable to attend in his place to-morrow, he should take the present opportunity of offering the clause. The Noble Earl described it to be of that nature which would go to render the measure more perfect and effectual in its altered state than it otherwise would be. The Noble Earl took the opportunity to state his intention of relinquishing, with respect to the present bill, the raising the amount of the sum for which arrests should take place, from 10*l.* to 20*l.* Upon consideration and further inquiry, he thought it would be better to leave that part of the law in its original state, on grounds as much of practical and substantial humanity to the debtor, as of justice and security to the creditor. An inconceivable number of debts of an amount between these sums, were afloat, and there was a certain description of persons whom, instead of wishing to take out of the power of their creditors, he intended if possible to make still more liable than they were at present: he meant those persons who passed as *gentlemen*, and who contrived to get into the books of tradesmen to different amounts. The Noble Earl then moved the clause above mentioned.

The Lord Chancellor was of opinion that the mode proposed by the Noble Earl, in point of form, for the introduction of his clause, was not the most regular. He thought it would be more proper to recommit the bill immediately, for the purpose of receiving the clause. The Noble and Learned Lord took the opportunity to express his sentiments with respect to the Noble Earl's intention of raising the amount of the sum for which debtors could be arrested, to 20*l.* It had in the first instance struck him that such an alteration could be well and safely made, but he had since considered the point with the most anxious regard, and the result of that consideration was, as the Noble Earl had stated, that such a regulation would not eventually tend to the ease or relief of the debtor, but would certainly operate oppressively with regard to the creditor, on whom indeed it would prove a kind of hardship, and tend considerably to lessen his security.

The Earl of Moira explained; after which the bill was recommitted, and the clause in question received and agreed to. The final alteration made in the bill was on the suggestion of the Noble Earl, and respected its title, which was to expunge therefrom the words, "and for the relief of persons *imprisoned* on *mesne* process."

The House then resumed, and ordered the report to be received next day.

[Irish post-office.]—The order being read for their Lordships going into a committee on the Irish postage rates bill,

Lord Auckland rose, and urged the objections which he offered last night against a particular clause of the bill, in some detail. His Lordship seemed to object to it on the ground of irregularity, on a constitutional principle, and, but comparatively in a very slight degree, with a reference to the question of revenue. Among other officers in Ireland to whom the exemption was extended, was one whose office was no longer in existence; it also had the effect of recognising, as it operated with respect to this country, a fourth secretary of state, which possibly may render the vacation of a seat in the other House of Parliament requisite. With respect to the consideration of revenue, he expressed his disapprobation of extending the exemptions upon slight grounds: he stated the net proceeds of the Post-office revenues from the regulations in 1783, at certain periods to the present year, in which he stated they amount to the enormous sum of upwards of 930,000*l.* payable into the Exchequer. After urging these several considerations with great precision and ability, his Lordship expressed himself aware of the possible effect of any alteration in a money-bill in that House, namely, its reje-

tion by the other; but he wished to learn from his Noble Friend on the woolsack, the best and most regular course of proceeding in the present instance.

The Lord Chancellor observed, there was an evident inaccuracy in that part of the bill alluded to by the Noble Lord. He coincided with what fell from his Noble Friend, and said it would be for the consideration of the House how far the probable event of the intended alteration should tend to deter them from doing what they themselves might conceive to be right. However, the best course to take would, he thought, be to negative the commitment of the bill, to proceed immediately to the third reading, and then to expunge the clause, should their Lordships so determine.

The Earl of Limerick took the opportunity to offer his sentiments upon the occasion, which he did at some length. He detailed the nature of the offices adverted to by the Noble Lord, some of which he said were recognised in the Imperial Parliament by the bills of 1800 and 1801. He was the decided friend and advocate of the Union; he was confident of the advantages which would eventually arise to Ireland therefrom; but he could not help observing, that in consequence of it she was shorn of some of her brightest feathers, many of which were transplanted hither; and the Noble Earl seemed to justify the drawers up of the present bill, as following the example of former bills of the kind.

Lord Auckland, in reply, vindicated himself from any imputation of disrespect to Ireland, or want of due attention to the welfare and interests of that part of the United Kingdom. In the course of the Noble Lord's explanation, he repeated his disapprobation of too widely extending the exemption, and took occasion to state, that no less a sum than 93,000*l.* was at present lost to the Post-office revenues by the privileges of Members of the Legislature, exclusive of between 94 and 95,000*l.* lost by the exemption of other privileged persons.

The Lord Chancellor expressed similar feelings respecting the interests of Ireland with those avowed by his Noble Friend.

Lord Carleton made a few observations on the occasion, after which the question for negativing the committee on the bill was carried, the bill read a third time, when the clause in question was expunged, and the bill afterwards passed in the usual way.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, Mar. 16.—(See Minutes, p. 506.)

[Nottingham election.]——Mr. H. Browne moved, That no warrant of the Speaker be directed to the Clerk of the Crown to issue a new writ for Nottingham, until after the Report shall have been taken into consideration.

The question being put,

Mr. Fox said, if the House came to this determination now, they would act most precipitately. The Hon. Gent. who moved this, and the committee of which he was a member, knew the circumstances of the case, and might, for aught he knew, be justified in wishing that no new election should take place until after this Report should be considered; but the House collectively had no such knowledge. He thought the Report ought to be perused for a few days by the Members of the House, and afterwards it would be time enough to bring forward a motion of this nature: he did not see there was at present sufficient ground for the House to determine at once that the town of Nottingham should remain unrepresented for all this time. He said there was a good deal of inconvenience likely to result to the town if this motion should be adopted, because it would be keeping it all that time as it were in a state of election; for every one knew that such would be the practical effect of keeping it for that time unrepresented, and in a state of uncertainty as to the time a poll may recommence. For these reasons this motion had his decided negative, though he did not know that he should take the sense of the House upon it.

Mr. Bond said that this motion was made in form and manner conformably to parliamentary usage and established precedent. It appeared from the Report which had just been read to the House, that it was the opinion of the committee who had investigated the matter, there was no reasonable ground of hope of a peaceable election for the town of Nottingham, unless some means be taken for its preservation different from those which at present exist. He submitted to the House the propriety of giving to the Report of this committee the same confidence that had been reposed in others; and if any such confidence was reposed, it was manifest from the Report itself that no new election ought to take place until after that Report should have been considered.

Mr. H. Browne said he should not have made this motion without assigning reasons for it; but that he thought the House would have seen the propriety of it immediately. The evidence given before the committee was now before the House, and ordered to be printed for the use of the Members; he thought it therefore disrespectful to the House to proceed to assign to them reasons upon a subject the House had agreed to take into consideration on a future day, a subject at present known only to the few Members who com-

posed the committee. The House, however, would so far give credit to the Report in the first instance, as to say that no new election should take place until this matter be considered; for it appeared on the face of the Report which had been read to the House, that the freedom of election had been grossly violated by a systematic tumult, which was as disgraceful as bribery and corruption. The House would so far confide in the committee as to believe they would not have reported these serious matters without foundation; and if the House gave that confidence to the committee, the case would need no further argument.

Mr. Fox said he did not mean to refuse every confidence to the committee of which the Hon. Gent. had been speaking, any more than he should to any other; but he wished to know the subject on which he was to confide before he gave that confidence: at present he had no such knowledge. This was a measure similar to a proceeding against an individual for crimes; for depriving the electors of the town of Nottingham of the exercise of the right of election, was in the nature of a punishment, a course which he was not now going to debate; he only thought that the House ought to take a little time to consider before it adopted it. He did not want time to consider whether any confidence was due to the committee, that he was ready to repose; but he wanted time to consider what the committee had reported.

Mr. W. Dundas said he did not see how the House could refuse that sort of credit to the Report of this committee which this motion only required, for the motion was almost of course, if the Report of the committee was a proper one. The Report stated, among other things, that there was no reasonable ground to hope for a peaceable election in the town of Nottingham, unless some measures be taken, which in the present state of things in that town cannot be taken: now if that was the opinion of a committee which had been for so many days carefully examining the matter, what reason was there for doubting that such will be the opinion of the House when they come to peruse the labours of that committee upon that subject; and if such was likely to be the ultimate opinion of the House, would it not be extremely improper to proceed to a new election at this place before this matter was seriously considered?

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he was led to concur in the proposition now before the House, on the ground stated by the Hon. Gent. who spoke last. The committee, whose Report the House had heard read, had declared that a legislative provision will be necessary to secure the freedom of election for the town of Nottingham. The House would not adopt any legislative provision, except on the ground on which the committee had formed their opinion. Was it not therefore fit, after an inquiry had been carried on by the committee, that the same inquiry should be carried on by the House in examining the materials on which the committee had formed its opinion, a committee composed of Hon. Members of that House, sworn to do their duty faithfully and impartially, and who had told the House by their Report that which was of the highest importance to the community, and the security of the constitution, namely, that freedom of election could not be had at Nottingham without the interference of Parliament. He would ask, was it or was it not fit to give credit to the committee who had examined this matter, until the House should have an opportunity of considering the ground on which their recommendation was founded? He did not consider himself pledged to follow up their resolution; he should suspend his opinion upon the subject, until after he should have read the Report; but in the mean time he should asquiesce in the opinion expressed by the committee: he should have time to consider the grounds on which that opinion was founded.

The question was then put and carried.

[Sir Thomas Troubridge.]—Captain Markham said he was under the disagreeable necessity of obtruding upon the House on a subject of a very delicate nature. When the character of an individual belonging to the House was attacked, he thought it was absolutely necessary that some investigation or inquiry should take place into the circumstances, so that either the honour of the individual should be cleared, or, if he had been guilty of what had been imputed to him, that the stigma might fairly rest upon his character. He was very sorry he was under the necessity of taking this course, particularly as the Hon. Gent. to whom he alluded was a friend of his; but as he was also high in general estimation, and at the Board to which he belonged, he thought it the more necessary to bring this matter forward. It was now some days since an Hon. Gent. now in the House, stated that some improper transactions had taken place on the Stock Exchange. He did not mean to say that he alluded to any one person in particular, he only meant to say that it seemed to have a reference to some part of his Majesty's government. He did not mean to state particular words; but since the statement he alluded to was made in the House, a number of reports had been circulated to the prejudice of his Hon. Friend: he meant Sir Thomas Troubridge, of whom he might speak since he was not present. Upon the statement to which he had already referred, a letter appeared in the newspapers from an agent. He wished to state, as nearly as he could, what the nature of the transaction was. It was this: —in the month of June or July last, Sir Tho-

mas Troubridge wishing to purchase an estate, and having fixed on the place, the name of which he believed was Chitham, in Sussex, he entered into a treaty for that estate, and in consequence of it was very near becoming the purchaser; to complete which purchase he sold out his stock, to the amount of 2000*l.* or 3000*l.* more or less. The person who lived on the estate and rented it, had laid out a great deal of money upon it, and from attachment to it, or from pride, or some other motive, chose to give a great deal more money for the estate than Sir T. had agreed to give; so that Sir T. had not the estate, and therefore he replaced the money again immediately in the funds. He still wished to lay out this money on the first opportunity in the purchase of an estate, and with that view he gave general orders to his agent, that he should, on the very first depreciation of the funds, sell out for him, in order that when he wanted the use of his money, he might not be obliged to relinquish his object, or sell out at a great disadvantage. This agent, so directed, found some depreciation of the funds on the Saturday; on the Monday there was a greater depreciation, and then the agent, without communicating with Sir T. sold this money out of the funds for Sir T.; and he now begged leave to read to the House an affidavit, stating, that Wm. E. Cook, an agent for Sir T. had, for several weeks past, had particular instructions to sell out stock for Sir T. Troubridge, when it might appear to him to be prudent to do so: that he did sell out for Sir T. when he so judged; and that Sir T. did not know of that sale of stock until he, the agent, had reported it to Sir T.; and that he always had power to sell out for him without further communication. Now, Captain Markham said, he did not know how any man was to act, if this was to subject Sir T. Troubridge to any suspicion. How was Sir T. to act with his agent? He gave directions to sell out, when, in the opinion of the agent, stock was likely to fall; and that agent sells out. Now, if Sir T. wished to have made any advantage of his official situation, he would not have done this, for he had money besides this in the stocks, besides that of which he is trustee for his children, over which he has the entire control, and he would not have confined himself to the sale of the stock that happened to be thus sold out by the agent; but none of the stock he had just mentioned had been sold, neither did the agent, Mr. Cook, know of what was going forward, for he had of his own 3000*l.* worth of stock, and which, if he had been let into the secret, he would have sold out. Under these impressions, Captain Markham said, and feeling, as he did, for the honour and long and valuable services of his Hon. Colleague, Sir Thomas Troubridge, it was impossible that he could remain quiet while any imputation rested on such a character. He believed every man in that House knew the character of Sir T. as an Hon. Member, and every man in the service knew him as a gallant meritorious officer, and a man of honour: he felt so much for his honour and integrity, for the unsullied purity of his mind, that he declared upon his honour, and he would utter it if he was going to stand before his Creator at this moment, that he believed Sir T. was absolutely spotless with regard to the reference which had been supposed to have been made to him, and of his having made use of his official situation to avail himself of the sale of property in the funds. Under this impression, there was but one thing he could desire the House to do for the satisfaction of Sir T. and that was, to go into a full and minute investigation of this matter. He hoped that an investigation best adapted for that purpose would immediately take effect, and therefore he should move, That a committee be appointed to inquire into this matter.

Mr. Dent declared that any allusion which he made in the House on this subject was not in the least degree to Capt. Troubridge. The allusion he made was as general as possible, and he believed as generally taken as it was made. That very considerable sums of money had been sold out of the funds previous to the event of the King's message being publicly announced, was beyond doubt; and when he took notice of it in the House, he took care to acquit the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Addington) of being a party to it, for he believed him to be as immaculate as his predecessor. The statement he made was on this ground: that having given credit to Administration for the time it was known, and having considered when it was made known to the Lord Mayor in the city, it did appear somewhat unfortunate that it should have got before that time to the knowledge of some other persons in the city, not within the knowledge of any one in administration; but something of that sort had got out, from what quarter he did not know; he did not insinuate that it came from any individual in government, but that something was known in the city no one would deny. He made no accusation on any man, he only made a general allusion: every man knew it as well as he did; that he mentioned it as a report, and nothing else; but upon his honour he never meant to insinuate any thing against the character of Sir T. Troubridge, for whom, from the account of others, without being known to him, he had the greatest esteem. He lamented that any affidavit had been made upon this occasion on behalf of Sir T. because he considered his character above all suspicion. He begged pardon of the House for stating so much; he could have wished that his Majesty's government had sent down to the Lord Mayor at nine o'clock in the morning of that day that press-warrants were to be issued; all inconve-

nience would then have been avoided; for he verily believed that nothing of this kind would have happened.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said he knew the irregularity of getting into a conversation of this sort, but he hoped it would be excused by the House on account of its extraordinary nature. The Hon. Gent. had said truly, that what he had said on a former night was couched in general terms; but it went forth to the country as a stigma upon somebody. The Hon. Gent. whose character had been brought forward to-night, was a distinguished officer, and who was now, he maintained it without the least hazard of contradiction, absolutely and entirely exculpated from all possible suspicion of misconduct. He was in a situation which the House could not fail to feel, and it must be matter of commiseration and regret to every one who knew him, and to every one who knew what were the feelings of wounded honour, to think that any suspicion should have attached on him. That gallant officer and honourable man had had recourse to what the Hon. Gent. who spoke last lamented, namely, the oath of his agent, which proved incontestably his perfect innocence. That agent had sworn positively that Sir T. had no communication with him respecting money in the funds for several weeks previous to the sale of this stock, and it was not until after the period the stock was sold the agent communicated any thing to him upon the subject of it; a circumstance so material, that it was absolutely conclusive upon the case, and no doubt could remain upon it. He was sure there was not one Member in the House who did not believe that the character of this officer was pure. He was sure there was not one man in that House, or any considerate man out of that House, attentive to what was said in it, who did not feel how important and essential it was to the welfare of the country itself, to support the characters of men of station and officers of distinguished merit. The people of this country were a steady and reflecting people, and they would not be very ready to set up any presumptions whatever without proof, against the character of a man whose life had been one constant scene of public services, adorned by unblemished honour. If there was any distinction of good qualities to be made, where all the qualities were good, he would say of Sir T. that he was most remarkable for a sturdy purity and unimpeached integrity. The Hon. Gent. had said, that his allusion was in general terms: that was the very thing he complained of. He called on the Hon. Gent. to speak out, to state any circumstance that attached the most minute or the most remote degree of suspicion, not only on Sir T. but on any individual connected with Government, upon the subject to which his allusion was made. These allusions were not to be hastily and inconsiderately made: Ministers had secrets to preserve, and he hoped they would preserve them when it was proper they should do so. They had secrets to preserve at the time of the signature of the late preliminaries of peace; nothing transpired previous to that event; but after it happened, there was no unnecessary delay in the communication of it. But they did not imagine they would have been accused of making an indiscreet disclosure on this occasion. The very preparation made on the coast of the enemy might have had the effect of which the Hon. Gent. spoke, for that was a matter which could not be known exclusively to Government; many merchants in the city might have known, and he had no doubt many merchants did know, of these preparations; so that this was not matter confined to persons in an official situation. The Hon. Gent. mentioned the circumstance of information to the Lord Mayor at nine o'clock in the morning. Upon this it naturally occurred to observe, there was no magic in any communication to the Lord Mayor of London: no individuals could have been prevented by this from speculation. The fact was, that a diametrically opposite conduct was observed, until the time came when it became necessary to apply to the Chief Magistrate of the city of London to back press-warrants, and then it could be no longer concealed; and this was not known until the Stock Exchange business was over, and he had left the House: it was the determination of himself, and all the Ministers of his Majesty's government, not to disclose any thing upon this subject until the last moment. He begged pardon of the House for saying so much on this occasion, but he thought what he was anxious upon was accomplished, for the character of Sir T. he maintained, was perfectly clear and spotless. And he called on the Hon. Gent. or any man in or out of that House, to do their duty, for it was their duty to state, if they knew the name of any one individual connected with Government, who had been guilty of such a breach of trust as that of turning to his own personal advantage, against the public, any knowledge which his official situation gave him. He meant this not only as applicable to every Member of Government, but to every individual in the remotest degree connected with it.

[Irish militia.]—Mr. Alexander brought up the Report of the Committee on the Irish militia bill; when the resolution respecting the bounty to be given to militia-men was read,

Mr. Windham said he rose to submit to the House some objections to the present measure, though he did not hope, by any arguments he could use, to be able to make any impression upon the House, or produce any modification in the measure now under consideration. His only object was, to enter

his protest against this measure, and to throw out some observations, which perhaps might be attended to in future, when any similar measure was brought forward. He begged, in the first place, to declare, that he was not a friend to militia institutions in general: he did not approve of them in England, still less in Scotland, and his objections were still greater when applied to Ireland. He would take it for granted, because it was the unanimous opinion of all the Irish Gentlemen who had spoken upon the subject, that the militia could not be raised in Ireland as it was in England, viz. by ballot; but he totally differed from them in the conclusion which they drew from that circumstance, viz. that if the militia could not be raised by ballot, that therefore it ought to be raised by bounty. If it could not be had by ballot, he would not have it at all. He spoke without any undue bias upon his mind; he was not a military man, and had neither prejudice or partialities, but he certainly was not a friend to institutions of that sort. When he said this, he hoped he should not be supposed to speak in disparagement of the militia, or of those gentlemen who had exerted themselves with so much spirit and zeal in that service, and who had foregone many of the comforts of life for the service of the country. He did mean to say that institution had been brought to a degree of perfection beyond the most sanguine expectations of those who first proposed the establishment of the militia. He knew that many regiments of militia were as expert, and made as good a figure upon the parade, as any regular regiment: he meant to impute to them no defects which were not inherent to the institution itself. The militia army, however perfect its discipline might be, was an army without experience; and indeed he hoped in common with every body else, that it would always continue so, because they could only gain experience by being called to act against an enemy in this country. He should not be told, that in the whole range of arts, mechanical, intellectual, and manual, the art of a soldier was the only one that did not require experience. It might be said that the men who formed the militia were of the same description as those who constituted the regulars; that the officers of the militia were as brave as those in the troops of the line, and, from the interest they had in the country, must be as anxious to defend it. All this was true, but valour would not do without experience; nay, spirit without experience was often productive of great danger. If even raw troops were going into action, they would feel great confidence if they knew they were led by officers of experience; if they could say, Such an officer distinguished himself in the glorious campaign in Egypt, such a one commanded in such an attack in the West Indies, &c. But if raw men were commanded by officers without experience, the courage of the officers would only make the men apprehensive that they would lead them into useless danger. It was true that one militia regiment, if acting with regiments of the line, might do perfectly well; but the case was very different when the whole, or nearly the whole of an army was composed of inexperienced troops, who certainly were not fit to go through the wear and tear of a campaign. Without enlarging upon this subject, he wished to observe, that he did not think the discipline of the militia equal to the regulars, particularly when we might be going into a struggle which might decide the fate of the empire.

Mr. Noel here called Mr. Windham to order, as he did not consider his arguments as applying to the question before the House.

The Speaker said he considered the Rt. Hon. Gent. as perfectly in order.

Mr. Windham said, that with respect to the defects which existed in the militia force, they did not arise from the fault of any person; they were defects that necessarily arose out of the nature of the institution itself. But it was obvious that a militia force could not be equal to a regular force, because the latter was as good as the former for defensive operations, and might be employed for purposes of offence; whereas the militia could only be employed at home for purposes of defence. If you have a large force, which might be employed both for offensive and defensive purposes, though you might never send them out of the country, yet they would keep the enemy in check, because they could not foresee whether you would send them on foreign service or not; but if the enemy knew that you had a large force in the country, and also knew that you could not send that force out of the country, it certainly would relieve them from any apprehensions of attack on their own coasts. Suppose at the time when Buonaparté marched into Italy, previous to that most unaccountable battle of Marengo, when he collected all the troops he could in France, and made that memorable passage of the Alps, which was almost as celebrated as the passage of Hannibal; suppose at that time we had had 30 or 40,000 men ready to make an attack upon the enemy's coast, he believed that the French would not have ventured to have sent so large a part of their force to Italy.

Mr. Wallace called the Rt. Hon. Gent. to order; he conceived that these observations did not rise out of the subject before the House.

Sir William Pulteney said, though he did not agree with the Rt. Hon. Gent. yet he hoped he would be suffered to go on, because it was necessary that his observations should be answered.

Mr. Windham said, that one of the great aguments for the militia was, the consti-

tional principle, that it prevented the necessity of a standing army: but he thought there was now no ground for the apprehensions that used to be entertained against a standing army: at all events, the danger, if there was any, was remote; while the danger which now threatened was immediate and pressing. He could not consider the militia as a constitutional force in the view it was first intended, because it was now formed almost entirely of substitutes. With respect to the economy of the measure, he wished to observe, that in such a crisis as the present, it would be absurd to be governed merely by views of economy; but certainly when they were considering whether they should give four guineas to militia-men, or six guineas to regulars, they ought to consider the difference there was in point of utility between the two descriptions of force; and, in his opinion, the difference between the two descriptions of force was greater than the difference between the bounties. If this bounty was given to men to serve in the militia, it certainly would very materially impede the recruiting service for troops of the line. He knew that there must be a great degree of partiality upon this subject in gentlemen who had devoted their time and exertions to perfect the militia, and who must therefore feel unwilling to see the effect of all their labour lost; but at a moment like the present, the country must not be governed by such considerations as these. The danger with which we were threatened was of so immediate and paramount a nature, that it required the constant exertion of all the ability of the Government; the least error, the least relaxation, might be attended with the most serious consequences. We were now going close-hauled; and if we only lost a point or two in our course, we run the risk of going to leeward of our port. It had been said, that at such a moment as the present the only object was to call forth the exertions of the country, and that it was wrong to comment upon the nature of those exertions; but, in his opinion, the more imminent and pressing the danger was, the greater the necessity was that the spirit and exertions of the country should be properly directed.

The Secretary at War said, he certainly did not intend to have taken any part in this debate, because he did not think that any Gentleman would have introduced such subjects as they now heard; but he could not sit still after hearing observations which he declared had given him as much uneasiness as he had ever felt since he sat in that House. He agreed with an Hon. Baronet (Sir Wm. Pulteney), that such arguments ought not to go forth unanswered, even if they were irregular; though he thought that the Rt. Hon. Gent. was strictly in order. He did not by any means complain of the Hon. Gent.'s objections to this measure, he only complained that the Rt. Hon. Gent. had made his general objections at a time and upon an occasion when these objections could lead to no practical conclusion. He complained that the Rt. Hon. Gent. entertaining such opinions upon this subject as he now appeared to do, should, while he was in office, have augmented the militia to a degree heretofore unprecedented; for the Rt. Hon. Gent. was at that time in a department immediately connected with the public force. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had not only suffered the militia in England to be so augmented, but while he held an important office in administration, the militia of Scotland was formed, and he believed that of Ireland; and yet upon these occasions the Rt. Hon. Gent. had urged no objection. But now, even if the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s objections should prevail (unless the Parliament were to supersede all the militia laws at once), he stated them for the first time. When the bill, of which the present one was only a part, was before the House, and when, from the situation of the country, his objections could have been more deliberately and maturely examined, the Rt. Hon. Gent. sat perfectly silent. He really could not comprehend how a Gentleman who had served his country so long, in many important situations, and for whose talents and sentiments he had the highest veneration, could have allowed himself at such a time to make such observations. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had occupied a considerable time in proving a proposition which nobody ever attempted to dispute, viz. that the militia were not in every respect equal to the regular force. It was never intended that they should be; they were merely meant as subsidiary to the regular troops, and he was convinced that a better system could not be adopted with a view to the constitutional principle, which he was convinced would never be given up. He begged the House and the Rt. Hon. Gent. to consider what the militia had done. In the year 1780 they saved the capital of this country; and upon every occasion where their services were required, they came forward with promptitude and alacrity; and he was convinced that no country possessed a force, maintained at so small an expense in time of peace, that could be made so effectual in time of war, and called forth at so short a notice. With regard to the militia of Ireland, it was not necessary to remind the House, that at the time of the rebellion they displayed a degree of courage that shewed them to be inferior to no troops in the world, and, in conjunction with the yeomanry, put down and trampled that rebellion under foot, and saved that country to the British crown. As to the militia of England, at one of the most critical periods of its history, they voluntarily offered their services in Ireland; and though the rebellion was put down before

many of them arrived there, yet it must be allowed that they rendered most essential service. In one of the most important expeditions which was undertaken last war, viz. the expedition to Holland, the greater part of the army was composed of volunteers from the militia; and though that expedition failed in part, from causes very different from those which had been stated, yet our troops conducted themselves in such a manner, that those who had upon that occasion to look them in the face, felt no great disposition to repeat the experiment.—Much of the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s argument went upon the supposition that the militia was preferred to the regular force—that was by no means the case. But when the immense possessions of this country were considered, the necessity of the militia for home defence would be obvious. He had the satisfaction of stating that the militia would soon appear to be in a state that would exceed the most sanguine expectations that could have been formed of it—that the regular force was more numerous and in a better condition than it was in any part of the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s administration, and that there were more troops now in Great Britain and Ireland than there were at any period of the last war. He trusted, therefore, that the country would not be disheartened at any observations which the Rt. Hon. Gent. had made, for it was now in a better state than when it had bid defiance to all Europe. He wished that the Rt. Hon. Gent. had heard the sentiments of the Gent. from Ireland, who all concurred in the impossibility of raising the militia of that country by ballot. But at all events, he wished the Rt. Hon. Gent. to recollect, that if the militia of Ireland was not raised in the manner now proposed, it must be attempted to be raised by ballot, or by volunteers, and in that case a bounty of six pounds per man would be given, which would interfere much more with the recruiting service than the present plan. It was true that the present mode would, in some degree, interfere with the recruiting of the army, but certainly not materially, because the persons who entered into the militia were such as would not enter into the regular service. He was sure that the Rt. Hon. Gent. did not wish to dishearten the country, though his observations had that tendency. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had stated, that all the abilities of the country ought now to be brought into action. Undoubtedly every exertion was necessary; but at the same time much would depend upon the firmness and good sense of that House, and upon the prudence which Gentlemen used in the observations which they made in that House.

Sir William Pulteney said, he gave the Hon. Gent. every credit for the ability he possessed, in painting a bad side of the question in such colours, as would render it apparently wise and proper for adoption. But he could not help saying to the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Windham), that he had mis-stated facts with regard to the militia in the two countries, as well as the disposable troops of the nation; and though the militia of the two countries had shewn their courage in numberless instances, and had met with the disapprobation of the Hon. Gent. yet the country at large, except him, had bestowed every praise on these constitutional bodies, who are of national importance. He said the Hon. Gent. seemed to be very much attached to a standing army, as he thought they were more essential to the safety of the nation than any militia that could be established. He said, he thought the Hon. Member appeared too fond of a regular force, and had not given, in his opinion, a single argument sufficiently strong, to induce any Member in that House to support his side of the question. Sir William then noticed several arguments which had been used by Mr. Windham, none of which he said would convince the House that a regular army was preferable to a militia in Ireland, agreeably to a plan proposed by the bill now under discussion. He had to observe, that if the plan now mentioned by the Hon. Gent. was to be adopted, he was sure you would not get the countenance and support of the country gentlemen, and a numerous body of persons who have and will enter cheerfully into the militia. Many hundred persons felt it their duty, for their own private safety, and the safety of the nation, to assist in the constitution of a militia in their respective counties; but few men who had many private ties, as dear as life, and on which life itself depends (such as men in business, and who could not leave their country and families for any length of time), would enter into the regular service, however glorious and honourable the name of a British soldier must sound to the ear of every man: this he thought one important reason for the maintenance of a militia in both countries. He thought this was no time for a discussion like the present—a discussion that would only shew the Hon. Gent.'s extensive talents, and his extensive metaphysical knowledge, which, in the present case, he thought, only went to perplex the question. He said the gentlemen of England were called upon to defend the country; at this critical period it was the duty of every man to use his interest for the public safety; and he did not doubt but there would be but one opinion in the nation, and that was for the maintenance of those blessings we now enjoy, and that could not be done unless the House gave Government that support they were now in want of. He said every Gentleman in that House must remember the courage and conduct of the American militia, who distinguished themselves when they fought on their own ground, and who beat the regular disciplined troops

sent against that country. He had military knowledge enough to know, that a greater number of men would enter into the militia than into the recruiting service. The Hon. Member had by his speech endeavoured to destroy every thing connected with the militia since its establishment in the year 1757.

General Tarleton observed, that he concurred with the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Windham) on many occasions, yet he must differ from him on the present. Experience had proved the utility of a militia in Ireland as well as in this country. Every man must know that we have to deal with a restless neighbour; it was therefore prudent to guard our coast with militia, as well as to have a sufficient body of regular disposable troops at the immediate service of Government. He thought no measure could be suggested to answer the purpose of Ireland as well as the one now under discussion, which he hoped would not meet an opposition sufficiently strong to destroy it. He considered it a measure that immediately called for the support of every Member in the House: it therefore should have his vote.

Sir L. Parsons said, he had had an opportunity of knowing something of the militia of Ireland as well as of the regular troops, and he was convinced he should not do justice to himself and the brave militia-men of that country, if he had continued silent on a question in which they were concerned. The militia of Ireland had served several years, and had proved themselves a noble and courageous body of men; and though they were at present but a skeleton of a military force in Ireland, it would be extremely impolitic not to increase the numbers of such a useful and praiseworthy establishment. He would call to the recollection of the House, the period when the French landed at Bantry Bay: their conduct at that time, as well as on many other occasions, did them the highest credit: no troops in the universe evinced more energy in the field than the militia of Ireland: those brave men only felt disheartened when the wind would not permit the remaining part of the French to land; this indeed was a painful disappointment to those courageous heroes, who would have carried victory had the French army been double the number. He was sure the Irish militia were of the first consequence to the country, and ought to receive every honour and attention which their courage and exertions had long merited; and he could not sit down till he repeated what had been before observed to the House, that we were at present in a critical situation, and therefore every mean ought to be used to keep an ambitious and overgrown enemy from our coast.

Lord Kensington said, it was the first time he had ever troubled the House on any question, and it was not his intention to trespass on their time for many minutes. The only inducement he had in addressing them, was, a mis-statement made by the Hon. Bart. behind him (Sir William Pulteney), who had said, his Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham) had made an attack on the militia of the two countries. This, he was sure, was not the case; his Hon. Friend had, by no means, said any thing offensive of that body of men; he had taken objections to the militia on general principles, and offered arguments to prove, that a disposable and regular force was of more importance to the country than the augmentation of the militia could possibly be. Whether his Hon. Friend's arguments would convince the House of the propriety of his position, would be seen by the vote of the House: yet he must be permitted to say, from some knowledge in military affairs, that he concurred with his Hon. Friend in some points, and thought that a regular disposable force would be more serviceable to Ireland than the militia. At the same time he had no objection to a militia in either country, yet he thought a regular disposable force was better for either an offensive or defensive purpose than a militia was, as the regular force was generally better constituted and disciplined for actual service than a militia could possibly be. In proof of his assertion, he begged the House to call to their recollection the militia that were sent to Holland, whose exertions proved their defective power, and evinced a want of discipline. This was well known to Government; and had they been all regular troops, there is no doubt but they would have made a better figure.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the Noble Lord had not stated what Mr. Windham had observed to the House; but as his Lordship's mistake must be obvious to any Member, he would go to his own remarks on the militia; in doing so, he must call to the recollection of the House, that the army who had distinguished themselves in Egypt, were volunteers taken from the militia; and that he was sure that most of the King's officers would be proud to have the regular troops mixed with militia-men. An Hon. Member of this House had said, very properly, that the militia of Ireland had distinguished themselves in the field at the time the French made an attack on their native soil, which did them great honour, and evinced a courage highly praiseworthy. During the last war the militia of Ireland had proved the utility of such a constituted body; and there was not an officer in the House who had to conduct the militia of Ireland, but was proud of the exertions of those brave men who had been under his command.

Sir W. Pulteney rose to say a few words by way of explanation. From a remark that

had been made on his observations on the militia of America, it appeared necessary for him to repeat what he meant. He observed, that he had before stated, that the militia of America had beat the regular troops, and that he did not doubt but the militia of this country and Ireland would beat the French whenever they met.

Sir Eyre Coote said, he rose merely to say, that the militia who had been sent to Holland had not evinced any want of courage or discipline, and all they were then in want of was a little more time; but there were many circumstances that combined at that period which rendered their exertions abortive. From the best information that could be obtained, he had no doubt but a militia in the two countries was highly necessary to be supported with the utmost vigour.

General Maitland made several observations on the militia of Ireland, and concluded with saying, the measure should have his support, as he thought the establishment of a militia was of the first importance to the two countries.

Mr. Wilberforce said, at a period when the public safety was endangered, it was certainly highly necessary to consider of the most effectual means of providing for that safety. If any Hon. Gent. thought that the present was such a period, then it was their duty to propose whatever means they thought the most effectual for providing for that safety. There was a period, however, when we had to contend against the whole force of France and Spain, when the militia was increased without any objection being made by his Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham), which enabled him to plead his Rt. Hon. Friend's authority against himself. The militia was the proper constitutional force of the country, and formed that which we ought to have, a large defensive force. No man could look upon a standing army with more constitutional jealousy than himself; but perhaps his Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham) had a great love for expeditions, and therefore thought that a militia force was not so immediately applicable for those purposes. If a standing army were to be raised in Ireland, instead of the proposed militia, it must necessarily be inexperienced, and therefore those who opposed the militia had no right to make use of the argument of inexperience against it. Something had been said by his Hon. Friend, as if his Majesty's Ministers were to set themselves above the opinion of the people; but he thought, in a free country like this, that popular opinion, to a certain degree, was the best regulator of the conduct of Government, and ought to be consulted.

Mr. Alexander defended the system of militia laws in Ireland, and observed, that gentlemen of rank and fortune could not be expected to enter as volunteers into the regular service; they could best defend their country at the head of the militia.

Mr. W. Elliot adverted to the point of order, and said, it appeared to him to be a new question, that, when the House were called upon to vote an additional bounty like the present, they should not be allowed to go into the general question. He objected to the proposed bounty, because it would tend to injure the recruiting service in Ireland. The constitutional mode of obtaining a militia was by ballot; but he was answered, that in Ireland a ballot could not be effected. This, in his mind, was an objection against the establishment of a militia. This measure went to raise a force in Ireland on the principle of the fencibles; it would no longer be a militia, but a fencible force of the worst species. He had been told on a preceding evening, by the Attorney General of Ireland, that he voted in the House of Commons in Ireland for a military force.

Mr. Bagwell spoke to order, observing, that the Rt. Hon. Gent. was referring to an argument used on a former evening by a Gent. not then in the House.

Mr. Elliot proceeded. When he was in office in Ireland, he said, the militia were not only embodied, but encamped; it would therefore not have been a very safe measure to have proposed at that period to dissolve it. What was the case now, when the militia was disbanded? The question now was as to its revival, and he objected to the policy of the measure. He did not wish to excite alarm; but if any measure was calculated to excite alarm it was one like the present, which went to lay the country prostrate at the feet of its enemies. With respect to the actual danger of the country, he hoped it would not be led into a war in darkness and obscurity; but he should even think a war in any shape preferable to a continued series of submissive and pusillanimous conduct.

Lord Castlereagh said, the question before the House could not justify the Hon. Gent. in going into charges against his Majesty's Ministers for submissive and pusillanimous conduct. He was not surprised at a disposition being evinced to debate the present measure, as it arose out of a subject which was dear to the community. If his Hon. Friends thought the defence of the country would be better maintained by a standing army than by a militia force, they were certainly perfectly justified in making objections to the latter. He differed with them however *in toto*; he was perfectly satisfied that it was impossible to have a better defence than a constitutional militia force.

Balloting was undoubtedly the constitutional mode of providing that militia; but if the question was as to the injury done to recruiting, there could be no doubt that the mode of ballot was the most injurious.—There were contrivances in this country to render the ballot less onerous by means of parish subscriptions:—the present was only a mode of making the country subscribe, as a body, to raise the men which it was called upon to provide. He was satisfied that Ireland could not be considered as in a perfect state of security, if it was trusted to the protection of the regular troops alone.

Mr. Hiley Addington said, the argument which had been used, that the present measure would be injurious to the recruiting service, had been conclusively answered by his Rt. Hon. Relation. In fact, there was a conclusive answer to it in the nature of things, as it was well known that many persons would prefer a larger bounty and enlisting for life, whilst many also would prefer a small bounty and a limited period of service. He had held a pretty high situation in a fencible regiment, part of which he had himself raised, and he did not know any individual of it who would recruit; and even when it was disbanded, not one fifth of the whole became regular soldiers. With respect to the militia, he would ask a distinguished officer (Sir Eyre Coote) who had spoken in this debate, whether a regiment of militia in service at the period of the expedition to Holland, and sent thither, would not serve with as much courage and discipline as any other? The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Elliot) as well as his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham) had taken a comparative view of the militia and the regulars, but in such a way as to give all the merit to the latter; and he confessed some comments had been made upon the militia, which excited uneasiness in his mind. If the present was, as had been stated by a Rt. Hon. Gent. a period of greater danger than any during the late war, why depreciate one of our best supports? He could not help thinking that they shewed a want of consistency. The Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Windham) had thrown out a charge against his Majesty's Government, of a want of prospective wisdom; and another Hon. Gent. (Mr. Elliot) had charged them with submissive and pusillanimous conduct. He defied those Hon. Gent. to produce a single instance to prove those charges; and till they did that, such charges must be considered as mere random assertions.

Mr. Wickham said, it would be still open to the colonels of militia, or the Lord Lieutenant, to continue the bounty as it was before this measure, or to lower the present bounty. There was no intention at present of granting the whole bounty mentioned in the resolution.

Mr. Windham, in explanation, said, he did not distrust the loyalty or the spirit of the militia; but he still thought them inferior to troops of the line.

Mr. Dawson thought it whimsical that the present measure should be opposed only by the late Secretary at War for England, and the late Secretary at War for Ireland. The Irish militia, he said, had put down rebellion, and had materially contributed to repel invasion.

The resolutions were then agreed to, and a bill ordered pursuant thereto.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, March 17. (See Minutes, p. 507.)

[Irish chalking act.]—The second reading of the Irish chalking act being moved,

Lord Auckland rose to make a very few observations on the bill. He did not mean to go into detail on the subject, but considered it his duty to allude to the difference which the bill went to establish betwixt the criminal laws of the two parts of the United Kingdom. A difference of this kind was in every case to be deprecated, but more especially when it regarded the criminal laws of the country. Some delay, therefore, in proceeding to the committee on the bill might be desirable, to enable their Lordships to consider how far it might be expedient to extend the provisions of the bill to this country.

The Archbishop of Dublin professed his inability to form an opinion how far the extension to which the Noble Lord alluded might be applicable to the circumstances of this country; but of its necessity, as far as Ireland was concerned, no one acquainted with the state of that part of the United Kingdom could doubt for a moment. In this country the crime was of rare occurrence, and therefore it might be a matter of doubt how far policy would suggest the propriety of making a general enactment on the subject. No man, however, could have lived twelve months in Ireland, without being convinced that it was essential to the safety of the peaceable part of the community.

The Lord Chancellor called the attention of their Lordships to a point which was entitled to particular attention. He had more than once had occasion to advert to the mode in which bills of the most important kind were introduced into that House. The second reading was not preceded, as it certainly

ought to be, with respect to bills whose general nature was not understood, by a short explanation of their object, but as a mere matter of course. This observation, in the present instance, was suggested by the title of the bill. It was entitled, A bill for the more effectual prevention of chalking; a practice, of the nature of which he professed his ignorance, and he believed many other Noble Lords would acknowledge the same ignorance. It was certainly the duty of those who were employed in introducing the bill, to have given this explanation, and thereon he took this opportunity of alluding to a general ground of complaint. His Lordship agreed with the Noble Lord who began the discussion, that it was highly desirable to have as little discordance as possible betwixt the criminal laws of Ireland and this country, but gave no decided opinion how far the extension might be necessary.

Lord Carleton gave a short sketch of the circumstances which rendered the present bill necessary. The practice which it was designed to punish was one which, at the time when the act was framed, had become highly alarming; and it was to counteract so serious an evil, that it was originally submitted to the Irish Parliament. About two years ago it had expired, but at the present moment it had again appeared necessary to renew it. He agreed with the Noble and Learned Lord who spoke last, that the title of the bill was not one very intelligible in this country, where the practice from which it was derived was almost unknown. In Ireland, however, the practice was unfortunately too well known, and the title was one universally understood. He professed himself not in possession of such a knowledge of the existing circumstances of the country as to be able to judge of the expediency of the extension.

Lord Ellenborough saw very powerful reasons for some improvement in the criminal law of this country, so far as assaults, with intent to commit murder, were concerned. He alluded particularly to the case of a trial at the Old Bailey (the trial of two men for cutting and maiming a man near Hammersmith, at one of the late sessions), where, under circumstances of the greatest atrocity, the capital part of the indictment was done away, because the crime of the prisoners did not come within the meaning of the act under which they were tried. He was desirous, therefore, that their Lordships might have an opportunity of considering how far the extension of the act to this country might be desirable. His Lordship adverted particularly to the manner in which the bill was framed. There was a great deal of superfluity of expression, which might in the committee be curtailed. His Lordship therefore wished that Monday might be fixed for going into a committee on the bill.

Lord Alvanley corroborated the statements of the Noble Lord, and argued in favour of some improvement in our criminal code. As the law now stood, an assault with a view to robbery was a felony, though not of a capital nature; whereas an assault with the view of perpetrating the crime of murder was a simple misdemeanour. He agreed entirely with his Noble Friend in what he had said about the case to which he had alluded, and he was sure all of their Lordships must see there was a necessity for revising the law, when a crime, in all its circumstances so atrocious, had escaped adequate punishment, merely from want of evidence that the criminals had lain in wait with the intention of perpetrating the crime. His Lordship was very pointed on the loose and inaccurate manner in which the bill was couched. In this respect it required very considerable improvement. He alluded to several clauses in which the language was extremely inaccurate. In one part of the bill it was enacted, that no person being in Ireland, should, without subjecting himself to certain penalties, be guilty of the crime specified in the bill. There was, however, a great want of precision here, because it might be inferred from that, though a person could not, without subjecting himself to penalties, be guilty of this crime in Ireland, he might with impunity perpetrate it in England, in Scotland, or, in short, in any other quarter. After dwelling on this topic, his Lordship concluded by declaring his complete approbation of the proposed delay.

The bill was then read a second time, and committed for next day.—Adjourned.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, March 18.—*(See Minutes, p.* 507.)

[The navy.]—The Earl of Carlisle called the attention of their Lordships to a motion, which he proposed to make that evening, had he seen those Ministers he had expected in their places. The proposition was of that nature, which he thought, on considerations of fairness and candour, it would not be proper to urge without at least giving some notice. What he had in contemplation (the Noble Earl observed), respected the artificers in his Majesty's dockyards, on the discussion of which subject he thought it would be proper that his Majesty's Ministers in that House should be present, particularly, his Lordship seemed to say, the Noble Earl at the head of the marine department, from whom it was naturally to be expected, peculiar information and assistance would be derived. For his own part, he

came forward as an independent Peer of Parliament, and actuated by no other motives whatever than his own sense of what was his duty in that character. He came forward on his own motion, unconnected with parties, as an unbiassed and independent Member of that House:—he was, happily,

"Unplac'd, unpension'd, no man's heir or slave;"

as such, he would freely, and without reserve, deliver his sentiments upon all public questions, in the discussion of which he should take a part, without reference to the opinions, the feelings, or the language of any person. He was unsolicitous whom his public conduct or his language offended, while it was inspired by a strong sense of what he conceived to be his Parliamentary duty. He was regardless of what the effect, under such impressions of his language, in delivering what others might deem his poor and narrow opinions, might be. He was regardless of the remarks, which their delivery might draw down from any quarter, either in the way of invective, sarcasm, or pretended admonition. He was utterly regardless of what might be asserted of him in that respect: whether his notions and sentiments pervaded only the narrow and limited circle of society in which he moved, or whether their effects or consequences were said to be more extensive; it was of no consideration to him what might be said in that respect, so long as he felt he performed his duty conscientiously as an independent Peer of Parliament. With respect to his proposed motion, the Noble Earl said, it was his intention to bring it forward on an early day next week, should he see Ministers in their places.

The Lord Chancellor quitted the woolsack, and observed, that with respect to the motion which the Noble Earl had announced his intention to bring forward, he could of course say nothing, because he knew nothing of its nature, from what the Noble Earl had stated. It might be of an unobjectionable, or perhaps of a questionable nature—he could not then possibly decide. With respect to other parts of the Noble Earl's observation, he should only say, that, in regard to the Noble Earl's Parliamentary conduct, he was convinced it would always be guided by pure and honourable motives. The Noble Earl would, at the same time, recollect that others had their feelings with respect to what may be said, as regarding unfounded imputations thrown out, as well as the Noble Earl himself. The question was not so much what individuals may think of themselves, as what others thought of them. As to the confidence of the country, those with whom he had the honour to act, had every reason to be satisfied from the conduct of that constitutional organ of the country, the Parliament—that confidence, they trusted, would, without reference to the opinion or assertions of individuals, be continued to them as long, and in such degree, as they continued to deserve it.

The Earl of Carlisle and the Lord Chancellor afterwards spoke severally in explanation; in the course of which the Noble Earl stated, that his motion should be for the production of the monthly returns, at certain periods, respecting the artificers in his Majesty's dock-yards.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, March 18.—(*See Minutes, p.* 507.)

[Militia officers' bill.]—The order of the day was read for taking into consideration the militia officers' bill.

Lord Folkstone said, he was surprised that an opposition had not been made to this bill on its first reading, and he could not but express his astonishment that no other Gent. had stood up to oppose a bill, which he thought went to reduce the dignity and consequence of the militia of this country. The militia was supported by men of fortune, whose situation in life would not permit them to enter into the regular service, as they could not leave the country, or conform to many necessary laws which attend the regular service; and therefore every care ought to be taken to prevent improper and unqualified persons from mixing with gentlemen of the first consequence in the country. The bill now under discussion would allow persons to enter into the militia who were by no means qualified, which would prevent men of fortune from considering a situation in the militia as an object of their ambition, consequently its present importance would soon be on the decline. A number of half-pay officers would be daily entering into the militia in preference to the regular service, where they ought to be. He did not mean by this observation to say any thing disrespectful of those gentlemen; but he thought every care ought to be taken to keep up the dignity of the militia, and every inducement held out to gentlemen of fortune to enter into it. On these grounds he thought proper to oppose that clause of the bill, which allows unqualified persons to enter into the militia.

The Secretary at War said, he thought the speech just delivered by the Noble Lord, went to give a death-blow to the militia of this country. The clause objected to by the Noble Lord went to this effect, that those gentlemen who held a rank in the militia last war, should have the privilege to hold the same rank in the present militia. This principle had been acted upon before, and he now saw that this clause would not be productive of any ill effects, or tend to lessen the dignity of

the militia of this country. He thought that the Noble Lord's observations, with respect to qualified persons going out of the militia, if the persons alluded to enter into it, was very improper, and ought not to have been made. No Gent. in the House could feel a greater desire to support the dignity of the militia than himself; but he thought the Noble Lord's objection to the clause he alluded to would not meet with the support of the House, as it was highly advantageous to the constitution of the present militia.

Mr. Sheridan said, the Noble Lord ought to have had a better reason than what he had just offered, as an objection to the bill. If the country is in that critical state that requires an immediate defence, he hoped that courage and exertion would be esteemed in preference to property. He thought the Noble Lord had been very illiberal on the gentlemen who fill various situations in the army. He was astonished to hear the Noble Lord say, that qualified men would leave the militia, if half-pay officers and indigent persons entered into it. He would ask the Noble Lord, how many qualified persons the Lord Lieut. would be able to get to answer the exigence of the moment, particularly when the young gentlemen of the country at present think of nothing but horse-racing and the sports of the field: if the country gentlemen are so jealous of the dignity and consequence of the militia, they should use their endeavours to fill the present vacancies in the militia with their friends, and not neglect the safety and interest of the country, from a false ambition for property. It is only courage and honour that will place the laurel on the soldier's brow. He therefore thought the Noble Lord's objection to the bill would have but little weight with the House.

Mr. Bastard said, notwithstanding what the last Hon. Gent. had said, he thought the dignity of the militia ought to be supported.

Lord Folkstone said, that Gentlemen had misunderstood him. He never said that unqualified persons being admitted into the militia, would prevent qualified gentlemen from entering into it. He spoke without any intention to be personal to any body of gentlemen. The Noble Lord then repeated his observations on the question, and perfectly concurred with Mr. Sheridan, that the young gentlemen should, at this moment, exert themselves for the defence of their country. He said he had applied, yesterday, to the Lord Lieut. for a regiment, and it was his particular wish that the militia should be supported by gentlemen of fortune.

Mr. Sheridan expressed his approbation of the Noble Lord's intention to exert himself for the safety of the country; but if gentlemen did not come forward, Government must take such measures as will be necessary for the security of the nation; and he hoped the Noble Lord's example would have a better effect than his speech.

General Tarleton made a few remarks on the bill, and concluded by saying, that he thought the clause would produce disagreeable effects to the gentlemen now, or at any period, in the militia.

Colonel Mitford agreed with the Noble Lord, that men of fortune should not associate with persons who are not qualified; but the honour and dignity of the militia depended much on the colonels, who ought to be very particular as to the gentlemen they brought into the militia.

Mr. Franklin said, the bill now before the House gave the Lord Lieutenant the power to select persons for the militia, and reject those who should be considered as unqualified for the service; therefore there is no danger of improper persons being offensive to this honourable establishment.

The Secretary at War said, he hoped the young gentlemen of the country would feel a disposition to enter, that the vacancies may be early filled; and it was his particular wish, that gentlemen should deliver their sentiments on the bill as it went through the committee.

The bill was read a second time, and ordered to be committed on Tuesday.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, March 21.—(See Minutes, p. 508.)

[Naval artificers.]—The Earl of Carlisle rose to bring forward his promised motion relative to the artificers in his Majesty's dock-yards: his Lordship prefaced it with a few general observations, referring to the necessity which existed in the present situation of the country, for Parliament to be informed upon certain points respecting the conduct of that most important branch of the Government, to which the subject of the motion related. On a due administration of the affairs of that department, the security of the country, in the present state of affairs, in a great degree depended. The information called for by the motion, was important, the Noble Earl observed, as forming the groundwork of other propositions, which, perhaps, he should find it necessary to bring forward. He then repeated some of his former observations respecting the general conduct of Ministers, who, he seemed to say, were not yet fairly tried; when they were, it would then appear how far they enjoyed that confidence of which

they boasted. After some further comment on these topics, the Noble Earl moved to the following effect:—"That the proper officers "do lay before thi House, a monthly return "of all the artificers employed in his Majesty's "dock-yards, from the month of May 1802, "to the present period."

Lord Hobart rose, and expressed his opinion, that the House ought not to agree to a motion of such a peculiar nature and importance, without hearing adequate grounds and reasons assigned for its adoption. Not one, he contended, had been advanced by the Noble Earl. His Lordship seemed to regret the absence of the Noble Earl at the head of the marine department, who of course possessed a more detailed knowledge of the subject to which the motion referred, than he could be supposed to possess. With respect to what the Noble Earl had been pleased to advance relative to the general conduct of Ministers, he could only then assure him generally, that these Ministers always held it their duty, and had so acted, to do that which they firmly believed would most conduce to the real interests of their country, and so acting, they were secure of its confidence. The Noble Earl had spoken of the trial of Ministers, but let that trial come on when it may, he, for one, was not apprehensive of its result. He was sure that Parliament had sufficient grounds for judging of Ministers by their conduct, and the conduct of Parliament had as clearly manifested its sense of their merits. He then vindicated, in general terms, the character and conduct of the Noble Earl at the head of the Admiralty, against every imputation; and he must believe that that character stood as high in the public opinion as ever, until he heard that something like a specific charge was urged against him.—Indirect insinuations were of no weight with him, until specific charges were made. He had every right to presume that there was nothing in the administration of the important department in question, that called for an inquiry to be set on foot; and with respect to the particular motion then before the House, he held it his duty to resist it, until he should hear adequate reasons assigned for its adoption.

The Earl of Carlisle in reply observed, that the thing was so simple in itself, and he had so plainly stated the object of the motion, that he did not think it necessary in the first instance to take up their Lordships' time. He contended, that Parliament should have every degree of information which could be attained without dangerous consequences to the real interests of the country. Nothing could be further from his intention than to offer any personal imputation against the Noble Earl, or disrespect towards him. On the contrary, no man in that House could more highly value that Noble Lord's services than he did. He felt the obligations which the country owed to Earl St. Vincent, and no man could more duly appreciate his great and eminent services. But, on the other hand, the more especially on such a crisis as the present, he had to consider his own duty as a Member of Parliament. The Noble Lord in question was to be regarded as a public character, and it was essential that the management of the affairs of the department over which that Noble Lord presided, should be such as to meet the present exigency of affairs. Its vigour and alertness, his Lordship seemed to say, should be such as to enable us to meet the French off Brest. He must be allowed to entertain his own doubts, and to observe, that even generally, in the public mind, some existed with regard to the management of the affairs of the Admiralty. It was important it should be known how Ministers had acted in these respects during the summer, and at a time when they were alternately arming and disarming, and whether the other measures of Ministers at home were commensurate to their conduct abroad. In this view, he thought it was incumbent on Ministers to afford every information. He had, at first, no wish to urge the motion, but entertained an idea of withdrawing it; but after what had passed, he had his doubts with respect to the propriety of such a proceeding.

The Lord Chancellor then put the question.

Lord Grenville begged leave to offer his advice to his Noble Friend, namely, that on the present occasion he would withdraw the motion. However, should he be compelled to give a vote, he would do it on the ground of his having heard no argument whatever for its rejection. In a moment like the present, he should be sorry that any thing should come from those with whom he agreed in opinion—even a motion in that House, which might throw any thing like embarrassment on the conduct of the King's servants. With respect to the subject to which the motion referred, it was one, he thought, into which inquiry should be instituted at a proper time. In consequence of the line of conduct adopted by Ministers for the last eighteen months, for some time past their responsibility was great beyond all former precedent, inasmuch as they had afforded no satisfactory information to Parliament, nor explained any part of their conduct whatever. They had seen measures done and undone, adopted and altered, and Parliament called upon to vote large estimates, merely on grounds of supposed notoriety. Ministers and the country were now so circumstanced, that he wished it might not be said with truth, that those with whom he acted, had done any thing tending to throw difficulties in their way: there would be future

opportunities for discussion, and on these grounds it was that he requested his Noble Friend to withdraw his motion for the present.

The Earl of Carlisle, in a few words, expressed his acquiescence in the proposition of his Noble Friend, but at the same time observed, that no well-founded objections had been offered against it.

Lord Pelham expressed his opinion, that a motion like that in question should not be agreed to, except distinct and adequate reasons were assigned for its adoption, and specific grounds urged for going into the inquiries alluded to. He perfectly agreed in what had fallen from his Noble Friend, that nothing had been suggested by the Noble Earl, in reference to the naval department, that constituted sufficient ground for inquiry; he should not, therefore, at present enter into that line of discussion. With respect to the point of which so much had been said, the conduct of Ministers, that, with reference to the peculiar circumstances of the country, would, at a proper period, be a fair ground for inquiry. But it was the consolation of his Majesty's present Ministers, that, with a reference to the existing circumstances of the country, their conduct had been such, as they conceived to be most conducive to the honour and the interests of the nation. On that ground it had been satisfactory to themselves, and had been sanctioned by Parliament; in that line of conduct they would persevere, nor would they be drawn from it by any taunts which may be thrown out against them. With respect to motions of such a nature as the present, he expressed his hope that the House would not countenance a sudden investigation at any time, without adequate grounds being previously assigned.

Lord Grenville in explanation observed, that Ministers could not consistently be said to rely on the confidence of Parliament and the country, as they uniformly withheld all knowledge and information whereby either could rightly judge of their conduct. They had gone on arming and disarming, without condescending to let the public know the circumstances which warranted such contradictory and opposite measures.

Lord Hobart, in reply, observed, that it was with Parliament alone to draw such conclusions; the sentiments of which had plainly indicated how far it approved of the conduct of Ministers. Since their accession to office two very great and important political measures had been completed, namely, the peace with the Northern Powers, and the subsequent peace with France. The unanimous approbation which both these measures met with was unprecedented in the annals of Parliament.

Lord Grenville shortly observed, that these circumstances had no application whatever to the points in question, which referred only to the conduct of Ministers during the last eighteen months.

The Earl of Carlisle spoke shortly in further explanation.

The Lord Chancellor quitted the woolsack, and after noticing the tenour of the motion, observed that the Noble Earl's complaining that no reasons were given why the motion should not be agreed to, appeared to him a little extraordinary, as he had always understood, that when motions of that kind were made, it was necessary that some reasons should be given for their adoption. The subsequent conduct of the Noble Earl appeared to him to be equally extraordinary. After having proposed the motion, without assigning any reason why it should be adopted, he now contents himself with withdrawing it, because he had heard no reasons for its rejection. The Noble and Learned Lord then proceeded to enforce the objections offered by the Peers on the ministerial bench, and added, that the Noble Earl had rather inconsistently asserted the object of the motion to be for the correction of evils, without condescending to state what those evils were. His Lordship then proceeded successfully to combat the general assertions made by the Peers in opposition, argued the inconsistency of their conduct, on their own principles, in judging the conduct of Ministers, previously to the institution of those inquiries they so loudly called for.

The question was then put, on a proposal from the Noble Earl (Carlisle) for withdrawing this motion, and agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, March 21.—(See Minutes, p. 508.)

[East India accounts.]—The report of the committee on East India accounts was taken into further consideration. The resolutions were all read and agreed to, without any observation being made on any of them, except the last; and the question being put upon which,

Mr. Francis said, he thought it proper for the satisfaction of the House, to explain what he meant by the word "false," as applied to the Indian accounts now before Parliament; and in doing this, he hoped every Gentleman would put the liberal construction on the intended application of the word, that was really meant by the use of it. When he used the word false, as applying to the accounts before the House, he did not mean to accuse any Hon. Gent. of having committed the least act that would stain his honour: he had only used it to convey this meaning, that the accounts

which had been offered to Parliament were incorrect; and, therefore, to express his opinion of those accounts, he had called them false—a word used and well understood in logic, which is not of personal application, but only expresses the inaccuracy of a position or statement. He could assure every Gentleman present, that he had no intention to apply the word in any other way than as explained by him. He understood of the Noble Lord who had laid the India papers before the House, that the Legislature was to guaranty the stock of the India Company, to the amount of twelve millions of money, with other circumstances connected with the Company, which had not in his mind been clearly laid before the House; the neglect of which, and inaccuracy of the accounts, were the objects of his complaint.

Mr. Theophilus Metcalf said, every Member in that House had a right to investigate the papers now before them relative to the affairs of India, but no Gentleman should go so far as to say, that the East India Company had taken any measure to conceal any part of their accounts, with an intention to deceive Parliament. If the Hon. Gent. thought the accounts were false, it was his duty to bring the business before the House in a regular way. The article alluded to by the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Francis), he had taken every method to explain on a former occasion, and had pointed out to the House, in the clearest possible way, how the money had been applied, and every circumstance connected with the article which has been the object of comment by that Hon. Gent. He said, he was aware that publishing the debates in Parliament, was contrary to the privileges of the House; however, on that subject he should not dwell, but he could not but make an observation on a paragraph in one of the public prints, which, in his mind, appeared something like a puff, and intended to have some weight with the public relative to the question now under discussion; but he could assure the House and the Hon. Gent that the Company's accounts would bear a minute investigation, and convince those Gentlemen who may feel inclined to examine them, of the justice and honour of the East India Company, and that the affairs of the Company were in a better state by a million or two than they had been. Mr. Metcalf then requested the Clerk to read the Journals of the House with respect to the sum of twelve millions alluded to by the Hon. Gent. [After the Clerk had read the record] he declared that there was a balance in favour of the Company of upwards of two millions, notwithstanding they have had heavy difficulties to struggle with, and which must always attend them during a war. The Hon. Gent. then went over several parts of the accounts he had on a former occasion entered at large into, which, he said, must be clear to any Gent. who would take the trouble to give them a minute consideration.

Lord Castlereagh said the last Gent. had, in his mind, given so clear a statement of the facts, that it was unnecessary for him to trespass on the attention of the House a minute, but he thought it right to observe that the Company had a claim on the public. He said that the original capital was 6,700,000*l.* His Lordship then went over several parts of the accounts which he had before explained on the night he brought the subject before the House, and concluded by paying Mr. Metcalf a compliment on the accuracy of his statement.

Mr. W. Dundas made a few general remarks on the Company's accounts, and considered them as very accurate.

Mr. Johnstone said, that it was very clear from the accounts which had been laid before the House, that the Company's affairs were in a worse state this year, than they had been found to be for several years back, by thirteen hundred thousand pounds, together with other deficiencies, which fully evinced, that they were not in that flourishing state which had been reported; and on a minute investigation of the accounts, they would be found very defective.

Mr. Wallace contended, that the estimates ought to be depended upon, inasmuch as they were always made with great care, and they had always been found to be as correct as the nature of the subject would admit. He then referred to a statement made by Mr. Dundas in his budget in 1796, and contended that he had never stated, that the public were to enjoy their participation at all events, whether the Company should be in a state of peace or war.

Mr. Kinnaird said, he was highly gratified with the statement given by a Noble Lord on a former night, respecting the situation of the East India Company; but there was one question which he wished to ask. It had been stated, that the war did not break out in India till 1798, therefore from the year 1793 to 1798, a period of five years, the Company enjoyed a state of peace. He wished to know whether, during that period, any and what money had been paid to the commissioners for the guarantee fund.

Lord Castlereagh said, that if the Hon. Gent. had read the act of Parliament, he would have found that no money could be paid towards the guarantee fund, until the East India Company's debt was reduced to the point required by law.

Mr. Kinnaird said, he was perfectly satisfied with the explanation.

The resolution was then agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, March 22. (See Minute p. 508.)

[Militia officers' bill.]—On the motion of the Secretary at War, the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole House on the militia officers' bill. He observed, that he had made a few alterations in the words of a clause or two, which were merely technical.

Mr. Bastard said, notwithstanding much had been observed to the House with respect to the clause which gave the Lord Lieutenant the power to accept the services of non-qualified men, he could not but express his disapprobation of the clause, as it would prevent men of landed property from giving their services to the militia. He was sure if persons were indiscriminately suffered to enter in the militia, as the clause in question would allow, men of property would not enter.

The Secretary at War said, the propriety of the clause must be obvious to every one, as the Lord Lieutenant must have the power to fill up the vacancies with unqualified persons, if men of landed property did not offer themselves.

The Hon. Henry Lascelles said, that as the clause now stood, the Lord Lieutenant had the power of choosing whom he pleased: he wished that men of landed property should have the preference.

The Secretary at War said, he thought it proper to vest the exercise of that authority in the Lord Lieutenant, as a man might be a proper person for the militia in consequence of his property, but a very improper person from various other circumstances.

Colonel Mitford contended for the importance of the militia; he observed he did not mean to say any thing unhandsome of those gentlemen in the regular service, but he thought the militia ought to consist of men of landed property; and as many gentlemen in the regular service were often not very wealthy, the two descriptions of characters ought not to associate with each other, in the sense he meant it, as public men.

Lord Folkstone concurred with the objections which had been made to the clause in question.

Mr. Bastard said, there was a period when the militia of this country was a body of the first consequence, but they had not been treated with kindness; and there was a time when men of the first consequence felt an ambition to enter into the militia; but the treatment they had experienced had chilled the desire of many gentlemen for the support of its dignity and consequence, and therefore there was no wonder that Government found a difficulty in filling the vacancies in the militia; as, during the last Parliament, a bill went through the House, that went at once to rob them of every dignity and comfort—and if that act was renewed, the House would again witness the great support of the country lessened and degraded. But he hoped Parliament would be cautious how they treated this valuable bulwark of the nation, on whom we should depend for the protection of those blessings we now enjoy. "Use," said he, "your militia with kindness, and you will find they will stand before an enemy with zeal to defend the country."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, in answer to the observations of the Hon. Gent. who spoke last, that his Rt. Hon. Friend, who had brought in this bill, was a true friend to the militia system, but that the observations of the Hon. Gent. who had just spoken (Mr. Bastard) did not apply to the principle of the bill now under consideration, though the Hon. Gent. undoubtedly meant that they should. He denied that the militia were insulted by the acts of the last Parliament, neither were they degraded; some of the measures of Parliament were indeed such as might have been wished to have been otherwise; but the committee, as well as the Hon. Gent. who spoke last, would have the goodness to remember, that the measures to which he referred were not measures of choice, but of necessity, and the Hon. Gent. as well as others, acted under it from necessity; and he would be as ready as any one to obey that necessity if it existed now; but would the Hon. Gent. state, that we were in the same situation as we were then? Certainly we were not. That situation arose from a consciousness that the other forces of his Majesty were employed in every part of the world; and could we forget what was due to the militia for their services, in consequence of his Majesty's forces being so employed? What were the instruments by which we supported our glory? The militia. How was Ireland defended? By the militia. How were our victories obtained on the coast of Egypt? By the very measure which the last Hon. Gent. condemned; by the laws which were made in the last Parliament for the regulation of the militia, and by the excellent conduct of that constitutional body of force—we could not have had those triumphs but in consequence of the measures taken by Parliament with regard to the militia. He had already said, however, that these measures of the last Parliament were the effect of necessity.

God grant that the necessity of recurring to such measures might never be felt again! These observations he thought he was called upon to make, in consequence of what had just fallen from the Hon. Gent. or he should not have made them, for he had no intention, when he came to the House, of taking any share in the discussion of this bill. But now that he was up, he could not help making a few, and they should be a few, observations. It had been stated, that the clause now proposed was a direct infringement on the militia laws. That it was an invasion on the original system, or a novelty in it rather, he did not deny; but he submitted, that it had been rendered unavoidable by the change which had taken place in the militia since the institution of that constitutional force. He knew that the militia was supported at its commencement with the ardour of the landed interest of this country. He knew also, and he had much pleasure in reflecting, that that ardour continued to a great extent; but it should not be forgotten there were other claims upon the patriotic exertions of gentlemen of the landed interest; that there were demands on their public spirit, and some novelties which operated upon their patriotism, and called forth their efforts in support of their country. All these things considered, it would be obvious there was not now the same facility as formerly in procuring officers for the militia. It was otherwise at the establishment. The difference of circumstances had introduced some novelties into the system. What was here proposed was not to outstep the ancient system, but to provide that the change of circumstances should not produce great inconveniences to that part of the service. The great object was, as the Hon. Gent. and many others had stated, to provide, as much as possible, the militia with officers from the great landed property and gentry of the kingdom; but if that could not be done, if they could not every where be found ready to take upon themselves that service, then that others, who, although not as well qualified in fortune, might be qualified in ability, should take that service. This measure was not intended to exclude the gentry from being officers of the militia; on the contrary, it was much desired that they should come forward in that service, but to provide for the service in case of their absence; for if we could not have officers qualified in fortune, in the way which was most desirable, we must take care that the militia service should not be left without officers. It was upon that principle he approved of the clause now before the committee, and it was upon that principle his Rt. Hon. Friend proposed it.

Lord Folkstone observed, though several Hon. Gent. had said on a former occasion, that the present period was not calculated to be too nice as to the qualification of persons to fill the vacancies alluded to, yet he thought gentlemen of landed property would not associate with unqualified persons, notwithstanding the exigency of the moment, to complete the militia of the country; he therefore could not, with any satisfaction to himself, agree to the clause.

Colonel Mitford also repeated his former observations on the clause.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said a few words in answer to the last Hon. Gent.

Several other Members expressed various opinions on the clause in debate, which was at length carried, leaving out the words which were imperative on the Lord Lieutenant to fill up the vacancies in the manner prescribed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, March 23. (See Minutes, p. 509.)

[Roman Catholics.]—The Master of the Rolls said, the object of the motion of which he had given notice, and which he now rose to make, was merely to remedy an inconvenience which resulted to the Roman Catholics from the provisions of two acts of Parliament. The inconvenience was simply this: that the Roman Catholics were obliged to take two separate oaths, whereas one would be completely sufficient. There had been, during his Majesty's reign, two acts of Parliament passed in favour of the Roman Catholics. The first was the 18th of the King, brought in by Sir George Saville; the other, the 31st of the King, brought in by the present Chancellor of Ireland. The object of the former was to relieve the Roman Catholics from the penalties and incapacities imposed by the 11th and 12th of William III. The second bill was to remove the penalties, &c. imposed since the 11th and 12th of William III. Neither of those acts entirely repealed the laws to which they referred—they were entirely conditional in their operation; they extended only to such Roman Catholics as gave assurance of their fidelity, and disclaimed such principles as were inconsistent with the safety of the state. An oath, containing such disclaimer, was introduced into each of the acts. If the oath in the second act had been precisely the same as that contained in the former one, the inconveniences which he now proposed to remedy would never have arisen; for, by taking the second oath, the person would have complied with the provisions of both the statutes; but when the second act was brought in, it was thought necessary to make some alterations in the wording of the oath, in form, but not in substance. The fact, however, was, that a Roman Catholic, to entitle himself to the benefit of both the statutes, was under the necessity of taking both the oaths. For, if he only took the oath prescribed in the second statute (which was more perfect than the one contain-

ed in the first statute), he still remained liable to all the penalties, &c. imposed by the 11th and 12th of William III. Now it happened, that a great number of Catholics had only taken the last oath, thinking that there was but one Catholic test, and that that was the one imposed by the last statute. They supposed that they were not under the necessity of taking the first oath, which in substance is included in the second one. Instances had occurred, where, when their titles to estates came to be examined, they had been found defective merely from the inadvertency of not taking the first oath. There appeared to him to be no conceivable reason why both the oaths should be retained, because the state derived no additional security from retaining the first oath. The second oath differed from the first, in an omission, the nature of which he should state. The first contained a renunciation of allegiance to the person assuming the title of Charles III. he being alive when that act passed; but it was omitted in the second act, because he was then dead. This was the only omission in the second oath, which, with that exception and some small additions, was the same as the former one. Now, it was rather singular, after a man had taken the more perfect oath, to call upon him to take one that was less perfect. A Catholic who had taken the last oath, could have no objection to take the former one, and therefore, if he did not take it, it could only arise from ignorance or inadvertence. It was therefore perfectly useless and inconvenient to retain it; besides, it led to a degree of incongruity in the law, which ought not to exist. Upon these grounds he should move for leave to bring in a bill to extend to Roman Catholics the benefit of both statutes, upon their taking the oath contained in the first.

This being a motion respecting religion, it was referred to a committee of the whole House.

[Militia officers' bill.]—Mr. Windham said, he had taken a very comprehensive view of the measure now about to be adopted by the bill before the House; upon the whole he did not mean to object to it, yet he thought it necessary to state how far he approved of the bill, and the clause relative to the admission of half-pay officers into the militia. It was nothing but the exigence of the moment warranted the present measure: he therefore should make a few remarks on the militia, as to its first constitution and present establishment. As the militia was first constituted, it was the armed force of the country, and contained those regulations which must be approved of by every man who took the trouble to compare it with the established militia of the present day. Within these few years it had been torn to pieces by many new laws, and its members embodied into the regular service. Such measures had done much to destroy the importance of this constitutional body. The militia, for these few years past, had been carried to a great and improper extent, and nothing but the exigence of the moment could justify the alteration which had taken place in the militia of the country, and which, in his mind, had reduced its importance. He thought it would be of advantage to the country if the regular army assimilated with the militia, and that those who came into the service, should enlist for the term of six years. The Hon. Gent. then repeated many of the observations on the army, he had made on a former occasion. It was a doctrine laid down the other day, that no opposition should be given to this bill, unless Gent. who opposed it, should suggest some plan that would answer the purpose of the country better than what the present bill had offered; but he did not think this doctrine good, as a man may be able to discover defects in a picture without being an artist, or be able to judge of a poem, without being a poet; and therefore he thought the opposition any Gent. might be inclined to give to the bill, was not improper. The militia, as it was now constituted, went a great way to destroy the regular army, for it was a known fact, that the militia officers were now giving nine guineas per man, consequently they could not suppose that men would enter into the regular service. He said, he would acknowledge with candour, that he had conversed with many military men, some of whom were advocates for the augmentation of the militia; others, indeed, did not support the principle.—He could not but again object to the militia as it was now established; for every Gent. in the House must own, it was not like the militia that was originally constituted. It has long appeared like the regular service, without its perfections. The Hon. Gent. then said, there ought to be no distinction between the gentlemen qualified for the militia, and those unqualified officers whose character and talents should be approved of by the Lord Lieutenant. The army abounds with gentlemen of the highest honour and talents, and therefore the want of property should not render their situation and duty unpleasant to them; but, at the same time, every care ought to be taken to prevent improper persons from being admitted to join the militia.

The Secretary at War said, he did not think it necessary to follow the Hon. Gent. through all his remarks, but he must repeat the observation he had before made on the clause alluded to by the Hon. Gent. If this was a moment of exigency, a strong and well-constituted militia was necessary, as the Hon. Gent. had allowed. He was sure the clause in question would not be considered as improper: as the vacancies might not be filled with qualified men in time, therefore it was necessary the Lord Lieutenant should have a power, which this clause grants to him, to complete the numbers as early as possible. The alteration

which the Hon. Gent. wished in the militia law, so as to enable the militia to enlist men for the term of six years, could not be carried into execution on account of colonial service. There was a material difference between the arrangements of our military force, and that on the continent; therefore the principle the Hon. Gent. had suggested could not be carried into effect. He said it was his intention to move a proviso to the clause, that if the Lord Lieutenant could not fill the vacancies with qualified men within two months, half-pay officers should not be advanced to a higher rank in the militia than a captain; this, he said, would satisfy the Gentlemen who had opposed the clause in question.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, Mar. 25.—(See Minutes, p. 509.)

[James Trotter.]—Lord Euston presented a petition from James Trotter, who had surrendered himself a few days ago, on a charge of not having attended as a witness on the Dunfermline committee, he having been summoned for that purpose. The petition expressed his contrition for the offence he had committed, and prayed the indulgence of the House.—Lord Euston then moved, "That he "be brought to the bar of the House on Mon-"day, and discharged."—On the question being put,

Mr. Tierney rose, and said it was the duty of the House to punish the offence this man stood charged with: it had been stated that this person had wilfully secreted himself, in order to perplex the business of the committee, and injure the Member, for whom his evidence would have been of considerable service. He could not help expressing his utmost detestation of this offence, which he considered of the very worst kind, and, if possible, exceeded in wickedness the crime of perjury, as his evidence might be very material to the support of the case; therefore there was no calculating how far a Member might be injured by this vile offence. On these grounds, he should move that James Trotter be committed to Newgate for six months.

The Speaker said, it was necessary that the Hon. Gent. should only negative that part of the motion which expresses the discharge of James Trotter, and that when he was brought up on Monday, the Hon. Gent. might then make his motion.

Mr. Strange said, he thought that a severe punishment should not be inflicted on any person from the bare report of an unsuccessful Member.

The Speaker mentioned a case, which he thought had a near application to the one before the House. He then read it, but it was considered as not sufficiently close to govern the question.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he thought it would be better to postpone any further steps, till the House was better prepared to discuss the merits of the question.

Lord Hawkesbury said, he thought some reason ought to be stated before the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) could bring forward this motion.

The Attorney General said, it was his wish that the House would agree to postpone the discussion of this question to a future period, in order to guard against inroads on the privileges of the House.

Mr. Bragge thought it would be better to withdraw the motion; then time would be given to consider the case.

Mr. Tierney read a case, which, he said, he thought went to support his motion.

Mr. Sheridan said, he could not but express his surprise that the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) should have said that Trotter, the prisoner, had been convicted of his offence. This, he observed, could not be the case; the man had not been heard in his defence, and therefore could not be convicted. And now he must be permitted to say, the prisoner could only be heard in palliation of his offence, and not in justification, as he had acknowledged his crime.

The question was then put, that James Trotter should be brought to the bar on Monday next. (The words, "and discharged," were left out.)—Ordered.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, Mar. 28.—(See Minutes, p. 510.)

[Irish chalking bill.]—Lord Ellenborough called to the recollection of the House generally, what had transpired relative to the Irish chalking bill, the further consideration of which was, by their Lordships' order, deferred till after the ensuing recess. He then held a bill in his hand, which he was about to submit to the consideration of the House: this (so we understood his Lordship) would tend, in a great degree, to render the measure he alluded to unnecessary. It would go, to a certain extent, to assimilate and render uniform some very important parts of the criminal code of the United Kingdom; and also to introduce some amendments to certain parts of the existing criminal laws, which were universally allowed to be greatly wanting. The Noble and Learned Lord took up

that part of his subject first which was more particularly connected with the measure, the discussions on which seemed to give rise to the present bill, namely, the Irish chalking act. The apparent inaccuracies in that bill were done away in the relevant parts of the bill he was about to propose; the spirit of its provisions was consolidated, and given in a more correct and technical form. He then adverted to the provisions of the Coventry act, to render which effectual, it was necessary that a "lying in wait" should be proved; and he also noticed the existing legal distinctions in this country between assaults with intent to rob, and those made with intent to murder, the latter of which, it appeared at present, amounted only to a misdemeanour: there were provisions in the bill to amend those parts of the existing law, and to render both offences a felony. With a reference to the provisions of the Coventry act, &c. the bill went generally to enact maiming, wounding, disfiguring, &c. any of his Majesty's subjects in any part of the body, a capital felony. The bill which he now proposed took into its purview other parts of the criminal code, where amendment was held to be highly necessary. His Lordship proceeded to state the leading provisions; particularly that which renders the administering any medicine, drug, &c. to procure the abortion of a child, a capital offence. The bill went also to provide some amendments in the existing laws, as relative to child-murder. In effecting these, it was necessary, in some degree, to repeal the statute of James I. a satisfactory application of which had in many instances been found difficult by the Judges. In this view of the act referred to, his Lordship seemed particularly to allude to that part of the statute, which makes the fact of hiding the body evidence against the mother; but this act, in the proposed bill, was afterwards in spirit re-enacted, but with the qualifying provision, that there should be probable evidence of the child's being born alive. The bill contained provisions for amending, to a certain extent, the laws relative to the heinous offence of *arson*, which his Lordship generally laid down; and, on this part of his subject, finally observed, that, as the law stood, to burn one's house with intent to defraud the underwriters, was only a misdemeanour, but which, we understood the Learned Lord, was, by the present bill, proposed to be made a capital offence. There were other legislative provisions enacted in the bill, under the general principle he had stated in the outset of his address, tending to render certain parts of the criminal code of both parts of the United Kingdom regular and uniform, and amending particular parts of the existing criminal law; such as extending the operations of the black act to Ireland, &c. His Lordship concluded by observing, that the bill he now submitted would, in a great degree, supersede the necessity of that which he had occasion at first to allude to. He would propose, in the first instance, that the bill should be now read a first time; after which it would lie over for further consideration. Having moved accordingly,

Lord Auckland observed, that the House and the country were undoubtedly under an high obligation to the Noble and Learned Lord, for coming forward so laudably as he had done. There was no person in the kingdom fitter, perhaps not one so fit, for the task he had undertaken; and he doubted not but the bill would prove a considerable emendation of the criminal law of the United Kingdom. Whilst he was on his legs, he wished to make one further observation: with respect to what he had said when a part of the present subject was under discussion, he was misunderstood, when he was conceived to say, that the criminal laws of Great Britain and Ireland, generally speaking, should be assimilated. He certainly could mean no such thing; as it was well known, not only to himself, but to several Peers present, that there existed such a difference between the habits, manners, &c. of certain classes of the inhabitants of both countries, as to render different legislative regulations indispensably necessary. He approved of the course suggested to be taken by the Noble and Learned Lord respecting the bill he had brought in, and also with regard to its effects with respect to the other bill alluded to.

The bill was then read a first time, and, as we could collect, ordered to be printed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, Mar. 28.—(See Minutes, p. 510.)

[James Trotter.]—On the motion of Lord Euston, the order of the day was read for bringing James Trotter to the bar of the House, who had wilfully absented himself from the committee appointed to try the merits of the Dunfermline election.

The Speaker said, before he put the question, he thought it his duty to inform the House, that the prisoner was to be brought to the bar of the House by the Serjeant at Arms, who is to stand there with the mace, and that no Gent. could put any question to the prisoner, but through the medium of the Chair. It was therefore necessary for those Gent. who had any intention to question the prisoner, to furnish him with the questions they wished to be put to him, as he did not mean to put any question to him on his own account, having no authority to do so.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney) should state

the points on which he meant to rest his motion; at present there was not sufficient before the House to warrant a punishment equal to that which was moved for on a former evening.

Mr. Tierney said, he had no intention to put any question to the prisoner through the medium of the Chair; all he meant to propose was, that James Trotter may be heard in his defence.

The Speaker then addressed the prisoner: "James Trotter, a select committee of this House, appointed to try the merits of the Dunfermline election, have reported that you were summoned by the Speaker's warrant to attend the said committee, and afterwards by an order from the committee, both which you have wilfully neglected to obey. What have you got to say in your defence?"

His defence was ordered to be taken down in writing; it was accordingly done, and read by the clerk, which is as follows: "That he was not at home for ten days previous to the time the first summons was left with his family, and when a second notice was left at his house, his wife did not inform him of it; he therefore left his dwelling, ignorant of his having been served with a second summons; and he added, that he was extremely sorry for the offence he had committed, and would have come up to London at his own expense, if he had known the dangerous consequences in not attending to the summons."

The prisoner was then taken from the bar by order of the Speaker.

Lord Euston said, he understood it was the custom of the House, for any person placed in the situation of the prisoner, to be called to the bar on the motion of a Member, to receive a severe reprimand for his offence, and then discharged on paying his fees.

The Speaker said, the question now before the House was, whether James Trotter should be discharged on paying his fees.

Mr. Tierney said, he could not help observing, that the punishment Trotter had already received was by no means adequate to the offence. There was a similar case on the records of the House, which stated that Alexander Morris, in the year 1796, had wilfully neglected to attend a committee agreeably to the summons he received for that purpose; in consequence of which he was taken into custody and brought to the bar, and the House committed him to Newgate for the offence. He could not but think this a case in point. James Trotter had evidently concealed himself from the committee; for if Gent. would observe, the Speaker's warrant was dated on the 2d of February, the Chairman of the committee's warrant on the 10th of the same month, and the prisoner never made his appearance till the 21st of March. It was his wish that the minutes should be laid before the House, and then Gent. would better judge of the conduct of the prisoner.

Mr. W. Dundas said, he could not agree with the desire of the Hon. Gent. in having the minutes of the committee laid before the House, as it was contrary to custom, and would operate as a bad precedent.

The Speaker said there was nothing improper in reading the minutes mentioned by the Hon. Member.

Mr. Bragge observed, that the introduction of the minutes would be highly improper, and that extracts from the evidence given before the committee had nothing to do with the present question. The prisoner was placed before the House as a person guilty of an offence, and therefore there was not any reason again to prove his guilt; that had already been done.

Mr. Tierney said, he surely ought to be allowed to read the minutes as a part of his speech. It was his wish that the minutes should be read, in order to form a proper judgment of the case now before the House. He found great difficulty in his present situation to please several Hon. Gent. as to his manner of addressing the House on this question. He again reverted to the case of Alexander Morris, which he considered a case in point; and the punishment the House had inflicted on him, as an example to others, evinced much wisdom. That this man now before the House had wilfully neglected to attend the committee, was beyond all doubt: he heard what he was about to say from good authority, that a witness for Sir John Henderson was ready to prove, that the prisoner was offered 500*l.* to keep out of the way. This offence was too gross to pass unpunished; he therefore should move, "That James Trotter be sent to Newgate "for six months."

Mr. Sheridan said, it did not appear to him necessary to offer any additional proofs of the prisoner's guilt: he had acknowledged his fault, and very candidly told the House, that he should have obeyed the summons had he known the bad consequences which would attend his improper conduct; this, he said, was the common language of persons who have been made sensible of the offence they have committed. It was now necessary to inflict some punishment on the prisoner as an example to others.

The Lord Advocate of Scotland said, it was his wish that the House should act with moderation; and, on a cool consideration of the case, he had no doubt but the House

would treat the prisoner with lenity, notwithstanding the Hon Gent. opposite to him had painted the prisoner's conduct in the blackest colours. He was ready to acknowledge that the prisoner had done wrong, and he was glad to see that the House was determined to punish persons guilty of any offence that went to injure any of its Members. But before punishment was inflicted, it was proper to be master of the case: he said, the Speaker's warrant was dated on the 2d of February, and the prisoner received it on the 7th of the same month; and, by the purport of the warrant, he was ordered to make his appearance on the following day, the 8th, at the House of Commons, a distance of 400 miles. It was unnecessary to make an excuse for his not being in London at the time mentioned in the warrant, as the distance was beyond human power to accomplish. The poor man, who knew nothing of the nature of a Speaker's warrant, thought, as he could be in London in a short time, it was of no consequence, consequently left his house on business, which has occasioned him to incur the displeasure of the House. The case which had been mentioned by the Hon. Gent. was a very different one: Alexander Morris was acquainted with the nature of the offence, and it was clearly proved that he wilfully neglected to attend the committee, for which offence he was very properly sent to Newgate. But this poor man resides in a part of the country where he had no opportunity of learning the nature of the warrant, as being of retired habits, he did not suppose it of any consequence, particularly when he found it impossible to comply with the meaning of its letter in so short a time. He hoped the House would take into consideration the simplicity of the man, his family, and situation in life, as every day's confinement in London would injure him much, as this was a time of year his services were required on his farm. He thought this was a case where indulgence might be granted, as the object before them was a poor, ignorant man, who did not know the meaning of the warrant.

Mr. W. Dundas recommended to the House to be merciful rather than severe with the prisoner, who had said in his defence, that he did not know the consequences of not attending to the order of the House: this arose from his ignorance in not being acquainted with the nature of the warrant, and for this offence the Hon. Gent. opposite to him would wish to send the prisoner to Newgate for six months. He could not but think the Hon. Gent. wished to push his principles of justice too far. The poor man had been brought up from his farm, and locked up at the top of this House; yet Shuttleworth, who had been guilty of gross prevarication, was discharged. He thought his offence deserved the most severe castigation; but he found Gent. had now shewn a difference of opinion, and the prisoner, whose ignorance had occasioned his guilt, was to be sent to prison, while a confidant, a false witness, who had insulted the committee by his gross prevarications, had only received a reprimand from the House. This did not accord with his sentiments, and he hoped the House would shew every indulgence in their power to the prisoner.

Lord Dunlow said, the question before the House is, what punishment ought to be inflicted on a man who had committed such an offence. It was certainly an important question, and deserved much consideration: but under all the circumstances of the present case, he thought a sufficient punishment had been inflicted to prevent a repetition of the offence. The case, he said, was very different with respect to Morris: it was clearly proved that he knew the nature of his offence, and therefore he added insult to the dignity of the House, by setting its order and laws at defiance. But he thought the case of a Mr. Sirick applied more than the one mentioned by Mr. Tierney, where a contested election had been determined by a committee, without the evidence of Sirick, who had kept out of the way, consequently one of the petitioners was precluded from having the benefit of his evidence: this case he thought similar to the one before the House, and the records would shew that Sirick was not sent to Newgate for the offence, but kept in custody a short time, then censured, and discharged.

Mr. Fox said, he was astonished that any Member in that House would sanction the motion made by the Noble Lord, as it was necessary to punish offenders of this description, for the support of election laws, and the dignity of the House. The crime of perjury was not worse than the offence now the subject of debate, and Gent. might beg the indulgence of the House to be granted to offenders, and say that there is no precedent for the motion: he would ask if the House of Commons could not punish the offence now complained of? The prisoner had said, he knew no dangerous consequences that would follow his conduct, but he ought to know, for the example of others; and unless it is severely punished, a party may in future send witnesses at any time out of the way, till the business of a contested election is over, and be able to calculate the exact expense of keeping the witness in confinement; and a person, careless as to the light punishment that will accompany his crime, in the course of a week or two be able to return to his friends, with an ample compensation for being locked up in the House of Commons. It appeared upon the face of the report, that the infamous conduct of the prisoner is beyond all doubt, whether the minutes are read or not; and he believed that the subpœnas of that House were similar to the subpœnas of the courts of law, and therefore some heavy pe-

nalty ought to attend those persons who neglect to obey them.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he confessed that he felt considerable anxiety upon this subject. He certainly was not disposed to proceed with any degree of severity or rigour beyond what the occasion called for; but he also felt the necessity of preserving the authority of the House; and he also felt what was due to a committee such as the present; and when the chairman of the committee recommended a proceeding, it certainly came with great weight. If any doubt was entertained with regard to the punishment to be inflicted upon this man, the leaning of his mind would be to adopt the opinion of those who had ample means of judging upon the subject. But as the House might have the same means of judging, all he asked was, that Gent. would suspend their opinion till they were in possession of all the materials upon which they might form their judgment. He confessed, that when this subject was first brought forward, he was astonished that a proposition of this kind had not been made. If he could not have access to such materials, he should certainly accede to the proposition made by the chairman of the committee; but he could not shut his eyes to the proceedings of that House in cases which appeared to him to be similar to the present. In the case of Alex. Morris he was committed to Newgate, but there was certainly some degree of difference between that case and the present; he had not acknowledged his offence, besides, he was residing in this town, and had not undergone the degree of punishment which has been already inflicted upon the prisoner in the present instance. But though these considerations might operate upon the compassion of the House, it should be recollected that they would not appear upon the Journals of the House, and therefore could not operate in point of example in future times. With regard to the case of Sirick, it undoubtedly was not in point; he pleaded ignorance of the crime, the present prisoner pleaded ignorance of the consequences. He at present only wished to ask the House to pause before they inflicted their judgment. He should therefore propose to get rid of the present motion, either by proceeding to the orders of the day, by negativing it, or, what would be much more agreeable to him, by the Noble Lord's consenting to withdraw it. If the Noble Lord should consent to withdraw it, he would be aware that he would be at liberty to bring it forward, if he thought proper, on another occasion.

Mr. Rose said, he was of opinion that this question could be as well decided by the House as by the committee. He wished to observe, that he knew nothing of this case but what he had heard in that House. He had always understood it to be a fundamental rule of justice, that a person should not benefit by keeping witnesses out of the way. It had been stated, that perjury was a greater crime than the one for which this man was now to be punished; undoubtedly, morally speaking, it was a more enormous offence than that of a witness wilfully absenting himself. But he believed that it very seldom happened that a man either served himself or his party by perjury, because, when he came into court, it was almost always possible either to extract the truth, or else to detect him in his falsehood; but it was impossible to foresee or to guard against the consequences of a witness being kept out of the way. It had been stated by a Noble Lord (Dunlow), that there was a case in point in which the person had been dismissed with a reprimand; but if this man was dismissed with such a punishment, and with an expense, perhaps, of 50*l.* it would really be an encouragement to others to commit the same offence. He was therefore of opinion, that calling this man to the bar, and reprimanding him, would by no means be a sufficient punishment. It had been urged in the course of the debate, that the courts of law were armed with powers to punish witnesses who did not attend; but he had long thought it a great defect in our laws, that the courts of law had not powers sufficient for that purpose. He had had opportunities, as a grand juryman, of seeing, that if a witness, whose name was on the back of the bill, did not attend, the only punishment was, that he forfeited his recognizance; therefore, if a person was rash enough to keep a witness out of the way, the ends of justice might be defeated. This was not an opinion now taken up for the first time; he did not wish to punish this man more than was necessary to deter others from committing similar offences, but he really thought a reprimand at the bar would not be sufficient.

Mr. Geo. Vansittart said, the recommendation of the committee was resolved upon, before this man had been heard in his defence; but that defence was so inconsistent and evasive, that there would be an end of the authority of that House if he did not undergo a further punishment.

Lord Euston said, he had not stated that he made the motion at the desire of the committee; he distinctly stated that he had communicated with several Members of Parliament upon the subject.

Mr. T. Grenville said, he hoped the Noble Lord would not press the motion, but that he would adopt the advice given by the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and thereby relieve the House from the difficulty in which it was now placed. He was firmly convinced, that if the present motion

was adopted, all hope of purity of election would be at an end. But that was not all; he was afraid of putting this motion upon the Journals, because then it would appear to posterity, that in a most serious case, like the present, the first question which the House considered, was merely whether the offender should be reprimanded, and then it would be urged as a precedent in all cases of a similar nature. The case had been so fully discussed, that he would not occupy the time of the House by making any further observations upon it. If any Gent. felt any doubt upon the subject, and required any further information, there could be no objection to the minutes of the committee being laid before the House.

Lord Euston said, as the House seemed to be of opinion that his motion ought to be withdrawn, he had no objection to withdraw it.

When the Speaker put the question for withdrawing the motion, several Members objected to it, and the discussion therefore proceeded.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the Noble Lord had relieved his mind from one great difficulty, by stating that he was not instructed by the committee to make the motion which he had made to the House.

The motion was then put and negatived without a division.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then moved, that so much of the minutes of the said committee as related to the summoning of James Trotter to appear as a witness, be laid before that House.

Mr. Tierney said, he did not think that motion went far enough; he thought if they were to call for the minutes of the evidence, they ought to have all the evidence that related to the prisoner, in order to know whether he was or was not an important witness; because if they merely wanted to know that he had been summoned and did not attend, the House was already in possession of that fact by the report of the committee.

The Hon. R. Dundas said, that if the Hon. Gent.'s proposition was acceded to, he thought the whole of the evidence ought to be laid before the House, so that they might judge as well upon the evidence which was given on the one side as the other.

Mr. Tierney, in explanation, said, that nothing could be further from his intention than to call for the whole evidence that was given before the committee, or to go at all into the merits of the decision of the committee, which he was convinced was perfectly proper; he only wished for so much of the evidence as related to the conduct of Mr. Trotter.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that if the proposition of the Hon. Gent. who spoke last but one was agreed to, it would tend to destroy all the advantages that resulted from the Grenville act, and would lead the House to try over again the whole of the case which had been decided by the committee. He was disposed to accede to the proposition made by the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Tierney), excluding, however, all idea of going any further, or of referring to any thing but that which immediately concerned the prisoner: with this exception, he had no objection to the production of the further information which the Hon. Gent. required.

Mr. Tierney then proposed to amend the motion of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, by calling for such parts of the minutes of the evidence of the said committee, as related to the said James Trotter.

The motion being put on the amendment,

The Lord Advocate of Scotland rose to oppose the motion: he contended, that the House could not have punished this person in the manner now proposed, unless he had admitted the fact at the bar of that House. The question was not now, whether this man should be punished for disobeying the order of that House; but the object of the present proceeding would be to punish him for an offence with which he was not charged by the committee. It had been said that this man had offered a bribe: but was that a crime of which he was accused? And it would be contrary to every principle of justice to go into the examination of a crime with which the man had never been accused, and against which he had never been heard in his defence. If the committee had entertained any suspicions of the kind that had now been thrown out, they would have asked leave to adjourn their proceedings till the man could have been found and examined. Suppose it should be stated in the minutes of the evidence, that this man did offer a bribe, would he be permitted to enter into his defence? And it certainly would be unjust to punish him without hearing what he had to say in his defence. On the other hand, it would be irregular to enter into an examination of the whole case, and to examine witnesses to ascertain his innocence: upon the whole, therefore, he was of opinion that the proceeding now proposed could not be listened to for a moment.

Lord Glenbervie said, he was decidedly of opinion, that before the House proceeded to pass any sentence upon the prisoner, they ought to be in possession not only of the fact

of his contempt of the order of the House, but they ought also to know the degree of guilt that was imputable to him. In calling for this further information, there was certainly no kind of imputation upon the committee, because, in apportioning the degree of punishment, it would be necessary to ascertain the different shades and degrees of guilt. This was analogous to the proceedings in courts of law in cases of misdemeanour; after a person was convicted, the judge, when the prisoner was brought up for judgment, read over the whole of the evidence of the case, in order that the court might know whether there was any circumstance of extenuation or of aggravation. He admitted, that it would be proper to have the minutes of the committee laid before the House; and if there were on the face of these minutes any thing which gave a colouring to the conduct of this man, he could not, as a Member of the House, refuse his assent to it. As to the propriety of not bearing this matter in aggravation, he saw no objection to it, for the whole of it was matter of aggravation. Would it not be aggravation, if it should appear that this man was agent to any of the parties, or connected with any of the parties? Most undoubtedly it would be matter of aggravation, and such as the House ought to consider. All that the House knew at present was, that he was here in the custody of the officer of the House, and that his name was James Trotter; that he had been served with the warrant of the Speaker of that House, and that he had disobeyed the injunctions of that warrant; that a committee of the House had reported him to have been wilfully absent, and that he confessed his guilt: that was all the House knew of him, and therefore further information was necessary, in order to the proper understanding of the case; and if that information led to the aggravation of the case, that was not matter to prevent the House from considering it. But although this course appeared to be just, yet he must further observe, that this was not all which justice required to be done, for the House must then hear what the prisoner had to say in his own behalf. That the House had done already on the case as it now stood: of course, if the prisoner was to be charged with something more, he ought to be heard again, for that was no more than a common rule of justice; and this obviated, perhaps, the whole objection which had hitherto been stated against the course which was now proposed. It was true that the prisoner could not call evidence, but he must admit the truth of the case exhibited against him: the House, however, would hear him with indulgence, and give him the full benefit of whatever he could reasonably urge in his own behalf, and the more so, because he could not offer any evidence; but that was a situation, however hard, it must be remembered he had brought upon himself; for had he appeared in time, as it was his duty, he would have avoided all this inconvenience. Upon the ground that the whole of the evidence ought to be laid before the House, in order that it might be fully acquainted with the nature of the case, which at present it was not, he concurred in the motion now before the House.

Mr. Sheridan explained.—He did not allude to the minutes of the committee as matter of aggravation on the general misconduct of the prisoner, but merely as it related to the wilfulness of his absence, after he was served with the Speaker's warrant to attend. He thought, however, that the House could not suffer this person to enter upon oath to contradict what appeared against him before the committee.

The Lord Advocate of Scotland explained and said, that all he contended was, that this was an *ex parte* proceeding, and might possibly affect some persons who ought not to be affected by it: it might in some degree affect the sitting Member, to whose election this matter referred, and that, he apprehended, would not be regular.

The Attorney General said, he could not understand the distinction which some Gent. seemed to take in this case; that they would not receive any thing that went in aggravation of punishment, but they would receive that which would aggravate the colour of guilt. Now, whether a man wilfully absented himself, or was absent from ignorance, was a question of colour to the offence, and to allow evidence of the colour of the offence, was allowing evidence of the aggravation of the offence; and he could not see how any aggravation of guilt could be received in evidence without drawing after it, as a necessary consequence, an aggravation of punishment. Whether the House should think that the prisoner, who had once an opportunity of explaining his conduct by evidence, but which he had lost, either by his own negligence or wilfulness, should now have that opportunity restored to him, was a consideration for the House; perhaps he was not now entitled to any such indulgence, nor was it easy to see how the forms of the House would admit it, supposing such a thing was desirable, which he was not saying it was; this was not the time for discussing that point, but he should think that if the minutes, after they were laid before the House, should call for a larger punishment than the House should be disposed in its justice to inflict upon the present statement of the case, then he should think the matter deserved to be considered; for they should not punish a man for what he did not know the House were going to punish him, but that the House should at least allow the prisoner to give whatever favourable colour

he was able to any thing that was objected to him. That perhaps would be the course which the House would adopt in this case.

The question was then put, "That so much "of the minutes of the evidence given before "the Dunfermline committee as relates to "James Trotter, be laid before this House:" which was ordered.

[Salt.]—General Gascoigne rose for the purpose, he said, of moving, pursuant to notice, for leave to bring in a bill to equalize by weight the bushel of all salt imported into that part of the United Kingdom called Ireland. He entered much at large into the history of the regulation of this article from the statute of the 4th of Anne, c. 14, down to the present moment, and observed that his object was, in point of fact, to lower the duty upon English salt imported into Ireland, by equalizing the duty upon all salt imported into that country. That was the effect of his motion. At present, all salt imported into Ireland bore a certain duty per bushel; but there was, however, an essential difference in the duty on the different sorts of salt imported into Ireland, and that difference arose from the difference of quantity which the bushels contained. The salt which was imported into Ireland from Portugal and Spain, which was commonly called bay salt, contained 84 pounds weight in the bushel; whereas the salt which was imported from this country into Ireland contained no more than 56 pounds weight to the bushel, and yet the duty was the same on both; his object was to make the duties equal in each, and he argued upon the policy of so doing. He said it would lower the price of English salt in Ireland, which was a very great object, and which the people of that country would receive as a great boon. He reminded the Chancellor of the Exchequer of England of his promise to diminish the duty upon salt soon after he came into office, and observed that it was a promise which was received with great joy all over the country here and in Ireland: he maintained it was politic to do so, on account of the importance of this article to various branches of our manufactures and trades in the curing of provisions, &c. and most particularly to the trade of Ireland; and he maintained, that if the object of his motion was carried into effect, the defalcation which it would occasion in the revenue would not be more than 13,000*l.* a year, a sum which the fertility of the mind of the Chancellor of the Exchequer would too easily supply to make this an objection to the motion. He was now only asking, that British salt should not be made to pay more on its being imported into Ireland, than Spanish salt paid; that we should, in this respect, be put on a footing with the most favoured nation. He maintained that bay salt had been considered, ever since the act of Parliament, as white salt, and there should be no distinction in the duty; whereas at present the bushel of bay salt, which contained 84 pounds weight, and which came from Spain, paid no more duty than the British salt, which contained only 56 pounds weight in the bushel; he wished to do away this distinction, by which he said much more British salt would be imported into Ireland than there had been of late; and he complained that this part of our trade, particularly at Liverpool, had greatly fallen off within the last three years. He complained also of the effect of smuggling. He said this measure would lower the price of that article in Ireland, and be of great advantage to the lower classes in that country, for they paid the same duty on that article as the higher classes, and consumed more in proportion to their wants, because they subsisted more on salt provisions than the higher classes. He saw no reason for continuing the present duty on salt imported into Ireland to Spain, as a favour to Spain, for Spain was no ally of ours, and was not unlikely soon to become an enemy, and, in the present state of things, might fitly enough be called our natural enemy. He argued at some length on the propriety of what he was about to propose, on the good effect which he said it would produce to trade, both in England and Ireland, which would be much more than a balance for the defalcation it would create in the revenue. He observed, that when the last duty was laid on, the late Chancellor of the Exchequer had lamented the necessity of it, and had considered it merely as a war tax. He considered the present Chancellor of the Exchequer as pledged in some measure to assent to the motion he proposed, from his former promise, and from every principle of policy, as well as liberality, to the people of Ireland, who laboured under some difficulties which this motion was intended to remove. He then moved, "That "leave be given to bring in a bill to equalize "by weight the bushel of all salt imported "into that part of the United Kingdom called "Ireland."

The Speaker observed, that as this was a matter relating to trade, it was necessary that it should be referred to a committee of the whole House, before any further proceeding could be had on the motion.—The motion being seconded,

It was then moved, that the said motion be referred to a committee of the whole House.

Mr. Corry took a very comprehensive view of the subject; he explained the regulation of the statute of Queen Ann, and the distinction between the bushel under that statute, which contained only the weight of 56 pounds of salt, and that of the Winchester bushel, which contained 84 pounds weight, in the reign of

King Charles the Second; and gave an historical account of the duties upon this article until they were made perpetual, and observed, that there had been no innovation in Ireland upon this subject, but it was imposed there as it was in England. He explained the whole custom in the way of importing this article; and observed, that in Ireland all bay salt was entered as white salt; and it was the same in this country, it paid nevertheless duty only on 84 pounds weight to the bushel. He explained the difference in the disposal of this article between the customs and the excise, and then proceeded to observe, that the Hon. Gent. had stated, that the export of salt from Liverpool to Ireland had of late diminished, and he seemed to wish to diminish the importation of foreign salt into Ireland, for the purpose of increasing the importation of British salt there; that seemed to be the object of the Hon. Gent. by the motion now before the House: it was to discourage the importation of foreign salt, for the purpose of encouraging that of British manufacture, for the demand for the one must increase in proportion to the diminution of the other. Now, upon this subject he must be permitted to observe, that bay salt was not only of a remarkably strong quality, but it was such as was indispensable to the provision trade of Ireland; and therefore, as long as the provision trade of Ireland remained as at this time, the mode now proposed by the Hon. Gent. would not answer the purpose for which he intended it: his object was to increase trade; but the mode proposed would diminish it, because it would diminish the importation of bay salt, and that article was actually necessary in many manufactures, and in the provision trade it was actually indispensable. Bay salt was very different in quality from other salt; it was of a grain much larger, and of a quality much stronger, and less easily dissolved than any other salt: it was therefore peculiarly fit for packing in the provision trade, and excellently adapted for provisions for his Majesty's navy and army: it was superior to any other salt for curing provisions destined to hot climates, and had therefore been employed in the service of this country in every part of the world. It was well known that Ireland depended much on its provision trade, and this was owing in some degree to the quality of the flesh of that country, but still more to the quality of the bay salt they used in curing it; and if that salt was not used, the quality of the cured provisions would be greatly deteriorated, which must soon produce a decay of trade, by which Ireland would lose her pre-eminence in this particular, as well as in some other articles of manufacture, for it would lose its character in the foreign market; but he apprehended he had stated enough, when he said that the provision trade of Ireland was essential to the support of his Majesty's fleets and armies: but that was not all; there were no salt springs in Ireland, nor had they there the means of manufacturing salt. They were indebted to this country for two very material articles, rock salt and coals; and, even if they could manufacture the article, there was much consideration due to the expense which would attend it in Ireland under its disadvantages for freight, commission, and a great many charges on the carriage of coals and other articles which must be brought from this country before they could manufacture rock salt; so that any measure tending (and this measure evidently and avowedly tended) to diminish the importation of bay or foreign salt would certainly be injurious to the trade of Ireland. There had been no complaints between the British and the Irish manufacturers upon this subject; the trade had been carried on without any difficulty in this respect, and such had been the policy of Ireland, that they had always used much foreign salt—they had always been obliged to prefer foreign salt, because, as he had said already, the article of provision required it. Now it might be said, that to lower the price of other salt, would not be injurious to the manufactures of Ireland in general; that was a sentence which sounded well, but it was not too lightly to be assumed; inconveniencies might follow this, although they were not obvious to every one. This might be an inducement to manufacturers to use the cheapest articles in curing their provisions, and in other manufactures, and which would not so well answer the purpose; the provisions would neither so well supply his Majesty's fleets and armies as they formerly did—a very important consideration at all times, and particularly at the present time, when we ought to take care not to expose ourselves to any danger in this respect in particular; nor would the character of the article of provision be long preserved in the foreign market—another very important consideration at any time, and still more so at this time, when Ireland was successfully endeavouring to enlarge its commerce. The Hon. Gent. complained of the diminution of exports from this country to Ireland, and particularly in the article of salt from Liverpool: that might be very true, and he believed it was as far as the Hon. Gent. took notice of it. There might be a diminution in the exportation from Liverpool to Ireland, but the general importation into Ireland had increased, notwithstanding it had for the last two or three years diminished; but that was a very partial way, as he conceived, of viewing the subject. It should be taken on a fair average of six years; and if the Hon. Gent. took that view of it, he would find that this trade had not diminished. It was true, that the quantity of provisions purchased from Ireland for the last two years, had been less than others upon an average of the last six years: this was partly owing to the demands of the war having

ended, and consequently less provision made up in Ireland, and of course less salt imported. Pork in particular, the salt for curing which came from Liverpool, had been much less demanded for the last three years than in former times; and so indeed had all demands of late for the provisions of Ireland into hot climates. As to the rock salt imported into Ireland, it had been nearly the same for some years. British white salt had diminished considerably, and salt in the last year had diminished nearly one third; foreign salt had also diminished in much the same proportion; so that the Hon. Gent.'s apprehension was not well founded, that the importation of foreign salt into Ireland was the cause of the diminution of that of the British. The diminution had been in not making up the same quantity of provisions for which the British salt was wanted. But if the Hon. Gent. would take the average of six years, he would have the consolation to find the importation of salt into Ireland from Liverpool was much increased. Here Mr. Corry went over the different importations for this period, to justify his assertion, and maintained there had been no increase of foreign importation, so as to stop the demand for the British salt; the general demand for the provision trade had fallen off for the present only, but no doubt would again revive. When all these things were considered, Mr. Corry said, the apprehensions of the Hon. Gent. respecting the trade between these two parts of the United Kingdom would cease. When the provision trade of Ireland should open again (as it soon might), all these apprehensions would be dispelled, and then there would be an end to the disadvantage which Ireland at present laboured under by the enormous rate of exchange which was against it, and which would cease or diminish rapidly when funds were duly provided for the payment of its debt. Upon a full consideration of all these things, he was confident that the opulent and respectable people of Liverpool would be much too liberal to complain of the present state of exportation of salt from thence to Ireland, or to desire their representative to persist in the motion now before the House, for that there would be no occasion to come for an act of Parliament upon the subject. Here Mr. Corry explained the schedule which was now before the House on the subject of duties on salt imported into Ireland, and then proceeded to observe, that the trade in this article had been uniformly carried on for a long time, without any complaint on the part of the manufacturers of this country, or of Ireland. He observed, that he had some regulations in contemplation upon this subject, and in which he had no doubt the Hon. Gent. would be able to give him some valuable assistance; but he submitted, whether it would not be more wise or prudent, that no measure should be brought forward at present, but that matters should stand as they are, and that they should be made matter of consideration next year, and then, Mr. Corry said, he should come to the discussion of this important subject, with the Hon. Gent. or any other Hon. Member who should choose to take up the matter. Nothing could give him greater satisfaction than a renewed discussion of duties in Ireland, upon this or any other topic on which he possessed any information, respecting that part of the United Kingdom for which he had the honour to act. With respect to smuggling salt into Ireland, of which the Hon. Member seemed to be so apprehensive, he assured him there was no probability of it whatever, because the attempt offered no profit; there was much more probability of that article being smuggled from Ireland into this country, and that was in reality the case. Upon this subject, as well as others, he should be happy to communicate his ideas to the Hon. Gent. and to consult with him: it was certainly a desirable thing to prevent smuggling of salt from Ireland into this country, a practice much too prevalent. After making an apology to the House for detaining it so long on this subject, he submitted the propriety of not acting hastily on it; for which reason, and without the slightest disrespect to the Hon. Gent. he should now move the order of the day.

Colonel Bagwell said, that nothing affected the people of Ireland so much as the duty on salt; and he understood, that the effect of the Rt. Hon. Gent.'s (Mr. Corry) statement, went to add 10,000*l.* to the duty.

Mr. Corry observed, in explanation, that his object was to reduce the bushel, and, at the same time, to reduce the duty.

Mr. Lee said, that his Rt. Hon. Friend had given up his schedule of Irish duties for this session, in compliance with the wishes of several Gentlemen from Ireland; and he therefore thought it would be very unfair to take detached parts of it at present for the purpose of arguing upon, instead of postponing the consideration of the whole to the ensuing session.

Mr. Wickham said, that his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Corry) had had no intention of proposing an additional duty on salt. He was convinced, that no man would wish to give a preference to foreign salt: the only question was, what was the best means of answering the proposed end? He hoped the Hon. Gent. would not press the measure at present, as he had not made up his mind upon the subject, and must be under the necessity of opposing such a bill at present in every stage of it.

General Gascoigne obtained leave from the House to withdraw his motion.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, Mar. 30.—(See Minutes, p. 511.)

[Clergy non-residence.]—On the question for the second reading of the clergy residence bill being put,

Lord Auckland rose, and shortly put it to the consideration of the Rt. Rev. Prelate near him, whether, for the sake of shortening the term of the leading provision of the bill, from two or three months to one, it would, under all the present circumstances, be expedient to risk the fate of the bill, as such an amendment in a bill of this peculiar description would, with a reference to the constitutional privileges of the other House, in all probability be fatal to it.

The Bishop of St. Asaph rose, and entered into the merits of the subject at some length; he argued that the bill in question, as connected with the general subject which gave rise to it, was one of considerable importance, and as it then presented itself, objectionable in a great degree. The Rev. Prelate detailed the leading provisions, and the effects of the statute of Hen. VIII. from which the clergy, under the present circumstances, he said, were liable to considerable hardships, and these hardships not unfrequently fell on the most conscientious of the clergy: those in a great degree arose from the state of the parsonage-houses in different parishes, many of which were not in a habitable condition. To remedy these, he observed bills were from time to time sent up to their Lordships from the other House of Parliament, and, in some instances he described, at a period of the session when the merits of the question could not be fully discussed. His Lordship enumerated the dates of these bills, and gave a history of their progress through both Houses. He expressed his disapprobation of this mode of proceeding. The statute of Hen. VIII. was one which required much amendment; but he was adverse to its operations being counteracted by perennial bills of suspension. He again lamented that it should so arise that the general subject could not have been adequately discussed; it came before them at periods of the session when the attendance was generally thin; and surely that in question was one of the highest importance. If the residence of the clergy was connected with the practical religion of the country; if the practical religion of the country was connected with its morals; and if the morals of the people were worthy the attention of the Legislature, then, unquestionably, the subject in question was one of the highest importance.—*(A cry of Hear! hear!)* —The subject was one of the most serious nature, and which should be deliberately discussed. His Lordship alluded to the bill in the contemplation of a very learned civilian, a Member of the other House, who had consulted the Rev. Bench on the occasion: this proceeding, he observed, was against his sense: he advised him to bring in the bill on his own ideas, and to trust to parliamentary discussion for the rest. The Rev. Prelates, he observed, were, at least, not all equally well versed in the Statute Book. He thought the statute of Hen. VIII. should be fairly amended; but he had no hesitation in deciding, were he driven to the alternative of either totally abrogating the statute in question, or of suffering it to stand totally unaltered, in favour of the latter. Much had been said about the necessity of such bills originating in the other House. He saw no reason why a bill to the effect to which he had alluded, should not be introduced in that House; and he thought it should be generally known, that the Rev. Prelates were not in favour of the system of going on with such bills as the present from year to year.

The Lord Chancellor also took a view of the subject at some length. He observed, that with a reference to the question regularly before the House, he saw no reason why the bill should not be suffered to go to a committee. He seemed to argue generally in favour of the bill, as, under the existing circumstances of the case, a measure of a desirable nature. He had, in his judicial capacity, while presiding in one of the courts below, opportunities of observing, in many cases, the hardship and unequal operation of some of the provisions of the act of Hen. VIII. His Lordship cited in particular two cases, the one in the Rector of Bow church, one of the most exemplary men in all the various branches of his duty in the clerical profession, against whom, in consequence of his living in Ely Place, Holborn, on account of its being, from peculiar circumstances, impracticable to live in the parsonage-house, he was obliged to direct a jury to find. Another case presented itself, the particulars of which he cited, of a very opposite description, and in which the penal operations of the bill in question were very properly applied. He adverted to these points, to evince not only the great importance, but also the difficulty of coming to a right decision upon the general subject. It was matter of serious and deliberate consideration. His Lordship alluded to the great difficulty which men placed in offices of important, severe, and complicated duties experienced, in maturing great public measures. He adverted particularly to the situation of the Learned Judge alluded to by the Rev. Prelate, who, had leisure and health permitted him to pursue his labours relative to the subject in question, their Lordships would not at this time have any part of it to discuss: the indisposition under which that person then laboured, was in a great degree owing to the very close and unremitted attention which he paid to the subject in question: it was one of more extensive concern than perhaps the House were generally aware of; it involved not only

considerations of justice and policy, but even of humanity. With respect to this point, his Lordship, with a creditable degree of warmth and feeling, alluded to the effect which a general enforcement of residence would have on the fate of the unfortunate and indigent curates; it would go in a great degree to deprive them of the scanty pittance they at present hold. Even from what had already taken place, many curates were turned out of employment; this he had some opportunity of learning in the exercise of his clerical patronage as Chancellor, and of which he stated some distressing instances. With respect to a comprehensive bill, containing adequate provisions for all that was complained of, he seemed to say the session was too far advanced for bringing such a measure to maturity within its period; and he remarked upon the superior wisdom of deliberate and mature decision, in opposition to hasty and premature conclusions; and he also noticed the peculiar calls which the Rev. Bench had generally towards the end of a session in their respective dioceses.

The Bishop of St. Asaph spoke shortly in explanation, and disclaimed any intention of throwing the least imputation on the very Learned Gentleman alluded to, for whom, on the contrary, he had the highest respect.

The Earl of Carlisle made a few observations, in the course of which he seemed to argue against the principle of bills of suspension, and adverted to the strong claims which curates had to the consideration and humanity of the Legislature.

Lord Auckland also made some observations, chiefly in reference to the general subject, respecting which he appeared of his Noble and Learned Friend's opinion, that the present session would not afford sufficient time for the full and adequate discussion of the measure, so generally allowed to be necessary. He proceeded to describe some general regulations which could, in such a measure, be introduced with good effect; and concluded by observing, that a full attendance of the Rev. Bench would be peculiarly necessary on such an occasion.

The Lord Chancellor, in allusion to the point last adverted to by the Noble Lord, said, that the Rev. Prelates had pleas for absenting themselves towards the close of a session, which perhaps temporal Peers, generally speaking, had not, namely, the exercise of their pastoral duties; and he lamented the thin attendance which took place of the temporal Peers towards the close of a session, a period when, from unavoidable circumstances, a great proportion of legislative business was transacted.

The bill was then read a second time, and committed for next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, March 30. (See Minutes, p. 511.)

[Grenada loan.]—The order of the day was read for the House to resolve itself into a committee of the whole House on the Grenada loan bill.

Sir Robert Buxton said he could not but express the sentiments he had done on a former occasion, with respect to the bill now brought into Parliament, and he should give his decided disapprobation to that measure, which went to misapply the public money. Many inconveniencies and losses would still arise to Government if they continued their support to that part of the West India trade.

Mr. Hobhouse said he could not agree with the last Hon. Gent.; he was certain that no loss had been sustained by Government: the plain facts were, that 1,400,000*l.* had been advanced for the support of this trade, and that this sum had been reduced to 500,000*l.*; that being the case, every Member in the House must see, that notwithstanding war and other unpleasant circumstances, which had prevented the progress of trade in the West Indies, yet that mercantile establishment was in a fair way of being a benefit to Government. The West India islands produced upwards of 30,000 hogsheads of sugar and other valuable articles; therefore Government had the best security for the money they advanced. The whole of the West India debt had not been contracted more than six years, and with the assistance now about to be given by the House, there was no doubt of the prosperity that would attend this West Indian mercantile establishment. Under these circumstances he should give his approbation to the measure.

Mr. Johnstone said he could not agree with the last Hon. Gent.: he knew perfectly well the great difference between the monied interest and landed interest of the country. It was no uncommon thing for persons connected with trade, to come into that House on all occasions and support Government, and therefore the mercantile part of the country would see their interest to support the present question. The Hon. Gent had made a mistake as to the time the Grenada debt was contracted; it was now upwards of eight years instead of six. He would now call to the recollection of the House the promise that was made to Parliament on the former application for money, that it should then be the last they would ask of the House to grant: but he was sorry to say the Gentlemen had not kept their word, and the indulgence then granted for the sup-

port of this unprofitable trade has turned out not sufficient. He was of a different opinion with the last Hon. Gent. as to the security Government were in possession of for their money; it appeared to him by no means good, and if this money now applied for is granted by the House, he would ask, what better security we should get for this loan than we before had? 500,000*l.* were now owing, and there was but a chance of its being paid for a long time to come. He thought the whole system to be highly improper in lending public money in such a concern. When the West India market was overstocked, we were called upon to make good their losses. This was an indulgence allowed to the West India trade which was allowed to no other; he therefore thought it ought not to be supported.

Mr. Wm. Dundas said he wished to submit a few observations in reply to what had fallen from the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down. The Hon. Gent. had argued very much at length upon the abstract question of, whether Government ought, or ought not, to advance the public money to support the mercantile interests of the country. But if the Hon. Gent. had such an objection to Government giving such assistance to the mercantile interest, how happened it that he had not stated his objections upon former occasions, when Government had adopted a similar conduct to the merchants of Liverpool, and to other merchants of this country? The fact was, that Parliament granted this aid to the merchants and planters of St. Vincent and Grenada, in 1795, when these islands were desolated by an event which human prudence could neither foresee nor prevent, viz. an insurrection of the blacks. The sum then advanced was 1,400,000*l.*; of that sum all had been paid off, except about 560,000*l.* and the interest had been regularly paid the whole time. It had been suggested, that more was paid in bounties on the re-exportation of the produce of those islands, than was received by the customs on their importation. Admitting this for a moment to be true, was there no advantage to the shipping interest of this country in carrying on the trade with those islands? or did the Hon. Gent. mean to say that those islands might as well be in the hands of France as of any other country? If of late the commodities of the West Indies had fallen in price, would it be consistent with generosity, wisdom, or policy, to press for the immediate payment of a debt, so large a part of which had been already discharged, the interest of which was so regularly paid, and for the whole of which the public had such ample security?

Mr. Rose said that the Rt. Hon. Gent. had in a great degree anticipated what he meant to have offered. The Hon. Gent. who spoke last but one, seemed to think that a greater degree of favour was shewn to the West India trade than to others; he was not aware upon what ground the Hon. Gent. made that assertion. The relief which Parliament had granted to the merchants of Grenada and St. Vincent, they had granted upon other occasions to other persons; and though the Hon. Gent. seemed to think that Government ought not to lend the public money to support the mercantile interest, he begged leave to observe, that if it had not been for the assistance afforded by Government some years ago to the manufacturing interest, the consequences might have been such as he was almost afraid to consider. But when the Hon. Gent. talked of considerable favour being shewn to the West India trade, did he consider of what importance that trade was to this country? Did he know that it employed nearly one third of our shipping? did he consider what a nursery it was for our seamen? or did he reflect upon the various advantages this country derived from that trade? At the commencement of the last century, Government had granted relief to some of the West India islands; but the mode in which that relief was granted, appeared to him to be neither so efficacious nor so economical as the relief which had been granted by Government on the present occasion. Under these circumstances, he should certainly give his vote for the Speaker leaving the chair.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, Mar. 31.—(See Minutes, p. 667.)

[Militia officers' bill.]—The order of the day being read for the second reading of the militia officers' bill,

Lord Hobart moved, "That the bill be "now read a second time."

The Earl of Carnarvon rose to oppose the proceeding; he delivered his sentiments at some length, which were decidedly against the leading provisions of the bill; his hostility to the measure, he observed, was founded in constitutional principles. The bill, which went to authorize the service of officers not duly qualified, would, when superadded to the other measures adopted by Government of late years with respect to the militia, grind down that constitutional force to a very standing army. He was aware of the necessity of Great Britain, especially in periods like the present, having a large disposable force: however, at the same time, one constituted on the original principles of the militia was admirably well calculated for defensive service. The conduct of Government latterly was such as went to disgust the respectable qualified officers, and would tend greatly to disincline them from serving in the militia. Pursuing this line of observation for some time, and in strong terms, the Noble Earl observed, that

were the bill passed in its present shape, he would never again come forward in the discussion of the subject; so degraded did he consider the militia by such a proposition. At the present moment he urged the propriety of allowing farther time for the consideration of the subject; and in that view he moved, in the way of an amendment, that the word 'now' be left out of the motion, "that this "bill be now read a second time."

Lord Hobart expressed himself perfectly aware of the importance of the measure, and his inclination to concur in the motion just made, did he entertain any hope of being able to induce the Noble Earl to agree to provisions which he thought wise and necessary. The Noble Secretary then proceeded to defend the provisions of the bill, which he thought, in sound argument and fact, not at all liable to the objections so warmly urged by the Noble Earl; a discretionary power was vested in the Lord Lieutenants, who, in cases of necessity, in the event of their not being able to procure officers possessing landed qualifications as heretofore, were authorized to accept the services of a description of officers, whose admission the Noble Earl so strongly opposed. His Lordship then detailed the prominent provisions of the bill, which offered arrangements, he contended, not liable to the imputed objections. At the same time, he entertained no doubt of the Lord Lieutenants exerting themselves to find out officers fully qualified, and who would be willing to serve. Such officers would naturally be preferred by them. In concluding, his Lordship observed, that the Noble Earl had assigned no sufficient reason for postponing the second reading of the bill.

Lord Rolle seemed to think that no necessity existed for the present measure, which, in some points of view, he regarded as highly questionable. To ascertain his first point, he thought that an official return of the number, &c. of the militia officers should be laid before the House; and if it should appear that there were not a sufficient number, he should have no objection to the bill's passing.

The Earl of Carnarvon spoke in explanation, in the course of which he repeated his observation, that the conduct of Government of late years relative to the militia, was such as to disgust the officers in general: respecting this he entered into some details, and observed, that, were the present system persisted in, and the militia continued, it would be preferable to lower the number of that part of the national force. The Noble Earl was called to order by the Lord Chancellor; and, after some conversation respecting the question of order, the Duke of Montrose rose, and spoke shortly in support of what fell from the Noble Lord on the woolsack. With respect to the observations of the Noble Earl, he conceived none of them applied against the present measure; they were the arguments adduced last year on an occasion nearly similar; and he begged leave to observe, that the measures respecting the militia, so strongly reprobated by the Noble Earl, were not, properly speaking, attributable to the Minister, but approved by the Legislature after full and repeated discussions. The Noble Duke expressed his regret that men duly qualified were not seen at such a crisis as the present, cheerfully coming forward to serve in that highly useful and constitutional part of the national force. He approved of the militia on other grounds besides those of constitutional principle; it was an excellent defensive system, and being on foot together with the standing army, they were reciprocally useful checks upon each other. Every man who possessed an acre of land in the kingdom was constitutionally bound to defend it; he owed a military service to the crown, on the old principles of the feudal constitution. It was necessary to procure an effective force, and if it could not be done in the way of bounty, stronger measures were necessary. He was adverse to any delay of the bill, the principle of which was then as fully understood as it could be six months hence.

The Earl of Radnor strongly disapproved some of the provisions of the bill, which he seemed to think would tend still more to disgust the officers alluded to.

The Lord Chancellor, in support of the motion, observed, that the disapprobation expressed by Noble Lords of any particular provisions of the bill, was rather a reason for its going to a committee; beside which, a future opportunity would regularly offer for the discussion of its principle. With respect to the maintenance of order in their Lordships' proceedings, the House would be aware of its necessity; and that it was his duty, to the best of his judgment, to see that it strictly took place, without reference to the situation or feelings of individuals: a necessity for acting in such a manner, he observed, had of late become more necessary than ever.

[Here another conversation took place concerning the question of order.]

Lord Cawdor delivered his sentiments on the subject at some length. He declared his attachment to the militia, as a constitutional and effective force; he expatiated on the services it had performed, and on the professional merits and patriotism of its officers. He seemed to disapprove of part of the former conduct of Government respecting the militia, and to express much anxiety relative to the practice of recruiting the standing army from the militia.

After a long and general conversation respecting points of order, the question being called for, the same was regularly put from the Woolsack, on which a division took place, when there appeared for the immediate second reading of the bill, 41; against it, 2.—Majority, 39.

On re-entering the House we found the Earl of Carnarvon on his feet, warmly contending against the bill. The question which furnished the Noble Earl an occasion for thus delivering his sentiments, appeared to be for its commitment. His Lordship spoke at some length, and urged a variety of detailed observations against the measure, founded on those principles which he had adverted to as above. He took occasion to combat an idea of the Noble and Learned Lord's, namely, that because only some of the provisions of a bill were objected to, it should be suffered to go to a committee; such a mode of reasoning, he contended, may be urged in behalf of any measure, however worthy of censure or disapprobation.

[Clergy non-residence.]—The House then, pursuant to the order of the day, resolved itself into a committee on the clergy residence bill, Lord Walsingham in the chair.

When that clause was come to which fixed the termination of the suspension to the 8th of July,

The Bishop of St. Asaph rose, and delivered his sentiments upon the subject of which the bill before the committee formed a part, at considerable length. He repeated many of his observations of last night, adverted to the indiscriminate operation of part of the statute of Henry VIII. and described the progress of the various suspending bills, which were passed within the three last years. He expressed his disapprobation of those measures, and gave his opinion that if they were not resorted to, that statute alluded to would ere now have been properly amended. He would go farther; he thought that if the present bill was assented to, they should hear no more of the amending bill till next spring, and so on. On these grounds it was, he should in the present instance propose to shorten the term of the suspension. With respect to the statute of Henry VIII. of which so much had been said, and also on the effects of the proposed plans for amending it, he thought the penalties of that act should be mitigated. He was fully aware of the present and future contingent situation of curates: if residence were fully enforced, many of them naturally would be ousted; but such a consequence could by no means generally follow. In illustration of this position, the Rev. Prelate entered into a detailed view of the situation of curates in general, particularly those in the country. He observed a resident curate was, in many instances, as great a *rara avis* as a resident clergyman; this in a great degree proceeded from many curates undertaking the duty of different parishes. The Rev. Prelate also adverted, and with great effect, to the unwillingness which especially young clergymen manifested to undertake the duty of country parishes; they preferred the duty of populous or market towns, and, above all, that of the metropolis, where many, conceiving themselves men of abilities and eloquence, were fond of exhibiting in the pulpits. Persons of this description generally employed curates for the country duty, who, in the event of an enforcement of residence, would probably be ousted: but at the same time, there were numerous instances where, in cases of small livings, the incumbents held also valuable curacies, of which, however, in the above event, were they to be deprived, they would obviously be not left destitute; and were one description of cases set against the other, those of real hardship would be found not so numerous as was generally imagined. Drawing towards a conclusion, the Rev. Prelate repeated his opinion, that, were the bill before the committee passed in its present shape, no more would be heard of the general amending bill until the next session, &c. Under which conviction, he would move, "That instead of the 8th of July, the "13th of May be inserted."

The Lord Chancellor observed, that the proceeding adverted to by the Rt. Rev. Prelate, was a parliamentary acknowledgment that the statute of Henry VIII. wanted revision. With respect to the question regularly before the committee, he observed, that there was no difference of opinion as to the expediency of continuing the suspension; but as to the interval of time, the Learned Prelate seemed to go upon an idea, that there existed an intention somewhere, to bring forward a general bill, which might pass before a certain period. On this head, he would say, it were better not to cramp such an intention by too limited a period, which might prevent exertion from having its full scope. For his own part, in this view of the case, he should vote for the longer term, because it would naturally afford a better chance of the bill alluded to being brought forward; at the same time he seemed averse to a further suspension.

The Bishop of Durham, in delivering his sentiments, took occasion to advert to the very great fitness of the learned and respectable Member of the other House, who had undertaken the task of the bill alluded to, to do ample justice to the subject. But his Lordship begged leave to question the propriety of seeming to call upon that Gentleman, when his present indisposition was considered. He had the highest possible opinion

of the character of that Learned Gentleman, and was persuaded he would come forward as soon as circumstances would permit him. His Lordship observed, he would not then follow the Rev. Prelate who opened the discussion, through his detailed observations, as probably another opportunity would present itself.

The LORD CHANCELLOR wished it to be distinctly understood, that he grounded his preference to the longer term, only because it afforded a better chance of something conclusive in the interval.

Lord ALVANLEY took occasion to observe, that if the general bill should be so far delayed this session as not to be brought up until the beginning of July, he should hold it his duty to oppose it; and he perfectly agreed in what had been so ably stated by a Noble Lord (Grenville), towards the end of the last session, respecting the necessity of having a full attendance, particularly of the Rev. Bench, in the discussion of the subject in question.

Lord AUCKLAND delivered his sentiments on the question at some length: he noticed the improper effect of such bills of suspension, which in some measure may be said to leave that part of the community without law. He argued in favour of a general amending bill, and which, among other good effects, would go to ameliorate the condition of the poorer orders of the clergy. With respect to shortening the term, the other House, in the view of its pecuniary operation, would, on that account, be induced to reject the bill. Adverting to the circumstance of a general amending bill, the Noble Lord expressed his opinion that such a measure might very properly originate in that House; and he alluded to certain regulations, which, in such a legislative provision, would be attended with the most salutary effects. In allusion to what had been said of the state of the attendance in that House, particularly towards the close of a session, his Lordship made some admirable philosophical remarks on the nature and propensities of man, the almost irresistible attractions of rural retirement or occupations at certain seasons of the year, with a view to palliate that occasional, and sometimes frequent secession from parliamentary attendance, at the seasons of the year alluded to.

Lord ALVANLEY, in explanation, observed, rather jocosely, that were the Noble Lord's ideas of green fields, &c. set up as a plea for the non-attendance of legislators, there ought to be a sort of *qui tam* proceedings instituted on the occasion. With respect to the bill so frequently alluded to, for his part, he rather preferred its originating in that House, as therein it would, most probably, have a more free and full discussion.

The LORD CHANCELLOR, after shortly noticing what had transpired on the subject of non-attendance and absence from town, observed, that he saw no objection to the bill originating in that House; but in all probability, a bill so originating, would require a very full second discussion, in consequence of the alterations which would most likely be made in it by the other House; and particularly with respect to the subject of curates, he observed, it would be found rather difficult to make a provision for them in that House.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH delivered his opinions on the general subject at some length. He was unfavourable to the practice of suspension—a subject which was never warranted, save by considerations of public necessity.—He took occasion to pronounce a splendid panegyric on the character and talents of the Right Hon. and Learned Gent. (Sir W. Scott), so often alluded to in the course of the discussion. He adverted to the great difficulties as well as the importance of framing legislative provisions to remedy the evils complained of; but though they could not do all the good they wished, they should do all the good they could: they should, as far as in them lay, ameliorate the statute of Henry VIII. by a general bill. The Noble Lord adverted to a variety of provisions which could in such a measure be introduced with the most salutary effect. He alluded to certain descriptions of the clergy who he thought should not be exempted from residence on pleas which were at present held as admissible. The consideration of how the Commons may afterwards treat the bill, should not prevent them from originating the measure in that House, in which work he would be most happy to assist, as far as the very little leisure his official duty afforded him.

Lord PELHAM delivered his sentiments on the occasion, which in a great degree seemed to tally with those of his Noble Friend on the Woolsack. He observed it would be improper to act on the presumption of what may be the intention of any individual to propose. He entertained no objection to a bill of the description alluded to originating in that House: on the contrary, he seemed to think it the better place, particularly with a reference to the Bench of Bishops; and in the discussion of the measure he would cheerfully assist to the utmost of his power.

The BISHOP of DURHAM spoke shortly in explanation, as did

The BISHOP of ST. ASAPH, in the course of which he deprecated the effects of misapprehension, and observed, it was proper it

should be understood, that the statute of Henry VIII. instead of diminishing the power of the ecclesiastical courts, went in furtherance of the old law of residence.

After some further observations, the Rev. Prelate, the Bishop of Rochester, having consented to withdraw his amendment, the bill went through the committee, and the report was ordered to be received next day.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, April 1. (See Minutes, p. 667.)

[Clergy non-residence.]—The order of the day being read for receiving the report of the clergy residence bill,

The Earl of Carlisle rose, and said, he had a few observations to make connected with the bill, which might be as formally offered on the present occasion as on any other stage of the bill. The Noble Earl then launched into a variety of observations, chiefly applying to the general subject. He declared his aversion to suspension bills in general, as they tended, so far as their operation applied, to leave the community without law, and to remove those landmarks which the wisdom of our ancestors had carefully established. The subject to which the bill related, was undoubtedly one of considerable importance; and it was generally admitted that something was necessary to be done to remedy the inconveniences and grievances complained of. On such an occasion the Noble Earl said their Lordships should depend upon themselves principally. It was improper to rely, in a case of such magnitude, on the exertions of any single individual, however learned or appropriately qualified: notwithstanding which, he was inclined to entertain little hopes of seeing an efficacious measure brought forward in that House. In framing a general bill, whenever it should be undertaken, there was one consideration which forcibly struck him as necessary, in order to render the measure complete and effectual; namely, an adequate provision not only for the poorer curates, but for some of the other inferior orders of the clergy, who were unhappily in very necessitous circumstances. Of the former, such instances of distress and misery could be detailed as would make their Lordships' hearts ache. Respecting this provision, he thought that it should come out of the public purse. His Lordship enforced these leading ideas by several relevant observations, in the course of which he said, there were persons in that House fraught with ecclesiastical and legal information, who were fully competent to the undertaking alluded to.

Lord Arden begged leave to offer a few observations on the present occasion; he expressed his surprise, that after what they had all heard in debate last night, any observation should be thrown out expressive of a degree of despair that the subject in question would not be effectually taken up, and originated in that House. What transpired in the discussion of last night, was of considerable importance; it would, he was confident, be productive of much benefit, and for his own part, it made a deep impression on his mind. He must deprecate all objections to bills originating in that House, with a reference to what might be their probable fate in the House of Commons. To act upon such a principle would be something like a standing in awe of the other House, and would in a certain degree tend to render the House, instead of its being, as it incontestably was, an efficient and component branch of the Legislature, a mere cipher in the constitution of the country. Though he thought and felt in this manner for the estimation, on constitutional grounds, of a House of which he had not long had the high honour to be a Member, yet he duly respected the constitutional privileges of the House of Commons, in which he had the honour to sit many years. After what had passed last night, he entertained no fears of an efficient measure originating in that House, which he was inclined to wish it should. The Rt. Rev. the Bishops formed a part of that House, to whose province the subject in question more particularly belonged; and besides these there were several Noble and Learned Lords every way adequate to the task; among these he could not help especially regarding one, then in his place (Lord Ellenborough), whose opinions seemed to make such an impression on their Lordships yesterday, and from the talents and information which he displayed, he evinced himself peculiarly well calculated for the task. He was aware of the important and various official duties of that Learned Lord, yet he could not avoid expressing his hope that his Lordship would come forward and give as much of his precious time as he conveniently could to the subject. Were the Noble and Learned Lord to undertake it, he entertained the most confident hopes of a salutary and effectual measure being the result; and he doubted not, that were a bill sent down from that House to the Commons, they would treat it with the most respectful attention, and contribute every thing in their power towards rendering the measure effectual, consistent with their own peculiar privileges.

Lord Auckland agreed with the Noble Lord as to the general propriety and good effect of a measure of this kind originating in that House; and further, he thought their Lordships should, on the present occasion, chiefly rely upon their own exertions. Did they rely solely on the other House, or rather on the exertions of any single individual, one

of these results would, he thought, be the consequence: either that no bill would be sent up to them this session, or, that it would be sent up at so late a period, that their Lordships would be unable to collect in sufficient numbers, fully and duly to discuss it. For his own part, he was not fond of giving pledges, but so deeply was he impressed with the consideration that something should be done in the affair, he would say thus far, and he begged to be rightly understood, that if no bill should be sent up to them on the subject, or no other Noble Lord came forward, at an early period after the ensuing recess he should himself, notwithstanding the importance of his official avocations, and however inadequate he might be in some parts of them, undertake it, so far as to commit his ideas on the subject to paper, and lay them before the House in the shape of a bill. He should certainly give his best attention to the subject, and what he should propose would be the result. He doubted not when he had gone so far, what he should crudely and indigestedly lay before the House would be attentively considered and discussed by their Lordships, among whom many men more competent than himself were to be found. He should have in view, in what he should propose, two principles, which he thought of the highest importance; first, that the church should be left to govern itself, and, secondly, to keep the principle of residence in view, so far as to secure to parishes a due care and attention, with as little hardship or inconvenience to individuals as was practicable.

The Lord Chancellor called the attention of the House to the precise nature of the question before them, which was, whether it would agree to a single amendment made in the title of the bill, and only going to correct an inaccuracy with respect to the dates as originally expressed? Their Lordships would judge how far what had been said was applicable to that question. However, what had transpired induced him to offer a very few observations. With respect to making pledges, he would remind any individual Peer of the extent, importance, and difficulties of the task to be undertaken, and he would beg leave particularly to address himself to the Noble and Learned Lord who seemed alluded to by the Noble Lord who spoke second in the debate, and bring to his consideration the duties of his official station: these were so various, so important, so onerous and pressing, as perhaps not to afford him sufficient time to pay the necessary degree of attention to the subject. For his own part, his official duties were such as entirely to disable him from undertaking the task; but whenever the bill should come before that House, he would of course assist in its discussion, and in bringing it to maturity to the utmost of his power: indeed it was the bounden duty of all their Lordships to assist on such occasions, to the extent of their respective abilities.

Lord Ellenborough expressed his coincidence with what fell from the Noble and Learned Lord. He was fully aware how much of his time was necessarily engrossed by due attention to his official duties, and such considerations should influence, with respect to his entering into a pledge for the performance of any thing that might clash or interfere with them. Indeed, generally speaking, he was not fond of pledging himself, or of making promises on such occasions; he had rather come forward and act where it was practicable, than make any promise at all. He was also as fully aware of the extent and importance of the subject in question, which he seemed to think admitted of two views, the greater and the less. His Lordship took occasion to panegyrize the talents and extensive information of the Rt. Hon. and Learned Gent. who had already come forward on the occasion; and in better hands, he observed, the subject could not be placed. However, with respect to the less or limited view of the subject, he did not see that degree of difficulty in it which some Noble Lords seemed to conceive—he meant the question of residence. To this point he had lately given some hours close consideration, and the result was, in his opinion, that the difficulties of it in a great degree may be obviated. With regard to the greater and more comprehensive view of the subject, he seemed to think himself inadequate to the task, even were there any prospect of his important judicial avocations affording him any leisure.

Lord Alvanley, in the course of his observations, remarked, that he never could entertain any doubts of the propriety of the bill originating in that House; he only meant to express his apprehension that the Commons would never agree to any provision for the inferior order of the clergy, out of the public purse, in the shape of a bill from that House. He then observed as to the tendency of what had already been done in the affair, and seemed of opinion that something should be done with respect to depending actions, even on grounds of justice; in regard to those which might arise hereafter, it would naturally be matter of future consideration.

The question was then put, and the report agreed to by their Lordships.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, April 4.—(See Minutes, p. 668.)

[Militia officers' bill.]—The order of the day being read for their Lordships going into a committee on the militia officers' bill, and the question being put,

Earl Romney rose, and expressed his sentiments upon the subject of the militia at some length. He adverted to the measures lately adopted with respect to the militia, particularly those which took place last year. Of the latter he expressed his disapprobation, considering them at best but as unnecessary, in many instances injurious, and generally disgusting to the constitutional officers of the old militia. The addition of the three captains to each corps clearly increased the difficulty experienced by the Lord Lieutenants in meeting with qualified officers. The measures of Ministers with respect to the militia were such as must disgust the commanders of militia regiments, and induce them to retire. With respect to himself, he thought the militia reduced to that situation, that, under all circumstances, its continuance was no longer desirable. If any Lord should concur with him, he could almost himself move for the repeal of the militia laws, when the army could go on as before the establishment of the militia.

Marquis Townshend spoke shortly in answer to what fell from the Noble Earl. He differed entirely from him with respect to the effect of the measures adopted by Government in regard to the militia, deeming them neither degrading nor injurious. He deprecated all ideas of suppressing the militia, and seemed surprised at hearing such an idea started, particularly at a period when the power of France was at such an alarming height. The militia he considered as necessary for the home defence, and, with a view to render the troops of the line the more completely disposable, independent of offensive operations, a large disposable force would always be necessary, particularly for the defence of our colonial possessions.

The House then resolved into a committee, Lord Walsingham in the Chair.—When the clause objected to, on a former discussion, by certain Peers, namely, that authorizing the service, and settling the rank of officers unqualified by the old militia laws, was read, some explanatory conversation took place in the first instance between Lords Radnor, Hobart, and his Royal Highness the Duke of Cumberland.

The Earl of Carnarvon expressed his hostility to the clause at some length. He asserted, that, did the committee agree to the clause, a great sacrifice would be made without any reasons being assigned, and, in fact, on the bare requisition of the Minister. He recapitulated several of his former observations respecting the original establishment of the militia as a constitutional defensive force, and alluded to certain points of the late conduct of Ministers, which he said were in direct contradiction to their declarations only ten months ago. He would prefer the suppression of the militia to its remaining in its present altered and degraded state. He expatiated on the constitutional evils of removing the necessity of qualifications, which he thought was done to bring the militia more into the power of the Minister. He deprecated the practice of sending the militia out of the country, and which was followed up, he observed, with the more injurious measure of rendering it, in fact, a mere drill for the regiments of the line.

The Duke of Cumberland observed, he ought to apologize to their Lordships for thus obtruding himself (two or three Peers having risen at the same time, but immediately gave way to his Royal Highness), when there were so many other Peers better qualified than he was to give an opinion upon the subject; but he assured the committee he should not detain them many minutes. With respect to the clause before them, and which was so strongly objected to, he observed, the effect of it was merely to enable the Lord Lieutenants to officer the militia corps, in cases of vacancy, by military men. The objections, however, to this regulation were made in the way of an apparent insinuation that such would be a breach of the constitution. Did he view the operation of the clause in that light, he assured their Lordships he would be the last in that House to support it: but he considered the measure very differently. In the first instance, the Lord Lieutenants were required to fill up with qualified officers according to the old regulations; nay more, the provisions of the bill before the committee went to strengthen the established principle of the old militia, inasmuch as it enabled the Lord Lieutenants to look for qualified officers in other counties than those to which their corps belonged, which they were not previously authorized to do. This he considered as a constitutional advantage, as it could not be denied but that a gentleman of landed property in Yorkshire, and one of landed property in Wiltshire, had the same general interest in defending the country. He entertained no doubts of qualified officers coming forward in its defence; and must deprecate every idea of disbanding the militia, that established constitutional force. The proposed measure he regarded as one dictated by necessity, for it was obvious the militia could not be brought into action, or marched, without officers. He entertained the highest possible respect for the militia, yet he must think the introduction of military men would be of service. Some stress was laid by a Noble Lord on the circumstance of militia-men being sent abroad: his way of putting the case, however, was not very correct; the army was in want of men, at the time, for a very particular and important occasion, on which a certain number of militia-men were authorized

by Parliament to enter into the regiments of the line, did they choose it, as volunteers, as the militia corps could not constitutionally be sent out of the country; for, with respect to Ireland, he must consider it, especially since the Union, as identified with this, and as forming but one country. He hoped the militia of both parts of the United Kingdom would be of reciprocal service. On these general grounds he should give his full support to the bill.

Earl Romney, in reply to part of what had fallen from the Royal Duke, expressed his regret at feeling himself obliged to differ even on the slightest point from his Royal Highness; but he was of opinion, that Ireland was very differently circumstanced from Great Britain in regard to its militia. With respect to the idea of abrogating the militia force, he certainly could not entertain it, as applying to the present period, or in the present circumstances of the country, but as a measure, under the consideration he had alluded to, desirable at a future period.

Lord Redesdale defended the conduct of Government with respect to the militia, and pointed out to the committee the essential difference between the constitution of the militia force as a permanent peace establishment, and as formed for purposes of war.

The Earl of Westmoreland followed on the same ground, and defended the militia as constituted at present, in which form it rendered the most essential and glorious services to this country. He observed, one great advantage derivable from the militia was, that it superseded the necessity of having recourse to a foreign service for defensive purposes. The principle upon which the clause objected to proceeded, was by no means new in the militia system; there were acts of Parliament which gave a suspending power with respect to a proof of qualification. He thought it better, as now proposed, to vest the Lord Lieutenants with a direct power in case of necessity; and he could not help observing, that the ideas suggested by the Noble Lords opposite, was rather an odd way of shewing their friendship for the militia.

The Earl of Limerick could not refrain from making a very few observations on the present subject. He observed, that the circumstance of the English militia serving in Ireland was noticed by certain Noble Lords in such a way, as if those troops were compelled by Government to go thither against their inclinations: that, however, was very far from being the case; the militia corps in this country felt for the situation of their loyal brethren in that country, and, with a zeal and alacrity which reflected eternal honour on them, and would lastingly attach the loyal inhabitants of Ireland to this, volunteered their services to assist them. Such a proceeding was not an infringement of the constitution, and wicked indeed would Ministers have been, did they refuse such offers. With respect to the Union, no man could possibly approve that wished-for consummation more than himself. But to render it fully effectual, or better than a parchment record, the two countries should assimilate in every thing. He even thought there should be a clause in the present bill for their service in Ireland, as it is already done with regard to Scotland. He knew not what difference there was between those countries, equally united to England, unless it was that the one required a voyage of about sixty miles to reach it. Were the services of the militia limited, according to the ideas of the Noble Lords, to their respective counties, it may be a good police institution, but could never be an efficient military force.

The Earl of Radnor, in reply to the last speaker, enforced some of his former objections, and contended that the original compact made with the militia had been violated.

The Duke of Cumberland protested against the idea that the militia were drafted into the regiments of the line; the case was very different, the act only enabled them to turn out as volunteers.

The Earl of Carnarvon spoke at some length in explanation.

The Earl of Limerick, in reply to an observation of the last speaker, observed, that the officers of the militia in Ireland, with the exception of the colonels, were not appointed by the Crown.

Lord Bolton approved of the present measure, but observed, he, as one of those officers authorized to act by the bill, should not feel himself justified in accepting the offers of unqualified officers, except he should not be able to meet with officers qualified according to the former regulations; of which, however, his Lordship seemed to think there was no danger.

The Marquis of Sligo, adverting to the constitution of the militia of Ireland, explained, that the officers there were appointed in the same way as in this country. He expatiated on the firm attachment of the Irish in general to Great Britain, and noticed that remarkable expression of the national wish at the famous meeting of Dungannon—"Let us share the liberties of the British Isle!" His Lordship expressed his heart-felt satisfaction at what had fallen from the Royal Duke respecting the reciprocal services of the militia of Great Britain and Ireland.

Lord Pelham defended the measure on the general grounds adopted by Noble Lords at his side of the House.

After which, some further discussion took place, chiefly between the Earls of Radnor and Carnarvon, and Lord Hobart, in which the last-mentioned Peer expressed his hope, that in general the provision would be unnecessary, save in a few counties, where it may be found indispensable.

The question was called for, when the strangers were ordered to withdraw, peparatory to a division, which, however, did not take place.

The remaining clauses of the bill were then agreed to by the committee, and the House resuming, ordered the report to be received the next day.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, April 4.—(See Minutes, p. 668.)

[James Trotter.]—Mr. Sheridan observed, that the prisoner could not be heard again at the bar upon the present charge, because he had been heard already. He thought the two resolutions of his Hon. Friend (Mr. Tierney) perfectly regular, and that there was no occasion at present to go beyond them: the substance of these resolutions was, that James Trotter, now in custody of the Serjeant at Arms, having been duly summoned by the warrant of the Speaker, and the order of the Chairman of the committee, and having disobeyed such warrant and order, had been guilty of a breach of the privilege of the House. This Mr. Tierney had moved. The next with which he proposed to follow it up was, "That the said James Trotter be committed to his Majesty's gaol of Newgate."

Mr. Bragge observed, that he had no wish upon this subject, but that the House should conform to the principles of justice: he had no concern with any of the parties; he hardly knew the name of the individual who was the subject of this motion; but he thought the House had rendered it necessary to hear the prisoner again, from the course the House pursued when he was before them. The House need not have taken that course, for it had full power to act upon the Report of the committee, and to have committed the prisoner immediately; but the House had not done so, but ordered another course to be pursued, and which, in his opinion, varied the course which the House ought to pursue now; and now he thought it proper to hear the prisoner again, because, by ordering the minutes to be laid before the House, they had aggravated the prisoner's case, and he had not been heard in answer to that aggravation.

Mr. Tierney observed, that as to the course now proposed, he should be ready to assent to it on certain conditions, which were to pursue the subject further. He had no difficulty in giving way to every suggestion that might appear favourable to the individual now in custody; his great object was to get out the whole truth. It was now said there were two charges against this man, and that he had been heard only upon one of them. He knew but of one charge against the prisoner, James Trotter, which was, that he had disobeyed the warrant of the Speaker of that House, and an order of the Chairman of a committee of that House; that was the charge against this person: it was, indeed, true, that that charge was strengthened by the evidence which had been laid before the House in addition to the Report of the committee, which stated him to be in contempt. The only question upon the evidence was, whether it furnished ground for a more harsh or a more lenient punishment than the House would have thought itself called upon to inflict, in case the whole matter had rested upon the Report of the committee? But the House, if it heard the prisoner again, must, in justice, hear the party accusing him again; and the House, if they felt any inconvenience in this course, would bear in mind that they brought it upon themselves, for the course was for them to commit the prisoner to Newgate at once, upon the Report of the committee, by which he appeared to be in contempt; and the House would recollect also, that as to the inconvenience felt by the prisoner, it was also an inconvenience which he had wilfully brought upon himself. For his part, he felt that he was shewing a great deal of forbearance in not carrying this matter further, nor did he wish to press against this man any thing harsh; but if this matter was pursued, and any other person was concerned in this most unfair proceeding, he ought to be brought forward and properly punished. He thought it an interesting matter to the public, that all the adherents of this man and his abettors, and perhaps the founders of the plan by which the purposes of justice had been defeated, should be punished. The motion which he should regularly make, after the present one was disposed of, would be, that James Trotter be now sent to Newgate. If he should hereafter petition that he may have an opportunity of being heard to explain away any misconception he may say had been entertained on his case, he should wish the House to hear the petition; but if that should be done, he now gave distinct notice that he should lay in his claim to be heard on the other side. He should propose to examine witnesses, and to bring home very serious charges, he believed, against some other persons, some of high station. He had reason to believe that this would distinctly appear if the matter was inquired into, and that was a matter which he had

much more desire to pursue than the punishment of this individual. He now only should move that this person should be committed to Newgate: but if Trotter took his advice as a friend, he would go to Newgate and stay a while quietly there, and stir no further in the matter. In point of public justice, more ought to be done in this business than he was now doing. He should now move, that James Trotter, having been duly summoned with the Speaker's warrant and Chairman's order, &c. and disobeyed such warrant and order, has been guilty of a breach of the privilege of this House.

The question was put and carried *nemine contradicente*.

The Speaker then suggested, that the latter part of the vote, that of its being *nemine contradicente*, ought not to be entered, lest it should imply a doubt upon a matter which was clear, and have some effect upon future proceedings: by entering these words *nemine contradicente*, it might seem as if the House thought a case might happen in which disobedience to the warrant of the Speaker was not a breach of privilege, and so the authority of the House might be weakened in future, by endeavouring to mark this particular case: every disobedience to the warrant of the Speaker, or order of a Chairman of a committee of that House, was a clear breach of privilege, and therefore there was no propriety in marking one case more than another, in the event of such disobedience; the vote upon them always ought to pass *nemine contradicente*, but never to be so entered, lest it might bring a doubt where there ought to be none.

The House immediately adopted this suggestion from the Chair, and the words *nem. con.* were left out.

Mr. Tierney then moved, "That the said "James Trotter be, for his said offence, com-"mitted to his Majesty's gaol of Newgate."

Mr. Bragge observed, that he had heard nothing which had changed his opinion relative to the course which the House ought ultimately to take in this proceeding. He had said, that in substance there were now two charges against this person instead of one: 1st, that he had disobeyed the summons of that House; 2dly, that he had wilfully, and from corrupt motives, been guilty of a breach of the privileges of that House: the latter was totally distinct from the former; to one of which the man had been heard, to the other he had not; for the one therefore he ought to be punished without further discussion, for the other he ought to be heard before he was punished at all. The Hon. Gent. whose motion was now before the House, had a right to say, that thus absenting himself was a crime of considerable magnitude, and that it was aggravated by what appeared on the minutes of the committee, which had been laid before the House; but then he could not help thinking that the man ought to be heard as to the matter of aggravation: but the Hon. Gent. said, he had no objection to the prisoner's producing evidence in his defence; now if he did not object to his producing evidence in his defence, how could he object to the man's being heard in his defence? But he said, that if Trotter was advised to make any further defence, the other side must have an opportunity of offering evidence. Now, this he could not assent to; he thought it impossible to hear any more evidence upon the subject. It was impossible to hear any further evidence, even on behalf of the prisoner himself, because the House had already, by voting that the prisoner had been guilty of a breach of privilege, decided that he must be punished, and the House could not hear any evidence against that decision. Still, as to the quantum of the punishment, he thought that the man ought to be heard, not by witnesses; he never had an idea of that, because they could not be upon oath, and their testimony could not be received against that which was upon oath, and now before the House; but he might be allowed to address the House for himself, upon the matter urged against him as aggravation, for upon that he had not been heard. The Hon. Gent. stated, that the absence of this man was a crime—that he admitted; and he thought upon the evidence, that the absence must be taken to be wilful. The Hon. Gent. seemed to take this matter up on behalf of some of the parties: he had no knowledge of that sort; he knew nothing of the case, further than as it appeared from the evidence on the table. But the Hon. Gent. took a more active part, and seemed to speak from further information, and to say there were others to be implicated in this matter, if further inquired into: he then said, that if this man should at any time petition the House to be released, he should move another inquiry. Now that would be going farther than he thought the Hon. Gent. ought to go. However, if the prisoner was brought up and heard, Mr. Bragge said his purpose would be answered.

Mr. Tierney said, he did not see what advantage this man could have by being heard at the bar of the House, if he was not allowed to give evidence; for how, without evidence, could he hope to alter the feeling of the House upon the case? He had no objection to evidence being given in behalf of this unfortunate man, for it was not punishment on him that was his main object—he wanted to develope the scene. He had been considered by the Rt. Hon. Gent. who spoke last, as if he was some agent of the parties in this business;

he was no such character. He certainly did hear from Sir John Henderson the nature of this case; and he knew no reason whatever why a Member of Parliament should not hear the case of a party aggrieved, who came to the House to ask redress—as a Member of Parliament he addressed the House on such a case. As to taking an active part either one way or the other, he saw no impropriety in that, so that a man followed the conviction of his own mind. He denied that he took upon himself this matter as an agent of a party. The Rt. Hon. Gent. ought to recollect, that none of this matter of aggravation was recommended at first by him; for the course which he advised was, that the House ought to proceed immediately upon the Report of the committee, which course, had the House taken it, would have saved all the trouble which must now be taken. Under these impressions, he could not help feeling a little sore, under the idea of being called upon in this manner: he should repeat, that he had reason to be perfectly convinced, that if this matter was followed up, certain foul proceedings would appear, and facts would come out against some very high persons; and he thought, that instead of accusing him of going further than he ought, some parties ought to thank him for his lenity.

Mr. Bragge saw no reason why the Hon. Gent. should feel sore at any thing that was said; there was nothing intended to hurt him. If he knew of any underhand proceeding in this business, he might make it the subject of a substantive motion: all that was said upon that by him was, that the Hon. Gent. seemed to have some information from one of the parties in this proceeding. Mr. Bragge retained his opinion that Trotter ought to be heard upon the subject-matter of the aggravation of his case, because upon that matter he had not been heard at all; but that he could call no witnesses.

Mr. Sheridan differed from both the Hon. Gent. who had spoken on the subject, both on the former day, and the present occasion, for he thought that the matter ought now to be concluded. The prisoner could have no more to say, for he had been heard already, and his crime stood established, and was even admitted by himself. But as to evidence being given on the part of this man's accuser, what would that be but trying this cause over again; and, perhaps, implicating parties who have not had an opportunity of being heard, and perhaps, too, upon charges of a very serious nature? This would be bringing forward again the whole case of the election, which had been already decided by the committee, and would be superseding the authority of Mr. Grenville's bill.

Mr. Frankland thought that the proposed inquiry would not encroach upon the provisions of Mr. Grenville's bill, because this was not an inquiry into the merits of the election, which had been settled by the committee, and whose decision was not to be reviewed by the House; but it was an inquiry into collateral matter, which the provisions of Mr. Grenville's bill did not touch, and in which the House was at liberty to proceed according to its usage, as if Mr. Grenville's bill had never passed.

The question was then put, that the said James Trotter, for his said offence, be committed to his Majesty's gaol of Newgate.—Ordered *nem. con.*

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Wednesday, April 6.—(See Minutes, p. 668.)

[Militia officers' bill.—Lord Hobart moved the third reading of the militia officers' bill.

The Earl of Radnor took the opportunity to propose some slight amendments in certain parts of the bill, which were agreed to by the House.

The bill being read a third time,

The Earl of Radnor rose to propose the introduction of a clause by way of rider to the bill, the particulars of which he stated to their Lordships; but the leading effect he described, would be to restore the command of those companies to the field officers of the militia corps, of which, by the regulations not long since adopted, they were deprived, but which were still held by officers of corresponding rank in regiments of the line. In recommending the clause to the adoption of the House, his Lordship recapitulated some of his former observations on the proceedings with respect to the militia, and urged, that besides tending so far to restore the militia to its original constitutional principle, it would diminish the difficulty of finding officers properly qualified, by lessening the number of captains in each corps. The Noble Earl also made some observations with respect to the subordinate parts of the clause, and concluded by regularly moving for its adoption.

Lord Hobart felt himself called upon, under the present circumstances, to resist the adoption of the proposed clause. In the first place, he observed, it would directly controvert a legislative provision made in the last session of Parliament, by which that alteration, proposed after a due consideration of the point, was deemed advisable. The effect of that regulation, which he thought likely to be advantageous, they had not yet had an opportunity of experiencing; and he was of opinion, that, at least, such an opportunity

should be given. Nor was this the only objection he entertained against the clause; it would go, in a great degree, to render inefficacious one of the leading provisions of the bill itself, as it would so far give a greater latitude to the power of the Lord Lieutenants in these respects, than was in the contemplation of the bill. The Noble Secretary here described the effect and intention of that part of the bill to which he alluded, and having argumentatively enforced the above points, concluded by observing, he felt it his duty to oppose the clause moved by the Noble Earl.

Earl Spencer delivered his sentiments on the question at some length, in the course of which he expatiated on the importance of the militia as a constitutional defensive force, and expressed his regret at the alterations which had been lately made in that system. He thought the bill before the House, in that point of view, one of considerable importance, and, with respect to it, he must observe, that no case of necessity for it had been made out by Ministers, which he thought should have been done before they could be justified in calling upon the Legislature to adopt provisions so contradictory to the constitutional principles of the militia as originally established. On these general grounds, he was inclined to support the proposition of the Noble Earl, whose particular observations in recommendation of the clause his Lordship also enforced.

The question was then put, the proposed clause was rejected, and the bill read a third time and passed, and a message sent to acquaint the Commons therewith.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 6. (See Minutes, p. 669.)

[Clergy non-residence bill.]—Sir William Scott addressed the House upon the nature of the bill he meant to offer to the consideration of Parliament. He said it was not his intention to trespass on the House any length of time, as the subject had undergone much discussion at various times; but he considered it necessary to observe, that ever since the establishment of religion in this country, there were existing laws which regulated the national church, and these laws possessed considerable merit, and evinced the wisdom of those legislators who framed them, and which enforced the clergy to give the strictest attention to the duties of the church, as well as allowing a certain provision to render her members in every respect comfortable. But these ancient laws had for centuries lain dormant. There were also several acts of a more recent date; in Lord Bacon's time, laws were framed for the regulation of the clergy; the letter and spirit of them were nearly the same as those of an anterior date, but which had also lain dormant till within these five years, since which time they have been brought into use, and, he was sorry to say, to the injury of many worthy men. Among the members of the church of England, he had to contemplate with pleasure many characters who were the highest honour to the nation; men of simple habits, amiable disposition, and laborious life, who were liable to feel the effect of one of these old statutes, and who would rather redeem themselves with money, than suffer the exposure which an information, founded on the act of Henry VIII. would enforce. Notwithstanding, it was his wish that some measure should be adopted to make the clergy attentive to the duties of the church. As the laws stood at present, relative to the duty of clergymen, they doubtless contained much defect; and it was high time to do what my Lord Coke had recommended above a hundred and fifty years ago, that was, to revise the statutes applicable to the regulation of the church. By the advice of his friends he had undertaken to give this subject serious consideration, and it would give him considerable pleasure, if he could serve a respectable class of men, consistently with the safety of religion and the morality of the country. On a former occasion, when this subject was discussed, he had expressed his wish that time should be given to deliberate on the bill then before the House; but every Member must recollect what a mob of bills rushed through the House, in the last agony of passing; yet he did not expect that the former bill would have been one of them. With respect to the present bill, he would inform the House explicitly, that it is fundamentally the same as the former bill. The bill he was about to submit to the wisdom of the House, contained an exemption to several persons; whether this was right he would leave the House to decide. He had not made any provision for the parochial clergy, not but it would be right to do so, but he thought it ought to come from another quarter. It was his wish that the parsonage-houses should be put in proper repair for the reception of their proper inhabitants: from the great decay these dwellings had been suffered to go into, many clergymen were under the necessity of residing at a great distance from their duty. As to those benefices to which there is no house attached, some provision ought to be made to render the clergy more comfortable. With respect, said the Learned Gent. to the small benefices, something has been done by Mr. Gilbert's act, but he thought it had not gone far enough to be of real service to this order of the clergy. The method he should propose would be, that Government should advance a large sum of money, as a fund, to mend the stipends of curates; this he thought necessary for the better support of those numerous, worthy, laborious men, on whom the religion and morality of the country much depended. He would

not wound the feelings of the House, by any recital of the gloomy stories which had been communicated to him, of the extreme distress these gentlemen have suffered since the act of Henry VIII. has been put in force, as it has been the means of their losing those livings which just gave them bread. The letters he had received from clergymen of this description, who are now in the greatest misery, affected his mind much; he therefore hoped some measure would be adopted by the wisdom of Parliament to relieve their necessities. The alteration of Queen Anne's act has made some progress to relieve the evil of small benefices, and it would be a matter of future consideration, whether it would not be better to consolidate Queen Anne's bounty for the advantage of small livings. He had not made any provision for the sister church, if that might be called the sister church, which was identically the same. The Learned Member said he had nothing farther to observe at present on the bill; but he hoped that it might go through a committee after the recess, as it possibly may be better regulated in a committee than on a first reading.—If, on the perusal of the bill, the House should express their satisfaction, he should be happy that he had been the means of rendering an effectual service to a large and valuable body of gentlemen, who have been much disturbed within these few years, by the letter of an old act of Parliament.—But if the bill should be found, by the good sense of the House, not to answer the intended purpose, he should be one of the first to relinquish it. He however hoped, that it would be found calculated to answer every purpose for which it was designed; therefore he should move for leave to bring in a bill for preventing spiritual persons from holding farms, and to enforce their residence on their benefices.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 7. (See Minutes, p. 669.)

[Grenada loan.]—The report of the Grenada loan bill was taken into consideration, with the amendments, and ordered to be read a second time.

Mr. Wilberforce rose, and entered into a long account of our first connexion with the West India planters: he observed, that whatever might have been the wisdom and policy of Government in giving their support to those planters at one period, he did not think it politic to continue it at the present time. When the measure was first discussed in the House, Parliament were informed, that the money applied for would be very soon repaid, and that the House would not be troubled with any future application for money; but every Member in the House must know that had not been the case: repeated applications had been since made to Parliament for additional assistance, and repeated sums voted by the House for the support of the West India trade. Different periods had also been mentioned for the repayment of the money advanced by Government; but the House well knew that it had been a promise without a performance. A large sum of money was granted in the year 1799, for the service of our West India connexion, and not long after this period an application was made for a longer time to repay the borrowed sums. He was ready to acknowledge that he had no objection to the West India security, but he thought their applications grew upon us; we therefore ought to be cautious how we make use of the public money. And he did not doubt but every Member in the House was acquainted with this fact, that year after year application has been made to pay the St. Vincent's and Grenada loan, and that the application was always granted without much opposition. He must acknowledge that it appeared to him that the longer the planters had our money, the period for repaying it was farther removed. It was his opinion, that the money might have been employed much better than sending it to the most vulnerable part of the world; indeed the late attacks which have been made on the West India islands, as well as their internal inquietude, do not promise much return for our assistance: it is therefore necessary that the House should consider the value of our money, and the many valuable uses to which it may be applied, before they vote it away for the support of an unprofitable connexion. He had long been of opinion, that property was not to be considered safe in that country, and it would be extremely impolitic on the part of Government, to lend large sums of money for foreign use: in his mind it would be a dangerous practice, and if often carried into effect, the nation would feel its bad consequences. It had been rumoured that this money was employed for various purposes foreign to its intended application, but he did not mean to say there was any truth in the report: the only object he had in view, was a proper application of the public money: he thought, that if our money was employed in our own country, it would answer the purpose of Government better than in giving it to the West India islands. If he could judge from the conduct of Government, it was their wish to get rid of the public money. These, he said, were his candid sentiments on the Grenada loan bill; and instead of advancing any additional sums of money to the West India planters, we ought to lose no time in getting back the money we have already advanced.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he was sure it must have been felt by the House, while his Hon. Friend was speaking, that a great part of his argument was addressed to them against the policy of the measure it-

self, and not to the circumstances of Grenada and St. Vincent's, either in the year 1795, or at present. His Hon. Friend had said, that by some Gentlemen that aid had been represented as a profitable and lucrative application of the public money, and his Hon. Friend had stated it as money lent out at interest to those persons who were the objects of it. He thought indeed it was both profitably and lucratively laid out at interest, but not in the way stated by his Hon. Friend, who had said some things which he could not hear from him without regret, particularly as the statement was made by one of so much general correctness of judgment. A great part of the argument of his Hon. Friend went to underrate the value of the object, for which this aid was given to the trade of Grenada and St. Vincent's, and he had suggested that it was employed in a different way from that which was professed to have been the object of it; that it had been employed on the subject of the slave-trade, or cultivation for extending that traffic. Now, Mr. Addington said, he hoped, let the sentiments of that House be what they might on the slave-trade, it had not made up its mind to do any thing that was unfavourable to the prosperity of any of our West India colonies. Did his Hon. Friend not recollect that every hogshead of sugar, and every puncheon of rum, and every other article of the produce of our West India colonies was material to us, as it tended to sustain the public credit of this country, by contributing its share in defraying our expenditure? Did his Hon. Friend not recollect, and feel how much the West India trade in general contributed to the maintenance of the maritime strength of this country? He was persuaded, that his Hon. Friend would upon reflection feel the weight of these observations, and he was confident that the House would not suffer any considerations, even of humanity, to mix with the consideration of policy to which he had adverted, as it might be supposed to bear on the measure now before the House; and in this he was confident he should have the concurrence of his Hon. Friend, for he was confident it was possible for many who wished for the abolition of the slave-trade, to attach the highest importance to our West India colonies and trade; but his Hon. Friend stated the danger which might arise from Government lending money to persons over whom it might afterwards have an influence.—Could this be seriously stated in the House of Commons?—Was this a loan from Government to individuals?—No; it was an aid given by Parliament to a particular part of trade connected with the public interest of the state. The sum was voted not by Government, but by the House of Commons, to individuals not connected with Government, to be distributed, and security taken for the repayment of it, not by Government, but by persons appointed for that office by Parliament; so that his Hon. Friend's apprehension in that respect was unfounded. His Hon. Friend had also observed, that Government ought to know whether the money already advanced under this bill had been properly applied or not; whether some of the parties had not made use of it for the purposes of extending the cultivation of other lands besides those that were in a state of cultivation at the time when this bill was first introduced? To this the answer was, that it was the duty of the commissioners appointed to act under the authority of the bill, to see that the aid of Parliament should not be improperly applied; and he did not think it proper to apply it to the purposes of extended cultivation; but, as to the security of repayment of the money granted under the authority of this legislative measure, he could assure his Hon. Friend, that Government had taken great pains to ascertain whether the parties were able to discharge the engagements they entered into on receiving this aid; and they were, as they ought to be, perfectly satisfied with the result of that inquiry, which was made by commissioners acting under the authority of that House. But it appeared also, from equal authority, that the individuals to whom the accommodation was granted, could not, without incurring more than inconvenience, discharge their engagements in the present year. What then was now asked? Not a renewal of aid, but a continuance of indulgence, from the last session of Parliament for one year longer. What was the proposition in regard to the indulgence already granted? That 200,000*l.* out of the remaining sum should be discharged in the course of one year, and the same sum in the following year, so that the whole will be discharged in three years from the present time. It was to be recollected that one third was discharged already, together with an interest, not to call it lucrative, but a limited interest of 5 per cent. and if the House would refer to the price of sugar at the time this indulgence was first granted, and the price of it for the last two years, they would see clearly the ground on which that indulgence was granted. The House had already acted on the ground that extraordinary indulgence ought to be shewn, and in so doing the House had proceeded with caution. In the present session of Parliament, a bounty had been granted on the exportation of sugar, in consequence of the low price, occasioned by a glut in the market at home, from the arrival of large cargoes from the West Indies. Under these circumstances those who suffered in this respect, did so more than formerly, and they stated to the House all the circumstances, by which it appeared, that by an ordinary price of sugar, they will be able to pay off 200,000*l.* in the present year, and a similar sum in each of the succeeding years, so that in three years the whole of the engagement of these persons with the public will be fulfilled; and the question now was; whether the House would

continue the measure which had been already adopted for so many years with so much advantage, or would contract its disposition, and subject these gentlemen, and all the property, perhaps, of Jamaica, to something more than inconvenience? He thought with his Hon. Friend, that this was an occasion which called for the vigilance of the House; not for its jealousy, but its attention, for there was nothing to suspect, but much to encourage; and on a view of all the circumstances of this case, he was convinced that the House would not only act liberally, but wisely, by acceding to the present proposition.

Sir Robert Peel said, he was relieved from a considerable anxiety by what the House had just heard from the Minister; for it was a subject that interested him greatly, and he did conceive it to be a subject, which, if discussed by men competent to that discussion, would appear in proportion as it was discussed, important and interesting, not merely to the West Indies, and to persons concerned in that trade, but to the people at large of the community in which we live, and even the great landed interest of this, not less than any other class of persons: it was therefore on this principle that he defended and supported the measure now before the House. What gave rise to this loan?—he did not call it a grant. Was it an unwise and imprudent speculation of a set of men who had no interest in the welfare of this country, with whom the measure originated? No; had it not been made appear that it was a measure of the wisest policy, to protect our property in the West Indies, at a time when, without it, perhaps, it would have been questionable, whether Government itself could have done so?—There was no blame attached to Government in consequence of that state of things at that time in the West Indies; it arose from circumstances which were unavoidable. He spoke with perfect independence upon this subject; for he did not so much as know the gentlemen who solicited the assistance of Parliament.—They applied for pecuniary aid from the House, not to incur any expense to this country, but merely for aid until their own affairs should come round; and in the granting of which the greatest advantage might be derived to the trade of the West Indies, which was so material to the whole of this empire. He was not only well convinced of the propriety of this application to Parliament, but he was also surprised very much they did not come forward with claims of a much stronger nature; that they did not apply to be reimbursed some losses which they sustained in consequence of a certain pressure which came on them.—The claim they brought forward was, in his opinion, moderate, nor was it an appeal to the humanity of the Legislature, or to the feelings of individuals, but an application to the good sense and the justice of those who were best acquainted with the true and enlarged interests of this country. The Legislature saw it in that light, and afforded assistance to the persons who made the application; in which it had acted wisely, for he had ever considered that West India property was a part of the interest of this country, and which had a perfect claim to the protection of Government. It was immaterial to him whether the produce of it was consumed here or in any other part of the globe; it was enough for him that it constituted part of the strength, as indeed it did the sinew, which was the marine strength of this country; for it was impossible not to know that our ships of war derived much of their vigour from this trade; and those who conceived that the landed interest of this country was not intimately connected with this interest, were but superficial politicians. One would have imagined from some things thrown out in the course of discussing this measure, that Government had been flippant in lending this money, when, in fact, Government acted in a manner that did it the greatest credit, and by which they removed a very considerable embarrassment, not only from Grenada and St. Vincent's, but from this country itself, which must have been ultimately affected if this measure had not been adopted. The measure had hitherto been attended by the best effects, and by no inconveniences; but if the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Wilberforce), by the exertion of his talents, should impress the House with an idea that this measure was an improper one, he would do an act of great mischief, because he would do an injury to the trade and manufacture of this country, for indeed they derived great support from the trade which this bill was calculated to protect; and he should be very sorry indeed to see any Ministers in this country inattentive to these considerations. He conceived this measure calculated for the interest of the whole, not a part, of our community. It had been said, that our property in the West Indies was of a precarious nature. Good God! that was the strongest reason upon earth why it should be assisted in time of need by the strong arm of Government. If it could not be supported without our aid, then they had a double claim—one upon our policy, the other on our justice. In whatever light he considered this measure, it met his entire approbation, although he should always be glad to see this, as well as every other matter, watched and examined.

Dr. Lawrence said, he had not heard anything to convince him that our support to the West India trade would be injurious to this country. A loan had been granted from time to time; it was a principle that had been acted upon with great benefit to this nation; and he considered it the duty of Government to protect the West India trade. If we were to withdraw our support, he would ask what

would become of the natives, a numerous body of persons who were now employed to prepare those articles of commerce, which form an important part of our trade? The islands would be in a dreadful state of confusion and misery, and every tie in nature would be separated and destroyed, by men not far removed from savages. We have already had a proof of the sanguinary conduct of the blacks in that quarter of the world; and if they cannot be employed by their owners, in consequence of the want of that support we at present give to their trade, every thing that is miserable must attend them. But he was sure that the House would continue their support to that trade, which was of the utmost importance to the country.

Mr. Johnstone observed, that it had been said that the West India security was doubtful; but it must be recollected that two London merchants of great eminence had also given security for the money advanced by Government to the West India planters. The landed interest and the monied interest of the country were inseparable, and therefore if one felt an injury, the other must. He was of opinion, that the West India merchants had not received our money and support, as an indulgence, but had asked for the loan, as a claim.

General Gascoyne supported the bill: he said, he was rather astonished at the opposition which it had received from some quarters, particularly when it was considered what sums had been advanced, not lent, to the Sierra Leone Company. He was much surprised at some observations which had fallen from an Hon. Gent. respecting the precarious state of the West India islands. Such observations were always dangerous, and he hoped they would not be used in future.

The report was then agreed to, and the bill was ordered to be read a third time on the 19th of April.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, April 20. *(See Minutes, p. 670.)*

[Nottingham election.]—Mr. H. Browne rose to make his intended motion. Having had the honour of being chairman of the committee, it was in compliance with their wish, and from the full conviction of his own mind, he brought forward this measure. He disclaimed any idea of proposing it with a view to criminate any individuals. The bill he intended to move for, he was aware, was a strong measure; but the facts that had been proved before the committee, and which had been long enough printed to afford Gent. an opportunity of becoming acquainted with them, shewed the necessity of making some alteration in the government of Nottingham. That House was particularly called upon to interfere, because the freedom of election had been grossly violated by outrages committed, not alone during last election, but on many other occasions, because the lives and properties of the inhabitants could not be secure without some effectual measure to guard against a repetition of the same violence. The outrages committed during the last election, had been attended with such circumstances of atrocity, as to induce the committee to make a special report. In compliance with the desire of the committee, he had, on a former occasion, moved for a suspension of the Speaker's writ till the report should be further considered; and under the same authority he proposed to move now for a farther suspension till the bill could pass through the House. The bill would not go to disfranchise nor to criminate any persons, it would operate only to enable Government to place the power of preserving the peace of Nottingham in proper hands, and would go no farther than a bill for appointing magistrates at Westminster. The object of it was to give to the magistrates of the county the same power which the magistrates of the city of Nottingham had; to restore to them a power which they possessed before the charter of incorporation was granted to Nottingham. He should not trouble the House longer, but reserve himself to answer any objections that might be advanced against his motion. He therefore moved for leave to bring in a bill for preserving the peace, and securing the freedom of election at Nottingham.

Mr. Pierrepont observed, that since he had the honour of a seat in the House, he had not trespassed on its indulgence. If his feelings could be known, it would be believed with what reluctance he now obtruded himself upon it. He had been called to the election of Nottingham, and he was sorry to say, that the most violent excesses took place there, and continued during the election.—The magistrates had been guilty of the most shameful negligence, and if they had not encouraged, they had certainly continued unconcerned spectators of outrages that were a disgrace to any civilized country.

Mr. Fox did not rise to oppose the bill, but he wished to call the attention of the House to the state in which the Report placed it. He thought it should not be prepossessed by accounts from any quarter, however respectable. If the report of the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pierrepont) was true, the committee had shamefully abandoned its duty, in not reporting the magistrates to have incurred the severest animadversions of the House. He had himself bestowed the closest attention on the matter of the minutes, and the result was, according to

the best effort of his judgment, a conviction that the mayor was not guilty. If the military were necessary, did he not, he asked, call them in on every proper occasion? Did he not go to Mr. Coke's committee, and consult with them? Did he not do every thing but surround the booth with armed men? Did he refuse to make constables for either side, from a partiality for the other? Did he not, on the contrary, appoint all proper persons that were proposed to him as additional constables? Did he not offer to do every thing in his power, but what would have deserved the severest animadversion of the House? This bill was besides founded, as the Hon. Mover accurately stated, on the habitual riots at Nottingham. That riots existed there at former elections, was well known; and that such riots were always on the part of the interest adverse to the corporation. If on such occasions they had not been able to suppress the disturbances, it was a strong presumptive evidence that the magistrates had not been guilty of neglect at the late election. As to the nature of the bill, the committee seemed to have decided the guilt, with a view to direct the proceedings of the House. But the conduct of the magistrates was not materially affected by the substance of the resolution. Their incapacity to preserve the peace must have arisen from a defect of duty or of means. If from the former, it would be proper to introduce others, better disposed to their duty; if from the latter, it would require a remedy of another nature—to enlarge the means. The case was not a new one. More than one had occurred of a like nature. In every such instance, remedial bills were enacted, but the magistrates never were altered. The Hon. Mover admitted it was a severe measure; but he affirmed it would not go to disfranchise any one. It was only to restore the rights of the county magistrates, before the charter was granted. How it could restore, by overturning the charter, he could not conceive. It would be for the House to see, whether or not the bill provided any remedy. The magistrates appeared to him to have done every thing in their power, except what, if they had dared to do, he trusted there was yet spirit enough in the House to punish with just and merited severity. He trusted this country should never witness such an election as a naval officer had stated once in that House to have been made of some officers at Brussels, in the hollow square of the French army. It appeared that the mayor had not been guilty but in not calling in the military, and he was sure the magistrates of the county would be equally incapable of such a proposition. He did not deny that a remedy was necessary, and on that account he would not oppose the motion.

Mr. Bond would not follow the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down. Every question of criminality was irrelevant. It was now only to be considered whether sufficient ground had been laid for the measure proposed. The committee had, by their Report, informed the House that scenes had passed during the last election at Nottingham, of the greatest outrage, by which the freedom of election was grossly violated; that no effectual means had been taken to put a stop to the riots; that the magistrates of Nottingham had proved inadequate to discharge the trust delegated to them by high authority. In such a case it could not be contended that the Crown might not depute others, or that the power should continue vested exclusively in those who had already shewn themselves incapable of their duty. It was much against his will, and to his great surprise, that the antecedent riots had been introduced in the examinations before the committee, and it had been found necessary often to interrupt counsel on that account; but it was then necessary to explain certain cant terms in use at Nottingham, such as punch, &c. &c. A self-constituted tribunal also existed at Nottingham, which required explanation. These facts, fully authenticated, appeared to the committee to require a remedy. It would be for the House to judge, whether the measure proposed would be adequate. As to the inability of the magistrates of the county, alluded to by the Hon. Gent. that would easily be refuted, when it was considered, that they could carry the *posse comitatus* into the town to maintain the peace; and he should rejoice to see such a force employed on such an occasion. After several other observations equally forcible, the Hon. Gent. concluded, by stating, that he thought sufficient ground had been laid for the measure.

Mr. Frankland agreed that the outrages of the mob, and the corruption of the magistrates, called for some effectual measure. Besides, the jurisdiction of the town magistrates was limited, and culprits may escape if the bill now proposed were not adopted to give the county magistrates a right of acting.—Leave was given.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 21.—(See Minutes, p. 671.)

[Mercantile accommodation.]—A motion being made that the House resolve into a committee of the whole, on so much of the King's speech of November last, as relates to this subject—General Gascoigne said, that after having had so long ago a communication from the Throne, on the state of affairs, and hearing the speech of the Minister, the other night, on that subject, in answer to a few words from himself (Gen. Gascoigne), and an Hon. Friend of his (Col. Patten), he had postponed the motion, of which he had given notice, for an inquiry into the state of the

nation, he should not now enter at large upon that subject, although, in strictness, it would have been regular in him to do so, because, upon any proposition that had for its object the laying any imposts upon the people, a Member of the House of Commons was entitled to look at the state of the imposts already laid, and how they bear upon the people; but although he intended to forego this privilege, he could not pass the subject over without notice, and therefore he should make some observations, notwithstanding the remark of the Rt. Hon. Gent. who was pleased to say, the other night, that he did not see the connexion between the measure now proposed and that of a consideration of peace and war: on this matter he differed from the Rt. Hon. Gent. By a paper printed by order of the Lords of the Treasury, he received some information, and from which he had no doubt it was intended to propose an increase of duty on the commerce of this country. Whether it was to be a new measure of duty, or that of increasing an old one, was not worthy of discussion, in his mind, because that was a distinction without a difference. Any subject which had for its object any increase of such duty, would admit of an extensive debate; for, however certain it was, that the power of disposing of the question of peace and war rested with the Crown, yet it was as certain that the control of that power, in granting or withholding supplies, vested in the House of Commons; and in exercising that most important function, the House would not only look how the revenue was to be applied, but would also consider the state of the nation: he said this, not for the purpose of preparing the way to general observations at this time, but merely to recognise the right of doing so, in the discussion of any subject of impost upon the public. He could not help considering this matter, although in terms only a motion to consolidate the public duties, as a measure intended to increase them, and he had no doubt it would operate on the articles of trade. There was to be a duty of 3½ per cent. proposed on the present duty; in some cases it would operate as a duty of 15 per cent. on the present duty. But this was not all the objection; for the tax on tonnage, which was a tax laid on by way of experiment, was now intended to be made permanent.—Now, after the very candid behaviour of an Hon. Member, who was not now present (the Lord Mayor), he did not think it proper to include that matter in the present discussion, since that Hon. Member had a proposition to submit on that subject. And in reply to the observations of the Minister on his (General Gascoigne's) observation the other night on his candour, he would say, it would be more consistent with the candour of the Rt. Hon. Gent. to stay until that Hon. Gent. should make his proposition, or at least to defer this matter until after the communication which he promised on the state of public affairs should have been made, that the House and the public might see, and be enabled to judge of the state of public affairs. But he understood it was intended by the measure about to be proposed to the committee, to furnish ways and means to pay the interest of the money expended in the present armament. Before this was done, it was material to consider whether these duties were such as applied to war or peace, for there was a material distinction in this respect. Duties might be objectionable in peace, which might be submitted to without objection in time of war. How far that was the case here, he could not now attempt to say, but he thought it would be better, at all events, to delay the measure for a day or two, and until after the promised communication of the Minister on the state of public affairs was made to the House. It was not his intention to oppose the principle of the measure at present, and he wished it to be perfectly understood, that he should take an opportunity of hearing the opinion of those who were best qualified to form an opinion, and for whose interest it was his wish to act in particular, as well as for the general interests of the empire, before he took any decisive course whatever; all that he asked now was, that the Minister would not press this measure in any of its future stages without affording ample time for considering it.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down, had, as it appeared to him, very wisely changed his intention as to the subject now about to be submitted to the House, as it related to a part of his Majesty's most gracious speech from the Throne in the month of November last, and which he had now the honour of submitting to the House. The Hon. Member had said, that from a schedule he had seen, the present object was that of an increase of the public revenue:—in this supposition the Hon. Member was completely mistaken; that was not the object of the measure—its object was to simplify the collection of the duties of customs, and thereby, also, to make some addition to the public revenue, in the same manner as it was made in the year 1787, when the question of peace and war, to which the Hon. Gent. had referred, did not in any degree agitate the feelings or the interests of the public. The Hon. Gent. had said, that on a former day, he (Mr. Addington) gave the House reason to expect, that in a few days he should make a communication on an important subject. He certainly did say he had hopes of being able to make a communication on a subject interesting to the feelings of the House and the public, in the course of a few days; but he also said, at the same time, that it was impossible for him to pledge himself, and that he did not pledge or commit himself upon that subject. His object then was to take care not

to endanger the public interest, either by a premature discussion, which must have been the case in the absence of communication, or to endanger the public interest by a precipitate communication: but, from the very nature of the thing, it was impossible for him to make any pledge upon the subject; nevertheless the Hon. Gent. had seemingly inferred, and others had industriously propagated as well as inferred, that what was represented by him on that occasion was, that which would give satisfaction to the House and the public on the subject. He did not say a single word to that effect. He said he should, he believed, be able in a few days to make a communication to the House, and that he thought would be necessary, because he felt the inconvenience and more than inconvenience of suspense; but as to the nature of the communication which it was probable he should be able to make, he not only did not say any thing, but he was not able to say any thing. He should not now say any more upon this subject, but propose, that the House should go into a committee on the subject he had moved; and if the House should assent to that, he should shortly open the outline of the measure he had to propose.

The question was then put and carried, and the House resolved itself into a committee of the whole House accordingly.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer then said, that the object he had in view, was to submit to the consideration of the committee, means to simplify, consolidate, and amend the mode of collecting the duties of customs, and he wished to conform to the communication of his Majesty, in his gracious speech from the Throne, in the month of November last. He wished the committee to understand, that the proposition he had to submit, was part of a system already adopted by the Legislature, the object of which was to consolidate, simplify, and amend all the laws which relate to the revenue from customs, in every branch of that public revenue, and to remove every obscurity, embarrassment, or difficulty in its collection, to render the appropriation of each part of it, clear, precise, and uniform, as well as to facilitate the mode of its collection, both with regard to those who collected these duties, and the public. The measure he had to submit to the committee, was founded on the same principle as that which produced the act of 1787. After giving a short account of the mode of collecting duties, as established in the time of King William III. and the establishment of the consolidated fund, and also of the appropriation of a certain revenue to provide for services within the year, he proceeded to observe, that what he had to suggest was, that all the duties of customs, which are now raised under no less than 170 acts of Parliament, should be consolidated; that in some cases where a consolidation took place, if there should be a fractional sum payable on a particular article, it should be raised to an integral sum above it, and in others be reduced to an integral sum below it. Some articles in the book of rates of duty having become obsolete, were to be omitted; and on others an *ad valorem* duty was to be imposed; and also for the sake of regularity in the entries, &c. a very small duty was proposed to be laid on all articles which at present were imported duty free. With respect to the detail of the measure, he should like to spare time by passing it over for the present, unless it was the wish of the committee that he should enter into it, because he was desirous that every Member should be in possession of the schedule, which the Hon. Gent. who spoke last, acknowledged he had seen, before the subject should be discussed in detail; and as to the principle of the measure, he did conceive, that as it was to improve the collection of the revenue, there would have been no difference of opinion upon it.—There might indeed be some difference of opinion on the quantity; and on that he did not ask for any opinion until every Gentleman had an opportunity of considering it with minuteness. It was proposed that most articles imported from the East Indies, with the exception of sugar, should be charged with the same duties as articles from other quarters. As to the West Indies, to use the phrase of his predecessor, it was proposed to put a mark, but not an invidious mark of preference to those of the West Indies, but not such a preference as might have the effect of discouraging the productions of any other part of his Majesty's dominions. Another object of the present measure was, that of further counteracting the practices of smugglers, which, notwithstanding the prohibitions and heavy penalties attached to them by enactments in our statute-books, still continued. It was his object not only to discourage this by regulations of duties, but also to afford more ample protection to our trade and commerce. Gentlemen had said, it was material that merchants should be consulted on this subject before it should be proposed to the committee—that it was too important to the interests of the country to be adopted without submitting it to the judgment of those who had the best experience upon the matter. He understood the Hon. Gent. who spoke last to have said so; but whether that understanding was right or not, he thought it material to state, that he had endeavoured to obtain the opinions of persons of the greatest experience on every part of the measure which he was now about to submit, and that had it not been for his having waited for such opinions, this measure would have been long ago submitted to Parliament. It had also been submitted to the Boards of Customs and of

Trade, and he had reason to believe, that although some difference of opinion had arisen on a few articles, yet on the outline very little difference of opinion had been entertained indeed, for it was to simplify the regulations of articles, the number of which was near 6000. As to the precise amount of the duties, he had nothing to say at present, for that was to be the result of communications and conferences with persons of the first ability upon the subject. Much labour had been already bestowed on this subject, and he trusted the committee would allow him to adopt the course which was formerly adopted by his predecessor in the year 1787, and also in the act of Union between this country and Ireland; namely, that of introducing the several heads of regulation in the form of a schedule, instead of proposing a distinct resolution on each separate article, for in that course the House would have to consider little less than 6000 resolutions; whereas, by referring to a schedule containing them all in their different classes, they might be comprehended in a few votes. But here it was fit for him to observe, that he should not do justice to the labour and abilities that were employed in the forming of this schedule, if he were not to acknowledge, that the merit of it was chiefly owing to a Gentleman of great knowledge and indefatigable attention—he meant Mr. Frewin, than whom, a more constant, accurate, and faithful servant was not in his Majesty's employment. He wished the committee to understand, that this measure, if the House should countenance and adopt it, was preparatory to another measure, of which he gave notice before Christmas, on the subject of warehousing and bonding. If this measure should pass, as he hoped it would, it was his intention to propose also a measure for that purpose. The examination of the schedule, and the investigation of many points to which the attention of the committee would be called, had impressed him with sentiments of admiration of the extent and vigour of the commerce of this country; growing out, as he knew it had (although commented upon, if he might be permitted to say so, irrationally), of capital that was unexampled in its amount; out of laws and regulations for promoting and encouraging industrious traffic; and out of a credit which was founded on good faith and personal integrity, upon the true character of the people of this country, that good faith between man and man, which was the foundation of its wealth, and main cause of its prosperity. It was thus that our commerce, while it afforded large and liberal aids to the exigencies of the public service for the last ten years, had yet continued to increase so rapidly, that the revenues of the customs had nearly doubled in that time, and the other branches of our commerce were increasing, particularly our navigation. This shewed us the abundance of our resources, and manifested the radical strength of the country; for we find our resources increasing under the pressure of unexampled difficulties, and before unheard-of trials. This shewed the confidence which we were all warranted in feeling, and the public credit which might warrant us in triumph. He then read the first resolution which he intended to move upon this subject, for carrying into effect that which he had stated, and then said, he wished the committee to understand that he was now pursuing the same course as that which was proposed by his predecessor, and adopted by the Legislature, in comprising the different heads of articles intended to be regulated, in a schedule. Should the committee approve of this course, he should propose that an interval should be afforded to consider the schedule, and then that the Chairman should ask leave to sit again; and therefore, if the committee should approve of this resolution, he should move that the Chairman do report progress, and ask leave to sit again; but he should not propose that the committee should sit again before this day se'nnight. The Hon. Gent. (Gen. Gascoigne) seemed surprised that he should propose so early a day for that purpose; but the session was advancing, and this and other business could not be passed over to another: but if the interval now stated should be found insufficient, he should not only be ready, but desirous, to assent to a proposition for further time. As to the tonnage duty, he should be extremely sorry to be thought wanting in candour towards a worthy magistrate (the Lord Mayor of London) in proposing that which might be the subject of his motion; but he had put off becomingly, if he might be allowed to say so, the investigation of a question which, in one way of deciding it, might operate to the diminution of the public revenue. Was it therefore fit that he should exclude from his plan that which had been the subject of public notice, and had occupied a great part of his attention for the last six months? Besides, that worthy magistrate, as well as every other Member, would have ample opportunity of delivering his sentiments on that very subject when it came to be discussed as a part of the measure now proposed: no part of it could pass without being canvassed; and the very step he was now taking, was for the purpose of affording a proper opportunity of discussing every part of it; and this he did the more readily, because there was no point to which he should not wish to call the attention of the committee, in the whole schedule which he was about to submit to its consideration.

Mr. Burdon said, he hoped, from the importance of the subject, sufficient time would be allowed to consider it, before the House was called on to pass the bill. From the best information he could get on the subject, he thought some amendments might be made relative to the tonnage duties: it was highly necessary that the schedule should undergo a

fair investigation before the sanction of the House was given to the measure proposed by the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer.

General Gascoigne said, notwithstanding what the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had said, in answer to his observations, he was surprised that the present measure was proposed to the House, before some account relative to the state of the country had been given, in order to satisfy the public mind. It had been said, that schedules have been circulated throughout the kingdom, but he had only seen one, which had undergone many alterations; and he had been informed by his constituents that they had not received a single schedule. He must again repeat, that he understood the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer to have said, that he hoped to give the House a satisfactory account relative to the state of the country; and he was sure that many Hon. Gent. had received the same impression, from the language the Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had used a few days back. But as far as related to the consideration of the present measure, he thought it would be better to postpone the time for going into a committee on the bill to this day fortnight.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that the question now before the committee was, whether they would agree with the resolution which was proposed; and the period when the committee was to sit again, could only be determined after the Speaker had taken the Chair. If the Hon. Gent. would assure him *bona fde* (and he was sure he would not assert it in any other way), that the addition of a few days would enable his constituents more fully to investigate the subject, he would not be unwilling to accede to a delay of a few days. The Hon. Gent. seemed to suppose that he was desirous of precipitating the public business, with a view of a speedy prorogation of Parliament; but he could assure that Hon. Gent. that there was public business enough before the House to afford a prospect of its sitting as long as he could wish.

General Gascoigne said, his constituents had certainly not seen the schedules, and he thought it was necessary that they should have time enough to consider the nature of the schedules, after they get possession of them.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he begged the Hon. Gent. and the House to understand, that he had in no degree varied on this occasion from what he had said upon a former day, respecting a communication to the House. The schedule of the duties had been made and circulated three months ago, but some alterations having been made in it, it was reprinted, and the last schedule had been in circulation above a month. If the Hon. Gent.'s constituents had not seen it, it was not the fault of his Majesty's Ministers: he would not take upon himself to say with whom the fault rested. With regard to what the Hon. Gent. had said about the duties being raised in some instances higher than to the next integral sum, the committee must be aware that he (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) could have no intention of deceiving them upon the subject, because the whole subject was minutely detailed in the schedule. In some few instances the duties were raised higher than to the next integral sum, and in other instances they were reduced much lower; but in general the whole plan was founded upon the principle adopted in 1787.

Mr. Vansittart said, there were only four instances in which the present schedule varied from the one which was printed and circulated three months ago. The four articles in which alterations had been made, were pimento, sugar from the East Indies, unmanufactured articles, and horses imported from the East Indies.

The resolution was agreed to, the Chairman reported progress, and the committee was ordered to sit again on Monday se'nnight.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 22.—(See Minutes, p. 671.)

[Ilchester election.] — Mr. Smith moved the order of the day for taking into further consideration the Report of the committee appointed to try the merits of the Ilchester election petition. This motion being agreed to, Mr. Smith next moved that the resolutions be now read a second time; which being done, the Hon. Gent. proceeded to observe, that in compliance with the instructions of the committee, he had laid before the House the evidence that was brought forward in the committee: that evidence contained parts which proved that a conspiracy had been formed to employ undue influence in returning members for the borough of Ilchester, and that flagrant acts of bribery had been resorted to in consequence of that conspiracy. On the nature of the offence which the evidence proved to be committed, he should withhold all observation: when it appeared fully proved to the House, they would no doubt shew the sense they entertained of its deep criminality by the severity of the punishment which their justice would inflict upon it. The evidence had been long before the House, and every Gent. had full time to make himself master of it. They were, therefore, enabled now to decide on the question, and that with due regard to that justice which individuals had a right to claim in a matter in which the essential interests of the country were also involved.

He should first move a resolution similar to that contained in the Report, viz. that such a system of corruption and of bribery was laid open in this transaction, that it called for the most serious consideration of the House. This motion he should follow up with others, the object of one of which would be, that the House do order his Majesty's Attorney General to prosecute the persons who were guilty of this offence.

Mr. Wallace said, that as the Hon. Mover had opened a string of resolutions, he thought it was competent for him to direct his observations to any of them. It did not appear to him that the House could proceed to instruct the Attorney General to prosecute any individual, or set of individuals, until the grounds for issuing such instructions were fully substantiated. Besides, no opportunity had been given to Mr. Davison to make any answer to the charge that was brought against him. Would the House act like a Grand Jury, and find a bill on *ex parte* evidence? The only evidence against him was that of an accomplice, and upon the evidence of an accomplice the House surely would not act, unless it was confirmed by other evidence. The Hon. Gent. then entered into a variety of strictures on the character and conduct of Mr. Oldfield, and endeavoured to shew how little stress should be laid upon it. The acts of bribery were committed in April, but Mr. Davison was known to declare in the preceding March, that he had relinquished all idea of becoming a candidate for the borough. He would not, indeed, deny, that there were proofs that Mr. Davison intended to bribe and corrupt the voters; but no proof whatever went to shew that he attempted to carry that intention into execution in any one instance.

Mr. Burdon contended that the evidence before the House was of the most clear and distinct nature, and he was sorry that the arguments that were urged seemed entirely directed to cover an individual. As to the first resolution, he could not see why it should be negatived; for that might be agreed to without convicting Mr. Davison, whose conduct should not be coupled with that of the other persons against whom the evidence was so direct. He made no doubt but they might be convicted on the evidence; but when the resolution was put, he hoped that the name of Mr. Davison might be expunged.

Mr. Johnstone said, that he had paid the most strict and diligent attention to every part of the evidence, and, from the impression it left upon his mind, he could not but think that it clearly affected Mr. Davison. Mr. Davison concurred in all the suggestions started by Oldfield; and though the whole plan might not have been carried into execution, yet there was scarcely any change made in it, except as to the mode of more effectually distributing the money; nor had he a doubt but Mr. Davison concurred even in that alteration of the plan. How the committee could have discharged their duty, unless they put Mr. Davison on his trial, he was at a loss to see. So much at least he felt himself bound in conscience to say as a member of the committee.

On the resolution being put, that the Attorney General be instructed to prosecute Alexander Davison, for the acts alluded to in the former resolution,

Lord Cole said, that it appeared from the evidence that Mr. Davison had attempted to corrupt other boroughs; that, indeed, he had acted as a contractor for boroughs. If he was not to be prosecuted, neither should any of the other persons implicated in the offence, for he could not well see any difference between conspiring to bribe and corrupt, and carrying the intention and plan into execution.

Mr. Sheridan could not see that there was any proof of the strong nature alluded to, which went to implicate Mr. Davison. If such a case, indeed, could be made out, no doubt the sentence of the House must fall upon it with all possible severity. Some Gentlemen were much inclined to believe the evidence of Oldfield; but why should they hesitate to believe the declaration of Mr. Davison? Was it consonant to the law of England to convict of an intention? Was it not facts that the law took cognizance of? He must admit, indeed, that Mr. Davison had betrayed an intention to bribe; but no one circumstance appeared to prove that he followed up the plan ascribed to him. On the contrary, there were strong presumptions that a different plan from that imputed to Mr. Davison was adopted. The plan that was adoped failed, even in a great measure from want of money, a difficulty which it could not be supposed that Mr. Davison laboured under. Mr. Davison abandoned the plan altogether; and if the matter was more minutely examined into, it would appear, as indeed it did appear, from the evidence of Mr. Hopping, that the election was carried on neither on the plan, the money, or for the candidates of Mr. Davison. Neither was there any attempt to prove that the land or the houses, upon which so much stress was laid, were now the property of Mr. Davison. If he has been guilty of corruption for electioneering purposes, he sincerely wished that Mr. Davison's case was a singular one. But before the House proceeded to convict him of that guilt, he trusted no Gent. would give a vote upon the question who had not minutely attended to the evidence.

Mr. Vansittart said, that whether the evidence was allowed or not directly to attach on Mr. Davison, he would not pronounce;

yet more than sufficient appeared to involve him in the guilt. It was pretty evident that, subsequent to his declaration, steps had been taken by him to execute the proposed plan. Three days before the election the candidates were not known, yet by those unknown candidates money had been distributed; and from whom did it come but from Mr. Davison? It was said that Mr. Davison had no opportunity to exculpate himself. Did not the evidence contained in the Report go forth with perfect notoriety? Why, then, did not Mr. Davison get a petition presented to the House, if he was conscious of being able to produce evidence in his exculpation that would overpower that which was adduced to criminate him? Much was wanted to give strength and weight to what has been urged in his favour.

The Master of the Rolls deprecated the interference of the House in the manner proposed. It did not appear to him becoming its dignity or justice to concern itself in the affair of an individual in such a way as might operate to bias the minds of a jury, by prejudging a case which was to be made the subject of legal investigation. If the House should so proceed, it might happen that two prosecutions would come before the courts for the same offence; for the Attorney General had no control over the popular informer, who was, by the statute of George II. enabled to bring forward a prosecution for bribery, and by whom he understood that actions were already commenced against Mr. Davison for penalties to the amount of 48,000*l*. This circumstance, he conceived, ought to serve as a strong inducement to the House to decline the mode of proceeding recommended by the motion of his Rt. Hon. Friend; but, independently of this consideration, he thought, on the ground of prejudging the question, the motion ought to be rejected. It was notorious, that the courts were so tenacious that no improper prepossession should be made on any case submitted to their deliberation, that any thing designed for that purpose was prohibited; it was known that they had taken notice of even handbills, and statements supposed to have that tendency, lest they should have any influence on a jury: and what, he would ask, could have such important influence on the minds of any jury, as the opinion of the House of Commons? There was, he was confident, no instance upon the Journals similar to that now proposed, of the Attorney General being directed to prosecute for an offence which was already under prosecution before the courts. The objections he entertained, he wished it to be understood, applied equally to the proposed prosecution for conspiracy as to that for bribery. Indeed, it did not appear to him that the evidence would be sufficient to sustain the charge, for no proof was given of any act done in pursuance of the conversation at West Camel. In order that no direct opposition should be given to the opinion of the committee, and as the most becoming way to get rid of the subject, the Hon. Member concluded with moving the previous question.

Mr. Fox expressed his concurrence with most of the arguments advanced by the Learned Member who had last addressed the House, and owned, that nothing appeared to him more correct than the motion he had submitted, for when the House did not approve of a proposition, or did not wish to go immediately into it, nothing was more proper than to move the previous question, which did not preclude the subsequent discussion of the same subject, if any Member should think it necessary to bring it forward. It left the case quite open for any future proceeding that justice might call for.

Mr. Bragge had no objection to the motion for the previous question, provided it was understood that it should not preclude the House from taking any proceeding which the nature of the case might hereafter call for, in pursuance of its own resolution, which could not consistently be abandoned. He was not unwilling to wait the result of the actions which were said to be pending against Mr. Davison, but those actions might be collusory; and suppose he were acquitted upon them, would it be becoming the importance of the House to be controlled by such discussions, or implicitly to abide by them? On the part of the House he protested against such an idea.

Mr. Grey was surprised that any Member, at all acquainted with the rules and practice of the House, could consider any express understanding necessary to know that the adoption of the previous question was nothing more than a postponement of the debate, and did not by any means preclude the House from subsequently taking any step in the same question they might think expedient. With respect to the measure recommended by the committee, it did not seem to him calculated to meet the mischief of which they complained. That the most flagrant corruption prevailed in the election of Ilchester, to which the Report referred, was a fact that could not be denied; but it would not materially avail to prosecute the agent of corruption, while those who were willing, or rather anxious to be corrupted, remained untouched, and retained the power of vitiating the freedom of election. The committee, in his opinion, would have acted more wisely had they proposed a remedy with respect to this borough, such as was adopted in the case of Cricklade, when the right of voting was extended; or that of Shoreham, where the voters who had accepted bribes were disfranchized. He hoped, however, the House would not lightly pass over

this business, nor suffer their resolution to be nugatory. It was a case of that nature which ought not to be winked at, or allowed to escape in silence.

Mr. Smith stated, that the committee were quite ignorant that any actions were commenced against Mr. Davison, as his Rt. Hon. Friend had stated.

The Master of the Rolls observed, that he was informed of the actions having actually commenced.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer coincided in the observations of the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grey), that this was a question which called for the fullest investigation. The House unquestionably stood committed, and it would be disgraceful to abandon the resolution recorded in the Journals. Not having read the minutes of the committee, he could not now pronounce any opinion upon the proceedings which it might be advisable to adopt: but he thought it right that the House should appoint some future day to take the subject into consideration, otherwise it might be supposed without doors that it was altogether dismissed, and that the House declined to follow up its own resolution. He therefore moved that this Report be taken into further consideration on Monday fortnight.—Ordered accordingly.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, April 28.—(See Minutes, p. 810.)

[Cape of Good Hope.]—Lord Folkestone rose, pursuant to the notice he had given, to move for certain papers, with a view of obtaining information respecting the events that have occurred at the Cape of Good Hope. He wished, before he made the motion, to observe, that he had no desire, by this motion, to interfere with the negotiations which were now carrying on between the Government of this country and France; nor had he any wish to call for any information which, under the present circumstances, his Majesty's Ministers might think it improper to give; though, perhaps, it might not be improper if the House were to call for such information, with a view of rescuing the business out of the weak hands in which it was now placed. But as it was not his wish to urge on a discussion upon the general subject of the negotiation, if his Majesty's Ministers would say that the production of the papers he now called for would in any degee interfere with the negotiation that was pending, he would immediately withdraw his motion, and drop it altogether. If, however, this assurance was not given, he would persist in the motion. There was another thing which he wished to premise, and that was, that in discussing this subject, he should be obliged to refer to a species of information which he was sorry to be obliged to refer to, viz. the French papers. Considering the ignorance in which the public had been for some time kept, upon what was going forward, Gentlemen must either be content to know nothing, or to have recourse to the French papers for the official documents which they contained. The reason why he wished the production of the orders which had been sent out relative to the Cape of Good Hope was, that the House should really know what the fact was. He had heard, that at different times different orders had been sent out: at one time it was determined to give it up, and at another it was to be kept, without any reason whatever being assigned for it. After the signature of the treaty of peace, orders were sent out to deliver up the Cape; afterwards, in the month of October last, when there was a considerable ferment in consequence of the invasion of Switzerland by France, orders were sent out that the Cape should not be given up. He did not know these circumstances from any official account published by his Majesty's Ministers, but from the accounts published in the French papers. In point of fact we did not keep the Cape; it was a kind of recapture, and there was a regular capitulation. He was anxious that the country should be acquainted with all the facts upon this subject, because it proved such a wavering in the councils of this country, that the House had a right to full information upon the subject. There was another reason why he wished for the production of the orders which had been sent out, and the dispatches which had been received, and that was, to have an opportunity of comparing dates. He wanted to compare the date of the dispatches which informed Ministers of the detention of the Cape, with the date of his Majesty's message to that House, because he did believe that those dispatches conduced to the message, and the consequent armament. The King's message was delivered on the 8th of March, stating that discussions were pending between this country and France, and that armaments were preparing in the ports of France and Holland. The French official paper denied that any discussions were pending, and indeed he did not see what discussions could be going on except with regard to the Cape. As to the armaments in the French ports, they were nothing more than had been carrying on for some time. But it was generally supposed that the discussions were relative to the island of Malta. Upon this point he wished to observe, that in the *exposé* of the French government, in which they gave an account of the situation of the country, it was stated that the English still retained possession of Alexandria and Malta, but that the ships which were to convey home the garrisons of those places, had arrived in the Mediterranean. In the correspondence between

Sir A. Ball and Mons. Bussy, it was contended by the latter, that the English had, as long ago as the month of June last, consented that the Grand Master should be elected by the Pope, which had been done; and that as to the guarantee of the great powers of Europe, they were to be solicited to guaranty the independence of the island, but that such a guarantee was not absolutely necessary. He did not state this as his opinion upon this question, because this was not the proper time to enter into it, though he had formed a decided opinion upon it. He did not urge this with a view to extract information from Ministers, but to shew that the discussion could not be about Malta, and consequently to strengthen his argument for the production of the papers relative to the Cape of Good Hope. He again repeated, that if Ministers would state, that any public inconvenience would arise from the production of the information he required, he would not press his motion; but if they did not state that, he should move, "That there be laid before this "House a copy, or copies, of all orders sent "to the Cape of Good Hope, respecting the "surrender of that colony, since the signature "of the treaty of peace with the French re-"public: together with a copy, or copies, of "all dispatches relative to the surrender or "detention of that colony, as received by "the commanders of British forces by land "or sea there, and the times when they were "received from his Majesty's Ministers—Also "an account of all discussion, if any, which "has taken place between his Majesty's Mi-"nisters and the French government, respect-"ing that colony, since the signature of the "treaty, previous to the last order sent out "for the surrender of the same."

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, the Noble Lord must forgive him if he observed, that there was a strange inconsistency between his declaration at the commencement of his speech, and the arguments which he had used in the course of it. The Noble Lord stated at the beginning of his speech, that he did not wish to bring forward in his motion the general points which might be supposed to be in discussion at present between this country and France, more especially as an Hon. Gent. had given notice of a motion which would embrace the whole subject. After making this declaration, the Noble Lord bestowed a considerable part of his speech to prove that the only subject in dispute between this country and France must be the Cape of Good Hope; and in the concluding part of his motion, he desired to know what were the discussions going on between this country and France relative to the Cape; so that the Noble Lord first declared that he did not want to extract information respecting the discussions now going on: then he endeavoured to prove that the only discussion going on must be about the Cape; and lastly, he moved for an account of the discussions which were going on respecting the Cape. He was therefore, he thought, justified in stating, that there was a considerable degree of inconsistency between the professions and the speech of the Noble Lord. But surely, if the Noble Lord had been aware of the general acceptation of the notice which had been given by an Hon. Member (Col. Patten), which embraced every object of public concern, he would have abstained from any specific motion. He really had entertained a hope that, under the present circumstances, such motions as the present would not have been made. He was by no means disposed to deny that the subject to which the Noble Lord's motion referred, was one upon which the House had a right to expect information and explanation. It was one upon which his Majesty's Ministers were anxious to give information, when it could be done without prejudice to the public service. With this view of the subject, he could not consent to negative the motion: on the other hand, he could not accede to it, because it would require explanations that could not be given under the present circumstances, without inconvenience to the public service. He should therefore move the order of the day, or the previous question: he was inclined to prefer the former, because he could not approve of the form of the motion—he should therefore move the order of the day, declaring again, that there was no inclination on the part of his Majesty's Ministers to keep back any information that could throw any light upon the subject, when that information could be properly given. With regard to the form of the motion, he suggested to the Noble Lord whether it would not be better to put it into the form of an address to his Majesty.

Lord Folkestone said, if it was more consistent with the forms of the House, he had no objection to move it in the shape of an address.

Mr. Windham said, he merely rose to remark, in answer to what had fallen from the Rt. Hon. Gent. who had censured his Noble Friend for some supposed inconsistency in his speech, that there appeared to him no ground for such a charge. His Noble Friend did not say, that he would not press his motion if it had any connexion with the discussion going on between this country and France; he had merely said, that he would not press for the disclosure of any information that might be prejudicial to the public interest. He was therefore at liberty to conjecture what were the points now in negotiation. With regard to the notice which had been given by an Hon. Member, he did not consider that as any argument against his Noble Friend's motion; on the contrary, if the

general subject was to be discussed, it was a strong reason why as much previous information should be obtained as possible. If Ministers would state that the production of this information would be injurious, in that case the House must wait until the proper time when the information could be given, resting, in the mean while, upon the responsibility of Ministers.

Lord Hawkesbury said, he was not in the House at the commencement of the Noble Lord's speech, but certainly he had very serious objections to the motion as it was worded, and connected with what he had heard of the Noble Lord's speech. He had stated that it was not his intention to embarrass the negotiation, and yet the latter part of the motion went to call for information respecting the discussions relative to the Cape. Now if this was one of the subjects under discussion, as the Noble Lord supposed, it would be impossible to produce the information required by the motion, without going into explanations of other points which might be in discussion. He did hope, that under the present circumstances, detached motions of this sort would not have been brought forward. The House and the country had a right to expect all the information that could be given as to the way in which the affairs of the country had been managed for some time past. But the way of obtaining that information, and of forming a good judgment upon it, was to have the whole subject before them at once, and not by taking up detached and unconnected points. Conformably with that principle, he thought it would have been better to wait until a communication was made, or until some general motion was made, which would bring the whole subject at once before the House. He begged, before he sat down, to observe, in reply to what had fallen from the Rt. Hon. Gent. who spoke last, that his Rt. Hon. Friend had not said the production of the papers moved for would be prejudicial; he had merely said, that the production of those papers might lead to a discussion and explanation, which might be productive of public inconvenience. It was not proposed to negative the motion, it might therefore be brought forward at any future time.

Lord Folkestone spoke shortly in reply: he said, he was not bound by any notice which might have been given by any other Member, and observed, that great inconvenience might result from the practice of giving notices of motions.

Mr. Fox said, that there was no want of candour, as he conceived, imputable to the Noble Lord who had brought forward the motion now, for the manner in which he had done it; but although he felt that impression, he could not support the motion at present; and he rose for the purpose of stating in a few words, why he should concur in the motion for the previous question, or in any other that might be the best mode of setting it aside for the present. He agreed with the Noble Lord in what he had stated about the Cape; it was a subject fit to be examined—he apprehended that every body was ready to agree to that proposition: but the question was, whether that examination should be on this day or not. If the House had agreed to the motion for an inquiry into the state of the nation, then the inquiry now proposed would have been fit as a part of that general inquiry; because that would be entering into the detail of a matter, the principle of which had been admitted. But whether, in the present state of the nation, the House ought now to enter into an inquiry into the conduct of the King's Ministers respecting the Cape—whether it was the best mode to take a view of that question, as the Noble Lord's motion pointed out, or to wait until the House had decided on the general question of an inquiry into the state of the nation, was for the House to determine. Now, upon that point he had no difficulty whatever. There was another consideration, which was, in his opinion, preliminary to this: the general state of the nation, in the first place; secondly, perhaps, the conduct which led to the situation in which we are. These general points ought, as he conceived, to be disposed of, before any question in detail should be discussed. This appeared to him to be obvious. If it should be the opinion of the House, it is not fit at this moment to enter into an inquiry into the state of the nation, then undoubtedly the present motion will have been premature, inasmuch as it must be improper to enter on a detailed part of an inquiry, the whole of which would, in the opinion of the House, have been unfit. If the whole ought to be negatived, undoubtedly a part of it could not properly be entertained. If, on the other hand, the House should agree to institute an inquiry into the state of the nation, then this motion, as a part of the detail of that inquiry, would become a very proper and a very important part. As to the general subject of inquiry, his opinion was, as it generally had been, that the House of Commons ought not to be timid in asking questions of Ministers, neither should it screen itself from the execution of its duty, by desiring Ministers, and relying on their responsibility, to do theirs. He had always been of opinion, that the House should take upon itself the task of advising the Crown in almost all cases whatever of difficulty; therefore, if the House should, as he was inclined to wish, enter into an inquiry into the state of the nation, this motion would be premature, because the general inquiry appeared to him to be preliminary to any particular detail of discussion. He thought to throw out these few hints upon the course of discussion, but

there was no ground whatever for saying that the conduct of the Noble Lord was not candid.

Mr. Martin said, that the Hon. Gent. who spoke last had used an expression, of which he could not help taking notice. He did not mean to pay the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) any compliments: since he had been in power, he (Mr. Martin) had bestowed his best attention to his conduct, and he conceived that that Rt. Hon. Gent. had acted with integrity and propriety. But, with regard to his responsibility, Mr. Martin said, "I have now been a good while in this House—I have heard 'responsibility' often used, but never to any effect: with regard to the responsibility of Ministers in this country, I would not give twopence for it."

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, April 29.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[Nottingham election.]—Mr. Hawkins Browne said, before he moved that the bill should go into a committee, he should trouble the House with a few observations on the subject, and on the remarks of the Learned Counsel. It had been said by the Learned Counsel, that no particular charge had been made out against the mayor and magistrates of Nottingham by the evidence adduced in the committee, to prove that they had taken an active part in the riots, and were guilty of wilful neglect; but in answer to that Learned Gentleman's remark, he would say, if the evidence had gone to prove that the magistrates had violated the law to that extent, he should have taken a different measure, and have brought them before a court of justice; but it was a different species of impropriety that they were accused of, and that was, a shameful partiality in favour of one candidate, and a neglect of duty in not endeavouring to subdue the riot which took place during the election at Nottingham, and which he had no doubt they might have done if they had been so inclined. The evidence called before the committee not only proved, that dreadful riots took place during the election, but on all occasions in that town: it was therefore necessary some measure should be adopted for the safety of the public. The bill now before the House goes to destroy those scenes of disorder and wickedness which have been the companions of the town of Nottingham too long; and he did not doubt but it would tend to produce that comfort to the inhabitants, to which they have been a considerable time strangers. He could not suppose that any Gent. in that House would take it upon himself to say, that dreadful riots have not existed in Nottingham; and therefore, that being the case, he thought every Member would allow that some measure ought to be adopted, to keep the peace of the corporation and county; and therefore those Gent. who object to the present bill, should suggest some measure to render the inhabitants secure from riots and continual disturbance. He would assure the House, that if the present bill passed into a law, and did not answer the purpose intended, he would be one of the first either to amend it, or give his vote for making it void, for any bill that the House should think better calculated for the safety of the public peace; but certainly some measure is highly necessary to correct the abuses complained of. It must be evident to the House, if we admit no blame can possibly attach to the magistrates, that their present power is not sufficiently strong to secure the peace of the town. The strong ground upon which he had gone, and the evidence adduced before the committee, go to prove that the evil complained of calls loudly for redress. In his mind, the scenes of vice which have been witnessed in Nottingham exceed all description. If we were to go beyond the statement of the evidence before the committee, and suffer persons to be called to the bar of the House, there would be no difficulty to prove that tumultuous parties have destroyed the peace of the town for these ten years past. There were strong political parties in Nottingham, and he would state to the House one among many circumstances which gave rise to much confusion during the late war. A number of persons would collect at the entrance of the town, to wait for the arrival of the mail coach, to learn the success of our navy and army; and whatever intelligence arrived of any importance to these politicians, was not argued on with temperance, but generally caused great confusion between the parties, and frequently ended in a dreadful riot: by this detail of facts he did not mean to censure any man for taking an interest in the welfare of his country; but when political differences engendered tumults dangerous to public safety, he thought it necessary that some steps should be taken to secure the comforts of the inhabitants. Nothing as yet had been adduced to satisfy him that the freedom of election had not been violated, and that there was no occasion to give a concurrent authority to the magistrates of the county: on the contrary, he thought some remedy ought to be taken to put an end to the confusion mentioned, and did not see a single evil that could arise from the bill now in the House. He should therefore move, that the bill should go into a committee of the whole House on Monday next.

Mr. Henderson said, he concurred with the last Hon. Gent. that the evils complained of required amendment by law, and that the peace of the town had been disturbed many years by tumultuous assemblies; he therefore

thought that the present bill was calculated to produce much good in the town of Nottingham; but he had great doubts whether the bill could pass into a law, consistent with the ancient law of the nation. The object of the bill is to increase the number of magistrates for the county and town of Nottingham; but according to an act of the 27th of Henry VIII. chap. 24. the appointment of magistrates is vested in the Crown, and the office of magistrate is procured by letters patent from the Great Seal. He observed, however useful the bill would be to the inhabitants of Nottingham, he had not a doubt but it was not only contrary to the ancient charter of the town, but the established law of the land.

Mr. Fox said, before he came to state his objections to the bill now in the House, he could not forbear reprobating the unhandsome way the Hon. Gent. opposite to him had treated the magistrates. If the mayor and magistrates have acted contrary to law, it would be the duty of the Hon. Gent. and the House to bring them into a court of justice; but he thought the method taken to degrade them in the public opinion, without making any thing like a charge, was highly censurable, and ought to meet with the disapprobation of every man who considers the merits of the case. He would ask, what was the charge against the magistrates? Did the resolutions contain any thing like proof that they had sanctioned a riot at Nottingham? He would answer, No. Why were these Gent. not accused of an offence in a direct way, if they had committed any thing criminal? But he was sorry to say, the Hon. Gent. had endeavoured to make out a charge in dark and unintelligible language, which goes to rob them of their peace of mind and character, without any thing like proof of guilt. The resolution contained a charge apparently lenient, but which teased them by pains and penalties. He would ask the Hon. Gent. if the magistrates were guilty of the offence talked so much of, why not come forward and exhibit their wickedness by something like proof? He was satisfied the resolution, in which the magistrates were mentioned as having done wrong during the election, amounted to nothing that would incur either punishment, or censure of Parliament. Many Gent. who have perused the resolution, acknowledge that it only expresses a doubt of their guilt. This was the only meaning conveyed; it was therefore very hard that the mayor and magistrates should suffer by mere assertion. It was true, the evidence was very voluminous, yet there was no part of it that affected the magistrates for not having done their duty to the best of their ability.—The preamble of the bill stated, that tumultuous conduct has existed for many years, and therefore it was common to the town. The facts are, that there are two parties at Nottingham—one by the name of Loyalists, the other by the name of Jacobins, who were continually opposing each other. He would mention a circumstance which the Hon. Gent. opposite to him had concealed, and which would shew the difficulty there was in keeping an inflamed populace from acts of violence. A Gent. of the name of Davison, who is a magistrate, had his house pulled down some few years ago by a Nottingham mob, notwithstanding every endeavour was made to prevent the riot. This shews the difficulty there is, particularly at an election, to keep a mob from committing some acts of outrage, and therefore is it to be supposed that an election mob are easily kept in order? The magistrates, he could prove, had done every thing in their power to prevent the riots at Nottingham. The freedom of election was one of the blessings of the English constitution, and he would advise the Hon. Gent. opposite to him not to carry the law too far, as it might produce many evils, and occasion much confusion. The last war has caused many persons to divide in opinion on the propriety of the nation entering into it; and as many persons had suffered much by the war, as far as related to their trade and manufactories, they therefore indulged a wish to support those Members who opposed the war. He therefore thought any attempt to prevent the inhabitants from shewing their zeal for a particular Member, would be dangerous. He should repeat an observation he made on a former evening on the subject, that this was not the only town where riots accompanied elections; yet no notice had been taken of them. He begged leave to call the attention of the House to the riots in the year 1780, which were suffered to get to an alarming height before the magistrates exerted themselves to prevent them. No one could doubt, who knew the facts, but the City magistrates were very inattentive to their duty; yet no attempt was made to get the concurrent jurisdiction of the county of Middlesex over the corporation of the city of London, which would have been contrary to the ancient charter of that city—and it evidently was contrary to the charter of the town of Nottingham. He would be glad to know why the magistrates of Birmingham did not get the concurrent jurisdiction of the county of Warwick, when half the Houses in Birmingham were destroyed; yet the magistrates were not called to an account for not having prevented the destruction which took place on that occasion. The Judges have paid the corporation of Nottingham, on many occasions, great praise for maintaining good order in the town; and it is also known, that the Judge have observed a smaller number of offenders have been brought before them in the town of Nottingham, than in any other of the same magnitude in England. During an election, it has always been thought prudent to give the mob a certain indulgence. He was sure,

had not Mr. Coke stood the contest, no confusion would have taken place. He could prove that the magistrates had done all they could for the purpose of giving each candidate satisfaction. If these gentlemen had acted contrary to law, and their offence was at all brought home to them, he for one would wish to see them punished, as an example to other magistrates. It was by charters that we preserved the freedom of the constitution; and wherever we lost part of our freedom, it was by the destruction of ancient charters and privileges: he therefore thought this bill would go a great way to rob the town of part of its freedom. He should not object to this bill, if it only gave a concurrent jurisdiction to magistrates of the county during an election, or in case of a riot, except one clause which applied to the magistrates, and which he so much reprobated. In order to slander the mayor and magistrates, it had been reported, that they had sanctioned the exhibition of a naked female, who was called the Goddess of Reason. This, with several other stories, were circulated to their prejudice; and an attempt was made to prove the truth of these stories before the committee, but it failed, as the Chairman of the committee would not admit the hired witnesses to give their evidence.

Mr. BOND said he had the honour to be one of the committee on whose report this bill was originally founded, and he had given much of his attention to the subject; he had formed an opinion upon it, and that opinion was decidedly opposite to that which had been expressed by the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down, and he felt it his duty to speak upon the subject: he was anxious to do so, particularly on account of what was stated by an Hon. Gent. opposite to him on the point of law, for he had argued it in some respect as contrary to our constitution, because it tended to create a magistracy, which was the undoubted prerogative of the Crown; but that was a misapprehension of the operation of the bill: it was not to create any magistracy, but to extend the authority of a magistracy already created; and that an act of Parliament may do this without any invasion of the prerogative of the Crown, he had many analogous cases to shew; and when he had done so, he should relieve the anxiety of the Hon. Member on the point of law. As to the hearing of counsel at the bar, he did not think that in strictness the parties were entitled to be heard by counsel on this subject; but he assented to it, because he did not wish to shut the door against any information which the House might receive, and therefore counsel was heard. He had great respect for that Learned Gent. both for his abilities as a lawyer, and character as a man, but he professed not to have changed his opinion from his arguments. He then proceeded to take notice of the arguments of that Learned Sergeant, and said, that he made no observations on the evidence on which this bill was founded, because he had no materials for that purpose, nor upon the preamble of the bill for the same reason; neither did he call any evidence on the part of his clients, and that for the same reason also. The preamble of the bill was important to be attended to in this debate; that preamble did not merely state the late riots at Nottingham, but took notice of many former riots there, and the single question now propounded to the House was, whether they should apply a remedy to that evil? As to the punishment, of which the Hon. Gent. who spoke last had said so much, and had said it was without conviction, he knew of no punishment or conviction necessary to support this bill, nor was any thing necessary to be adverted to for that purpose but the evidence and the resolutions now upon the table. He was surprised to hear the bill now before the House called the insulting language of lenity; if there was in that bill any language of insult, he was glad to bear his share of that insult. That any Gent. from reading detached parts of the evidence, should say that the Mayor of Nottingham deserved praise, he should not wonder; but if any body who had read it through, which was necessary to the proper understanding it, for it was not like some briefs that are delivered to counsel, where he might jump over the parts which were immaterial, and yet miss nothing which was important, but if, he said, any body who had read the whole of the evidence, question and answer, should say that the Mayor of Nottingham deserved praise, he should indeed wonder. He had no hesitation in saying, that if any Member of that House, on reading the whole of that evidence, would say that the Mayor of Nottingham deserved praise, "why, then," said Mr. Bond, "he has a temper and a mode of thinking, which I neither have nor envy." He had no scruple in saying, and he pledged whatever character he had as a lawyer in that House, that the magistrates of Nottingham were criminally responsible for their conduct at the late election; but he did not advise them to be pursued, on that account, for this reason, there were many very material circumstances of extenuation in their case; and therefore, although they were criminal, yet, with his impression of the circumstances of extenuation, it was his wish and his inclination, and if it was the language of insult, he must hold it still, that lenient measures should be adopted; but if it became necessary to adopt other measures, and if he was driven to them by opposition to this bill, and if he could have no remedy such as this bill proposed, and which was congenial to his wishes and to his disposition, he must pursue these magistrates as criminals; for in such a case, when there was no other remedy, he would pursue the course of public justice, without regard to private

lenity; but if this bill passed, he should not be driven to that course. He had hitherto avoided these considerations, by proposing the present bill, in which the House had not the trouble of trying the guilt, or discovering the innocence of the parties. Having said this, he would now call the attention of the House to the sort of case which was now before it. With regard first to the justice of the case, he would inquire, whether this was an invasion of the rights of any parties? and if it was an invasion, then whether it was strictly necessary? He contended that this was no invasion whatever; confining the right of election to a few, might render that right valuable to those who had it; but this was not applicable to the case of magistrates; it was not for the value of it to a magistrate that the power was given to him, it was for the better advantage of the place where he was to act; and if that advantage was not accomplished by the office not being properly filled up, the public interference of that House was necessary; this was particularly the case of corporations: from the nature of their constitutions, if their magistrates did not properly fill up their situations, they became a blot upon the character, for the inhabitants of a chartered corporation had none of the common privileges of another place. They were not like common subjects, to cure the evil of their magistrates' inefficiency; they had no advantages but their charter, which, if their magistrates did not do their duty, they could not enjoy; so that they might be said to be left out of the reach of the law, and might be said to be outlawed. This, he maintained, was the case of the town of Nottingham; for as the preamble of the bill stated, that riots had often happened at Nottingham, all the information the House had upon its table proved this, nor was there a single witness called by the Learned Counsel at the bar to prove that the facts were not so. The truth was, that riots at Nottingham had happened from time whereof the memory of man runneth not to the contrary; but it seems they had been used to it so long, that it was proper they should endure it longer. This was an argument like that which the cook made use of when she was accused of cruelty in skinning live eels, that they were used to it: such was the case at Nottingham, they were used to riots there. This was not only the case of an election for a member of Parliament, but of every election whatever. At the election for a common councilman there was a riot and violent outrage, when the practice of what was called spencering was introduced, that of cutting off the clothes of those whom the mob did not like; and that practice had continued. The election of a churchwarden, which was carried on in the church, was most impiously and scandalously outraged, where such scenes were acted as we never before heard of in a church in any country, except one, thank God. It had been said that the magistrates of the town of Nottingham had received the thanks of the Judges once; now he had information on which he could venture to depend, from some Learned Friends of his, that riots often happened at the time of the assizes at Nottingham. He knew that one Learned Judge had said that he would never go there again: that another Learned Judge had observed riots at the time of his sitting to administer justice; that he had called on the Sheriff to do his duty, to put an end to the disturbance; the Sheriff, in a soft tone of voice, said he could not: the Judge said, that if peace was not restored in five minutes, he should adjourn the court, and go to London and report the matter, and then silence was obtained: this proved that when a proper exertion of authority took place, tranquillity might be restored. It was said there was nothing like this bill to be found any where, whereas there were many cases analogous to this. The power of magistrates under charter had been increased where their power had been found deficient. This was the case of the borough of Leicester; the magistrates there had a power of concurrent jurisdiction over parts of the county. The same case applied to Clitheroe, where the magistrates of the borough interfere with those of the county, and this principle was recognised in a statute of Henry VII. which he cited. There was also an Irish act of Parliament of the 38th of George III. c. 73. by which the magistrates of the counties can go to all the boroughs to convict those who are guilty of selling spirituous liquors contrary to law. The Coventry case was likewise a case analogous to the present proceeding; it was an act for regulating the mode of admitting freemen, and making it different from what it was before: all these, in his apprehension, were cases analogous to the present; they shewed that Parliament had interfered in the conduct of magistrates in boroughs, as well as in places without charters, wh n the public welfare could not be supported by these chartered customs. Here, indeed, the evil was of a larger size, and therefore the remedy should be of a larger extent. But did he ask for a larger remedy than was necessary? He said, decidedly, no; but if the bill was to be put into the shape which was recommended by the Hon. Gent. who spoke last, it would deserve the name which the Hon. Gent. gave it in its present shape, that of a foolish bill; indeed, it should never be called his bill, he should beg leave to withdraw from it altogether, and so he believed would all his Hon. Friends who supported it at present. The Hon. Gent. said, that the jurisdiction of the magistrates of the county should be confined to times of tumult alone. If he thought that would answer any good purpose, he had a mode of estimating human nature which he (Mr. Bond) did not possess. He knew nothing of Nottingham, except from that which appeared upon the table of that

House at this moment. The Hon. Gent. had given the House an accurate account of parties, and that Hon. Gent. had more reason to know Nottingham than he himself had; but he must express what he felt, which was, an anxious wish that independent gentlemen should act for Nottingham; and if that was not to be the consequence of the bill, it would be an useless bill. But he would ask, how, without insulting common sense, could it be required, that a person who was to act as a magistrate under the authority of this bill, should take out a *dedimus potestatem*, for the purpose of merely running his head into a riot, without having any means of preventing riot, which was the most interesting, anxious, and solicitous part of the duty of a magistrate, of a good magistrate? Every one knew that every good magistrate exercised much of his authority before a riot began, and that if he did it with judgment, it was the most valuable service he could render to his country, inasmuch as the prevention of crimes was much more desirable than punishment. How many riots had happened at Nottingham, and would continue to happen, if this bill was thrown out? Magistrates had much to do in a quiet way, as well as acting on occasions of actual riot: they had no small discretion to exercise on the subject of licensing alehouses. Did we not hear almost from every charge delivered by a Learned Judge to the grand jury at an assize, something on these topics? To provide against these evils was one of the objects of the bill. He knew that these tumults could not grow up unless there were nests where they were nurtured. He knew there was no turbulence or confusion of which the plot was not laid in some alehouse; and as to what the Hon. Gent. observed on the *posse comitatus*, he felt no difference, such as the Hon. Gent. hinted at, likely to happen: but he knew that force would never be drawn out unless there was an occasion for it, and then he should rejoice to see the efforts of the honest yeomanry of the kingdom opposed to a Jacobin mob. These were the provisions which, in his opinion, would render the bill efficacious, and without which it would be inadequate to the purpose for which it was intended. Considering this bill on the point of law, it was unobjectionable; considering it upon policy, it was expedient; considering it in point of probable effect, he had strong hopes it would be efficacious. In a word, he believed that if the House adopted this bill, they would adopt the best means that had yet been offered to remedy a considerable evil; that if this bill was rejected by the House, new blood and a vital principle would be transfused into the dead carcases of anarchy in this place, and it would again resuscitate; but if the bill was agreed to, the magistrates would become what they ought to be, a protection to the good and a terror to the wicked.

Mr. Moore (of Coventry) said, that if he had been on the committee, he should not have confined his labours to what the committee had confined their Report to upon the Nottingham election. He thought the magistrates had neglected their duty in this case. He read the Report of the committee with accuracy and attention, and he thought, that, from recent experience, he was competent to form a tolerable judgment how far this measure was likely to answer the purpose for which it was intended. He had witnessed some riotous proceedings at Coventry, and other populous places, and he examined the description of the riot at Nottingham, in order to see whether it resembled what he had witnessed at other places. He saw, however, that in the business of Nottingham there was much to lament and much to correct; but he saw nothing in the Report upon this subject, which the magistrates at present in the town of Nottingham were not competent to correct; and this, he thought, was fully made out by one witness, who was three days under examination; who had proved that tranquillity might be restored at Nottingham, and who had indeed restored it. He thought that every necessary provision should be made to prevent the recurrence of the evil in this case, without overturning the constitution of the borough, and that was by rousing the magistrates of the town from their dormancy. He had no doubt that the mayor and other officers had neglected their duty upon this occasion, and that they were highly criminal; there was an evil existing, but he did not think this proposed act of Parliament was calculated to remedy that evil, nor did he approve of any of the remedies which had been proposed: there was nothing really wanting but to awaken the magistrates out of their dormancy, and that was to be effected by making them feel the severities of the law, for criminally neglecting their duty. In support of this, he referred to the instance given by the Hon. and Learned Gent. who had just preceded him, of the threat of the Learned Judge having such an effect. He observed, that what was done with Simpson at the bar of the House might be a lesson proper to be taught to some others; and concluded with observing, that he saw nothing in the case of Nottingham any more than any other place where there had been riots, which could not be properly remedied by a due administration of the law as it now stands, and that could not be accomplished by rousing the magistrates to the performance of their duty, the which if they neglected, they might be reminded of by the wholesome penalties of the law.

Mr. Frankland said, that to incumber the present measure with a previous investigation of guilt, would necessarily delay the issuing of the writ; whilst on the contrary, the pass-

ing of the bill would enable the town of Nottingham to return a representative to Parliament. The concession which had been made by the opposers of the present bill, in suggesting an amendment, necessarily destroyed their arguments against its principle. With respect to the amendment suggested, it was supposing a mode of controlling riots, by first permitting them to exist, and that a justice of the peace should first see the peace broken before he acts.

Mr. GREY said he had not had time to read the whole of the Report, but he had a right to complain that those who brought in the bill had not brought forward in its support any specific part of the evidence contained in that Report. The Hon. and Learned Gent. (Mr. Bond) had set out with observing, that he did not mean to impute guilt to the magistrates of Nottingham; and had concluded by making a very heavy charge against them of criminal neglect of duty, and secretly encouraging a Jacobin mob. He could not agree that extending a magistracy was not, in many instances, destroying it. The present bill was a bill of disfranchisement, and a severe bill of pains and penalties. He did not think that any of the cases adduced by the Hon. and Learned Gent. applied to that now under consideration. The Hon. and Learned Gent. had said, that the greater the evil the more extensive ought to be the measure which was proposed to remedy that evil: he asked the Hon. Gent. to state those points of evidence which made out his case. If the magistrates were criminal, punish them. Something had been said about lenity: in this case the magistrates of Nottingham were not convicted criminals praying for mercy, but persons calling out for trial. The former riots which had taken place at Nottingham, did not appear to enter regularly into the consideration of the committee. From the statement of the Hon. and Learned Gent. it must be inferred, that the magistrates were either guilty of wilful neglect, or that they did not possess sufficient powers; if the former, they ought to be punished; if the latter, it did not appear to him that the giving a concurrent jurisdiction to the magistrates of the county would be a sufficient remedy. It might be very possible, and if the bill went into a committee he should propose it as an amendment, to require ten householders, in case of a riot, to sign a requisition to the neighbouring magistrates, in which case the latter might bring in the *posse comitatus*. This would confine the bill to the fact complained of.

Mr. ROSE said, if he had any objection to the bill, it was that it did not go far enough. No speech had ever satisfied him more upon any subject than that of the Hon. and Learned Gent. with respect to the present bill. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grey) had urged that the committee had no right to go into the consideration of the former riots which had taken place at Nottingham; but the fact was, that they were brought forward by the magistrates of Nottingham themselves, in order to prove that riots at an election in that town were nothing new. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had taken credit to the people of Nottingham, because the story respecting the Goddess of Reason did not prove to be exactly true: but proceedings certainly did take place which were not very creditable.—There clearly appeared either gross neglect on the part of the magistrates of Nottingham, or the greatest insufficiency of power.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Tuesday, May 3.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[BANK OF IRELAND.]—The order of the day for the second reading of the Bank of Ireland restriction Bill being read, and on the question being put that the bill be now read a second time,

Lord KING rose, and, in a speech of some length, delivered his sentiments upon the measure before the House, and upon the important subjects connected with it. In discussing these, however, he observed he should, though in a general view of them they might bear a more comprehensive scope, confine himself to those points which more immediately concerned Ireland. The Noble Lord set out with observing the very great increase of Bank of Ireland small notes in circulation, which within a comparatively short space of time had increased more than fourfold, and which consideration should operate upon their Lordships' minds with respect to the great discretionary powers which the present bill continued to vest in the Directors of the Bank of Ireland. He was aware, that in defence of the measure much stress would be laid on the utility of country banks, the great assistance afforded them by the national bank, &c.; but with respect to Ireland, a part of this argument would not hold good, for it was well known that country banks had not increased of late years in that country, which was chiefly to be attributed to the unfortunate situation in which that island had for a long time been plunged. In considering this part of the subject, his Lordship adverted to the large issue of small notes, as for seven and ten shillings, &c. and to the effects produced by such a circulation, and alluded to one advantage which private banks possessed over those grounded upon extensive public institutions, namely, the far greater control they possessed with respect to false and fabricated notes. To a certain extent, he admitted that the competition produced by a number of country banks was of public utility; and he adverted to a circumstance, which he said reflected honour upon them, namely, their continuing to pay in specie for a considerable time after the prohibitory order was issued in

1797. Their Lordships would be aware of the exorbitant abuse of the discretionary power vested in the Bank Directors of Ireland, when they contemplated the excessive increase in the issue of small notes, and which was a sufficient reason that in 1801 the course of the exchange should be 17 per cent. against Ireland, a circumstance which he regarded as singular in the history of commerce; and specie, he observed, had in a great measure disappeared in the southern parts of Ireland. The Directors had perverted their discretionary powers to ends of private advantage: he meant the Proprietors of the Bank stock, which was advantaged to the public detriment. He contrasted the large issues made by the Bank of Ireland with those of the Bank of England, within a given period; and he contended that it would be impolitic and improper to vest in future such a discretionary power in the Bank of Ireland Directors, after they had seen the nature and tendency of their former conduct. He had it in contemplation to propose a clause to be introduced into the bill, which in its effect would in some measure do away the nauseous parts of it: the object of this would be, to oblige the Bank of Ireland Directors, after a given period, suppose six months, to pay in Bank of England notes, which would have the effect of placing the Bank of Ireland, to a certain degree, in the same situation as that of England was before the suspension of payments in specie. He argued, that such a regulation would be attended with no ill effects, and he expatiated upon the impropriety of vesting in the Bank of Ireland a power of depreciating the standard of the currency of that country. He thought the case at best an extreme one, and were Parliament called upon to act so with respect to the Bank of England it would certainly refuse the interference. He knew not whether the present was the regular stage for proposing such a clause; but whenever it could be introduced into the bill, he most seriously recommended their Lordships to adopt it.

The Earl of Limerick contended that the Directors of the Bank of Ireland were driven by necessity, and from step to step, to increase the issue of their small notes; and that the proposed remedy, instead of removing, would only aggravate whatever unavoidable evils might exist. Towards the close of 1796 it was a part of the plan of a set of desperate and ambitious conspirators, who plunged their country into rebellion, to palsy by every means in their power, the exertions and credit of the Bank of Ireland: a very considerable issue of small notes was the result of their machinations. He contended that the credit and security of the Bank of Ireland was made stronger than ever; it had withstood the shocks of rebellion, invasion, and of untoward events, from a variety of other causes. He expatiated at length on the various causes of the unfavourable course of exchange against Ireland, which however he denied prevailed to the degree laid down by the Noble Lord; the chief of these he stated to arise from the effects of the rebellion, the interest of debt remitted to this country, and the increased drains of absentees. These various positions were established by the Noble Earl by calculations and details drawn from official documents, &c. He concluded by strongly recommending it to their Lordships to accede to the bill before them.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, May 3.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[Nottingham election.]—Mr. Hawkins Browne moved the order of the day for the third reading of the Nottingham election bill.

Mr. Fox said, though he had stated his objections at some length on a former evening to the bill before the House, yet he thought it his duty again to address the House on the same topic. The bill now the subject of discussion, was of serious consequence to the kingdom, as it went to undermine the ancient law of the country, and intrust an improper power in the hands of Government: he therefore wished the House to give the bill due consideration before it was suffered to pass into a law. Much had been said of the lenity which had been shewn to the magistrates by the present measure; but he thought there was no lenity in taking a man's character away, when no charge had been made against him. This was exactly the case with respect to the mayor and magistrates of Nottingham; they have been abused, but nothing has been offered to prove that they were guilty of any offence: they have challenged the committee to come forward and accuse them of improper conduct, but thechallenge has not been accepted; it was therefore extremely improper to destroy the reputation of the magistrates, without giving to the House some proof of their guilt. He did not mean to doubt but much disturbance had taken place in the town of Nottingham; the resolutions, however, did not go so far as to prove, in any way, that the magistrates had wilfully connived at the evil complained of. If the Hon. Gent. who had brought this bill into the House were satisfied that the magistrates were guilty of any wrong, why not bring those gentlemen before a court of justice? The magistrates have repeatedly solicited to have their conduct canvassed in a court of law, but a species of lenity has been shewn them that has gone to destroy their peace of mind and character. These gentlemen, by the present bill, were to account for the riots which took place, not only at the late election, but for these ten years past: he considered it a dangerous principle to be acted upon, and ought not to re-

ceive the vote of the House. Agreeable to the meaning of this bill, whenever an inhabitant is inclined to find fault with the conduct of a magistrate, he, in conjunction with a party, may increase the number of magistrates till there is no end to them, and in a few years half the men in the county will be chosen magistrates, under the idea of looking over each other: this certainly was contrary to the ancient law of the country. It is a characteristic feature of the perfection of the British constitution, that magistrates should be under the nomination of the Crown: no increase was made to the number of magistrates in London in consequence of the riots which took place in the year 1780; but he was ready to allow there had been an increase of magistrates in the city and liberty he had the honour to represent; and he was proud to say, that the magistrates of Westminster had been highly useful to the inhabitants. If the riots at Nottingham had been mentioned at the time the riots of London and Birmingham had taken place, little indeed would have been thought of the complaint. He must again repeat, if the magistrates were guilty, there was not an inch of ground for them to stand on; but they had challenged a prosecution, they had solicited their opponents to proceed against them, as they knew a court of justice would send them into society free from disgrace. As he had mentioned the name of Mr. Coke repeatedly in the course of the debates on the present bill, he thought it necessary to say, he never knew a man of a better private character than that Gentleman. It was almost unnecessary to mention the great difference of opinion which has long existed at Nottingham with respect to politics: he however would say, if the present bill passed into a law, it would be in favour of Mr. Coke. It had been said, that the power of concurrent magistrates would only be called in on extraordinary occasions; but he would ask the House, whether a man, having been once nominated a magistrate, would not, according to the state of human nature, take upon him all the authority of his office? and then his power would be a compound of duty and interest; therefore the Hon. Gent. saying, that the assistant duty of the magistrates was required during a riot, was absurd. Notwithstanding all that had been said with respect to the magistrates of Nottingham, he would ask, whether the judicial power of Nottingham was worse than in any other town? He knew it was not. Mr. Coke brought a bill into Parliament some years ago, to carry the causes from the sessions of the town of Nottingham to the county, but no man had thought proper to avail himself of that law to this day. The present magistrates were not only to suffer for the riots at the last election, but for all previous disturbances, such as pulling down houses, mills, &c. All these offences had been stated in a very ingenious way to attach blame to the present magistrates. Mr. Fox then produced a pamphlet, and read several passages from it, which went to shew, that if the bill passed, it would operate as a punishment on the present magistrates, by the establishment of a concurrent jurisdiction of the county magistrates, though it did not destroy their present power. He said he should trouble the House but a minute or two longer, in observing he had no objection to the increase of the number of magistrates, if there was an alteration in the manner of electing them: the present method he could never submit to.

Mr. BOND said, that what had been before said on the bill, rendered it unnecessary for him to go at length into its merits; but he could not but express his surprise, that the last Hon. Gent. should have said last night, when the bill was in a committee, that he had no objection to the bill if his amendment was acceded to by the committee, and to hear him now, in the most energetic language, reprobate the whole of the bill: he thought the Hon. Gent. a little inconsistent in his conduct. The bill went, in his mind, to prevent future riots in the town and county of Nottingham, which must be the object of every man's wish who was acquainted with the wickedness which had taken place in that town and county. Now the clause which the Hon. Gent. had proposed, went to give power to persons after a riot had taken place; this he thought very inconsistent, and not at all calculated to be of service to the inhabitants of Nottingham. The Hon. Gent. had used many strong words to weaken the bill with the House, but he had to observe, that no threats should prevent him from doing his duty. He thought it would be extremely wrong to wait for a riot before the inhabitants nominated magistrates to put a stop to it, and therefore the Hon. Gent.'s amendment could not be approved of. The Learned Gent. (Sergeant Lens) who addressed the House on the merits of the present bill, had stated that the measure had been conducted in a very lenient way to the mayor and magistrates, and that much blame certainly attached to them: he should therefore give his decided opinion in favour of the bill.

Mr. GREY said that the Hon. Gent. had not answered the arguments of his Hon. Friend, but he had ventured to make bold assertions: he did not recollect that the Learned Counsel had, in his address to the House, said that the magistrates were guilty of wilful neglect of duty, and he thought it was contrary to the custom of the House to refer to any former debates. If he was permitted to recur to what had been said on a former debate, he was sure his Hon. Friend had not approved of the principle of the bill, as it had been said; on the contrary, he had reprobated the whole of the bill; but finding that it had the support of the House, it was his wish that an amendment he proposed should be adopted, in order to make

it less objectionable: he however would not trespass on the time of the House by repeating his Hon. Friend's arguments; but he thought they had been perverted in a most unjustifiable manner.

The Attorney General expressed his surprise that the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) should have opposed the bill, after he had proposed an amendment yesterday in the committee. The Hon. Gent. then gave a statement of the facts which took place in the town and county of Nottingham; and observed, that the present bill was brought into the House from a conviction that the magistrates had not done their duty, and he assured the House, that he would not have given his support to the bill if he had not been satisfied the magistrates had not done their duty. It was therefore necessary that some measure should be adopted to keep the peace of the town and county of Nottingham, and ensure the freedom of election. He could not approve of the conduct of the magistrates and returning officer, notwithstanding all that had been said in favour of them; and it had been pretty clearly proved, that they had not taken any effectual means to suppress the riots. If the magistrates had made use of all their civil power, and that would not do, he had no hesitation in saying, that they ought to have called in the military to their assistance; and he was sure the returning officer would not have been censured for seeing the peace of the town kept during a fair and legal election; and the House of Commons would pause, had the business come before them, ere they would censure the returning officer for doing all he could to support the freedom of election, and keep the peace of the inhabitants. An Hon. Member opposite to him had said, that the Judges had bestowed great praise on the order and regularity of the town of Nottingham; but it must be recollected that was upwards of eighteen years ago; and, therefore, the encomiums of the then existing Judges could have no weight with the House now. It was necessary, in order to prevent riot, that the magistrates should be known, that appearance and power should have some effect with a mob. Under all the circumstances of the case he should not trouble the House any longer, as much had been said with respect to the present question; but he thought it highly necessary that the bill should pass the House, in order to support the freedom of election, and the peace of the inhabitants.

Mr. Grey explained. He said he did not advert to the Hon. Gent. having quoted the arguments made use of on a former day, but to his having quoted particular words supposed to have been used on a former day; and that he took the liberty of regarding as a practice, which, if followed up in other cases, might be attended with many difficulties in debate, and some other serious inconveniencies in the discussions of that House.

Mr. Fox explained also upon the subject of his having proposed, yesterday, to alter a clause of this bill in a committee of the whole House. He said he thought this a bad measure; and he had therefore endeavoured to alter it, so as to make it less bad; but that did not imply any approbation of any part of it, any more than if a land-tax bill of four shillings in the pound were now proposed, and he were to propose in a committee to have two shillings, instead of four, inserted in the bill: he could not be said to be a friend to the bill itself; he proposed it as a less evil than that of the original bill. As to his having observed, that the town of Nottingham had been commended on account of the tranquillity, which had been approved of by two Learned Judges, the Hon. Gent. who had taken notice of it, had very much misapprehended his meaning. He did not quote it as an extraordinary case, merely on account of the absence of a riot, but he stated it to shew the police and general good government of the town under its present municipal authority; and he had accompanied it with an observation of a general nature, namely, that there were fewer crimes in the town of Nottingham than in many others of which no complaint had been made: this shewed the purity of the general administration of justice in that town; and the observations of the Learned Judges, to whom he had referred, fairly bore that interpretation; and he thought the manner in which that subject was now treated by Gentlemen on the other side of the House, full as hard on the Learned Judges as they could be on him. With regard to certain officers, who had been alluded to in the course of this debate, he did not say one word on them, because there was nothing concerning them in the present bill. As to any accusation that could be made against the magistrates for not bringing in the military, that was best answered by the fact—they did bring in the military.

Mr. Frankland said, he should suppose that if a tax was proposed of four shillings in the pound, and two shillings in the pound was proposed instead of it, such an amendment might be made by a person who thought if he could not oppose the bill altogether successfully, yet would wish to render it less objectionable; but he had no conception of that sort of amendment, which, under pretence of lessening a supposed evil, introduced independent matter, that was of itself a greater evil than that which it affected to diminish; and this he considered to be the nature of the amendment recommended yesterday by the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down (Mr. Fox). The general objection to this bill was, that it might become a precedent, which might be followed up, and made at last to affect every

borough in the kingdom; upon which, he confessed, he had no apprehensions whatever: the riots of the town of Nottingham were the foundation of this; they were not like the riots of other places, for they were become habitual riots, and required a remedy like the present.

Lord George Cavendish said, he thought that the question now before the House was a very important one; no less than this, whether the freedom of election of the town of Nottingham should be continued? He disapproved of the riots which had taken place in that town, but he thought no ground was laid for so strong a measure as the present, which was that of altering the jurisdiction of the magistracy of the town. He thought there should have been laid before the House much further proofs of the necessity of such a measure as this, before it was adopted by the House. He was himself an elector of Nottingham, but he had never exercised his franchise, nor did he oppose this measure from any personal considerations of any kind whatever. He looked upon the right of election as a very serious matter, and not to be altered but upon the most absolute necessity, such as in this case did not appear: he thought innovation in those matters very dangerous.

Mr. Rose said, that if this bill was founded on a mere riot happening once at Nottingham, he should have thought it prudent to have deliberated a good deal; but that was not the case, for it was not merely on the last riot at Nottingham that the bill was founded, but on a proof of a system of rioting, and that proof came before the committee on the cross-examination of the witnesses produced on behalf of the Petitioner, when it appeared as a sort of justification of the riot at the last election for Nottingham, that what then happened there was not new. Gentlemen seemed to say, "God bless us! riots at Nottingham! What do you complain of? We will shew you that this is not new; there never was an election at Nottingham without a riot; it is not confined to the election of Members to serve in Parliament, but it happens at the election of every municipal officer of that place, and even on occasions when there is no election at all, and in some of which men have lost their lives." This was the species of apology that had been set up for the late riots at Nottingham, by which it appeared there was a regular system formed and carried into effect, to punish every person whom the prevailing party did not like; and that punishment was inflicted on them by burning their property, destroying their cattle, and inflicting every species of cruelty that was practicable by the rioters; for which reasons he was convinced there were abundant grounds for the interference of Parliament. An Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had said, that this was not a proper remedy, and he objected to giving to additional power of interference to magistrates appointed by the Crown: now this was the very thing which, in his opinion, recommended the bill most. He did not like the mode of choosing the present magistrates of the town of Nottingham, because they were self-elected magistrates, they elected each other; and when he saw a bench of magistrates who elected each other, incapable, or unwilling, to preserve the peace of a populous town, he could have no difficulty in agreeing to some remedy to that evil, but that remedy was not to consist of appointing more magistrates of the same description. He had no hesitation in saying, that the conduct of the magistrates at the last election for the town of Nottingham was highly culpable; for it appeared, that men came to the booth and shook an halter at one of the candidates, and said, "If I had you at another place, you should suffer death by this;" and that very man afterwards sat down by the side of one of the magistrates. It appeared also, that men sat on the top of the booth, and gave notice to others stationed at a distance, to observe their signals, to insult, in the most cruel manner, all those who did not vote for their favourite; and all this was followed up, on the part of the magistrates, by merely saying, "Gentlemen, all this is extremely wrong;" and there was no instance of the magistrates doing their duty properly. The military were called in, but if the sheriff had suspended the election during the riot, there would have been an end of the riot, because then there would have been an entire defeat of the object of the riot. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox), in his explanation, had said, that he did not mean that the Learned Judge took notice of the good government of the town of Nottingham in one instance, but that he gave it as evidence of the general good government of the town: but this he knew, to the reproach of a magistrate there, that a Judge's warrant was once sent there, for the purpose of apprehending a rioter, and the magistrate did not follow it up, and see it executed. The Rt. Hon. Gent. then concluded with saying, that this bill should have his cordial support, and he was really sorry that the committee had not carried the matter further: he thought they would have done well to have recommended to the House to call upon the Attorney General to prosecute with the rigour of the law, those who by name had been reported to have conducted themselves so criminally.

Lord George Cavendish explained, and said, that, so far from screening the magistrates, he was for punishing them, nor was he for screening the vices of the town of Nottingham, but he was for preserving ancient establishments, which were very serious things, and great care should be taken not to lay a precedent for overturning them.

Mr. HAWKINS BROWNE observed, that the Rt. Hon. Gent. who had lately spoken (Mr. Rose) had said, that the committee should have taken steps towards the punishment of the instigators of the late riots at Nottingham; that they should have been marked out in the Report as objects fit for punishment: the reason why the committee did not do so was, that the persons alluded to were not parties to the cause before the committee, and could not be heard in their own defence, and so the committee thought it would not be fair to proceed to any step that might lead to their punishment, without giving them an opportunity of being heard in their own defence: but the committee had recommended that the House might peruse the evidence, and upon which evidence it was as competent to any member of the House as it was to the committee, to recommend a prosecution against all or any of those persons who appeared to have misconducted themselves. This bill had been called a strong measure: he proposed it as a strong measure, for he did not put the riots at Nottingham upon a footing with common riots; they were not like the riots at Coventry, nor any other election riots. He did not call the riots of Nottingham election riots; it was a planned scheme, long concerted, to insult and ill-treat in the most outrageous manner, all those who should vote for Mr. Coke, and there were men stationed at and upon the booth for that purpose, and to give signals for persons at a distance to do the same thing; it was in the estimation of these rioters a capital crime to vote for a Gentleman who had represented the town for upwards of twenty years, rather than for a Gentleman who, whatever his merit was, was certainly a new candidate. The outrages were the effect of a systematic plan; in short, it was a scheme founded on French principles, which produced French practices; and if this bill was an unprecedented measure, he answered, that the cause which produced it was unprecedented in this country. The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had called this bill a measure of affected and insulting lenity. Now the committee did not consider any thing of lenity, they were guided by views of justice, as it was their duty to be guided. There was not any difference of opinion on the conduct of the magistrates; they all agreed that effectual measures were not taken by them at the last election for Nottingham to suppress riot, and to preserve the freedom of election; but the committee had not expressed their opinion so as directly to involve the magistrates in criminality; they did not think proper to propose any measure of prosecution, supposing that which was assumed on the other side to be correct, which was far from being the case; but supposing it to be so, namely, that these magistrates of the town of Nottingham were elected by the people, and that, as such, they were really the guardians of the people, yet it could not be said that their jurisdiction was destroyed by this bill, for it only gave to other justices a concurrent jurisdiction with them. As to the precedent, of which the Hon. Gent. appeared to be so apprehensive, he owned he saw no danger in it, for such a measure never would be taken except where it was necessary, and it would never be necessary, but where such principles prevailed as those which made a system of riot at Nottingham, and it was our comfort that such principles had but little root in this country.

Mr. SHAW LEFEVER said, that the present bill had his hearty concurrence. As to the amendment proposed yesterday, by an Hon. Gent. who opposed this bill with much vehemence (Mr. Fox), he found it his duty to oppose it, not only on account of its general bad principle, but also because it tended to degrade the magistracy of the counties of this kingdom, to reduce them, and to place them in a situation with the *posse comitatus* of which they were the directors on fit occasions. As to county magistrates being called crown magistrates, he begged it to be understood by the public, that they were persons generally appointed to their office (which was a laborious one, and which they performed gratis), upon principles of independence. They were appointed for the general good of the country, and they generally acted upon the principle of their appointment. He did not like that it should go forth from that House to the public, that the magistrates of the counties had either salaries or emoluments for what they did, or that they had any dependance on the Crown or other dependance whatever; on the contrary, they devoted their time often from week to week, leaving the concerns of themselves and families, to perform some of the most important business of the county and of the public, without any other fee or reward than the approbation of their consciences for having contributed much to the public welfare. As to the licensing of public-houses, no advantages were derived to the county magistrates from it; on the contrary, it was a power, the exercise of which gave them much trouble. Some clerks and inferior persons had fees and emoluments on such occasions, but the magistrates none.

Mr. FOX explained, and said he was misunderstood by the Hon. Gent. who spoke last: he did not mean to cast the slightest reflection on the magistrates of the counties, on account of their being appointed by the Crown; on the contrary, he stated that the greater part of our magistracy was appointed by the Crown, and that he regarded as one of the excellencies of the system of our government when they were mixed with those magistrates who were elected. He never knew any suspicion entertained of the general character of the justices of the peace for the counties. He never insinuated that their power was exercised from corrupt motives: what he said was, there was

much merit in the principle, and great benefit from the practice of blending with them in the general government of the community, magistrates who were elective; and he had only alluded to the general duty of a magistrate, and observed that some parts of it were more agreeable to perform than others. The excellence of our general government by municipal authority was, that it was blended, that it was an union of those who were nominated by the Crown, and those who were elected by the subject; for he detested that affectation of simplicity which would have one of them without the other. The excellency of our system consisted in providing that they should go on together, but each in his proper station.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, May 4.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[NAVY ABUSE BILL.]—Sir HENRY MILDMAY rose, and observed, that in any thing he was about to say on a question, in his mind, of considerable importance to the House and the public at large, he did not mean to attach any unjust conduct to any gentleman in his Majesty's navy. He was entirely governed by an act of Parliament which passed a short time back, the letter and spirit of which required, that the commissioners appointed under the act to investigate the abuses which have taken place in his Majesty's navy, should report to the House the nature and result of their minute inquiry; but he could not but express his astonishment, that so much time should have elapsed since the passing of the bill, for the purpose mentioned, and not the least information has yet been given to Parliament on the subject. He thought it would have been no more than the duty of the commissioners to have given the House some information how they were going on, in the business imposed on them: but it did not appear that the public was likely to receive any information on the subject. Under this impression he rose to address the House, on what he thought was his duty as a Member of Parliament. There was one circumstance among several, that he should take the liberty to mention to the House, which called for some investigation. A gentleman of the name of Taylor, had entered into a contract with the Board of Admiralty, for the term of seven, fourteen, and twenty-one years, to furnish Government with blocks; but without any real cause of complaint against Mr. Taylor, the Board of Admiralty thought proper to break the contract with him at the end of nine years: this sudden and strange conduct on the part of the Board of Admiralty to Mr. Taylor, operated for a time as hurtful to his arrangements: however, no great length of time elapsed before the Board of Admiralty were obliged to come back and solicit him to renew his engagements with them; but this application was refused by Mr. Taylor, unless the Board gave him an additional sum of 10 per cent. to what he before had from them. This, among other things, ought to come before the House through the medium of the commissioners, so that Parliament might form some opinion of Mr. Taylor's conduct. He begged leave to call the attention of the House to the time the Navy Abuse Bill was first offered for the consideration of Parliament: at that period he well recollected, that the friends of the bill urged the necessity of passing it immediately into a law, as many abuses in the navy were known to exist; he therefore thought if there was good cause to pass the bill into a law at a very short notice, there was also good cause to know something of the good effect produced by the bill; he should therefore move, that the commissioners appointed by act of Parliament, to investigate abuses in the civil departments of the navy, as practised by prize agents, &c. &c. do report the same to the House.

Sir CHARLES POLE said, he had the honour to be one of the commissioners appointed by the bill in question, and he could assure the House, that no time had been lost, and that ever since he, with the other commissioners, had met, they had sat from five to seven hours a day; he thought it necessary to observe, that as soon as fair copies were made out, the Report should be laid before the House for the inspection of Parliament, and which should be done as early as possible. He did not doubt but if the Hon. Bart. had made any inquiry respecting the business in question, of either of the commissioners, he would not have brought forward the present motion; he therefore could not but receive it as a rebuke.

Captain MARKHAM said, he had the honour to be a Member of the Board of Admiralty, but all he had to observe at present on the Hon. Gent.'s remarks respecting Mr. Taylor was, that the Admiralty considered the contract between him and them as a bad one for the public; he however should not enter into the particulars now, but when the business came before the House, he should speak at some length on the subject; yet it might be necessary for him on the present occasion to inform the House, that a very ingenious mechanic had invented an engine to cut blocks, at a much less expense than Mr. Taylor could make them for, consequently it was the duty of the Board of Admiralty to save the public money, by getting blocks as cheap as possible. And notwithstanding the Board of Admiralty had been abused by the Hon. Bart. yet, he had the pleasure of informing the House, that since the year 1792, we have a better naval force to

stand against any enemy, than we had before that period. As to the French naval force, which had been so much talked of, it only existed in the minds of Gentlemen on the opposite side of the House. He did not hesitate to say, that the French naval force consisted of nothing but a few fishing-boats.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he concurred entirely with the Hon. Gent. who said there was no imputation whatever of blame upon the Admiralty Board; but his regret was, that some particulars had been entered into in the speech of the Hon. Member who made this motion. All that had been said on the subject to which the speech of the Hon. Bart. referred, must necessarily form a part of the object to which the inquiry of the committee was to be directed, and surely it was not too much to ask that the discussion of that and other points which were the objects of inquiry of the committee, should be suspended until the Report had been made.—An Hon. Gent. at the head of the committee, had stated that the Report would in part be ready in the course of a very few days, and he thought that Hon. Member had satisfied the House there had been no delay in the progress of the inquiry, nor needed that Hon. Member have brought forward any comparison between the present time and the year 1790, as to the interval that had passed between the forming of the committee and the making a report. With regard to this motion, he did not feel there was any thing in the nature of the motion itself that tended to reflect on any body, but there was something in the particular manner of the Hon. Bart. in the speech with which he introduced that motion, that might be called an intended rebuke, and also a suspicion of an unnecessary delay. What was the statement of the Hon. Gent. at the head of the committee of inquiry? That they were almost quite prepared with one part of the Report, and that several other parts were soon to come forward: he could not therefore think it would appear to the House there had been any negligence in the proceedings of this committee; nor was the imputation of negligence indeed stated; it was only implied from what was stated by the Hon. Bart. He hoped he did not intend to convey that imputation, and he should be glad to hear from the same quarter, a disclaimer of such implication. That Hon. Bart. had alluded to some expressions which fell from him (Mr. Addington) previous to the Christmas recess, and he seemed, from that observation, to think that the Admiralty had, from an ill-timed and miserable parsimony, starved a material part of the public service, and he had compared the present state of the naval force, with the declaration made before the recess. Mr. Addington said, he had much rather be found to have made an improvident declaration, than that it should appear that any part of the public service, and particularly that part of it, had been starved by parsimony, or from any other cause neglected, or that there should rest a suspicion that it had been neglected; but he made no such declaration as that which had been imputed to him. He never said that fifty sail of the line would be ready for sea at a moment of emergency, within a month, as the Hon. Bart. stated; but he said then, and he said now, that although in time of peace, on an emergency, fifty sail of the line might be got ready for sea, he had not intimated, for it would be madness to intimate, that in that period all the men for that number of ships could be provided. His expression, at the time, conveyed no such meaning, and it would appear impossible, from the nature of the thing; so it was now impossible to say correctly the period within which that fleet could be manned. When a number of ships and proper equipments for them may be ready, was a matter which might be calculated, and therefore stated, and that was all to which his expression referred, and that might be still better known by those who were at the head of the naval department; but how was it possible to know precisely when all the men necessary for that service could be procured? That referred to a variety of considerations—first, to the state of the merchants' service in shipping, for the supply of men must come from that source; secondly, to the means taken to procure these men for the royal navy. It must therefore appear to the House manifestly impossible for him to say at what precise period fifty sail of the line would be ready to go to sea on actual service. He did not intend to say any thing that could have been so construed, and he should have been ashamed of having attempted it, if he had done so. He would not now, because this was not the season for it, state the number of ships which are ready for sea; but did Gentlemen know how many were so? This he would say, the number was much greater than any thing which had been of late generally stated to the public, and such as would gratify the wishes of the best friends of this country. Thirty-two sail of the line were in commission in British ports: more information would be given in a few days. The Admiralty had used no means that were not justifiable in procuring men: they had hitherto had recourse to none but the most moderate means; but let it not be supposed that because men were not procured, they were therefore not procurable. The House would learn that the exertions of the Admiralty to procure men, had hitherto had a strict regard to the interests of commerce, they had wisely proportioned their exertions to the emergency of the public service on the one hand, and the interests of trade and merchandise on the other. They had not hitherto pressed any from protections, nor had the commerce of the country been, in the least degree, interrupted. Gentlemen should recollect, that the scale now was greatly altered

from what it was in former years in this particular. In former times it was thought a great exertion to raise from 16,000 to 20,000 seamen; but now we were to raise from 30,000 to 50,000 seamen, which was a very great difference of comparative exertion. He observed, however, there was no remissness in the present service; on the contrary, greater exertion than at any former time, of the same length, and by much more moderate means, and better regard to the interests of trade, than on any former occasion. He was aware that he had gone more into particulars, on this occasion, than perhaps was warranted by strict regularity, and by which he had fallen into the course which he had regretted to have been done by others. His apology was, that he was desirous to set the matter right, and to assure the House, there was no period for which he was more anxious than the day when he should have it in his power to bring forward a correct statement on this part of the public service, as well as that of endeavouring to do justice to every Member of his Majesty's government, as well as himself, upon the discharge of their public duty in this and every other branch of the public service. He should then bring forward certain topics with more satisfaction than he was at present able to describe. No longer time than was absolutely necessary would be taken to bring forward these topics, when, he was confident, they would undergo a full and perfect discussion. For the present he apprehended, that his Hon. Friend behind him had given to the House an explanation that was perfectly satisfactory. He had now only to say, that, instead of proposing to negative the motion now before the House, he should move the order of the day.

Mr. Canning observed, that the Hon. Bart. had at present received a satisfactory answer to his motion, and probably, if such an answer had been given formerly to his question, as had now been given to his motion, the House would not have been troubled with the present discussion; but there was one point in which it appeared to him that his Hon. Friend had not had justice done him—he was represented as persevering in this matter without necessity, when, in point of fact, his motion arose from his not having had an answer to a question which he had put on a former occasion. His Hon. Friend was represented as imputing blame to the commissioners under the bill for inquiry into abuses in the navy; now if there was any one thing more remarkable than another in the course of what he said with perfect fairness on this occasion, it was that of a studious assurance to the House, that he did not blame the commissioners, and he thought it impossible to accuse his Hon. Friend on that ground. He understood the motion as merely preparatory to an inquiry into the subject by the House, after receiving whatever information should be conveyed by the Report. This committee was appointed before Christmas, on an allegation that great abuses prevailed in the civil departments of the navy, and so urgent and crying were these abuses stated to be, that the bill was passed, he would not say improperly, but in a very limited time, considering the constitutional principles which it involved. Parliament, however, concurred in passing it thus rapidly, under a conviction, that the abuses were so crying, that they must not be allowed to pass over the holidays, and one argument then made use of by way of sanction to the bill was, that if it did not pass before the holidays, a great deal of guilt would fly off and escape from punishment. Now he would ask, had any man fled to escape punishment? Had Mr. Taylor fled, of whom so much had been said, and who had been so treated? On the contrary, as a proof that he had no occasion to fly, or to fear, he was even now reinvested with his contract. There was, therefore, an end of that argument of the necessity of the measure, for the purpose of providing against the flight of guilt. The object of his Hon. Friend by the present motion, he understood to be this—that as the bill gave to these commissioners an extraordinary and anomalous power, and applied an extraordinary remedy, and nothing but the extent of abuse stated as the cause of it, he wished to know what was done by that committee, that was to say, to know what use the committee had made of such power? And he owned he could not think it was unworthy the feelings of a Member of Parliament to express a wish for such information, in order that the uses of this extraordinary power might appear to the House, and that the House might see how it had been applied; in order that his Hon. Friend, and every other Member who had supported the bill, might stand well with himself for having assented to such a measure. If so much, and such extraordinary, power was given, was it too much for a Member of Parliament to ask, how such power had been employed? Was that an inquiry which was unworthy a Member of Parliament? His Hon. Friend was charged with going into particulars upon this occasion, before the Report was brought forward. On a former occasion, when he asked for the Report of the committee, he received no answer; and as one head of the Report must then have been nearly ready, as appeared by the statement of an Hon. Member of the committee, that might have been stated to his Hon. Friend, and then he was confident that he would not have gone into particulars before he saw that Report. Another point on which his Hon. Friend was justified in calling for the Report, was this; when this committee was instituted, the House was perpetually warned by Ministers to consider that we were in a state of profound peace, and when, therefore, no possible injury could be felt by probing into abuses which had crept into our

affairs in the course of a long war; and this argument must be supposed to have great weight, from such authority; for was it possible that a measure might be laudable in time of peace, and yet infinitely dangerous even to be tried in time of war. In time of war, it was possible to feel abuses, and yet we should not attempt to remove them. Mr. Taylor got his contract again—Why? Because that which was intended to supply his place was not ready. What did that prove, but that Members of Government began to destroy, before they had provided means for substitution? He would ask, if that was the situation in which it was wise to place us? and was a man to be rebuked afterwards for doing nothing but his duty, by calling on the House to examine into the manner in which power so obtained had been exercised? It was very possible that the bill under which these commissioners acted, was meant for peace and not for war—he was not saying that was the case—but it was possible, and that was a question fit for discussion; and his Hon. Friend was now not only justified, but he was performing a laudable duty in calling the attention of Parliament to a subject of so much importance: nor was this all; his Hon. Friend would have been justified in taking the course he did, although none of these reasons existed. He would have been justified upon the principles of humanity and the feelings of a gent. in calling for an account of the manner in which this power had been exercised, if he had only conceived that Mr. Taylor was an ill-used individual. He saw nothing discreditable to his Hon. Friend in bringing this matter forward, even if it appeared that he had no other motive but that of vindicating the character of an individual whom he had thought ill-treated; why, then, his Hon. Friend was justified in calling the attention of the House to the subject on the feelings of common humanity. He was justified in doing so from the civility of a gent. a point which no Gent. would dispute, and as a Member of Parliament not only was he justified in what he did, but he was laudably performing a laborious task. The conduct of the Admiralty was not in question now, nor need it have been brought into this debate, in the course of which, without any reference to any personal question, it appeared that persons who mean to speak on one side, might happen to contradict each other; and this had been the fact to-night in this debate between his Hon. Friend behind him (Captain Markham) and the Rt. Hon. Gent. upon the floor (the Chancellor of the Exchequer). The Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, that with regard to the preparations of the navy of this country, it is, in point of fact, in a greater state of preparation than on the apprehension of hostilities at the beginning of the last war. That was not the question; but the question was, whether, with reference to the comparative establishments at both periods, more had been done now than had been done then in the same length of time, to put this country in a proper state of preparation for hostilities? The Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, that when he said fifty sail of the line meant for service would be ready in a month, on an emergency, he did not mean that they should be actually fit for sea, because they might not be manned in that time. He would not contradict the present statement of the Rt. Hon. Gent. but the way in which he accounted for having deceived himself by hearing the statement was this: the Rt. Hon. Gent. had said on that occasion, the men were more easily collected now than they were formerly, because they were now distributed in frigates, and that therefore the ships might be equipped in a shorter time than formerly. This was the reason alleged by the Rt. Hon. Gent. why we could fit out fifty sail of the line within so short a time upon an emergency, and this could not formerly be done. How the men might be brought together, and so form a force sufficient to fit out a fleet of fifty sail of the line, he could not understand, and that was the sense in which he comprehended, or thought he comprehended, the assertion of the Rt. Hon. Gent. upon that subject. But how frigates can be changed into large ships of the line, he owned he did not understand. He could not understand how frigates could be changed into ships of the line, but he could conceive how the men taken out of a great number of frigates, were brought together, and put on board ships of the line; and this was the only way in which he hoped to atone for the misconception he had formed of the assertion of the Rt. Hon. Gent. What he had heard to-night, excited his astonishment; and he must now beg that the King's message of the 8th of March be read.—[The message was read in part—"His Majesty thinks it necessary to acquaint the House of Commons that very considerable military preparations are carrying on in the ports of France and Holland."]—Mr. Canning proceeded: he said, that was enough for him. It was now for the first time that the House had heard, from the best authority, from one of the Lords of the Admiralty, that there was no preparation in the ports of France and Holland. Until to-day the House had been led to believe there were considerable preparations carrying on in the ports of France and Holland.—But now we had a plain assertion from one of the Lords of the Admiralty, directly contradicting the whole of the most material sentence in the message from the King. In the very teeth of all our alarm, a Gent. from the Admiralty told the House there was no foundation for any part of it, for that we had nothing to oppose but a few fishing-boats. This was an agreeable surprise, and he had too high an opinion of his Hon. Friend Captain Markham's vigilance, to doubt the correctness of his information, and too high an opinion of his veracity, for an instant to suspect the truth of his assertion—too

high an opinion of his integrity, to suspect that he would attempt to delude the House. If not, then the question would be, who have deluded the House? On what pretence was that message sent? If the statement of his Hon. Friend (Captain Markham) was correct, he believed he understood the case a little, and that it was not difficult to judge why the House had no information. The Report of the committee would soon be made, and then the House would take the matter of it into consideration. The material question which would arise on it would be, not only whether the commissioners had exercised their powers properly or not? but also, whether this measure did more good than harm? or whether, which was a possible case, instead of redressing grievances, it had been applied to the oppression of a worthy individual, and exercised to the detriment of the state?

Mr. FOX said, that the Rt. Hon. Gent. who spoke last must perceive that no motion had been made at present upon the conduct of the Board of Admiralty; if that subject should come under discussion, he had such a perfect reliance upon the high character of the Noble Person who presided over that Board, that he had no doubt but a complete and sufficient answer would be given to any charges that might be brought forward. It was certainly natural to wish, that upon a point of great public importance the House should have information upon the subject, but it was impossible sometimes to have information simply, and at the same time justly, because information, to be satisfactory, must embrace all the points connected with it. He was perfectly convinced of the good intention of the present Board of Admiralty: by good intention, he meant not only the disposition, but the ability to reform and root out the abuses which were known to exist in parts of the naval service. He trusted that in the prosecution of this great work, the Board of Admiralty would not suffer themselves to be intimidated by the clamours or insinuations which were thrown out against them by jobbers, or by persons who were interested in continuing those abuses. Strong powers were certainly given to the commissioners by the bill which had been alluded to: he certainly was not a friend to vesting strong powers in any persons; but if he were to give them in any case, it would be where they were to be used to effect reforms in the abuses of the state. He had seen instances in which former administrations had been anxious upon all occasions to take strong measures against the subject, and it would be too much now if they were to refuse strong powers, which were to be exercised for the benefit of the subject. This certainly was not the time for entering into any discussion upon the armament; he could not, however, help expressing his surprise at what had fallen from an Hon. Gent. (Captain Markham) upon that subject, even though the Hon. Member's opinion upon that point agreed with his own. The words of the message certainly were military armaments; now the word military was certainly sometimes used in contradistinction to naval; but when the subject came to be inquired into, it would make very little difference in what sense the word was understood. He had merely risen to state his perfect confidence in the ability of the present Board of Admiralty to carry the reforms into effect, either in time of peace or war.

Capt. MARKHAM, in explanation, said, that when he spoke of the respective naval force of this country, and of that which he must call our natural enemy, he certainly outstepped the strict line, as men sometimes used strong expressions without expecting to be held to the strict letter of them. Perhaps, too, it might be a little allowable to Gent. of his profession to hold the naval power of France in contempt, and it was in that view he spoke of the navy of France. He begged to refer to the history of the last war, and it would be found that he had not much outstepped the bounds of truth, when he called the navy of France mere fishing-boats. He did not say there were no armaments in the ports of France and Holland, but he hoped he should always be able to speak of them with the same contempt.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, May 5.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[IRISH BANK RESTRICTION.]—Lord KING took the first regular opportunity that presented itself, for proposing the introduction of the clause he had given notice of on two former occasions: the substance and effect of this clause was, to authorize the creditors of the Governors and Company of the Bank of Ireland to compel, by legal process, that corporation to pay them the amount of their demands in Bank of England notes, allowing for the difference of the currency in Ireland. The adoption of this measure, the Noble Lord contended, would in a great degree remedy the evils produced in Ireland by the depreciation of its currency, in consequence of the enormous circulation of Bank notes. He pointed out the difference between a real and nominal exchange, and argued that the latter was by no means so much against Ireland as was generally supposed; inasmuch as the actual balance of trade would be found to be in its favour. The causes of the unfavourable state of the exchange with respect to Ireland, arose, he contended, chiefly, if not solely, from the great depreciation of its currency. The chief objection against what he proposed was, that it would tend to draw the specie out of the country—this he could not think would be the case. He was of opinion

that an adequate supply of Bank of England notes could be procured by means of bills of exchange, and in the way of commerce. He contended, that unless the causes of the depreciation of its currency were done away, which his proposition would tend more than any other measure, equally unexceptionable, to do, the consequences must eventually be ruinous to that country. The Noble Lord concluded with moving his clause, which was to the effect above stated.

The Marquis of SLIGO said, nothing could more clearly shew the difficulty of finding any remedy for the grievance under which the Irish laboured in the high and increasing exchange, than that a proposition should come from a Noble Lord, who had considered the subject so much with intent to do it away, which was in no sort practicable, and which, if practicable by any possible means, would be productive of the most serious mischiefs. His Lordship said, he had considered the subject a great deal, not only as a duty to Ireland, but also for the purpose of giving such local information to their Lordships, as they might not otherwise obtain; and by doing of which, perhaps, on such occasions, the seat he had the honour of filling would be of most public utility. A bill for continuing the restrictions on the bank of Ireland could scarcely have any clause added to it more entirely inconsistent with its principle, than that which was proposed; neither could his Lordship possibly understand what difference there was between allowing the Bank to pay their engagements with guineas, or with notes from another country, which they must buy with guineas It would open the Bank in the worst manner possible, by allowing all the specie to go out of the country, without circulating any of it through it for its own internal purposes. His Lordship said, the difficulty in discussing money questions arose partly from not considering specie like any other article of commerce. Take it in that view, and much of its apparent complicacy vanished. Gold, it was very certain, bore a premium of above five per cent. in Ireland above its nominal value in Bank notes; but though he was not prepared to say paper was not in some degree of depreciation, he would not agree that it was a necessary consequence resulting from it; and in the present instance he was much inclined to think it was not the case. Specie, it was well known, was indispensably necessary for the linen trade, the great staple manufacture of Ireland, and not necessary, from any preference given to it alone by those who carried on the trade, but from other very good and sufficient reasons. With a limited quantity of specie in the country, it was very natural, when indispensably wanted any where, that those who chanced to hold what there was of it, should give it an increased value. A horse worth 30*l.* at Smithfield last month, might be worth 40*l.* now, without any depreciation in the notes of the Bank of England; and the same argument would apply to specie. His Lordship said, that the high price of bullion in Ireland, and the high exchange against that country, were both circumstances much to be regretted; and yet though acting in some degree as cause and effect, they tended to counteract the mischiefs of each other; and if it were possible to remove the one without the other, it would be attended with consequences the most ruinous. The high value of specie for internal purposes kept the money in the country, which otherwise would be forced out by the high premium of the exchange; and the high exchange reimbursed the merchant what he had paid for specie, without obliging him to add to its price upon the consumer. The exchange operated as a tax upon all imports, and as a bounty on our own manufacture; and thus perhaps it carried with it a kind of sinking fund, that might ultimately do away a grievance for which it was scarcely possible to find a direct remedy; and all the proposals for which were so full of difficulty and danger, that in his mind it was better far to bear the ills we have, than taste of others that we know not of. With respect to the causes of the high exchange against Ireland, they were pretty generally known: a great military establishment, in times when the country was disturbed, had incurred expense, the means for which were necessarily got out of it. The interest on those loans, great in comparison to the wealth of the country, and paid out of it, was one cause; coals imported, and amounting to near 700,000*l.* a year, one half of which was used in Dublin, and paid for in specie, was another cause; an increase of expense in those who lived out of the country, by the rise in every article of consumption, was another cause; an increase of foreign trade, and every other natural cause for the balance of trade, also operated; and it was unfortunately too true what was advanced by the Noble Lord, that Ireland had not a balance of trade in her favour with any country in the world. Such were her present circumstances, but he hoped and trusted with much better prospects before her. His Lordship said, there was one point advanced, to which, from personal motives, he was particularly anxious to allude: it had been very industriously circulated, that the high exchange against Ireland had been occasioned by an increase of absentees in consequence of the Union, and that it was a fair price to pay for it. His Lordship said, the fact was not so, there was no increase of absentees worth naming—that he never believed the Union would increase the absentees—and that if he had, he never would have voted for it, not from regard to the paltry sum which a few individuals might expend, and which would be provided for by half the value of a linen ship, but because nothing could com-

pensate any country for the loss of its resident gentry. The example of their lives, the encouragement of their countenance to industry, the protection of the weak, and seeing and enforcing a regular and impartial administration of justice, were duties which the great owed to their situation; they belonged to their residence, and the want of them no advantage could compensate.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, May 6.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[Insolvent debtors.]—On the motion for the committal of the insolvent debtors' bill,

Lord Moira rose, and took a wide and comprehensive view of the laws of this country with respect to debtor and creditor, and complained of the power which, contrary to the principles of the constitution, and the precepts of universal justice, the creditor now possessed of inflicting punishment upon his debtor. It was the only instance in which an individual was allowed to be judge in his own cause, and permitted to subject another man to penal imprisonment (for it was cavilling with terms to call it any thing else), without any proof of delinquency. Against this default it was his wish to provide a remedy, not by a temporary act, but by a permanent regulation. It was a common saying, that there were twenty evil debtors to one cruel creditor. He would not deny that fraudulent debtors were numerous—perhaps, more than half of those who contracted debts did so, either with no intention to pay, or squandered the means which should be applied to that purpose. Such persons it was the object of his measure to exclude; but though he meant to propose so to do, he would not be understood to accede to the whole of the saying he alluded to. There might be many evil debtors, but that could only be assumed, while the cruelty of creditors was proved by many record. It was proved by the Report of the Society for the relief of persons confined for small debts, from which it appeared, that in the year ending the 1st of March 1802, they liberated 1125 persons, who were confined for debts, on an average not exceeding 2*l.* 7*s.* 2*d.* per head; and these poor prisoners had 500 wives and 1400 children. On the feelings and justice of such creditors, he thought a comment would be superfluous. He cited the case to shew the pressing necessity for legislative interposition. The Noble Lord stated the bill he held in his hand to be merely a transcript of the last bill which the House had adopted; but that in the committee he meant to propose a clause which would obviate the necessity of any further insolvent bills, for the object of it would be to give a power to confined debtors to appeal to the magistrates at quarter sessions, and that, if those magistrates see cause, they should be invested with an authority to refer the case to a jury, whose decision should be final, either to liberate the prisoner, or, if found to be fraudulent in his views, to recommit him to prison, as a punishment, for such time as should seem proper. It was also a part of his plan, that the creditors, on a similar appeal, should be able to obtain from debtors who may be disposed to prefer a prison to a fair settlement, a full account and surrender of their effects. These were the prominent features of the clause he should submit; providing also that the magistrates should, in all cases where they saw proof of fraud in an appealing debtor, be at liberty to remand him to prison for another year, if they thought necessary. The Noble Lord concluded with saying, that his wish was, that the bill should be now committed, that the clause he described should be inserted, the bill printed, and that the discussion should take place on a recommittal on Thursday next.

Lord Ellenborough defended the system of arrest which had so long existed, as necessary to maintain that credit which was the life and soul of the country, and he therefore opposed the Noble Lord's project. With respect to the Noble Lord's allusion to the 1100 prisoners released by the Society for relieving persons confined for small debts, he observed, that their confinement was necessary to maintain that credit upon which so many thousands of the poor subsisted; and if these eleven hundred persons were not confined, perhaps eleven millions would have starved. As to the general operation of the insolvent bill, he could state that persons were in the habit of rushing into the prisons the moment such bills were announced, in order to avail themselves of this indulgence. He believed, in fact, that the prisoners really entitled to the benefit of such acts were very few; and he was certain these few would, when their case was explained, not fail of success in an appeal to their creditors.

The Lord Chancellor followed on the same side, and asserted, that among the most prominent features in the British character, was the humanity of an English creditor; and this he had an opportunity of knowing, from his own experience in the administration of the bankrupt laws. He had therefore no fear that persecution would be practised on the debtor whose inability was not attributed to want of principle or industry. With regard to the insolvent debtors' bills generally, they were to be considered with relation to the creditors as well as to the debtors, and to the public at large. To creditors he considered them unjust, to the public injurious, and to even debtors inhuman, for they encouraged

improvidence. So much was he of that opinion, that, instead of agreeing to the Noble Lord's proposition to prevent arrest for any sum under 20*l.* he would rather recommend to allow it for any sum over 5*l.* as really more humane and best calculated to prevent litigation. As to this bill in particular, he understood, that from the first time it was mentioned persons rushed into prison, in the hope of benefiting by it, and that every step it had gone through the House the number was increased.

After an able reply from Lord Moira, the motion for committal was rejected, with only one dissentient voice, and the bill of course was lost.

[Negotiation.]—Lord Pelham began by adverting to a notice of a motion from a Noble Lord, which stood for Monday, and stated that he had a communication to make, which would, he supposed, supersede the necessity of that motion, though he had to regret that this communication was not quite conclusive upon the subject; and he had still more to regret, that it was of a nature which must be more painful to the feelings of their Lordships, than all the suspense and uncertainty in which the House and the country had been so long but so necessarily placed. The subject of this communication he observed to be, with regard to a circumstance particularly which had taken place this morning, and of which he thought it his duty to inform their Lordships. The French Ambassador had, in pursuance of instructions from his court, applied for a passport, which was of course granted. He had also to mention, that his Majesty's Ministers had some days since sent directions to Lord Whitworth, that if he should not be able, within a certain period, to bring the negotiation to a point, he should leave Paris. They had not, however, yet received any communications from that Noble Personage to apprize them of the event, whether he had terminated the negotiation, and actually left Paris, though, in his opinion, his Lordship was on his journey home. However, until Ministers received intelligence from him, his Majesty would not be enabled to communicate to the House that full and satisfactory information which he was anxious to do, and which was desirable and necessary. This, he had confident expectation, would be laid before their Lordships on Monday next, to which day he should propose an adjournment. Understanding that some Noble Lords objected to the delay, he thought it necessary to observe, that it would be perfectly impossible to make the wished-for communication sooner; and he saw no necessity that existed, nor any use that could arise from sitting to-morrow, contrary to the general custom.

Lord Darnley could not persuade himself that it would be proper in him, from the kind of statement which the Noble Secretary of State had made, to withdraw the notice he had given of a motion for Monday; on the contrary, he thought it still more necessary. However he felt under these circumstances, he was most decidedly of opinion that it would be highly improper to adjourn over till Monday. In such a state of affairs their Lordships should continue at their post, for something might occur, even within twenty-four hours, which would require the assistance of their advice. The Noble Secretary had indeed promised a satisfactory communication on Monday; but he spoke not in the language of certainty, and he therefore felt disinclined to abandon the motion he proposed to bring forward. The system of confidence in Ministers had been too long followed up—this indulgence ought now at least to terminate. The mischiefs of delay were but too obvious; and, among its consequences, the late disgraceful transaction at the Stock Exchange was very fairly to be classed. He would not, therefore, consent to any farther procrastination, but would on Monday, unless the proposed communication should be made on that day, call upon Ministers for their defence, and for an explanation as to the present state of the country. Upon this he was determined to take the sense of the House. With respect to the adjournment, he thought it ought not to go beyond to-morrow; but he would leave it to some Noble Lord of more weight to propose a motion to that effect.

Earl Spencer was surprised that Ministers could attempt to propose any adjournment beyond a single day, in such a conjuncture as the present. It was to be sure stated, that it would be impossible for Ministers to give full information to the House as to the cause of that conjuncture before Monday; but that was not a reason why their Lordships should not continue to sit, at a time when we might perhaps be within an hour of absolute war, when we were unaware of the amount of the dangers which menaced the country, and of the provision made against them. The House would desert its duty, if upon such an occasion it consented to any longer adjournment than was really necessary. It was rather, in his judgment, incumbent on their Lordships to take up the subject of public affairs with zeal and promptitude, and interpose between Ministers and the Crown, in order to save the country. It might be said that he was prematurely entering into the question, that he was making observations which had a tendency to excite ill humour; but he would not be influenced by arguments drawn from such sources. It would be culpable any longer to attend to such remarks. Too much forbearance had been manifested, and the country

had reason to regret it. The Noble Lord concluded with moving, that the word "to-morrow" should be substituted for "Monday next."

The LORD CHANCELLOR professed his regard for all those who felt a warm solicitude for the public interest, and paid a close attention to their public duties; but he did not see that any advantage could arise from the attendance which the amendment proposed. As to the censures which a Noble Lord had thought proper to pronounce on the measures of Ministers, he thought that it would be but candid in that Noble Lord to suspend his censures until he should know what those measures were. It was undoubtedly desirable that their Lordships should, by the faithful execution of their duty, deserve the approbation of the country; but he was certain their attendance to-morrow would not in the least degree tend to raise them higher in the estimation of any part of the thinking and rational public. The House could not go into the subject of the present state of the country, until the communication should be made, which his Noble Friend had said it was impossible to prepare before Monday, and therefore he would ask, what end it could answer to meet to-morrow?

Lord DARNLEY could not pretend to the accuracy of expression which distinguished the Noble and Learned Lord who spoke last, and he was therefore, perhaps, liable to be misunderstood. He could assure that Noble Lord that he had quite misunderstood his sentiments, for he meant not to make any strictures on Ministers at present. He only expressed the anxiety which he, in common with every Englishman, must feel for a complete and explicit statement as to the present situation and prospects of the country.

Lord CARLISLE remarked on the objections made to the amendment by the Noble and Learned Lord on the woolsack. His Noble Friend, when he alluded to the protracted negotiation, did not, he was sure, mean to confine the allusion merely to the seven weeks which had elapsed since the message of his Majesty was delivered to the House, but to the nineteen months negotiation in which Ministers had been engaged since the signing of the preliminaries which succeeded the treaty of Amiens, and which had so long kept the country in suspense. This was the first object of his Noble Friend's animadversion. It was not to be supposed that their Lordships would not rise higher in public estimation by paying such attention to the state of affairs at this moment, as their nature urgently called for. The Noble Secretary of State had informed the House that the French Ambassador had applied for a passport, and was about to leave England; and that Lord Whitworth was instructed to leave Paris, and in that Noble Lord's opinion he had actually left it. If so, was not that, he would ask, a state of war, and could the House then agree to one hour's unnecessary adjournment? The public mind was in a state of inexpressible anxiety, and their Lordships should use their utmost endeavours to allay it. According to the report without doors, he would not say that it came from Ministers, but he understood it to prevail among intelligent persons, a messenger was hourly expected from France, with intelligence from our Ambassador. If so, why postpone the satisfaction of the public mind to Monday next? Curiosity ought to be gratified as soon as possible. Ministers ought to have felt it, and the proposition for a short adjournment ought to have come from themselves. However, he trusted the House would fully consider their duty, and adopt the motion of his Noble Friend.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 6.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[THE NEGOTIATION.] — The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER rose.—Before, said he, I make the usual motion, that the House, on its rising this day, do adjourn till Monday next, I think it proper to say, that I expect to have a command from his Majesty, to make a communication to the House on that day respecting the issue of the discussion between the two governments, together with an intimation that all the papers and documents connected with that important subject shall also be very speedily submitted to the consideration of the House. Even under the circumstances in which the House and the country stand at the present moment, I feel anxious to inform the House, that the French Ambassador has this morning applied for passports, for the purpose of availing himself immediately of them as soon as he should learn that Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris, which he had reason to suppose had already been the case. It is true, indeed, that Lord Whitworth was instructed to leave Paris on a certain day, if he found it impossible to obtain a satisfactory answer to the point upon which his Majesty's Ministers had pressed for a final decision. No accounts have yet been received that this answer has been given, and therefore it is probable, indeed more than probable, that before this time Lord Whitworth had left Paris. I trust the House will feel the propriety of my not entering into any further explanation on the present occasion, and of agreeing to the motion, that the House, on its rising, adjourn till Monday next.

Mr. FOX would trouble the House but with very few words. The House must feel that the present was a most critical and awful mo-

ment: and if things were brought to this melancholy state, he could not help saying that the House should take the earliest opportunity of obtaining information respecting it. Any delay might be of the most serious inconvenience; and if it was possible that any further communication could be made to-morrow, the House should hold itself in readiness to receive it. If the House did not meet to-morrow, two days must elapse before they could receive any additional light on the present uncertain posture of affairs. There was nothing decisive in what the Rt. Hon. Gent. had said: on the contrary, the House were left in a still more painful suspense. The sooner the matter was brought under consideration the better; for the discussion that would take place upon it might prove of the most material importance. Not a moment should therefore be lost in taking the opinion of the House upon it.

Lord HAWKESBURY did not think that any official and regular communication could be made to the House without the knowledge that Lord Whitworth had actually left Paris. It was uncertain whether that could be known early enough to make any communication respecting it to the House: he was also at a loss to conceive what inconvenience could possibly arise from so short a delay. It had already been intimated to the House by his Rt. Hon. Friend (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), that a message would be brought down from his Majesty on Monday, and that his Majesty would order the different papers and documents relative to the negotiation to be laid before the House for their consideration. These documents would enable the House to decide upon the propriety or impropriety of the conduct which Ministers had pursued during the important and arduous discussion in which they have been engaged; but before these papers were duly before the House, and before they were possessed of the information to be gathered from them, it was impossible for the House to see the question in a full and fair light, and consequently they must be unable to come to any thing like a determination respecting it. Surely so short a delay, under such circumstances, could not be productive of any bad effect, more especially as Ministers were ready to assure the House that they should not lose a moment in advising his Majesty to order every possible information to be laid before them that could afford the fullest explanation of the actual state of the difference between [illegible] two countries. Before that information w[illegible] the House, any discussion of the q[illegible], in his mind, be unsatisfactory a[illegible]

Mr. GREY.—The p[illegible]nceive to be one wh[illegible] altogether and imp[illegible] recommended by [illegible]

The present is a moment of such serious difficulty and danger, that the House should judge and decide for themselves; and I trust that the House will not agree to postpone their sitting till Monday, but that they will determine to meet to-morrow. The Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Addington) says, that he has reason to apprehend that Lord Whitworth is on his return. Indeed, I cannot pretend to know officially on what particular day Lord Whitworth had orders to leave Paris; he did not receive the final answer which Ministers seem to have expected: but if any attention was to be paid to the rumours that were afloat, it was neither impossible nor improbable that his Lordship might arrive in the course of this day, or early to-morrow. Most undoubtedly Ministers, in compliance with their duty, in compliance with the anxious desire of the House and of the country, and in compliance with the severe and heavy responsibility they had incurred—a responsibility heavier than ever hung upon the shoulders of any former Administration, should seize the earliest opportunity to relieve the House from its present anxiety, and not let a day or an hour pass in making that communication which has been so impatiently expected, and so long delayed. The advice which the House might give his Majesty on so trying an occasion might, under the present circumstances, be of the most important consequence, and such indeed as might rescue the country from the difficulties and dangers to which it was now exposed. The delay of an hour might therefore be of incalculable disadvantage. When the communication was made, a day would be appointed for examining and discussing the conduct of Ministers, and that conduct must, no doubt, be brought to a strict inquiry and examination. But if the House decided to meet to-morrow, that discussion might be entered into two days sooner than otherwise it can be. The Noble Lord (Lord Hawkesbury) objects, however, to its being brought forward until all the papers respecting the negotiation were ready to be laid upon the table. Was it possible then, that, after all that has been said, Ministers could be so remiss as not to have prepared every possible document that can tend to explain and justify their conduct—a conduct which to every observer must appear so mysterious and unaccountable? That they were so prepared I cannot permit myself to doubt. Under that conviction, and under the present circumstances of the country, I am almost confident the House will not agree to the proposed adjournment; for when the promised information is laid before the House, some time must elapse before it can be printed, and before the discussion can be fully entered into. The least delay should not therefore be admitted; and with that view he should move an amendment, "That the "House do adjourn till to-morrow, instead "of Monday."

Mr. Canning was anxious to distinguish the grounds upon which he should vote for the earlier day. He could not agree with the Hon. Gent. who moved the amendment, that Ministers could be prepared to lay before the House the full information that was expected from them; at least he had no expectation of receiving any such information to-morrow; but he still was anxious that the House should meet to-morrow, even though they should only meet to adjourn again; because, at a moment of such unprecedented alarm to the country, the House should not be absent for a moment from their post. Both the Rt. Hon. Gent. and the Noble Lord have acknowledged that they cannot as yet make a final communication to the House, though they may be able to give some additional information to-morrow to what they have given this day. From what they have said this day, the House might conclude that Lord Whitworth has already left Paris; but certain information is yet to be obtained respecting that event; but this information may be had to-morrow, and it will make that certain which is now only a strong conjecture, and a conclusive probability. Was any man prepared to say, that after what has passed within these two days, the earliest possible information was not necessary? [*A cry of Hear! hear!*]—But it might be said, there were other modes of making the communication, should any accounts arrive to give room to one. To this he should only reply, that if any one knew a more constitutional mode of conveying such information to the country than through Parliament, he wished that mode might be pointed out to the House. If to the doubtful intelligence now given to the House, one single atom more of certain information could be added within twenty-four hours, he could not see with what consistency those who have all along expressed such anxiety for information could vote for taking away from the House the opportunity of receiving it. On this ground it was that he wished the House not to adjourn beyond to-morrow. He was not eager for any hasty discussion, nor would the meeting to-morrow tend in the least to precipitate the expected discussion. But surely the House should shew the country that they sympathized with the feelings of the country, and they would not be thinking of giving themselves a holiday, while all around was confusion, anxiety, agitation, and dismay.

The Secretary at War did not imagine that it was possible to afford any more information to-morrow than was communicated to the House this day. He hoped the House would consider how derogatory it would be from their dignity to continue sitting on a day not usually employed in business, merely because the French Ambassador had thought proper to apply for passports, especially when there was no probability of obtaining any more distinct information than what had already been submitted to them. Were it probable that any practical advantage could be derived from sitting to-morrow, he was ready to admit the propriety of so doing; but when there was no such probability, he must again repeat that it would be beneath the dignity of the House to sit waiting in momentary expectation of some accounts from the French government, and that merely because the French Ambassador had applied for passports. Lord Whitworth most likely may have left Paris on Tuesday or Wednesday last; but it should be recollected that he travelled with a numerous retinue, and consequently it could not be expected that he could arrive sooner than to-morrow evening, or at an hour too late for any communication to be brought down on that day: even should the House meet to-morrow, it would be impossible for them to enter a moment earlier into the discussion of the question, than at the time to which it was intended to defer it; for it could not be fairly discussed until the House were in possession of all the papers connected with it. When they were before the House, then would be the time to enter coolly and deliberately into the discussion, and in a manner suitable to the wisdom and gravity of Parliament. If the House met to-morrow, it was likely that something might be started which would give rise to a discussion that might be attended with the worst consequences both here and abroad: on that ground principally he should resist the motion.

Mr. Canning, in explanation, said, that he did not look for any papers being presented to-morrow. All he insisted on was, that if the fact that Lord Whitworth was actually arrived could be ascertained to the House, it was their duty to be at their post to receive the intelligence.

Mr. Lascelles and Mr. Whitbread rose at the same time. There was a general cry to hear Mr. Lascelles, but the Speaker called to

Mr. Whitbread, who gave it as his opinion, that the House would but ill consult their dignity if they were not to be found at their post, waiting to see in what state the country was really placed, and how it could best be extricated from its present difficulties. He therefore differed widely from the Hon. Secretary at War, for not a moment should be lost in inquiring into the present posture of affairs—it was truly alarming.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 9.—(See Minutes, p. 811.)

[Negotiation.]—Lord Pelham observed, that under the particular circumstances of

the case, he had a communication to make to their Lordships relative to the negotiation with the government of France. He alluded to the notice recently given by a Noble Earl, that he should on that day bring forward a motion respecting the subject, if no communication were made. Motives of respect to that Noble Lord, as well as to the House in general, induced him to come forward, and state what had come to the knowledge of his Majesty's Ministers, as having taken place since the period he had last mentioned the subject to their Lordships. He reminded the House, that he had stated on a former evening, that on Friday morning the French Ambassador had applied for passports; and he had farther apprized the House, that his Majesty's Ambassador had orders to quit Paris on a certain day, in case the matter in discussion were not likely to be brought to a favourable issue. He had now to state, that circumstances, however, had since occurred, which had induced a delay on the part of his Majesty's Ambassador at Paris; but this circumstance was not attended with any other changes than the necessary delay which arose from the proceeding. However, he entertained a confidential hope that he should, in a short time, be able to come down with a regular communication upon the subject to the House.

The Earl of Darnley could not avoid expressing his sense of the degree of candour with which the Noble Secretary of State had conducted himself on the present occasion. As circumstances stood, he felt himself inclined, with a reference to what had fallen from Ministers, and considering what was due to decorum on such an occasion, to decline giving their Lordships any further trouble at present, than merely to state his understanding, that it was the intention of Ministers to take the earliest opportunity of bringing this long-protracted negotiation to a speedy issue. However, while he was on his legs, he should take the opportunity, with the permission of their Lordships, to state the grounds of his projected motion. In framing that proposition, he had no idea of attempting to criminate his Majesty's Ministers, on account of any thing which hitherto appeared in their conduct; but he, in common with all their Lordships, and with the country at large, felt that it was desirable and proper, that such a long and protracted negotiation should be brought to a point: his wish, however, was not to do any thing that might embarrass Ministers. At the same time, he might be permitted to doubt whether any good could possibly arise from such procrastinated delay; and on these general grounds it was that he intended to come forward. Having said so much, he wished farther to premise, at the same time, that he should feel it incumbent on him, if it should appear contrary to every expectation held out that night, and contrary to his own feelings as to what should be the right line of conduct that Ministers should think fit again to enter into a protracted negotiation, and (so we understood the Noble Earl) again to express themselves in terms of uncertainty, to come forward and again trouble their Lordships on the subject, and with a detailed statement of his reasons in favour of an address to his Majesty, expressive of what he thought should be the sense of the House in such circumstances, and urging an inquiry into the causes of a delay, which he was convinced must be injurious to the real interests of the country. He concluded by moving, that the order which was made respecting his intended motion of to-day be discharged.

Earl Spencer begged leave to take the opportunity to offer a few observations upon the subject under their Lordships' consideration. He perfectly coincided with the Noble Earl who had just sat down, in the propriety of his waving his proposed motion under the present circumstances. He was of opinion, that, after the communication of this day, it would be highly unadvisable to make a motion of that kind: when the obvious situation of the country was considered, it could not satisfactorily be discussed. The real grounds on which he thought the House would consent to a farther delay were, in his view of the affair, neither more nor less than these: all who thought they saw reason, from what they knew, to approve of the conduct of Ministers, would of course agree to the proposition; while, on the other hand, others, and those with whom he joined in opinion, were averse from taking any steps which might embarrass his Majesty's Ministers, who were already in a situation of great difficulty. However, in other points of view, those who acted on the principle he had latterly alluded to, might think it proper, and in other circumstances would feel themselves called upon, to urge repeatedly for the necessary information on the real state of the country. With respect to the line of proceeding that day adopted by the Noble Earl, he repeated it was, in his mind, judiciously conceived; but he could not help observing, that, by what transpired that day, it appeared that unforeseen circumstances, as alluded to by a Noble Friend of his, had actually happened, which it was proper the public should be informed of, and, at the earliest opportunity, through the medium of Parliament, the more especially for the purpose of relieving those doubts to which uncertain reports must necessarily give rise.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, May 12.—(See Minutes, p. 812.)

[Bill of indemnity.]—The Attorney General said, that the papers upon which

he should ground his motion having been laid before the House, Gent. were of course in possession of the subject: his intention was to move for a bill of indemnity for all the persons who issued, or who carried into execution, the orders for prohibiting the exportation of military stores, and for permitting the exportation of a certain quantity of seed corn to Norway. As these two orders depended upon circumstances that were distinct, he would take them separately; and first, with regard to the permission to export a certain quantity of seed corn to Norway. Representations having been made by the Danish government, stating the great distress that was experienced in Norway in consequence of the failure of the harvest last season, and asking for permission to export 5000 quarters of barley and oats from this country into Norway, as seed corn, the Secretary of State communicated that request to the Lords of the Treasury, and urged the importance of the object, and the advanced season of the year. That such a request ought to be complied with he did not suppose would be for a moment doubted, when the nature of the application was considered, and the quarter from which it came. The application was made by a neighbouring nation, in amity and friendship with this country, and it was only for a small quantity of seed corn to rescue Norway from the danger of a famine. He should do injustice to the House if he took up their time in arguing such a point. The propriety of granting this request was not only clear upon the principles of liberality, charity, and good neighbourhood, but even the most narrow and contracted mind must be sensible of the expediency of complying with it; because this country was interested in the produce of the harvest of neighbouring countries; because, if their harvests failed, they must be supplied from those sources from which we derived our own importation. These considerations would induce Government at any time to comply with such a request; but this application was made at a time when there was nothing connected with our own markets, which would justify a refusal. The application was made on the 24th of March: all that time the order of Council for prohibiting the exportation of corn was near its expiration, and Government were actually considering whether that order should be renewed or not. Urgent applications were made by the trade against the renewal of the order; but it was renewed upon other considerations besides those which related to the state of our markets. Under these circumstances, an order was issued by the Lords of the Treasury to permit the exportation of the 5000 quarters. It was at first intended that the whole should be exported from Scotland, but it was afterwards thought expedient that a part should be sent from England. With respect to the other order, that depended upon other circumstances---but upon circumstances that made it, if possible, more clearly justifiable than the other.—A Noble Lord had given notice yesterday, that he should this day move for certain papers respecting the prohibition with regard to naval stores. (Lord Temple said across the House, that was not the notice he had given.) The Attorney General said he had then misunderstood the Noble Lord. The House, he presumed, were aware how the law stood with regard to the power of the Crown to prevent the exportation of naval and military stores. That power, to a certain extent, was granted to the Crown by an act of Charles II. and had been extended to different articles of naval stores by other acts, particularly the acts of 29th Geo. II. and 33d Geo. III. therefore there was no question that Government had the power of preventing the exportation of those articles. Under these circumstances, information was received that a considerable quantity of stores was on the point of being exported to Holland and France; that information being received, he apprehended there could be no doubt but that it was proper to prevent it: but as it was a subject of great urgency, it was necessary that no time should be lost; a letter was therefore immediately written to the Board of Customs for that purpose. On the 6th of April an order was issued to prevent the exportation of gunpowder, saltpetre, arms, and ammunition, founded upon the 29th Geo. II. and not upon the 33d Geo. III. and therefore it did not extend to naval stores. This omission proceeded entirely from an inadvertence. They were afterwards informed that an unusually large quantity of lignum vitæ was ordered for exportation, which was also prevented. Under all these circumstances, he must admit, that in point of form neither of these measures were strictly legal; but he really could not bring his mind to believe that any body could find fault with the conduct of Government upon this occasion. The only point upon which any objection could be made was, that the House of Commons had not been immediately acquainted with it: this certainly should be explained. The necessity of an immediate communication to Parliament must be measured by the importance of the subject. If it was a case of great doubt, it was a stronger reason for an immediate communication. It was thought expedient that both measures should be communicated to the House at the same time; and Government were of opinion that, under the existing circumstances, it would be better not to make a communication which might appear to be of an hostile nature. Upon these grounds, he hoped the House would give him leave to bring in the bill which he then moved for.

Mr. COKE (of Norfolk) said, he attributed this measure to the motion he made some time ago for papers relative to the exportation of grain. He did not find fault with Ministers for permitting the exportation of 5000 quar-

ters, he was only surprised that the permission to export was not made general. If they had done so, they would have been entitled to the thanks of the country. He understood that permission had been given to particular persons to export this grain: this he considered as being done with a view to influence, for he understood that the permission was given to persons who were Members of that House. Last year there was permission given to re-export some damaged corn, which was actually sent to Barcelona. If ever there was a Minister who ought to have granted general permission for the exportation of grain, it was the present Minister, on account of the enormous duty he last year laid upon malt; but he was not astonished at it, because no Minister, in his remembrance, had ever attended to the landed interest.

Lord TEMPLE said, he did no object to this motion: he did not think Ministers were wrong in preventing the exportation of naval stores; but he wished to know whether there was any order in existence before against the exportation of military and naval stores.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, there was no order in existence before the one alluded to of the 6th of April. That order was intended to extend to naval stores, but it was omitted by inadvertence. On the 31st of March a letter was received by Mr. Vansittart from the Custom-house, stating that inquiries had been made by persons connected with houses on the continent, to know whether there was any order in force to prevent the exportation of saltpetre. It was impossible to hold a Council the next day; but he consulted with some of his Majesty's confidential servants, and they were unanimously of opinion, that the exportation of saltpetre should be prevented, till the authority of the King in Council could be had. This certainly was not an order of Council, but an order was issued on the 6th of April, which, from the inadvertence he had mentioned, did not include naval stores. It was not thought expedient to abstain from promulgating that order at that time, but the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Coke) was mistaken in supposing that it was his motion that had induced Ministers to apply for this measure, though he certainly had in some degree accelerated it. But he wished to state generally, that similar considerations of policy that led to the prohibition of the exportation of naval and military stores, occasioned the renewing of the order of Council to prevent the exportation of grain. He agreed with the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Coke), that nothing but strong reasons would have justified the prohibition of the exportation of grain under the present state of the markets; and, in his opinion, if it had not been for the circumstances to which he had alluded, the prohibition would not have been renewed; but he wished to observe, that it was renewed for the unusually short space of one month. As to what the Hon. Gent. had said about the selection of persons to export this grain, he could assure the House he knew of no selection; Government did not interfere in any manner; he did not even know the names of the persons till he came into the House, and then he learnt that a Gent. of great respectability had been employed, not by Government, but by the Danish Minister.—[*Here* Mr. Fox *shook his head, and smiled.*]—The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, he asserted this to be the fact, and he was entitled to credit for his assertion. As to what the Gent. alluded to, as happening in 1802, he was totally unacquainted with it; but if the Hon. Gent. would move for any papers upon the subject, he should have no objection to it. On the 24th of March the application was made by the Danish Minister: directions were sent to the customs of Scotland on the Friday, and the House did not sit on the Saturday or Sunday. The next week the question of continuing the order of Council was discussed, and on the 31st of March the order respecting naval and military stores was sent to the Custom-house. These circumstances occurring at the same time, it was thought better that the promulgation should not take place till the discussions which were going on at Paris should be terminated, as a hostile interpretation might be put upon it. He was ready to admit and contend, that there ought not to be any interval between a violation of the law and a communication to Parliament, if it was not justified by public convenience. It remained for the House to consider, whether Ministers were justified in what they had done, and whether there was any unbecoming delay in making this communication to Parliament; which certainly would have been delayed a few days longer, if it had not been for the motion of the Hon. Gent.

Lord TEMPLE said, the point he wanted to be informed about was, whether there was any order to prevent the exportation of military and naval stores, between the signing of the preliminary and definitive treaty of peace.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he did not immediately recollect, but he would inquire into the subject.

Mr. FOX said, he did not mean to insinuate that the Rt. Hon. Gent. used the power he had alluded to from any improper motive whatever, but yet it was apparent that such practices as these were the grounds of abuse in all the governments of the world. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, he did not know any of the persons who had this leave to export corn, nor had he any share in the recommendation of any individual for that purpose: now suppose the Rt. Hon. Gent. to be as free as he

admitted he was, for he was really as unlikely to have any share in such a transaction as this, as any Minister whatever, yet it was possible to suppose that persons in very inferior situations, who had never been considered the most pure of the people, had some share in recommending particular individuals to the conduct of this business; why then it would be a grievance in that sense, because it was a favour to some individual upon a subject which the public ought to be acquainted with, either by law, or a direct communication to that House; and therefore this practice was liable to make an unfavourable impression on the public, without imputing, as he certainly did not impute to the Hon. Gent. or the lowest person connected with him, the least impropriety of motive. He thought, however, that application should have been made to Parliament at once, and as the thing had happened five weeks ago, some inconvenience had arisen by not coming to Parliament; nor did he see the connexion between the points of the exportation of corn and the other political topics stated by the Rt. Hon. Gent. and which prudence had required to have been concealed. He thought the whole of the argument laboured very much in that part on the other side. The Rt. Hon. Gent. said they were connected, but he had adduced no argument to shew their connexion. He did not object to any thing done by Administration, but to the manner of doing it: he thought it should either have been done by act of Parliament, or a communication should have been made to the House, and it should have been done under the sanction of the House; for he owned his inclination to be jealous of acts of indemnity for those things which might have been previously made the subject of communication to Parliament, the sanction of which might have made indemnity unnecessary, and that the more especially on subjects materially connected with the agricultural interests of the country.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, the Hon. Gent. had stated, that the argument laboured in that point where he said there was a connexion in the cases he had stated, that of the prohibition of naval and military stores, and the exportation of grain. Had it not been for those causes which produced both prohibitions, the order of Council respecting the prohibition, and the exportation of grain, would not have been renewed; but at the time the Lords of the Treasury consented to permit the exportation of grain, it was matter of great doubt with the Privy Council whether they should or should not renew the prohibition: in one of these events, namely, the not determining to renew the prohibition, the application of the Danish Minister would have been unnecessary; and it was on that ground he conceived his Majesty's Ministers were justified in not coming to Parliament immediately. Had the order to prohibit exportation not been renewed, the exportation would not have taken place under the operation of law.

Mr. RYDER admitted it to be a laudable jealousy in any Member to suspect corruption in Government, where there was a foundation for it; but here there was not any, and the suspicion of the Hon. Gent. who spoke lately seemed to be applied to all governments in general, but to have no specification as it referred to our own. The Hon. Gent. had said, that Government should have come to the House at once with a communication upon the subject. Now if Government had intended to act corruptly, they would not have come to Parliament at all with the communication the Hon. Gent. seemed to wish; nor would their so coming have prevented them from acting corruptly in this case, if they had been so minded: for if Parliament had been applied to for leave to export 5000 quarters of barley, all that Parliament could have done would have been to give that leave, and then who should procure and furnish it, would have rested with the Danish Minister, or it would have rested with Government to employ the person who was to export it. In neither case would the interference of Parliament have taken place to prevent corruption, if any such had been intended, which certainly there was not. He then took notice of the order in Council for exportation, and approved of what had been done respecting it; and concluded with observing, that he could not help thinking there never was an attack upon Government more feebly made than this, nor any that was less supported.

Mr. FOX said, that if the thing had been done by Parliament, instead of being done by Ministers, it would not have given them power to favour any persons whatever: besides, these things had a very serious effect; for a man having a great deal of corn, and wishing to export, and another was allowed to do so, and no communication was made of it, he would naturally say, why should one man be allowed to do this, and another should not? Now this inconvenience would be obviated by a communication to the House, for then the thing would be open.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, May 13.—(See Minutes, p. 812.)

[FINANCE.]—Lord KING rose pursuant to the notice he had given, to state his sentiments with respect to this important subject. He should not, he said, have come forward, had any other Peer, more able and more conversant on the subject than himself, appeared inclined at least, in his mind, sufficiently early to agitate the discussion. Their Lordships were aware, that a variety of financial ac-

counts, some of a voluminous nature, were on their Lordships' table. These were ordered, for the most part, on the motions of a Noble Lord opposite to him; but in what he was about to submit to their Lordships' consideration, he should chiefly confine himself to those accounts presented previous to the delivery of his Majesty's message, and from which too flattering deductions had been made, with a view, no doubt, of raising the public confidence; but under impressions of public duty, and with a view to evince to the country its real situation in point of finance, he felt it incumbent on him to examine with strictness and precision, and the results which he should be able to make, he doubted not, would be of a very different nature from the deduction to which he had alluded. The Noble Lord then proceeded to a detailed examination of those points of the accounts upon the table, to which he said he should direct their Lordships' attention. With respect to a part of these, his object seemed to point out some great and important differences in the modes of stating the heads of revenue, expenditure, &c. with a view to evince the necessity for a subsequent detailed and deliberate inquiry. From his view of these items, he argued that the different heads were in some instances, as those of income, revenue, &c. over-rated; in these items which regarded the expenditure and disbursements, under-rated. To establish these positions, his Lordship entered into a variety of calculations and details, which, as they mostly consisted of comparative statements, were the more complex and abstruse: we therefore, under the apprehension of unintentional mis-statement, shall not attempt to follow his Lordship. He touched, but not weightily, upon the statements made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and entered into some calculations to shew the erroneous tendency of part of his statements. He then adverted to what had fallen from a Noble Lord opposite to him on a former night, respecting the general subject, and contended that there could by no means be such an aggregate as a sum exceeding sixteen millions, applicable to public purposes. In arguing this point, his Lordship seemed to say, that the British and Irish expenditure were not sufficiently discriminated. He then commented upon the real circumstances of the consolidated fund, and the state of actual expenditure, and contended, instead of there existing a considerable surplus, as argued on the part of the Minister, there was a real deficit to a considerable amount, inasmuch as there remained, after a due and candid statement of the whole supply and ways and means, a sum of only 9,172,000*l.* to cover an expenditure of more than sixteen millions. He then took a view of the different ways in which the national income could be equalized, one of which means, namely, an appropriation of the sinking fund, he thought none could dare to propose. Drawing towards a conclusion, he censured the system, particularly with respect to finance, pursued by Ministers, in concealing from the country its real state in that respect, and holding forth the hopes of seeing a surplus, when in fact there existed an alarming deficit. Upon the whole, he deemed the general subject well worthy the serious attention and minute consideration of their Lordships; and in that view he should move for the appointment of a committee for the purpose of inquiring into the real situation of the finances of the country, and to report their opinion of the same to the House.

Lord AUCKLAND rose, and combated the positions of the Noble Lord who had just sat down. He contended, that no satisfactory ground whatever had been laid down by his Lordship for the institution of such an inquiry. He took a comprehensive view of the principal financial disquisitions which had taken place since the accession of the late Administration to power, and particularly dwelt upon the proceedings of the committee of 1786, and exhibited a regular financial history of the country since that period. With a view of bringing the subject fully before the House, he had moved for the production of a variety of documents, from a perusal of which any individual Peer could thoroughly satisfy himself there existed not the least necessity for the inquiry proposed by the Noble Lord. The statements with which he proposed then to trouble their Lordships, on the particular points in discussion, were comparatively reducible to a small compass. He reminded their Lordships, the discussion did not originate with him: a Noble Earl opposite was the first mover for accounts; but upon what had been said, he thought it his duty to state his own sentiments, and to move for additional documents, in order to bring the subject duly before the House. He thought, that instead of there being a considerable *minus*, as was asserted, he could evince there was a surplus of between three and four millions. In endeavouring to substantiate this position, he contended that the Noble Lord opposite had calculated upon erroneous grounds; the Irish part of the expenditure had nothing to do with his statement. He entered into a consideration of the different heads of the revenue, and dwelt with some stress upon the article of the bounties paid on account of corn and rice, the importance and extent of which never seemed to have been adequately considered. He argued, that every thing which occurred within the year made part of the real income of that period, and in the aggregate calculated, that amount would be found to exceed 34,345,000*l.* He then proceeded to the consideration of the consolidated fund, with respect to which we understood his Lordship to say, there existed a true and real surplus of more than seven millions. Recurring again

to the Reports of the finance committees, he observed the results shewed the progressive increase of the revenue, and the improved energies of the country. He then exhibited a view of the number of ships, men, and tons, employed at different periods in the merchant service, which abundantly proved that the commercial kept pace with the financial prosperity of the country: and those in the last year, he observed, were treble to what they were in 1779. Adverting generally to the national expenditure, his Lordship did not deem it incumbent on him, considering the view upon which he came forward, to dwell upon it in detail. He then alluded to the situation in which the country was placed, particularly with respect to its late adversary, a power which had not, since the pacification, manifested any genuine proofs of conciliation towards us; and observed, that it would hardly be recommended from any quarter, to reduce the present expenditure. His Lordship concluded with stating his disapprobation of the motion.

The Earl of MOIRA spoke in answer to what had fallen from the Noble Lord who spoke last, at some length: he complimented the Noble Lord who had introduced the subject, for the repeated display he made of talents which would one day become highly useful to his country: he deprecated the mode of substituting a branch of the subject, for the main points of it, and observed, that it was not so much on the details of the subject, as on its final results, that the merits of the question depended. In that view it was indifferent to him whether the Noble Lord was in error one, two, or three millions. He then entered into some calculations to prove the nonexistence of the surplus advanced by a Noble Lord on a former occasion. The accounts before the House, particularly those moved for by the Noble Lord, were of a very voluminous nature, and, in his mind, the subject required farther and deliberate inquiry.

Lord AUCKLAND just rose to explain, that the Noble Earl seemed to misconceive him; a part of what he adverted to, was by him only admitted for the sake of argument.

The Earl of MOIRA proceeded, and after contending that much of the financial statements on the part of Ministers was unfounded, adverted in some degree to their political conduct, of which, as it tended to operate, particularly in a financial point of view, he spoke in terms of disapprobation. He thought Parliament in these respects ought to act frankly with the country, instead of concealing its real situation. In the present stage of the business, and considering the voluminous nature of the accounts, even Members of that House could not become masters of the subject, still less the public at large. He contended for the existence of an alarming deficit, and strongly recommended the adoption of his Noble Friend's motion.

Lord GRENVILLE observed, that he should proceed to call their Lordships' attention to the subject upon which the Noble Lord had grounded his motion, though he, in some degree, differed from that Noble Lord as to what he had advanced; his object, however, in so coming forward, was not to place himself in opposition to any of the Noble Lords who had delivered their sentiments, but impelled by considerations of public duty, to shew, as far as he was able, and which he thought was the bounden duty of all, to shew to the country its true situation, by a fair and manly statement of the circumstances under which it was placed. That system of concealment which prevailed too much of late, had been carried too far, and particularly upon a subject, the most interesting of all others to the country. He thought no Member of that or the other House of Parliament, had need to apologize for bringing forward a subject of such vital importance fairly to the view of the country. There must, however, be persons conscious of not having thus come forward to serve the country: but with respect to Parliament generally, it was necessary they should open the eyes of the country, and, particularly in such a momentous crisis as the present, shew them their real situation: it ought to be made clear to the country, whether or not its finances were in that state, that there existed a large disposable surplus, or a real alarming deficiency. In contemplating the circumstance of a deficiency, it should be further inquired into, whether there really existed a necessity of supplying those deficiencies by that most ruinous of all financial measures, a system of peace loans? He acknowledged the utility of the various accounts which had been laid before the House; however, in the important, but perhaps rather general view which he then meant to take of the subject, he was saved the trouble of adverting to them in detail; a casual reference would be sufficient for his purpose. Those which he should have occasion to refer to were of unquestionable authenticity, being signed by the Secretary of the Treasury, and the results of these, he meant to contrast with the statements made by the Chancellor of the Exchequer himself, taken from a publication issued by authority into the world, and with a view to the full information of the public; and statements which he could not refrain from observing, had been fatally, to a certain degree, credited and acted upon by the monied interest of the country. In considering the subject before them, he disclaimed the least idea whatever of exciting any sensation of despondency. On a subject of this particular nature, he knew a speaker was more liable to misrepresentation than on any other subject, and in that view he felt himself called upon distinctly to state his firm conviction, that instead of there existing any real cause for de-

spondency or dismay, the country had upon every account just reason to be confident of the strength and adequacy of its own resources. The country was able to cover the existence of much greater deficiencies, and this he was perfectly able to prove; and farther, that it was not only equal to maintain its existence and independence, but even to repel aggression, and to take ample vengeance on the authors of that aggression: the Parliament, under such circumstances, should not shrink from its duty, but fairly call these resources into action, and provide a revenue fully adequate to meet the occasions of the country. It was in the recollection of their Lordships, that, a short time before the Christmas recess, the finance minister of the country, at an unusual period of the session, and in circumstances of extraordinary moment, anticipated the customary statement of the finances of the present year. The reason assigned for this proceeding was, the necessity of laying before the country a true picture of its finances; he was relieved from much trouble on the score of reference, as his statements respecting that display of the finances, were drawn from a publication which he had reason to believe was ushered into public notice under the authority of Ministers, and therefore it could not be conceived to contain a false account of those statements. Notwithstanding these specious advantages, the effect of this publication was to delude every monied man who placed confidence in it. On this head he could say much; but the consideration of the subject, in the view he alluded to, had better be left until the real budget of the present year should come forward, which in the course of a few weeks may be found necessary. Among other points of finance, that statement exhibited the melancholy expedient of a loan; but the question was, whether that was the last time such a measure would be recurred to? That publication contained also a statement of the revenue and expenditure of the country, and laid before the public the comfortable view of a surplus of even a million sterling. What the effect must be of such a statement on the public at large, and on the metropolis, may be easily conceived. It was not long, however, before doubts were entertained of the truth of these statements, and they had nearly fallen into complete discredit, when a Noble Lord was pleased to step forth, and contend that the calculations in question, instead of being exaggerated, were below the truth. In considering the real state of the question, he would undertake to prove, that the actual revenue at that very time, instead of yielding a surplus, was in fact more than two millions below the expenditure, which, as the result of that statement, exhibited a gross and inexcusable error of at least three millions sterling. In another point of view, he contended, that the actual revenue would be found to fall even four millions short of the peace establishment, as voted by the other House of Parliament in November last. In calculating those points, he should take the year as ending the 5th of January, and he had no hesitation in taking his statements from the documents he had before specified, and that the statement made by the financial minister on the 19th of December was full of the grossest fallacy. His first reference would be to the 29th page of the publication alluded to, and there the supposed expenditure was stated to be in the aggregate 11,530,000*l.* from which were to be deducted the 2-17ths for the Irish proportion, and also the Irish charges upon the consolidated fund: but afterwards was to be added a charge of 500,000*l.* which would make the total supposed expenditure of the navy, army, ordnance, and miscellaneous services, to amount to 10,533,000*l.* for Great Britain. In this part of the calculation he had to observe, that one material article of expense was entirely overlooked, namely, the extra buildings in the navy, which this year amounted to 900,000*l.* The average amount of this necessary expense during the last peace was about 500,000*l.* per annum; but allowing for the various differences which had taken place since that period, he thought the average expense of that department could not be estimated at less than 700,000*l.* per annum, which, added to the other articles of expenditure, would form a total of 11,233,000*l.* This would be the aggregate when the expenses could be reduced to the amount stated in the speech. In considering the amount of the revenue, as set forth in the same publication, the Noble Lord argued that certain heads thereof were not accurately discussed. He alluded principally to the consideration of the land and malt taxes. He then passed to a review of the statements in the consolidated fund, and described the real free revenue to be only that which was disposable after the payment of the interest of the national debt, and charges of the sinking fund: this was stated as amounting to 10,599,000*l.* to which was added, after the produce of the lottery (in calculating which his Lordship seemed to say, there was some mistake)—the expected contribution of 500,000*l.* from the revenues of India. In this part of his speech, his Lordship took occasion to panegyrize the Administration, and the abilities of the Noble Marquis, at the head of the government in India, whose talents, great as they were, in negotiation, war, and civil government, were, perhaps, exceeded by those he possessed for matters of finance, a ground upon which his enemies had unaccountably strove to calumniate him; but this reference, his Lordship observed, naturally depended upon the continuance of peace in India: this and other points made the supposed total of the ways and means to be 11,595,000*l.* which after deducting the hypothetical expenditure, as set forth in the same document, left an imaginary surplus of 1,032,000*l.* In controverting these statements, his Lordship entered into a variety of detailed calculations, drawn, as he had be-

fore observed, from the accounts before the House, signed by the Secretrry of the Treasury. He first adverted to the different heads of proposed reduction, upon which the foregoing conclusions were drawn, and which it would be superfluous to observe, were, in the present circumstances of this country, totally out of the question. He would consider what the actual situation of the country now would be, were the proposed reductions carried into effect. Under the head of the army, to reduce the expenses in the sum proposed, a number of about 25,000 men should be reduced, which, according to the plan of disposing the army, would, at about the period of the delivery of the King's message, not have left one foot soldier in Great Britain. In the head of reduction proposed for the navy, about 1,540,000*l.* was intended to be saved, and to do this, he calculated about 18,000 men must be reduced: this, according to the newly broached doctrine that ships might be ready for sea without men *(a laugh)*, may be practicable enough; but were the reduction actually made, we should now have no navy fit for service. After shewing the impracticability of those intended reductions, and calculating upon the indispensable expenses of the actual establishment, he contended that the permanent establishment, as arranged even in November last, would be 13,436,000*l.* A diminution was a consideration of possibility, but a considerable increase, one of great probability. His Lordship then proceeded to the consideration of the real income of the nation, and after touching upon the various sources from which it was derived, and the indispensable charges to be made thereon, he calculated the total of the actual ways and means to meet the real expenditure of the country, at not more than 9,682,000*l.* He then adverted to the Austrian loan, upon which, after commenting upon its origin, and the important circumstances connected with that measure, he declared his opinion, that it behoved Parliament to make provision for the interest of it, which he stated at about 497,000*l.* Pursuing the line of general calculation further, he stated, that the free revenue amounted to about 9,185,000*l.* which, calculated together with the heads of the genuine state he had given of the supplies and ways and means, would evince the deficiency he had set out with stating, of more than two millions sterling. The Noble Lord then proceeded to calculate the different heads of revenue and expenditure, upon a more enlarged scale, and to demonstrate deficits to a more considerable amount. He then expatiated on the conduct of Ministers, in rather concealing the true financial circumstances of the country, than coming forward manfully to meet the exigencies of the case, and at once render the revenue equal to the necessary expenditure of the country; and condemned the system of the political conduct of Ministers, as equally censurable with the others. He proceeded to comment on the conduct of Ministers, particularly with respect to their financial measures. At the same time he disclaimed all ideas of personal animosity; so far from it, that for several of them he entertained the warmest feelings of friendship and regard. The great object of his argument was to shew that they had not met the financial difficulties of the country in any one instance. He adverted to the salutary expedient of their predecessors, of raising part of the supplies within the year, which he thought they acted unwisely, as well as weakly, in not following up. Their abandonment of the system of finance laid down by these Ministers, had reduced them to the miserable expedient of peace loans, measures which would palsy the operations of the sinking fund, and check the gradual extinction of the public debt: he principally condemned the financial system pursued by Ministers, which, at the end of two years, left them with a real deficiency of four millions, instead of the boasted surplus of a million sterling: and he insisted, that no financial minister, in the present circumstances of the country, would do his duty, if he shrunk from the project of equalizing the actual revenue with the necessary expenditure of the country.

The Earl of Westmorland defended the accuracy of the accounts. The expenditure, he said, amounted to 13,000,000*l.*; and when the produce of the consolidated fund and of the land and malt was deducted, the deficiency would not amount to more than about 3,400,000*l.* The produce of the old taxes had, he said, increased more than 3,000,000*l.* He must, however, enter his protest against the practice of making statements made in other places, and pamphlets, the subject of discussion in that House. In adverting to the expenditure of the present year, he said, that it was undoubtedly large, and ought not to be taken as an average criterion; but it should be recollected, that, under the present circumstances of the country, economy might only have invited the sword of the spoiler.

Lord Pelham likewise defended the accuracy of the accounts, and objected to making the statements which had been made in other places, the subject of discussion in that House. Those accounts would have been much better discussed in another place, where they could have been properly met by the person who brought them forward. A severe invective had been made against that person, but it should be recollected, at least if the publication which had been alluded to, could be depended upon, that it had been stated by that person, that it would be necessary to make the revenue equal the expenditure. He observed that the Imperial loan could not with any propriety be considered as a subsidy, but as a loan to be paid by Austria.

The Bishop of Rochester said, if it was merely a question whether the accounts on the

table were correct or not, it might certainly be proper to appoint a committee to investigate them, in order that, if there were errors, they might be detected; and if there were not, that the accounts might remain unsuspected and unimpeached. It was, however, to be considered, whether this was the moment for entering into such an investigation. This was peculiarly to be considered, because, perhaps, at the next meeting of that House they and the country might be called upon to unite in repressing the ambition and chastising the bad faith of one whom he could not, perhaps, at the present moment call our enemy, but whom he would designate as our most detestable friend.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 13.—(See Minutes, p. 813.)

[STATE OF THE NEGOTIATION.]—Lord GRANVILLE LEVISON said, that he rose for the purpose of moving, that the House should at its rising adjourn till to-morrow. In making this motion he would not repeat the arguments which had been urged on Friday last, which appeared to him to be unanswerable. The events which had occurred since Friday appeared to him completely to justify those who voted against the adjournment till Monday. It would be in the recollection of the House, that the intelligence which arrived after that discussion completely contradicted the statement which had been made by the Minister. After the Rt. Hon. Gent. had stated, that Lord Whitworth had left Paris, it surely was a matter of sufficient importance to have communicated to the House on Saturday that he had not left Paris. Lord Whitworth, it was understood, remained at Paris, because some further propositions had been made; similar circumstances might again occur; but at all events, it was proper that the House should be at its post to receive any communication that Government might be enabled to make on so important a subject: he should therefore move, "That the House should, at its rising, adjourn "till to-morrow."

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he apprehended, that, independent of the objection which he felt to the motion of the Noble Lord, in point of substance, there was one, in point of form, which rendered it, he presumed, inadmissible. Such a motion, he believed, was never allowed to pass in that House: as matter of course the House would adjourn to to-morrow, without any motion, unless it should specifically determine to adjourn to some other day; and, therefore, the Noble Lord's motion was needless as well as unprecedented: the only way in which the motion now before the House could be regular in terms, would be that of an amendment to a motion to adjourn to some future day; neither would that be agreeable to the regular practice, until after most of the business which constituted the orders of the day was over: the Noble Lord would, therefore, allow him to say, he was not well advised with respect to the terms of his motion: he could have wished that the Noble Lord had given notice, that after the orders of the day were disposed of, he should bring forward this subject, if any motion should be made to adjourn over to-morrow; and the Noble Lord would allow him to say also, that until a motion of another description was made, this course was irregular; but the Noble Lord would soon have an opportunity of submitting the substance of his present motion to the House, for he intended to move that the House do at its rising adjourn to Monday next. Having said this upon the form, he would now, with the leave of the House, state the objections he entertained to the substance of the motion of the Noble Lord. The Noble Lord had said, that the circumstances which had occurred had disproved the statement made by his Majesty's Ministers: the Noble Lord was not correct in that statement. The statement made by his Majesty's Ministers was not disproved by the circumstances which had actually occurred. It was stated by him, this day se'nnight, not that he was convinced that Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris, for he had no knowledge of the fact, but that he had reason to apprehend it, and that apprehension arose from his knowledge of the fact that General Andreossi had applied for passports. It was an inference of his from this fact and accompanying circumstances, that Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris, and he then believed that Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris; but he never said Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris—he made no such declaration. The Noble Lord had expressed his regret that the House did not sit on Saturday last, and he had added his conviction that many gentlemen, and this was a circumstance worthy of observation, that many Gentlemen who voted in the majority for an adjournment to Monday, might regret the House did not sit. Now, he knew of no reason why that event should have excited any regret in the minds of any of the Gentlemen who voted in that majority; he was, on the contrary, convinced it ought to be matter of satisfaction on the part of those who supported the motion, that the House did not sit on the Saturday, as proposed by the amendment moved by an Hon. Gent. He alluded to the effect which might have resulted from their sitting on that day, and he begged the House would pardon him for not stating the reason for saying this. It was, however, his intention, if the Noble Lord had not superseded him, to propose that the House should, at its rising, adjourn to Monday next, and that he intended to propose exactly as usual, without any comment, being perfectly prepared, however, if any question was put

to him by any Member of the House, to answer it as distinctly as he could, consistently with his duty. On Friday last he had stated to the House the opinion which he entertained, which was, that Lord Whitworth was on his departure from Paris. He was not able, at present, to make any communication whatever to the House, or to express an opinion whether Lord Whitworth was or was not on his way from Paris, but there was no probability of any information whatever being received, so as to enable him to make any communication from his Majesty to that House to morrow. The Speaker would observe on the regularity of the motion now before the House, after which, he presumed, the Noble Lord would not persist in it; and if so, he should afterwards move, that the House do, at its rising, adjourn to Monday next.

Mr. CANNING observed, that the Rt. Hon. Gent. who had just spoken, had stated two objections to the motion now before the House: one in point of form, the other in point of substance. If in point of form the motion was defective, the motion must fall, because it was irregular; but until he heard that from the Chair, he should be much inclined to doubt the irregularity of this motion; and he doubted it on the ground that the last motion upon this subject, which was this day se'nnight, was entertained. On that occasion the Rt. Hon. Gent. moved, "That "the House do, at its rising, adjourn to Mon- "day next," and the amendment proposed to that was, to insert "to-morrow;" and that was in substance the motion of his Noble Friend to-day; and as all the rules of the House were founded on good sense, he saw no reason why this motion should not be entertained in its present form; he could not enter into any distinction which the Rt. Hon. Gent. intended to take, for he could not see the difference between debating a thing in the shape of an original motion, and that of debating the same thing in the shape of an amendment to an original motion. The motion now before the House was the very same thing in point of sense as the amendment moved this day se'nnight by an Hon. Gent. and which was debated for several hours in that House, without any body being rebuked or corrected for it. He was not aware how the matter could be objected to now, not having been objected to then. He confessed, however, after having heard the statement of the Rt. Hon. Gent. on his own conviction, that the meeting of the House to-morrow would not enable him to make any communication to the House; he should, for one, not wish to press for a division; but here, again, he must take the distinction of the Rt. Hon. Gent. who said he had formerly spoken his opinion, as it was formed in consequence of the conduct of the French ambassador; that from that conduct he drew certain inferences. The Rt. Hon Gent. was, however, he hoped, speaking not again on conjecture, but from some assurance that to-morrow he would not be able to make any communication to the House: if that was the case, the House should not take the trouble of meeting, because it would be only meeting in vain; but then he wished to understand the Rt. Hon. Gent. distinctly whether he now said, that he should not be able to make any communication to the House to-morrow? If he did not say so, he thought the House should be pressed to a division, and he should press it to a division, when so many Gent. felt as he did, and as his Noble Friend felt, that this was not a time when the House of Commons should consult its own ease, nor be even too scrupulous in adhering to its own usages, when either might be at variance with its great public duty. On the contrary, it was a time when the House of Commons should be unremitting in its labours, for the purpose of attending to the interests of the country: the House of Commons was the proper organ for conveying information from the Executive Government to the people; it ought therefore to be on its post, and be vigilant; nor could he help thinking, that a communication from the Executive Government to Parliament was a more constitutional source of information than a placard on the Stock Exchange, upon the question of peace and war. He did not think it consistent with the duty of the House of Commons to put itself into a situation in which they would not have the means of receiving information from the Executive Government and conveying it to the people, and that for no better reason than that they chose to take a holyday on Saturday.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER observed, that the observations of the last speaker were fair, upon the supposition that a communication might be made to the House to-morrow on the substance of the motion now before the House; but on the regularity of the motion he should appeal to the Chair, from which the House would derive correct knowledge upon the subject: he should be ashamed to refer to his own knowledge, although his attention had for many years been directed to the subject. He appealed to the Chair, whether, unless an adjournment was proposed to a day after the morrow, it ever was expressed other than as he had stated, namely, "that this House do now adjourn." What he had said this night had not been correctly repeated. He had said, that he was thoroughly convinced that no communication would be made to his Majesty, to enable his Majesty to make a communication to the House to-morrow; he thought that no communication ought to come from his Majesty to that House, until it was known that the negotiation had taken a satisfactory turn, or was totally broken off—until Lord Whitworth had arrived in this country. He

begged pardon, he knew he was irregular; he would go further, and say, he saw no probability of being able to make any communication whatever to the House to-morrow: that was his opinion; but if he thought there was a chance of that, he should think it incumbent on him to make a motion to adjourn to Monday next, because he could not reconcile it to what was due to the dignity of the House, or to the feelings of this country, that the House should sit on an unusual day, for the mere chance of a communication. The present motion was not formal or regular, and on which, therefore, no proceeding could be had.

Mr. GREY said that the motion of the Noble Lord was in such a form, that the House could not, consistently with its rules and with strict propriety, adopt it; but after that motion was disposed of in point of form, the House would have to consider whether it ought, under the present extraordinary circumstances, to adjourn to Monday, or to sit to-morrow. When assertions came from such authority as that of the Rt. Hon. Gent. they came with great weight: if he was convinced that no communication could in fact be made from his Majesty to the House to-morrow, he should accede to the motion of adjournment to Monday; but when the Rt. Hon. Gent. expressed some doubts upon that matter, and as it might happen that the House might require some information which the Rt. Hon. Gent. might think it improper for him to communicate, he owned he had some doubts as to the propriety of adjourning even to Monday. He wished the House to recollect a little the situation in which it was: it was now a week since the Rt. Hon. Gent. made an important and alarming communication, which disappointed the House of almost all hopes of an amicable termination to the negotiation. Since that, the Rt. Hon. Gent. stated to the House, that unforeseen and unexpected circumstances had prevented Lord Whitworth from leaving Paris on the Wednesday, yet that matters would in a few days come to a decisive issue, and that he expected information in a few days. Now he wished the House to consider its situation, and to examine into the propriety of adjourning over to-morrow. He knew that on the day when the Rt. Hon. Gent. had stated that Lord Whitworth was expected to have left Paris, intelligence had arrived to certain Members of that House, that night while the House was sitting; he had received intelligence himself that very night in the House, that Lord Whitworth had not left Paris, for the truth of which, if doubted, he could appeal to many of his friends about him. Now he wished to know how the Rt. Hon. Gent. could be sure that the decisive result, of which he had spoken, would not arrive here to-morrow? How could he say that such decisive result might not actually arrive this night before the House adjourned? Why, then, was it too much to ask, that the House should sit to-morrow, when the Minister would, according to all probability, be able to state to the House that decisive result for which the House and the public had so long and so anxiously waited? Let the House remark the difference of the situation now and that of last Friday. On last Friday the Minister told the House that no intelligence could arrive that night, an assertion falsified by the event; for intelligence did arrive, and at the very same time when the Minister said there was none. The Minister had said to-night, he was glad the House did not sit on Saturday last; and he seemed to congratulate the House that it did not assemble; and as a Minister he seemed to express a great deal of desire to impress the House with an idea of mystery, and to create alarm, for he had expressed much apprehension from the consequences which might have followed if the House had sitten on Saturday. What these consequences might have been, besides the public deriving information from the proper channel, he was unable to comprehend. Now the House was told, that information could not be given to-morrow; he hardly saw why not; he thought there was every probability that the messenger would arrive this night or to-morrow morning. How then could the House be said to be in a state in which an important communication might not be made to it to-morrow? "No," said the Minister—and why? "Because, forsooth, my Lord Whitworth is not arrived in this country." Now the House would recollect, the Rt. Hon. Gent. told them last Friday, that all the papers by which information was to be conveyed, were actually in the press. He should be glad to know, as Ministers were in possession of that decisive result which the Rt. Hon. Gent. talked of, why should not the anxiety of the House and of the public be relieved? he could not comprehend that the arrival of my Lord Whitworth could be essential for that purpose. But the communication may be such as that his Majesty's Ministers might not wish to lay too soon before the House: to which he would answer, any information was better than suspense; and all the arguments of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, if indeed that could be called argument which consisted only of assertion, stood on the supposition of an unforeseen result, which he hoped was not hostile, but which would perhaps lead to hostility; but if that decisive result should be, what he hoped it would be, for our honour and satisfaction, he should not think the time of the House misspent in waiting for such result. But Saturday was an unusual day for the House to sit. He would not go over that argument much at length, but he would observe, that it was by no means uncommon for the House to sit on a Saturday, for the purpose of transacting very common and ordinary, and sometimes even private business. Upon these grounds he must say, that

he was not satisfied by what he had heard from the Minister, concerning the propriety of the House adjourning until Monday. The Rt. Hon. Gent. said there was no probability of any information arriving to enable his Majesty to make a communication to the House to-morrow, and that such communication could not be made until my Lord Whitworth arrived in this country: if this was the rule by which we were to judge, he saw no reason to conclude that we may not be in the same situation next Friday as we are at this moment.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER then referred to the Chair, on the subject of the regularity of the motion now before the House.

The SPEAKER said, that before the debate proceeded any further, he rose to say, that in the form of the question proposed by the Noble Lord to be put to the House, he was not prepared to state to the House, from his own memory or reading, any one instance, except that of last Friday, of such a motion being offered to the House in such terms, and it did not appear to him to be consistent with the orders and forms of the proceedings of the House.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said that the Hon. Member who had just sat down had stated, and stated truly, that on Monday last he informed the House, that probably the discussion at Paris would be brought to a decisive result in the course of a few days, that of the following day, or Wednesday morning: it was perfectly true he had said so, and he was justified in expressing that conviction, but circumstances had occurred which did produce some delay, but which delay would be inconsiderable; what these circumstances were, he was sure the House would not ask him to disclose, but it was on those circumstances of that delay, that he should desire the Noble Lord to withdraw his motion, and then move that of which he had this night given notice.

The Noble Lord's motion was then withdrawn.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER moved, "That the House should at its rising "adjourn to Monday next."

Mr. HENRY LASCELLES said he wished to say a few words, merely to defend his own consistency with reference to the vote which he gave on Friday last, and to the conduct he should adopt this night. When the question of adjournment was proposed on Friday last, he gave his vote upon the best judgment he could exercise upon the merits of the question, and he was still of opinion, that in giving the vote he did upon that occasion, he had acted consistently with his duty. With respect to the question now before the House, he was still of opinion that it would be better that the House should sit to-morrow, but, for the reasons he should give, he was determined to give no vote upon the subject. After the vote he gave on Friday last, he found himself in a situation he did not expect; he had stated in the few observations which he had submitted to the House upon that occasion, that it was by no means his intention to prejudge the general question, but when he came to vote, he found himself voting with Gentlemen who were generally considered as the systematic opposers of Government *(Here there was a cry of "Order")*—he meant that they were always in the habit of opposing Ministers, and therefore he was sorry he had given that vote, as it might appear as if he had, to a certain degree, prejudged the question.

Mr. FOX said he rose to say a few words in consequence of some observations which had fallen from the Hon. Gent. and which appeared to him to be a little singular. The Hon. Gent. lamented that he had been induced to vote on Friday last, with those whom he characterized as the systematic opposers of Ministers; but as the Hon. Gent. had stated, that he had voted upon the merits of the question, he did not think that the vote he had given called for such strong marks of penitence. If the Hon. Gent. felt such concern for once voting with the systematic opposers of Ministers, he might frequently be placed in an unfortunate situation, because whenever these systematic opposers happened to agree in opinion with him, he would be under the necessity of not voting for a question which he approved, or he must vote in company he did not like. But however unpleasant the Hon. Gent.'s situation would be in that point of view, it would be still more so if he should happen to take a similar dislike to the systematic supporters of Ministers, for then it would be extremely difficult for him to decide how he should vote. The Hon. Gent. had shewn much more penitence upon the occasion than in his opinion it required, because he had declared, that he had voted according to the best of his judgment upon the merits of the question. How such a vote could be a subject of lamentation, he could not immediately discover, because he always understood that to be the way in which Members of Parliament ought to vote upon every question. But the Hon. Gent. seemed also to labour under some apprehension that he might be supposed to have prejudged the question; how the Hon. Gent. came to entertain such an apprehension, he could not imagine, because there was not one word said upon the question of peace or war, in the discussion to which the Hon. Gent. alluded. If, however, the Hon. Gent. had prejudged the question by his vote that day, it would gratify his curiosity very highly, if the Hon. Gent. would tell him on which side he had prejudged

it, for without some farther information he was really unable to form a guess upon the subject. Did the Hon. Gent. apprehend, that by voting with the systematic opposers of Ministers, who were generally considered as strong advocates for peace, he might be supposed to have prejudged the question in favour of peace? If that was the cause of the Hon. Gent.'s alarm, he had only to look at some of the company with whom he voted that day, and his apprehensions would vanish. There were some Gentlemen who sat towards the lower end of the House, to whom, he believed, the epithet of "bloodhounds" had, in some publication, been applied, who had voted with him on that occasion, and if they were at all culpable, it was not from any extraordinary anxiety which they had evinced for the maintenance of peace. He would not, however, investigate this subject any longer; he could only say, that he was utterly unable to conceive what was the ground of the Hon. Gent.'s repentance, or on which side he had prejudged the question: with regard to himself, he should prove his consistency by voting in the same way that he had done upon a former occasion.—The Rt. Hon. the Chancellor of the Exchequer had laid down a principle to which he could by no means accede, viz. that no communication could be made to the House till Lord Whitworth had arrived. If that was a regular principle always to be acted upon, he could not account for what had fallen from the Rt. Hon. Gent. on Monday last. He then said that the discussions would be brought to an issue on Tuesday or Wednesday, and that he would be enabled to make a communication in a few days, meaning evidently in the course of the present week; though supposing Lord Whitworth had left Paris on Wednesday morning, it was not probable that he would reach London in the course of this week. It was therefore pretty evident that the Rt. Hon. Gent. was not quite so much attached to this point of form on Monday last as he now appeared to be. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, that circumstances had arisen which led him to expect that the answer would not come so soon as he had expected, and which circumstances were in some degree the ground of his present motion. He could not guess what those circumstances were, nor did he wish the Rt. Hon. Gent. to explain them if it was improper; but certainly if the points in discussion were to be decided on Friday, the intelligence might reach this country to-night or to-morrow morning; and certainly if there was any thing to communicate, the House ought to be at its post to receive it. He did not mean to enter into the question of decorum, but it certainly was no unimportant matter that the House and the country should know its fate with regard to the question of peace or war as soon as possible. It had been said that no communication could be made respecting the rupture of the negotiation until Lord Whitworth arrived at Dover; but he begged the House to recollect, that there was another alternative: suppose the messenger should fortunately bring the intelligence that all the differences were settled, would it not be material that the House should receive a communication to-morrow, rather than on Monday? and certainly it could not be doubted that that House was the proper channel of communication between the King and his subjects. He did not mean to throw any blame upon the Rt. Hon. Gent. but he could not help observing that he had been mistaken in his expectation three or four times; but as it arose from circumstances which he could not foresee, it certainly was not a ground upon which any blame could be attributed to him. With regard to the delay which had taken place in Lord Whitworth's departure, he was of opinion that that Noble Lord had acted in a most judicious manner, in deviating from the instructions which it was generally supposed he had received, and he could not help hoping that it might tend to a more favourable issue of the discussion. Upon these grounds, he was of opinion that the House ought to meet to-morrow, though he should not take the sense of the House upon it.

Lord HAWKESBURY said he should adopt the same line of conduct, and upon the same grounds, that he had upon Friday last, viz. that it was not usual to sit on Saturday, unless there was public business of great importance, or even private business, where the object was to have some proceeding, or to take some step; but when it was proposed to sit without the possibility of any proceeding on the part of the House, he thought it more consistent with the dignity of the House that they should follow the usual course, and adjourn till Monday. His Rt. Hon. Friend had not stated that there was no probability of any communication to-morrow; he had only said, that there was no probability of a communication from his Majesty: and he did not think it consistent with the dignity of the House, that they should depart from their usual mode of proceeding, merely in the expectation of receiving an oral communication, upon which no proceeding could be had. It was perfectly true, that since the declaration of his Rt. Hon. Friend on Monday last, a probability of delay had occurred, but he hoped it would not be a delay of many hours; it was owing to circumstances which it was not necessary now to explain. The Hon. Gent. had stated, that there were two alternatives, and that the issue might be in favour of peace, which might be immediately communicated to the House. But even in that case, he was not aware how any official communication could be made to the House, because he believed, though he did not speak with perfect certainty, that it was not usual for his Majesty to communicate the result of any treaty that was concluded until it was

actually ready to be laid before the House. In the event, therefore, of a satisfactory arrangement, he did not see that it could lead to an official communication to-morrow. Under these circumstances, he saw no possible benefit that could result from sitting to-morrow, thinking, as he did, that the mere chance of an oral communication was not a sufficient ground to justify the House in departing from its usual mode of proceeding.

Mr. MARTIN (of Tewkesbury) said, he was disposed to think favourably of the present Ministers till he heard something to induce him to change his opinion. He only wished to ask them what evil could result from their sitting to-morrow, and to beg them to consider whether something might not occur that might draw upon them the displeasure of the country and the House.

Dr. LAWRENCE said a few words, after which the motion was agreed to.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, May 17.—(See Minutes, p. 814.)

[CONSOLIDATING CUSTOMS.]—General GASCOYNE rose to make a few observations. He did not mean in any case to object to the principle of the bill. It was to the tonnage duty being made a permanent tax in time of peace that his objections principally applied. Under the existing circumstances of the country, and after the communication which was yesterday made to the House, it was not his intention to oppose the continuance of the tax. He could not help thinking, however, that into any bill to be formed on the basis of the schedule now before the House, it would be highly expedient that the duty on tonnage should not be introduced. It would, in his opinion, be much better that this should be made the subject of a separate bill, and he should hereafter take an opportunity of following up this suggestion by a specific proposition. There were several parts of the schedule on which he meant to deliver his sentiments; and though he should not oppose the present motion, he begged it to be understood that he reserved to himself the right of combating their expediency on any future occasion.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER appealed to the House, whether he had ever discovered any thing like a disposition to prevent Members from having a full opportunity to consider the different articles which the schedule contained. It would also, he was sure, be admitted that he had never pressed the discussion while the circumstances existed which rendered a fair discussion impossible. He felt, however, the necessity and the propriety of carrying through the measure with all possible expedition. This was necessary, not only from a regard to the recommendation contained in his Majesty's speech, but that a foundation might be laid for another measure of very great importance, of which he had given notice in the previous part of the session: he meant to allude to the extension of the system of bonding and warehousing, the beneficial effects of which had already been experienced, and which could not be reduced to practice till the previous measure was adopted. As to the observations which the Hon. Member had made respecting the tonnage duty, it was unnecessary for him to enter into any detail. The Hon. Gent. having, under the present situation of the country, agreed to withdraw his opposition, it was not particularly incumbent on him to attempt a formal justification of the policy or the expediency of the duty even during the continuance of peace. The Hon. Member had thrown out a suggestion about the propriety of dividing the resolution respecting the continuance of this duty from the other parts of the bill, founded on the schedule. This was not the stage of the business in which this suggestion could best be considered; whatever observations he had to offer on the subject would apply with much more effect on the second reading of the bill, if the House should suffer the bill to be introduced, or rather in the committee, when the different articles to which the bill referred would come to be particularly considered. Gentlemen, by consenting to go into the committee, did not pledge themselves to the approbation of any specific parts of the schedule. All that they did was to admit the propriety of the principle of consolidation, reserving to themselves the full right of examining minutely the different parts of a bill by which this consolidation was to be effected, and proposing any amendment which to them appeared the best calculated to promote the general object with the least possible inconvenience.

General GASCOYNE rose again, with the view of obtaining some information how far there was any plan of applying a similar measure of consolidation to the duties of excise, and other branches of the public revenue.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, in reply, stated his resolution to apply the same measures to the branches of the revenue to which the Hon. Member alluded. He meant that the measure should be introduced before the close of the session, but he would not pledge himself to any particular period.

After a few words of conversation between Mr. Dent and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, which we could not overhear distinctly, the House resolved itself into the committee.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER addressed the committee in a short speech, in which he touched on several of the most im-

portant alterations which the schedule proposed. Very considerable alterations were proposed to be introduced into the schedule as it now stood. As he had formerly stated to the House, there was intended to be in many articles a large addition of duty, and in others, a very considerable reduction. It was meant that the duties on wines in the port of London and the out-ports should be equalized, and that the duty should in every instance be similar. It was somewhat difficult to see what were the principles which had in the first instance given rise to the distinction of duties: whatever the principles of this distinction were, however, they did not exist at the present moment. It was usual that in the port of London the duty on each pipe of wine should be 1*l.* 10*s.* higher than in the out-ports. Whatever were the circumstances which suggested the propriety of this arrangement, the situation of the country was now such as to render its continuance unnecessary. The consumption of wine was now by much more general than at any former period, and the means of conveying it from the out-ports to the interior of the country were much increased. The propriety of equalizing the duties had therefore given rise to the intended equalization. The book of rates, in stating the amount of the duties payable on skins and furs, was not founded on any regard to the real value of the articles. A change was to be introduced, which would remedy this inconvenience, and make real value the standard of taxation. In the year 1795, certain duties were imposed on the importation of wood; these were to be continued, with the exception of certain exemptions, in favour of timber for ship-building. The duties on the importation of chemical oils were intended to be increased. This increase was founded on a wish to give encouragement to the use which might be made of the produce of the Spice Islands. Since our acquisition of Ceylon, the quantity of spices which might be applied to the purpose of obtaining essential oils was so great, as powerfully to suggest the propriety of granting this encouragement. On the importation of diamonds and precious stones, there was to be imposed a duty of five per cent. *ad valorem*. On many unenumerated articles of East India produce there was to be a reduction from 71 per cent. to 20 per cent.; and on articles imported from China the reduction was proposed to be from 109 to 50 per cent. The duties on East India calicoes were to be reduced from 125 to 50 per cent. *ad valorem*. The Rt. Hon. Gent. explained the proposed arrangements with a degree of minuteness into which we conceive it unnecessary to follow him, and therefore we only profess to give the general results. He alluded to an addition of two shillings to the existing duty of twenty shillings on East India sugar. When the increase of freight and other favourable circumstances were considered, he did not think that this was an increase to be the ground of any fair objection. On all indigo imported, whether from the plantations or from the East Indies, there was to be a diminution of the duty. To every department of the dyeing trade, this would operate as a very important accommodation. On cotton wool imported, the proposed duty was to be one penny per pound. It had formerly been subject to a duty of three halfpence per pound; and though he was sensible that there were objections to the duty being laid on the raw material instead of the manufactured article, yet, after a full consideration of the subject, he was of opinion that the manner in which the duty was to be imposed, was one which operated with the lightest pressure. At all events, whatever objections existed could be urged with much greater propriety when the bill was regularly before the House. On the subject of the importation of Bandana handkerchiefs and silk lace, there was a strong necessity for putting a check to that system of smuggling which was the ground of very general complaint. On bale silk it was proposed that there should be a duty of 20 per cent.; and on the article of Bandana handkerchiefs, of 25 per cent. besides 2 per cent. on warehousing, which was conceived to be adequate to the protection of the fair trader, as far as that could be affected by positive duties. The duties on the importation of hemp from America and the East Indies were to be diminished. The difference with respect to the amount of the revenue would not be a consideration. It was thought proper, however, that encouragement should be held out to the importation of this article, an article at all times of great importance, but particularly so under the circumstances in which this country was likely to be placed. On Italian wines it was proposed that the duty should be the same as the duty now payable on port wine. On linen yarn imported the duty was to be sixpence instead of one shilling per cwt.; but this was to be counteracted by a new additional duty on narrow linen cloths. As to the duty on tonnage, after the declaration made by the Hon. Gent. he thought it unnecessary to take up the time of the committee by going into any minute statement of the reasons which would have induced him to propose its continuance, even as a permanent tax, during peace. He could not help stating, however, for his own satisfaction, and the satisfaction of the House, that the view which he had on a former occasion given of the flourishing state of the trade of the country was strictly consistent with truth. The trade of the country had indeed, for the last fourteen or fifteen years, been experiencing, whether in peace or in war, a gradual and constant increase. He was happy to be able to assert with confidence, that, during the last year, the same increase had been observable. In proof of this, he had only to call the attention of the committee to the number of British and foreign ships which had during

the last year cleared outwards and inwards, and at the same time advert to the amount of their tonnage. The increase in the number of British ships which had cleared outwards, was above the preceding year 3275, and the increase of tonnage was 414,755. On the other hand, the decrease of foreign shipping was 1704, and the decrease of tonnage 299,914; on the other hand, the increase of British, shipping which had cleared inwards was 27,50, and the increase of tonnage 269,245: the decrease in the foreign shipping, clearing inwards, was 3274, and the decrease of tonnage upwards of 344,000. He did not wish to go into any further detail on this part of the subject, but thought it proper to put the committee in possession of these facts, in support of his former statement. The Rt. Hon. Gent. after a few more observations, concluded with a motion, the object of which was to obtain leave to bring in a bill to accomplish the objects stated in his speech.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, May 19.—*(See Minutes, p.* 814.)

[NEGOTIATION.]—Mr. GREY said, that in consequence of the refusal of the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) to grant the information for which he had applied yesterday, he now thought it his duty to bring forward a specific motion on the subject; and he was not sorry for the delay, as from the short attention he was able to bestow on the papers relative to the late negotiation, which were yesterday laid before the House, he had discovered that there were many points in which the information they contained was defective. It was, therefore, his intention, in order to remove those defects, and to furnish the House with that ample knowledge which was necessary towards the complete comprehension of the important question that was to be discussed on Monday, to combine with the motion of which he had given notice yesterday, a number of other motions, in stating and commenting on which, it was by no means his wish to say any thing that might go to prejudge the subject of Monday's debate. He observed, that it was a very striking fact, that though in his Majesty's Declaration it was alleged that violence had been committed by the French upon the shipping and property of British subjects, yet it did not appear in the course of the papers yesterday presented, that any redress or satisfaction had been obtained on this point from the French government, nor indeed were the particular cases of violence at all described. This was one of the points on which he meant to make a motion, for if such violence had actually taken place, it was alone a just ground of war: it was so held by that House in the case of Nootka Sound. The first motion, therefore, he should make would be, that there should be laid before the House, an account of any acts of violence which had been committed by the French on any British vessels, or other property, from May 1802, to the 1st of March last; with copies of any representations that might have been made on the subject to the French government, together with the answers thereto. The other motions he proposed to submit to the House referred to the conduct of the several persons dispatched by France to the different ports of this country and Ireland, under the name of commercial commissioners, and the proceedings of our Government thereon; the continuance of the French troops in Holland; the answers, if any obtained, to the remonstrances contained in the account of the negotiations relative to Switzerland; the different orders given with regard to the Cape of Good Hope since the treaty of Amiens; the remarks made by our Ministers upon some expressions in the declaration of the state of France, some time since published by the French government, with the replies thereto. He also wished that the House should be informed whether it was the fact, as generally understood, that Louisiana had been very lately ceded to America. This was material, as it made the relative situation of this country with France much more favourable to us, and was not less in a political than a commercial view of advantage to this country. There were other articles of information which he felt to be highly necessary previous to the discussion of Monday, and he was happy to hear that an Hon. Member had given notice of motions for to-morrow respecting them. The Hon. Member now came to the motion of which he had given notice yesterday, with respect to the substance of the intelligence communicated to Government as to the armaments in the ports of France and Holland, which were alluded to in his Majesty's message to Parliament in the month of March last. The truth of this statement it was desirable to ascertain, and he worded the motion so that it could not be liable to the common objection of an unwillingness to disclose private sources of information, as no names were called for. Upon this point there was not one tittle of information in the papers yesterday presented, except the absolute denial of that assertion by the French government, and the statement that they had at that time but two frigates on the coast of Holland, and three corvettes in the port of Dunkirk: such was the description of their considerable naval armament, which was made the ground of an alarming message to Parliament. Here the Hon. Member took occasion to allude to the observations made of late as to the situation of our navy; and as the friend of the First Lord of the Admiralty, whom he much admired, he desired an investigation of the subject: he was sure that Noble Lord was ready to meet it, and he was fully certain that he would disclaim the petty subterfuge taken by the Rt. Hon. Gent.

on the Treasury Bench, as to the number of ships which were to be prepared at a short time after the commencement of war. If that Noble Lord promised fifty sail of the line, he surely could not be supposed to mean fifty hulks? However, he had no difficulty in saying, notwithstanding his regard for the general character of the Noble President of the Admiralty, that if we had not at present in the East and West Indies, and in the Mediterranean, fleets more than sufficient to encounter any force which can be brought against us, that Noble Lord would deserve the severest punishment the country could inflict. If so, and that our fleets were equally strong at home, and he had little doubt of the fact, we had nothing to apprehend from a military force which had not a fleet to convey it to any quarter where it might annoy us. After a short review of the several motions which he meant to submit to the House, remarking on the private instructions said to have been sent to Citizen Foubert, the French commercial commissioner in Dublin, directing him to take the soundings of that harbour, and upon other parts; the account of the negotiation, where no satisfactory explanation seemed to have been given by the French government, and where several instances of aggression occurred, any one of which, quite insulated, and unconnected with other proofs of a hostile mind, would have formed a legitimate ground for war, the Hon. Member reverted to the subject of the alleged armaments in the French and Dutch ports in March last. He quoted the precedents of motions similar to that he now proposed, which had occurred during the war of 1756, and also one in the year 1782, from the words of which he copied his motion.

The first motion being put,

Lord Hawkesbury wished the House to be particularly impressed with the idea that the conduct of Ministers in the course of the negotiation was not actuated so much by a view of the facts alluded to by the Hon. Gent. who had just sat down, or indeed by any single insulated act. They rested their justification on the production of a body of evidence, tending irresistibly to prove the existence of a hostile mind on the part of France. This he was desirous to mention, without meaning to prejudge the question for discussion on Monday. The Noble Lord then went over and replied to the several points touched on by the Hon. Gent. who spoke last. As to that which formed the subject of the motion now before the House, he explained how it was alluded to in his Majesty's Declaration, and contended that it was quite misunderstood by the Hon. Gent.; for he appeared not to have made a just distinction between the not giving a proper satisfaction, and the absolute refusal to do so. Had the latter been the case in any instance, particularly with respect to the security of our shipping; had such a refusal been made, either in the conversations of the First Consul with our Ambassador, or in any official communication, most undoubtedly Ministers would have been bound to consider it as a ground for war; but no such thing had ever happened until the final conclusion of the negotiation. To the Hon. Gent.'s first motion he should not object; but as to that which related to the commercial agents of France in this country, he observed, that the Hon Gent. had taken an exaggerated view of that subject. It was perfectly true that many such persons were sent into this country, but as they appeared in a capacity in which they could not be recognised, no commercial treaty being in existence between this country and France, he had no difficulty in saying that very few of them were suffered to go to the places of their destination; and upon suspicions arising as to the objects of their mission, representations were made to the French government, and several of them were recalled. As to the declaration of the First Consul upon the state of France, which formed the third of the Hon. Member's motions, he would say, that though that paper presented a strong manifestation of a hostile mind in the French government, yet it was thought more consonant with the usual course of diplomatic transactions, to notice it only by directing our Ambassador to refer to it upon any allusion being made in his intercourse with that government to the publication in England. Switzerland was the fourth point touched on by the Hon. Gent. In answer to the *note verbale* which his Majesty's Ministers had thought proper to present to the French government on that subject, they certainly did not receive a communication of the same kind with that given to Bavaria and other powers; but they were shewn by M. Otto an ostensible dispatch, in which was a solemn assurance that the First Consul did not mean to invade the independence of Switzerland. How far that assurance had been observed, it was open to the House and to Europe to judge; but as to the dispatch itself, it was a copy of that which appeared about the same time in the Moniteur and other newspapers, under the title of a proclamation. To the Hon. Gent.'s motion respecting the Cape of Good Hope he had no objection, nor to that either which regarded the cession of Louisiana to America; for there was a document forthcoming on that transaction which had lately been presented to his Majesty's Ministers by the American ambassador, and which confirmed that important fact—a fact which, though it took place subsequent to the close of the negotiation, was yet considerably promoted by our conduct during its progress. As to the motion respecting the French troops in Holland, he had to inform the Hon. Gent. that no such representations had ever been made to the French government as the Hon. Gent. seemed to imagine. To the last

motion of the Hon. Gent. relative to the intelligence received of the armaments referred to in his Majesty's message in March last, he felt it his duty strongly to object, because he did not see any good that could result from the motion, nor any necessity that called for it, though he was aware of the evils which would result from such a disclosure of secret information; and those evils were very manifest, even from one of the precedents cited by the Hon. Gent.; for the inconveniencies which arose from cases alluded to in 1754, were not to be forgotten. The acquiescence of Parliament in that motion served to break up a channel of private communication which was of the utmost importance to this country, and which had subsisted for years. Against such consequences the House should be particularly guarded, and before such a danger were even risked, a very strong case indeed should be made out. He did not think the grounds stated by the Hon. Gent. to be at all of that description, and therefore his motion could not be acceded to. It was not upon the armaments in the ports of France and Holland that his Majesty's Ministers meant to rely for the vindication of the message referred to by the Hon. Gent. but upon the whole tenour of the conduct which distinguished the French government, and which was sufficiently exposed in the papers presented yesterday. It was upon a series of circumstances tending to demonstrate a hostile purpose, which convinced Ministers of the necessity for active preparation; for he begged to call to the minds of the House that his Majesty's Ministers were not the first to arm; the First Consul preceded them, and he prepared his troops with a view to those hostile objects which are alluded to in his conversation with our Ambassador, and also in his declaration addressed to the Legislative Body, *which took place before the delivery of his Majesty's message*. He would ask whether, under such circumstances, Ministers would not have been highly culpable if they had neglected to put the country in a proper state of defence by calling out the militia, &c.; and he would also ask, whether such steps of precaution could have been consistently taken; whether the militia could have been called out, without a communication from his Majesty to Parliament? Such were the motives which dictated the communication of the 8th of March last; and to a combined view of all the existing circumstances, he trusted with confidence for the proof of its necessity, and for the justification of Ministers.

Mr. WHITBREAD was sensible that the House must feel themselves much indebted to his Hon. Friend for the motions he had this day brought forward, as they must afford the House an opportunity of obtaining more ample and satisfactory information respecting the great question which was so soon to come under their consideration. The Hon. Gent. then followed up the arguments urged by his Hon. Friend (Mr. Grey); he insisted that if offensive expressions had been made use of by the First Consul in his communication to the Legislative Body, Ministers had failed in their duty at the time in not calling for an explanation of those expressions. Ministers had also laid much stress on the mission of the commercial agents into the more considerable seaport towns of the empire, and on the views and projects which they were commissioned to prosecute. But the Noble Lord confessed that this cause of complaint had been done away; for, on a representation of it to General Andreossi, those agents who had already arrived were sent away, and the arrival of those who were preparing to come over was suspended: this, in his mind, was a satisfactory explanation upon that point. As to the case of Switzerland, the *note verbale* upon that point was communicated both to the Ministers of our government and to those of the other governments of Europe. But there was another point upon which the House must undoubtedly be anxious to obtain some information. The point he alluded to was, what communications, if any, had taken place since the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris, between Mr. Talbot and the French government. In the present state of the country, surely no information could be more material or more requisite for the House to be in possession of before they came to any decision on the great question. Now as to the more immediate object of his Hon. Friend's motion, viz. the obtaining information respecting the armaments, their extent, destination, &c. &c. said to be carrying on in the ports of France and Holland, he was at a loss to discover what danger could be apprehended from granting such information as was called for, especially in the shape in which it was moved for by his Hon. Friend. His Hon. Friend called only for the substance of that information; but it was objected to on the ground of its being dangerous to cut off the sources of such intelligence. But the House would, no doubt, recollect the difference in such cases between a time of war and a time of peace. In time of war it might be difficult to obtain information, and dangerous even to communicate the substance of it; but in time of peace, as was stated by the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), in time of profound peace, when access was open to every Englishman to visit what parts of France he thought proper, to inspect the ports of Boulogne, Dunkirk, Cherbourgh, &c. &c. how could any objection be made to granting the substance of any information that might be communicated at such a period? and indeed if any danger was to arise to the persons who made the communication from the substance of the information being laid before the House, would they not be exposed to that danger from the very fact of that information being alluded to in his Majesty's message? Be-

sides, Ministers, by the message they brought down from his Majesty, intimated a near and great alarm; and by sounding this alarm they shut the mouth of the House, and called on Parliament to leave their conduct, under such circumstances, free and unembarrassed. They represented the preparations in the ports of France and Holland as not intended for colonial purposes; and that during a negotiation it was proper to take every precaution against their being intended for any hostile project. They might have in view an invasion of this country. But in the whole course of the negotiation, and on the face of the papers laid before the House, there was not a single word to prove a meditation of such designs. It was a mere assertion on the part of Ministers, and that assertion was flatly denied by the French government. But Ministers say they are responsible; if so, let them not shrink from granting the information called for, and let the House go into an examination of their conduct on Monday, with all the evidence before them which can possibly be adduced to explain and clear up their conduct.

Lord Castlereagh contended that the very aspect of the armaments carrying on in the ports of France and Holland rendered it a duty in Ministers to bring down a message of the nature of that which had been delivered to the House in the month of March. At first it was notorious that a great expedition was preparing in the ports of Holland for Louisiana. The message did not assert that this expedition was intended to act hostilely against this country; it merely stated the fact, that such an armament existed pending a negotiation; and that combined with the subsisting negotiation, it was the duty of Ministers to make a communication of it to the House. Nor was it only the armament of Helvoetsluys that Government had to attend to; if due attention was paid to what was observed by the First Consul himself, it was evident that apprehensions might also be rationally entertained of the armaments fitted out at Toulon and other of the southern ports of France, said to be intended for St. Domingo, but which afforded the facility of invading Egypt, if such had been the First Consul's wish and design. Were not these, then, just subjects of alarm? To these armaments might be added another fitted out at Brest for the East Indies, all of which, when combined together, afforded ample room for precaution and for well-grounded apprehension; and unless a message was brought down to Parliament expressive of these apprehensions, how could the militia have been called out either in this country or in Ireland, in which latter part of the United Empire such serious alarms were to be apprehended? It was therefore, no doubt, the duty of Ministers to provide for every exigency. But on all these points his Noble Friend has enlarged with so much perspicuity, that it was superfluous for him to travel over the same ground. As to the question put by the Hon. Gent. whether Mr. Talbot had not had further communication with the French government after Lord Whitworth had quitted Paris, he had only to say, that no further attempt had been made to carry on the negotiation after the departure of his Lordship, and that Mr. Talbot was only employed to wait on M. Talleyrand, while Lord Whitworth was still at Paris; nothing had been done subsequent to his leaving that city. When the whole of this important matter came to be more fully and minutely discussed, whatever might be the opinion of the House on its ultimate result, he was confident that on one point they would be unanimous, viz. that Ministers never betrayed any wish to conceal their conduct, but, on the contrary, were anxious to submit it to the severest parliamentary ordeal.

Mr. Windham supported the motion of the Hon. Gent. who introduced the discussion, with his usual force and energy. He conceived, that one important point of information had been already gained by the discussion, and that was, the declaration of Ministers that no information had been communicated. A good deal of argument had been employed respecting those persons whom, under the character of commercial commissioners, the French government had chosen to send into this country. It was not enough that remonstrances had been employed by Ministers, and that in consequence of these remonstrances they were forced to withdraw. The House had a right to know on what grounds they were in the first instance received into the country; for after they were admitted, it was no sufficient cure for the evils which their appearance might have created, that they should be dismissed from the kingdom. It was a matter of very serious consideration, that in time of peace a set of men had appeared in this country possessed of no definite character, but under the pretence of acting as commercial agents in the absence of any treaty of commerce, acting as spies, and employing themselves in collecting information hereafter to be employed in facilitating any plans of national annoyance. The House were entitled to know whether this had ever been a ground of remonstrance on the part of Ministers, and in what manner these remonstrances had been received by the French government. But passing from this point, the Hon. Member adverted particularly to the subject of the armaments, as described in his Majesty's message delivered in March. When peace or war was to be founded on these armaments, it was no matter of light consideration. It had been said by a Noble Lord (Lord Castlereagh), that armaments were nothing, independent of circumstances. With this opinion he perfectly coincided. But it was not to be forgotten, that in circumstances there was nothing of peculiar alarm, independent

of armaments. The great question to be considered was, whether the armaments were such as might in all cases be expected to exist, extended as the military force of France now was; or whether they were armaments which might be pointed to any specific object, or made the ground of any peculiar alarm? The Hon. Gent. with great acuteness illustrated his argument on this point: he saw no reasonable objection against the motion for ascertaining on what grounds Ministers had stated the existence of the military preparations in the ports of Holland and France. The manner in which the motion was made for the production of this information, met his entire approbation. As nothing more than the substance of the information in the possession of Ministers was required, he saw no solid reason for refusing to accede to the motion. It was absurd to urge any reasons drawn from a wish of concealing the sources of this information. In a time of peace, when there was a constant succession of travellers from all the different parts of France and Holland, an affectation of mysterious means of information was ridiculous. Whatever was necessary to be known might be disclosed to the House without any danger. Ministers had, for a very long period, enveloped the whole of their proceedings in impenetrable mystery. They at length condescended to lay some documents before the House; but no sooner did any Member advert to a blank in these documents, than they took shelter under the same system of mysterious responsibility. After the House and the country had been so long famished for want of knowledge of the proceedings of Ministers, complaint was very natural when it was attempted to satisfy them by supplies of information furnished in so scanty and unsatisfactory a manner. After urging some strong considerations in reply to the last speaker, Mr. Windham sat down, with giving his hearty support to the motion.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER disclaimed, on the part of Ministers, every wish to conceal any part of their proceedings. It was from a wish to have their whole conduct fully and fairly considered, that they had not limited the papers to the particular points included in the late negotiation, but had referred to all the intercourse betwixt the two governments since the definitive treaty. The Rt. Hon. Gent. in the course of his observations, went over the grounds insisted on by two Noble Lords who preceded him in the debate. He illustrated and confirmed their statements: he endeavoured to shew that the expressions of his Maje ty's message relative to the armaments in the ports of France and Holland, were strictly justified by circumstances; and that if Ministers had acted in any other way than that which they had pursued, they could not have acted consistently with the honour of their country. In corroboration of his statements, he on several occasions referred to the correspondence betwixt the two governments. The information required on this subject could answer no useful end. If it was too general, it could not be applicable to the purpose which was intended. If, on the other hand, it was too particular, it might disclose sources of information which it was important to conceal. He descanted on all the topics touched on by former speakers at some length, and concluded by declaring, that whatever reasonable degree of information was required, should not willingly be withheld.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Friday, May 20.—(See Minutes, p. 815.)

[NEGOTIATION.]—Lord BORINGDON began by stating, that from the very candid manner in which his Noble Friend, the Secretary of State, had declared his wish to furnish the House with any information that could be deemed necessary to the full comprehension of the subject which stood for discussion on Monday next, he had no doubt that the motions he was about to submit to the House would be acceded to, if Ministers thought it consistent with their duty to grant the information which these motions sought for; and if they did not think so, he confessed that he would feel very unwilling to press them. He stated, that the motions he meant to propose would comprehend the attacks alleged to have been made on British shipping, from the signature of the treaty of Amiens up to the 8th of March last, with the proceedings of Ministers thereon, and the consequences; also an account of the correspondence which took place upon the arrest and interrogation of Capt. D'Auvergne; and as he understood that a *projet* had been presented by Lord Whitworth to the French Minister, immediately previous to his departure from Paris, demanding the possession of Malta in perpetuity, and directing the *contre-projet*, if any should be delivered, to be given to his secretary, who would remain behind him to receive it, he wished to know whether any such *contre-projet* had been received by Ministers; and if it had been received, he thought it would be highly proper that it should be laid before the House, as certainly the last step in any negotiation was the most essentially necessary, in order to enable men to form a correct judgment, with respect either to the policy or necessity of breaking off that negotiation.

Lord PELHAM expressed his readiness to concur in the first motion; but with respect to the arrest of Capt. D'Auvergne, he confessed he was unable to form any decided opinion, until he should have examined the papers concerning it: he however assured the

Noble Lord that he should come down on Monday fully prepared to give the House a satisfactory answer upon that subject. With regard to the third point alluded to by the Noble Lord, he had to state that no such *contre-projet* as that described had ever been received. It was, however, a fact, that communications had been had from France since the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris; but they were of a secret unofficial kind, and he cautioned the House against entertaining any hope that they were of such a nature as could at all lead to form the basis of a negotiation. They were not indeed by any means entertained; and as they could not tend to any proceeding, they were not, of course, such documents as it would be proper to lay before their Lordships.

Earl Stanhope said, he was happy that the Noble Secretary of State had agreed to the proposition relative to the outrages said to have been committed on our shipping; but he objected to the Noble Secretary's purpose to postpone the information applied for as to Capt. D'Auvergne, to Monday next; for surely it would then be too late to communicate information so immediately connected with a subject which was fixed for discussion on that day. He conceived that the Noble Secretary should either adhere to what he could now state on that point, or he should propose the adjournment of the discussion, which stood for Monday, to some future day, in order to give farther time for consideration.

Lord Boringdon said, that he felt so forcibly the propriety of the reasons stated by his Noble Friend, with regard to the two other motions he had intended to submit to the House, that he certainly should not persist in proposing them.

Earl Fitzwilliam, after some observations on the defects which appeared to him in the information afforded by the papers presented to the House on Wednesday last, stated several motions which he wished to propose for obtaining farther information. Those motions he described: they were precisely the same as those moved for the preceding day in the other House of Parliament, with the addition of two motions relative to the interference of France in the Ionian republic, and the conduct of Ministers by written representation, or otherwise, in consequence thereof; and also the representations, if any, which Ministers may have made against the spirit of aggrandizement which France had manifested on the continent, together with the replies thereto.

The Noble Earl's first motion as to the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers respecting the persons sent into this country by France, under the denomination of commercial agents, being put,

Lord Pelham rose, and recited the several motions which the Noble Earl had announced his intention to bring forward, commenting on each. Upon those which we have already referred to, as forming the subject of debate the preceding day in the other House, he gave the same explanation as that delivered by his Noble Colleague (Lord Hawkesbury); but as to the conduct of Ministers upon the interposition of France in the affairs of the Ionian republic, he referred the Noble Earl to the Appendix to the Report of the Negotiation already before the House; and as to the representations made respecting the spirit of aggrandizement manifested by France on the continent, he held in his hand a paper, which he was directed by his Majesty to lay before the House, and which he supposed would supersede the necessity of the Noble Earl's motion: it was the copy of a letter addressed by Lord Hawkesbury to Lord Whitworth, immediately on his leaving this country, directing him to watch with peculiar care any spirit of aggrandizement which might be manifested by the French government after his arrival in France, and to take proper notice of any evidence of that spirit which might have occurred since the treaty of Amiens. As to the Noble Earl's proposition for an account of the nature of the intelligence upon which the assertion in his Majesty's message of March last, respecting the French and Dutch armaments, was founded, it was unnecessary to the question fixed for consideration on Monday, and impolitic to grant—unnecessary, because it was matter of notoriety, that there was at the time quite enough of armaments then preparing to warrant the assertion in his Majesty's message: for there were then nearly in readiness, French armaments for the East Indies, Louisiana, and St. Domingo, which, though ostensibly intended for legitimate objects, might, in the then state of discussions subsisting between the two governments, be converted to very hostile purposes: of this it was reasonable to entertain apprehension. The intelligence sought for, however, upon this subject, it would be impolitic to grant, because it would be to endanger the loss of an important source of private information.

Earl Carlisle admitted the importance and necessity of the information being obtained, which the Noble Earl's motions sought for; and so convinced was he of that necessity, that he intended to submit motions of precisely the same nature to the House at a future day, but he conceived them quite unnecessary towards enabling their Lordships to decide upon the subject fixed for consideration on Monday next; from which it was highly desirable to exclude all matter not strictly re-

levant, lest it should tend to prevent that unanimity—[*A cry of Hear! hear!*]—which he hoped and trusted would prevail on that occasion. That nothing collateral should be introduced was his wish; but, no doubt, when the conduct of Ministers came to be examined—when the question should be discussed, whether they had acted so as to maintain the dignity and secure the interests of the country, then indeed the information which the Noble Lord had now in view would be material. With respect to the armaments alluded to in his Majesty's message of March last, he would say, that if Ministers had meant merely the armaments referred to by the Secretary of State in the course of this debate, the grounds of that alarming message, and of calling out the militia, such a conduct was so culpable, that they ought to have accompanied it by a proposal for a bill of indemnity. This, however, with other circumstances of their administration, would be hereafter brought before the House; but in the present instance he deprecated any thing that could lead to discussion, or to damp that zeal upon which his Majesty, in his gracious Declaration, expressed his reliance for upholding the honour and dignity of his Crown, and for asserting and maintaining the rights and interests of his people.

Lord HOBART said, that he felt the utmost pleasure in the declaration which the Noble Lord had just made, respecting the unanimity which was so very desirable in the discussion of Monday next, and he hoped that Parliament and the people would ever feel a common interest in the maintenance of a public cause, particularly one of a nature so important as that which was appointed for consideration on Monday. With regard to the threatened inquiry into the conduct of Ministers, he would observe, that whenever the day of investigation should come, he could assure the Noble Lord that they were perfectly ready and willing to meet it. He was not so confident as to say, that their conduct was without any faults; but under all the difficulties of their situation (and difficulties perhaps unprecedented in our history they had to encounter), he was quite certain that they would be found to have been uniformly actuated by the best intentions towards the honour of their Sovereign and the safety of their country.

Earl FITZWILLIAM expressed himself satisfied with the explanation of the Noble Lord (Pelham) as to the conduct of Ministers towards the *soi-disant* commercial commissioners, and said he should, with the consent of the House, propose to withdraw his motion. As to the increased armaments of France, he took occasion to observe, that, though so much talked of, they were incapable of injuring us, unless the statement as to the practicability of conveying an army under the sea to invade this country, was to be attended to. Of this, however, he had no apprehension. (*A laugh.*)

The motion being withdrawn, and a motion as to the representations made by Ministers respecting the French troops in Holland, being proposed and read,

Earl STANHOPE rose to disclaim having ever stated any thing which could warrant the inference drawn by the Noble Earl who had spoken last. The idea was quite absurd. What he said on a former occasion referred solely to the celebrated project of Fulton, the American, and which, to save his own life, he was obliged to communicate to the French government. The intelligence of this fact he had from seven different sources; and in order to save the lives of his fellow-men, and to save the fleet of his country, he thought it his duty to mention the scheme in that House, as Ministers had made no endeavour to inquire into it; though he could assure the House there were many scientific and professional men who were of opinion that this plan was practicable; and there were three Noble Lords in that House, among the friends of Ministers, who offered to investigate the plan, if called upon by them. It was properly a subject for private consideration; but if Ministers did not think proper to seek for knowledge in this way, he would certainly bring the business before the House and the public.

Lord BORINGDON rose to order, and begged that the Noble Lord might speak to the question before the House.

Lord STANHOPE asserted, that he knew the orders of the House at least as well as the Noble Lord, but he was aware of the Noble Lord's reasons for interrupting him—he was unwilling to go into the investigation.—(*A laugh.*)

Earl SPENCER, after expressing his unwillingness to take up the time of the House by adverting to the subject of the Noble Lord's observations who had just sat down, declared that he cordially concurred in the sentiments of his Noble Friend (Lord Carlisle) as to the propriety of avoiding any topic that could produce the least dissension in the vote of Monday next—a vote which must so materially concern the best interests of the state. He therefore confidently trusted that unanimity would prevail; and, in his judgment, there were more than sufficient grounds in the papers already before the House, to justify that confidence, to induce their Lordships to accede to the propriety of adopting measures to vindicate the insulted consequence of the country. No further information appeared necessary upon that head; but the case was different with respect to the system which Ministers had pursued. He wished, however,

that those two great questions should be kept quite distinct, namely, the one as to the deliberation and judgment of the House upon the cause of the country, with respect to France; and the other as to the cause of the country, with respect to Ministers. These were topics which he thought ought to be quite distinctly considered; and the motions of the Noble Earl on the floor seemed to him more properly to belong to the latter question, than to that which stood for discussion on Monday.

Lord Pelham agreed with the Noble Earl who had just sat down, as to the propriety of separating the two questions to which he had alluded; and, with respect to the Noble Earl's motions, though some of the information they applied for did not appear at all necessary to form a correct judgment on the subject of Monday's debate, and therefore he objected to them, yet, with reference to the other objects alluded to by the Noble Lord who had spoken last, he should most probably feel it to be his duty to adopt a different line of conduct, and therefore he would recommend the Noble Earl, according to the suggestions of these Noble Lords, to withdraw his motion for the present, and in all likelihood, by the time the intelligence he wished for might be necessary, his object would be answered through a private conference; and if not, perhaps the paper he was just about to lay before the House would enable the Noble Earl to frame his motions in a more satisfactory way.

The Lord Chancellor said, that he could not conceive of what stuff that man's mind must be made, who would hesitate in deciding, from a review of the papers on the table, what course the country ought to pursue for preserving its honour and security. Some Noble Lords, indeed, were free to admit, that the act of Government, in this instance at least, stood upon good grounds; but laying his claim to a candid consideration of the whole of the proceedings of Administration, he had no difficulty in stating that they would be found to stand upon justifiable grounds.

The motion was withdrawn.

Lord Pelham presented the paper which the Noble Lord had described in his speech as the copy of instructions to Lord Whitworth; which was ordered to lie on the table.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 20.—(See Minutes, p. 814.)

[Militia.]—The Secretary at War rose, pursuant to a notice which he had given yesterday of a motion for leave to bring in a bill for the more speedy completing of the militia, and for making several amendments in the acts for that purpo e. The principal object of the intended bill was to complete the quotas of the different counties, and to facilitate the means of calling out the supplementary militia, should his Majesty think fit to have that measure adopted. Although he had the satisfaction to mention that the adoption of the measure proposed last session had produced great effect, and that nearly four fifths of the militia were already assembled; yet he could not disguise it from the House, that there were still many deficiencies to be made up in several counties. These he was sure the House would see the necessity of filling up without delay: there would consequently be a clause in the bill, empowering the Deputy Lieutenants of counties to proceed forthwith to fill up those vacancies, without any reference to their cause. As the law now stood, vacancies caused by desertion could not be filled up till three months had elapsed; but he should propose so to amend the bill, as to cause such vacancies to be filled up within the space of one month. He should also propose a clause, empowering the commandants of regiments of militia to report the vacancies, and the magistrates to levy the penalties that might be incurred, at every quarter sessions. Several abuses had crept into the enrolment of men for the militia, which it was essential to correct; and if the measure proposed appeared to be a strong one, the House, upon reflection, would see that it was not stronger than the nature of the case required. It might also happen that his Majesty would issue a proclamation, calling in deserters from the militia, in like manner as deserters from the army are invited to return. Those who should return within a given time would be free from the penalty they had incurred, while those who refused to return within the time limited would be punished as they deserved, and a description of their persons published all over the kingdom, while the magistrates would be enjoined to aid and assist in causing such persons to be arrested. Towards facilitating the enrolment of the supplementary militia, there would also be a clause in the bill similar to that introduced during the last war, for admitting men of five feet two inches; and should the course of hostilities make it necessary to embody the supplementary militia, his Majesty should be empowered so to do without being under the necessity of calling Parliament together. He should also propose that all seamen who may be serving in the militia might be turned over to the navy, and that they should be replaced by substitutes, provided at the public expense. These were the general outlines of the bill, which, when duly examined, he trusted the House would agree to, though the provisions of the bill might in some instances appear rather strong. They were not, however, stronger than the nature of the case, and of the circumstances

that called for it. The Rt. Hon. Gent. concluded with moving that leave be given to bring in a bill for the more speedy completing, &c. the enrolment of the militia.

Col. PORTER asked the Rt. Hon. Gent. if he did not intend to propose some mode for preventing the frauds that were so frequently practised by persons chosen to serve in the militia?

The SECRETARY at WAR replied, that it was intended to propose an oath similar to that prescribed by the mutiny act for recruits for the army. A man, for instance, should be examined on oath with regard to his residence, the number of his family, and whether he was enrolled in any other corps of the militia.

Mr. WINDHAM highly disapproved of the multiplication of oaths. He did not think that men's consciences were strengthened, like their bodies, by hard and frequent exercise.

Mr. BUXTON wished that persons serving in the militia should be made to declare upon oath to what parish they belonged.

Sir W. ELFORD said, it would prevent great inconveniencies and much injustice to declare in the first instance upon what plea they grounded an exemption from serving in the militia.

The SECRETARY at WAR observed, that the idea started by the Hon. Bart. had not escaped him, and that a clause would be introduced to that effect.

The question was then put for leave to bring in the bill, and agreed to.

[THE NEGOTIATION.]—Lord HAWKESBURY presented the papers which were ordered yesterday, pursuant to the motions made by Mr. Grey. In presenting them, his Lordship took an opportunity of observing, that though a variety of memorials that may have been presented, complaining of violence offered to the property of his Majesty's subjects, were not as yet arrived in this country, there were sufficient documents, however, now on the table to answer the purpose which induced the Hon. Gent. to move for them. There were also among them the papers that related to the Cape of Good Hope, and to the cession of Louisiana. In addition to the papers moved for, he had also laid upon the table, by his Majesty's command, a copy of a dispatch, which proved that no actual remonstrance had been made to the French government respecting the French troops occupying Holland, but merely an instruction to Lord Whitworth respecting the manner he should observe, and the language he should hold, when discussing that point with the French government.

Mr. GREY thought that the dispatches alluded to should be printed, together with the other papers already ordered by the House. Perhaps they might enable the House to judge of the nature of the violence offered, and of the remonstrances which that violence must, no doubt, have drawn from his Majesty's Ministers. If any other papers, containing further and more satisfactory information, could possibly be laid before the House, he readily trusted to the Noble Lord's candour to produce them. The dispatch ordered by his Majesty is said to relate to representations made respecting the continuance of French troops in Holland, contrary to the will of the people, and in direct violation of solemn treaties. As that was made a principal cause of complaint, surely there must exist some official document as to the answers made to those complaints. Lord Whitworth had undoubtedly obeyed his instructions in making the representations prescribed to him, and must have conveyed to Ministers the answers that were made to them. Of these answers Ministers must surely be in possession. But it appears from the case, as it was stated last night, that many points have been confined to verbal communications, and these have not been reduced to any official form: yet most undoubtedly it was material to know what passed here between his Majesty's Secretary of State, and the Ambassador from the French republic; for without that knowledge, how could a fair and adequate judgment be formed of the conduct and issue of the negotiation? The Noble Secretary of State must greatly increase his responsibility, if, for points of such magnitude, he trusted merely to his memory, without committing them to something in the form of an official record. Might they not be laid before the House in that shape? The Noble Lord should endeavour to hit upon some mode of submitting the tenour of these conversations to the House.

Lord HAWKESBURY observed, that what was suggested by the Hon. Gent. appeared to him wholly new, and had never yet occurred, as far as he could recollect. As to the general course of the negotiation, it was pretty well known that it was carried on at Paris, and not here. No doubt frequent conversations were carried on in London between himself and the French Ambassador, in which he took an opportunity to insist on the justice of our demands, that the French Ambassador might repeat these conversations to his government. But the principal seat of that negotiation was Paris; and indeed it could not be carried on both there and in London, without producing the greatest confusion. The preliminaries were negotiated here, and he was ready pre-

pared to produce all the documents respecting that negotiation, in case it had failed.

Mr. GREY said, he understood the Noble Lord to say that there were no written representations respecting the continuance of the French troops in Holland. Was he therefore to understand that these unwritten representations took place here? If so, some account of them might in one shape or other be laid before Parliament.

Lord HAWKESBURY contended, that in what he had said he meant no reference to Holland, but to the consuls, or commercial agents, to whom allusion was made last night.

Mr. GREY then moved, that the papers now presented be printed.

Mr. SHERIDAN thought it of the highest importance that the House should be in possession of every possible information that could enable them to come duly prepared to the discussion of the great question that was to be submitted to them on Monday next. But to him it appeared frivolous to have any additional papers printed, unless sufficient time was allowed attentively and carefully to peruse them, which could not be the case if the discussion took place on Monday. In his mind it was not so useful to come to the discussion expeditiously, as to come to it with minds fully prepared to give the question a thorough and complete investigation. To that end he ventured to suggest the propriety of deferring the discussion till Wednesday. He should now, however, beg leave to ask whether Mr. Talbot still continued at Paris, and whether M. Portalis had left London? Many reports were abroad on this subject, respecting the truth of which it was essential the public should be informed.

Lord HAWKESBURY had received no authentic account of Mr. Talbot having left Paris, neither did he know if M. Portalis was still in London. As to the reports alluded to by the Hon. Gent. that these Gentlemen might be still employed in carrying on a negotiation, there was no foundation whatever for them. He should oppose any delay in bringing on the question on Monday, unless some very urgent reason was adduced in support of it. The papers now produced and moved to be printed contained no new fact, nor any information with which Gent. might not already be acquainted. He was therefore at a loss to see any necessity for deferring the consideration of the papers already before the House.

Mr. CANNING objected to deferring the discussion beyond Monday. The papers, of which the House were already in possession, contained ample matter on which to make up their mind on the great question that was then to come before them.

Mr. WHITBREAD rose to repeat a question which he put last night, but to which he had obtained no distinct answer. The question was, whether Government had received no new communication from France since the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris?

Lord HAWKESBURY had no difficulty in saying that he had seen a note, but not officially, until this day. He might, perhaps, produce that note, but it came to him in that sort of way, that, as to the political point which the Hon. Gent. seemed to have in view, Ministers would not be justifiable in drawing any inference from it.

Mr. WHITBREAD and Mr. GREY again asked the Noble Lord, whether substantially there was not received some communication from France, whether signed or not, whether in an official or unofficial form?

Lord HAWKESBURY would feel no difficulty in producing the communication alluded to, if it had come to him in an official form. The communication was made in a confidential manner, such indeed as prevented him from producing it. As to the substance of it, however, he had no disposition to conceal it. The communication came through a circuitous channel, and proposed a possible ground of arrangement; but it was so inadmissible, that it could not be listened to for a moment. Not only was it not put in an official shape, but it contained a proposition which it was impossible to accede to consistently with the good faith of the country, and that sense of dignity and honour which would ever characterize the conduct which this country would invariably pursue.

Lord TEMPLE repeated the question, whether Mr. Talbot was not left at Paris for the purpose of entering into negotiations with the French government; and has General Andreossi left his secretary here with a similar intention? They were said to remain merely for domestic purposes. Surely it was a new occupation for secretaries of legation to be employed in packing up trunks!

Lord HAWKESBURY replied, that neither Mr. Talbot was at Paris, nor M. Portalis here, for the purpose of carrying on any negotiation. Mr. Talbot remained to take care of the papers belonging to the embassy, and to give his countenance to such of his Majesty's subjects as still remained in France.

Mr. GREY would not inquire into the precise nature of the communication, or whether it was admissible or not. It was of extreme

importance that the House should at least be acquainted with the substance of it. He could not but suppose it to be the contre-projet which was to have been delivered to Lord Whitworth, and he trusted that the absence of official form, and its having come through a circuitous channel, would not be made a reason for refusing to lay the substance of it before the House. Such a mode of communicating information to the House was not unusual—it had been resorted to in the beginning of the last war. It was also desirable to know whether no other communication had been made to Ministers since Lord Whitworth left Paris. As for delay, he should not press it, though he entirely agreed with his Hon. Friend, Mr. Sheridan, that there would be more advantage gained by a perfect consideration of the case, than from any over-expeditious or precipitate discussion of it. If the House would but pause, and he hoped they would, the more ample and minute the information that was laid before them, the less strong might be found the case of violence and aggression: for however strong that case might have appeared in the first instance, yet subsequent explanations might in a great measure have done it away. These were the explanations which he felt so anxious to obtain, because they might materially contribute to guide the House in the judgment and opinion they were to pronounce on the present critical situation of the country. But as he was now on his legs, he must beg leave to ask another question of the Noble Lord, and that question referred to reports which were this day very generally circulated, and which seemed to be taken from the French papers, viz. that the Emperor of Russia had interposed his mediation for the adjustment of the differences now subsisting between the two countries. On this point he was extremely desirous to be accurately informed, and he wished to know if any official communication had been made respecting it.

Lord Hawkesbury professed his readiness to afford the House every information in his power; and he perfectly agreed with the Hon. Gent. who spoke last, that no deficiency in mere point of form should preclude him from communicating a fact on which the House could be enabled to form a judgment. The communication that had been made since the departure of Lord Whitworth from Paris, was conveyed in a way that might justify him in concluding that it did not come from the French government, though in his own mind he had no doubt of its authenticity. Indeed, it was his intention to have stated it to the House on Monday next; nor would he hesitate to state it now, if he was sure it would not provoke any premature discussion.—*(A general cry of Hear! hear!)*—The communication that was thus made to him in an unofficial manner, had for its object to propose an arrangement, the subject of which was, that we were to be left in possession of Malta for a stated number of years, provided France was permitted to take possession of Otranto and Tarentum for the same number of years. As to the proposed mediation of the Emperor of Russia, the report was so far founded in fact, that his Imperial Majesty, while he seemed disposed not to interfere, had generally expressed a wish for the maintenance of peace; but it did not appear to him that his Imperial Majesty had sent any precise instructions for bringing his mediation to any distinct point whatever. The whole appeared to him, on the part of the French government, to be merely calculated to protract the negotiation, and to gain delay.

Mr. Whitbread and Mr. Sheridan anxiously pressed for laying before the House the answer to the remonstrances respecting Holland: the dispatch instructing Lord Whitworth to remonstrate on that point, was dated November 14. There must surely have been some reply to that remonstrance, and it was essential the House should be put in possession of it. He hoped the Noble Lord would not persist in refusing to produce it.

Lord Hawkesbury must again repeat, that there was no distinct remonstrance made upon the subject. Lord Whitworth was merely instructed what language and manner he should employ in the conferences he held with the French government on these points. What that language was, abundantly appeared on the face of the papers already before the House.

Mr. Sheridan contended, that it would be of the utmost advantage to Government to produce the paper; for if it appeared that these remonstrances were treated with contempt, and a disregard had thus been shewn to the faith of treaties, Ministers would be able to take the strongest ground possible from that single instance in the behaviour of the French government. At all events, Lord Whitworth must, in some way or other, have reported the manner in which his remonstrances were received; and it was that report which the House must be desirous to get possession of.

Mr. Canning concurred with Mr. Sheridan, and saw the question in a double point of view, both as it affected the cause of the country, and the conduct of Ministers.

Lord Hawkesbury had only again to repeat, that as there was no formal remonstrance on this subject, neither could there be expected any formal answer.

Mr. Sheridan moved for an address to his Majesty, praying that he would order to be laid before the House the substance of the in-

formation which had been received by his Majesty's Ministers, in what manner the representations of Lord Hawkesbury, if any, respecting the armaments in the ports of Holland, had been received by the French government.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER assured the Hon. Gent. that any official document which was in his power, and which might tend to satisfy the wish of the House on that head, should be produced. He also stated, that up to the period of the discussions, Ministers were led to believe that the French troops would be withdrawn from Holland.

Mr. SHERIDAN, after the assurances of the Rt. Hon. Gent. consented to withdraw his motion; he, however, thought that there might be other, though not official papers.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER declared there were none but such as would lead to a disclosure of some of the persons concerned in giving the information.

Mr. GREY said, that he had been informed that there had been no representations made by Mr. Liston to the Batavian government on the subject, at the time alluded to.

Mr. CANNING was of opinion, that the substance of the information might be given without any disclosure.

Mr. JOHNSTONE moved for the production of certain papers respecting the Emperor of Russia having refused to garrison Malta.

Lord HAWKESBURY thought it would be more advisable for Gentlemen to give notice of such motions, as a matter of personal convenience towards the persons who were to produce them, and matter of urbanity in regard to the mover himself.—Motion withdrawn.

General GASCOYNE, after a few prefatory observations, moved for the production of papers respecting any representations made by the Maltese to our Government, from October 1801, to March 1802, and of the proclamation issued by Col. Graham to the inhabitants; also for all papers respecting the annexation of the Italian republic; also the papers relative to all the islands taken, and afterwards ceded, in the West Indies: they might have been retained with the same propriety as Malta. Another point he would submit to the Noble Secretary of State, was contained in No. 38 of the official correspondence, relative to the sending of General Georges to Canada; but on this he did not mean to take the sense of the House. Another motion which he did not mean to press was, for a copy of any accounts which had been sent by Mr. Liston to acquaint Government of the armaments going on in the ports of Holland. The Hon. Member also moved for the production of all papers that related to the island of Lampedosa, since the signing of the treaty of Amiens.

Lord HAWKESBURY rose to take up the attention of the House for a few moments. He had no difficulty in saying, that to the motion relative to the orders for the evacuation or retention of the West India islands, he had no possible objection. Whatever papers were connected with this subject should be readily produced. With regard to all the other motions, he entertained a very different opinion. As to the motion which had been put from the Chair, he felt himself called on to say, that he had seen no parliamentary ground for the production of the papers which it was the object of the motion to bring before the House. If motions of this kind, referring to subjects which were connected with events antecedent to the treaty of Amiens, were once acceded to, it was quite impossible to determine how far the same principle might be carried. It was beyond the means of calculation when such inquiries would be suspended. Though he should resist the motion, he thought it due to the House to state a few circumstances which would, in his opinion, be very satisfactory to the House. It had been asserted, and had even been introduced into periodical publications, that a remonstrance had been made by the Maltese deputies, in which they brought forward a grave subject of complaint against the Government of this country for indifference to their just rights and privileges in the arrangement of the definitive treaty. This was a charge which he felt it necessary on his part to repel in the strongest terms. With this view he could not do better than direct the attention of the House to a letter, written by the deputies subsequent to the treaty of Amiens, in which they expressed their perfect satisfaction with the conduct held towards them by Ministers, and their gratitude for the exertions which had been resorted to in their favour. Their great object, he did not mean to deny, was the privilege of being under the direct protection and government of his Britannic Majesty; but if this could not be obtained, the arrangement made in their behalf was one which they thought demanded a warm expression of gratitude.—[Here the Noble Lord read a part of the letter, which fully justified his statements. The deputies declared, that they considered it their highest honour to be admitted to the privileges of British subjects. As this, however, was impracticable, they could not, without the most affectionate gratitude, reflect on the efforts made by Ministers to secure their privileges. These efforts they should communicate with the history of their country to the latest posterity; and, while they gloried in the conti-

nuance of their privileges, they would tell, that to the British government was their protection to be ascribed.]—Having finished the reading of this extract, the Noble Lord proceeded to state, that he did not consider that any parliamentary ground had been laid for the motion. This constituted his objection, which he conceived sufficient to induce him to resist the production of the papers required. He had already declared his opinion, that, with the exception of the first motion, all the others were such as ought not to be acceded to by the House. To the last motion the answer was simple and satisfactory; it was nothing more than a repetition of the motion, which, after a great deal of argument, had been rejected on a division. The motion respecting the orders sent out to the West Indies he should willingly accede to; on all the others he should, as the most convenient way of disposing of them, move the previous question.

Mr. WINDHAM thought that the first motion was one highly necessary to the national dignity, the national interest, and the national honour. After it had been generally circulated over the country, that the representations of allies had not met with a suitable degree of attention and respect, it was highly important to know how far their rights and their wishes had been regarded by his Majesty's Ministers. If Ministers were prepared to say that these statements were not consistent with fact, this he allowed would certainly be a sufficient answer to the motion, and would supersede its necessity. But if it was said, as the Noble Lord who spoke last contended, that papers of a different description were in possession of Ministers, this he considered to be no satisfactory answer to the motion. One party said that they were perfectly satisfied with the exertions which Ministers had made in their favour. This was expressly denied by another party, who, instead of being satisfied, complained of the conduct of Ministers in the bitterest terms. Those who were connected with this party, not only gave Ministers no credit for the arrangements they had made in their favour, but positively accused them of surrendering their most important rights. These allegations were not to be set aside by declarations of a contrary description. It was essential that the House should know the character of the different parties; and a fairer ground of inquiry could not, in his opinion, be easily produced. But the Noble Lord had contended, that no parliamentary ground had been laid before the House for entertaining the motion. He confessed himself at a loss to define what particular ideas were meant to be attached to this expression. Of this, however, he was well convinced, as he had observed at the beginning of his speech, that the motion was one in which the national interest, honour, and dignity, were deeply involved. The truth of the case was what the House ought to call for on every principle of duty. In the papers to which he had already alluded, a good deal was said of the treatment which the deputies had received. It was not pretended by Ministers that those remonstrances should not be received; but the remonstrances of allies having every claim to protection, were not to be heard in a regular official manner. Now of all the possible disgraces which could attach to the government of a country, such conduct as this he could not but consider as of the most degrading description. What he desired the House to consider was, the case as described in publications circulated not only in this country, but all over Europe. It was not less than this—that the Ministers of the King of Great Britain had refused to listen in a regular official way to the remonstrances of allies who had every claim to their good offices. What, according to the statements in these publications, had been the language held to the Maltese deputies? Had they denied the justice of their claims, or rejected the urgency of their rights? No. Ministers had not taken grounds of this nature, which, if facts corresponded with their assertions, would have been perfectly justifiable. They had admitted the claims in their fullest extent; they had not denied them an opportunity of enforcing them, but in the mode of hearing these remonstrances the ground of accusation appeared. The Maltese deputies were not suffered to wait on a Noble Secretary of State (Lord Hobart) at his office, because their business was of a nature not to be discussed in an official situation. No; but because an official discussion might give umbrage to the French government. If these things were so, whatever circumstances of disgrace previously existed, this conduct was certainly the consummation of infamy. He begged it to be understood, while he made use of such language, that he used it merely with reference to the actual existence of such disgraceful conduct. He was far from meaning to assert that Ministers were guilty of the charge imputed to them; but after such charges were made against Ministers, it was fit that they should have an opportunity of exculpating their conduct. What, he desired to know, could be more ignominious than for the Ministers of a great empire to tell allies, who were entitled to every degree of kindness and protection, that their complaints, for fear of giving umbrage to another power, could not be entertained, but that they might introduce their complaints by stealth, and trust in this indirect way to some chance of redress? These were the grounds on which he should support inquiry. He should be glad to find that no truth existed in the reports which had gone abroad on this subject, but it was in the hope that this would turn out to be the case, that he was induced to support the motion.

If the grounds which had been stated in support of the motion were not parliamentary, he again repeated what he had already hinted at, that he misconceived the term, or was unable to understand its application.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER agreed with his Noble Friend near him (Lord Hawkesbury), that no parliamentary ground had been laid for the motion. He begged this assertion to be understood in the way in which the Noble Lord had employed it. When the Noble Lord said, that no parliamentary ground was laid for the motion, he meant, as he understood his language, merely to say that the motion was of a nature which was not at all applicable to the subject to be considered on Monday. He therefore contended, that under the present circumstances the production of the papers, which it was the object of the motion to bring before the House, could promote no useful purpose. With this sentiment of the Noble Lord he entirely coincided. But it had been contended by a Rt. Hon. Gent. on the other side, that as reports of indignities being offered to the Maltese deputies were abroad, the production of the papers was necessary to vindicate Ministers against a charge of the most grave and important nature. He must take on himself to repel such a charge in the most direct terms, and to deny that any thing approaching to indignity had ever been offered to the deputies. Such a sentiment as this he had never heard, till it had been uttered by the Rt. Hon. Gent. on the present occasion. The fact was, that during their stay in this country they had experienced every mark of respect and of kindness, and at their departure a ship was specially provided, by order of his Majesty, to convey them back to their own country. The extract from the letter read by his Noble Friend was amply sufficient to do away any impression of their being treated in a way unworthy of the claims which they possessed to a reception of the most distinguished kind. The Rt. Hon. Gent. in conclusion, referred to a similar motion being made in May last. On that occasion the motion had been rejected; and certainly whatever reasons existed to justify its rejection at that time, operated with much greater force at the present moment. He sat down by declaring his determination to vote against all the motions, with the exception of that to which his Noble Friend had adverted.

Dr. LAWRENCE argued that the motion was directly connected with the great question to be discussed on Monday. It had been argued, that because a motion to the same effect had been rejected in May last, it ought not now to be received. But he desired the House to advert to the difference of circumstances: there were now in the papers on the table three *projets* of an ultimatum proposed by Ministers to the French government. By the first of these *projets* his Majesty was to possess the sovereignty of Malta, but the civil government of the island was to remain exclusively in the hands of the order of St. John of Jerusalem. By another *projet*, his Majesty was only to have a temporary possession of the island, and at the expiration of that period the island was to be given up to the inhabitants, and their independence was to be recognized. What the causes of these variations were, it was important that the House should know, as by the first of these propositions the treaty was made the basis of the arrangement; whereas in the other the rights and privileges of the inhabitants appeared the objects of most peculiar consideration. The Hon. and Learned Member having established this argument, touched on the consideration of the necessity of the motion, drawn from views of national honour. The question here was not whether the deputies had suffered any particular indignities, but whether they had been denied a fair opportunity of stating their claims and supporting their rights—whether their remonstrances had been delivered in an official form, or whether they had been communicated by stealth, and in a manner disgraceful to the allies of an independent government? In the papers which had already been repeatedly alluded to, a charge was brought forward, that one of his Majesty's Secretaries of State had refused to receive them at his office, but, with the view of avoiding all cause of umbrage to France, had appointed them a private interview. This, if true, was a most disgraceful and reprehensible proceeding, and one which loudly called for inquiry.

Col. GRAHAM thought the motion inapplicable, as far as the debate on Monday was concerned. As to the proclamation which he had issued to the inhabitants of Malta, he could assure the House that the production of a copy of it would be altogether useless, and this on a very simple ground. He had issued the proclamation on his own private opinion of its expediency, and not on the authority of any orders which he had received from Government.

The SECRETARY at WAR did not mean to deny that the subject to which the motion referred was one which might hereafter be thought worthy of discussion. At the present moment he could not see of what advantage it would be to press it, as the production of the papers could not at all throw any additional light on the subject to be discussed on Monday. On this ground he should have no difficulty in voting for the previous question.

Mr. WARD, considering the reports circulated to the prejudice of a Noble Lord (Lord Hobart) as being in every point of view

mous, wished to have a categorical answer, whether language of the nature alleged had at any time been employed to the Maltese deputies? When he reflected that the calumnies to which he had alluded were circulated not only in this country, but all over Europe, it was the more necessary that a direct answer to this question should be given by Ministers.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, as a direct question had been put to him, thought it his duty to give a direct answer. This answer was in the same terms which he had formerly employed, that until this evening he had never heard of the charge which had, in the course of the debate, been so frequently referred to. He had the strongest reason for asserting, that no one of his Majesty's Ministers had ever used language of the nature described.

Mr. CANNING, though he agreed in the inference of several Gentlemen who had spoken, that the papers which it was the object of the motion to produce, had a direct application to the debate to take place on Monday, thought that the point of national honour which it involved of far greater importance. As, however, he understood, from the speech of the Secretary at War, that there was no disposition to resist the introduction of the motion at a future period, he was the less inclined to oppose the motion for the previous question. It certainly was a matter of very grave consideration, to inquire whether a Secretary of State to the King of Great Britain had refused to the allies of the Crown an opportunity of explaining their grievances and supporting their rights. This was a question, in which not only the character of the Government, but the character of the country, were deeply involved. If it was understood that there would be no objection to a full consideration of this question on a future occasion, he had no wish at present to press the discussion; but certainly this was the only ground of his forbearance. It would give him infinite pleasure to find that representations which had obtained very general currency were completely unfounded, and he fully agreed with those who thought that this expectation was the best reason for wishing the motion to be adopted. He considered the inquiry the more necessary, as, if his recollection did not materially fail him, when information was required respecting the representations of the Maltese deputies, it was answered, that no official papers on this subject existed. Was this because the deputies had not been received in an official way? Was it because the Secretary of State could not receive them at his office, but only admit them by stealth to a private meeting? He did not say that this was the case, but at the same time he thought that this was an additional ground of inquiry.

Lord CASTLEREAGH shortly resisted the motion, on the ground of its not applying to the grand subject of discussion. He denied that the Maltese deputies received any treatment which was not highly honourable and distinguished. He reprobated the charges thrown out against a Noble Secretary of State, who he was sure was utterly incapable of using the language imputed to him.

Lord TEMPLE thought inquiry peculiarly necessary. He protested, however, against any inference being drawn against the character of the Noble Secretary of State: he believed him incapable of the language and conduct represented; but if such language was used, he was sure that it was contrary to the Noble Lord's own feelings. It was surely a part of the general system which Ministers had adopted, and was a proof how little consistent that system was with every view of national character, dignity, or honour.

Mr. WILLIAM SMITH gave his support to the arguments, and commended the candour of the Noble Secretary of State. He trusted that the Hon. Member would consent to withdraw his motion.

After mutual explanations between the Hon. Mover, Lord Hawkesbury, and other Gentlemen who had previously spoken on the subject, the question was put, and the motion for the previous question carried on all, except that which related to the islands in the West Indies.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, May 23.—(See Minutes, p. 816.)

[ADDRESS TO THE KING.]—Lord PELHAM rose to move the address. From the papers which were on the table, he was confident that their Lordships must see that Ministers had no wish whatever to conceal any part of their conduct, not only during the late negotiations, but through any part of the period which had elapsed since the signature of the definitive treaty. For himself he could state his conviction, that in the whole of this conduct there was no reasonable ground of reproach. Of this he was at least sure, that Ministers had, to the best of their abilities and knowledge, acted a conscientious part during the whole of that important period. He was not now disposed to contend that their conduct might not, on a future occasion, be made the subject of solemn inquiry, but he could not but express a hope that the discussion on the present occasion might be conducted with as little reference as possible to the conduct and merits of Ministers. That conduct and those merits might be considered on a future day, without at all compromising

any support which might be given to the address. To introduce these two subjects at the same time would only have the effect of fettering the decision. From a perusal of the papers on the table, the great and indeed the only question was, whether a distinct and legitimate ground of war had been established. After having seriously and maturely considered the whole of the papers, and after reflecting on the part which, as one of his Majesty's confidential Ministers, he had thought it his duty to pursue, he had no difficulty in declaring that he considered the ground of war contained in the documents in the hands of their Lordships to be the most strong, the most clear, the most distinct which were ever submitted to Parliament. The conclusion which those documents, in his opinion, left on the minds of all unprejudiced men, must be, that war was, by the conduct of the French government, rendered inevitable. It was necessary to the support of the national honour, the protection of the national rights. The interests of our commerce, the safety of our liberties, the existence of our independence, were all involved in the appearance of effectual resistance to French aggrandizement and ambition. His Lordship declared it not to be his wish or intention to go minutely through the papers, because he had no doubt that their Lordships had given them a very attentive consideration, and had formed the conclusion which a careful perusal was calculated to induce. It was only necessary for him to trace the outline of the conduct pursued by the two governments since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens. Proceeding on this principle, he adverted briefly to the principal points of dispute betwixt the two governments, as described in the documents on the table. With respect to Malta, the conduct pursued on the part of this country was such as must prove the sincerest desire of peace. A very short period had elapsed before, with the view of facilitating the evacuation of the island, an accredited officer was appointed to arrange the mode in which it was to take place. Capt. Sir Alexander Ball received full powers and instructions to concert with an agent on the part of the French government the means of executing the article of the treaty with the least possible difficulty. Previous to the evacuation, the election of a Grand Master was an object of important consideration, and to this his Majesty had given every possible facility. The Grand Master then chosen had seen reasons for not acceding to the election, and a new election became indispensable. Again, his Majesty, actuated by the same desire of peace, and the same wish of carrying into effect the stipulations of the treaty with scrupulous fidelity, acceded to an arrangement for a subsequent election, with the view of removing every obstacle to the evacuation of the island. A body of Neapolitan troops were in the first instance to be admitted into the island, and to their admission, on the part of his Majesty, not the smallest obstacle was opposed. In a word, without going into any minuteness of detail, he would content himself with referring their Lordships to the clear and unequivocal proofs of a pacific spirit which had, throughout the whole of the stipulated arrangements relative to Malta, been exhibited on the part of this country. It was about the 27th of January that the French government began to press, in a very peremptory manner, the evacuation of Malta; and it was about that period that Ministers thought themselves bound to demand some satisfactory explanation of the pretensions advanced and the views disclosed by the French government. Circumstances then existed, which rendered it necessary to refer back to what had been the conduct of the First Consul from the period when the treaty was concluded. In the course of this review, the plain, the irresistible inference was, that the conduct of the French government had been one constant series of acts totally inconsistent with a sincere desire of preserving the peace of the two countries. At an early period after the treaty was signed, representations were made about the freedom of the press in this country, the publications reflecting on the French government, to which this freedom gave rise, and the necessity of subjecting not only the press, but the deliberative assemblies of the country, to a degree of restraint inconsistent with the genius of our excellent constitution. The stay of the Princes of the house of Bourbon, of certain bishops particularly named, and a number of emigrants who continued to wear the badges of extinguished royalty, were made the subjects of complaint. What the answer of Ministers to these complaints was, was sufficiently explained in the papers; and he entertained a confident expectation that it was of a nature to meet with universal support and approbation. With regard to the complaint about the freedom of discussion in different publications, it was hardly necessary for him to say that he was a decided friend to a free press. He did not mean to deny that this freedom was sometimes carried to an unjustifiable length, and was applied to very improper purposes. He would allow that he had met with publications whose spirit and tendency he extremely disapproved of, as being calculated only to produce irritation, and to ferment that spirit of inveteracy which it was one great object of the peace to extinguish. Ministers had shewn their disposition to give no countenance to publications of this kind, by referring the French government to the tribunals of the country, in which alone, according to the genius of our constitution, adequate redress could be obtained. This answer was not held in all respects satisfactory by the French government, and a spirit of distrust and animosity continued to be che-

rished. He was convinced that it was unnecessary to remind their Lordships minutely of the various other proofs which the French government had given of a hostile and dangerous spirit. It would be necessary only to refer to a few which were most prominent and worthy of consideration. At the period when the First Consul began to be so extremely clamorous about the evacuation of Malta, it would not be forgotten by their Lordships, that an official document of a very extraordinary nature made its appearance in France. He meant to allude to the Report of Col. Sebastiani, an agent dispatched by the First Consul to make the tour of the greater part of the provinces of the Turkish empire. The publication of this Report necessarily excited suspicion. It disclosed views and unfolded projects which could not fail to attract the peculiar notice of Ministers. In every page one most important lesson was to be collected, that the views of the First Consul relative to Egypt had not been for a moment abandoned. It was clearly seen that the possession of that country was the constant object of his ambition. The internal evidence of the Report proved this in a way which could not be misunderstood by the most careless observer. If, however, this inference had been at all doubtful, this doubt must have been completely removed by subsequent circumstances. In an interview with our Ambassador, the First Consul had not thought it necessary to throw the slightest veil of secrecy over his designs. The publication of the Report was sufficient to rouse our jealousy; but the language of the First Magistrate of France rendered it more peculiarly worthy of observation. In a formal conference with the Ambassador of an independent power, the First Consul had not hesitated to declare that Egypt must sooner or later be in the possession of France. He would put it to the candour and the feelings of their Lordships, whether Ministers were not entitled to demand from the French government some security for its future views relative to Egypt, beyond what the treaty of Amiens provided. In the continued possession of Malta, Ministers conceived that this security could be found; and hence originated the discussions which this subject had created, and the importance which the possession of the island afterwards assumed. Malta, in the hands of this country, could only be viewed as a security: it could afford to France, or any other power, no reasonable ground of jealousy or alarm. No other place was liable to so little objection, and on this ground Ministers rested their claims to its possession. But, independent of these considerations, there were others which justified Ministers in retaining the island. When the treaty of Amiens was formed, and when, according to the stipulations of that treaty, the island was to be restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem, certain revenues were understood to be appropriated to their support, in a way consistent with the objects which the treaty proposed to establish. Without this support, it was absurd to talk of that independence which the treaty professedly guarantied. But their Lordships could not have forgotten, that in Spain the revenues of the order had been confiscated. The same thing had taken place in Italy and in Bavaria. The French government, so far from opposing any obstacle to this sequestration, had appeared to have encouraged it, in a way which shewed a very great degree of disinclination to the execution of the treaty. After pursuing this species of conduct, it was with a very bad grace that the First Consul came forward to insist on the peremptory execution of the treaty. As long as the hope of peace could, with the smallest degree of reason, be entertained, Ministers had shewn the utmost reluctance to resort to any measure which might hasten on a renewal of hostilities. When, however, the conduct of the French government had become such as could no longer be tolerated, consistent with national honour, dignity, or safety, it became Parliament and the country to speak in terms of suitable indignation of these repeated acts of insult and aggression. If war had become inevitable, it ought to be a war in which the national spirit should be excited in a way which would demonstrate to a proud and insolent foe, that while the people of this country were not anxious for an opportunity of taking offence, they were sensibly alive to the least imputation of dishonour, and determined on punishing insults with the most exemplary vengeance. If the conduct of Ministers was in any respect to be blamed, it possibly might be on the ground that they had not, at a much earlier period, shewn a determination no longer to suffer the insults or the injuries of the French government to pass over with impunity. Peace was in itself so important a blessing, that great allowances were to be made in favour of exertions to preserve its continuance. He would deny, however, in the strongest terms any imputation against Ministers for yielding to any dishonourable sacrifices, with the view of preserving peace. They had certainly manifested extraordinary forbearance, but he trusted it would be found, that in no part of their conduct had they displayed a spirit unworthy of the lofty character which England had long held among the commonwealths of Europe. Delay had, no doubt, to a considerable degree, taken place; but he was convinced, that any inconvenience which might have taken place from the delay, was more than counterbalanced by the additional evidence which was given to this country and to Europe of that pacific spirit by which the councils of his Majesty had been governed. Under all these circumstances of the case, his Lordship thought that there could be no difficulty in agreeing to the address with which he meant to conclude. It should be of that sim-

ple and precise nature which would be the least liable to create any thing like the application of party spirit; it should be such an address as might be voted on true English principles, without at all involving a pledge of approbation to the whole conduct of Ministers since the conclusion of the treaty; it should be such an address as naturally originated out of those views of French aggrandizement, encroachment, and ambition, which the papers in the hands of their Lordships disclosed.—His Lordship concluded by moving the address, in which an assurance was given to his Majesty of the conviction entertained by their Lordships of his sincere and anxious desire to preserve to his subjects the blessings of peace; their regret that these wishes had not been met by a corresponding disposition on the part of the French government; of the feeling of lively indignation with which they heard of the spirit of encroachment and ambition which that government had, ever since the conclusion of the treaty, manifested; of the reliance which his Majesty might have on the support of their Lordships in maintaining the just rights of his kingdom, the honour of his crown, and the security of his people.

The Duke of CUMBERLAND rose to second the motion, which he did in a very elegant and impressive speech. His R. H. thought, that from the papers on the table the only question was, whether England was to continue a free and independent kingdom, as she had existed for so many ages, or whether she was to sink into that state of degrading vassalage to which many of the continental powers were now unhappily reduced? This was a question for which their Lordships and the country had long been prepared by the constant proofs exhibited of the operation of French ambition. If any evidence had been wanting to establish the existence of this ambition, by the papers on the table such evidence would have been abundantly supplied. Never, in his opinion, was a specific case of ambition and encroachment, inconsistent with the independence of all other states, more satisfactorily proved. Threatened then as the country was by a power to whose lust of dominion there was no restraint and no end, he trusted that it would be animated by one general sentiment of patriotism. The present was a moment, above all others, when every man was called upon to unite hand in hand, to put his shoulder to the difficulties in which the country was placed, and to make light of all personal consideration, with the view of more effectually co-operating in the great cause. We were not now called on to contend for light objects, or indifferent and doubtful interests; our liberty, our religion was at stake. At this moment we were to contend for all that is most valuable in civil society, for all that is most esteemed by men who have experienced the blessings of liberty. It was hardly necessary for him to recall to the attention of their Lordships those times of civic dissension, which formerly desolated this fair land, and rendered the country a prey to every foreign invader. Firmness and unanimity were only wanting to enable us to triumph over every enemy, however formidable. The character of the First Consul of France could not be too often a subject of contemplation. When he spoke of this personage, he meant to apply his observations merely to his character. Speaking then of him merely in this character, he must be permitted to say, that he considered him as the decided enemy of this country—and this was the only country which could stem the torrent of his insatiable thirst of dominion. Putting the most favourable construction on his conduct, it could not be denied that he was a man whose friendship was dangerous, and even destructive. What, he desired their Lordships to consider, was was the present state of France? The French had given up their nobility and their wealth; they had seen their altars stripped of their accustomed worship, and the rites of their religion profaned; they had submitted to privations of the most grievous kind: and all these sacrifices they had endured for the great object of procuring liberty. But had they obtained this liberty by all these painful exertions? On the contrary, were they not now subject to the most galling and the most ignominious despotism? What was the situation of Holland, professedly under the protection of the First Consul? Was she not bending under the yoke, and deprived of all her ancient energies? Did she not exhibit a humiliating contrast from the picture she exhibited in the better times of her history? What was the view which Switzerland presented to the eye of humanity? Peace and tranquillity were driven from that region, which for ages they seemed to have taken up for their favourite abode; and the mild virtues of a free and interesting people were contaminated by the pollution of French fraternity. But what had been the conduct of the First Consul to this country? Was there a single part of Europe where French influence had not been exerted to undermine and destroy the influence of this country? Was there any one effort omitted to create a prejudice to our disadvantage? He needed only, for the answers to these questions, to refer their Lordships to the open and avowed exertions of the French government on the subject. Whatever obstruction our commercial prosperity could meet with had been offered, with a degree of continued hostility which sufficiently manifested the disposition of the French government to be essentially and irreconcilably hostile. But the views manifested by the French government with respect to Egypt were particularly worthy of attention. The possession of that country had been avowed to be the object of peculiar avidity; it did not require much political sa-

gacity to point out the connexion betwixt the possession of Egypt, and the insecurity of our Eastern dominions. His R. H. took occasion here particularly to refer to the conversation of the 21st of February, betwixt Buonaparté and our Ambassador, in which the First Consul, with so little desire of concealment, discloses his certain prospect of the ultimate possession of Egypt. After shortly alluding to the atrocious and malignant accusation brought by the French government, that eminent public characters in this country were for encouraging assassination, which he reprobated in terms of very strong indignation, his R. H. adverted to the claims set up by France for curtailing the liberty of the press, for dismissing emigrants from the enjoyment of that hospitality which had been their refuge when driven from their native land, and to the other propositions intended to introduce changes into our domestic system. He was confident that he spoke the sentiments of every one of their Lordships, when he said that such attempts to dictate to the government of this free and independent country were such as ought to be resisted with the utmost vigour. The First Consul was, indeed, so much in the habit of dictating to dependant powers, and he had so completely established a system of absolute sway in France, that such requisitions, however firmly and indignantly they might be resisted, did not excite much astonishment. Whole countries had, from the time that the treaty of peace was concluded, been annexed to France, and every new act of the government was a new ground of jealousy and alarm. This system of encroachment and ambition she had, in so many various ways, so unequivocally displayed, that forbearance became impossible, and a war on the part of this country had become the only means of preserving inviolate the free constitution which had been transmitted to us from our fathers as the price of their labours, their sufferings, and their blood. As this great inheritance had been received unsullied and unpolluted, so he trusted that it would be handed down entire and unchanged to our children, who might, in their turn, perpetuate its descent to distant times. After witnessing all the encroachments of French ambition, was this country at last to fall a sacrifice to the ambition which knew no bounds? He would not for a moment detain their Lordships with such an unworthy idea. He trusted that the period would never come when our nobility would be overturned, when our constitution would be destroyed, the sanctuary of domestic virtue invaded, the altar of religion defiled. Then, indeed, would be the consummation of national infamy, and the glory of England would be stranded in darkness never to be dispelled. Such a crisis could never approach, if the people were true to themselves, and determined, as he was confident they would be, in resisting any foreign invader. If they were animated by a general sentiment of loyalty, if they discovered a proper degree of affectionate attachment to their Sovereign and their country, we should continue what we had long been, the freest and happiest nation in Europe. It had been said in an official paper of the French government, that England, single-handed, could not contend against France. This was a sentiment, the fallacy of which the whole history of this country contradicted; and he trusted, that, when driven to hostilities by unprovoked insults and aggressions, we should never want an arm to check injustice, and to punish lawless ambition. His R. H. concluded his speech by again urging the necessity of unanimity, and expressing himself in decided terms in favour of the address, which, in his opinion, was most unequivocally justified by the papers on the table.

Earl Stanhope gave the Noble Lord who moved the address great credit for the fairness and the candour with which he had introduced it. There were not many of the propositions which he had laid down that he was at all disposed to controvert. On a few of the positions, however, he should beg leave to offer some observations. He trusted that their Lordships would unanimously be disposed to follow the wise and patriotic line of conduct which his R. H. who had just sat down, had so eloquently recommended. All party feelings and party distinctions would, he was convinced, be banished at a period so perilous as the present was, whether the nature of the contest, or the enemy with whom it was to be sustained, were to be considered. When the great question was, in what manner the country was to be most effectually saved, he conceived that moderation and mildness of temper ought to be the predominant principles of opinion. So much convinced was he of the propriety of this, that in the observations which he had now to offer, he should not consider himself at all as debating in Parliament, but rather as giving sentence in a judicial proceeding. He should therefore endeavour to keep his mind as free from the influence of passion or prejudice as if he were deciding on an impeachment in Westminster Hall. In doing this, he should attempt to state what the real differences betwixt the two countries were; and in his description of these differences he should take as little as possible from his own recollection, and as much as possible from the papers on the table. In the 102d page of the Correspondence, a proposition was brought forward by Ministers, that Malta should remain in the hands of this country for ten years, and it was hardly necessary for him to remind their Lordships, that, agreeably to the terms of the treaty of peace, it was to be given up by this country in three months after the ratification had taken place. He would not take on himself to say, that no circumstances might have occurred which

rendered the non-execution of the stipulation highly proper and highly expedient. Whether such circumstances did occur, was the great subject for examination at the present moment. Now, with reference to the possession of Malta, it was of consequence to ascertain whether Ministers had always represented it as the grand object of dispute betwixt the two governments. In paper 83 of the Correspondence, he found that the acceptance of a *projet* relative to Malta would, according to the representation of a Noble Secretary of State (Lord Hawkesbury), remove one of the most material of the difficulties existing between the two governments. For himself, he was ready to confess, that there was an object much dearer to his heart than the possession of Malta, important as he considered it. This was the maintenance of the constitution and the liberties of his country. One single iota of those liberties and that constitution he would on no account consent to relinquish; and any attack on them, on the part of a foreign power, he would consider as a ground of war, on which no possible diversity of opinion could prevail. He did not think, that in the principle on which the retention of Malta was required, Ministers were justified. Their argument was, that because, since the signature of the definitive treaty, France had received a considerable accession of power, therefore England was required to hold Malta by way of additional security. To such a principle as this he never could give his approbation. He would put a case to the candour of their Lordships, from which some idea might be formed of the principle which Ministers set up in defence of the retention of Malta. Supposing that Cuba had, during the intermediate period, been ceded to this country by Spain, or Sicily by the King of Naples, what would any of their Lordships think if Buonaparté had come to this country with a demand for additional security in consequence of this cession? Was there a single individual, having a drop of English blood in his bosom, who would not have indignantly spurned at such a requisition? How then were Ministers to be justified in the principle which they had laid down for the retention of Malta? As it appeared to him, the whole of their argument fell to the ground. But he was ready to admit, for the sake of argument, the principle which Ministers seemed so anxious to establish, and all that he had to require on his part was, that if their proposition was true in principle, they would have no objection to his contending that it ought to be equally true in point of fact. With this understanding he should contend, that, instead of the power of France being augmented since the peace, it had been materially decreased. In Europe it might indeed be said, that it had been increased; but this was a necessary consequence of antecedent events. After the battles of Marengo and Hohenlinden, all the subordinate states of Europe were virtually under her control, and any formal cession was merely a nominal, not a real accession of power. But he begged their Lordships to consider what was the decrease and influence of power which the French government had sustained in other parts of the world. Did their Lordships bear in mind, that, since the signature of the definitive treaty, the important colony of St. Domingo, a colony, in point of real value and importance, superior to all the other French possessions in the West Indies, had been lost to France? In stating the debtor and creditor side of the account, this was a circumstance deserving of peculiar attention. His Lordship, in this part of his argument, took occasion to refer to the exertion of a well-known society at Paris *(Les Amis des Noirs)*, who, with the most philanthropic views, had established a system as applicable to the Blacks in the West Indies, which, if carried into full effect, might have been productive of the most serious consequences. The negroes might have been conciliated and effectually trained to arms. A numerous and formidable body of soldiers might have been employed in attempting a descent on some one or other of our West India islands. Jamaica itself might have fallen in a warfare so conducted. On the most respectable authorities it had been stated, that ships with quantities of ammunition, and a proportionate number of troops, might have been landed in some one of our islands before such an event could be anticipated, and the most disastrous consequences might have ensued. The existence of our whole West India possessions might have been exposed to the most imminent peril; but now all this danger had entirely disappeared. By the unwise conduct of the First Consul, for whatever was contrary to the rights of man he must always consider unwise, a system of extermination had been pursued, by which the indignation of the Blacks was exasperated to madness, and France was deprived of one of the richest and the fairest colonies of the world. But Ministers, after all this, still reverted to the views of Buonaparté respecting Egypt. Putting this question fairly and candidly, he wished to ask their Lordships, whether it was meant to be insinuated that the predilection of Buonaparté for Egypt was any thing novel? Was it not well enough ascertained, that the possession of it was one of his most favourite objects? Did he not, for the accomplishment of this object, sacrifice one of the bravest armies that ever followed the fortunes of a favourite general? Because the First Consul had at one time expressed a very strong inclination to obtain possession of Egypt, he did not think that this was a sufficient ground for the retention of Malta, in the way in which it was by Ministers proposed to be retained. He desired their Lordships to reflect on this circumstance, that a favourable change might be introduced into the sent-

ments and views of the First Consul. He had not shewn himself to be guided by any systematic or invariable principles. It was impossible, from what he had done to-day, to calculate what he would do to-morrow. This might, with some persons, be a ground of censure; but he liked the First Consul the better for this disposition. There appeared to him, his Lordship argued, something laughable in the whole of the arrangements relative to the retention of Malta. The ultimatum of Ministers was, that Malta should remain in our possession for ten years. Now he would beg to know what was the object of such arrangement? Was there any thing mysterious in having Malta in our possession by a bond for ten years? He should wish to be informed, whether any important national advantage could result from it? After the ten years were expired, were the ambitious views of Buonaparté to be moderated? Was he to divest himself of all the qualities which were now the objects of anxiety and alarm? He certainly entertained no sort of doubt of the views of the French government respecting Egypt, and he would be the last man in the world to deny that, with a view to the security of our Eastern dominions, the possession of Egypt by France was certainly an event most earnestly to be deplored. He differed, however, from Ministers on this point in the most decided manner. He differed from them on the simple principle, that Malta ought to be kept in perpetuity by this country. But how had Ministers conducted the discussion? Their conduct, as he had before hinted, was ridiculous in the highest degree. It appeared in page 110 of the Correspondence, in a dispatch dated as near to the present day as the 12th of May, that at the time when Lord Whitworth was preparing to set out from Paris, M. Talleyrand brought forward a proposition, holding out a prospect of allowing us to retain Malta in perpetuity for a valuable consideration. The answer to this proposition was of a very simple description. Lord Whitworth solicited for his passports, and left Paris without any explanation. This he could not help thinking contrary to all the wisest maxims of policy. It appeared to him, indeed, to violate the plainest principles of common sense. In judging of this question, he thought that he could not have a better criterion of judgment, than by putting himself in the supposed situation of an arbitrator. Acting in this capacity, if he were called on to decide on the differences of two individuals, he should begin by ascertaining what were the particular objects to which they respectively laid claim. If he found that the claims of both referred to the same object, his arbitration might then appear fruitless. If, however, he found, on the contrary, that their wishes were directed to different and unconnected objects, the task of arbitration would become easy. He should in this case ask the parties, what they respectively wanted? He should make an equitable adjustment, and leave them to settle the difference. But Ministers did not rest their case with Malta. They had a long string of complaints against the French government, respecting the curtailment of the liberty of the press, the dismissal of emigrants, and the seditious publications of bishops. The insolence of Buonaparté, in requiring these concessions to his haughty demands, had been made a subject of very general complaint. He was ready to declare, that after having perused the papers with the greatest possible attention, he saw no proof of his insolence in the correspondence betwixt the two governments. If the French government really required that the liberty of the press should be curtailed, that the freedom of discussion in both Houses of Parliament should be limited, then he declared that Ministers ought to have insisted on an immediate and distinct explanation. If the answer of the French government was not satisfactory, what was to be the conduct pursued by Ministers? They ought to have recalled our Minister that day, and on the succeeding day our cannon ought to have roared to avenge the insult offered to the national honour. He scarcely thought it necessary for him to declare his attachment to the liberty of the press. There was no constitutional privilege to which he was more strongly attached; he had even written a pamphlet in its defence; it was a privilege which he would surrender only with his life. But while he was an advocate for the liberty of the press, he was not to stand up for its licentiousness. He gave the Noble Lord who opened the discussion credit for the candour and the openness with which he had spoken on the subject. The Noble Lord allowed that he had seen some late publications of a most mischievous tendency. This he could say from his own knowledge—some of these publications were indeed of a nature which could not be justified on any principle of regard to the rights of independent states. It was of great importance that the liberty of the press, as it ought to be exercised, should be clearly and accurately defined. He wished to state to their Lordships what were the views which he entertained on the subject. The criterion betwixt what was false, scandalous, and scurrilous, was what would be tolerated with respect to the Ministers of the Crown. What could not be applied to their conduct, it was unfair and criminal to apply to the conduct of the first magistrates of other countries. On this point he thought the First Consul of France had a right to complain, because it does not appear that any specific case of insolence on the part of the government of France was established. The plain objection against Ministers was this, that they did not make a specific remonstrance: they suffered past injuries to pass over unnoticed; they continued to negotiate

about Malta, and they have no ground now to hold up these as real grounds for war. His Lordship next touched upon the armaments described in the ports of France and Holland, alluded to in his Majesty's first message. Here he thought the matter lay in a very narrow compass. Ministers asserted the existence of armaments, without producing even an intimation of preparations. The French government denies the assertion of Ministers, and appeals to facts in support of their assertion. The defence on this point was what the public anxiously looked for on as early a day as possible. His Lordship, after a few more observations, concluded by saying that he should vote against the address, as it was now formed, whatever his sentiments of indignation were against French ambition. Before he sat down, he paid some high compliments to a Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Addington), whose uprightness of conduct demanded the highest approbation. He was confident of that Rt. Hon. Gent.'s sincere desire of peace, and thought that even still an effort might be made to maintain the continuance of tranquillity betwixt the governments.

The Duke of Clarence rose, and said, that he was one of those who had voted for peace, and supported his Majesty's Ministers in executing the treaty of Amiens, because he had perceived the general wish for peace: on that account, he accorded with it, though he must acknowledge he never thought it could be lasting; and he would add, that he was considerably disappointed when he heard it was signed. But under existing circumstances he had no doubt that Ministers had done the best for the country. After having read over many of the articles, and commented on them with great judgment and perspicuity, he called their Lordships' attention to Malta, which he impressively stated would be a place of defence, and not of offence, in the hands of Great Britain; but in the possession of France, it would necessarily lead to the most dangerous consequences: from Toulon a squadron may sail to Malta, from Malta to Egypt, and from Egypt to our Eastern possessions. The Noble Earl (Stanhope) said, that, by the conduct of the First Consul himself, St. Domingo was lost to France. He thought differently; and was of opinion that France lost St. Domingo through this country, which had lately opened its eyes to the designs of a few desperate men. It was in consequence of his Majesty's message of the 9th of March, that it might be said to the French government, You shall not have St. Domingo, You shall not have Louisiana, or the Floridas: and to her ally the Batavian republic I would say, You shall not have the Cape of Good Hope, you shall not have but what Great Britain pleases to give you. But, my Lords, I will declare to you, that, notwithstanding my wish to see my country ascend in the scale of Europe, I would not wish to see France put down. I do think that for the sake of preserving a balance and securing liberty there should be a species of rivalry. I only wish that England may assert herself, and correct the insolence of France, who, whether at peace or war, will always be the enemy of this country. Having said thus much, he would no longer trespass on their Lordships' patience, but give his cordial support to the address.

Lord Mulgrave. The present subject, which involves both the interest and independence of Great Britain, is of too much importance not to excite the feelings and command the most serious consideration of every Englishman. Before I proceed farther, I will return thanks to his Majesty's Ministers for their forbearance, for their conciliatory spirit, and for their estimation of the feelings of this House and of the country. I will follow their example, and abstain from any comments that would irritate or provoke, because I think it beneath the dignity of the House to express its feelings upon the insults offered by France, on the course of her ambition, and upon her various aggressions. I shall notice part of the speech of a Noble Earl (Stanhope), which was one of the most extraordinary I have ever heard. If in his own person he wished to provoke a debate in the House, he could not resort to more effectual means than his expression of English sentiments and French partiality. The Noble Earl would give up Guernsey and Jersey to the First Consul for Malta; he would yield the possession of those islands for the basest of purposes—he would barter them in order to appease the French government; he would surrender up their inhabitants, whose loyalty to his Majesty, and attachment to this country, is unquestionable. Having read the negotiation, my Lords, with close attention, as I am sure each of you has, I will ask, whether the state of affairs, whether circumstances being maturely weighed, it ought not to be matter of exultation that the treaty of Amiens no longer exists? I was one of those who wished for peace, and deprecated war as the greatest of calamities; but I have considered the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens as incapable of execution in its real sense and spirit; but as it has been signed, and as the honour of his Majesty and of the country is committed, it ought to be adhered to. Yes, my Lords, a treaty should be sacred. But if one of the contracting parties departs from it, then the other is no longer bound. I would ask you, my Lords, I would ask my country, and all Europe, whether there were not dispositions manifested, whether acts of hostility were not committed by the French government, which violated the treaty, and justified this country in demanding security against the gigantic strides of its insatiable ambition? It is impossible, from the purview of this treaty, and of the circumstances attending it, that it can

continue any longer. Let me call your attention, my Lords, to the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, and consider it in every point of view. How has the French government acted in conformity to the spirit and meaning of it? Why, my Lords, on the 11th of September 1802, Piedmont was annexed to France. Is this, my Lords, a *bagatelle?* Piedmont is a country of greater importance than is generally supposed; its resources are great for its extent; and its productions abundant. We know that its princes, supported by the ardour of the people, served as a counterpoise against Austria in former wars; and shall we admit as a mere *bagatelle*, that the resources of a country capable of being dangerous, in the hands of France, against Germany, and consequently against Europe, at present shall be so employed—shall we consider this as a *bagatelle?*—"Ces sont les bagatelles." Is not this a reason why this country should demand explanation and additional security in consequence of the annexation of this valuable territory? The Helvetic republic was to have been independent, it was to have the power of legislating for itself—but see it reduced to the vassalage of France, trodden upon by her armies, and obliged to accept a constitution. What is the state of Holland? Compelled to feed and pay the armies of its great ally and protector, it groans under the weight of its slavery. What are we to understand by slavery? If a country cannot act in conformity to its own wishes, if it cannot legislate for itself, if it should be obliged to give up, when called upon, every thing it possesses, under the pretence of friendship, to an ambitious and powerful neighbour—what is this but slavery? And such is the condition of Holland, or, as it is nick-named, the Batavian republic. Can she be distinguished in any respect from France? Is she not completely prostrated? I do therefore call upon you, my Lords, to say, whether the aggregate, at least of the ambitious and domineering acts of the French government in Europe, and its views respecting Asia and India, should not be well weighed; and before I would commence on this occasion, I should weigh the conclusion very deliberately. But, my Lords, the conclusion is most clear and decisive, and his Majesty's Ministers have declared, that notwithstanding the many incitements to irritation and hostility they had received, still that they preferred the blessings of peace, consistently with the dignity of the Crown, and the honour and welfare of the country, to every other consideration, and did ingenuously profess an intention to execute the treaty of Amiens. But in the purview of this treaty the independence of Malta was to be guarantied; a Grand Master was to be appointed—by whom?—By the langues, and to be confirmed by the Pope. View this subject in its proper point of view, my Lords; the Grand Master was to be confirmed in his situation by the Pope. The guarantee of the Pope, my Lords, in past ages, might have been sufficient security, when he could say to one power, You shall submit to my mandate, or I will excommunicate you, and absolve all your subjects from their allegiance.—But without dwelling on the power of the Pope in former ages, what is his power at present? Is he not the vassal of the French republic? Is he not the instrument of its ambition? Is he not all things unto all men, when the Consul commands? But, my Lords, there is somewhat extraordinary in the history of the langues of Malta. I shall instance one, in order to shew the insecurity of any treaty that might be subject to its ratification, as far as the articles respecting it may be extended. "A Grand Master had offended the langues: in consequence, as they thought they had a right to do, they suspended him; he appealed to the Pope, who remonstrated, but in vain; the Grand Master, appointed by the langues, continued in his office until death." This, my Lords, is an historical and unequivocal proof of the hostility of the knights of Malta to the papal power. It is evident, under the circumstances of the present case, that the Pope cannot be a sufficient guarantee for the independence of Malta; without power, without territory, without even spiritual influence, what security can be afforded by him to the British empire? I shall now, my Lords, call your attention to Colonel Sebastiani's Report; a Report which was given officially, but was it given in the spirit of commercial rivalry? No, my Lords; disregarding the ties by which both countries ought to be united, he proceeds on his expedition. He passes from Africa to Asia; he visits Ghezar Pacha, as he acknowledges at the risk of his life; so anxious was he to perform his employer's mission. Having made his arrangements and impressions in that quarter, he proceeded to the Ionian islands, in which, having ascertained his influence, he informs the First Consul that the inhabitants will be ready at any favourable opportunity to shake off the yoke. In this view of the subject can it be said, that Buonaparté has executed the treaty of Amiens? No, my Lords: conformably to it, the independence of the Ionian islands was secured. Conformably to its stipulations, the integrity of the Turkish empire was to be confirmed; but how does it accord with the mission of Sebastiani? Surely not, my Lords. But allow me to observe on the conversation of the First Consul with Lord Whitworth—[Here the Noble Lord recited the conversation from the printed papers.]—Under these circumstances allow me to ask, whether we are declaring war against France, or France against us? Are there not grounds at least, my Lords, of apprehension? And why should Great Britain for an instant hesitate to bring the point to an issue? But consider this subject a little farther. In turning over the pages of the negotiation, I find a note from M. Otto, requesting to send away from this country the princes, bishops, and

other emigrants, who had sacrificed their comforts, their property, their connexions, and, in fine, all that was dear to them, to their honour and principles. The Government of this country was called upon to banish them, to refuse them the rites of hospitality, and eject them from us as outcasts of society, doomed to encounter the horrors of degradation, poverty, and perhaps persecution. But, my Lords, what language is this? Is it not speaking to the Government of this country, as to the King of Naples? Is it not commanding us in a manner to succumb to the yoke, and bear the iron rod? Then we may expect to be under the proconsulate of Arthur O'Connor, "shorn, and to the quick indeed." But he goes farther; he calls upon you to destroy the palladium of our liberties; he demands that we shall regulate it in a manner unknown in this country. Talleyrand, the regulator of the affairs of Europe, tells us we shall do so; and Buonaparté, the regulator-general of the universe, demands Malta for himself. What sort of conduct is this from one independent country to another? I have now to apologize to the House for trespassing so long on its patience; but I hope I shall be excused, on an occasion of this kind, for indulging a little in English feeling and English sentiments, arising from a wish to preserve our constitution, our liberty, and our rights.

Lord MELVILLE rose to give his hearty concurrence to the address which had been moved by the Noble Lord; and in pledging himself to support his Majesty in the maintenance of the just rights and interests of the country, he begged leave to explain, in a few words, the sentiments he entertained upon this important subject. In alluding to what had been said respecting Malta, he observed, that the question was now freed from much of the difficulty and perplexity in which it had been involved. He rejoiced most heartily that nobody could stand up to deny that the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens was totally incapable of being carried into execution. He congratulated the House, he congratulated the country, that it was so incapable of being executed; nay, he thought it matter of congratulation that the French, by their obstinacy, had prevented any new and adequate arrangement for the independence of Malta from being substituted in the room of that which circumstances had so completely rendered impracticable. What indeed would have been the situation of Malta with all its guarantees? Was the guarantee of Spain, of Prussia, of France, to be relied upon? It would not be pretended that such securities were of any avail. The only guarantee of importance, and which could have any efficacy, was that of Russia, in conjunction with Great Britain. He spoke of the importance of Russia in such an arrangement with the greatest satisfaction, for he considered it mutually for the interest of the two countries to cherish the strictest union and alliance. Nevertheless he was happy that the guarantee of Russia was not to be attached to an arrangement in every way so inadequate to the object it had in view. It was in fact most advantageous for Russia that Malta should be under the protection of Great Britain. It was Great Britain alone which, by its naval superiority, by its capacity to avail itself of the harbours and naval station of Malta, was calculated to be the custodier of Malta. Every other plan for its protection and its independence was futile and inadequate. Now indeed he was at liberty to contemplate the possibility of realizing an object of so much importance as the settlement of Malta under British protection. Well did he remember the melancholy moments he had passed, when, after reading the definitive treaty, he found Malta exposed to so much danger of falling into the hands of a power that would employ it for our destruction. The importance of that island had long appeared to him to be very great, and Europe had in the most decisive instances witnessed it. By means of Malta it was that the French had attacked and made themselves masters of Egypt. By Malta it was that we had been enabled to recover that possession. If Malta remained in our hands, it was impossible that all the efforts of France, that all the armaments she could send forth, could obtain possession of Egypt, while we, with a superior navy, had the opportunity of availing ourselves of the harbours of Malta. Malta, therefore, was to be considered as of infinite importance to the strengthening and security of our empire in India. He considered it as a great tower erected in the Mediterranean, on which the flag of Great Britain, displayed and floating, would hold forth an invitation to the people of the Mediterranean, of the Adriatic, and of the Levant seas, to rally round it, and to avail themselves of the protection of this country. It therefore was subject of congratulation, that, without any charge upon our good faith, an opportunity had occurred in which the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens could not be executed. As we were now going to war, and as Malta formed one of the main objects of the war, he wished that its value should be fully understood, and that we should likewise keep in view the necessity of availing ourselves of its advantages to the utmost. He hoped to hear no more of the Order being restored; or of the independence of the island being in any manner guarantied. While Great Britain was able to keep a superior fleet in the harbours of Malta, in the protection of Great Britain it would be secure. It was evident how great interests depended upon the retention of Malta; were we then to give up that possession which was so essential to those interests? If, then, we were going to war for Malta, it was an object to animate the courage and reward the achievements of our fleets and armies. We should go to war,

therefore, upon this ground as a broad question both of right and of general policy. In this view it was matter of congratulation that Malta was to be considered as a British object. We had now got rid of any consideration of the knights of St. John. What was the situa- of those knights when we obtained possession of the island? They had degraded and overthrown their Order by an act of perfidy; nor could they be restored without the severest injury to the people of the island. The Order had become odious to the Maltese by the act of treachery by which they had put them under the government of France, and it was doubtful whether the Maltese would not have deemed themselves less unfortunate in being transferred to France than being again placed under the command of an Order which they had so much reason to hate and to distrust. Besides, it was to be considered that we went to the aid of the Maltese, previously engaged in the reduction of the French; and it was greatly against the wishes of the people that the Order was to be reinstated upon any terms. We ought therefore to secure to the Maltese a wise and suitable form of civil government, to be enjoyed by them under the protection of the British power. This object ought to be prosecuted and settled without any delay, so that whenever any new negotiation should be set on foot, we might be enabled to say that the people of Malta, under a form of government agreeable to their wishes, were now established under the protection of Great Britain. He wished it to be understood that he considered the retention of Malta for ever to be a most essential object, and one to which, in the relative circumstances of France and this country, we were fully entitled to prosecute by war. In voting for the address we therefore voted our concurrence in the war, of which that was the principal object. The attainment of it would be of the utmost benefit to all the states of the Levant, and under our protection alone Malta could be rendered independent and happy.

The Duke of RICHMOND said, that he considered the demands made by Ministers in the *ultimatum* which closed the negotiation as not adequate motives for going to war; and that he did not consider the possession of Malta for ten years, or the island of Lampedosa, as sufficient grounds for war.

The Marquis of LANSDOWNE said, that he was to consider the grounds of war stated in the Declaration which had been published as the real grounds of war, and was not to draw in any rumours to swell out the case. With respect to Holland, it was known at the time when the treaty of Amiens was concluded, that Holland was entirely in the power of France. Switzerland, though an interesting part of Europe, lay too remote to be greatly assisted by the friendship of Great Britain. It was an object which more properly belonged to the House of Austria. Parma and Placentia were likewise objects remote from us, and not fully within the sphere of our political influence. Russia, it was said, had espoused the cause of the King of Sardinia. Was not Russia a power able to support his rights with effect? The maintenance of his interests, therefore, did not immediately call for our interposition. The Report of Sebastiani was stated among the causes of the war. It certainly was true that this publication contained much that was offensive in the manner, but surely there was nothing new in the nature of such a Report. Had it not been usual for every country to send persons to inquire into the situation of other countries with which they were connected? Had not France sent persons of that description to this country, and we, on the other hand, similar persons to France? As to views of ambition, it might be true that the First Consul was ambitious. But who in such a situation would not be actuated by views of ambition? Was it to be expected that, in the situation of France and of Europe, all views of ambition should be extinguished in the breast of the First Consul? He was far from approving the whole of that person's character. No honest man, he believed, could approve of his conduct. Yet it was not because the First Consul had developed views of ambition that we ought to conclude that he intended to go to war with us. Our business however was, not to allow ourselves to be hurried away by disapprobation of the First Consul's measures, or by an exaggerated alarm at his ambition, but to follow a steady course of national policy. Malta certainly was an object of importance; but he doubted whether it was of that immense importance attached to it by Lord Melville. About five years ago, he understood that an offer was made by the Grand Master of the Order, to this country, on certain conditions; but it was not thought advisable by the cabinet to accept the offer. But granting it to be of value, was it necessary to go to war for it, when, perhaps, by skilful negotiation we might have obtained it? His Lordship concluded with some other observations which we did not hear.

The Duke of NORFOLK remarked, that it had been stated as subject of congratulation, that we had made a treaty which could not and ought not to be fulfilled. This, however, was to expose the national faith, which bound us to fulfil contracts, though it might be discovered that we might have made a better bargain. In his Grace's opinion, if the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens could have been put under the guarantee of the powers mentioned in it, particularly Russia, we should have had as much security for the peace as the circumstances of Europe would permit. He still hoped that

some means might be discovered for maintaining peace, and he thought that if any opportunity should offer, it ought to be embraced. At the same time, if we are to go to war, he was confident that every Englishman would join heart and hand in repelling the attack of a foreign enemy attempting to invade the country. The address did not entirely meet his ideas; he wished that it should state that the House would see with satisfaction his Majesty avail himself of any opening, either by negotiation or mediation, calculated to avoid the necessity of war.

Lord MELVILLE was anxious to explain that he did not state that it would have been proper not to execute the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens; it could have been executed, but he thought that since circumstances in which this country had no concern had rendered its execution impossible, a new negotiation suitable to the change of circumstances was to be entered upon, and therefore he considered the country justified in retaining Malta.

Lord KING said, that though the situation of Europe, and the power of France, were such as to be alarming to this country, he did not see that the present moment was favourable for attempting to redress what was wrong. Single-handed, we never could make any great impression on France; nor could the capture of her colonies seriously reduce her power. France was not made up of various, separate, and detached settlements. Nor did her resources depend so much on distant colonies, or foreign commerce. France was a great territorial and military power, and therefore not to be materially repressed by a power of a different description, like that of England. His Lordship, therefore, greatly doubted the prudence of going to war at this juncture without an immediate and pressing necessity. He considered the war now entered upon as a war for correcting the errors of the treaty of Amiens. Malta was an important object, but he did not think it worth being purchased at the expense of a war. He therefore wished that all means for effecting peace might not be abandoned. For this purpose he proposed an amendment, the object of which was to leave out the greater part of the address, and to substitute some new paragraphs, the purport of which was, that the House would see with satisfaction that his Majesty should listen to any farther offer of amicable settlement, consistent with the honour and interests of the country.

Lord ELLENBOROUGH said, it had been asked, where were the causes that justified our going to war? He would answer, that if we had not at present adequate justification of war, he knew not what insults, provocations, or dangers could justify Christian men in appealing to the laws of self-defence. What was the object of the war? He would say broadly that it was a war to redress all our wrongs and to repel all our dangers. It was not a war merely for Lampedosa, as a Noble Duke (Richmond) had said, though, as the Noble Duke might have looked to that object as a fruitful subject of future fortification, he ought not to have held it so despicable. We were going to war not for such inferior considerations, but the greatest stake of civil society—for every thing which an independent nation could prize—for the right of legislating for ourselves, which the enemy had proposed to submit to the standard of their arbitrary principles. He trusted, however, that such valuable privileges we should never abandon to the dictates of any sovereign, whether lawful or usurping, or to any mass of men however formidable in power. His Lordship alluded with the highest praise to the note of Lord Hawkesbury, in answer to M. Otto's note, and said, that it entitled Ministers to the thanks and gratitude of the country. It was necessary to consider, whether the war was just; for unless that was sound, all the rest was hollow. But he contended, that for Malta alone, independent of other circumstances, we had a just ground for war. The 10th article of the treaty could not be carried into execution. The Order was degraded by the confiscation of their revenues; the guarantees were withheld, so that it could not be executed. By every principle both of the law of nations and of common law, it was necessary to execute the contract as nearly in the spirit and sense, if not in the form intended. But it was necessary too that time and conference should be employed to that end. Upon taking up the treaty on the ground of its being impracticable, France could not with justice demand the evacuation of Malta, since nothing has continued in the same state as when the former arrangement was concluded. It had been said, with some ridicule, that the nomination of the new Grand Master of Malta was left to the Pope. But was not the nomination of the Pope, from a list presented by the cabinet of Russia, as likely to be satisfactory as the choice of the priories, such as they are now constituted? and besides, that arrangement was agreed to before the hostile and ambitious views of the First Consul were developed. But since it had been shewn that Malta was of the utmost importance to the preservation of the interests of this country, could it be expected that Malta should be given up after Sebastiani's Report furnished us with such decisive information of his intentions? In his conversation with Lord Whitworth, on the 9th of February, the First Consul informed us that he had 25,000 men which might have been sent to Egypt, and the hint gave sufficient warning that some other of the 500,000 men he boasted to have in arms might be converted to that purpose. Besides, the aggrandizement of France since the peace entitled us to new se-

curities and compensation. By the law of nature and nations even an aggrandizement, by succession or otherwise, might have been ground of jealousy and suspicion; but when that aggrandizement had been obtained by violence and injustice, it could no longer be doubted that we were entitled to make new demands. His Lordship then alluded to the seizure of British vessels on the most frivolous pretences. He likewise dwelt upon the conduct of France to Switzerland. He denied that the proposal of accepting Lampedosa in sovereignty, and Malta for ten years, was one that was to be rated by the mere value of these objects. The object gained would have been security that the danger which the ambition of France threatened would be guarded against for ten years; that Europe would have obtained a breathing-time; that means might have been devised for fresh securities. It was great objects like these, and not merely possession of a station for ten years, that were required. He was aware of the burdens which the contest would involve, and nobody regretted them more than he did; but he knew also the resources of the country to be equal to any necessity. If we had not the chivalry and gallantry of Cressy, Poictiers, and Agincourt, we had to oppose to the enemy the heroes of Aboukir, of the Nile, of St. Jean d'Acre, of St. Vincent, of Camperdown. Similar heroism and similar achievements, he trusted, would signalize the present contest; and with such resources ought we to submit to insults? To the energies of the people, Parliament, he trusted, would supply wisdom, counsel, and unanimous resolution to withstand the common enemy, without being influenced by any low considerations of party.

Earl Moira acknowledged the justice of the picture which some Noble Lords had drawn of all the calamities attendant on a state of war. It was like the pestilential blast of the desert, which withered every thing before it. He also agreed with the sentiments of the Noble Lord who proposed the amendment, that their Lordships had not merely to decide upon their own feelings and interests, but how far the feelings of the people of the country were congenial, and how far their interests were to be affected. However, though he coincided in this position, and sincerely approved the motives which generally actuated the conduct of that Noble Lord, yet he could not help regretting that any amendment should have been proposed which could tend to produce the least diversity of sentiment upon an occasion when unanimity was so very desirable, and might be productive of the last consequence to the fate of the country. Passing from this amendment, which the Noble Lord expressed his hope would not be pressed, he took notice of the manner in which a Noble and Learned Judge had treated the complaints of the French government with respect to the publications in this country, referring to its administration; and upon this point he was ready to admit the candour of the Noble Secretary of State as to the offensive tendency of the general tenour of those publications—for offensive many of them certainly were. Among those, however, he did not mean so much to dwell upon the sentiments of the English newspapers, as upon those which appeared in French newspapers published in London, particularly the *Courier de Londres*, a paper understood to be in a great degree under the peculiar patronage of his Majesty's Ministers. If so, the French government had very just reason to complain. It was reviled in the grossest terms of abuse in this publication; and why, he would ask, should a paper which could not be employed for any purpose of amusing or informing the people of this country, be suffered to pursue that system of conduct which must operate to disturb the amity subsisting between the two governments, more particularly when Government had power, under the alien act, to send the editor out of the country, if it chose to discountenance such proceedings? Their declining to do so was not less a justification of the remonstrances of the French government upon this subject than a ground of suspicion to this country as to the disposition of his Majesty's Ministers. Those observations he thought a sufficient reply to the arguments advanced by the Learned Judge on the Ministerial Bench. With respect to the very animated observations of an illustrious Personage who spoke early in the debate, they had his heart-felt approbation; he perfectly agreed with his Royal Highness, that we were not in that state in which we were to consider merely the justice or inexpediency of the war, but whether this country should continue to enjoy that independence which belonged to her, or whether she should submit to the absolute dictation of a French ambassador. But he could not accede to the proposition of a Noble Viscount, that Malta alone would have been a rational ground for war, because, if that island had been completely ceded to us, it would have afforded a degree of security infinitely short of what we had a right to expect, and what it became necessary for us now to seek. The objects for which we had to contend were of a wider and more important nature. Our jealousy and alarm was excited by that incorrigible spirit of encroachment and ambition which not only the First Consul, but in fact all the persons connected with the government of France, had for some time manifested; and even if Malta were actually in our hands in perpetuity, we should not sit down contented until some further security should be obtained. Of this the nation ought to be aware. If the list of injuries and manifestations of design contained in the papers on the table, were to be attended to, certainly Malta afforded but one means of our safety. It would, to be sure, contribute to

the protection of Egypt, and, through that, of our Indian empire; but was that the only point in which we were vulnerable? Were not the states of Holland, Piedmont, and Switzerland, just subjects of our solicitude? It was well observed, that the power of France was the more formidable, because it was condensed: but it was not therefore to be concluded that that connexion was not to be broken, and the idea was not to be entertained that that power was not to be overcome. It was not less absurd than impolitic to propagate such an opinion. The fact was, that from the present state of this country there was no option; either the attempt to reduce that power must be made, or the nation must fall down to the most abject and degrading submission. The main object of the war, if it be either popular or politic, must be to restrain the arrogance, to reduce the preponderance of the French government; and until that object be attained the war should not be abandoned; until France shall not be capable of endangering our existence, whatever may be the disposition of her government to injure us. Such ought to be the object of the war, and so it ought to be defined to the country. In such a cause he was confident there was not a man in the British empire who thought justly and felt like an Englishman who would not devote his best exertions. The people should be told that the possession of Malta would not be sufficient to satisfy the views of Government; that much more was sought for—the material point was to diminish the continental power of France, where he contended she was vulnerable; for, whatever Noble Lords might say of her extent, he would beg the House to consider the nature of the strange combination of particles which formed that extent, and it would cease to be thought an object of such terrific magnitude. It was, in fact, quite competent to Great Britain, with the resources, population, and spirit she possessed, to bring this overgrown authority within reasonable bounds; but it must be done by vigorous efforts, by a short and decisive war, not by petty attempts with respect to Malta, or any comparatively inferior object, or by any colonial expeditions, calculated to cramp the energy and waste the strength of the country, but by a bold and extensive exertion. If this plan were not pursued, he was sure that the means of war would be exhausted, without producing any of the advantages we had a right to look for; and therefore if it were not determined on, it would be better that the country should at once submit. However much he deprecated the thought of unmanly submission, he would say, that unless the contest were commenced with resolution and followed up with dignified intrepidity and promptitude, the country would meet its fate, and it would then be stated with justice that the pusillanimous would have no right to complain of adverse fortune, and no claim to pity in their humiliation. He exhorted Ministers to study the best means of rendering the war of the nature he described. Let it not be a protracted, balanced war. They had for the last year a deficiency of four millions in what they called a peace establishment; and if to that deficit was to be added the expense to be incurred in the future establishment of Malta, if annexed to this country, he would say that it was utterly impossible the country could go on with such a deficit. A vigorous war that should terminate the state which subjected the country to such an increased expenditure would be much preferable; for such a course must tend to ruin. This was the sentiment of an illustrious Personage who had spoken in the course of the debate, and who had delivered his opinions in such a strain as must have considerable influence on the feelings of the country. That effect, so desirable in the present crisis, a person of still higher rank would have contributed his sentiments to produce (we understood the Noble Lord to allude to the Prince of Wales), if a peculiar delicacy had not restrained his Royal Highness from interfering, lest his interference should have had any undue influence on the minds of their Lordships upon a subject in which the most unbiassed and deliberate consideration was so material. Recurring to the hostile disposition of the French government towards this country, the Noble Lord remarked, that before any papers at present on the table had ever appeared, his mind was impressed with the fullest conviction upon that point. Even before the treaty of Amiens was signed he was of that opinion, and therefore in the course of the discussions respecting it, he declined to give any opinion concerning it, because, however little he expected that it would tend to produce the actual blessings of peace, he could not permit himself to offer any thing to damp the satisfacation which prevailed among the people on the conclusion of that treaty. It however appeared to him not only the day Ministers executed the treaty, but before and immediatly after. Into this question he would not now enter, particularly as he understood that the penetration and conduct of Ministers, in this and other instances, was to be made the subject of consideration on a future day. The Noble Lord again urged the necessity or endeavouring to render the war of short duration, and this was not possible, unless the minds and the resources of the nation were vigorously and judiciously exerted—unless an appeal were made to the souls of the people. Whatever might be the difference of opinion as to the system of his Majesty's Ministers, it must naturally be the ardent wish of every Noble Lord that Britons should rise triumphant from the contest. The House would recollect that the resources of the country were amply adequate to every purpose, if applied with judgment. It would also be recollected, that though the power of our enemy was immense

in point of size, it was composed of very discordant parts. If the country was to be engaged in war, it ought to receive a confident assurance that it did not go into it merely for colonial purposes, for petty contests, but for great national interests. Such ought to be the general feeling; and the House should bear in mind this important fact, that, if the present war be misconducted, one consolation only will remain, that we shall never have another war to conduct.

Earl SPENCER dwelt upon the long forbearance which this country had shewn towards the French government, or rather which Ministers had endured; but this allusion, he felt, would lead him into a discussion of the conduct of Ministers, which he wished to keep entirely separate from the subject now immediately before the House. With respect to Malta, he begged to call to the recollection of the House, that he always maintained the article in the treaty of Amiens which related to that island, was utterly impracticable; and it could not be denied that many new circumstances had occurred since the signing of that treaty, which formed grounds to justify the demands Ministers had made for a new arrangement. Of the whole of these circumstances it was easy to have been aware at the time the treaty was signed.

Lord ROSSLYN took a view of the causes and objects of the war. He agreed with his Noble Friend (Lord Melville) that Malta alone was a sufficient, adequate, and broad cause of war; but that to repel the extravagant pretensions of France in other respects, as exposed in the papers on the table, formed a mass of causes, independently of Malta. If a spirit of aggrandizement unparalleled at any other period of even French history; if an attempt to interfere in the internal government of this country; if menaces of the most insulting and haughty kind, could be considered as justifiable grounds of war, the French government had given this country ample provocation indeed. With respect to the attempt to interfere in our internal police, he could not help observing on that singularly impudent assertion, that it was contrary to the law of nations to tolerate the liberty of the press in this country: and upon the subject of menaces he would only request their Lordships to consider that part of the papers on the table which referred to the conversation which took place between the First Consul and Lord Whitworth—conversations which were altogether so different from the established custom in diplomatic affairs, and in which the demeanour of the First Consul was so contrary to the habits which prevail in polished life, that the behaviour of the Pacha of Acre towards Sebastiani was more marked by urbanity of manners than that of Buonaparté to Lord Whitworth.

Lord GRENVILLE said, that, notwithstanding all the circumstances, he rose upon this occasion with great satisfaction, arising from this reflection, that their Lordships, after nearly twelve months suspension of their deliberative councils, were called upon to give their advice to his Majesty upon a subject of the last importance to the vital interests of the state. They were called on to express their opinions upon a body of facts, which, however, they were not this night to discuss, though it was closely connected with that which these facts had tended to produce, namely, the Declaration of his Majesty, to which the Address before the House was the answer: an address drawn up in terms with which he heartily concurred, because they were congenial with those sentiments of national honour and personal pride, which formed the best securities to the country. Of all the remarks made in approbation of those sentiments, recommendatory of spirit and unanimity, he heartily approved, not because they were the same as those he had on all occasions advanced, but because, under the present circumstances, they were the main pillars of our national safety. He did not wish it to be inferred, that because he applauded those sentiments, he was therefore an advocate for war, as he had been most falsely represented. No man felt more strongly than he did the calamities which must attend a state of war, and the activity which ought of course to be employed to preserve mankind from such an evil; but the best way of warding it off was not by feeling, or appearing to feel, too much afraid of it; for that perhaps may serve only to postpone the danger, and when it again approaches, its advances might become irresistible and its evils aggravated. It was in order, therefore, to guard against such a war that he had continued for some time back to recommend a line of policy to Ministers which he was convinced would have been much more effectual towards avoiding war than the course they had pursued. He condemned their system, and he had before stated distinctly the reasons of his opinion—it was grounded upon a series of transactions into which he would not now enter, for he was not disposed to confound it with the question now before the House, which related solely to the principle of the contest between this country and the enemy. This was the question, which was not only paramount to all others, but in fact the only one now properly before the House. It was this; that Great Britain should be superior to France, he meant in this contest—a contest which, from the documents on the table, was evidently just, because it was necessary, and necessary, because it was just. It was, in fact, founded upon those principles, which must render it popular in this country, and an object of general interest throughout Europe. In considering the subject which his Majesty's Declaration involved, two questions arose: the

one which naturally claimed the precedence, related to the policy of concurring with his Majesty to maintain the honour of his crown, and the interests of his people, upon which he trusted there could not be a dissentient voice; the other, as to the conduct of Ministers since the termination of the last war. The latter point he would exclude from the question before the House, as it was meant to make the subject of consideration at a future day. In offering his Majesty the solemn assurance of his support, he was not induced to do so in order to rectify the errors of the treaty of Amiens, or to sustain any deviation from it. For it was his wish that that treaty should be adhered to strictly—the public faith stood pledged for it: but it seemed impossible to conform to that treaty. Indeed, when he submitted his opinions to the House on the conclusion of that treaty, he stated that impossibility, and among the losses which the country would suffer from it, he foresaw that the public faith and national honour would be injured. The tenth article, with respect to Malta, was evidently impracticable: but it is now stated that it would have been practicable if new circumstances had not arisen.—What were they, he would ask, which did not actually exist, or were not on the brink of existing, at the time the treaty was signed? Yet he never did say that those errors would be a fair ground for war; he strongly recommended that they should be removed, not by war, but by amicable negotiation. A Noble Earl on the floor had said, that as Malta was so valuable, a proposition ought to be made to the French government to give in exchange for Malta the islands of Guernsey and Jersey. This was an idea not at all to be endured; and he would be sorry that it should go forth to the public from their Lordships without being marked by the strongest reprobation. What! would the Noble Earl, who professed himself an advocate for liberty, recommend to have so many thousands of British subjects transferred to the most severe and degrading slavery which at present exists in Europe? Was that the kind of protection he would grant in return for allegiance? The act itself was beyond the power of the House to attempt, because their Lordships were incapable of injustice, and it was an act which could not be even meditated without the grossest injustice. Returning to the question before the House, he observed that a Noble Lord had said that the contest we had commenced was for all our honours, and he would tell the House that it was for all our rights and interests. It was a war of necessity, justice, and expediency; it was in resistance to a sense of aggression, violence, and insult, that could not be endured without sinking the country to the lowest state of degradation; and he was happy to see such a spirit revived in that House and the country as would enable us to meet a war with dignity, from which we could not recede without meanness—a war which was not a matter of choice on our part, but of necessity. From the particular situation of this country at present, and from the general circumstances of Europe, it is impossible that Great Britain can exist in degradation. She has now only the option between two evils—war, vigorous and determined war, or farther temporising; and from the moment she should resolve on the latter, the whole frame of her existence would begin to fall into pieces; her resources would decline, her commerce would be annihilated, her importance would disappear, because her freedom and national pride would be no more: her people, indeed, might remain, but so completely changed from circumstances, that not a trait of the British character would exist. Such would be the consequence of submitting to the ill treatment described in the papers on the table. It was unnecessary to eke out any arguments to prove a case of aggression; the facts were quite glaring.—There were acts and proofs enough to urge the House and the country to prepare for determined, effective, energetic war. Whatever inconveniences they may endure, whatever burdens they may incur, it is better to begin the contest now, than wait until we should be obliged to engage in it, with perhaps diminished means, and against increased forces. Of such delay he would disapprove, because the ground of expectation of any security from concession was, he was fully persuaded, not only absurd, but dangerous. Without touching on the many points in justification of his Majesty's Declaration, which had been so ably illustrated by other Noble Lords, he would say that the French government had given such direct evidence of an intention to violate the treaty of Amiens, that even on the grounds of prevention war was justifiable, and that was ground uniformly sustained by the best writers on the law of nations. The designs of Buonaparté on the Turkish empire were too notorious to be denied, though he had in the treaty of Amiens guarantied the integrity of that empire. Yet it is stated in his Majesty's Declaration, that the French government had actually proposed to other governments the partition of the Turkish territories, and her share would no doubt comprehend Egypt. Without taking Sebastiani's Report at all into account, though certainly it is a paper of that nature, which, if found in a vessel almost without any seal of authenticity upon it, the British government could not consistently overlook it; the circumstance alluded to in the Declaration is quite sufficient to warrant the inference, that the First Consul meditated a breach of the treaty of Amiens. This statement in his Majesty's Declaration, the truth of which no one could doubt, without any reference to the language of a heated, intemperate, passionate man, sufficiently manifested the designs of the French government. Under all those circumstances, he was perfectly convinced that peace or war

was not a matter of choice, and he would suggest to the Noble Lord who proposed the amendment (who introduced it with the same ability and eloquence that he does every proposition he submits to the House), that, as temporising has already produced no other effect than to torture the people of this country by suspense, and embolden the pretensions of the First Consul, it would hardly be advisable to make any farther experiments in that way. In pursuance of that system, his Majesty's Ministers had given up the Cape of Good Hope, and Martinique; and, if still more were to be given up, the country would be convinced, notwithstanding, that protection was not to be obtained by such means, against any project that France might have in contemplation against our Indian empire, or elsewhere. The man who now governed France was not to be conciliated into the practice of justice by the appearance of submission. Being convinced that war alone was the remedy left for the country, he would strongly exhort to every possible exertion; and deeply convinced as he was of the necessity of this war, to preserve our liberty and laws, he thought that no expectation should be held out that it would be short. The people should be told to look their danger full in the face; they should understand that it must be an awful and serious contest, calling for unusual and unheard-of exertions; that they should put their shoulders to the machine with heart and spirit, without any very sanguine calculation upon chances or very favourable events; and that if they will not do so, they must submit; that such submission will obtain them but a temporary relief, while it must incur the contempt of mankind, and lead to their own ruin. You must be aware, added the Noble Lord, and the people should be fully apprized of it, that the contest in which we are now engaged is not of a light or trifling kind, to be met by light or trifling means—not to be encountered by hacknied, ordinary, or common-place exertions, but by a spirit exalted and equal to the magnitude of the occasion. You must be sensible that the vital interests of the country are at stake; and that in order to preserve them, you must expose yourselves to danger; you must be reconciled to heavy burdens, and if you will not submit to such sacrifices, the consequence will be the sacrifice of your country and of yourselves.

Lord GWYDIR remarked that we were now actually at war; and in his opinion it appeared absurd to deliberate a moment with any idea of negotiation. As soon as an ultimatum had been delivered to the French government, and they had given a refusal to that particular point, war was to be considered as not only inevitable, but nearly the same as if hostilities had been actually commenced. From the recall of our Ambassador, it was evident that the ultimatum of our Government had not been agreed to. It was, therefore, to be considered as an aggression when the French gave such a refusal, and which was only to be remedied by spirited and unanimous resistance. He rejoiced at the war, because it put an end to the treaty of Amiens, but still more because it prevented the adoption of Lord Hawkesbury's ultimatum. His Lordship concluded by voting for the address.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, May 23.—(See Minutes, p. 816.)

[ADDRESS TO THE KING.] Mr. PITT began by observing upon some passages of Mr. Erskine's speech, the tendency of which he professed not entirely to understand, but from which he was led to hope that the Learned Gentleman, and those with whom he usually acted, were not likely materially to object to the substance of the proposed address. He flattered himself that this was likely to be the case, because, whatever difference of sentiment might arise, and much was certainly to be expected, on many points included in the great mass of information contained in the papers upon the table, yet upon the great and important question at issue between this country and France, and upon the justice and necessity of the grounds on which we were compelled to enter into the war, he thought it almost impossible that the House should not be unanimous. He stated, that in those transactions which had most immediately produced our present situation, the Learned Gent. himself appeared, notwithstanding some doubts which he had thrown out on particular points, to admit, upon the whole, that there was such clear evidence of views of aggression and hostility on the part of France, as justified this country in retaining Malta for its own security. This he maintained to be the first great point on which the question turned; and he contended that the whole of Sebastiani's Report, and the circumstances of his mission to Egypt, the express and deliberate avowal by Buonaparte himself of his views and intentions in a formal conference with Lord Whitworth, and the information of the same intentions through the official channel of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, afforded the clearest and most indisputable evidence that the First Consul had formed the determination, even while Malta was yet in our hands, of resuming his hostile projects against Egypt; that the pursuit of such a project was an undeniable act of hostility against this country, and aimed at some of its most important interests; that it was, besides, a direct violation both of the letter and spirit of the treaty of Amiens itself, under pretence of which treaty alone our evacuation of that island was demanded, though under circumstances which, in other respects, according to the letter of that treaty, did not authorize such a demand; that the disclosure of this hostile project clearly justified this country in

requiring fresh security against it; and if such security was refused, in having recourse to arms for that purpose, at the moment which appeared to be most for our advantage. He then more particularly commented on each of these several circumstances with respect to the Report of Sebastiani. He stated that that was evidently an official paper addressed to the government, by a person regularly commissioned and employed by the Consul himself; that its contents could never have been published in France but by his consent, and that they were published, in fact, in the official paper, under the direct authority of the government; that the whole tenour of that paper, and the account thus given by Sebastiani himself of his conduct in Egypt, made it impossible to doubt that he was sent there to prepare for the execution of a fresh attempt to put that country under the dominion of France; but that it was not necessary to dwell on the particular contents of the Report; the mere circumstance of a military man having been sent at that time with such a commission to Egypt, was a sufficient evidence of the object of his mission. The time, he remarked, was very material, because it at once destroyed the chief pretext under which the French government had attempted, in the course of the official correspondence, to justify or extenuate the publication, or to deny the conclusion to be drawn from it. This pretext was, that the honour of the Chief Consul had been wounded by a Narrative of the Expedition to Egypt, published by a respectable officer in the British army (Sir Robert Wilson), and that the publication of Sebastiani's Report became necessary for his vindication. The facts stated in that Narrative, he observed, were not even contradicted by the Report, but even if they had been, in what degree would that circumstance account for originally sending Sebastiani to Egypt, with such a commission as had been already stated? It appeared that that officer had actually embarked from Toulon on the 16th of September, and after proceeding to Tripoli, had arrived at Alexandria on the 16th of October; whereas it is notorious, that, at that time, Sir Robert Wilson's Narrative had not actually been published, and probably not sent to the press. With respect to the avowal of his design by the First Consul himself, he referred to Lord Whitworth's account in his dispatch of the 21st of February. He observed, that, so far from the conversation appearing, as some persons had imagined, only loose and desultory, it was one which took place by the express appointment of the First Consul—that it was therefore evidently prepared and deliberate, and that it was actually opened by the First Consul himself, as being the mode which he had adopted for the purpose of "conveying to his Majesty, in the most clear and authentic manner, his sentiments on points which must be brought to an issue." In the course of this conversation, the First Consul did not attempt to disguise his ultimate views upon Egypt; and though he professed to disclaim any intention of seizing it at present, he assigned as the reason for his forbearance, "that sooner or later it would belong to France, either by the falling to pieces of the Turkish empire, or by some arrangement with the Porte." In a subsequent conversation with M. Talleyrand, it was expressly admitted that the acquisition of Egypt had been, and still was, a favourite object of the First Consul, but he at the same time endeavoured to convince his Majesty's Ambassador, that it was not so great an object as to allow him to go to war for its attainment; and yet, upon being pressed to explain what security it was intended to give, to remove apprehension on this point, for which he had before stated there was a project in contemplation, he referred only to a passage in the First Consul's message to the Legislative Body, saying that "There is a French Ambassador at Constantinople, who is charged to give every assurance of the disposition of France to strengthen instead of to weaken the Turkish government." To all the evidence founded on these several documents, he had heard but one argument opposed—the improbability of the French government thus disclosing its views, if it really entertained them. On this point it might be sufficient to observe, that it might indeed be difficult to account for such a disclosure, even on the supposition of such a project being really intended; but that it was not only difficult, but impossible, to account for it at all, on the supposition of its not being intended. He asked, whether, on the latter supposition, any motive could be assigned, either for the mission having been sent, or the Report having been made and published, or for the avowals contained in the conversations of the First Consul and M. Talleyrand? He thought, however, that the difficulty of accounting for the disclosure, was removed, by referring to the new and peculiar policy which had marked the conduct of France on many extraordinary occasions, from the very beginning of the revolution; that where any measure was in contemplation more flagrant and atrocious than another, and more likely to shock the general feelings of Europe, and perhaps to excite vigorous and united resistance, instead of carefully concealing it till the moment of execution, it had, on the contrary, been studiously announced beforehand; that the object of this policy had been gradually to familiarize men's minds to that which at first they could scarcely even believe, and that their schemes, which, in the first instance, were received with horror, and would have been opposed with indignation, came afterwards to be contemplated with neglect and indifference; and that which at first no man thought it possible seriously to attempt, was by degrees considered as natural and probable, and, in the end, as that which it was hopeless and impossible to resist. He therefore put it to the House, whether, after having observed

this practice, it was possible for us to be so credulous and childish, as to act on the belief that Buonaparte would abandon the projects he had formed, only because he had himself told us he would persist in them; and whether we thought that if, for whatever reason, he had been led prematurely to disclose this project, even while Malta, the great security against its execution, was still in our possession, he would renounce the attempt when that security had been surrendered by us, and put, in fact, into his possession? If then the design against Egypt was apparent, he desired the House to consider whether, upon every principle of justice and self-defence, admitted by all the systems of the law of nations, and adopted by the practice of all countries, we have not the clear right to take, from this moment, such measures of prevention and security as are sufficient to guard against the danger to which we should be in consequence exposed—whether it was not admitted, on almost all hands, that our possession of Malta was essential, or at least in the highest degree material, for the defence of Egypt—whether the importance of Egypt to this country was not in itself sufficiently evident, from its connexion with the safety of our Indian possessions, and whether it might not at this day be considered as a point to our national policy, already decided and attested by the glorious efforts which had been made, and the heroic blood which had been shed in the last war for recovering it from France, and which had in a manner consecrated it in the hearts and affections of Englishmen? He therefore wished the House to consider what was to be our future conduct, if, after all the warnings given us, we were now to surrender Malta out of our hands, and the attack upon Egypt were to follow in six or in twelve months afterwards. Were we prepared for the ridiculous, but disastrous alternative to which we should be reduced, of either submitting without a struggle to national calamity and disgrace, because, foreseeing our danger, we had voluntarily and wantonly sacrificed the best means of averting it; or, when it was perhaps too late to enter upon a difficult and almost hopeless contest, having by our own act given up the arms by which we could be enabled to conduct it to a successful issue? If the question were closed here, Mr. Pitt observed, that, for the reasons he had given, he was prepared to maintain, that on these grounds alone the war was both just and necessary, and such as ought to call forth the utmost exertions of Parliament and the nation in its support. But so far was this from being the case, that there was not any one of the leading transactions subsequent to the treaty of Amiens, to which his Majesty's declaration referred, which was not, in his opinion, as far as justice was concerned, a clear and evident cause of war, and such as would have been acted upon, if there were sufficient means of co-operation on the continent, in almost every period of the history of this country. He here referred to the annexation of Piedmont, as the first act by which the French government had proceeded, subsequent to the treaty, to pursue the same system of aggrandizement, which had appeared in all their previous conduct, and which it was vainly hoped they had relinquished. He referred also to the transaction respecting the German indemnities, where the French government, with an arrogance, he believed, unprecedented in the history of Europe, had presumed to dictate to all Germany the detailed mode of arranging those indemnities, on which the Diet of the Empire was expressly convened to deliberate, pursuant to the treaty of Luneville, and had publicly announced their scheme as settled and decided, before it was even communicated to those to whom it ought, in the first instance, to have been proposed. He next passed to the violence offered to Switzerland, on which he thought it the less necessary to dwell, because he believed the conduct of France towards that unfortunate and devoted country had excited one universal sentiment of detestation. He wished here to declare (as this had been a subject so often adverted to on former occasions, when he had been unavoidably absent) that he considered the interference of his Majesty's Ministers on this subject, as not only evidently warranted by the circumstances, but such as it was their duty to employ to the extent to which he understood it to have been carried, in order to give time for learning whether a confederacy could be formed in Europe, really sufficient for saving that country from the yoke of France; but that when upon trial all hopes of such a confederacy vanished, he thought them equally right in not pushing the contest, on the part of this country, to extremities.—He then adverted to the continuance of the French armies in Holland, which appeared from the papers on the table to have been directly inconsistent with the principles on which the treaty of Amiens had been negotiated, and with the engagements which were known to subsist between France and Holland. After dwelling on these points, he stated, however, that he thought it less material to discuss whether they were each in itself sufficient causes of war on the part of this country, because he admitted, that, whatever might be the justice of the case, our conduct upon them at the time was necessarily regulated, not by that consideration only, but by the question of policy which was unavoidably dependant upon the state of the continent: but that whatever it might be right to decide upon them at the time they occurred, it was impossible to contend that they were not now material, as symptoms of that deliberate system of ambition and encroachment which had been thus uniformly pursued towards others, and which was now directed to a quarter where it immediately affected our separate interests, and was in direct violation of the treaty with this country itself. He here drew a strong pic-

ture of the continued and rapid succession of the acts of violence and oppression which during this period had desolated so many of the countries of Europe; and after comparing the irresistible force and overwhelming progress of French ambition to those dreadful convulsions of nature by which provinces and kingdoms were consumed and buried in ruins, he asked whether we could contemplate those scenes of havock and destruction without reflecting how soon that torrent of liquid fire might direct its ravages against ourselves? Having here closed his review of what had passed on the continent, he next observed, that the period of which he had been speaking was marked not only by the hostile acts which he had detailed, with respect to other powers in Europe, but by others immediately affecting the separate rights and interests of this country. He referred, he said, principally to two points which appeared in the Correspondence. The first point was the demand which had been made by the French government, respecting the restraints on the liberty of the press, and the expulsion of the French emigrants now remaining in the country. On this it was unnecessary to enlarge, because the insolence of the proposition was sufficiently felt, and because it had been at the time resisted by his Majesty's Ministers, on grounds which were stated with great force and ability in one of the papers on the table, and which, he was persuaded, every Member of the House had read with the highest approbation. The second point related to the commercial agents: the indignity and outrage which attended their mission, was one of which it was difficult to speak with composure. The French government had made a formal proposition to send persons of this description, who had never been found necessary even when a commercial treaty subsisted, at a time when not only there was no such treaty, but when, as appears from the papers on the table, the commercial intercourse of his Majesty's subjects with France was suffering every degree of violence and oppression. This proposition had naturally and wisely been refused. The French government then proceeded clandestinely to send these agents in the train of their Ambassador; and not content with this breach of the law of nations, they afterwards addressed to them instructions, under the official character in which they had received admittance; and the object of these instructions was to direct them to take measures, in time of peace, for ascertaining the soundings of ports, and for obtaining military information of districts; acts for which they would have been hanged as spies in time of war. Under such circumstances, he could not but lament to find that his Majesty's Ministers had contented themselves with merely applying to the French government to withdraw those persons, and had not at once advised his Majesty, by his own authority, to order them to depart the kingdom within twenty-four hours, reserving it to himself afterwards to require from France the reparation due for so gross an insult.—He did not think it necessary to dwell separately on another head of complaint, the violence committed against the vessels and property of his Majesty's subjects in the French ports, and the withholding to this hour all satisfaction for those injuries. These proceedings, he said, would have been sufficient ground of complaint in ordinary times, but they could scarcely give additional force to the outrageous transactions which he had just enumerated, and which appeared to him as if they had been designedly calculated to include, under two distinct heads, the grossest insults that could be offered to the independence of any country. The first pretension of which he had spoken, that of restraining the liberty of the press, was nothing short of claiming the right to dictate to us in a point of municipal law, and to require that we should sacrifice to the caprice of the First Consul a known and important privilege of our constitution, and model at his pleasure the judicial proceedings and internal regulations of the country. The second pretension, that respecting his commercial agents, manifested, as had been already stated, an avowed determination to introduce, in defiance of our formal refusal, authorized emissaries into our arsenals and ports, in order to prepare, in time of peace, the most effectual means for our annoyance and destruction in time of war. This was nothing less than to insist on our surrendering beforehand the right and the means of national defence; and if the former claim had struck at the liberty, this struck as directly at the actual safety of the country. It was true, he believed and hoped, that the commercial agents had at length been withdrawn, upon the representation of his Majesty's Ministers; but, as he had already stated and lamented, it did not appear that any disavowal had been obtained of the principle on which they had been sent. The claim respecting the restraint upon the press, and the expulsion of the emigrants, had also been suspended for a time, in consequence of the unanswerable representations in the dispatch before referred to. But the first part of this claim had since been expressly revived in the course of the late negotiation. At all events, he contended that the circumstance of the First Consul having even suspended it as he did, only afforded a striking lesson of the benefit to be derived from a firm and seasonable resistance: but that the fact of such pretensions having at any time been urged (whether they were persisted in or withdrawn), must be remembered as the strongest proof of the nature of the views which he really entertained, and which he would unquestionably accomplish whenever he found it in his power. He maintained, therefore, that all these indignities and insults, as well as the

encroachments and violences of which he had before been speaking, on the continent, must enter deeply into our consideration, in judging of the character and ultimate views and policy of our enemy. They must decisively confirm us in the resolution to employ, without hesitation, the most vigorous and determined resistance, when, in addition to these proofs of his general disposition, both towards this country and towards Europe, we found him now engaged in that project of direct and separate hostility against ourselves, which had already been argued.—On all these grounds, he felt convinced that there never was an occasion on which it more clearly became the indispensable duty of Parliament to concur with his Majesty in the declaration of the necessity and justice of the war in which we were engaged, and to assure him of their firm and effectual support. But in giving these assurances, he trusted that other Gent. felt impressed with the same sense which he did of the awful importance of the engagement into which they were preparing to enter, and that they considered those assurances not as formal words of ceremony or custom, but as a solemn and deliberate pledge on behalf of themselves and the nation whom they represented—knowing and feeling to their full extent the real difficulties and dangers of their situation, and of the arduous struggle which it compelled them to endure, and being prepared to meet those difficulties and dangers with every exertion and every sacrifice which the unexampled circumstances of the times rendered indispensable for the public safety. For his own part, although he considered the war as a war of necessity, and one which we could not decline without surrendering both our security and our honour, he should enter upon it with little hopes of ultimate success, if these sentiments were not deeply impressed on the minds of Parliament and the people. The scale of our exertions could not be measured by those of former times, or confined within the limits even of the great, and, till then, unexampled efforts of the last war. He was convinced that some system, far more vigorous and effectual than any even then adopted, would be found necessary, both in our finance, and in the preparation for national defence. On the provisions to be made for these two primary and paramount objects, it would principally depend whether we could effectually disconcert the favourite projects, and disappoint the main hopes of the enemy. It was evident, that if they indulged themselves in any expectation of success in the present contest, it was built chiefly on the supposition that they could either break the spirit, and shake the determination of the country, by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of descent upon our coasts, or that they could impair our resources, and undermine our credit, by the effects of an expensive and protracted contest. To defeat the first of these purposes, it was not, in his judgment, sufficient to make those naval and military preparations, which would prevent any invasion that might be attempted from being ultimately successful (an event which he trusted he was justified, in common with others, in considering as utterly impossible), but to make such vigorous and extensive arrangements for national defence, as might diffuse a sense of the most complete security against even the temporary impression to be produced by such an attempt, and might enable every individual to lay down his head to rest, in the persuasion and confidence that nothing was omitted which could enable us at once to meet and repel the danger at any moment, and in any quarter, in which it might threaten us.—In order to disappoint the second object, that of wearing out our resources, he trusted the House would, from the beginning, form its system of finance, not with a view only to the expense which might be necessary in the first year of the contest, but that they would look at once to the possibility of its being protracted to as long a period as that which was lately terminated; that they would consider fully what, on the probable scale of the war, would be the whole extent of the burdens necessary to be imposed on that supposition. He was persuaded, that it could only be by providing in the outset means adequate to the whole extent of these purposes, that we could, in fact, prevent the ultimate amount of our expenses from being unnecessarily, and perhaps intolerably, augmented; or that we could ensure the best chance either of bringing the contest to a speedy conclusion, by convincing the enemy of our sufficiency to maintain it, or could meet its continued exigencies, if necessary, without the annual recurrence of growing and accumulated embarrassments. He trusted, therefore, that his Majesty's Ministers would, on their part, feel the necessity of bringing both these points under consideration with all practicable promptitude and dispatch, and that, if possible, not even a fortnight might be suffered to elapse without enabling Parliament to adopt such measures as would convince both France and the world that we had from that hour provided the means of supporting the force, and defraying the expenditure which might be necessary for maintaining our internal security, and for the vigorous and effectual prosecution of the war, to any period to which it could reasonably be supposed to extend. He repeated, that he was aware that these measures could not be effected without material and extensive personal sacrifices, and without great additional burdens, which must to a degree affect the ease, convenience, and even comfort of many classes of society—that he lamented these consequences as much as any man, and if he saw any prospect that, by present concession, we could obtain a real and desirable interval of peace, security, and re-

pose, he should be as anxious as any man to avoid the necessity of such arduous and painful exertions; but that, under the present circumstances, a weak and timid policy could perhaps scarcely even postpone the moment when they would become indispensable for our existence, and would infallibly expose us to the certainty, at no distant period, of a similar struggle, with those means given out of our hands which we now possessed, and with the chance diminished, of finally conducting it to a successful issue—that we had not an option at this moment between the blessings of peace and the dangers of war—that from the fatality of the times, and the general state of the world, we must consider our lot as cast by the decrees of Providence, in a time of peril and trouble—that he trusted the temper and courage of the nation would conform itself to the duties of that situation—that we should be prepared collectively and individually to meet it with that resignation and fortitude, and, at the same time, with that active zeal and exertion, which, in proportion to the magnitude of the crisis, might be expected from a brave and free people—and that we should reflect, even in the hour of trial, what abundant reason we have to be grateful to Providence for the distinction we enjoy over most of the countries of Europe, and for all the advantages and blessings which national wisdom and virtue have hitherto protected, and which it now depends on perseverance in the same just and honourable sentiments, still to guard and to preserve.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, May 24.—(See Minutes, p. 817.)

[War with France.]—Mr. T. Grenville said, that when a call like the present, so superior to any other, was made upon the country, he thought that a sufficient motive for confining themselves strictly to the great and pressing duty which was then before them. His Majesty had told the House that the aggressions and insults offered to this country by France, had forced his Majesty to commence hostilities against that power. If any man could bring himself to believe that there was not a just ground for war, then he would take the side he had described. Those, on the contrary, who thought with him that it was their first duty to remove from the question every point which might prevent that unanimity which was so desirable to enable his Majesty to prosecute the contest with that vigour and energy which the occasion required, would put out of their consideration any thing except the important duty which they had to discharge. After complaining so often of the want of information, he ought to be the first to congratulate the House on the full information which they were now in possession of; but the duty he had spoken of was so far transcendant, that he should consider himself as blameable, there being sufficient information to enable them to discuss what were the causes of the war, if he embarrassed the question with the consideration of any other points. The first question for consideration was, whether this country had a right to go to war with France? And the second, whether, having a just cause for war, there was such a want of expediency in pursuing it, that, notwithstanding the justice of the cause, it would not be politic to carry it on? Ever since the treaty of Amiens, there had been one continued system, on the part of France, to vilify and insult the British government and people, a deliberate system of ambition and aggrandizement on the part of the French republic: and when he considered whether there were just grounds of war, his difficulty consisted rather in the abundance from which he was to choose. If he took the first act, that of sending persons here with the appearance of a commercial character, in the character of peace, and claiming the rights of hospitality and protection, whilst their real views had for their object the ascertainment of the means of destroying this country, he thought it was so unprecedented and unparalleled an insult and injury, that it furnished of itself a sufficient cause for war: it was so gross a violation of public faith, that it was certainly a sufficient ground for hostilities. It was unnecessary to go through the whole of the grounds for war: he would not treat upon the annexation of Piedmont, of which country we were the direct guarantees, nor upon the subject of Switzerland. These were amply sufficient grounds for war: but although he would not dwell upon the subjects of the indemnities in the German empire, the annexation of Piedmont, the invasion of Switzerland, or of the Batavian republic, yet all these were such sufficient proofs of the ambition of the French republic, as not less than at other periods to excite a disposition on the part of this country to resist the ambition and aggrandizement of France. It had been doubted how far some of these were just grounds for war; it had been said that they were not, because at the period of signing the treaty of Amiens, French troops were in Holland, Piedmont was really annexed to France, and Switzerland might be considered to be so. Could any man doubt at that period, it had been asked, that Switzerland and Holland must become subject to the power of France, whenever the latter chose to make an effort for that purpose? The great argument used in support of the treaty of Amiens was the tone and temper in which it was made, from which if any thing was to be inferred, it was that a disposition was beginning to arise in France, to act upon the principles adopted by regular governments, and a hope to find in that disposition reasonable grounds for believing that

France would observe the treaties she had made. Now, when there was a general system of ambition and aggrandizement on the part of France, it was said it was no subject of complaint: be it so. But should this country not be prepared to check that ambition? To say that the influence of France was so great in Holland and Switzerland, that therefore it ought not to be resisted, was so strange an argument, that he did not think it necessary to pursue it any further. All these acts were not only altogether, but each of them, a sufficient cause for war, and such as in other times had been acted upon vigorously and successfully. Here he wished to recur to what related to Egypt, in which there was a direct breach of the treaty of Amiens. By that treaty the French republic was solemnly bound to guaranty the integrity of the Turkish dominions, which became an important object to us, not only in itself, but because of the great necessity which existed for it, for the security of our own possessions. In that view he conceived that we demanded security from France against any attempt in that quarter. Egypt was evacuated by our troops, and the evacuation made a sacrifice to peace, whilst we demanded the guarantee as a security for our Eastern possessions. If any man doubted the insincerity of France, after reading the Report of Sebastiani, it would be extremely difficult to prove it: yet the Report was said to be commercial. Vain and idle pretext! on which the purpose of it was attempted to be done away. Was it possible to conceive that it could be a commercial mission? If any man doubted, however, upon the subject, he desired to refer him to higher authority, to Buonaparté himself, who had distinctly described it as a military mission; and to Andreossi, the French Ambassador, who had not attempted to conceal the purpose of the mission under the semblance of commerce, but who distinctly designated it as a military mission. Thus, then, the Report of Sebastiani was confirmed in all its military character. But was that all? Look at the supplementary part of the Report, view Sebastiani travelling in the republic of the Seven Islands: that republic was, however, not confined to Sebastiani's Report; another supplementary account amongst the papers on the table, informed them that the First Consul had granted his protection to the Catholic church of the Seven Islands, and that when the members of that communion prayed to God, they must pray for the First Consul. Thus stood the case with respect to Egypt. If the Report of Sebastiani had merely consisted of an intercepted letter, it might have been said, that it was not a sufficient act of hostility on the part of France towards this country, though he should have contended that it was; but when, in addition to the Report, it was adopted by the First Consul, and by the French Ambassador here, could any reasonable man, he asked, read that, and doubt that there had been in the mind of Buonaparté an hostile view with respect to Egypt, a disposition to act directly contrary to his own guarantee of the integrity of the Turkish empire? This was even not all; but when, in the Declaration of his Majesty, it was stated that the French government had suggested the idea of a partition of the Turkish empire, he must suppose that it related to a regular proposal made by France to a great northern power, for such a partition. With respect to this point, no documents were offered; but if Ministers had not referred to it, they would have done less than their duty; and to have referred to it more distinctly, would have been more than was called for. Before he quitted this subject, he could not help adverting to an expression that had been used, that Buonaparté had a desire to possess himself of Egypt. If it was meant to be said that there was an abstract wish on the part of the Great Consul, possessing half the world, secretly, silently, and piously to add Egypt to his dominions, he could not conceive that such a simple abstract wish could be a cause for war. But putting together facts, would any man assert that it was a fair interpretation of those facts, to say merely that Buonaparté had a desire to possess himself of Egypt? That desire was manifested by acts so manifestly in breach of the treaty which he had signed, that we were justified in saying that it was a hostile breach of faith. Steps had been taken by the First Consul, which clearly indicated the means by which his designs were to be executed. From the moment that any hostile act was committed by France, we were justified in using every means for our own security. The best means by which the First Consul could execute his projects upon Egypt were those which he thought the most necessary to the accomplishment of his desire; they depended upon Malta, and if we had evacuated Malta, we should have been justified, after the Report of Sebastiani, in endeavouring to retake it. Would any man say, that if it was just to retake it, it was not also just to retain it when it was already in our possession? He could not see the least difference between our retaining Malta, if France committed a breach of faith, and our right of possessing ourselves of it again after a breach of the treaty of Amiens, and having previously given it up. In this view of the subject, he would not go into a minute discussion respecting the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. He would grant, that if the stipulations of the treaty had been fulfilled, and we had then refused to deliver up Malta, a breach of that treaty might have been alleged against us; but no case had ever been made out by France, which gave her a right to demand the evacuation of Malta by us. He really thought that there never was a period in which so many and such invincible grounds of war, on the part of this country, were so clearly

and distinctly made out, as in the moment when he was addressing the House. It might be said, that amply sufficient grounds of war might exist, and yet considerations of expediency might render it doubtful whether Parliament should recommend the prosecution of the war; but were there or not any such grounds of expediency at the present moment? If they were to say that such a war at the present moment would not be a dangerous experiment, and that it would not press heavily, in point of expense, upon every man in the country, they would be deceiving themselves, and disguising the truth. But what had they to consider? He lamented that their voice upon this occasion would only be a choice of great evil. Before, however, they agreed to a change for war, they were to consider what they would lose. Was it peace that they would lose? Would any man say that it was a change from peace to war? It was, on the contrary, a change from a state of unequal truce to a state of equal war. They must look danger courageously in the face, and hope with confidence for a glorious result. Did they sacrifice, by such a change, that which was valuable, or even tolerable? Without entering into the consideration of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, he would ask, whether, if the wisest men in the country had been at the head of affairs, it were possible that they would have suffered the last two months of protracted negotiation, during which we experienced not a peace but a truce, in which we disarmed whilst the enemy armed—in which we were called upon to give up our conquests, whilst the enemy was pursuing a system of aggrandizement, and completing their military preparations, to be afterwards carried into effect against this country? Was it to be said, that we were to wait till they had completed all their arrangements? And were we to be taught to wait patiently the event of the attack, and not to take those means which we were called upon by God and man to take for our own security? It might be said, that even at the period of the present discussion, we had gained an advantage of vast moment, since the great and mighty republic of France had thought fit to abandon the important acquisition of Louisiana. He could not conceive that any one would be so childish as to ask, whether that was a fresh indication of a pacific spirit? What was the cause of it? The war. However paradoxical it might seem, he considered that cession as a fresh indication of a hostile mind on the part of France. It was evident, in his opinion, that it was the object of France, in this cession, to do away one enemy more, and to endeavour to prevent an alliance between the United States and this country. It had been said that we were without allies: he did not see any occasion for treating our former continental alliances so lightly as they had been treated. But however we might be without allies, to those countries with whom we might wish to ally ourselves, it would not be unimportant to shew our readiness to repel a danger which was common to all, to shew our disposition courageously to meet the difficulties which presented themselves, and bravely to overcome them. With respect to the amendment, it appeared to him that there was no duty more incumbent upon them, when representing the spirit and sense of the country upon the present occasion, than that they should speak with an unanimous voice. There was no sacrifice which he would not make, consistent with conscience and honour, to obtain that unanimity. If, then, he saw in the amendment no material difference, must he not complain, that, without any essential difference, it should have the effect of weakening that unanimity? Though there was not one word in that amendment that he would not willingly subscribe to, yet he could not but lament that it would have the effect of preventing Parliament from speaking with an unanimous voice. The country was placed in a very arduous situation; but he was confident that the spirit of Englishmen was amply sufficient to encounter successfully the perils which surrounded them, and that there would be found means, and mind, and spirit to meet the contest in which we were engaged. If the country was true to itself, and Parliament was true to the country, there need be no fear for the issue of that contest.

Mr. Whitbread said, the Rt. Hon. Gent. had called for unanimity in the discussion of this subject, and he (Mr. Whitbread) also called for unanimity. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, that there was nothing he would not sacrifice for the sake of unanimity, except honour and conscience. He put it to the Rt. Hon. Gent. under the gallery (Mr. Pitt), and to the Rt. Hon. Gent. who had just spoken, or to the Hon. Gent. who sat upon the same bench with that Rt. Hon. Gent. whether they could, with a safe conscience, vote a direct approbation of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, to which the present address would pledge them? He called upon them to say, whether his Majesty's Ministers had uniformly manifested a desire for the maintenance of peace? whether those Ministers had conducted themselves well, and whether they had not committed the honour of the country? The Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville) had distinctly admitted, that Ministers had committed the honour of the country; and if the Rt. Hon. Gent. could not approve of them, he could not approve of that part of the address which went to the approval of their conduct. Let those, therefore, who called for unanimity, vote for the amendment of his Hon. Friend (Mr. Grey), which went the full length of pledging their lives and fortunes in the support of his Majesty in the contest in which we were engaged, without pledging themselves

to the approval of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers. He trusted the House would indulge him, when he previously confessed that it was impossible for him to take that narrow view of the question which was proposed by the Rt. Hon. Gent. He thought it absolutely necessary to comment upon those steps which Ministers had taken during the negotiation, since it was impossible to discuss the steps ultimately taken by those Ministers, without inquiring into the previous negotiation. In doing this, whatever might have been his feelings with respect to any party with which he was connected, he acted perfectly free from all party bias. He had hailed the accession of the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Addington) and his colleagues to power, as the only chance of saving the country. He acknowledged the brilliancy of the speech made by a Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) on the preceding evening, and he so much the more regretted the part that Rt. Hon. Gent. had taken, for as it had been said that one person in France had absorbed the whole power of that mighty empire, so it might be observed, that if ever the fate of empires hung upon the lips of one individual, it was on the lips of that Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) on the preceding evening. He regretted the part which that Rt. Hon. Gent. had taken, and should have been happy if it had been otherwise, for no one would be more happy than himself at the return to power of any one who was disposed to restore peace, which he thought might still be restored. He thought the negotiation had been conducted ill, and that when it was broken off, it might still have been brought to a happy issue. But if the Noble Lord (Hawkesbury) thought the experiment of the treaty of Amiens was useful in destroying that spirit of enthusiasm in France, from whence so much mischief had resulted, do not let those who spoke upon this subject, increase inflammation upon a question which they ought to discuss dispassionately, and not suffer themselves to be run away with by the old inveterate spirit of hatred against France. Let them recollect who were the Ministers who called for war. He was not surprised that the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville), and those who sat with him, should contend that there were sufficient grounds for war, but did not enter into the consideration of any distinct cause for war, contending, as they did, that at any time since the signature of the treaty of Amiens there was sufficient ground for war. But what did we now go to war for? Was it or was it not on account of the single paper of the ultimatum of this country which now lay upon the table? And if France had accepted that ultimatum, should we or should we not be now at peace? If so, let them dismiss all circumstances of aggravation from the discussion of the subject before them. No man felt more than he did the aggravated insults offered to this country by France; but why not make representations upon each insult received, and, if no satisfaction was obtained, why not appeal to Parliament? He granted that every individual insult was a cause for war; but why then not demand satisfaction, and if not granted, appeal to Parliament? What were the circumstances which related to the treaty of Amiens? On the 23d of November last, his Majesty's speech was made to Parliament. He confessed that the speech of the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) then made upon the question respecting the address, was far from being satisfactory to him. He took the liberty at that period to ask for explanation; and if he did not much misinterpret what was then stated by that Rt. Hon. Gent. it was, that there was no danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens. From this circumstance, a grave and weighty responsibility rested upon Ministers. The subject of Switzerland had been dwelt upon already with so much eloquence, that he should only say, that he viewed the events which had taken place in that country with as much horror as any man. But how did the question stand with respect to that country? At the time that Buonaparté invaded its liberties, a Swiss deputy applied to the powers of Europe, through the medium of their ambassadors at Paris, for assistance; they were only successful in their application to this country. A note was presented from Lord Hawkesbury, remonstrating with the French government respecting that subject. A letter of instructions, dated the same day (the 22d of November) with that note, was sent to Mr. Moore, giving him an irrevocable power to involve this country in a war with France; not but that there was a just cause for war, but knowing at the same time that the Swiss were supported by no other power than by this country, under which circumstance it must be agreed, that such a war would have been impolitic. Thus, after the refusal of the other powers of Europe was known, and Ministers having, on the 23d of November, risked a war with France on the subject of Switzerland, and not then knowing the issue of the negotiation, did then in point of fact inform the House and the country, that there existed no danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens. How was this to be interpreted? Ministers sent out immediate orders, in consequence of this dispute, not to evacuate the Cape of Good Hope and other places, which was a direct breach of the treaty of Amiens. Soon afterwards they sent out orders to evacuate those places. This would serve to shew how Ministers interpreted their own act respecting Switzerland. It was most extraordinary that at the same time when they sent out orders not to evacuate the Cape and other places, no orders were sent out not to evacuate Malta, which was more particularly the subject of dispute between the countries, on the importance of which so much stress was laid,

and which it now appeared formed the whole subject of the present contest. On the 8th of December, when a flourishing statement of the finances of the country was made by the Rt. Hon. Gent. (the Chancellor of the Exchequer), he then said, that there was no danger of any breach of the treaty of Amiens, at least if not so in terms, that was the tenour of the expression used by him. At the time of his Majesty's message respecting his R. H. the Prince of Wales, the same thing was repeated, that there was no danger of war. Very soon afterwards came his Majesty's message, announcing a probable rupture with France: the grounds of that message had never yet been explained: distinct information had been asked for as to the grounds of that message, but his Majesty's Ministers had never yet given it, nor had they at all explained that message, which appeared now so very inexpedient. It had been asked by the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville) what we should give up by going to war. He would ask what was the sensation produced in the country by that message, which announced the probability of war? Let that Rt. Hon. Gent. consider the sorrow which was produced throughout the country by the tidings of that message, and let him imagine the real grief which it occasioned. As to the opinion of the country, his opinion was, that if it was polled from one end to the other, with those exceptions which must always be the case, there was not one man to be found who would not say, that if we had received insults from France, those insults ought not to go unredressed; but let that opinion be taken in the same way, as to the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, and whether they had done all in their power to avoid war, and he believed the answer of a large majority would be, that they had not; that was also his feeling upon that subject. He thought that his Majesty's Ministers had passed over in the Declaration, many points with respect to which the tone of France was more insulting, or at least as much so as in those they had noticed. With respect to the representations of France respecting libels alleged to be published against the government of that republic in this country, such remonstrances should have been treated with contempt; the answer should have been, We have no satisfaction to give you, take your remedy. With respect to the commercial commissioners, did Ministers do their duty? were those men sent out of the country? The consequence of not doing their duty was, that it still remained a problem, whether they had received satisfaction from France on that point: and this, mixed up with other things, was brought forward as matter of aggravation against France. Lord Hawkesbury had been called upon to send out of the country certain individuals because they were obnoxious to France. No Briton would contend that men who had received the protection of this country, ought to be sent out of it; but it appeared that the Noble Lord had made a promise upon the subject. But how should the representations upon that subject have been met? By a direct refusal; and if France chose to avenge herself, let her do it. The subject of the aggrandizement of France had been already ably discussed. Those who voted against the peace of Amiens, stated this as a reason why they opposed that treaty. But how was it with respect to his Majesty's Ministers? The independence of Holland was secured; but the fact was, that French troops were in the Batavian republic at that time, and continued there. Were any representations made respecting those troops? Several motions were afterwards made by those troops, for the purpose, as it was supposed, of quitting the Batavian republic, but they stopped on the frontiers of Holland, under the pretext of being destined to serve in the expedition to Louisiana; but was there any formal remonstrance upon this subject? He should have thought it proper that Ministers should have sent a formal representation, in order that they might have had a formal answer; then they might have come to Parliament with their doubts; and there would now have been no dispute about the object of war. The independence of Switzerland was secured by the treaty of Luneville; yet, eight or nine months after the signature of that treaty, the French troops were not withdrawn from that country: that might have been considered as an omen of the bad faith of France. A considerable time elapsed between the signature of the treaty of Luneville, and that of the treaty of Amiens, and still the French troops were not withdrawn. Those who made the treaty of Amiens must have considered at that time that Switzerland would be kept by France. All these circumstances were stated, and the argument by which they were answered was, that it was to be supposed that the treaty would be executed. A system of aggrandizement was likewise pursued in Italy; and at the time of signing the treaty, Piedmont was in fact annexed to France, by being made a military *arrondissement* of that country, which was very little different from being really annexed to France. The isle of Elba was likewise taken under the protection of France, and that protection was sufficiently known. All these circumstances were known at the time the definitive treaty was signed. It was not therefore for those who signed that treaty, or those who supported it, to contend, that those reasons which existed at the time of signing the treaty were now reasons for going to war. It had been asked by the Noble Lord (Hawkesbury) on the preceding evening, was no country to come forward to take up the cause of an injured Sovereign, or an injured people? He (Mr. Whitbread) agreed, that if a case was made out of injury, their cause ought to be taken up; but it was needless to talk of giving what could not be given. That Noble Lord

had alluded to the German indemnities, the whole of which was a complete system of robbery: but did the Noble Lord and his colleagues, who knew such a system was resolved upon at the treaty of Luneville, set their faces against it? Now, however, we were to go to war to redress the wrongs of the continent. If the ultimatum on the table was not the object of the war, in God's name let them know the object of it; let them not raise a false spirit in the country; let them know whether the object might be attained or not without going to war. With respect to Malta, which seemed to be the sole object in dispute with a view to Egypt, the Noble Lord (Hawkesbury) had descanted upon the perfidy of the French government, in throwing difficulties in the way of the guarantees; but he forgot that all the while the French government were throwing difficulties in the way of those guarantees, Malta remained in the possession of England, and that it must have done so whilst those difficulties remained. The Noble Lord and his colleagues had, however, resolved to fulfil the treaty of Amiens, when, on the 9th day of February, a dispatch was sent to Lord Whitworth, announcing that the evacuation of Malta would have taken place if a certain circumstance had not happened. This circumstance was Sebastiani's mission. The Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) had said, that the hostile disposition of the First Consul was to be inferred more from the mission than the Report. Ministers had stated, that they knew of the mission, and that they knew Sebastiani had seen General Stuart, as in their dispatch to the French government they had stated that Egypt had not been evacuated, in consequence of a mistake. If the Report was an act of aggression, he thought that Ministers were highly culpable in not remonstrating at the time. Did that Report disclose more of the hostile disposition of the First Consul than was before known? Egypt was always a favourite object of the French government, and Malta also, with a view to the former. What was done to prevent Malta from falling into the hands of the First Consul? It was proposed to garrison it with Neapolitan troops, when the feeling of every military man upon that occasion was, that it was in fact placing it in the hands of France, as the First Consul might have it when he pleased. As to the importance of Malta with a view to Egypt, it had been stated upon a former occasion by a gallant officer (Gen. Maitland), that it was of no importance in that point of view. It was not unlikely that the empire of the Ottoman Porte might fall by means of some arrangement of partition, to which the First Consul might be supposed to allude in conversation with Lord Whitworth, and therefore his words were not to be taken in that sense which was applied to them; but at any rate it only resulted that all that we knew before upon that subject was confirmed. It appeared that Talleyrand had signified the willingness of the French government to give every security respecting Egypt; he did not think Ministers went far enough in inquiring what that security was. The Emperor of Russia had offered to guaranty Malta, leaving out the Maltese langue. This morning an important document had arrived, contained in the French official paper, which was a note from the Russian Minister, to Talleyrand, stating in the most conciliatory terms, the desire of his Imperial Majesty that the treaty of Amiens should be maintained, and his wish to interpose his good offices between the two countries, and at the same time stating, that the English government knew that the Emperor could not assent to the Maltese langue, on account of a previous arrangement to the contrary. From this it appeared that his Imperial Majesty was willing to interfere between the two countries. With respect to the previous arrangement there mentioned, it appeared very strange, but perhaps Ministers might be able to explain it satisfactorily. This, however, he was sure they would not explain satisfactorily, why they had not noticed that projet of the court of Petersburgh at that time, when there had been no Sebastiani and no message to the Legislative Body. The publication of the Report of Sebastiani, notwithstanding what had been said by the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt), might be considered as an answer to Sir Robert Wilson's work, respecting the transactions of our army in Egypt. If the message to the Legislative Body had been considered as an insult, Ministers might have demanded and obtained satisfaction immediately, as they had done in the case of M. Reinhard. With respect to the refusal of Russia to guaranty Malta, it was contradicted by the note which had been laid upon the table that evening by the Noble Lord. He thought that his Majesty's Ministers might still avail themselves of the interference of Russia, and that peace might even yet be preserved.

Mr. Dallas said, that the question before the House involved in it two considerations: the justice of the war, and the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers in the conduct of the negotiation. Upon the latter point there appeared to be considerable difference of opinion; some Gentlemen seemed to think that Ministers had not gone far enough in their efforts to preserve peace, while others thought that they had not taken their stand early enough against the aggressions of France. He wished to recall the attention of the House to what appeared to him to be the only question now before them. The question was, whether the war in which we were now engaged was on our part a just war, or not? As to the conduct of Ministers during the negotiation, that certainly did not form a part of the consideration before the House; at least the address which had been moved for by the Noble Lord, did not

call upon them for any approbation of the conduct of Ministers. But as to the real question before the House, he would ask whether there was any man who would say that the conduct of France was not, in every instance, marked with insult and aggression against this country; and yet it was proposed in the amendment, to leave out all that part of the address which expressed the opinion of Parliament upon the justice of the war. If the amendment was adopted, Parliament would be pledged to support the war, without giving any opinion whatever upon the nature of the war which they pledged themselves to support. He confessed that he came to the consideration of the papers which had been laid before the House, with a mind not destitute of partiality for his Majesty's Ministers, who had concluded a treaty of peace, which had been approved of by the country, though perhaps some of its stipulations were liable to objection: it struck him, therefore, that the persons who had made such a peace must be anxious to preserve it. But he came also to the consideration of these papers with another and a superior feeling, viz. an anxious wish, an ardent desire, to find his country in the right; a hope that we should not now, for the first time, be found to have departed from that strict observation of treaties, that course of honourable moderation, which had always characterized our conduct. Upon the desire of Ministers to maintain peace, it seemed to him impossible to entertain a doubt. Had they not made every cession stipulated for by the treaty of Amiens, except only that of Malta? and had they not made every effort in their power to prevail on those powers of Europe who were to guaranty that island, to accede to that guarantee, in order that Great Britain might completely fulfil the treaty? It was not necessary to enter into an examination of the conduct of France with regard to Holland, to Italy, or to Switzerland. Nobody pretended to defend or excuse their conduct in relation to these states. With regard to the execution of the treaty of peace, every thing on the part of this country manifested a desire to execute the treaty: every thing on the part of France was evasion, prevarication, and delay. With regard to the mission of Colonel Sebastiani, he should pass that over, as so much had been said upon it, with merely observing that it was a clear manifestation on the part of France of a desire to get possession of Egypt, and, through Egypt, of India. The First Consul had told this country that Egypt was his object, but that he would not go to war for it. This was a faithful picture of his mind. He will not go to war; why? because he is restrained by the stipulations of a treaty, because he is restrained by a sense of honour and good faith? No; these are restraints much too weak for his great and daring mind: but he will not go to war now for Egypt, because he had hopes to get it at another time and by other means; that is to say, he will choose the moment when it is most convenient for him to go to war for it. The British government had constantly asked for explanations of all the conduct of France, which explanations were constantly refused; and at last, when the British Minister had left Paris, then they made an offer, which was in fact nothing less than to ask us to participate in a scheme of plunder and robbery. An Hon. Member (Mr. Whitbread) had asked for information upon a point upon which it was essential that not only he, but the House and the country, should obtain a specific answer. He had asked for what purpose we were going to war? The answer he would give to that question would be this: "We were going to war for Malta—not for Malta only, but for Egypt—not only for Egypt, but for India—not only for India, but for the integrity of the British empire—not only for the integrity of the British empire, but for the cause of justice, good faith, and freedom all over the world."

Mr. Elliot said, that in voting for the address, he meant merely to express his opinion of the justice of the war on the part of this country; but to give no opinion whatever upon the conduct of Ministers. The war appeared to him both just and necessary; necessary, because we were forced into it for self-preservation and defence; and he really would not give his vote for the war unless he was convinced that it was not only just but necessary. It was not necessary to refer to, or to comment upon the repeated acts of insult and aggression offered by France to this country; they had increased every day, and were still increasing. Upon this subject he was happy to find that there were not two opinions in the House. With respect to the mission of Col. Sebastiani, it had been said that France had given no satisfactory explanation upon this point; but it appeared to him to be an act which was almost incapable of explanation or of reparation; it was a cool, deliberate, determined act of aggression. It was true, that in entering into this war we commenced it with many disadvantages; we had given up all our conquests; we had given up to France many possessions which were important in a military and commercial point of view; and he was every day more and more confirmed in the opinion which he had always entertained, that we had lost more by the late unfortunate truce, than we could have done by even a disastrous war. Of all things, now that the contest had commenced, he should deprecate a speedy and insecure compromise with France; he hoped that the contest would be continued until real peace and tranquillity could be restored.

Mr. Sergeant Best said, if he were asked, would he go to war for Malta? he would answer, No; he would not, or for a much more extensive possession, in the abstract: but it was the manner in which France demanded Malta, it

was the disposition she had shewn, it was the designs which she had openly avowed, that in his opinion justified this country in going to war. If the smallest spot of earth was demanded of us, in the manner and under the circumstances that France demanded Malta, he would refuse it, because he would consider it as essentially connected with the safety and the interest of the British empire. He was ready to admit, that between the preliminary and definitive treaties, France had repeatedly given us cause for war; but it did not therefore follow that Ministers were to blame for not going to war, for it by no means followed that a country was always to go to war, whenever it had a just cause of so doing.

Mr. Canning said, that the amendment which had been proposed, had rendered it necessary for him to say a few words in answer to the Hon. Gent. who had proposed it, and those who had supported it. Gentlemen had contended that it was impossible to vote for the original address, without precluding themselves from entering into any examination of the conduct of Ministers. To this he could by no means assent. If it was only to guard his own vote against such a construction, he should have thought it necessary to trouble the House; but he was also anxious to controvert another proposition which had been advanced, viz. that those who disapproved of the conduct of Ministers, were bound to withhold their assent from the address. He could not comprehend upon what ground the distinction which had been taken on there points, was represented as so absurd; for it appeared to him that these two points, viz. the justice of the war, and the conduct of Ministers, might very fairly and properly be separated on the present occasion. When they are engaged in a war with a great and powerful enemy, their first business was to assure the Executive Government that they should receive the support of the Parliament and of the country; but at the same time warning Ministers that if there had been any thing improper in their conduct, this general support should not protect them, at a proper time, from examination and censure, if censure should be necessary. He did not mean to throw out any insinuations against the conduct of Ministers; and if any observation of his had that tendency, he begged leave, beforehand, to disavow it. He would reserve what he had to say upon that point for a future occasion. But no consideration could affect the substantial justice of the war on the part of this country. It was a war for the dearest interests of the British empire, into which we were compelled to enter by the deep-rooted, avowed, and incurable hostility of France. Whether Gentlemen might think that the stand of Ministers was not made at the proper point, still there was not, there could not be any difference of opinion upon the justice of the cause in which we were engaged. Whatever imputations might be thrown out against Ministers upon other points, no man could say that with regard to Malta they had shewn any unwillingness to comply with that part of the treaty: on the contrary, they had shewn the greatest industry in negotiating and endeavouring to carry the stipulations relative to that island into effect. If, therefore, under all the circumstances of the case, they kept Malta, the fault was not to be attributed to them, but to France. The question now under consideration was, whether Malta being in our possession, Ministers were blameable in making their stand there. Upon this point his opinion was completely made up, and he entirely agreed with the Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Grenville), that if Malta had been previously given up, Great Britain would have been justified, after the designs so openly avowed by France, in endeavouring again to obtain possession of it. This being the case with regard to Malta, the House was told, by those who supported the amendment, that they had no right to allude to former grievances, and that, however bad the conduct of France might have been on former occasions, we had no right to refer to it now, because it had not been noticed before. He did not understand that the former aggressions of France were now alluded to, as being in themselves distinct and substantive causes of war; they were introduced to shew the general disposition and intentions of France. Without discussing whether Ministers were or were not culpable in not making a stand upon these former aggressions, still their not going to war upon these grounds could not preclude this country, when a fresh cause of war arose, from adding to its case those previous indications of hostility, those previous acts of aggression. But he would not now use them as matter of complaint against France, he would only use them historically as indicative of the disposition of France. With regard to the importance of Malta, he could only speak from what he heard or what he observed; but upon that point he had the opinion of Buonaparté himself. The importance of Malta was distinctly proved by the events which had occurred. When the French were going to invade Egypt they touched at Malta: when the English were going to drive them out of Egypt, they touched at Malta. The inference was obvious. As it appeared now that the Mediterranean was to be the scene of struggle between this country and France, Malta could not be looked upon as unimportant. An allusion had been made to a statement which appeared in a French paper, which arrived this day, that it was possible to put Malta into the hands of one of the three great powers who were invited to guaranty it; but we had declared in a previous part of the negotiation, that Russia was the only one of the three powers to whom we could consent to deliver it up, and he did not understand that there

had been any offer made by Russia to garrison Malta, as well as to guaranty it. Therefor this statement in the French paper left the case precisely where it was before. Something had been said in the course of the debate about the value of continental alliances: we had now before us the experience of a century, in which continental alliances had formed a part of the political system of this country; we had also the experience of two years in which we had adopted a different line of policy, and experience had shewn that the latter plan was not the best calculated to promote our interests or secure our tranquility. He wished it to be understood, that even if Russia would accept the military protection of Malta, that would not be considered as a satisfactory adjustment of the differences relative to that island. It was stated that Russia was the only power into whose hands Great Britain could in fact trust the protection of that island: but it was not stated that if Russia had acceded to that proposal, it would have been perfectly satisfactory to this government. His assertion had been grounded on this circumstance—the refusal of the court of Petersburgh to accede to the guarantee, the correspondence which had taken place since the treaty of peace, and the sentiments which had been expressed by the Russian ambassador at this court. He wished also to observe, that the very messenger who had brought Count Markoff his instructions to offer his good offices between the two countries had brought similar instructions to the Russian ambassador at this court. He was not in possession of these instructions in an official manner, so as to be enabled to lay them before the House, but they had been communicated to him, and they did not contain one word that held out the idea that the Emperor of Russia was disposed to take upon himself the military protection of Malta. They only contained general expressions of good will, and a desire to the Russian ambassador in this country to become, if it should be necessary, a channel for any explanation that could be carried on between the two countries. The only expressions with regard to Malta in those instructions, so far from holding out the idea of a military protection of Malta, stated, that it was not his Majesty's desire to accept even of the general guarantee, and that only upon the terms which had been previously mentioned.

Mr. Fox said, that he should be very unwilling to trouble the House, if he did not feel it an absolute duty to the people of England to endeavour, if possible, to rescue them out of a situation of great danger, and at all events of certain misery, even if the contest in which they were about to engage should be attended with the most brilliant success. But before he entered into the general question, he wished to say a word or two upon the manner in which it had been taken up. Those who had spoken in favour of the original address had expressed an apparent wish to confine the discussion entirely to the justice of the war, and to treat it as an entirely separate question from the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers. Now, with respect to the justice of the war, it could not, in his opinion, be by any possibility separated from an examination of the conduct of Administration, because the question of the justice of the war might, in a very great degree, depend upon the refusal on the part of France to give explanation, satisfaction, or redress, and it would be necessary to know when and in what manner Ministers had applied for such explanation and redress; but it was impossible to contend that by voting for the original address, they would not vote their approbation to Ministers for their conduct, because the address went to thank his Majesty for his uniform efforts to preserve peace, which he could not do until he had more complete proofs of the fact. The Hon. Gent. who sat below him, would, perhaps, concur in declaring that Ministers had been uniform in their desire to preserve peace, but would he concur in thanking Ministers for the whole of their conduct in the negotiation? A Rt. Hon. Gent. had said, that there was not a word in the amendment to which he was not ready to accede; but that he would vote for the original address, though it contained some passages to which he could not give his consent without a long explanation, and without entering his protest. It was then surely better to vote for the amendment, in which all could concur, than to vote for the address, which required so much explanation. Mr. Fox went over the whole of the correspondence between the two countries, and made comments on each particular part as he went along, by which he maintained that it was manifest there was a great deal of shuffling on both sides, between the representatives of the two countries; he disapproved of the demand made by the Chief Consul of France, that any one member of the House of Bourbon should be ordered to quit this country; he had no idea, that under any pretence whatever an independent state was to be called on to deny to any unfortunate or persecuted emigrant the rites of hospitality. He considered the application made to us to abridge the liberty of the press, to be the offspring of the most profound ignorance of our laws and constitution, and a thing deserving only contempt and ridicule. He thought that much too great stress had been laid on several of the expressions of Buonaparté, by the commentaries of Lord Whitworth, in his account of the conversation between his Lordship and the Chief Consul, and that the report from memory of a long conversation was necessarily, and, at best, a very defective thing. He ridiculed some conclusions that were drawn from the tone and manner of Buonaparté, that he was proud and haughty in talking of an attempt on our coast,

and saying that it was an hundred to one that he would be destroyed in the attempt, and that he despaired of accomplishing his end: this, he said, reminded him of the most extravagant passage in the most extravagant work of the most extravagant, though admirable poet, Dryden, who had put into the mouth of one of his characters, speaking to the other—"You shall not dare to be so impudent as to despair."—He ridiculed also the idea of supposing that Buonaparté would have been so extremely foolish (unless indeed we supposed him to be fit for Bedlam) as to tell our Ambassador of his intention to go soon to Egypt, if he really had that intention. It was true he had expressed a desire to go there, but certainly no design; but the desire of a person to do a thing was not a ground for war, else we should never have been at peace with the House of Bourbon; nor was the sending a person to Egypt to examine that place, for that has been often done. As to the commercial commissioners, who came here in disguise to take the soundings of our coasts, he thought that was a great breach of faith, and they ought to have been arrested, and satisfaction demanded; and if refused, that would have been ground for war: but there was nothing of that kind done. With regard to the general system of aggrandizement, unless it affected us immediately, we had no right to complain of it more than the French had to complain of us for our aggrandizement in India; if they accused us in this respect, by way of retaliation for our railing, he knew of no answer he could make, unless we imitated the lady who being accused of a disregard of her virtue in many instances, said, "Never before, upon my honour, on this side of the Cape of Good Hope."—As to Egypt, the Rt. Hon. Gent. ought to know that Vergennes, the minister of Louis the XVIth, had an expedition thither in contemplation, and how was that resented? Why, exactly by making a treaty of commerce with him! We ought not to suffer ourselves to be deceived by the hyperboles of eloquence out of our common sense. We were bound by our treaty to deliver up Malta at a certain time. This article was said to be of the Minister's own manufacture. As to the article concerning the guarantee, the two other articles are not affected by it; and they provide for the appointment of the Grand Master and the garrison of Neapolitan troops. Well! but France wished to throw difficulties in the way! How? For the purpose of preventing its surrender! What was France to get by that? Ministers are then angry that France was not as zealous as themselves in endeavouring to procure the acceptance of the guaranteeship of Malta. What said Russia? She would do it upon certain conditions. What signified the Maltese langue, about which so much was said? Was it for a point of good faith? Why, if it was kept by England for ten years, the knights of Malta might go where they pleased! But then comes Col. Sebastiani's Report, with the mighty disclosure of the First Consul's desire to retain Egypt. The letter is a complete proof of a military officer having been sent to take military surveys, and form, probably, military connexions for France. Then Ministers find a desire, which they immediately convert into a design and overt act of seizing on Egypt. As to the reflections contained in that letter on Gen. Stuart, he considered them as most unfair and unmanly, and deserving of the highest reprobation. He was happy, however, they could do him no harm, as he understood him to be a very meritorious and intelligent officer, and a deserving man. In a political view, that Report was most absurd; but of itself it does not amount to a ground of war. Let any man name a year from the treaty of Utrecht, in time of peace, when the old French government had not some such missionary at work. In this he was fortified by the Secretary of State's speech, which stated, that in no time of peace following the three last treaties of 1749, 1763, and 1783, had one year elapsed without an indication of hostility and an infraction of peace. Would he on this principle have made war constantly on every one of those grounds? How monstrous! how extravagant! Europe would not have had a short breathing-time once in a century from the horrors of war! He thought the curious conversation with Lord Whitworth had some marks of openness. If the Consul had not mentioned the idea of Turkey falling to pieces, he must have observed a greater degree of reserve than is usual in any political conversation in Europe. Why, the late Empress of Russia was well known to have designs upon Turkey, and the naming of her son Constantine was once said to be with that view. Who ever heard of an idea of war by the sovereigns of Europe against her on that ground? We must be acquainted with all the circumstances in such cases, before we can pronounce judgment. What might not be said on countermanding the evacuation of the Cape? They might say we were determined to break the treaty; we had a Minister who said, he that gave up the Cape ought to lose his head; and the English were, it might be said, resolved to break the treaty for that and such purposes. The publication of Sebastiani's Report is of itself a proof rather that it was not to be considered as an hostile aggression. Then came a part of the negotiation, incomprehensible indeed on both sides, but most so on ours. Lord Whitworth goes to request an explanation. What says the French Minister? Oh, I can tell nothing about it, Sir! Then explanation is changed for security, and security for Malta in perpetuity; and, last of all, Malta for ten years! Having pushed the Consul as far as prudence would permit, it was thought better to make it a little easy; and so, as a ghost comes in after a tragedy, they bring up some more proposals and conditions at the end. As

in the Rehearsal a King of Sardinia is brought in who had been dead before the play, and with Malta at his tail! So we pushed the Consul hard, and then to make a show of something, they cry, "Bring in the King of Sardinia," and then they put him out again along with Switzerland, as easily as possible. The most unjustifiable of all the conduct of Buonaparté on the subject of annexation of territory, was that of his behaviour to Holland and Switzerland, which was certainly most cruel; but he maintained, that we had not acted properly in these particulars. With regard to the abuse of the one government towards the other, there were but two ways of disposing of that point—either to demand satisfaction, or to pass it over in contempt; neither of which we had followed; besides, the parties in this respect appeared to be pretty nearly on a level. His general blame upon Ministers was, that if they had any subject of complaint, they did not specify it, and demand satisfaction; and then, if satisfaction was refused, it would be time enough to think of going to war, for insult was no ground of war. It was the refusal of satisfaction for insult, after satisfaction was demanded, that was ground for war. This he applied to the whole of the case of aggravation and insult, as it was insisted upon on the part of our government; and he maintained that we had been deficient in our course in not demanding satisfaction for the insult whenever we met it, instead of waiting for an accumulation of insults, and then to make the total a subject of complaint. He accused both sides of a great deal of hypocrisy on this occasion, and charged us with having at last gone to war upon a sordid principle, that of the possession of Malta, and for which it was improbable we should have any alliances, because the thing in contest was interesting to none but ourselves. The remedy for all this he stated to be that of an appeal to the great Monarch, the Emperor of Russia, first to become guarantee for Malta, afterwards arbiter between us; and then, if the French should persist in their career of injustice, the probability would be, that we should have allies, because the matter in contest would then be generally interesting. He said that this was the only course that could wisely be taken by us. He would, therefore, recommend that the House should agree to the amendment, and that an alliance should be formed with Russia for the prevention of French aggression. The other alternative was war. We had talked much more of other countries than of our own. Suppose all imminent great danger out of the case, let Gentlemen recollect the state of the country during the latter period of the last war. What was the state of villagers, of tradesmen, even of gentlemen of moderate incomes? He had heard much talk of economical war; it could not be meant in the vulgar sense. We should now have exertions to make to which all former exertions were as nothing. This we had been told last night pretty plainly, and this not in the flourishing speech of a young Member, but an old Member, no novice, but an adept: "I," says that Rt. Hon. Gent. "who have had such great practice formerly, in drawing your teeth and paring your fingers, cutting you to the quick indeed pretty often, have provided for you a new operator, who has an entire new discipline for you. You fought last war for religion and social order, and the balance of power; but that is all nothing to what you are now to expect. Prepare! Lord North and myself were mere triflers. You are not to think of a year, but a continuation of years, and an addition of two or three hundred millions of debt. The income-tax was to many intolerable, but the new income-tax will be much more severe and oppressive. We must expect great improvements in those measures, and in the mode too of enforcing them. The last income-tax was pretty near to an inquisition, but the next will complete the business! Don't let any body think of paying any thing less than a fifth, a fourth, or perhaps a third, if necessary. Don't let him think of paying less than fifteen shillings out of a guinea, nor of a drawer which shall not be liable to be opened to the inspector!" And all this for what? Why, for Malta! plain Malta! plain Malta, after all!! Malta, unconnected with any great, general, generous interest of Europe! There was some Emperor of Fez or Morocco, who wore on particular occasions a grand turban and dress, which excited the admiration of strangers. "Ay," said his subjects, "these are fine exhibitions for you, but they are only the signs of an execution-day with us!!!" So when we hear Members of Parliament indulging us with luxurious treats of eloquence, and full-dressed speeches, and high-toned declamations, I feel myself finely feasted and pleased in the House; but when I go into the lobby, and see the people standing about the door, I cannot help thinking, Ay, ay, you have to pay smartly for all this! We have had philippics that Demosthenes himself might have envied. I remember in the American war we had plenty of the same luxuriancy of hyperbole, metaphor, and romantic rhodomontade! In the last war we had still more of it; for then we had the most eloquent of men declaring in favour of the war. All was rich and delightful as a feast; but unfortunately then came the bill, and the enormous charges spoiled all the relish of the entertainment! I am esteemed so Frenchified by some persons, that I may be excused here in quoting an old French proverb, applicable enough in this case—"Le cout ote le gout!" Sir, I remember, when all the privy council came out of their chamber perfectly intoxicated with a fine piece of declamation of Lord Rosslyn's against Dr. Franklin; they were very nigh tossing their hats in the air for joy at this notable victory of the tongue! Well, Sir, I

don't think any man will dispute the fact, that we paid pretty well for that exhibition.—Mr. Fox considered an alliance with Russia as the most advisable, and the only policy at the present important moment: he thought it the only method of benefiting Europe, and of putting ourselves in the most favourable light to Europe. He observed, that the address stated a fact which but few could assent to, namely, that Ministers had been sincere in their endeavours to preserve peace, and which no one assented to without qualifying his vote; whereas the amendment stated that which every body admitted to be true: the way therefore to produce unanimity in the House, was to adopt that which every body admitted to be true, instead of proposing that which nobody could assent to without qualification.

The Chancellor of the Exchequer said, that he never heard with more admiration the talents of the Hon. Gent. nor had greater occasion to lament that the effusions of his great and exalted mind should have been employed for the purpose for which they were then applied. It certainly was not the intention of that Hon. Gent. to produce the effect of unhinging and unnerving the House, at a period the most important for the consideration of the most momentous subject that could come before Parliament; and he could not help lamenting, that such powers should have been so employed, and to give encouragement where there ought not to be encouragement given, namely, to our enemies; not that it could be so intended, although it might be considered as likely to have such effect. He would put it to the candour of that Hon. Gent.'s mind, and would ask him, upon reflection, whether he thought the language he had used was not likely to accomplish an object which he could not wish to have accomplished? whether he did think, that describing that subject in the manner in which he had described it, was necessary for any good purpose; and whether he thought it fair to make such an appeal as he had done to the feelings of mankind, for the purpose of enlisting them, as it were, to fight against their public duty? Such might be the effect of the eloquence of the Hon. Gent. that night; but he had a firm reliance on the good sense and fortitude of the people of this country; and he had a perfect conviction that, at that moment, they felt the danger of their situation, and would not be led away by any artifice or eloquence whatever. He should not follow the Hon. Gent. into a minute detail of this case; he should rest it upon its plain and obvious good sense. Having been one of those who advised his Majesty to send to Parliament the message on which the address now before the House was moved, he was satisfied to rest with the House the consideration of his motives, and that of his colleagues upon this occasion, and he hoped the House were satisfied that no reluctance had ever been shewn on his part to enter into that discussion: that he had been desirous to have it considered by the House, and that he had frequently expressed his mind to that effect, for that he had said that he should not shrink from the moment of discussion; but, on the contrary, had waited with impatience for the arrival of this moment, that every part of his conduct might be canvassed by the House. He earnestly wished also to obtain, and he trusted he should obtain, the concurrence of the House, in every part of his conduct in this particular. The hope which he entertained that such a discussion would take place before the House, was now fulfilled. He hoped it would be the general opinion of the House that night, that his Majesty's Ministers had been sincere in their conduct, and their endeavours to preserve peace, although the Hon. Gent. who spoke last had said that they were not so, and had objected to the address on that account. Now, what were the words of the address in that particular? "That this "House entertains a just sense of his Majes-"ty's anxious and uniform endeavours to pre-"serve to his people the blessings of peace." Such were the words; and he never expected to hear in that House, that such endeavours for the preservation of peace had not been sincere. He now, however, knew there were many, he wished to God there were not so many, who thought they were not sincere in such endeavours; and that there were others who thought that, although they were sincere, they had not been wise in their endeavours to preserve peace. He then noticed what had been stated by Mr. Fox, by way of comment on the Declaration of his Majesty on the subject now before the House; on the point of the indemnities; on the subject of the French troops not evacuating Holland; on the subject of Parma and Placentia, and the annexation of Piedmont; on the case of Switzerland, and on the various other topics stated in that Declaration. Upon all which topics the Hon. Gent. seemed to insist that his Majesty's Ministers had not performed their duty, inasmuch as they had omitted to make specific remonstrances to France in each of these cases as they occurred, instead of waiting for the accumulation of them all. Upon this subject, however, he begged leave to say that the Hon. Gent. had not done justice to Ministers, *for representations had been made upon almost every one of these topics.* He then read from different parts of the Correspondence, the instructions which were given to our Ministers, Mr. Liston at the Hague, and to Lord Whitworth at Paris. He said he should not go over all the grounds of these instructions. With regard, however, to Switzerland, he would observe, as the Hon. Gent. had particularly noticed their conduct in that respect, their object was to maintain the independence of Switzerland, and they expressed that object by Mr. Moore, and intended to support the Swiss, until it

became impracticable by their being overwhelmed. However, the interference of this country had not been totally useless in that respect; for although our wishes were not accomplished, yet much had been accomplished by our exertions; for he had reason to apprehend that our exertions had been the means of preventing the First Consul from declaring himself their first magistrate. He was convinced of this from the information of those who had an opportunity of observing what passed in Switzerland, and from which he learnt that the interposition of his Majesty's Ministers in that respect had been beneficial to the people of Switzerland. More might have been done, had their disposition been properly supported, and more would have been endeavoured by Ministers in that case; but it was discovered that there was no corresponding disposition in the other great powers of Europe to make a common cause with the people of Switzerland. There were therefore no farther means left in this country for that purpose. The course which he should take would be to shew, that the whole of the conduct of the government of France, taken collectively, was manifestly the *animus* to injure and insult this country, and that it was under a conviction of this *animus* that the question of peace or war was properly to be decided. He maintained that all the parts, taken collectively, manifested than *animus*. An imputation had been cast on his Majesty's Ministers, as if they had neglected their duty in not having demanded satisfaction upon points as they occurred; but it did appear to him, and he trusted it would appear to the House, that satisfaction had been demanded on each particular case which required it. He then referred to the Correspondence in several particulars relating to the Report of Sebastiani, from which he contended, that it appeared to be the determination of the French government to interfere with respect to Egypt, and to conduct itself contrary to the express provisions of the treaty of Amiens, which provided for the integrity of the Turkish empire; and to various other parts of the Correspondence between Lord Whitworth and the French Minister, as well as to the long conference therein detailed, as it took place between Lord Whitworth and the Chief Consul himself; and also to what related to Malta in particular; and maintained that it appeared from these extracts, that his Majesty's Ministers had never omitted any part of their duty, but had with great care and attention endeavoured to perform it. He maintained that it appeared in every article that it was the disposition of the French government to avail itself of every opportunity that occurred to shew its hostile temper, and to manifest a determination of going to war, or of rendering war inevitable; that they had made preparations for that purpose by an augmentation of their forces, for that it appeared, that from the 4th of February to the 4th of March 1803, an army was to be paid 243 millions of livres, voted for that year; and the charge of the navy was larger in proportion for the same period, amounting to 126 millions of livres. He then went over those parts of the Correspondence which applied to the offer that was made for the guarantee of Malta by the Emperor of Russia, &c. and alleged the reason why such a guarantee did not take place. He made several comments upon this part of the case, tending to shew that it was not the fault of this country that this part of the treaty was not carried into full execution. —The Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) had said, that he believed the war might yet be avoided: the war could certainly not be avoided, because the war was already begun; but if the Emperor of Russia, or any other considerable power, should be pleased to interfere, with friendly intentions, and make any proposition of a practicable nature, by which peace may be restored, he was sure there was not any individual in the House, or in this country, who would be more glad to attend to it than himself; and he would go further, and say, that he should betray his duty to his Sovereign and to his country, if he did not endeavour to forward such an understanding; always remembering, that such object should appear practicable before it should be recommended to the consideration of his Majesty, consistent with the honour of the Crown, and also of advantage to the country; he meant not the apparent advantage in the opinion of some persons, but the real advantages of the people, and to give them the advantages of peace; to give us the prospect of peace. He was not so vain as to talk of a permanent peace, but a real prospect of the real enjoyment of peace. Whenever that proposition should be thought advisable to be made, he should feel a great satisfaction in being the instrument in laying it before his Majesty, and in advising his Majesty to shew that which he had indeed invariably manifested, an inclination to peace, when peace can be obtained with honour; and a repugnance to war, when war was unavoidable; but under the present circumstances, he should deceive the country, if he said he saw any thing in the disposition of the French government which warranted such an expectation. We ought therefore to prepare for meeting all the difficulties of an arduous contest. If by any false advice we were to be lulled asleep, or to relax in our endeavours for the preservation of the state, by which our security was maintained, and leave all our chance to the caprice of fortune, not only should we then not discharge our duty to the country, but the country itself might not then be at any great distance from ruin. And he was desirous this should be impressed on the mind of every individual Member who did him the honour to attend to him, that he did not, and that he could not ask for support on any thing less than a conviction, that he who

does support this system must make up his mind to great sacrifices in a case which required them, and which had been proved to be necessary, as he had stated already, and which had been recommended by the highest force and authority in the House yesterday (that of Mr. Pitt). We must provide effectually for our domestic security; many persons, he was aware, must be put to great inconvenience, and they must suffer great privations for the purpose of having the country secured against the danger and the hatred with which it was already menaced. He wished to impress upon the House these truths; that the present war was founded upon unavoidable necessity, and that there is in his Majesty's Ministers a sincere disposition to terminate this war whenever it can be terminated with honour; but he was also anxious to impress upon the House, that it must make up its mind to meet our difficulties properly in the face. The only regret he felt was, that state to which the House was necessarily driven by the want of unanimity; he would therefore indulge a hope, that the Hon. Gent. opposite to him who had moved the amendment last night (Mr. Grey), would sacrifice a private opinion in this case to the advantages of unanimity. The Hon. Gent. opposite to him, who opened this debate to-night, had well and patriotically said, there was no sacrifice consistently with conscience, which he would not make for the sake of unanimity in this case. He said the same thing, and Ministers entreated that no Member in the House would feel the slightest expression of approbation on any part of the conduct of Ministers, either to preserve peace, or to any terms here made. Under these circumstances, what the motive could be for depriving the country of the benefits of unanimity on this most important occasion he could not possibly discover. The difference between the sentiments contained in the address and those in the amendment, in the opinion of any man of plain common sense, was literally nothing. There was no reason for depriving the country of the advantages arising from a general concurrence of sentiment on this occasion. He should therefore entertain a hope that the Hon. Gent. would examine attentively the words of the address propounded by his Noble Friend, and also the amendment moved by the Hon. Gent. and then he should leave it to the gentlemen on the other side to see if they could have any ground for resisting the address. With respect to the papers now upon the table, he should say nothing of them by way of comment, he should leave them to speak for themselves; he was satisfied they furnished abundant materials for satisfying the House that the French were pursuing a course of aggrandizement which was inconsistent with the honour of this country. In a word, the cause we had to sustain was founded on incontrovertible justice, against insult and aggression; a cause which had left to his Majesty or Parliament no alternative.

The Attorney General could not suffer the eloquence of the Hon. Gent. (Mr. Fox) to pass unnoticed, as it was a cloak to sentiments which were calculated to destroy the unanimity of the House. The amendment he did not so much object to as his speech that accompanied it; the arguments which the Hon. Member had offered to the House were calculated to do much mischief, as they were founded in ingenuity. He had talked much of the value of the blessings attending peace; the House also knew the value of peace as well as the Hon. Gent.; but he would say, that peace could not be valuable to the country when maintained at the hazard of our ruin, and perhaps the loss of our nation. Let any man look over the papers now on the table relative to the negotiation between this country and France, and he was sure it would be immediately acknowledged, that the French wished to destroy the British power. Every person who has considered the subject without prejudice, must see the necessity to check the ambition and overgrown power of the First Consul. He did not wish, at this late hour, to intrude on the time of the House, otherwise he had materials before him that would convince the House of the immediate necessity to commence a war against a powerful and dangerous enemy.

Mr. Windham said it was not his intention to trouble the House many minutes, but the arguments offered by Mr. Fox appeared to him fallacious, and he could not but express his disapprobation of the sentiments delivered by that Hon. Gent. The question before the House was certainly of considerable moment; he could not approve of the Hon. Gent.'s (Mr. Fox) arguments, if arguments they may be called. That Gent. had told the House that it was his wish to suspend hostilities, in order to see whether the negotiation may not be kept open for the benefit of a peace: this would be giving time to our enemy, and doing us a considerable injury; he could not but think the arguments which the Hon. Gent. had offered to the House went like poisoned arrows to each Member, and was the effect of wickedness. To encourage delay, under any flattering hope of peace, would be a stab to the country, and place it at the foot of our enemy. Mr. Fox had talked of the income-tax; but how would the people of this country like an income-tax laid on by the French? If the Hon. Gent. could shew by any possible means, that the interference of the Russian power would produce a good effect, he would support the measure proposed. Mr. Fox had used eloquence to destroy every thing that is valuable to society. It had been said by that Hon. Gent. that he did not wish to see the Rt.

Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt) in the House, as he had given his support to the question. But he should always be happy to see that Rt. Hon. Gent. in the House, as he was one of the brightest ornaments of the state. He considered it a perfectly just war, and a peace under the present situation of affairs would be dangerous to the country. The House of Commons he considered like an assembly of surgeons, convened to execute a great but delicate operation; and he would ask, whether it would not be better to give the patient a little pain, than let him perish by false kindness. This was the exact state of the country at the present moment: we must suffer pain, to save our country from becoming a heap of ruins; it was therefore necessary we should lose a limb to preserve our body. He should for these reasons support the original question.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wednesday, May 25.—(See Minutes, p. 818.)

[War with France.]—Sir Robert Peele said that he had a decided objection to war in any shape, for he conceived it to be the greatest of all evils to the human race; and it should be always his endeavour, while he had a seat in that House, to get rid of a situation so deplorable; but with respect to this war, it did not appear from the papers on the table that it was brought upon us in consequence of any fault of the present Administration. It did not appear to be the desire of the French to obtain the rock of Malta: they had other objects in view. He believed the rock of the English constitution was what they really aimed at: he conceived it was our liberty, protected by our constitution, that gave the most uneasiness; a constitution which reflected so strong a light to the people of France, that it gave them a perfect insight into the rotten state of their own society. He conceived that the French people, who had so long been struggling for liberty, who were an enlightened people, and who valued freedom, would wish us well, and wish a happy issue to this contest.

Mr. Henry Lascelles said that the conduct of France ever since the peace had been atrocious, and ever since they had the opportunity, they had pursued a system of aggrandizement, and of insult and aggression to every country they could; so that we could not remain in security. Provocations had been offered to this country, which, in ordinary times, would have been considered as a declaration of war; and he did consider that every mean had been employed by us to procure satisfaction, and to avert the calamities of war. France had put it to us, whether we would sacrifice every thing to support ourselves in an insecure peace. He thought that a state of war, evil as it was, yet was preferable to a state of peace under such circumstances as we were surrounded by since the treaty of Amiens, because such a peace must be liable to continual interruption, and, circumstanced as this country was, must be fatal.

Mr. Bankes found it impossible to vote for the address, because it stated that uniform endeavours had been used on the part of this country to preserve peace. Now this he could not assent to, after he had read the instructions given to Mr. Moore. At the same time he did not concur altogether in the amendment, nor in the arguments by which it had been supported by an Hon. Member last night (Mr. Fox).

Sir Richard Hill believed in his conscience that Ministers had been anxious for the preservation of peace, and were sincerely grieved that it should be interrupted, and that they would have sacrificed every thing consistent with the honour and security of the country, to prevent a rupture.

Mr. Hobhouse considered it his duty to express his approbation of the conduct and wisdom of his Majesty's Ministers; and he was sure every Member of the House who had taken a view of their conduct, would concur with him in bestowing praise on those Hon. Gent. who had made every endeavour to continue peace. The conduct of the French to Switzerland was sufficient ground for this country to enter into a war with a people who have become so powerful and dangerous. Ministers have not been blind to the intentions of the First Consul, and therefore they had done right to maintain the Cape and Malta. No man could be so blind as not to see that the French wished to increase their power in the East: Malta was therefore the object of their desire. He was, however, happy to find that our Ministers had used every precaution to prevent their extension of dominion in Egypt and the East Indies. The French had gone beyond all bounds of reason, honour, and every thing that constitutes greatness in a nation. It was now time to look after the safety of our own country. He was proud to say that every honour was due to Ministers for the wisdom they have manifested on this important occasion, and their attention to preserve the liberty and the dignity of the island.

Mr. Shaw Lefevre said that the people of this country were not to be alarmed by any dreadful picture that may be exhibited to them against a war, when their property and liberties are in danger; and he was sure they would not suffer the French to get a foot of British ground, but shed their blood to preserve the envied blessings of England; envied they had long been, and now are, by a desperate enemy: but he could answer for the courage of his countrymen, that they never would

tamely lose those liberties, of which they are now the happy participators: he hoped the people would follow up the war with spirit, agreeable to the old saying, have a "long pull, a strong pull, and a pull all together."

Mr. WILBERFORCE said, that he did not think the amendment contained any thing improper in it. The part of the address which had occasioned so much observation, and had met with so much opposition, was the lines which expressed "the uniform conduct of the Ministers to preserve peace." No man could suppose for a moment, but his Majesty's Ministers wished to maintain peace between the two countries: therefore by what he said of them respecting their inattention to the blessings of peace, it could only be understood that they had not made use of the best endeavours to produce peace. He wished Ministers had encouraged the Russian power to mediate between France and this country, which might, in his humble opinion, be still the means to settle the differences between the two countries. He allowed that the French had given many proofs of their want of attention to the treaty of Amiens, and had acted in violation of all principle, consequently we must be on our guard, and make the best endeavours to curb the ambition of French power, and convince them that England is not to be trifled with. It was true, that the people of this country must suffer, in order to make our enemy suffer, and that taxes would be laid on the subject to carry on the war; but these are trifles compared with the importance of our religion, morality, and all those rights dear to Englishmen. He was certain he spoke the voice of the people when he told the House, that, from one end of the nation to the other, there would be an unanimity to defend the shores of Great Britain.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, May 27.—(See Minutes, p. 819.)

[MEDIATION OF RUSSIA.]—Mr. FOX. I rise in pursuance to the notice I gave on a former day, in order to submit to the House a motion of the utmost importance, a motion, perhaps, of as much consequence, considering the present situation of public affairs, as ever was discussed in this House; and it is from a conviction of its importance alone that I should be induced to trespass on your attention; but that trespass, however, shall be very short. Into the general question of the present war I do not now mean to enter. From my opinions, which I took occasion to state very fully on a former evening, a majority of this House has thought proper to differ, and to the judgment of that majority I bow with respect. The country is now engaged in war, and it shall therefore have my most ardent support. No one can wish it to be more successful than I do; and whatever difference of opinion may prevail as to the grounds of the war, to which I shall not now refer, I am persuaded that there cannot be a dissentient voice upon this question—that it is desirable to bring it to an honourable termination as soon as possible. With this view I have thought it my duty to call the attention of the House to a proposition which, I understand, has been recently made by the Emperor of Russia, to interpose his mediation for the complete settlement of the differences subsisting between Great Britain and France. Such is the disposition which has been manifested by the sovereign of Russia, and of which it is the object of the motion with which I shall conclude, to recommend that his Majesty's Ministers should immediately avail themselves. It is almost unnecessary for me to recite the various advantages which must result from the mediation of this powerful, respected, and much-esteemed sovereign; and among the most valuable of those advantages would be this, that should you be obliged to prosecute the war for the attainment of any objects of which that sovereign should approve, you would have the material support of that approbation—you would have the sanction of his great name—you would have the opinion of the world in your favour—and is not this, I would ask, a consideration of consequence? If you had no other motive for accepting the proposed mediation, this ought to influence you. But not only in this instance would it be desirable. You might, through means of this mediation, contrive to procure the adjustment of not merely the question respecting Malta, but, in fact, of all the points in dispute. Impressed as I am with this idea, and believing it quite practicable, I cannot but be anxious for the interests of my country, and for the peace of Europe, that his Majesty's Ministers should not let the opportunity pass by—that they will not allow themselves to overlook the means which this offers of accomplishing all the objects they desire, of security, honour, and satisfaction. The power and character of the mediator, and the rank which he holds in Europe, justify the strongest hopes. With respect to his character, it stands upon the most elevated ground; and if the report of all men speaks true, that elevation is highly deserved—just to the people committed to his government, and benevolent to all mankind, he is generally known to be extremely desirous for the preservation of the peace of Europe. If so (and I have no doubt of the fact), would any power in Europe attempt to resist our claims, when seconded by the decided expression of that monarch's opinion?—I understand that this Prince is very much affected by the changes which have taken place in the situation of Europe, that he is warmly attached to peace, and that no one can be more disgusted than he is with the conduct of

France since the treaty of Amiens. I cannot conceive then, a character whose mediation it would be more suitable to our wishes and more for our interest to accept. In the situation in which the country is at present placed, it is peculiarly happy that the offer has been made. Upon this particular point I am very sanguine, because I am convinced that if acceded to it may be productive of the best consequences, and, if refused, I am apprehensive of many unfavourable effects. I think it would tend to the satisfactory termination of the war, and also to a satisfactory regulation of the state of the continent. It may be said that I am too sanguine; perhaps so; but yet I have no difficulty in saying, that there exists a strong probability to warrant my expectations. If any one were to ask me, was I certain that such effects as I have described would flow from the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, I fairly own that I would answer in the negative. But of this I am certain, that no injury can arise from it, and that much good may; therefore I would exhort Ministers to avail themselves of it. If I am asked my opinion of the present state of the continent, I would say that it is very far from being satisfactory; but I would ask in return, can you amend that state by a war? Can you promise yourself any such thing? If France be farther inclined to oppress the weaker powers of the continent, how do you propose, with the means you now have, to prevent it? How can you contrive in any degree to restrain the spirit of aggrandizement in that quarter of which you so much complain? This offer of mediation, therefore, you should gladly receive, for two reasons: First, in order to adjust the points in which you are more immediately concerned yourselves; and secondly, with the view of settling the state of the continent. Why then should Ministers decline an offer now, which they would have been happy to embrace at any period of the negotiation? The enemy has expressed a readiness to accept it, and how will it appear to Europe should you attempt to refuse it? I strongly advise you not to do so. If there be any wisdom or moderation in the French government, you will, through the medium of this mediation, be enabled to restore peace upon terms of justice and honour; and certainly there does not exist a power so competent to the object as the proposed mediator, nor one that has a fairer right to interpose its influence for the preservation of the peace of Europe. He may say to this country, "I have agreed to an arrangement with you upon certain points of great importance to my naval power, which was not in all respects satisfactory to my wishes, but yet I acceded to it from the love of peace, and from the same motive I shall adhere to it. You complain of the terms of the treaty of Amiens, and so do I of the terms of the Northern Convention; but you say you agreed to that treaty from the love of peace—just the same reason induced me to subscribe to the Northern Convention. Then I contend you are as much bound to make a sacrifice to the peace of Amiens, as I am to sacrifice to the Northern Convention." But when this Prince shall come to address himself to the French government, he might speak upon still stronger grounds. It is reported that a proposition was some time since made by France to a certain European power (and no one doubts that this power is Russia), to divide the territory of the Turkish empire. This report is alluded to in a paragraph of his Majesty's Declaration, and it is there stated, that this proposition was distinctly refused. The Emperor would therefore stand upon the highest grounds in talking of the French government. He might say, "You proposed to me the dismemberment of Turkey, which is an object that has been much wished for by my predecessors, and for which, therefore, I might naturally be supposed to entertain an hereditary partiality; but I would not adopt your proposition, because I felt that it would not be just in me to invade the possessions of a neighbouring power, although I am quite sensible that I have as much right to do so as you have. If you use lofty language, I am not less entitled to do so; but I prefer peace to the gratification of any arrogant pretensions or ambitious projects, and you should do the same from the same solicitude. I abstain from any hostile attacks on other powers, and you should abstain also." Such are the terms in which this Prince could speak, and if urged to it no doubt would, if you accept his mediation. Let me, therefore, advise you to attach yourself to that power from which alone you can expect to derive any material assistance towards accomplishing the ends you have in view, either of an honourable and immediate peace, or a successful war. With that power alone if you could contrive to form a close alliance, you would be able to protect all the other states of Europe from unjust attack. It is well known that a strong desire of peace prevails among the people of France; but however general and sincere that opinion may be, will not war become somewhat popular when it is stated to them, that their government was willing to submit the consideration of their case to the Emperor of Russia, but that England refused to avail itself of that Monarch's offer to mediate? This will furnish presumptive evidence against you. It would be material to your purpose to deprive the French government of this advantage. Some Gentlemen affect to say that a proposition has been made by the Russian Emperor of such a nature as not to promise any decisive consequences; and others assert, that even if so, it ought not to be acceded to. With neither of these Gentlemen do I agree; but I certainly coincide with those who maintain that this country should not submit its claims to the arbitrary decision of Russia, or any other power;

but will it not be wise to explain the justice of those claims, and to interest a powerful state in your cause? If, after having done so, the French government should refuse you a fair satisfaction, and its system should appear to lead to the subversion of the continental powers, do you think it improbable that Russia would connect herself with you on fair defensive principles to repel such injustice? I think it is not; at least you ought to make the experiment, as the opportunity is so favourable. It cannot prevent you from prosecuting the war with vigour, a war to which I am far from saying you are not competent in point of means, if it should be necessary for you to pursue it alone. But, however high I may think of your resources, I must say that they are not such as are applicable to the main object of the war with France, which I take it for granted to be for the purpose of abridging the continental power of that government. To that, however, you would be quite adequate with the assistance of Russia; at least it would afford the best chance of it. If Russia offers her mediation with sincerity, and I believe none doubts that she does, she feels an interest in the question that must turn in a very material manner to your advantage, perhaps ultimately to a treaty of alliance. Acting in concert with such a power, and for a just object, you could have little danger to apprehend. With such a junction, Europe would have little to fear from the ambition of any man. It would be quite sufficient to make any government of France, however powerful or enterprising, hesitate before it resolved to engage in any war against such an union. She certainly had not sufficient resources to warrant the undertaking. A short review of the state of Europe would serve to establish that point. I shall not now argue the question, whether France or Russia has the preponderance as to military force; but I will observe, that, united with this country, Russia would have the decided advantage, particularly as there seems no likelihood whatever that any other power on the continent would engage in the conflict, at least not to throw their weight into the scale of France. Indeed, it is manifest that Russia is the only power on the continent whose connexion we should studiously cultivate, in the view of checking the career of France. Neither Austria nor Prussia can be for that purpose at all looked to. I will not enter into any investigation of the conduct of the latter power for some time back, which may in some instances be very justly condemned; but it is evident that its general policy is pacific; and Austria from prudence and necessity is not less so. From the lassitude occasioned by the last war, from the diminution of her resources, and from the change of her councils, she does not seem at all disposed to warfare. That respectable, and universally respected character, the Archduke Charles, after the immortal glory which he has acquired in war, a glory not to be reduced by defeat, now, happily for mankind, seems to consider his best glory to consist in discharging the obligations which he owes to the people, through whose assistance he has been enabled to establish his fame, by endeavouring to secure to them the enjoyment, and studying to promote the advantages, of peace. Such is the employment of this illustrious Prince, and therefore there appears very little probability that Austria will be for some time revisited by the calamities of war. This short review of European powers serves to shew that Russia is the only state to which you can look at present for effective aid; and, independently of this consideration, is it not desirable for you to have the good wishes of mankind? and of that you must be certain, should you obtain the concurrence of the Emperor of Russia in the justice of the cause which has urged you to war. This concurrence would completely satisfy the House and the country; and it would also produce an impression in your favour in the minds of the people and governments of the other states of Europe, which are tribunals that it is for your interest to conciliate; still more, it would induce a good opinion of your cause in the minds of the people, subject to the authority of the French government. In all probability you would, through this concurrence, not only obtain good wishes, but allies. When your cause should be made known, you would, at all events, be certain of the good wishes of the people of Holland, Switzerland, and many parts of Italy; but it may be said that these people could give you no assistance. Under the present circumstances perhaps they could not. The case, however, would be materially different, if you had the co-operation of Russia. In various other points of view it will be advisable for you to avail yourself of this proposed mediation. The consequences of your refusal to give an account (I don't mean that this country is to account for its conduct to any power whatever); but I say, that if you decline to state your case now, you may not be in such a favourable situation again.—The same power may be slow to come forward, and there is no other to which you can refer, because there is none that can or will assist you in checking the aggrandizement of France. Whether Ministers, then, are disposed to peace, or determined on vigorous war, it is their interest to avail themselves of the proposed mediation. If, however, they are of opinion, upon good grounds, that this proposal is a mere expedient to procure delay; if they think that with that view solely this offer of mediation was made in collusion with France, most undoubtedly it ought to be rejected; but this suspicion, I am persuaded, can never have entered into any rational mind. So little are Ministers disposed to think so, and so respectfully do they estimate the character of the Russian government,

that I have no doubt they would have gladly received it, had it been earlier made. Why then should not that proposal be acceptable to terminate a war which would have had a welcome reception at the beginning of it? Russia was one of the guarantees, or rather the principal, you relied upon for the security of Malta against France. This was to have been the solid ground of peace. You have now an opportunity by which, in all likelihood, you may extend that guarantee to the peace and security of Europe. You may now, by wise management, be able to establish a better safeguard for the small states of the continent than you ever can, at least, by your own single exertion in arms. You have, in fact, the best opportunity that has offered for the two last centuries for fixing the tranquillity of Europe on a solid and permanent basis. Combining all the powers specified in the guarantee for Malta, they would be able to keep any individual state within equitable bounds; they would be able to protect the rights and territories of all states from invasion, to prevent the oppression of the smaller states, and to restrain the mischievous spirit of aggrandizement. They would be able to say to the several states of Europe, Let those who have gained not think of any farther extending their gains, and let those who have lost acquiesce in their losses, and let justice and tranquillity prevail. That such a combination of the higher states, directed to such high objects, is desirable, all good men will admit; and that it is practicable I am fully convinced; and an occasion now offers, in which Ministers may have the means of commencing the glorious work. The uneasiness of the minds of the people of every nation at the prospect of war, and the universal abhorrence of injustice, naturally induce an opinion that such a measure would have the benediction of all mankind; and surely humanity and sound policy would equally urge it.—The Hon. Member concluded with moving an address to his Majesty, praying that his Majesty would be graciously pleased to avail himself of the disposition manifested by the Emperor of Russia to mediate between this country and the French government; which disposition might not only lead to the speedy and honourable termination of the present contest, but to produce the most beneficial effects upon the general tranquillity and safety of Europe.

Lord HAWKESBURY rose to object to the motion upon two grounds: first, that there was no fair parliamentary ground laid for its adoption; and secondly, that, as no such ground was laid, the House should not, under the present circumstances, accede to a motion which could not be productive of any good, and might do harm, by betraying indecision. For the constitutional right of the House to interpose its advice upon the exercise of any branch of the Royal prerogative, and particularly as to peace or war, he felt as much respect and regard as the Hon. Gent.; but he contended, that before such interference was attempted, a good case ought to be made out. As the constitution vested certain powers in the Executive Government, the inference naturally was, that those powers were not to be restrained or dictated to by any other branch of the Legislature, but where they appeared to be abused. There were only two cases in which it was the province of any Hon. Member to recommend a measure to the Executive Government: the one where his Majesty's Ministers neglected to do that to which it was their duty to have attended; and the other, where the measure recommended was wholly different from the system which those Ministers pursued. Now, upon neither of those grounds did he think the proposition of the Hon. Gent. could be supported; for however some Gent. might be disposed to censure his Majesty's Ministers, he believed there were scarce any who would charge them with neglecting any means that could be resorted to to preserve peace with honour; and in proof of that disposition, he had only to refer to his Majesty's Declaration, where it was expressed in the strongest terms. Here all Europe might see that his Majesty was even now ready to enter into any arrangement consistent with the dignity of his Crown, and the essential interests of his people. He would ask, what could be the motive of such an appeal, but to shew the sincerity of his Majesty's wishes for the restoration of peace? And after such an appeal, he would ask also, was it possible that any Minister would advise his Majesty to refuse any mediation that was likely to produce acceptable terms of peace? With respect to the Hon. Gent.'s observations on the general state of Europe, he was not at all disposed to differ with him; but as to the practicability of the coalition he had described, he could not by any means agree with him, and the experience of the last ten years forbid any hope of such a league acting long and steadily in concert for such an object. Though such a concert, he would readily admit, was in the highest degree desirable—a concert not to be fettered or damped by little confined views, or by separate interests, but proceeding on fair, broad, and liberal grounds, yet he was not sanguine in his hope of witnessing it. He was aware that Russia was the power which it was most for the interest of this country to conciliate, with a view to avert the evils and to produce the good to which the Hon. Gent. had alluded; and without wishing to provoke any discussion upon this occasion, he would say, that one of the reasons he had for acceding to the last peace was, that during peace there might be an opportunity of procuring some continental alliance, of which there could be no hope during war, and which would serve to fix a barrier to the ambition

aggrandizement to which the French government was manifestly disposed; but notwithstanding this wish, he could state with the utmost sincerity, that he never omitted any endeavour that could tend to preserve the peace inviolate: his endeavours with regard to an alliance were merely for a concert of a defensive nature, such as the Hon. Gent. had referred to in a part of his observations: that alone was his object, and with no view whatever to renew the war. However little might be the disposition of some parties to do justice to Ministers, he hoped this at least, they would acknowledge that nothing was omitted to preserve that peace; and he saw no change in the state of things that could induce him at all to calculate upon the probability of its restoration from the adoption of the motion. There was nothing feasible in the proposition alluded to by the Hon. Gent. He had stated, that it would have been gladly received by Ministers at any period of the negotiation. What, in point of fact, was this proposal? Why, that if any difficulty arose between the British and French governments, in the communication of their sentiments to each other, that the Russian Ambassadors at Paris and London should facilitate that communication, and that they might be made the mediums of explanation. Now, he would ask of the House, after the very protracted negotiation they had witnessed, after the state of anxiety in which they had known the country to have been placed, whether Ministers would have been justifiable in consenting to any farther delay, where no mediation likely to be effective had been offered. That the French government should have expressed its willingness to avail itself of the mode of communication proposed, was not to be wondered at, as, had this country consented, it would have afforded the means for continuing for some time longer that system of evasion and procrastination which the papers on the table sufficiently exposed, and which seemed to be the policy of that government to pursue.—The Hon. Gent. had stated the advantages to be derived from the mediation of Russia, not only with reference to the particular case of the points in dispute betwixt this country and the French republic, but with a view to the establishment of a general guarantee for the protection of all the weaker states of Europe. With this opinion he most distinctly coincided. Of the importance of the mediation of Russia, no man, possessing enlarged views of national policy, could for a moment entertain a doubt. If such a mediation could be procured, it would not be contended by any one that it would not be peculiarly advantageous. An allusion had been made to the system of naval neutrality which had been set up by the Northern powers. He had much satisfaction in stating to the House, that with the great majority of reflecting individuals in Russia, and particularly with the individuals composing the government, a more wise system of policy was now pursued. Views of an enlarged and comprehensive nature were indulged. It was allowed that the interests of this country and of Russia were in every point of view compatible: a decided opinion was formed, that no useful purpose could be promoted by pressing the neutral question. The fact was, indeed, that this question was brought forward under the reign of the late Empress, in whose character the pride and the vanity of being at the head of a coalition, operated more powerfully than any considerations of real and permanent utility to her empire. It could not be forgotten that Russia possessed no mercantile marine, and that if the present relations of the Turkish empire continued, a mercantile marine never could, to any great extent, be formed. The only consequence of the establishment of the neutrality to be contended for, would therefore be to introduce into the Baltic, powers whose influence it was the obvious interest of Russia to counteract. He could not too strongly press on the House his conviction of the extreme importance of the co-operation of Russia in any plan to counteract the progress of French ambition; and he could fairly assure the House, that any measure calculated to promote this object was one which would meet with the warmest concurrence from Ministers. His objection to the Hon. Gent.'s motion was, however, simply, that it had been supported on no parliamentary ground. It had not been proved that Ministers had shewn any indisposition to accept of this mediation; and till this were proved, he must contend that the motion was unnecessary and inexpedient. In the conclusion of his Majesty's Declaration, on the contrary, a disposition to accept of any arrangement by which an amicable adjustment could be obtained, was clearly laid down; and after such a declaration, he could not see what beneficial consequence could arise from pressing the motion. On the other hand, it might have a very unfavourable effect on the state of the public mind; it might unhinge the exertions of the country, and lead to expectations which were not to be realized. He would not say that the hope of mediation was altogether romantic, but he would contend that hopes ought not to be held out to the country which might be disappointed. These were the grounds on which he objected to the motion. To the principles of the Hon. Gent.'s speech he had no possible objection—they were principles in which all were agreed. As it now stood, however, the motion could be productive of no good, and might be attended with considerable evil. He should therefore, as the most convenient way of disposing of it, move the previous question.

Mr. Pitt.—In rising upon this occasion, it is not my intention to detain the House many moments. In the present important crisis of

affairs, I am sure there must be a common wish and a general feeling that it is not desirable to press into view any differences, or to press the House to any division upon topics of minor importance. Whatever I may think of the Hon. Gent.'s proposal as a motion of advice in the actual circumstances, with most, nay, I may say with all, of the general principles of the speech on which it was grounded, I most heartily concur. I heard, indeed, the speech of the Hon. Gent. with infinite satisfaction; and that satisfaction was heightened by observing, that my Noble Friend, the Secretary of State, received the sentiments with that approbation which left no doubt on my mind, that, if any effect can be given to those principles (and it belongs to the Executive Government, in the first instance, to give them application), no favourable opportunity will be lost of putting them in practice. It would be strange, however, if I had not heard with approbation the principles laid down by the Hon. Gent. They are the principles which, in the best times of this country, induced and enabled this House to contribute to the general liberty and independence of Europe; to support the rights and redress the wrongs of minor powers, and to oppose a successful resistance to the encroachments of ambition. They are the principles which (more than any passionate and national opposition to France, proved, as France has been by so many facts, to be the rival and almost the national enemy of this country) led us not to consider the name of any particular state, or the prejudices of local situation, or the dictates of separate interest, but prompted us to set ourselves in opposition to any power, both as, in the first instance, it threatened the repose and the rights of other states; and, in the second, as it affected the independence and security of Great Britain. I rejoice to be able, on this occasion, to agree with the Hon. Gent. in his general principles, though I cannot but remember there have been times when the Hon. Gent. differed from me, on the application of those principles, with a vehemence that looked very like an entire condemnation of them. If, however, he does admit the principles, I rejoice, for the sake of the country, that he has stated them in a manner so clear, so just, and so satisfactory. They are the principles on which the greatness, the glory, and the prosperity of this nation have been reared; and never were they struggled for more gloriously than they were during the last war: and it was only when I saw myself compelled, by adverse circumstances, to despair of the effect of their application, that I looked to any separate arrangements for this country. They are the principles upon which I found myself justified in proposing to this House large subsidies to continental powers; they are the principles on which I have thought that it was justifiable to sacrifice our private and separate interests to procure greater advantages for our allies, and to promote and consolidate the security of the general system of Europe; they are the principles that supported me when I found myself obliged to differ from several friends, for whose talents and opinions I entertain the highest respect, about the manner in which the war was terminated. It was those principles which, after there was no longer any hope of improving the situation of the continent, and promoting the security of the general system of Europe, by any separate efforts of our own, led me to think, that in making terms for ourselves, we were more at liberty to yield considerable sacrifices, with a view to put an end to the evils of war, than we should have been had we sought peace by the desertion of our allies, and an abandonment of the cause of Europe.—But far be it from me to enter upon those topics to call forth difference of opinion, and to provoke former disputes. I allude to them to shew that the principles I now applaud are not new to me. My approbation of them is recorded in my past conduct. I am glad that the Hon. Gent. has proclaimed them with so much precision and force: I hope they will have the benefit of his great authority, and the recommendation of his great talents (and greater authority they cannot have), to remove objections which have sheltered themselves, perhaps more than there was ground for, under his name, against all common cause with the rest of Europe, and against sacrificing, in any circumstances, the least portion of British interests, for the balance and preservation of the continent. But, while I approve the principle of keeping a watchful eye upon the state of the continent, I do not mean that, on every occasion, upon every movement, we ought to interfere with continental affairs. All I say is, that no great convulsion, which shall unhinge the established interests, and dissolve former relations, can take place without involving consequences highly important to Great Britain. We are not bound, however, to take upon ourselves to interfere, even when interference would be desirable, unless we are joined by those whose co-operation would be necessary to give effect to that interference. But whether for a season of war or of peace—whether in the view of giving energy to our arms, or security to our repose—whether with a view of preventing war by negotiation, or restoring peace after war has broken out, it is the duty of the Ministers of this country to avail themselves of the good offices of powers with whom it must be the interest of this country to be united in alliance.—The Hon. Gent. very properly avoided detailing any mode in which the principles he laid down might be applied to the mediation of Russia. Indeed, it is impossible to point out the mode of application, without knowing exactly the circumstances in which it would be exerted. I shall therefore, upon the whole, follow the Hon. Gent.'s ex-

ample in avoiding that detail. It will appear whimsical, however, if I now seem to narrow the principle of continental policy, which the Hon. Gent. has sanctioned. This, nevertheless, I venture to state, that if there can arise out of the mediation of the Emperor of Russia, any chance of producing a general system on which peace could be restored, and confirmed by respectable guarantees—a peace by which not only the objects in dispute between Great Britain and France, but other points relative to the state of Europe, could be adjusted—it would be a consummation so important, that, to obtain it, some arrangement, even less advantageous to this country in a separate view, would be admissible. What that arrangement should be, either as to the general system or our particular interest, it is impossible beforehand to determine: it will depend upon all the circumstances of the case.—On the other hand, if that system were not attainable, our interest would prescribe other views and other precautions. Though unwilling to separate ourselves from the continent, though willing to make some deduction from the sum of our own demands, and from the means of separate security to augment the strength of the general system, it might happen that we should be left, without any fault of our own, to maintain a separate struggle. If we know that France entertains views of hostility towards us—if we know that we have in our hands strong and impregnable means of resistance—powerful and effectual means to defeat that hostility with which we have been particularly threatened, then would it be especially incumbent on us to provide, that any substitute for our security, which a general arrangement would afford, should be solid and efficient. If our security is to depend upon our own single efforts, and to be maintained by our own separate arrangements, we have in our power the means; nor shall we put to hazard by a feeble policy what British valour has gained. To consolidate our security by the general security of Europe, is undoubtedly desirable; as well as to provide for it by particular and separate arrangements. To unite both in their respective degrees, must be that which is most desirable; but how far each will be carried must be regulated by circumstances. So much I thought it necessary to hint, that we may not be turned into the opposite extremes of, on the one hand, neglecting the state of the continent altogether, as conducive to our security; and, on the other, that we may not look to any continental arrangements with such confidence as to slacken our efforts, and to abandon our separate means of vindicating our rights, and preserving by war that security to which we are entitled: unless, like most of the states of the continent, we are ready to sink into subjection to the power of the aggressions and outrages of which we complain.—So much upon the general principles laid down by the Hon. Gent. the justice of which I so strongly feel. Nevertheless, unless some practicable benefit is to be derived from pressing the motion, I hope the Hon. Gent. will be inclined to withdraw it. To press it to a division at the present moment, would be attended with one of two inconveniences: either the previous question would be carried, by which there might be room for the misconstruction that one part of the House was hostile to the principles on which the Hon. Gent. argued; or, on the other hand, if the motion were carried, it would imply a doubt that the House entertained a suspicion that Ministers did not concur in the principles so well laid down in the Hon. Gent.'s speech, and were unwilling to give them effect; a suspicion for which, after what has been said by my Noble Friend, the Secretary of State, there appears no foundation. I therefore hope that the Hon. Gent. will rescue the House from this dilemma, by withdrawing his motion.

Mr. Fox, in reply, contended that he opposed the late war on precisely the same principles which he had this evening thought it his duty to state to the House. He opposed it at the commencement, because he foresaw that its prosecution would only have the effect of destroying the influence of this country on the continent. Throughout the course, he only saw additional proofs of the correctness of that opinion. The Rt. Hon. Gent. had himself allowed that he was friendly to the peace, on the precise ground that the further prosecution of the war would not have held out a prospect of producing any change in the unsatisfactory state of the continent. Without assuming to himself any peculiar degree of credit for superior sagacity, he might be permitted to say that he had, at a much earlier period, foreseen what the Rt. Hon. Gent. had at length admitted. On the same principle he had supported the treaty of peace, not as good in itself, but as preferable to a continuance of the war. He did not at all mean to revive the remembrance of points of former dispute, which were now happily passed over, but these few observations he felt himself called on to state to the House. With respect to the question immediately before the House, it was necessary for him only to say a few words, having previously stated the grounds of his motion. He did not mean to dispute the right of the Executive Government to decide, in the first instance, on the question of peace or war. He was not, however, at all disposed to admit the position, that no Member of the House of Commons had a right to call in question the propriety of the exercise of this right, till some proof of the existence of criminality or neglect on the part of Ministers was established. He did not, by bringing forward the motion, charge Ministers with having neglected to take pro-

per measures for the preservation of peace, but, at the same time, a motion of the nature which he had brought forward might be highly necessary. It was, he believed, pretty notorious that an offer of mediation had been made by the court of Russia. It was not, however, at all equally notorious, that this offer of mediation had been accepted, or was likely to be accepted. He had no wish to press his motion to a division, if the information he wished to receive could be otherwise obtained. If it could be stated by Ministers that there was, at this moment, a disposition to accept of the mediation of Russia, he had no sort of objection to withdraw his motion. Something had been said about the effect which the motion would have in unhinging the public mind. He was at a loss to conceive how such an assertion could be seriously urged: he really confessed himself at a loss to see how such an effect could be produced. He could not imagine why attempts to negotiate at the time a war was commenced, could at all paralyze the exertions of the country. He was only anxious to press the motion, because from the mediation of Russia he entertained the most sanguine hopes that the war in which we were engaged would be speedily terminated. The Noble Lord had said, that the mediation offered was merely an offer of the explanation of the Russian Ambassador, relative to the points in dispute betwixt the two governments. He would not deny that this was the lowest species of mediation, but it still might be productive of important consequences, and might lead to a mediation of a more important kind. He pressed his motion now, because if the offer of a mediation were not now accepted, the advantages which might result from it would be lost, and it would be no satisfaction to any Member then to ask Ministers why they had not accepted the offer, when the consequences of their refusal could not be repaired. In this case the evil would be positively felt, which, by a timely interference on the part of the House, might have been avoided. Unless, therefore, he received a more distinct assurance from Ministers of their readiness to accept of the mediation, he should, however unwilling to disturb the unanimity which was so desirable, feel it his duty to press the motion.

Lord HAWKESBURY stated what was the nature of the mediation offered by Russia. The fact was, that the impression on the mind of the Emperor Alexander was, that there was a certain degree of reluctance on the part of the two governments to explain distinctly the points of mutual dispute. It had accordingly been proposed, that the Russian Ministers at London and Paris should interpose their good offices for procuring this explanation. A desire was also expressed of the willingness of the Emperor to do all in his power to facilitate an amicable adjustment of the differences betwixt the two governments. At the time this offer was made, Lord Whitworth was on the eve of quitting Paris; and looking, therefore, to an immediate termination of the discussions, the offer was by far too loose and too general, in the judgment of Ministers, to be then adopted. At the same time Ministers did not conceal from the court of St. Petersburgh, and they were as little desirous of concealing from the House, that with reference not only to the particular points in dispute betwixt the two governments, but with reference to the establishment of a guarantee for the general independence and security of Europe, they were ready to accept of the mediation of Russia. On this ground they had not only expressed their willingness to receive any proposition from the court of St. Petersburgh, but they had gone much beyond this assurance. They had declared their readiness to explain, in the most frank and explicit terms, the views which they entertained on the points in dispute, and the mode which to them appeared the best calculated to bring about an amicable arrangement. No question of etiquette would stand in the way; the whole declaration of Ministers had been given in the true spirit of peace. In aid of his Majesty's Declaration, an express assurance was given of his readiness to listen to any proposal for restoring the blessings of peace; and he had now to assure the Hon. Gent. and the House, that Ministers were ready to receive any offer of mediation on the part of Russia, or to offer to the mediation of this power the points in dispute betwixt the two governments.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Thursday, June 2.—(See Minutes, p. 869.)

[CONDUCT OF MINISTERS.]—Earl FITZWILLIAM, in the course of the various observations he made, as introductory to his proposed resolutions, adverted to the solemnity and importance of the questions which their Lordships were that night to decide. He, in common with those who heard him, must be apprized of the respectable character of those against whom he was about to state grounds for the disapprobation of that House, as Ministers. The task he had undertaken was painful; he was guided by no personal motives, but came forward upon public grounds, and under strong impressions of his parliamentary duty. The subject which he brought forward to the consideration of their Lordships, was not the act of his Majesty's Ministers upon any one day, nor their conduct at any given particular period singly, but the general tenour and uniform character of their proceedings for a very important time. He should have particularly to notice their

conduct, not only since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, but from the signing of the preliminaries. In this view of the question, the Noble Earl proceeded to argue, that many of the acts of the French government, in the interval alluded to, were of the precise character and description of those acts which Ministers afterwards thought worthy of specific remonstrance and negotiation, and at a period when such proceedings could not obtain with that effect as if they had been taken up in the first instance. Among the instances stated by his Lordship of the unjustifiable and aggressive conduct of the French at these periods, were their proceedings with respect to several parts of Italy, where, with the most unprincipled audacity, they dismembered ancient nations, and annexed their spoliated territories. Why did not Ministers shew some indications of wisdom or of spirit by an interference on these occasions? Why was not so extensive an aggrandizement of the French territory and power resisted by his Majesty's government? So early as the month of February in that year, was the basis agreed upon between the two governments infringed upon and disregarded by France. Adverting to a more advanced period, he observed, that scarcely had the first months of peace elapsed before the French made additional annexations to their territory: the countries of Parma, &c. were taken possession of. In this part of his speech, his Lordship referred to memorandums for the dates of the periods in which the French had taken possession of different parts of Italy, until they became possessed of the greater or more valuable part of that peninsula: in short, if that country could not be considered as an integral part of France, it must be considered in the light of a province. On these occasions, he contended, Ministers should have stepped forward, and at least done that which afterwards they found themselves constrained to do, but at a period when it was impossible they could act with such advantage or effect. He next adverted to the affairs of Switzerland: by the information laid before Parliament, he said it appeared, that the conduct of Ministers with respect to the Cape was guided by their sense of the transactions which had taken place in Switzerland. If not, it would be incumbent upon them to state the grounds upon which so extraordinary a line of conduct proceeded. He then referred to the papers upon the table for the dates, &c. of particular proceedings which took place in the course of those transactions. He next alluded to the mission of Mr. Moore, which he contended was at a period when it was well known the interference of Ministers could be of no avail. He then noticed the admitted acts of aggression and injustice which had been exercised by the French against the subjects of this country, and which were in open violation of express treaty, and contended, that in scarcely any one instance had justice been done to the representations on our part. Passing on to the affair on which so much stress had been laid, namely, that of Malta, he observed, that on this occasion it was that Ministers first appeared to manifest any degree of spirit or resolution, which former instances more loudly called for, and where a spirited interference could have been made with much more grace and effect. He made frequent references, and read copious extracts from the papers while discussing this part of his subject, and argued, that Ministers must have been long before aware of the intentions of the First Consul with respect to Egypt, and before any specific communications took place relative to the island of Malta; but that was the only point upon which Ministers seemed to call for decisive explanation. They at length called upon the spirit of the country for support, in a case in which, comparatively, there existed no adequate grounds, when they passed by the innumerable acts of violence and aggression on the part of France, without one decisive interference, or call upon the country for its support in resisting them. He censured the line of conduct adopted by Ministers with respect to the termination of those transactions, as well as the mode and period in which they came forward to Parliament and the country. Circumstances had shewn that their boasted treaty of peace was only a temporary truce, and that Ministers had withheld all due knowledge and information from Parliament and the country, at periods when those were necessary, and might have been attended with the most desirable consequences. It was upon these general grounds that he had to call upon their Lordships, in vindication of their own honour, and in contemplation of the best interests of the country, to adopt resolutions expressive of their just sense of the weak, impolitic, and disgraceful conduct of Ministers in the points to which he had adverted. He could not avoid pressing to their consideration, that now the country being, in consequence of the measures of those Ministers, again in a state of war, if they desired the assistance or co-operation of other nations, or wished their country to be respected abroad, the affairs of government must be administered by men of acknowledged talent, in whom the country could safely confide, and who, in return, could fairly call upon the country for its exertions and support.

The Earl of LIMERICK said, that on a former night it was proposed to consider the necessity and justice of the war, as a subject distinct from the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers. For his part he could not separate those considerations, so closely were they linked and interwoven. He entertained no doubt of being able to shew from the speech of the Noble Earl himself, that the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers had been guided by moderation, as

long as they thought peace could be preserved; and when they could no longer preserve peace consistently with the honour of their Sovereign, or the true interest of their country, they acted with becoming spirit and decision; that they endeavoured to raise the dormant spirit of Europe, and finally recurred to that line of conduct which a long series of insults and aggressions on the part of the enemy had rendered necessary. The substance of the first resolution, he conceived to be, that since the treaty of peace, a series of insults and aggressions was experienced by this country from France, and that from a number of those acts, a disposition had become manifest, on the part of the French government, to violate the treaty of peace. The next resolution went to complain of Ministers for not having from time to time communicated those acts of aggression, the correspondence, &c. to Parliament. If Ministers had followed such a course, it would be a dereliction of their duty; nay, it would be an infringement of the constitution of their country. The prerogative of the Crown was too well known to require exposition: to have recourse, therefore, to Parliament in the way alluded to, would be to convert both branches of the Legislature into cabinets. It would go, in a great degree, to exonerate Ministers from their responsibility, and share it between them and both Houses of Parliament, and ultimately, the Great Council of the Nation could not punish for acts which it had repeatedly sanctioned. It was asserted in another of the resolutions, that Ministers made no representations against those acts of the French government; but let their Lordships look to the correspondence, and they will be convinced of the contrary. The conduct of Ministers might be divided into three periods: the first, that which immediately succeeded the definitive treaty of peace; in that they endeavoured most scrupulously to fulfil all its conditions, and to secure to their country and to Europe the blessings of peace. The second was, that at which they laudably endeavoured to rescue Switzerland from its impending fate; and on this point, what could, or what should Ministers do, but precisely what they did? They dispatched a person to learn first, whether the Swiss were disposed to resist; secondly, the extent of their power; and lastly, the dispositions of those continental powers more intimately connected with that country. There were two parties, who disapproved of the conduct of Ministers: the one thought they had unnecessarily forced the country into the war; the other, that war ought to have been made long since: for his part he disagreed with both. Ministers had chosen the moment to act with spirit, when it was impossible to refrain from war. Previous to this, their conduct was such, as tended to give every facility to the execution of the treaty; they endured, for a considerable time, the aggressive conduct of the French government, in its insolent attempts against that great palladium of the liberties of the country, namely, the freedom of the press, and in the cruel demand respecting the Bourbon family, and the train of virtuous nobles who preferred sharing their fortune and their fate; and ecclesiastics who had resisted the proffers held out to them, sooner than violate their consciences and their oaths. At the moment these insolent requisitions were made, self-convicted and avowed traitors were openly protected and cherished by the French government; men who had plunged their daggers into the bosoms of their unoffending countrymen. It would appear, he observed, that there were other causes for ordering the evacuation of the Cape to be suspended, than the affairs of Switzerland. About the period the counter-orders were sent out, there was an apparent intention on the part of France, to pour a great number of troops into Holland, under the pretence of securing its independence, but, in fact, to abrogate the little remnant of its independence which then existed. Were the cession made under such circumstances, though nominally to Holland, it would in effect be to France. About that period it appeared Ministers had received intelligence of a design formed by the accommodating father of the Western family, who had made overtures to Russia, &c. respecting a partition of the Turkish empire. In this project the First Consul intended to secure Egypt for himself, and the Morea was to be erected into an independent republic. This proposition was not acceded to; however, Ministers very properly required explanation: about this time they came to the knowledge of Sebastiani's mission, of which an official report had been published. He then adverted to another aggression manifested by the French government—the publication which the French agent, Reinhard, caused to take place at Hamburgh, which he reprobated as a foul and aggravated libel on his Majesty's government. There could be no palliation for this outrageous proceeding, for Reinhard was long employed in proceedings of the kind, and he knew that Ireland was not exempt from the effects of his manœuvres. Soon after this, the well-known insult at the Thuilleries took place: this was deliberately designed, under the idea of sinking this government in the eyes of Europe. The intentions of the First Consul with respect to Egypt, were soon after avowed. Let their Lordships recollect the language of Talleyrand, that the refusal to evacuate Malta would be considered as a renewal of war; that England should not retain any thing in the Mediterranean; that not a sail of theirs should swim upon that sea, nor should she have a port therein to receive them. With respect to the references to Russia, it must be obvious to the meanest capacity, that their object was to gain time, in order to recall their scattered commerce and their ships of war. He trusted the resolutions of the Noble Earl

would be negatived, and expressed his hope that some Noble Lord, more competent to the task than he was, would bring forward some resolution, expressive of their Lordships' approbation of the conduct of Ministers.

Lord GROSVENOR said, that with regard to the first resolution, he thought it would be better to move the previous question; but as to the others, he trusted that he concurred with a majority of the House in thinking that they ought to be negatived. The Noble Lord had preferred a series of charges against his Majesty's Ministers, and if his motion was agreed to, an impeachment against Ministers ought to follow. He wished the House to recall to its recollection the time and the circumstances under which the present Administration were called into office: it was at a period of great danger and difficulty. The House would also recollect, that it had distinctly approved of the convention with the Northern powers—it had approved of the preliminary and of the definitive treaties of peace. It was therefore fair, when they were called upon to vote a censure against Ministers, to bear in mind how much of their conduct had already received the approbation of the House. If Ministers had lost the confidence of Parliament, or of the people, they ought not to retain their situation; but he saw no reason for believing that they had lost the confidence of the people of this country, or of foreign powers. The Noble Earl who moved the resolutions had entertained opinions about the peace different from those of a very large majority of that House, and of the country. The Noble Lord had complained that Ministers had not resisted the first insults and aggressions on the part of France. It was undoubtedly true, that if they had been disposed to go to war, the conduct of France had afforded them many justifications, in the annexation of Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, Elba, &c. to the French republic. But if Ministers had acted upon these provocations, if they had immediately plunged the country into a war, would they have given the experiment which had been made of a peace, a fair trial? Another charge against Ministers was, they had not made earlier communications of the hostile dispositions of France; but if they were anxious to preserve peace, a premature communication to Parliament was perhaps the only mean to render it impossible. The earnest wish of this country, and all Europe, was to maintain peace: it was Buonaparté, and Buonaparté alone, that wished for war. He certainly did not believe that the people of France were desirous of war, but they were forced into it by the ambition of their ruler: he hoped, however, they would throw off a yoke which was now so galling. In saying this he did not wish any thing personally hostile to the First Consul; he only wished him removed from his situation, because he believed that would afford the only chance of peace.

Lord DARNLEY said, that however high he respected the individuals who composed the administration, yet collectively, it was his duty to say that he disapproved their conduct. He considered that the occupation of the Italian republic, Piedmont, Parma, and Switzerland, by France, were every one of them objects deserving a decided interference on the part of the British Cabinet. He thought, that if a tone of proper firmness had been held by his Majesty's Ministers on these several occasions, we should either have had no occasion to go to war at all, or the war would have been entered into with much greater advantage than we now have. He was of opinion that the Ministers have made out a strong cause for war, but have not equally proved their own ability for the conducting it.

Lord BORINGDON said, that occasions had occurred in which Ministers would have been justified in calling upon Parliament to take the measures they were now recommending, but in acting in the manner they had, that they had displayed great moderation and wisdom. It was true that France had been guilty of many acts of aggression and insult against us, and against all Europe; but previous to the grand question about Malta, he did not think there was any point upon which the country would have gone heart and hand into a war.

Lord WESTMORELAND called upon the House to look at the whole of the conduct of Ministers since they came into office, and by that they wished to be tried. Their conduct when they first came into office, did not tend to weaken the exertions of our naval and military force; and in proof of this assertion, he need only refer to what had passed at Copenhagen, in the Straits of Gibraltar, and in Egypt. If they were to be judged by the convention with the Northern powers, he could only say, that upon that subject they had received the decided approbation of Parliament. With respect to the preliminary treaty of peace, upon that point also they had received the approbation of Parliament, and of a Rt. Hon. Gent. under whose support they were proud to shelter themselves.—It had been said, that when peace was made, assurances were held out, that every thing was to be amity and friendship. If Noble Lords would look to the address which was voted upon that occasion, they would find that it contained very different language. That Government was sincere in its wish for peace, was proved by their conduct after the signature of the definitive treaty; they disbanded 70,000 militia, 20,000 fencibles, and as great a number of other troops, foreign and

English, who were engaged for a limited time; and every seaman that come home was immediately discharged. It had been asked, why, if France had shewn a hostile disposition, they had evacuated the Cape and other places? He said, that Government would not have been justified in refusing to evacuate the Cape, &c. which they were bound to evacuate by the treaty; and it would not have been very prudent then to have gone to war with a reduced army and navy. With regard to Switzerland, Ministers had interfered, and prevented the union of Switzerland with France, as the Italian republic had been united to it. Though he thought the Cape a very important place, he did not think it would be worth while risking a war for it, as he entertained no apprehensions of any attack that could be made upon our Indian possessions, as we had in India a native force of 100,000 well-disciplined men, besides 20,000 Europeans. It had been asserted that facts did not warrant the assertion in the King's message of the 8th of March respecting the armaments in the French and Dutch ports. There was, at this time, a naval force in the Texel, and 8000 men who were to be conveyed to Louisiana; the armament that could convey such a force to such a distance, could convey nearly three times the number across the Channel: there were other preparations in Havre, in Dunkirk, in Brest, and in the Mediterranean, capable in the whole of conveying a force of 50,000 men; so that there was ample justification for that part of the message.

Lord MULGRAVE said that all must be convinced, that there were three great objects of ambition which actuated the French government: the first was, to destroy the power and resources of this country in India; the next, to exclude our manufactures and our commerce from every port in Europe; and the third, resulting from the attainment of the other two, the destruction of the independence and prosperity of this great and immortal nation. These purposes had constantly been the objects of the French government, whether in war or in peace; and that these were still the objects of that government we must well be convinced, from the warnings which had fortunately been given to us. He would not go at length into the consideration of the various acts of hostility committed by France. The intention of France to invade this country had been fully explained. The instructions given to the persons called commercial commissioners, sent to this country, was of itself a sufficient explanation of that purpose. They had been told from good authority, that the war might probably be a short one; he was glad of it. He thought every discussion was impolitic which went to turn aside the attention of the people, which went to divert the high spirit and energies of the nation from the grand object of the aggressions of the enemy. It behoved the honour of the House, and it was important to the safety and security of this country, that they ought not to be discussing who should take measures for the defence of the country at the period when they should be discussing whether those measures ought to be taken. For these reasons he did not think that either the original motion, or the previous question, ought to be discussed; and he should therefore move, that the House do now adjourn.

The Earl of CARLISLE said, that every person must wish that Ministers should answer the charges which had been brought against them. They were told this was not the time to inquire into their conduct, but they had been told during a period of war, that that was not the time, in peace it was not the time; he should like to know when was the time to make that inquiry. On the contrary, it was their duty to inquire; and if they did not approve of the conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, it was their duty to address his Majesty, praying, that he would be graciously pleased to admit to his councils more of the talents of the country. He charged Ministers with not possessing those talents which were necessary for the carrying into effect the measures required for the prosecution of the contest in which we were engaged. With respect to the absence of all communication to Parliament, respecting the dispute between this country and France, there never was a period pregnant with so much danger, in which his Majesty's speech, at the commencement of a session like the present, had afforded so little information. Much had been urged on the subjects of Piedmont and Switzerland, and several other topics which had never been satisfactorily explained by Ministers; and now when they looked at his Majesty's Declaration, they found that those topics were urged with even greater force than had been before applied to them, yet no information was given to Parliament upon these subjects; on the contrary, Ministers had continually held out hopes of a permanent peace, and had talked of profound peace, when they knew that the country was on the verge of war. Could they say, that at those periods when they promised profound peace they believed in its continuance? Could they say so, when they had sent Mr. Moore to Switzerland to make war, and particularly when that mission was coupled with an order sent out for the non-evacuation of the Cape of Good Hope, which would have been a palpable violation of the treaty of Amiens? With respect to the general conduct of Ministers since the peace, it might be called moderate, but it appeared to him to be low and humble; and with respect to the French Princes, a low and humble tone had been assumed, which was extremely unbecoming, whilst a sentiment was attributed to

his Majesty on the subject, which he was sure never entered into the mind of his Majesty. When the commercial commissioners were sent to this country, and their object was discovered, Ministers ought to have sent a remonstrance that would have made the Thuilleries shake. It was certainly true that Ministers had no desire to go to war, as it was evident from the documents before the House, that they had no such desire. He did not deny the good intentions of his Majesty's Ministers, but they had not firmness adequate to encounter the perilous crisis to which we were now brought.

The Earl of Caernarvon said, that he was perfectly convinced, that those people in general who are the best judges, and whose good opinions were therefore most desirable, had not a confidence in the present Administration. He would request their Lordships seriously to consider what might be the consequences which might arise from a distrust or a contempt, on the part of the public, towards an administration. For himself, he had no hesitation in declaring that he had no confidence in Ministers. He respected their personal characters; some of them were particularly deserving of esteem; but in a public view of them, taken as a body, he must entertain a different opinion. They had, after making an inglorious peace, a peace of sacrifices, a disgraceful peace, assured the country of the great probability of its continuance. And then, after a short delusive repose, they came down to Parliament to inform them, that during that interval, when they had been proclaiming the duration of peace, they had been receiving nothing but a series of encroachments, hostile acts, aggressive provocations, and insults! Was this to be the fruits of their boasted peace, upon the grand experiment of which they reconciled the people to the surrender of all their victories? By the statement they had laid on the table, that state of peace which they had prepared for us by the improvident treaty of Amiens, was, in fact, no peace at all; a peace of trouble, a peace of war! The conduct of his Majesty's Ministers, therefore, loudly called for censure. They had, he was sorry to say, given evident proofs of an incapacity for their high and trying situations. He must speak out: they are not qualified for the management of the state in these times. The want of abilities in such great stations was a state crime; when men, by an error, got into such places, and then, by presumption, remained in them, after repeated proofs of their incapacity, they were highly culpable. The opinion of the public could not be forced by Parliament; and that public opinion, he would venture to say, was decidedly against the capability of Ministers. For his own part, he could not tell how to consent to draw forth the last dregs of comfort to aid the resources of this country in the present arduous war, while such want of talent was to be intrusted with its direction. However he must feel the propriety and probable necessity of contributing to the utmost for the support of Government, he must say that the support of those who conducted the government, as connected with the general object, was greatly against his inclination. The House should recollect, as had been already said, upon the events of this war would depend whether we should have another to conduct.

Lord Ellenborough said, he could not bear to hear the capacity of Ministers arraigned by the incapable, or their want of knowledge impeached by those who knew nothing. At the time that the present Administration came into power, dark clouds were thickening every hour around us, and he believed no man who did not possess firmness, would have accepted of offices at that period, when, added to our foreign enemies, there were still existing the smoking embers of an unextinguished rebellion. During that administration, our glorious success in Egypt took place, the honour of the country was supported in every quarter of the world. The nation, exhausted by a long war, called for peace; the peace was made, and was approved of both by the Parliament and the people. The peace was an experiment that it was fit and proper to make; and he was one who thought the experiment would have been more successful. He denied that the peace was a fraud; it was a scandal on the nation to call it a fraud. With respect to the conduct of Ministers previous to the present war, which had been already approved of, he contended that the several other hostile acts were not adequate causes for war, until the country saw that considerable efforts had been made to preserve peace, and that those efforts had failed. He did not mean to say that they were not adequate causes in themselves, but they were not justifiable causes under the circumstances of the case. It had been asked, why did not Ministers communicate to Parliament the situation of affairs between the two countries? but he asked any Noble Lord to lay his hand upon any paper, and to say, that that ought to have been communicated by his Majesty's Ministers to Parliament, pending a negotiation which involved the question of peace or war. The Ministers would, indeed, have deserved the charge of want of firmness, if they had come down to Parliament upon every point of the negotiation, instead of waiting till they could communicate the final result. He trusted, therefore, the House would shew, by its decision, that Ministers ought to have that credit and confidence which they had so well deserved by their conduct.

Earl SPENCER disclaimed any personal motives in the opposition he thought it his duty to make to Ministers. He entertained great regard and respect for them as individuals, but the situation of the country required that he should look with suspicion to their conduct as Ministers. In considering the conduct of Ministers, it would be necessary to take a view of their proceedings both before and after the treaty of peace. When that subject was first discussed in Parliament, his Majesty's Ministers boasted of the security of the peace, and to the pledge of its continuance which they had given by their assertions the country was indebted for many of the inconveniences under which it now laboured. It had been said that Ministers would not have run rashly into war, for their popularity depended on the preservation of peace. He acknowledged the truth of this; but he would ask whether it was not probable that this strong desire for peace on the part of his Majesty's Ministers might not render them less attentive to the terms on which it was preserved. It had also been contended that Ministers were driven into the peace by the universal call of the country. He must, however, beg of their Lordships to recollect what was the state of the public mind at that time: never was there less clamour for peace, and the intelligence of its being agreed upon astonished every one. It was true the approbation given to the peace by their Lordships was nearly unanimous; but let the Noble Lord recollect what was the ground of that unanimity. It could not be that the country wished to have peace on any terms: No. The approbation was given on the ground that there was no doubt of its permanency. It was given in consequence of the strong assurances made by Ministers of the certainty of the long duration of peace, in consequence of a change which they said had taken place in the temper and disposition of the enemy; but how far Ministers were authorized in making that assertion, their Lordships would be better able to judge if they were made acquainted with what passed during the negotiation. It had, from time immemorial, been the practice of the British government to inform Parliament in his Majesty's speech at the commencement of every session, of the situation of public affairs, as they respected foreign powers. How, then, were Ministers to justify their conduct in defending the treaty, when they knew that circumstances had occurred to render it absolutely incapable of execution, and which must soon drive the country into war? He must assert, that they could not justify themselves; for if they said that those circumstances to which he had alluded were not causes for war, it would then be incumbent on them to shew how they came to be so now. Nothing could be more censurable than the conduct of Ministers in allowing aggressions on the part of France to pass by unnoticed; nothing had been done to put a stop to the conduct of France: by a singular inconsistency, instructions had been given to Ld. Whitworth, dated the 14th of November, to state that any attempt to march French troops into Holland would be considered as a violation of the treaty of peace; yet immediately after orders had been sent out for the evacuation of the Cape of Good Hope. After instances of this kind, it was useless to talk of unanimity. It was true that it was not possible for the greatest wisdom always to ensure success; but every prudent man would wish to see the resources of the country intrusted in hands which were likely to give them a proper application. It was his wish to do every thing in his power to support his Majesty's government, and to defend his just rights; but it was at the same time his duty to see that the means of the country were not wasted and misapplied.

Lord MELVILLE said, that he found himself impelled to concur in the motion of adjournment, first, because if this matter was entered into at all, it would take up the greater part of the remainder of the session, if it was to be adequately discussed, and it was better not to discuss it at all than to discuss it imperfectly; secondly, that although this was an important point, and their Lordships had certainly the power of interfering to address the King to remove his Ministers, yet they had also besides their power, another thing to consider, which was the exercise of their discretion; and he thought that before any thing else was done, the House should do every thing in its power to put the country into a proper state for its defence at this most important crisis, as well to encourage the people at home, as to teach the enemy abroad, that we are an united people, which was not to be accomplished by a party struggle of who should get places under Government; thirdly, because there was no reason for presuming that the Ministers did not possess the entire confidence of the Crown; and therefore if the House addressed his Majesty to remove them, it might not perhaps be quite easy to agree upon others to supply their places, and this was not a time to be without an Administration. His Lordship assigned several reasons why he could not be able to assent to the several propositions with which the original motion was proposed to be followed up, and some others in which he could assent for disapproving of the conduct of Ministers, particularly in giving up the Cape of Good Hope, which he considered of immense value to us; but all these topics he said were of much too laborious a discussion for the present.

Lord HOBART complained of the manner in which Ministers were treated on the present occasion. A motion was made to censure them—they were aware that as they had been in a very arduous situation, in which there

must be many things done, which, without close examination, might be disapproved of, they were not anxious to have an inquiry into their conduct, but they were ready to meet it. A censure to be moved on Ministers was no light matter, and yet now it was proposed that the question should be adjourned, by which they would be left in the same situation as they were in before the debate, with the difference only of having had their conduct complained of.

Lord GRENVILLE said, that it was thought Ministers had a right to complain of the form and manner in which the subject was brought forward. If there was any deviation from the mode stated by the Noble and Learned Lords to be the usual mode, it arose from two causes: first, from a desire to separate the consideration of the state of the country from every other consideration; secondly, that Ministers themselves might be prepared to take what course they liked best. He had avoided saying any thing of the conduct of the King's Ministers on the night of the discussion of the question of peace or war, upon the information laid before the House, although, for the last twelve months, he had most undoubtedly much to state by way of censure upon them: but he abstained for two reasons; first, because he would not have the people of this country suppose that any consideration could supersede that of their interests; secondly, that the enemy may learn, that, as far as regards a stedfast opposition to them, we are an united people. It was true, there was great difference of opinion on the conduct of the King's Ministers; but that was a subject which did not mix with the consideration of the conduct of the enemy, the aggression and insolence of which we were determined to resist. They had no desire to embarrass the King's government, they had only the desire of performing their duty, that of entering into a consideration of the situation of this country, a situation which none felt more than those who brought the present subject before their Lordships. He would ask whether this could be deemed an unfair mode of proceeding? No—directly the contrary. It was an earnest and particular desire of doing their duty in that House as Peers of Parliament, that actuated those who brought this subject forward, a desire to do justice to the country itself, and also to pursue the faults of Ministers with candour and moderation, not complaining of those whom they were obliged to condemn, until after the other and still more important business was disposed of. They had not contented themselves with making a general accusation, but they had pointed out specific charges. He was prepared to substantiate those charges. A message came some time ago from the Crown, calling on the country to arm against France. Those who had complained of the conduct of the King's Ministers, long before this period, suspended all their proceedings upon that subject immediately; and from the delivery of that message, down to the final close of the measure, no interruption took place in the discussion of the public business. Now that business was over, the opponents of Ministers came forward, and spoke sincerely of what appeared to be their faults. His Noble and Learned Friend knew very well that the debate now before the House might be turned into a committee of inquiry by any body, either on the one side or the other. If any one of his Majesty's Ministers should propose that this subject should even now be referred to a committee of inquiry, his Lordship said that he would not object to it. He said thus much to defend himself against the imputation of harshness, and indeed Noble Lords were much mistaken if they thought he had any pleasure in bringing this business forward; the truth was, that he was performing a very painful duty. His Lordship said, he should not think it necessary to go much at length into this subject. The question before the House, before that of the adjournment, was only a declaration of certain facts, which it was impossible to controvert, and which had not been attempted to be controverted. It was indeed stated by his Noble Friend who brought forward this subject, that it was meant to be followed up by other resolutions; it would have been trifling with the House if he had not done so, because to pass a vote without some practical measure to follow it up, would have been futile; and therefore his Noble Friend had given their Lordships to understand, that if his first motion was adopted, he should follow it up by another, for the removal of the King's Ministers, as it was called; but that was not the form of the resolution which his Noble Friend intended to propose; it was only to express to the King, that the confidence of that House was withdrawn from his Majesty's Ministers. He was anxious to speak upon these points, because he was afraid that the subject hitherto had not obtained all the attention its parliamentry importance appeared to him to deserve. Upon the constitutional point in this case his Lordship observed, that he was not going to pledge himself to the certainty of being in the right in every thing he said in that House, like the Noble and Learned Lord who had spoken so authoritatively upon this subject, but he believed that no man would deny that communication from the Throne to the Houses of Parliament was a very usual thing, nor did he believe that any man who had any value for the principles of our constitution would deny the propriety of these communications; for without information of this kind Parliament would not know properly what duties it had to discharge. This was a point on which he saw no difficulty in the investigation. There were some things which were rather delicate

to pursue, and he should touch upon them very lightly. The noble and learned lord had said, that of all the charges that were made, the charge that ministers did not come down to Parliament sooner, was the most foolish that ever was exhibited, and he gave a challenge to any one to shew the contrary: now his lordship said, that at the hazard of being called foolish by the noble and learned lord, he should accept this challenge. He had called on any body to point out what was the communication which ministers ought to have made to Parliament; and notwithstanding the risk he ran of exposing what that noble and learned lord called consummate ignorance, he would point out, not only one particular thing which ministers ought to have communicated to Parliament, which they did not, but a detail of particular points in which it was the duty of the King's ministers to give information to the two Houses of Parliament, in order to keep up that which it was essential to the interest of this country to keep up; namely, a good understanding between the Crown and the two Houses of Parliament. As to the manner in which the preliminary articles of peace were defended, and what had been said on the terms of them, and also the tone of the government with whom we treated, and especially what had been said on the tone and manner of the government of France after the signature of the definitive treaty, when it was confidently stated there was nothing in the character of the government of France, or in the character of the person at the head of that government, which ought to lead us to suppose that the peace then concluded would not be as permanent as any this country had agreed to within the last century; this his lordship said, he should not now insist upon, although it proved a lamentable want of foresight, and might have misled the public if there had been nothing else to do so; but instead of insisting upon this assertion, he would take the matter up after the definitive treaty. The House had heard of the abolition of the Spanish langues, which was a material part of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens; there was, he believed, no information before the House when that abolition took place, although that was important on the subject of Malta. It appeared by the declaration, that this abolition took place previous to the execution of the definitive treaty of Amiens, and when this was debated in Parliament, he told ministers and the House, that the treaty was impracticable in the 10th article, on account of the abolition of the Spanish langue. He would not risk his character upon that matter, but his firm belief was, that the Spanish langues had been abolished before the ratification of that treaty.—Ministers had better means of information than others, but he had a firm belief that this was so, and that these langues were abolished before the end of March. This subject was debated in the House on the 13th of May, and then the ministers defended the practicability of this 10th article of the treaty.—This he charged as misbehaviour in ministers; for by this they misled the public; they ought to have advised his Majesty to inform the Houses of Parliament that the treaty was become impracticable, and then the two Houses would have had an opportunity of judging what advice to give to the throne, whether to endeavour to negotiate for another treaty, or to pursue the war. But it was now said, that the treaty of Amiens was only an experiment. If an experiment, it was nothing but an unfortunate experiment; for its duration was very short, and we made immense sacrifices to obtain it short as it was: sacrifices and concessions to the enemy, which he was almost afraid to mention. God only knew how many soldiers and sailors were disbanded, and that when we had to deal with an enemy of a singular character; an enemy whom our utmost efforts of force employed for years, had not been able to reduce to moderation, our ministers endavoured to make moderate by submission and concession. Now he said, that ministers knowing these things, ought not to have advised the King to tell the two Houses that we had a treaty with France, and had concluded peace, when at that very moment they knew that that which they called a definitive treaty was an impracticable thing; they were told so, and they defended the treaty: this his lordship charged on ministers as a great misconduct, which had the effect of deluding the public. This was on the 13th or 14th of May. The session lasted six weeks longer, and we proceeded on the experiment of peace, and to make great reductions, as if we had secured peace. The session lasted until the 9th of June. If their lordships wished to know how Parliament acted afterwards, he would refer them to the Journals, by which it appeared that the speaker of the House of Commons, on the last day of the session of Parliament, wherein he thanks his Majesty for having procured to his faithful subjects the blessings of peace.—Now, undoubtedly, the speaker of the House of Commons was not one of his Majesty's ministers, but he was one of those who were deluded by his Majesty's ministers, and contributed in deluding the public; and what was his Majesty's answer to that speech? He advised his subjects to the cultivation of the advantages of peace, at the very time that ministers knew that the treaty they had agreed to was impracticable.—He contended we ought to have the truth as they knew it to be. His lordship then came to the constitutional part of the case, and maintained that whatever might be said to the contrary by any man, learned or unlearned, it was the practice of our government, uniformly, from the revolution downwards, for the Crown always, upon the meeting of Parliament, to inform the two Houses of the internal state of the country, and all its external relations, for the purpose of calling for their advice on all these points, as advice might be necessary, a practice in which consisted the freedom of the state, and without which ours did not deserve the name of a free state. His

lordship said he looked carefully over all the Journals from the time of the revolution to the present, and he would venture to affirm, there was not a single instance in which, if there was any thing important to be communicated, it was not communicated from the throne to the two Houses of Parliament; and many instances occurred, in which not only the circumstances stated, but the advice of Parliament was specifically asked upon them: these things frequently occurred in the reign of Queen Anne and King William, and there were many instances of a similar kind in the illustrious predecessors of his present Majesty, George I. and II. Here his lordship specified several, and observed, that not one of them was a case of so much importance as the present: he was therefore not afraid of the rebuke of the learned lord who had taken upon himself to pronounce upon this subject in so peremptory a tone; he asked for no more than that government should follow the precedents of their ancestors, for "*state super vias antiquas*," was a good maxim. His lordship then proceeded to enumerate many other points which were within the knowledge of the ministers, and which it was their duty to have communicated to the two Houses of Parliament, and which manifested the hostile disposition of the enemy, and by which the public would have saved from the evils to which they had been exposed by the delusion. In one word, there was no one fact complained of in his Majesty's declaration against France, that was not known to ministers so long ago as November last, except the publication of Sebastiani's report.—His lordship proceeded to animadvert upon various other topics connected with the subject under discussion, and argued considerably in detail as to the ill consequences produced by the measures adopted by ministers. He instanced, amongst other points, the losses suffered by the Sovereign as elector of Hanover, and the situation to which the house of Orange was reduced. If the conduct adopted by ministers, with respect to Swisserland, were wise in October, it would be more wise in June, when their land force was twenty thousand men stronger, and they had a powerful navy to act with; but their interference on that head was too late, and before our messenger reached Vienna with propositions to the Emperor, Swisserland was in possession of the French troops. Their orders with respect to the Cape were, under the circumstances they had sent them, unjustifiable—they should have dispatched spirited remonstances in the first instance; and after all that had been said that night, they surrendered the Cape, at a time when a powerful body of French troops were in the heart of Holland. Their conduct with respect to Malta, was weak and impolitic in the extreme, as most forcibly appeared in a document published at the other side of the water, by which it appeared, that the Russians were adverse to the measures taken with respect to that island, and that they were even contrary to existing engagements between this country and that potentate. After touching upon the affair of Egypt, he proceeded to animadvert upon the conduct of ministers with respect to different royal communications to Parliament, which, for want of sufficient explicitness, were productive of the most injurious consequences to the commercial interests of the country. He then commented upon the tenor and drift of some of the resolutions, and thought that the adoption thereof could in no point of view be productive of mischief, nor could it militate against the discharge of any of the duties of that House.

The LORD CHANCELLOR totally disapproved the motion for an adjournment, because, if carried, it left a stain on the conduct of ministry which their exertions for the country did by no means merit. If administration were weak, why attempt to diminish their influence with the country by a censure of their conduct? The motion for adjournment not only went to that extent; but would, if carried, by bringing the government into disrepute, tend to impede their operations for the interests of the state. Instead of pressing motions of this nature at this particular period, when all the departments of government ought to be invigorated, it would be more liberal and patriotic to suggest and support some measures for the defence of the country against the common enemy. What would Buonaparté think, if he found that the very same government, whose conduct had been so highly approved, on the discussion of the official papers respecting the late negotiation, were some few days after censured by the very same Parliament? Such an idea was both ridiculous and absurd, and he hoped would not receive the approbation of their lordships. It would tend to remove all thoughts of peace to a very remote period, by encouraging the enemy to the full and persevering exercise of his power. If the First Consul found that any want of unanimity prevailed in Parliament, it would stimulate him to the most active exertions against our government. Such a motion, therefore, as was now before them, if carried, would disappoint the hopes of the best men, and operate even contrary to the interest of the respectable characters who supported it. He would not accuse those who supported the motion of a mischievous intent, but he was fully persuaded, that it would not tend to accelerate the operations of government against the enemy.

Lord GRANTLEY thought the present ministry in many instances censurable. He was, however, of opinion, that on this trying occasion, when the greatest exertions were necessary, the arm of power ought to be strengthened, instead of weakened. In this view, he would much sooner pass a vote of thanks than that of censure on the conduct of the present administration.

The Earl of WARWICK condemned those who now governed public affairs, as inadequate to the situations in which they were placed.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Friday, June 3. (Min. 870).

[Censure of Ministers.]——Col. Patten said it was with reluctance he rose to draw the attention of the House to such a subject as he had now to submit to their consideration. The House would recollect the character which he held within those walls; he had no communication with gentlemen on the one side, nor did he evince a disposition uniformly to oppose gentlemen on the other. But, when he found his country involved in war, and thought that that war might have been avoided, as also that ministers were culpable in delaying it so long, he must beg the indulgence of the House while he endeavoured to point out to them in what manner the conduct of his Majesty's ministers was deserving of crimination, or at least of censure. In the first place he must request the House to pay attention while he read a part of his Majesty's declaration, which expressly says that "the period which has elapsed since "the conclusion of the definitive treaty, has been "marked with one continued series of aggression, "violence, and insult, on the part of the French "government." If this were true (and of the truth of it he had no reason to doubt), ministers were most undoubtedly culpable in with-holding that communication from the Parliament of the Country for such a length of time. Ministers had since that period held out a hope of peace, and even given a confidential assurance to Parliament that there was no probability of the treaty being broken, but their orders and their counter-orders were sufficient evidence of their knowledge to the contrary. Respect for the opinions and the feelings of his brother subjects induced him to come to this public explanation, as it appeared to him no more than fair, no more than justice and honour demanded, that the people of a free country should be informed of what was the cause of their being involved in the horrors of war, or what were the endeavours of their rulers to avert that evil. He was deterred, however, from bringing forward his promised motion by what he thought no more than a becoming deference to the opinions of those whose ability and discrimination, he was well convinced, was far superior to his own. At length, finding the House and the Country still continue in a state of uncertainty; finding so much doubt, perplexity and ambiguity hang over the sort of explanation that was given them, he felt it his duty to complain of such conduct in the face of the House and of the Country, in order that the case might be judged of fairly between him and the administration of the country, and that those persons who were more experienced in politics and more eloquent in speech, might deliver their opinion, and that the House might come to a positive decision on the question. He was well convinced that, whatever might be the event of his motion in that House, he was borne out in his opinions by the sentiments of the people of Great Britain: they heard of increased expenses, they saw their trade becoming stagnated, and commerce stood dismayed and appalled; and all this with only the general assertion of aggravation and insult on the part of the French government! He disclaimed any personal aversion to the gentlemen who now directed his Majesty's councils; no doubt there were many worthy and respectable characters among them.—But he wished to see that Bench (pointing to the Treasury Bench) filled with all the talent and ability of the country at this momentous crisis. He had nothing to wish, nothing to hope, and nothing to fear from that or any administration; but at a period like the present he thought it his duty, as a representative of the people, whose dearest interests were so immediately at their disposal, to warn the House against giving their confidence, and if the House should concur in opinion with him, to caution our most Gracious Sovereign against the danger of longer entrusting the conduct of his affairs to men so incapable of guiding the helm of the State.——He declared he had been influenced in the conduct he had pursued solely by his own feelings, and his own conviction of duty. He knew, however, that in consequence of the part he had taken, he had been made the subject of much calumny; so far as the slanderous reports affect himself only, he was indifferent to them, and therefore would not be disposed to allude to them there; but when they implicated others, when they affected those hon. friends whom he must respect, it was impossible to pass them unnoticed. He therefore, positively declared, that at the time he first offered his motion to the House, he had no consultation with the hon gent. near to him, nor had he since up to this time concerted any measure with them respecting the mode or time of bringing it forward. But it had been stated that he was the tool of those hon. gentlemen; that he was only the instrument which they employed for breaking the ground they were afterwards to cultivate themselves. All these calumnies were as false as they were malignant. This vindication was due to the characters of his hon. friends; but he should not do justice to himself, if he did not state that he was proud to be classed with men who by their foresight and firmness had rendered such essential services to their country. He should be ashamed of himself, if he were not happy to be classed with men who, for their abilities as statesmen, were not only the admiration of this country, but looked up to with reverence by all the Cabinets of Europe. Notwithstanding all that had been said respecting the preparations in the ports of France, he was convinced that at the time the Message of the 8th of March was delivered to the House, there were no preparations made in the ports of France, with any hostile view towards this country. As to the hostile disposition of France, at that time, as well as before and since, there could be no doubt. He never entertained the idea that this country was immediately endangered by the preparations of France. Her views were first directed to Egypt, to the embarrassment of our commerce, but there was no doubt that their ultimate object was to strike at the very root of our independence. Ministers complained of the aggressions and insults of France, but had taken no means to repel them. He thought it was with countries, as with individuals, when one injury was submitted to, another was invited. Among the aggressions of France, recapitulated in the declaration, the invasion of Switzerland was one of the most prominent. He could not help feeling more for the Swiss, than for any other people the French had unjustly attacked. Like us, they had free institutions handed down to them from their ancestors. They had bravely struggled to defend their freedom and independence against

France, but they had been overpowered. Their manly conduct had procured for them the inveterate hostility of France. The petty states of Italy might be permitted to live at peace, while they were subjected to truck and barter; but the First Consul would never forgive the stand made for freedom by Switzerland. In proportion as countries were free and happy, in proportion did they become the objects of jealousy on the part of the French government; and he was convinced that the great hostility of Buonaparté to this country was founded on that principle.——The hon. member then adverted to the communications with Mr. Merry on that subject, to the orders for the surrender of the Cape, to the counter orders, to the possession of Parma, Placentia, &c. and observed that, from all these things, it appeared the French government had done every thing but making a direct attack upon our own country. He must therefore charge ministers with holding out improper hopes of peace to Parliament, at a time when they were compromising the honour of the country by protraction, and when they could not themselves see any sure foundation for a supposition that peace could be much longer enjoyed, consistent with the honour and dignity of the nation. He need refer to no other proof than the papers on the table, to shew that ministers had, by their conduct, compromised the dignity and honour of the country, and lowered and debased the spirit of the people.

Col Graham begged the indulgence of the house a few moments. About two hours before he came down, Gen. Pigot called upon him with Mr. Cobbett's Register, which, probably contained the same papers which had been moved for by an hon. gent. yesterday, concerning Malta. He was particularly requested to say, from Gen. Pigot, that those papers contained the most gross misrepresentations and charges against his character.

Col. Bastard thought that if the state of the nation was fairly laid before Parliament, it would be the best justification of the conduct of ministers. The situation of the country was one of great anxiety, but was it to be attributed to the late or to the present administration? The present administration had come into power at a most critical period, and had acted under difficulties unparalleled. They found the whole chain of connexion with which this country had acted, broken, and the country discontented in a very high degree; the circumstances in which they were placed compelled the Treaty of Amiens, and, in his opinion, made it prudent not to push every point of aggression. When he said he heard two opposite parties, the one accusing ministers of being too rash, and the other of being too timid, he concluded that ministers had acted just as they ought to have done. It required more fortitude to bear an insult than to resent one. A man worn out ought not to attempt to combat with another in full health and vigour; and we required time to renew our strength ——Mr. I. H. Browne said that the difficulties and dangers to which the hon. gent alluded originated with the former, and not with the present administration. He did not think it right at this critical moment when all agree, in the propriety of supporting the country against the dangers which threaten it, to interrupt the harmony and unanimity of the House by any vote of censure on his Majesty's government. The conclusion of the Treaty of Amiens he thought praiseworthy in the present administration. While France continued to violate only the spirit of the treaty, he thought it most wise to avoid hostilities; but when she came to violate the letter of the treaty, that was a point to stand on, there he thought it fit to rest. He thought indeed it was impossible for any gent. who was not more than a mere Member of Parliament, to decide upon the propriety of the point on which a stand should be made, amidst so many acts of aggravation and insult. A wish had been expressed by an hon. gent. opposite him (Mr. Patten) to see all the talents, all the ability of the country on the Treasury Bench. He agreed in the sentiment; but it was not high sounding words or eloquence of language; it was not attachment to names or persons which should attract his voice or bias his judgment.——Lord Kensington declared that at the present critical moment the House had a right to know whatever concerned their political situation. The hon. gent. who spoke last, had observed, that the difficulties and dangers to which we were now exposed, had originated with the former ministers. He denied that this was the case. Their administration had been high and honourable, and at the very conclusion was glorious to the British name. The conduct of the present ministers had been deceitful, and unwise, and submissive. The N. Ld. then read an extract from his Majesty's Declaration, expressive of the repeated acts of insult and aggression on the part of the French government, ever since the signing the Treaty of Amiens. That Treaty was discussed on the 14th of May; after that, the sequestration of the property belonging to the Spanish Langue, the annexation of the island of Elba, &c.; but all prior to the 23d of November, the day on which the Rt. Hon. Gent. opposite to him (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) assured that House, there was no probability of the treaty being broken. The views of France were obvious to the whole world, and every one was acquainted with the insults she had heaped upon us, and yet ministers took no measures to counteract her designs, nor to resent her insulting conduct.

Lord Temple.——With respect to the first resolution, little remains to be said. His Majesty's declaration speaks for itself, and, in this House, is only to be considered as the language of H. M's ministers. They have observed, and they have lamented "that the system of aggression, "violence, and aggrandisement which characte-"rise the proceedings of the different governments "of France, during the war, has been continued, "with as little disguise, since its termination." At length, then, we have a bold avowal of the opinion which H. M's ministers have held respecting the conduct of the French government, during the peace. At length, we are told, that every principle of fraud, of violence, and of rapine, upon which the different sanguinary governments have acted, at the different periods of the revolution, have been equally the rule of conduct of him, who now holds in his hands, the reins of power in that country; we are told that the same detestable system of policy which dictated that ambitious and boasting edict, that France and England should never exist together in the same hemisphere; which sent Buonaparté to seize by force of arms, a country the possession of a power then in amity with France, for the avowed object of striking a blow at the Indian interests of this

country, who secured his entry into that country, by disavowing his faith, by boasting that he had been the means of overturning altars and dispersing the ministers of his religion, by trampling upon the bible, swearing by the koran, who secured his retreat from that country by destroying it cold and deliberate cruelty the miserable prisoners who had fallen into his hands, and by poisoning his own wounded and defenceless soldiers; the same feelings which dictated, and the same revenge which prompted the execution of every act of hostility, of rapine, and of horror against this country and the world during the different periods of his power, have existed at every moment since the peace. How H. M's ministers can justify this tardy avowal; how they can presume to come down to this House, with the declaration in their hands, with the confession unwillingly drawn from them of the existence of proceedings which they now say they have seen and felt ever since the peace was signed, how they came to tell us, *now*, that nothing but hostility and aggression existed at periods when they told us that nothing but harmony and profound peace prevailed, remains for their further ingenuity to explain. A reference to their parliamentary conduct ever since the Treaty of Amiens, will shew, that instead of putting us upon our guard against dangers which we now find they knew existed, instead of stimulating our watchfulness and encouraging our vigilance, they have universally, at the different periods I allude to, tried to lull the country into a security, which they now tell us was not warranted by the fact, and inspire us with hopes, which they now declare they knew to be fallacious. On the *23d of Nov.* 1802, the Chancellor of the Exchequer declared, in this House, "that there was nothing that indicated the renewal of hostilities with France." Look to the events of that period as collected in the papers upon your table, recollect the public circumstances of Europe at that time, and then say whether ministers were justified in what they said. At that very moment, there is scarce a circumstance which is now declared to be a cause of war, or collectively with others to form a cause of war, which did not exist in its full force. Not one of the articles of the Treaty of Amiens had been executed by France. Parma was annexed to her dominions by public proclamation dated the *23d of October*. The system of commercial agents, which has been justly made a cause of war, existed in full force, at the period I allude to. With the exception of one only, every instance of aggression complained of, as being committed by France against the commerce of this country, had occurred long before the 23d of November. It appears from the printed papers, that from June to October 1802, Mr. Merry repeatedly informed ministers of the different acts of violence committed against our merchants and their ships. On the *25th of October*, Mr. Merry informed government of the most violent and flagrant breach of treaty that ever existed, the case of the ship *George*, when the ship was condemned with all her cargo, because her captain had on board, *for his own private use*, knives, forks, and plates of British manufacture. *October the 13th* is the date of Mr. Liston's first dispatch on a subject which is made another ground for war, the occupation of Holland by the French troops. On *October 29th*, his second dispatch is sent, notifying that the French troops had began their march out of the Batavian territories, but that instead of evacuating them, they had halted upon the frontiers and occupied Breda, Bois-le-Duc, and Bergen op-Zoom. This was all that appeared upon the subject in the papers first laid upon your table, but the noble Secretary of State, finding that more information was wanting, produced after much search among the pigeon-holes of his bureau, another dispatch from Mr. Liston dated a few days after the last, in which, he says, that the Batavian minister at Paris had made a remonstrance on the subject of the occupation of his country by the French, and that he had written *a most able* letter to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that in consequence of this most persuasive and most argumentative letter, the First Consul had been graciously pleased to do—What? To cause the Batavian troops to evacuate the country? No! but to direct them to remain where they were in the occupation of the barrier towns of Holland, in possession of the strongest fortresses on the frontier, by which means they had the key of the country in their hands, and this at the moment when both the Batavian and English governments, as well as Mr. Liston, knew, that the project of France at that instant, was to seize upon those towns for the purpose of ultimately making Holland an integral part of the French Republic; and Mr. Liston concludes, by saying, that upon this occasion it was thought advisable to *humour the wishes of the First Consul*. All this happened in October, long before this time ministers knew that the execution of the 10th article of the Treaty of Amiens, relative to Malta, had become utterly impossible. The declaration very justly states that the Treaty of Amiens and every part of that Treaty was founded on the assumption of the state of possession and engagements actually subsisting at the moment of the signature of the Treaty. The practice of ministers forms a singular contrast with their theory. On that very principle they knew that the articles respecting Malta could not be executed. The revenues of that order, the independence of which it was the professed object of the treaty to secure, and on the existence of which revenues that independence existed, were known to be confiscated, in fact, before the conclusion of the peace, or immediately after. In the Madrid Gazette of the *27th of April* 1802, it is stated that the King of Spain had annexed to the Royal domain the Langues and possessions of the Order of Malta, within his dominions, and yet with this fact known, and avowed in every newspaper in Europe, we see ministers from the *May following* down to the breaking off the negotiation, pestering every power on the Continent with applications to guarantee the execution of an article which they knew could not be executed. Nay, on the *23d of August*, Lord Hawkesbury writes to Mr. Otto, to inform him, that his Majesty is ready to carry into effect the article respecting Malta, the moment the other powers of Europe had guaranteed its execution: an article which had been framed with a view to the actual possessions and situation of the power whose interests that treaty was to provide for, and which possessions and situation were completely changed since the conclusion of that treaty. That change ministers use as an excuse for their not evacuating Malta, but it also was a fair excuse for the other powers not to guarantee the treaty. It was a fair reason for

forming a new arrangement for Malta, but it could not be a reason for employing a whole summer in persuading other powers to do what you had refused to do, because subsequent events had rendered it impossible. As to Switzerland, the ambitious projects of France with respect to that country were well known before November; all that happened which made it necessary for this country to interfere in its fate had happened before *November*; nay, at the very moment when ministers were gravely assuring the country, that they saw no prospect of a renewal of hostilities, Mr. Moore was engaged at Constance in negotiations, which, if the situation of Europe had allowed of their being carried to the extent, his instructions authorised, would have ended in a renewal of hostilities. Prior to the time to which I have so often alluded, every complaint which we now urge as cause of war against France for its insolent and hostile interference in the administration of our laws, and its audacious attack upon the liberty of the press existed in its full force. On the *17th August* M. Otto writes that insulting letter to Lord Hawkesbury, in which, in the name of the First Consul, he insists upon a stop being put to publications hostile to France, the removal of the emigrant noblesse and clergy out of this country, and the "*deportation*" of other emigrants to Canada. All this, and much more on the same subject, happened long before the *23d of November*. In August it was that captain d'Auvergne was seized contrary to every principle of justice, and in violation of the treaty of Amiens; long before *November* it was well known and universally acknowledged that France did not mean to indemnify the Stadtholder, according to spirit of the treaty of Amiens; in short, almost every case that is now made, either of itself, or conjointly, a cause of war, almost every insult of which we now so justly complain, almost every aggression which we are now called upon to resent had occurred before the *23d of November*, and yet, on that day, minister came down to this house and states "that he sees no prospect of a renewal of hostilities." We are now confined in our researches to that period, for the same declaration, more strongly marked, was made on the *23d of the February following*, in the reason assigned for increasing the establishment of H. R. H. the Prince of Wales was, that it was a moment of "*profound peace*" that the measure was one which tho' equally necessary in a time of war, the difficulties of such times rendered improper to bring forward, and therefore, a moment of "profound peace" was chosen by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, as the auspicious moment. Thus, Sir, every argument that held good on the *23d of November* came with redoubled force when urged on the *23d of February*, every insult was then aggravated, every aggression which began to shew itself at the former period had completed and formed itself by the latter. By that period one would have supposed that ministers had began to doubt the truth of their former speculations. One would think that their spirit of prophecy would have been a little damped by perverse experience. Careless, however, of the lessons of experience, and heedless of future fame, they boldly state, on the *23d of February*, that the country is in *profound peace*, and that no discussions existed at that moment between the two countries. Dates and facts are the witnesses I call to the veracity of the king's ministers.—On the *9th of February* Lord Hawkesbury directs Ld. Whitworth to remonstrate against the publication of Sebastiani's report. On the *17th* that remonstrance is made. On the *21st of February* Ld. Whitworth had the famous audience of Buonaparté, which ministers declared was a decisive proof of the hostile views of the First Consul: the measure of insult was full; aggression had followed aggression, the views of France upon Egypt, upon the Turkish empire, upon Switzerland, upon Holland, and upon this country, were known and avowed. Every feeling which animates us as Englishmen had been insulted; we were told by our insolent enemy, your press must be made subservient to my view, you must transport the nobles and the priesthood who have sought refuge in your hospitality, you must import commercial agents, whom, as my R. Hon. relation (*Mr. Pitt*) has justly observed, you would been bound to have hanged as spies in time of war: you must stand aloof whilst I seize, with a giant's hand, the whole of Europe, you must give up all connexion with the continent, *the treaty of Amiens provides for every thing and settles every thing*. On the *23d of February* we had been told all this: on the *23d of February* minister comes here and tells us that we are in profound peace, and that there are no discussions existing between the two countries; and, on the *8th of March*, the same minister comes and tells us to prepare for war. We are prepared for war—I trust there is not a man in this country, whose breast does not glow with indignation at the insults we have suffered, and with a determination to support the honour and avenge the injured cause of his country. Ministers lulled the country into an unreal belief of security, they cherished her with false hopes, they asked unlimited confidence, and have reposed none in return; they deluded the people with glittering visions of peace, knowing that when they awoke they would awake to the reality of a war. The next point is, have ministers done all that became them to do, to avert the calamity which has come upon us? Now, whether they have submitted enough, God knows the country has seen enough of submission; not whether they have sufficiently given way to the views of France. God knows their bitterest enemies cannot accuse them of having conceded too little to France. The question is, whether they remonstrated in such a manner as became the ministers of a great and powerful nation; whether they interfered in such a manner as to make their interference effective; whether they mediated in such a manner as to aid those in whose favour they mediated; whether they repelled aggressions with firmness, and opposed dignified moderation to violent and presuming demand? I do not hesitate to say, that here they have completely failed. When they conceded most, they conceded with least dignity; when they resisted most, they resisted with least effect. They have urged in their declaration as one of these causes which in the aggregate made the great cause of war, "that "France has enforced war since the peace with "inexcusable strictness and severity, the prohibitions which had been placed upon the commerce of the subjects of his Majesty, that violence has been offered to their vessels and their "property." Let us look to the papers before us, and how stands the fact? Sir, the first collection

of papers presented to us, not one word is mentioned of what constitutes this part of their declaration; in one solitary instance, only, is the subject alluded to. In the 2d collection of papers we see notification after notification from Mr. Merry, of insult upon insult offered to our flags and commerce, but in no one instance does any remonstrance appear from his Majesty's government, no instructions to Mr. Merry to remonstrate; and, in the case of the *Ship George*, to which I before alluded, no answer of any kind appears to have been given to Mr. Merry. The second cause of war is, the introduction by France into this country of her privileged spies, the Commercial Agents. To this insulting act of aggression no remonstrance is made by ministers, and except in the one case no steps appear to have been taken for sending them out of the country. Once, indeed, Lord Hawkesbury informed the French minister that the Agents could not be acknowledged as such, and that if any attempts were made to send them to their places of destination they would receive orders to quit the country. In London, however, the whole corps d'espionage was permitted to remain unmolested. The Agents were not sent to their destination, but in London they remained till Gen. Andreossi left the country. The next cause of war is, the occupation of Holland by the French troops. To this violent act of aggression, to this breach of the letter "of three solemn treaties," not only no remonstrance appears to have been made, but we have the assurance of the noble Secretary of State, that, in fact, no written remonstrance was made by the ministers, and though, in consequence of Mr. Liston's dispatch of the 13*th of October*, orders were sent out on the 17th to retain the Cape and the West-India Islands, on the receipt of his dispatch of the 29th, stating the seizure by the French troops of the frontier towns of Holland, orders are sent out on the 16*th of November* to evacuate the Cape and the West-India Islands, which we had before ordered to be retained, notwithstanding the cause of that order remained the same. The fourth cause of war is, the seizure of Swisserland by France. I will not here inquire, whether it was fitting that this country should have interfered in its fate. Upon that subject, I entertain a decided opinion, which it is not now necessary to avow. We have interfered: and it is enough for me to ascertain, whether that interference was made in the manner most likely to answer the purpose for which it was intended. How stands the fact, and how is that fact supported by dates? As early as the 13*th of July*, 1802, the Deputies of almost all the Swiss Cantons remonstrated publicly against the constitution forced upon them by Buonaparté. From that time it was evident, that the Swiss only waited for the moment most propitious to make another struggle for their liberties. France saw the blow that was impending, and during the whole summer made preparations for maintaining the seizure of Swisserland. At length, on the 12*th of September*, the flame burst forth: all Swisserland appeared in arms against her task-masters; during this whole interval did this country stir one step to aid the rising spirit of the Swiss or assist their daring efforts?—Of their interference we hear nothing till the 3*d of October*. On that day Mr. Merry writes word that the Swiss had an agent in Paris, who was directed to apply to the foreign ministers there, to interfere with the First Consul in their favour. After having in vain tried to interest the feelings of all Europe in his behalf, after having in vain solicited the good offices of Austria, Prussia, Russia and the king of Etruria, having been refused by all the ministers of those powers, he comes at last to the English minister, and tells the piteous story of his country's wrongs. On England he places his last, but his firmest reliance, to England his country looks for protection and for assistance. Mr. Merry writes for instructions. He receives none; no answer is ever given to the Swiss agent, and he is left to cool his heels in the antichamber of Mr. Merry. In this instance, however, an English minister ventures to make a written remonstrance, and no answer is given to it. *On the 10th of October* the remonstrance is sent to Mr. Otto; but it appears that no answer was made to it. Rumour, indeed, says that one was made, but in such offensive terms, so broadly declaring that we had no right to interfere with the affairs of the continent, and referring us with such insolent pedantry to the treaty of Amiens as to the book in which alone we were to read our destinies, that it would have justified immediate war, instead of being followed by the surrender of the Cape and our West-India conquests. On the same day are dated the instructions to Mr. Moore, directing him to proceed to Constance, where he arrives on the 31*st of October*; and the first news he receives is, that the struggle is over, and the diet of Schwitz is dissolved. He writes home to inquire what he is to do; and on the 25*th of November* Ld. Hawkesbury tells him, that he may return. During all this time is any effort made to back our remonstrance at Paris? Is our minister there directed to support our interference? Is any answer given to the Swiss agent which he might shew to the ministers of other courts, and which would have encouraged those courts to give that assistance? The want of which ministers urge as the reason for not interfering further, but which it appears we never asked for! Mr. Moore's instructions are to ascertain whether any Austrian or other continental troops are ready to enter Swisserland in case it was found necessary to support, by arms, the pretensions of the Swiss. From *July to November* ministers could find no other time proper for their interference, but that in which no troops could enter, much less act in Swisserland in consequence of the severity of the season.—The next cause of war is the non-execution on the part of France of that part of the treaty of Amiens respecting Malta: and upon this point the negotiation appears to have been conducted with the same *firmness* and *dignity* which so strongly characterised its whole course. *In May* the Spanish revenues of the order were confiscated. *In October*, by the annexation of Parma, more were confiscated; still the literal execution of the 10th art. is insisted upon by England. During the whole time no new arrangement is heard of. The 10th art. is constantly rung in our ears. The whole 10th art., nothing but the 10th art. of the treaty of Amiens, till at last the farce can be carried on no longer, and the necessity of a new arrangement begins to be talked of. How is that negotiation supported by our ministers? On the 21*st of July* Buonaparté tells Ld. Whithworth, that, on Malta, depends the question of peace or war, that on no terms shall England be permitted to retain Malta,

that he had rather she should have the fauxbourg St. Antoine than Malta. On the *11th of March*, Talleyrand tells Ld. Whitworth that the First Consul will look upon the non evacuation of Malta as the commencement of hostilities, not as a cause of war, but as an act of war. Here all discussion about Malta should have ended. Ld. Whitworth had said the occupation of Malta by England in some shape or other was absolutely necessary; and Talleyrand had said such occupation would be deemed the commencement of hostilities. *Ultimatum* upon *ultimatum*; and at last you give up the idea of retaining Malta for ever, on the dignified and honorable condition that France agreed to your reserving it for 10 years only, and secured your possession in full sovereignty of the island of Lampedosa. Your last *ultimatum* (for however absurd may be the expression, there is no way of stating the proceedings of this negotiation, but by talking of the 1st, 2d, 3d and *last ultimatum*) by which you, of course, pledged yourselves to abide; and which, if it had been agreed to, would have brought the negotiation to a *favourable* issue, proposed that in consideration of the immense accession of strength obtained by France, upon the continent, she would give up Malta for 10 years, and *steal* Lampedosa for you for ever! You therefore gravely state that, at the end of 10 years, the vast accession of force to France confirmed by 10 years' possession, the immense increase of her resources ripened by ten years' maturity, her possession of Italy, her influence in Germany, in Spain and in Portugal, and her command of Holland, will be counterbalanced by the *enormous acquisition* of a barren rock, of an island without an inhabitant, of that nursery of sea gulls, Lampedosa! The next cause for war is the attack upon the liberty of the press, and the requisition to *transport* the emigrants to Canada or elsewhere. I call upon ministers to point out to me in any part of the correspondence, which lays upon your table, one remonstrance against the insolent attack upon the liberty of the press. Ld. Hawkesbury writes very prettily on the subject, and Ld. Whitworth assures M. Talleyrand that it is impossible for Ld. Hawkesbury to controul the licence of the press here, because he could not influence *a single newspaper for his own objects*: he trusts therefore that the First Consul will not be so unreasonable as to insist upon his controlling the language of the news-writers and pamphleteers in this country. But have we one word of *remonstrance* against the insolent language, or the insulting of the French government? Can ministers point out one instance in which they directed Ld. Whitworth to ask satisfaction for the outrage, and to say, in distinct terms, that unless interference in our own concerns by France was distinctly and openly disavowed, he should leave the country? No; in proportion as France increased in insolence, we multiplied concession; and the more revolting and violent became her demands, the weaker and the more inefficient became our remonstrance. When we look to the subject, relating to the French emigrants, disgraceful, indeed, is the tale we have to tell, and disgusting the scene of humiliation which H. M. ministers have acted. The first attack made by the French government is a remonstrance from Talleyrand to Mr. Merry, against the conduct of the French princes in publicly wearing the insignia of their orders, which Talleyrand describes as insulting to his government. The tame and disgraceful answer which ministers make to this childish and impertinent complaint is, that "it would be more proper if they (the French princes and nobles) abstained from it." But how could ministers help it or prevent it? Was that the language for his Majesty's ministers to hold in reply to such a remonstrance? I ask them if ever the chastening hand of Providence was to plunge this country into the same misfortunes which have overwhelmed France, if ever our nobles were sent to seek refuge in a foreign land, how they would brook the idea of our nobility surrendering the badges of their rank and the insignia of their honours, because they no longer dared to wear them. Yet this is the conduct which ministers think "it would have been more proper," if the French nobles had followed.—The next demand the French government makes is that the French superior clergy, who were emigrants in England, should be removed from the kingdom, and that others, who they named, should be *déporté to Canada!* These august, these venerable characters, who true to their religion and faithful to their sovereign, gave up *even the means of subsistence* and left their friends, relations and dearest connexions rather than remain in the land where that sovereign had been murdered, and that religion prophaned, who encouraged by the general voice of England sought that refuge here which almost every other country refused them. We are called upon by the authors of their miseries, who are at this moment revelling in their spoils and exulting in their misfortunes, to remove them from the refuge we gave them, and thus to violate that hospitality on the faith of which they came. Those gallant men, who sacrificing every consideration of personal risque, made an unavailing, but glorious attempt to restore the throne of their kings and to re-establish the altars of their faith, whose exertions *we* animated, and whose arms *we* assisted, who engaged in this memorable struggle on the faith of British promises, and in the confidence of British assistance, *we* are called upon by the very men against whom they fought, and against whom *we* once made common cause with them, to "*déporter*" to Canada. Let Gentlemen recollect the meaning attached to that word by the present rulers of France, let them recollect the horrors of the famous "deportation" to Cayenne, as described by the miserable survivors of it; let them recollect that to a "deportation," of this kind, the French government wished to doom the loyal and persecuted emigrants of France, and then let them turn to the answer which H. M. ministers chose to give to this cruel, this infernal proposal. "His Majesty is very de-"sirous to obviate any cause of complaint or un-"easiness with respect to their persons, and mea-"sures are in contemplation, *and will be taken* for "the purpose of removing them out of H. M. Eu-"ropean dominions." I shut the book in disgust, in horror and in shame. In disgust and in horror at the barbarity which could dictate this sentence, and in shame and in confusion at the eternal stain and blot which it will fix upon this page of our history.—I have thus gone through the different points which appear to me to bear upon the subject before you, and to justify the resolutions which are submitted to the House. From these extracts which I have made from the papers on your table, from the facts which they avow, and from the dates which confirm these facts, *three* deductions are to be made. The first is, that from the moment the treaty of Amiens was signed, H. M. ministers were aware of the hostile intentions avowed and expressed by the government of France towards this country; secondly, that being so aware of them, they concealed that conviction from the country, and encouraged the people with hopes of permanent peace and tranquil-

lity; knowing, at the moment they held out those hopes, that they were false and illusory; and thirdly, that on many points which they now make, either distinctly or collectively, causes of war, they made no remonstrance, or such remonstrances as were degrading to the dignity of the nation, and that when they interfered or mediated, they interfered without firmness and mediated without honour.

Mr. Hobhouse said, that ministers were charged with having neglected to communicate to the House the disposition of the French government and the agressions that had occurred. True, they had received sufficient provocation, were they to yield to their feelings, to break off the negotiation, but do they not deserve applause for suppressing those feelings and for waiting until they had unequivocal ground for going to war. If they had come to parliament, from time to time, with their complaints, they would have been charged with disturbing the harmony of the two countries, and rekindling war. And because they did not do so; because they did not go to war with France for her encroachement on the continent; and for demanding that the emigrants should be sent out of the country; and for requiring first to control the liberty of our press; because they did not go to war for these things, are his Majesty's ministers to incur the charge of timidity, irresolution and inconsistency?

Sir W. Young observed, that this administration came into power under many disadvantages: they had to terminate a most dangerous war, without allies, against a terrible enemy. The aggressions of France, since the treaty of Amiens, arose out of the treaty itself. With respect to Malta, he would say that the order was degraded. He would have the country direct its attention to the hostile mind Buonaparté bears against this country. An *arreté* of the 20th of June last had been passed, ordering that all connexions with foreigners, meaning English, shall be dissolved. By the treaty of Amiens, is not our commerce undermined? Wherever France can prevail, is it not checked, clogged, and prohibited? From a review of the conduct of ministers he did not think that they had acted as became the ministers of this country.

Mr. Fonblanque said, that here was nothing in the papers before the House that made him repent of his confidence in ministry, nor that could bring reproach upon them for the concealment which they had practised. The line of conduct which the ministers pursued, as far as he had been enabled to judge of it, had been proper. The conduct of France, since the treaty of Amiens, had been one continual scene of aggression. To watch her motions and intentions, in his opinion, did not so much require distinguished talents, as active vigilance, and never was this demanded more in any period of history. As to Malta, he considered the possession of it essential to our commercial greatness, and it ought not to be given up on any account. Ministers are also charged with having forborne to remonstrate against the conduct of France to Holland. This is unfounded; for it is known that their forbearance was at the instance of Holland itself. They are charged with abandoning the unfortunate Swiss. What could England do alone in such a contest? The powers of the continent refused to interfere; and is their criminal indifference chargeable in this House as a crime to his Majesty's ministers? As to insults, he would state it as a cause of exultation, that the First Consul had spoken of the freedom of our press, and found himself at length constrained to recur to the judicial decisions of the country. And as to Sebastiani, he thought if the French government chose to deny the object of his mission, the government, this House, and the country, were abundantly satisfied, and could not feel any longer an insult on this point.

Mr. Archdale professed his approbation of the conduct of ministers through the whole of the negotiations. He thought they had been throughout animated with a sincere desire to preserve peace, consistent with the honour and the interests of the country. He congratulated the House on the important improvement which had taken place in the temper and disposition of the people of Ireland, and on the attachment they felt for this country and the government. The conduct of the First Consul had opened the eyes of the deluded, and all ranks now detested him as the common enemy of the independence and the liberty of mankind. If he should dare to make his appearance in that country, he would meet with a very warm reception from the well-affected, from principle; and from some of our jacobins, from revenge.

Mr. C. Wynne condemned ministers strongly for deluding the nation with hopes of peace, when every act of the French government manifested a hostile and dangerous spirit which rendered any hope of continued peace absurd.

Mr. Courtenay. I think the R. Hon. Gentl. opposite (the Ch. of the Ex.) has been very hardly dealt with by all parties, on the subject of this negotiation, and the turn it has taken. The R. Hon Gentl. wished to conciliate all parties: how has he done it? When the state of the country and of the negotiation promised peace, then the party who wished for war inveighed against him for pusillanimous and disgraceful conduct; but as soon as he gave them war, they found matter still to inveigh against him. As to certain experiments for restoring the state to its former prosperity, I shall mention the opinion of a great philosopher, statesman, and legislator: I mean *Hippocrates:* in his *Aphorisms*, he says, if you should break your leg, and either by neglect, or an unskilful artist, it should not knit well together, or knit in such a manner as to destroy the strength or symmetry of the limb, the remedy is simple: *Break it again*, and give the care of it to *another artist*. I do not mean, Sir, to make any particular application of the advice of Hippocrates, or any invidious allusion; but simply to state the advice of a great philosopher and statesman.

Sir W. Milner saw much to praise, and little to censure in the conduct of ministers. He commended them for their spirit of moderation and forbearance. The French government had been insolent; but, ministers had wisely made great sacrifices to peace. As long as their conduct was constitutional, they should have his support.

Sir T. Metcalf thought the motion pernicious in itself, and particularly inexpedient, as it might give information to the enemy, and unhinge the spirit of the country at home. The R. Hon. Gentl. at the head of his Majesty's councils, against whom these resolutions were chiefly directed, had resigned an honourable situation where he was universally beloved and respected, and accepting of the commands of his Sovereign, had taken on himself the management of affairs at a very difficult crisis. Through that crisis he had conducted the country with honour. He had given us peace when it was infinitely desirable. He had used every means to preserve it, and now that the ambition of the enemy had forced us to renew

the war, he truſted that he would conduct it with ability and ſucceſs. He ſtood high in the confidence of the country; and his conduct, and the conduct of his colleagues, deſerved praiſe inſtead of being expoſed to cenſure.

Mr. Gregor conſidered it neceſſary to inveſtigate the conduct of miniſters: if the conduct of France has been a ſyſtem of ſuppreſſion and inſult to this country, he was aſtoniſhed we ſhould have given up any of our conqueſts, which now would be of the utmoſt importance to us, or diſembody our military and naval force. When he reviewed the conduct of miniſters, he could not give them his confidence, nor think them men of ſufficient ability to be truſted with the management of the affairs of the country in a ſituation ſo critical as the preſent.

Mr. Burland aſſured the Houſe, that the people were ſo well ſatisfied with peace, that Mr. Pitt could not have carried on the war another year; and from being a magiſtrate of a very populous neighbourhood, he had an opportunity of knowing the ſentiments of the people, who conſidered the peace as a bleſſing to them.

Mr. T. Grenville ſaid, that before he offered himſelf to the attention of the Houſe, he had been anxious to hear from miniſters ſome juſtification of their conduct, which had on this and various other occaſions been ſo powerfully aſſailed. Perceiving, however, that the expectation of receiving this explanation, on which he wiſhed to found what he had to ſubmit on the ſubject of the reſolution moved by his hon. friend was vain, he ſhould now beg leave to ſolicit the attention of the Houſe, while he endeavoured to ſtate, with as much brevity as poſſible, the reaſons on which he felt it his duty, as an independent member of Parliament, to give his decided ſupport to theſe reſolutions. He expreſſed his unwillingneſs to offer many obſervations on the objection which had been adduced by moſt of the members who had ſpoken this night. He was ſtill leſs willing to detain the attention of the Houſe by replying to falſe, malicious, and unfounded inſinuations which had been thrown out in certain quarters againſt thoſe gentlemen, who from conſiderations of public duty were determined to ſupport the reſolution which had been propoſed by the hon. member who began the diſcuſſion. The motion had been aſcribed to mean conſiderations of party ſpirit; to the mere wiſh of one ſet of gentlemen to drive others from confidential ſituations under government, with the view of occupying their places. For himſelf he muſt moſt unequivocally reprobate ſuch inſinuations, and he would not ſo far forget what he owed to the Houſe and to his own character, as make them the ſubject of any greater length of animadverſion. But having adverted to this objection, he had only to ſay a few words to the only other objection which had been adduced in the courſe of the diſcuſſion. It had been argued that the preſent was not the time for bringing forward reſolutions of the nature which had this evening been ſubmitted to the Houſe. This country was now engaged in a conteſt where unanimity among all ranks and orders in the ſtate was of the higheſt importance, and when conſequently, it was highly to be wiſhed for that no diſcuſſion might be provoked which might have the appearance of a wiſh to diſturb this unanimity. Of all the poſſible objections which could be urged, he had no difficulty in ſaying, that he conſidered this as one of the moſt extraordinary. He could hardly bring himſelf to believe that this evening he had heard it gravely ſtated by an hon. member on the other ſide (Mr T. Metcalf), that by agreeing to the reſolutions, or even by preſſing the diſcuſſion, information might be conveyed to the enemy. It was not very eaſy to ſee what was the ſpecies of information to which the hon. member alluded. For himſelf, he had no ſort of difficulty in ſaying, that a principal object which he had in view by ſupporting the reſolutions, was to convey both to the enemy and to the people of this country information which, at a criſis like the preſent, was in all points of view ſo important. He was anxious that, at a moment when we were engaged in a conteſt more trying and more hazardous, in a conteſt in which great exertions and great ſacrifices would be more powerfully required than in any former ſtruggle in which the country was ever engaged, that an inquiry ſhould be inſtituted into the capacity of thoſe who were to direct the application of the national reſources, and the national ſtrength; to aſcertain whether the battle which was to be fought would be fought with proportionate energy and courage; to ſee that every department of the public ſervice was properly adminiſtered; to take care, that if the country was to ſubmit to extraordinary ſacrifices, the exertions which were made were directed by thoſe to whom all ought to look up with confidence. In this ſenſe he certainly wiſhed that the enemy and the people of Great Britain ſhould be put in poſſeſſion of that, which it was the object of the reſolutions to procure. Having ſaid this, he would not pretend to deny that the object of the reſolutions was to call in queſtion the conduct of miniſters throughout the whole of the negotiations and diſcuſſions which had taken place betwixt the two governments from the time that the definitive treaty of peace was concluded. To have a full and fair view of this ſubject it would, however, be in the firſt place neceſſary, briefly to advert to the ſituation of the country at the time when the treaty was concluded. By the 2d of the reſolutions it was declared, that miniſters had not made to Parliament ſuch full and ample communications as could lead to any eſtimate of the real ſituation of the country, and therefore the Houſe was debarred from the conſtitutional right of giving any opinion on the ſtate of public affairs. A diſpoſition had been manifeſted to lay a great deal of ſtreſs on particular expreſſions. He was not at any time diſpoſed to queſtion the words which Gentl. themſelves were diſinclined to diſavow, but he would contend that it was perfectly parliamentary to draw an inference from the general ſpirit and complexion of the language employed by thoſe in official ſituations, which gave to that language a degree of weight and conſequence, which it did not otherwiſe poſſeſs; which was the foundation of important concluſions, and which was, conſequently, in all caſes, more narrowly canvaſſed. He was deſirous, therefore, of diſtinctly recollecting and ſtating to the Houſe the views and expectations which had been held out at the time of the ſignature of the definitive treaty. He could not better explain what thoſe views and expectations were at that period, than by referring to the language which

had then been employed by the R. Hon. Gent. on the other side (Mr Adaiſon), when the merits of the definitive treaty were ſo fully diſcuſſed [12th of May 1802] At that time, in anſwer to ſome arguments to prove that the peace could not poſſibly be of long duration, the R. Hon. Gent. had ſaid, "I am impreſſed with a thorough conviction that the peace which has now been concluded will, in all probability, be of as long duration as any of the pacifications concluded at various periods of the laſt century. I ſee nothing in the appearance of the times, in the preſent government of France, or the character of the individuals of whom that government is compoſed, which at all induces me to think that the peace will not be laſting." On that occaſion he was among the ſmall number of thoſe who had unanimouſly argued in favour of the propriety of an addreſs to his Majeſty, recommending an immediate ſettlement of the various points which the treaty had left open to diſcuſſion, and from which we anticipated a rupture at no very diſtant period, unleſs an adjuſtment was effected. This propoſition had, however, been reſiſted by miniſters and rejected by the House. What then was the ſtate of the information which miniſters communicated to parliament? The fact was, that no information of any kind was communicated to the laſt parliament after the ſignature of the treaty, except what was communicated through his Majeſty's gracious ſpeech at the concluſion of the ſeſſion. In that ſpeech an expectation was certainly held out that there was a proſpect of the continuance of peace, and a recommendation was given to cultivate the advantage which a ſtate of peace preſented. With this general impreſſion the laſt parliament was diſſolved. He certainly had never heard it aſſerted, and he could in no caſe admit the poſition, that the proſpect of a ſpeedy diſſolution of parliament at all leſſened the obligation of miniſters to communicate full and fair explanation of the ſtate of public affairs. In this ſtate the matter continued till the opening of the new parliament on the 23d of November, and then, as before, all communication was with-held. Here, however, it became important to inquire what were the facts which had occurred during the interval. When thoſe who ſupported the reſolution contended that no information of the real ſtate of the country was laid before Parliament, at the opening of the ſeſſion in his Majeſty's ſpeech from the throne, they at the ſame time argued that every one of the grounds of war enumerated in his Majeſty's declaration had then taken place, and were as well known to miniſters as at the period when the declaration was publiſhed. To ſhew that this aſſertion was well founded, he ſhould beg leave to direct the attention of the Houſe to a few of the principal grounds of complaint and agreſſion which the declaration contained. The firſt to which he would advert, was the complaints of the moleſtation to which our commerce was expoſed. From documents now on the table, it appeared that from December 1801, to the ſame period in the following year, a ſeries of theſe complaints had been preferred to miniſters, and no ſpirited remonſtrance had taken place on the ſubject. The viſit of the military conſuls was known before his Majeſty's ſpeech was delivered, for it appeared by a paper, which was a few days ſince laid before the Houſe, that the inſtructions of Talleyrand to Fauvelet, who had been ſent to take ſoundings of the harbour of Dublin, that they were dated at an early part of the month of November, and conſequently were known to miniſters when Parliament was opened. That the deſigns of the Firſt Conſul of France with reſpect to Switzerland were known, was a matter of general notoriety. Miniſters themſelves had preſented a remonſtrance long before that period. On this part of the ſubject he ſhould, before he ſat down, ſubmit ſome important conſiderations. With the annexation of Piedmont to France, miniſters were not unacquainted. The confiſcation of the revenue of the Spaniſh priories of the order of Malta, there was alſo every reaſon to think that miniſters were acquainted with even before the definitive treaty was concluded. The miſſion of Sebaſtiani, miniſters were fully apprized of, long before they thought proper publicly to allude to it. They were not ignorant of the time when he left France, and on the 29th of November a diſpatch from Gen. Stewart announced his arrival in Egypt. Thus did it appear, that all the principal grounds of the declaration were perfectly well known to miniſters, long before the declaration made its appearance. But, he would not confine himſelf to theſe circumſtances, but would refer to others of not leſs importance, though they were not introduced into the declaration, and very materially implicated the conduct of miniſters. The firſt of theſe points to which he begged leave to allude, was the arrangement of the German indemnities, which to a conſiderable degree involved Britiſh intereſts. When he ſaid this, he meant to allude to the inſult which had been offered to his Majeſty by mulcting a part of his Hanoverian dominions to ſatisfy the avarice of the greater powers. Complete myſtery had covered the whole buſineſs of the indemnities to the houſe of Orange. For this arrangement an article had been introduced into the treaty; but till the papers were laid on the table the Houſe had been totally ignorant in what train the negotiation on this ſubject had been left by miniſters. The whole buſineſs about the order for the evacuation of the Cape, and its ſubſequent retention, was entirely paſſed over in ſilence. By papers ſubſequently called for, it appeared that on the 16th of October, miniſters had diſpatched orders to retain the Cape, though, by a ſolemn treaty, it was to be given up within a limited period. Miniſters, by this treaty, entered into a ſtipulation, which ſtated, that within a certain period the Cape ſhould be ſurrendered to the Batavian republic. The treaty containing this ſtipulation had been laid before both Houſes of Parliament, and had received their approbation. Under ſuch circumſtances, miniſters had taken on themſelves to violate a direct ſtipulation of the treaty. They had choſen particularly to diſpatch orders to ſuſpend the execution of the treaty, and of conſequence to declare the country in a ſtate of war. At what time, he deſired the Houſe to conſider, was it that this extraordinary ſtep had been taken by miniſters? It was juſt about one month from the time that Parliament aſſembled. Did miniſters, when Parliament aſſembled, inform the Houſe of the extraordinary meaſures to which they had reſorted? They had not ſaid a ſingle word on the ſubject. In a very few weeks after, it had appeared proper to them to evacuate the Cape, and

then a war virtually intervened; ſtill miniſters continued to obſerve the ſame ſilence. Some hon. members, and particularly an hon. Gent. under the gallery (Mr. H. Browne), whom he muſt ever eſteem, had commended miniſters for the ſilence they had ſo long obſerved on the ſtate of public affairs. He could not at all accede to this doctrine. The ſyſtem purſued by miniſters would, under the cloak of responſibility, deſtroy every conſtitutional principle, of parliamentary right, of diſcuſſion, and inquiry. He ſincerly believed, that if the negotiation, which had lately terminated, had taken a favourable turn, we ſhould have heard nothing of the whole of the orders and counter-orders of miniſters; all would in a ſhort time have been involved in the darkeſt night. Every diſcuſſion would have been diſcountenanced by miniſters, and converſation in the public prints would have ſupplied the place of official documents on a matter of the higheſt importance. It would not be forgotten what the principles were which miniſters had laid down on this ſubject. In caſe of war they were not unwilling to grant what information was required. On the other hand, if there had been a favourable period put to the negotiations, miniſters did not indeed ſay that they would refuſe all explanation, but they reſerved themſelves as to the caſes on which they conſidered ſuch information expedient, uſeful, or neceſſary. Having gone through theſe obſervations, as tending to ſhew the propriety of the two firſt reſolutions, the R. Hon. Gent. proceeded to examine in detail the grounds on which the third reſolution was founded. From the two firſt reſolutions, the third appeared to flow as a neceſſary inference. It involved a variety of ſerious and weighty obſervations. Firſt, in the attacks which had been made on our ſhips by the officers of the French government. One hon. Gent. ſeemed to conſider, that on this point there was no reaſonable ground of complaint. If injuries had been received, Britiſh ſubjects had only to appeal to the national courts of juſtice. But, what he begged the Houſe to conſider were theſe national courts of juſtice. The principal ground of complaint was, that theſe courts of appeal decide only by taking immediate poſeſſion of the prizes ſubmitted to their deciſion. But what does the Firſt Conſul ſay to the complaints of Britiſh ſubjects? Why, he tells them, that they muſt appeal to the tribunals of the country, to the very tribunals from which all the injuſtice complained of had been received. Let juſtice take its courſe, is the language of the Firſt Conſul; and the groſſeſt injuſtice is the courſe which this pretended juſtice invariably purſues. The capture is divided, and the Britiſh claimant is forced to bear thoſe loſſes, againſt which the remonſtrances of miniſters had failed to protect them. In failing to remonſtrate with vigour againſt a ſpecies of aggreſſion, ſo contrary to every principle of intercourſe between civilized nations, miniſters had incurred a very grave and ſerious reſponſibility. The miſſion of the French Military Conſul did not appear to him to be deſcribed in his Majeſty's declaration, in terms at all correſpondent to the nature of the inſult. It was an outrage in all reſpects ſo groſs, that miniſters ought with much greater ſpirit to have reſented the attempt to violate the uſages of independent nations. It afforded him no inconſiderable degree of ſatisfaction, on a former occaſion, to find that the two eminent and moſt conſiderable members of the Houſe were completely agreed in opinion that the miſſion of thoſe individuals was a groſs inſult, and that in twenty-four hours after their arrival they ought to have been peremptorily required to quit the country. But this was an adequate ſatisfaction; and, if the French government refuſed to give ſatisfaction, there could be no doubt that war, to avenge this national inſult, would have been juſtifiable. In vain, however, had theſe two great characters expreſſed ſuch an opinion. Miniſters had choſen to purſue a courſe totally different. No memorial could be laid before the Houſe, not becauſe they had not remonſtrated, but becauſe the remonſtrance had taken place merely in a verbal converence with the French Ambaſſador. The next point on which he wiſhed to touch, was one which, he ſaid, he conſidered as of the higheſt importance. He meant to allude to the ſituation of Holland.—On this ſubject it alſo afforded him real delight, as he was ſure it muſt have done to the Houſe at large, to find the two Rt. Hon. Gent. (Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox), to whom he had already alluded, ſpeaking with reſpect to the policy which this country ought to purſue with reſpect to Holland, thoſe ſentiments, which every Engliſhman could not fail cordially to approve. For his own part he had no difficulty in ſaying, that he conſidered the conduct of the French government to the Batavian Republic, independent of all other conſiderations, to be a full, fair, and unanſwerable ground of war. What he had to complain of in the conduct of miniſters was, that they had not ſhewn that zeal and activity with regard to the neceſſity of remonſtrating againſt the violence and the injuſtice of the French government to the Dutch, which their duty to the public imperiouſly called on them to diſplay. So far from making the cauſe of the Batavian Republic diſtinctly the cauſe of this country, they appeared on all occaſions backward to take up the buſineſs. So far from availing themſelves of opportunities which occurred of reviving the ſolid connexion of friendſhip and intereſt which it was ſo obviouſly the mutual intereſt of both countries to maintain, their conduct was marked by weakneſs, irreſolution, and timidity. It had been remarked by one Hon. Gent., that in making their ſtand for Malta, miniſters had made their ſtand for a truly Britiſh object. When he conſidered the manner in which the ſtand was made, whatever he might think of the importance of Malta, he could not perfectly coincide with that ſentiment. But even granting that Malta was a fair Britiſh object, he would aſk of miniſters whether, on their own principles, a ſtand in favour of Holland was not of infinitely more importance in a national point of view. Was there any man who did not think that miniſters ought firmly and manfully to have remonſtrated againſt the continuance of the French troops in Holland? Was there any man who expected that miniſters had neglected making ſuch remonſtrance with energy and ſpirit? It was, he muſt confeſs, to his infinite aſtoniſhment, that he found that no memorial had been preſented to the French government on the ſubject; not that no memorial or remonſtrance had been drawn up with the view of being preſented; not that it had not been tranſmitted to Paris, with the view of being laid before the Firſt Conſul; but that after being in the hands of our ambaſſador, miniſters had at length diſcovered that it would be more wiſe, prudent, and proper,

that it should not be delivered. And on what motive was it that so extraordinary a neglect of the most imperious duty was attempted to be justified? The justification was more humiliating and degrading than the neglect itself. It was not true that ministers were not sensible of the importance of getting the French troops removed from the Batavian Republic: it was not that they did not conceive that, according to the clearest principles of the law of nations, and the most obvious maxims of a national policy, they had an undeniable right to interfere; but they declined interfering, on the base and dishonourable principle, that their interference might have excited the jealousy of the French government. Was such language to be endured in an English Parliament? Was a British Secretary of State to tell a British House of Commons, that a memorial drawn up in behalf of an ancient and valuable ally, in support of the independence of a power with which we have a mutual interest, should, from considerations of prudence, propriety, or wisdom, from a dread of irritating France, be cancelled or buried in oblivion. Such was the disgraceful picture which the conduct of ministers to the Batavian Republic presented. Now, as to their conduct to Swisserland, he confessed that here too ministers seemed to prove highly reprehensible. In offering a few observations on this subject, he begged leave to go back a good deal farther than had been gone by any of those by whom the subject had been mentioned. What he should state in the first instance, he should state on the authority of very prevalent rumours, though he would not take upon himself to say, that these rumours were in all respects accurate as to the facts. He had good reason, however, for believing that as early as the spring of last year, several persons of eminent character, and invested with considerable situations, had come from Swisserland to London, with the view of consulting about the best means of providing against that interference of the French government in their internal affairs they had even then began to dread. He had heard that these individuals, so far from being received with favour or with kindness, it was not till after a solicitation of nearly two months that they could gain admission to any one of his Majesty's ministers. This was a circumstance of considerable importance, and could not fail to make a strong impression on the House. But he wished to point out particularly the application of this circumstance as throwing light on the conduct of ministers. They must have known long before October, when their remonstrance in behalf of Swisserland was presented, what was the real situation of that country. In June the fears, the wishes, and the views of the inhabitants had been explained to them. He wished to know from ministers what circumstances existed to induce them to remonstrate in October, which did not operate with equal force in June? Was not the right of interference equal? Were not the claims of the Swiss as powerful? Was not their situation as much recommended to protection? Was there not then a much greater probability of successful resistance than at the time when the remonstrance was presented, when, in fact, that was done beyond the power of reparation, which it was the object of Mr. Moore's journey to prevent? Did ministers expect that any thing mysterious was to result from this journey? Did they hope to find an Austrian army at Constance, ready to afford protection to a persecuted country. The whole remonstrance evinced neither dignity nor foresight. It was equally destitute of policy, wisdom, or ability.——The memorial had been presented to the French government on the 10th of October, and nothing more is heard of it till the 27th of February, when Ld. Whitworth is instructed to demand an answer to the remonstrance. Was no inquiry made during the whole intermediate space, in what light the memorial was regarded by the French government? Was this a matter of such trifling importance, that ministers chose to overlook it? Was not this refusal to give any answer, an indirect way of telling ministers, that the French government was determined not to permit them to interfere on the Continent? Was it not a tacit mode of establishing what ministers could not but know was the avowed and favourite object of the ambition of the First Consul? Ministers on every consideration of wisdom and policy ought much earlier to have demanded explanation. As to Piedmont, he had to offer a few observations. On a former occasion the situation of the King of Sardinia had given rise to a good deal of discussion. On the debates on the Definitive Treaty, when it was objected that no provison was obtained for that Sovereign, a noble Secretary of State opposite (Ld Hawkesbury) had said, that he had not only lost all right to interfetence on his behalf on the part of this country, but had, from his conduct, placed himself in the situation of being considered as an enemy. Against such a view of the subject he did protest at the time, and must at all times protest in the strongest terms. Because a Prince who, fighting in our cause, had been stripped of his dominions, and deprived of his all, was for a while obliged to assume the nominal appearance of a foe, he could never admit the doctrines which the Noble Lord had laid down. But on a sudden a most important change is introduced in the situation of this Sovereign. From being something little short of an avowed enemy, he is at once converted into a favourable ally, for whom ample security is to be obtained for all his losses. And how is this new indemnity to be procured? Why, by the rare scheme of the cession of Lampedosa, and by tacking the poor King of Sardinia to the end of the projet, which contains two articles which may be either admitted or not, as the French Minister for Foreign Affairs chooses to receive them. Whether, however, the menace of war or proffer of peace was considered, the whole conduct of ministers to that unfortunate Prince appeared equally disgusting. Now as to the direct subject of Malta. He could not but think that a total want of policy with regard to Russia had been discovered by ministers, while negotiations were going forward on this subject. Russia is allowed on all hands to have been the principal power on which ministers relied for the guarantee of Malta at the time the 10th article of the Treaty was formed. Now, what happened while such was the avowed wish and design of ministers? Ministers signed a Treaty, by one article of which Russia is to be invited to be one of the guarantees of the independence of the Island of Malta; and this ministers do, while at the very moment they were making this requisition, they were conscious that such a guarantee would be directly contrary to a previous arrangement betwixt this Country and Russia. [Here he read an extract from Count

Woronzow's Note on the 12th of November, stating this fact.] The history which he had at present to present to the House on the subject of Malta, was short and simple, unless the Note to which he had alluded was a direct forgery, which there was no reason whatever to suppose. The language of the Emperor of Russia to the ministers of this country, or to the French government is—"You wish me to be one of the guarantees of Malta, agreeably to the tenth article of the Treaty of Amiens, which I am far from wishing to undertake; but if I were willing, I cannot accept the invitation; it is not in my power, as you must be perfectly aware. You know that I have already entered into an agreement with your Court relative to Malta, in its nature entirely contrary to the guarantee you require."—Is it really true that the King's ministers knew that such was the situation of the Emperor of Russia with regard to Malta; and did they really form an article which they must have been conscious at the time could never be fulfilled. Those who objected to the article originally, did so on the ground of the difficulties which could not fail to attend its being carried into execution. How much stronger reasons had ministers to entertain such an opinion. They knew that it was contrary to the wishes of the Emperor of Russia to undertake the guarantee. They knew further, that it was impossible that he could, consistently with a former solemn engagement, undertake, and yet with such knowledge they conclude the Treaty, and gravely call for the guarantee. In the whole annals of diplomacy, he believed, it would be difficult to find any parallel to the conduct of ministers in this point; of a piece with this was the manner in which they had acted with respect to the sale of the priories of the Order of Malta in Spain. They knew, that without revenues the restoration of the Order was utterly impracticable, but, at the very time when the Definitive Treaty was signed, they had every reason for thinking that in Italy, in Bavaria, and in Spain, the revenues of the Order were either confiscated, or on the eve of being confiscated. After all this knowledge they come forward and call for the guarantees, to pave the way for the restoration of the Order. He was anxious to hear what account ministers would be able to give of these circumstances, to which he had now alluded. If they were false, he should rejoice to find that this was the case. If, however, on the other hand they were false, how was it possible for any man to conceive that ministers ever could have entertained the remotest idea of the restoration of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, in Malta? Before he concluded, he wished to occupy the attention of the House a few moments on the subject of the Cape of Good Hope. Of the importance of the Cape as a naval station, no diversity of opinion prevailed, All these whose habits of life led them to form the most accurate ideas of its value, were those who spoke most highly of its importance. It was merely with the view of an absolute necessity of its surrender at the conclusion of peace, that the cession was ever attempted to be justified. On this ground alone had the expediency of ceding the Cape been argued, both on the Preliminary Articles and the Definitive Treaty. With this impression powerfully operating on his mind, it was, he said, with no small degree of surprise that he found, on referring to the French official papers, that the proposition for ceding the Cape originated with the minister of this country; that it was brought forward even so early as the second conference. He begged leave to press this on the attention of the House, which in the mind of many gentlemen could not fail to excite very considerable surprise. He recurred to the order for retaining the Cape, and on this subject he made some very pointed observations. It was generally understood the orders for the retention were sent out on the 6th of October, with reference to the prospect of a war with France, on account of her unjustifiable interference with Switzerland. He would not now decide how far this was politic or wise. But this, however, he would say, that, if the interference of France with Switzerland was a just ground of war, the same interference with respect to Holland was a still more powerful reason for hostilities. If the occupation of Switzerland by French troops was a fair ground of remonstrance, it surely was not less so with regard to Holland. Now ministers on the 16th of October dispatched orders to retain the Cape of Good Hope, under an apprehension of the renewal of war, on account of the unjust attempts of the French government to impose a form of government on the Swiss people. On the 14th of November they receive a dispatch from the British minister at the Hague, which gives them no room to entertain any hope of the French troops being speedily withdrawn from Holland. Do they discover new jealousy, and adopt new measures of precaution? On the contrary, they send out orders for the evacuation of the Cape! The desired gentlemen to contrast this with the order of the same day on the preceding month, and then judge of the taxen's or the consistency of ministers. The Rt. Hon. Gent. after recapitulating and enforcing all his arguments, sat down by giving his cordial vote for declaring his Majesty's present ministers unworthy of the confidence of Parliament and unfit to manage the affairs of the empire at so perilous a crisis.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, that much has on the present and on former occasions been remarked upon the treaty of Amiens. I shall not only repeat what I always have felt and said respecting it, viz. that conscientiously and deliberately I entertain the same opinion of it as I did at the time it was immediately under discussion, and that opinion prompts me to pronounce that it was a measure not only wise, prudent, and necessary at the time it was adopted, but that it has since been productive of the most beneficial consequences; nor will I hesitate to affirm, that I should not have now to congratulate you, the House, and the country on the spirit, the vigour, and the unanimity which the present emergency has called forth, were it not for that very treaty which is so loudly arraigned and so severely stigmatized. Of the wisdom and beneficial consequences of that treaty, not only do I continue to retain a hardened sense, but I am ready now to go further, and to affirm that it was also wise and desirable to endeavour to maintain it; and until the causes have occurred which produced the present rupture, causes which have been stated with all possible truth and accuracy, it was the first wish of my heart, and I think I may venture to say, that it was likewise the first wish of the hearts of my colleagues in office, that the peace might have been maintained if it could

be maintained consistently with the honour, the dignity, and the interests of the country. But since our anxious wishes in that respect have been frustrated, and war has necessarily arisen, I trust I am prepared to meet the crisis with the feelings of an Englishman, and, anxious as I was to sheath the sword, I shall now be found no less determined to unsheath it, until it appear that the honour of the country remains untouched, and that its safety and independence are more effectually secured.——Let me now be permitted to advert to what has been rather harshly observed respecting the temper which his Majesty's ministers are said to have observed respecting the conduct of the French Government. Their desire of peace had no doubt induced them to manifest no inconsiderable share of patience and forbearance; but they felt that the situation of France itself, and the circumstances in which was placed the person who held the chief rule in that country, called for some allowances. These circumstances might seem perhaps for a time to justify the conduct of that person. His mind was so pampered with victories; it was so dazzled with the additional splendour that was shed upon his name, that it might not be fair to expect he would immediately sit down in quiet, and soberly examine what might best belong to his new situation. Under that impression it was judged wise to observe a certain degree of forbearance with respect to what should otherwise be noticed in the French Government at other times, and under other circumstances. A desire to make these allowances produced the forbearance which had marked the conduct of ministers, a conduct to which I feel is now owing the spirit and the energy which the country seems prepared to display. That forbearance which some gentlemen are so prone to censure, ministers, I think have reason to boast of. It has produced no bad consequences, if we are to go to war; it has neither delayed too long, nor has it brought it on one hour too soon. If it had been brought on sooner, we should not be actuated by that spirit and courage which, under the guidance of Providence, will, I trust, enable us to get through the contest with honour and success. I will again repeat it. I am free to confess, the conduct of his Majesty's ministers has argued throughout, an uniform spirit of forbearance, which might appear, perhaps, to have been carried to an extreme; but, I am at the same time warranted in asserting, that in no instance has it exhibited a single proof of unmanly and unbecoming concession; and in no instance has it been marked by any one act of that description. Let me next briefly advert to the language which I am said to have held upon different occasions. I have been charged by the R. Hon. Gent. of holding out expectations of the continuance of peace, which expectations have since been proved not to be justified by circumstances of the moment. His Majesty's ministers have also been charged with with-holding from Parliament those communications which Parliament had a right to expect, and which it was their duty to have made. As far, Sir, as my recollection will bear me back, I am ready to restate the expression to which the R. Hon. Gent. seems to allude. My noble friend (Ld. Hawkesbury) also expressed himself in the same language. We stated that we had no reliance at any time on the continuance of peace, but such as arose from a view of the situation of the enemy, and the consciousness of our own strength. France might have discovered the same restless spirit of ambition that has ever marked her character. Yet, on the occasion to which the R. Hon. Gent. seems to refer, I did say, that the peace might last as long as any other; and I then also added, that the only chance of its continuance arose from the energy of our strength, and the impregnable security of our resources. I was of the same opinion when the preliminaries were discussed. The same language have I held in the debates of last session. But the R. Hon Gent. observes, that the conduct of the French Government should have inspired different apprehensions. I am sure I am not very much disposed to flatter and compliment the person who is now at the head of the French Government; but still I must say, that I could see nothing in his conduct which led me to believe that it was his policy to renew hostilities. In this I am willing to allow that I may have been deceived; but his sending at the time the remaining navy of France to St. Domingo, his exposing so large a portion both of his naval and military force, were surely pretty reasonable indications of a pacific system; nor can it well be accounted for, but on a principle of peace. It has also been asserted, that in the discussion on his Majesty's speech, on the 23d of November, an assurance was expressed by me, that there was no probability of a rupture. What I then said was in answer to an Hon. Gent. who observed that he was concerned to see that it was likely hostilities would be renewed. All I asserted on the occasion was, that I saw no probability of an immediate rupture at that time. Similar language is said also to have been used by me when the question respecting the income of his R. H. the Prince of Wales was under discussion. I am supposed then to have observed that we were in profound peace. That I mentioned our being at peace, I readily agree, but I do not think that I made use of the word *profound*. The circumstance which led me to make use of the expression was an allusion to the language that was used in 1796, when the same subject was under the consideration of Parliament. It was then observed that it was right to continue the restrictions on the expenditure of his R. H. on account of the extreme difficulties of the times. But I observed, on the occasion alluded to, that the restrictions that might be proper in time of war, might as properly be done away in time of peace, and if I added the word *profound*, it was probably only from the usual combination of the two words. Another conversation has also been referred to, which took place in a discussion on the Consolidated Fund. In that conversation I am again supposed to have said, that I had no expectation that the war would be renewed. What I said then merely referred to the state of our naval and military strength, which I asserted was not intended to answer any views of ambition and aggrandizement, but had only in contemplation the assertion of our just rights, and the maintenance of the blessings of peace. But I am eager now to release the House from any further reference to any language used by me. I wish them to rest their opinion on better authority; let the House, therefore, consult the records of Parliament, and they will there find what were the real sentiments of his Majesty's ministers. Let them consult the speech of his Majesty at the beginning of the ses-

sion, and the address, and even the amendment to the address, which were moved on that occasion. Do they imply any thing like the opinion which I am asserted to have uttered? On the contrary, did not the sentiments there expressed create great anxiety in the minds of some gentlemen? Is it to be supposed that I should have expressed a perfect conviction that no renewal of hostilities would take place, at a time when I was agreeing to a large naval and military establishment? Why should those who proposed such precautions, be imagined to be wholly without any apprehension of war? This surely would argue a strange and unaccountable inconsistency between their opinions and their measures. The preparations then advised and pursued, are therefore the best proof of what were the real sentiments of ministers—and if that proof were not sufficient, an additional one might be found in the observations which I made at the time it was proposed to renew the restriction on the Cash Payment of the Bank, viz. that the state of Europe was the best argument that could be urged in favour of its adoption. Ministers were also accused of not making formal communications to Parliament of the matters that gave rise to the discussions. Such communications might be attended with the worst effects, and therefore it was prudent to with-hold them until the time came for making them with safety. As to the application from Swisserland, it is true that it took place before the meeting of Parliament, but it was then earnestly wished that no resistance should be made on their part. Nor was there then any combination that could give any effect to a remonstrance in their behalf. When that combination afterwards took place, it was too late to make any successful remonstrance. —With regard to Holland, the R. Hon. Gent. complained that strong and vigorous remonstrances had not been made for the removal of the French troops from that country. The contrary would appear from the instructions given to Ld. Whitworth. Hopes were given by Mr. Liston on the 5th November, that the French troops would evacuate Holland; but on the 12th, that expectation was discouraged. The French Government expressed a wish that the troops destined for Louisiana might continue some time longer in the Batavian territories: with which wish the Batavian Government seemed disposed to comply; for they hinted a desire that we should forbear to interpose in their behalf. On the subject of the Cape of Good Hope, much had been said, and more value has been attached to that possession than, perhaps, it deserves. In my opinion it is of much less value than other possessions which his Majesty's ministers were anxious to retain. Besides, the retaining of it would involve a large expense; for during the time we were in possession of it, that expense amounted to no less than two millions. Whatever its value might be estimated at by others, I could never bring myself to imagine that we should forego, for its sake, the chance of retaining more valuable possessions. — The Rt. Hon. Gent. in speaking of Malta, seemed to suppose that an engagement respecting it had been entered into with Russia; no such engagement had taken place, nor any thing approaching to it. Previous to the conclusion of the Preliminaries, a communication had been made to the Russian Government of the heads of the arrangement respecting Malta, and then no objection was made to the arrangement, except to that part which related to a Maltese langue. We afterwards, indeed, agreed to adopt the Russian mode of electing the Grand Master, and hopes were given by Ld. St. Helens that Russia would on her part consent to grant her guarantee, but these hopes were afterwards disappointed. But with respect to any other engagement, there was none, and consequently there was no breach of faith on our part with respect to Russia. The Rt. Hon. Gent. is also pleased to complain of the insults and indignities offered to this country by the French Government; and of their disregard of our remonstrances against them, which, in his mind, is a sufficient ground for war. Whether they have properly remonstrated against it or not, is shewn by the papers on the table: but that the disregard of such remonstrances is an adequate cause of war, I cannot bring myself to agree. Such disregard may indeed afford just ground of jealousy, of complaint and remonstrance, but not of war, as a variety of examples might abundantly prove. With regard to the Commercial Commissioners, and the intention with which it appeared that they were sent into the British dominions, my noble friend remonstrated in the most spirited terms, and he received a disavowal of the purpose for which they were supposed to be intended. But he did not stop here; as soon as all hopes had vanished of concluding a commercial treaty, Government refused to recognise them, and they were instructed to remove from the country. The only one of them who attempted to remain, was sent away from Jersey, by virtue of an order from the Secretary of State's Office, and an intimation was sent to Gen. Andreossi, that unless they all withdrew force would be employed to compel them. Will it now be contended that no remonstrances have been made against the insults and injuries offered to the country by the French Government, or that they have been all disregarded? I venture to hope, that if more energetic measures have not been pursued, the House will make due allowance for the difficulties in which ministers were placed.—Ministers anxiously wished to preserve peace, but notwithstanding that anxiety, the honour of the country was never committed. The documents on the table will exhibit strong marks of forbearance, but not one of unbecoming weakness. While there remained a hope of peace no communication was made to Parliament, because it was thought that such communications would frustrate rather than promote the attainment of the desirable object. What the conduct of ministers has been throughout, I hope that the House have now before them full and ample communications, and if a single document be wanting, by the help of which the conduct of ministers may be better elucidated, it shall be furnished without delay. In my own and their name I am now ready to say, that in whatever light they may be induced to behold their conduct, ministers are ready to meet their decision. We only call for a decision; we do not venture to ask for approbation: we are anxious, however, to escape censure. If it be merited, we submissively acquiesce in the sentence of the House; but if it be unmerited, let our minds be relieved from the charges which the resolutions hang over us, and let them go unfettered to the discharge of those arduous duties of which they are desirous to acquit themselves with zeal, diligence, and fidelity. Let us know that

we do not go forth in the eyes of the country branded with the ſtigma of the diſpleaſure of the Houſe; or if we have unfortunately incurred their diſapprobation, let it be proved by a direct charge; if the Houſe ſay the charge is not founded, our gratitude will be unbounded; if they ſay it is, we ſhall bow to the deciſion with the conſciouſneſs of having exerted our beſt endeavours to deſerve a better fate.

Mr. Pitt.—If I poſſeſſed a full and clear opinion on the merits of the caſe, to the extent of either directly negativing or adopting the reſolutions which have been propoſed, I ſhould, following the unbiaſſed dictates of my conſcience, give my vote on that ſide to which my judgment inclined. If I agreed with my Rt. Hon. Friend, Mr. Grenville, in thinking that the firſt ſteps we ought to take in duty to the public, were by a retroſpective ſurvey of the conduct of miniſters to judge of their fitneſs to exerciſe the functions to which they are called, and if upon that reſult I were forced to conclude, that the papers on the table afforded evidence of criminality, of incapacity, of miſconduct; then, however painful the ſacrifice of private feelings might be in taking ſuch a part in the caſe of individuals whom I reſpect, I ſhould feel myſelf bound to concur in an addreſs to his Majeſty, for the removal of his miniſters. On the other hand, if I were one of thoſe who conſidered the explanation afforded by miniſters upon general points, ſo clear as to juſtify a decided negative of the propoſitions moved by the Hon. Gent. over the way—a negative which would imply approbation, for in ſuch a matter to avoid ground of cenſure, may be conſidered the ſame as to have deſerved applauſe; I ſhould feel myſelf happy in joining in a deciſive negative to the motion. But to this extent, either of approbation or of cenſure, I am unable to go. I cannot concur in the latter, or in the extent of the charges involved in the propoſitions which have been moved. Beſides, I am aware of the inconveniencies that would reſult from ſupporting any meaſure which has the tendency of the preſent motion, unleſs the cleareſt neceſſity exiſts for it. Though I do not diſpute the right of this Houſe to addreſs the King for the removal of miniſters, yet nothing is more miſchievous than a Parliamentary interference by declared cenſure, rendering the continuance of miniſters in office impoſſible, unleſs that interference is juſtified by extraordinary exigency of affairs. Not diſputing the right of the Houſe, I contend that the right is to be governed by a ſound diſcretion and by the public intereſt. We muſt look to conſiderations of public expediency and of public ſafety. There are ſome queſtions in the diſcuſſion of which Gent. muſt feel more than they can well expreſs, and this, with regard to the interference of Parliament for removing miniſters, is one of them. Admitting even that there were conſiderable grounds of diſſatisfaction at the conduct of miniſters, would it tend to promote thoſe exertions, to encourage thoſe ſacrifices, which the difficulty and danger of our ſituation require? Would our means of ſuſtaining the ſtruggle in which we are engaged, and of calling forth thoſe reſources neceſſary for our defence, be improved by cutting ſhort the date of adminiſtration, and unſettling the whole ſyſtem of government? To diſplace one adminiſtration and to introduce a new one is not the work of a day. With all the functions of executive power ſuſpended, with the regular means of communication between Parliament and the Throne interrupted, weeks, nay months, waſted in doubt, uncertainty, and inaction, how could the public ſafely conſent, with a ſtate of things ſo violent and unnatural as would reſult from Parliament rendering one adminiſtration incapable of exerciſing any public functions without any other efficient government being obtained in its ſtead? I will venture to hint alſo that after ſuch a ſtep any adminiſtration that ſhould ſucceed, be what it might and what it would be, muſt ſtill depend upon the Crown, would feel itſelf placed in a moſt delicate ſituation. To put the matter as conſcientiouſly and delicately as poſſible, would any ſet of men feel their introduction to power in theſe circumſtances to be ſuch as to enable them to diſcharge, in a manner ſatisfactory to themſelves, the duties which ſo eventful a period muſt impoſe? Theſe are conſiderations for the Crown and the Public; and they outweigh all thoſe which preſent themſelves, on a partial view of the advantages which could be hoped from a proſecution of that cenſure and diſſolution of adminiſtration to which the propoſitions tend. I am aware that the Rt. Hon. Gent. on the floor, and my friends on the ſame bench with him, muſt feel their ſituation irkſome under the weight of a queſtion ſo important, in which they are perſonally involved, remaining undecided. Nevertheleſs, when other ſacrifices are demanded for the public intereſt, perſonal feelings muſt be overlooked. Thoſe who, with me, have not made up their minds to the extent of cenſuring miniſters by the adoption of the propoſitions, or approving their conduct by agreeing to a direct negative, muſt purſue ſome middle courſe. Thoſe who, on the examination of the papers, from any feeling of regret for the ſteps which miniſters took in the negotiation, muſt conſult their conſcience on the vote they are to give. They cannot do that which muſt imply approbation when they do not find from the caſe made out that approbation has been deſerved; neither can they vote ſevere cenſure leading to an addreſs for removal, when they do not conſider the charges made completely ſuſtained. Having ſtated the oppoſite lines of conduct which preſent themſelves in deciding upon the propoſitions, I do not intend to enter into any detailed diſcuſſion of the papers. I wiſh if good cannot be obtained by continuing to diſcuſs them, comparable to the evil of interrupting the courſe of our parliamentary duty, to ſuſpend them altogether. Since things more urgent and more important demand our care, let us make good the parliamentary pledge we have given. I ſhall behold with much greater ſatisfaction, as firſt proofs of our determination to ſupport his Majeſty with our lives and fortunes, you, preſenting a ſtrong Bill of Supply, providing reſources, not merely for every demand of public ſervice, but adequate to every ſcale of exertion; a meaſure that will diſplay and call forth the means of ſuſtaining the ſtruggle, not merely for one year, but, till we ſhall have brought it to a ſucceſsful iſſue; ſome meaſure by which we ſhall be enabled to complete our army, and to call into action the national ſtrength, and give activity to all the military ſkill, diſcipline, and experience we poſſeſs. I do not know if gentlemen feel as I do upon this occaſion, or if I have been ſucceſsful in making my feelings un-

derstood. Impressed as I am with those feelings, and unprepared for the decisive vote which is offerred in the direct negative, or affirmative of the propositions before the House, I move that the other orders of the day be now read.

LORD HAWKESBURY. He said, that never before had he risen in Parliament with such feelings as those that now oppressed him. With every wish to do justice to the feelings of his right hon. friend, in making the motion with which he had concluded his speech, he and his colleague should be shrinking from their duty to themselves, if they could accept the compromise offered, between a direct censure and a total acquittal. A charge of crimination founded upon papers laid on the table, had been brought forward. He asked, if there was an instance in which proposition s founded on such documents and involving the conduct of ministers had not been met either with a direct negative or affirmative? A motion of inquiry might be got rid of by a previous question; but when a direct charge was made, grounded on facts, rising out of public documents, a previous question was not the fit way of disposing of the subject. No man was more ready than he was to acknowledge the prerogative of the Crown to choose its ministers; but on the other hand, ministers were responsible to Parliament for the exercise of their functions, and when Parliament saw sufficient grounds of censure they ought to state it, and then ministers, no longer able usefully to serve the public, ought to retire. Independent of private considerations, he must contend that the credit of the government ought to be maintained, particularly at such a crisis as the present. But he had no difficulty in saying, that those who wished to destroy the administration, ought to vote for the resolutions because that was their obvious tendency, while the vote which his right hon. friend had proposed, would have the effect to discredit government, to leave them discredited, in possession of functions which they could not exercise with honour to themselves nor advantage to the public. His right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt) had declined going into details. He wished, however, that he had afforded some details, that he had pointed out those parts of the conduct of ministers which he could not approve, that they might have an opportunity of meeting any charge, or explaining what was deemed exceptionable. It was possible that in a long, and arduous course of conduct, some points might be liable to objection. In a country like this, however, he always considered it to be the fair principle, both of support and of opposition to ministers, that those who agreed or disagreed with them should do so on a general system. It was not to be expected that all should approve every particular point. They were to overlook minor differences for the sake of giving effect to the general scheme of measures and conduct which they approved. These he had always understood, where the general principles, and he regretted that Mr. Pitt had not made up his mind to act upon them. He asked whether, after surveying the conduct of ministers during a period of unexampled difficulty, he was not now prepared to say yes, or no, directly to a motion of censure?—On the Russian armament, he well remembered that his right hon. friend and himself had not thought it sufficient to get rid of a motion of censure by a previous question, but in circumstances when the government in one point had given up, yet the charges were met boldly, and directly negatived. He wished that, on the present occasion, ministers might either be acquitted or condemned. He was sure, from what he knew of his right hon. friend, that his motives in bringing forward a previous question were pure and upright, but ministers could not acquiesce in the discredit of a suspended censure. If it were the desire of ministers to retain their places at all hazards, they might accept the compromise which had been offered, but he could say for himself and his colleagues, that they had no desire to remain in office longer than they could be useful to their country. If he felt himself reduced to that situation in which he could not serve it with advantage, he would carry the seals to the feet of his gracious Sovereign, and intreat him to appoint a successor more worthy. It was that they might not remain in office discredited, and useless, that he must oppose the previous question; for he could not think of remaining an hour in office after having forfeited the confidence of the House and the good opinion of the country.

MR. CANNING declared, that he rose in discharge of a solemn duty with feelings scarcely inferior to those so creditably manifested by his noble friend. For the first time in his life he was by an over-ruling sense of duty to vote differently from his right hon. friend. He was so far agreed with his noble friend as to give a vote that went to decide the case at once; he felt himself bound to give him that explicit answer. After the ample manner in which the question had been discussed, he merely rose to express the ground of his vote, fearful that a silent vote might be liable to misconstruction. He had often expressed his opinion of his Majesty's government which the papers now before the House most fully confirmed, and as to the first point, shewed clearly that the negotiation was very far from being managed in a statesman-like way. As to the second resolution, that his Majesty's ministers had with-held information to Parliament, and even practised a delusion upon it, relative to the discussions with France, this, he conceived, strictly proved, as Parliament had been taught to expect security, when government knew the peace, of which they boasted, was crumbling into pieces. He wished the House to consider the great injury this species of imposition was to every class of society; it had, by the excess of disappointment, rendered them less adequate to act up to the exigency of their present arduous situation. Hence he was prepared to say, in the language of the resolution, that the conduct of government was such as he explicitly condemned. He thought, that they had neglected many opportunities of resisting, with firmness and effect, the insults and aggressions of France. He differed from the right hon. gent. on the floor (Mr. Addington), and would not think that any extraordinary allowance was to be made to a lawless Usurper. A spirited and timely opposition to his unjust views might, on the contrary, have taught him a different lesson. In another point he differed from that Gent. namely, that the evils of war could never come too late. He, on the contrary, thought that permission in many cases operated as an invitation to proceed, and that if the insult and aggressions of Buonaparté had been properly resisted in the first instance, we now

should have been spared the emergency of war. As to the 4th resolution he thought it justified by the dates of the papers; but it appeared by them that after the Cape was retained, no explanation was demanded on the score on which it was retained. By this, and other surrenders thus made, while dispute was pending, and war obvious, it became of course more difficult to make a stand on that point which ministers themselves admitted was essential. If Malta was the cause of war, all that was done should have been done as bearing on that question; whereas ministers had now given up every thing before the question was brought on. Upon these grounds he proposed to vote directly for the resolutions in censure of ministers. As to the insinuation thrown out by an honourable baronet, that all opposition was only an effort to obtain places, he begged to assure him that it was wholly disregarded by him, and that he never knew it made but by those who were most open to its application. There had been all along a most unusual forbearance on the part of the country and the House towards ministers. Not one motion had been brought forward in opposition to government befor the present. They had been allowed a most unexampled degree of latitude. If they had been harassed with perpetual motions they would have had some right to complain, but never was any administration treated with so much allowance. How far they were now deserving of it, the House and country were to say. From the 23d of November to the 8th of March not a motion had been made. Since the 8th of March, still yet more deference had been shewed.—Nothing had been said till government themselves brought forwardsome subject connected with public affairs, and until they had agreed to separate their own conduct from their country's cause.

THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS defended the conduct of ministers, and opposed the previous question, because the fair way was to come to a decisive vote. He said it was unfair to try the conduct of ministers on the principles of those who opposed the treaty of Amiens. The part of ministers in concluding the peace was arraigned, and on the same grounds their endeavours to preserve it. Ministers should be tried on the principle recognised and approved by almost the whole nation, that it was fit and proper to endeavour to put an end to the last war.

SIR R. PEELE disapproved of the conduct of ministers since the definitive treaty. He said, that towards the latter end of the last glorious war, ministers had received the national firm of army and navy, in the best condition, but since that time a great part of the army had been disbanded, and the strength of the navy had been allowed to fall away. He did not think that ministers were adequate to the present crisis.

THE SECRETARY AT WAR called for a decisive vote on the same grounds with his colleagues. He said that the militia, and a certain portion of the army, had been disbanded on peace, but the military force of this country was never in a better state than it was at present. He defended the conduct of the Admiralty. He shewed that we had a naval force in every quarter superior to the enemy; and in Europe superior to that of the French by a much greater proportion than had ever happened on the breaking out of any war.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, June 6. (Min. 272.)

[CONDUCT OF MINISTERS.]—EARL FITZWILLIAM, pursuant to the notice he had given, rose, and after a short introductory speech, expressive of his strong disapprobation of the conduct of ministers, since the negotiation of the late treaties of peace, brought forward certain resolutions, founded on the positions advanced in the course of his speech, and implying a censure upon his Majesty's ministers.

THE DUKE OF CLARENCE observed, that notwithstanding his personal respect for the noble earl, whose parliamentary conduct ever was manly, and consistent, yet holding the opinions he did, he could not support the resolution just moved. With respect to for ministers, he thought they deserved thanks, even having so long procured the blessings of peace as they had done. He was well aware of the difficulties of any negotiation with France; that such could be brought to a pacific issue, was matter of surprise to him, and under these impressions he regarded it as a matter of experiment. With respect to the preliminaries, when he considered the circumstances in which the country was placed at that time, they ought to have been satisfactory: but into the subject of the definitive treaty, he should not then enter. He could not avoid adverting to the gross misconduct of the late ministers, which had brought the country into that situation in which the present ministers found it; and he avowed his readiness to meet any noble lord with respect to any military event which had taken place since the marching of the Guards in February, 1793, to the period of the present ministers coming into power. With respect to the affair of Malta, he expressed his opinion, that under the circumstances of the case, ministers were justified in maintaining it; what reductions of force had taken place were a proof of the hope ministers entertained of being able to execute the treaty. He alluded to the language of one of his Majesty's late speeches, considering it as dictated by ministers, which he commended as wise, moderate, and firm; and also the prudence of ministers in having the naval force of the country, at the time of delivering the message, nearly in as good a state as in a period of war. He adverted to the conduct of ministers with respect to the affair of Swisserland, and the temporary retention of the Cape, which H. R. H. approved; and he alluded to the insolent menaces of the enemy, that England could not meet France single-handed: the experience of ages and the page of history refuted this untruth, and evinced that England never encountered France with so much energy, effect, or advantage, as when she was single handed, "And," added his royal highness, "he who makes such an assertion "is either a liar in his heart, or a fool, that should "be sent to school to learn better." He gave ministers full credit for their endeavours to maintain peace, as long as it could consistently be done; and concluded by warmly declaring his conviction, that the country suffered much from the gross misconduct of his Majesty's late ministers; and that sooner than they should again be brought into his Majesty's councils, he would do any thing to keep the present ministers in power.

LORD COVENTRY said, that ministers had a third enemy to contend with, and that was party, which

was excellently described in those lines of Pope applied to Addison, beginning,

"Willing to wound, and yet afraid to strike."

EARL MINTO supported the resolutions.—*As an accurate report of his Lordship's eloquent speech has been published, it is thought unnecessary to attempt any abridgement of it here.*

EARL GROSVENOR thought the resolutions could not be for a moment entertained by the House, after the decided vote in favour of ministers given on a former evening. He was anxious that the noble lord who brought them forward should consent to their being withdrawn. He vindicated the whole of the conduct of ministers, which he thought deserving of the confidence of parliament and the country.

LORD BOLTON said, that though in some parts of the conduct of ministers he had doubts of its propriety, yet on the whole he felt himself inclined to give it his general approbation. He rejoiced that the French government had not accepted of the propositions of ministers relative to Malta. Fortunately it was now in our possession, and he trusted it never would be relinquished.

LORD WARWICK, though he greatly approved of the spirit of the resolution, wished the noble earl to withdraw his motion, as under the present circumstances he thought the discussion could not be productive of advantage to the country.

THE EARL OF SCARBOROUGH defended the conduct of the late administration, which he thought had saved every thing valuable in this world from destruction. As for the measures of the present ministers they had been such as he could by no means approve.

LORD DE DUNSTANVILLE called the attention of their lordships to the treaty of Amiens, (which he now considered as dead and buried), to the unfavourable circumstances under which it was made. If peace had not then been made, the tables of both Houses of parliament would have been covered with petitions, which would lead to the conclusion of peace under still more unfavourable circumstances. He vindicated the conduct of ministers during the late negotiation, for which, instead of censure, he deemed them intitled to the thanks of the House.

THE EARL OF CARYSFORT censured ministers for most of the prominent parts of their conduct; he condemned the late pacification, and contrasted the situation of the country prior to that period, in point of acquired territory and extensive force, with its present situation. He blamed ministers for their want of decision and vigour, and thought their conduct justified the resolutions.

THE EARL OF DARNLEY expressed his acquiescence with what had fallen from a royal Duke, as to the misconduct of the late ministers with respect to the war. He did not in every point approve of the conduct of the present ministers, and alluded to some where he thought they might have acted better, but thought them upon the whole entitled to confidence; and as they appeared to possess the confidence of the Sovereign, he hoped they would profit by their recent experience, and conduct the war with spirit, vigour and energy, to an honourable and successful termination.

LORD HOBART assured the House that the army had been no where reduced where it could possibly be avoided. Every body was aware that the militia must necessarily be reduced on the conclusion of articles of peace; the period of the fencibles' service also terminated with the war. The service of many of the army was also at an end with the war; but as many as could be retained, by giving them a high bounty, were retained. As to the orders and counter-orders which some noble lords had noticed in such terms of severity, the House would please to observe that it was not a partial or incomplete measure confined to only one or two places; the same sort of orders and counter-orders were sent out to every island in the West Indies, as well as to the Cape. If Austria or the other great continental powers did not think fit to interfere, to check the ambition of the First Consul after the signing of the treaty of Amiens, he did not think that we should single-handed contend about the Cape; and the answers received from other courts might be deemed a sufficient reason for ministers altering their conduct. The Cape had last war cost 2½ millions, which was more than its value could be fairly estimated at for that period. He had also the best naval authority for stating, that it was not absolutely necessary to stop at the Cape in going to the East Indies, and coming back, it was only necessary, in case of tempestuous weather. It had been stated, on the authority of rumour, in another place, that he had refused to have any conference with the Maltese deputies in his office. This he positively denied, and assured the House that he had two meetings with those Gentlemen upon the affairs of their unhappy country.

LORD GRENVILLE stated, that the present charge was entirely the reverse of that adopted by other noble lords. They were of opinion that ministers were culpable for not going to war sooner, he charged them with criminality in not avoiding the war altogether. He then went over the different grounds of a difference of sentiment which had been urged on each side of the question. If it could be clearly proved, however, that ministers had not been guilty of neglecting to accept the mediation of Russia, or any other power pacifically inclined, he should think them entitled to a verdict of acquittal. But, if on the other hand, it was proved to the satisfaction of the House that such mediation had ben offered, and that they had neglected to accept the offer, they were subject to a most awful responsibility. An unofficial paper, most certainly, but to which he had every reason to give credit, had asserted that such an offer had been made, but that, "one of the contracting parties had with-held their assent." He could not suppose—it was not by any means probable, that France was this contracting power; England therefore must be the power which refused. A noble ld. opposite had referred to the peace of 1763, and contrasted it with the navy we had now at our command. That could not, on mature deliberation, be considered a fair mode of comparison; we should take into the account the relative and general situation of Europe, and then draw a balance of their respective force. The imprisonment of captain d'Auvergne: the insolent declaration of the French, that they would consider the Alien Act as an infraction of the treaty; the non-fulfilment of the second article,

which respects the payment of money for the maintenance of prisoners, and against which no remonstrance had been made by our ministers; at least no such remonstrance appeared from the papers on their lordships' table. The first remonstrance was on the 14th of Nov., which was after the surrender of the Cape, and that was about the French troops occupying Holland, though it was a matter of general notoriety that their keeping possession of Holland with an armed force was not then any thing novel in the eyes of Europe. The charge which he most positively brought against ministers was that of a breach of faith with Austria, a breach of faith with Russia and Prussia, and above all a breach of faith with France. He charged ministers with deceiving France, and with deceiving our allies, under the idea of fulfilling an article which they knew it was impossible to be fulfilled. It was now said that, if Sebastiani had not made his report, we should not now be at war. At first satisfaction for what had passed was demanded, and then security for the future, and their they rested their ultimatum. All this it appeared obvious to his mind, might have been obviated by the acceptance of proffered mediation.

The Lord Chancellor justified the conduct of ministers on all the points, which he called the counts of an indictment preferred against them. As to the cessions by the treaty of Amiens, Parliament and the country had approved the peace, and the late ministers, by their negotiation at Lisle, declared their opinion respecting the necessity of peace. As to the Italian Republic, Piedmont and Parma, the fate of these countries was decided before the treaty of Amiens, and therefore could not have furnished a ground of war. As to Swisserland, this was certainly the only country which manifested a strong feeling for its oppression, and appeared disposed to resist it; but the continental powers being indifferent, it was not possible for us to save Swisserland. As to the conduct of ministers respecting the Cape, the other conquests had been restored, and the Cape of Good Hope alone was certainly not worth a war; even if it was worth a war, it appeared doubtful at that time whether it also had not been surrendered. Under these circumstances, if we were disposed to go to war singly, there were no advantages to be gained. The government where therefore prepared to give up Malta according to the treaty, when the report of Sebastiani was published, developing such projects, that government thought it necessary to retain Malta. He concluded by an appeal to the House and the country for a vigorous prosecution of the contest into which we were forced by the hostile conduct of France.

Earl Spencer said, that all he had heard did but confirm him in his opinion of the necessity of the resolutions, He supported the arguments of lord Grenville in favour of them, and condemned ministers as grossly inattentive to their duty, and as having sacrificed the honour and the dignity of the country.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 6. (*Min.* 874.)

[Army estimates.]—The Secretary at War said, that the remaining army estimates, consisted of two parts:—One of them related to those estimates that were not presented to the House at the commencement of the sessions. They were the usual estimates for supplementary officers, pensioners at the Royal Hospitals at Chelsea and Kilmainham, the Royal Military College, and the Military Asylum. These estimates could not be presented before, because the whole of the expense could not be ascertained until the seven Garrison Battalions were complete. The second head of estimates related to some augmentation that had been ordered in the regular forces, the militia and supplementary militia, and to some further expenses which had taken place in the Barrack Department. These estimates which related to the supplementary officers, pensioners at Chelsea and Kilmainham, &c. were the same as before. The expense of the Royal Military College was greater than that of last year, it amounted to 8110l. This increase was owing to a second company of Cadets being formed. This institution being found to answer so well all the purposes for which it was formed, it had been thought expedient to add a second company of Cadets. Any body who considered fairly the nature of this institution, would, he was sure, agree with him, that it was an expense well laid out on the part of the public. He trusted that it was an institution that would be constantly kept up, as it afforded to young men destined for the army, better means of instructions than they could obtain in this country: he hoped also, that it would always be managed with economy, and without any partiality or favour. He now came to the Royal Military Asylum; for this service he should move for a sum of 31,000 l. of this sum 21,000 l. was to be applied to complete the building. He was sorry to say, that the buildings which were completed, cost more than had been originally estimated, though every attempt had been made to make the estimates as accurate as possible.—This increase of the expense beyond the estimate arose partly from this circumstance, viz. that soon after the estimate was formed the dispute with the Northern Powers took place, which caused a great increase in the price of many of the articles used in the building—This, however, would he hoped be the whole expense of the building, and he should only ask 10,000l. for fitting up the rooms, &c. He came now to the second head of estimates, viz. those which related to the augmentation of the forces.—The augmentation which had been ordered was not to a very considerable extent, for the committee would recollect that when the army was voted in December last, it was upon an unusually high establishment, the highest that ever was proposed in time of peace. It was thought that completing the army by a small augmentation would be sufficient—as the army voted was 130,000 men.—The augmentation that would take place, would be principally in the cavalry. The committee would recollect, that by the plan which he proposed in December last, ten men per troop of the cavalry were to remain dismounted; those men were now to be mounted, and their place to be supplied with recruits; this would make 70 men per troop. There was also to be an augmentation in the foot-guards. The next augmentation arose from a regulation which had been adopted of abolishing the field-officers having companies; in consequence of which there would be three additional captains in each regiment. He would not now enter into any arguments upon the propriety of this regulation, he would only say, that it was one that met with the approbation of the most experienced officers of the army; by this plan the situation of captain-lieutenant would be abolished, and he

would of course have one of the three companies, another of the companies was to be given to a captain on half pay; and the senior lieutenant was to have the third company on condition of raising 30 men, and the senior ensign to succeed him on raising 10 men. The expence of this measure would be about 35,000l. viz. 26,000 for Great Britain, and 9000 for Ireland. The greatest part of the expence of these estimates arose from the militia, it amount to a sum of 1,267,000l. for Great Britain, and 480,197l. for Ireland. Contingencies, 13,345l. cloathing, 143,891l. The militia of Great Britain would amount to 60,893, supplementary militia 24,000, making (exclusive of officers, non-commissioned officers, &c.) the number of rank and file above 73,000 men. The militia of Ireland, amounted to 18,000 men, making altogether above 90,000 men. And he was happy to say, that a very short time indeed would elapse before they were all embodied and fit for service.—The additional expense for the supplementary militia, would amount to 416,000l. the additional expence of the barrack department 15,000l. making the total expense for Great Britain, 2,540,000l. and for Ireland, 570,000l. being altogether, 3,110,000l.

MR. WINDHAM said, that he had not objection to any of the details which the right hon. gent. had gone into except one, which appeared to be calculated to revive the practice of raising men for the rank, and which was productive of such inconvenience that he should always object to it. It was resorted to in time of necessity, when the inconvenience which it was calculated to produce was not foreseen; but he should be sorry to see it revived again. His object in rising, was not so much to comment upon the details which had been laid before the House, as to take the opportunity, which the army estimates always afforded, of making some observations upon the war and the general state of the country. The first subject upon which he should make any observations was one upon which he had touched on a former occasion: he meant, the propriety of having so large a part of our force to consist of militia. He thought the scale upon which it was proposed to form the military force was wrong, because the population of the country was such, that it would not afford, at once, a large militia and a large army. In fact, the system pursued of late years, if it did not "suckle armies and dry-nurse the land," must at least, be said to suckle the militia and dry-nurse the army. If such large bounties were given to men who engaged only for a few years, and for home-service, how was it to be supposed, that for a small bounty men would be induced to enter the army, to serve for life and in every quarter of the globe? The army, in such a state of things, must not only stand still, it must go backwards, for it was not to be conceived, that, with these high bribes, desertion would not become general: so that the army would, not only get no new men, but lose many of those whom they already had. In fact, desertion, it was well known, had become a sort of trade. Men got a livelihood by passing from corps to corps, and performing, what they called, the grand tour. If, at the end of the tour the man remained in the service, the only effect of all these bounties was, that you had obtained a soldier in the militia or fencibles, in exchange for a soldier in the regular army. One reason, perhaps, for this anxiety for augmenting the militia, was, that the money with which they were levied, did not come in the shape of a direct tax, and therefore, it was thought, would pass without notice. But this was a poor and criminal policy. The money, though not raised avowedly by Parliament, was equally drawn from the pockets of the people. The man who paid this tax for procuring a militia-man, was less able, as well as less willing to pay other taxes. The nation equally paid: the only difference was, that they paid to a greater amount, and in a far more incommodious manner. His general objection, however, to the measure was, that it would create a militia and not an army. This was an universal objection, applicable to all times, though varying in its force, according to circumstances, and according to the nature of the war in which we might happen to be engaged. It was the duty of those entrusted with the government of a country, in the first place, to form in their own minds, some idea of the nature of the war which they were to carry on, and then to regulate the public force accordingly. When this was done, it was easy to form a notion of the nature of a war which a government had in view, from the nature of the establishment which they proposed to make. He was afraid, however, that the inference in this case, was not a very sure one. It looked as if the government had gone into the war, without at all considering the nature of it, and, in truth, without plan of any sort. After endeavouring to preserve peace as long as they could, and longer than they ought, they were forced into war, when all their means of concession and submission were exhausted, and when no option was left; and finding themselves in that situation, they seemed to have no idea of doing any thing but what they understood to have been usual on such occasions, and what the situation itself, indeed, necessarily forced upon them. They issued press-warrants, they offered bounties, they sent out recruiting parties, they put ships in commission, they did whatever they were told was regular and proper. It was indeed curious to hear the enumeration of their services in these respects, and the list of articles for which they took credit. These extended back, beyond the period when war was become inevitable. "Did we "not," said the hon. Gent., "in the midst of "profound peace, and in a few months after "signing a definitive treaty, call upon the "country for two successive augmentations of "army and navy? Afterwards, when the "danger became more pressing, and we were

" obliged to say something, did we not bring " a message to the House, true, perhaps, in " the mere terms of it, but wholly untrue " as to the sense in which it was sure to be " understood? When, by these means, war " was, as it were, declared, did we not, like " good watchmen of the state, immediately " spring our rattles, and call out the militia? " What is it that we have left undone?" He admitted, that all these merits claimed by ministers were justly due to them; but it did not follow from thence, that they had any just views of their situation, or indeed, any distinct views at all. If they could be said to have any plan at all, it seemed to be one of strict defence; that is to say, we were to wait passively, until we could find an opportunity of sneaking into a peace, as we had just sneaked out of one. If we voluntarily confined ourselves to this sort of war, nothing could be said too bad of our *counsels*, but if we were really forced to it, nothing could be more deplorable than our *situation*. The worst of all conditions in which a country or an individual could be placed, was one, in which it would be possible to lose and impossible to win. There was not an instance to be found in history, in which a nation successfully carried on a system of pure defence. Every body knew the advantage which assailants had over those whom they attacked; and that which was true of an individual was true of a nation. So far as to the nature of the force now proposed, considered as indicating the views of ministers, or as determining the character of the war, whether intended by ministers or not: but it remained to be considered how far a force of this sort was good, even as a mere defensive force. It appeared to him that for the purposes of defence, you ought to have as large a regular force as possible, because regular forces could only be opposed by regular forces: it was " diamond cut diamond". But even adopting the system that ministers were acting upon, and admitting the number of men to be realized, he should contend that there would not be men enough, supposing an invasion to take place. And in the mean time that such exertions were made to raise an ineffectual force, the recruiting of an army, the force certainly most effectual, would be essentially impeded. If, at last, it would be necessary to have recourse to more extensive and energetic means of raising the force of the country, it would, in his opinion, be better to begin with them. He would have a force still less regular than the militia, but one that should not stand in the way of recruiting the army. Some such measure must in the end, be resorted to; and, in his opinion, it would be better to adopt it in the first instance; at the same time that he would employ every means of recruiting the army, because we must not only have a large army now, but always, at least until some very material change took place on the continent. For the purposes of mere defence, therefore, this was a bad force; but he trusted that our object was not confined merely to defence. The cause which drew us into the present war, was, the destruction of the balance of power in Europe; and, in consequence thereof, the great acquisition of power by one state. Now, when the balance of power was destroyed, he knew but two ways in nature of restoring it, either by taking some weight out of one scale, or by putting some into the other; unless, indeed, you might forcibly hold both scales even, by means of an external force, such as a powerful mediator or guarantee. But, generally speaking, the only means we had to adopt, was either to strengthen ourselves or to weaken the enemy; or we could not exist as an independent nation. This being the case, it remained only to consider the order in which these subjects were to be taken, and what the means by which they might severally be pursued. In touching upon this point fairly, he would refer for a moment to the events of last war. In that war, it appeared to him that the plan of weakening the enemy was not only the most proper and most effectual, but, by far, the shortest and most practicable. He thought it would be more easy to kill the revolutionary tiger, than to chain or to cage him. To that object, therefore, almost the whole force of this country ought to have been directed, though there was no reason, in the meanwhile, that the other object should have been lost sight of. The same objects that existed at that time, exist at present, though, certainly, the progress of time might have changed the relations of these objects, as well as the means of attaining them. That which before was practicable might now be hopeless; and, in that case, could be no longer an object of pursuit: for he knew of no situation so deplorable, as that of remaining, with respect to France, in our present relative state, with no means of augmentating our own force, or of diminishing that of our rival. Whatever might be thought, therefore, of the project of reducing the power of France; in the only way in which it can be reduced, namely, by co-operation with parties within, it had, at least, this recommendation, that if practicable at all, it was at once the most effectual and the most easy. Whether we believed or not in the truth of the notion, it was, at least, one which we must wish to be true. As Mrs. Cole said of the Roman Catholic religion, " that it was a most comfortable persuasion to one of her calling;" so we may say, that a possible co-operation with royalists and destruction of the present revolutionary government, or, which is the same thing, restoration of the ancient monarchy, is a very comfortable persuasion to persons in our situation. If some means of this kind were not adopted, the prospect before us would be gloomy indeed, in spite even of that mediation, of which Gent. had talked so much, but from which, for his own part, he so little hoped any good, in which he foresaw so much possible future mischief, and in which he felt so much present disgrace. We were to

consider what the task was, of restoring the lost balance of Europe, by the addition of consequence and power to ourselves. The treaty of Amiens had, by one stroke, taken from the power and consequence of this country, in point of actual possessions, to say nothing of character, what we might be well satisfied if ten yeas of successful war would replace. We had, in one fatal moment, so fallen to leeward, that unless some fortunate shift of wind should come to favour us, we might be beating for years and years against a head-sea without regaining our former station. If he were asked what his hopes were of doing any thing at this moment, either in France itself or on the rest of the continent (the powers of the continent could hardly be considered in existence), he should certainly say "very little," thanks to the treaty of Amiens, which had given away the powers and the mind of the continent from us, and had made the whole coast of Europe an iron-bound coast to us, not affording an inlet or a creek into which we could run a cutter. It might be said, that the powers of the continent detested France; he believed they did: but did Gent. never hear of that maxim of tyrants, "*Oderint dum metuant?*" However strong their hatred might be, while there was another feeling as strong as it is at present, namely, fear, it mattered little whether they loved or hated her. He, however, could not entirely abandon the hope, which he had placed in the exertions which the continent would, some time or other, make for itself, and therefore he was the more hostile against the scheme of policy now proposed, because it would not only render such exertions infinitely less probable, but would make us incapable of taking advantage of them should they be made. He was not only dissatisfied with the policy which ministers seemed inclined to adopt, but with the language which they held. It was, with peculiar regret, that he read the passage at the end of his Majesty's declaration, which was calculated to prove to the continent, that we looked merely to British objects, and that we should be ready, if those objects were attained, to give them up as we had done before. He knew very well what the sort of clamour was which this observation was calculated to excite. It would be said, "you are fighting "for the Bourbons, for the Royalists, for Monarchy, &c." He must still, he feared, retain his opinion; even if he was wrong it could not be said that he was an obstinate sinner: his plans never having been tried, his opinions were, at least, not contradicted by experience. This was more than could be said by the hon. Gent. who made the experiment of the treaty of Amiens. His opinions had certainly been so contradicted. He did not expect of the hon. Gent. a confession that these opinions were originally wrong, that, perhaps, would be too much to look for, even from his candour, but he might, perhaps, admit, that they had not been exactly verified by the event.—When Mr. Whiston predicted that on a certain day, a comet would appear which would destroy the earth; and, when the day came and no comet appeared, he believed that though Mr. Whiston might not acknowledge that his prediction was foolish or founded on principles improperly chosen, he had no objection to own, when the day was past, and mankind safe, that the principles of his calculation had for once deceived him. So he thought that whatever wisdom the right hon. Gent. might think he had displayed in making the treaty of Amiens, he could now have no great hesitation in admitting that it had not quite answered his expectation. He did not know what might be the result of the experiments he had recommended, but he protested against a declaration, that they should not be tried at all. It was his opinion, that if England would make an open, grand declaration, in the face of Europe, of her views and objects, he did not mean a romantic, chivalrous declaration, but one that would draw with us the sympathy and feeling of all Europe, it would contribute more than any single act, to terminate the calamities which now oppressed the world. Much was always said of the great power of the French republic, but it was by no means right to confound together ideas so separate as those of strength and durability. Nothing was more intelligible than that a nation or individual might be at the period of their greatest strength, when they touched the very moment of their dissolution. The power of France was, at this time, indisputable; but how long that power would exist was a different question. That we wished and hoped to see an end to it, it was impossible for us to deny, notwithstanding all the dissembling and crouching language which we held at certain times, and all the boastful and vapouring which we indulged in at others, That prospect was at the bottom of all our hopes. Every thing which he saw in our plans and counsels, as well as in those who were to conduct them, was calculated to throw him into despair; but he begged that this declaration might not be understood as implying any distrust in the resources and strength of the country, supposing them to be properly applied. Much as he thought of the dangers of invasion (and few persons were inclined to treat them more seriously), they were only formidable to him from the idea of the manner in which they might possibly be met. We were in the state of a ship in a storm. The vessel was tight and well-found, and nothing was wanted but care and conduct, to enable it to brave all the fury of the elements. But if the officers were ignorant or negligent, if the crew were drunken and mutinous, if all proper precautions were not taken, and all proper exertions used, down she might go with all the means of safety in her power. We must not dissemble to ourselves the violence of the storm, with which we were threatened. We had to deal with an adversary who would not do things by halves; and who had the re-

sources of a continent at his command. Against such an attack he confessed he wished to have something more than the mere loose notions, and vapouring talk of which we heard so much in that House. He entertained, as well as others, a high idea of the native courage of the people of this country: but he did not quite understand the notion, which many seemed to rely on with confidence, of stopping armies by peasantry. An army incapable of recruiting itself, may be finally worn down by the continued attacks even of irregular troops; but he wished to know where the examples were to be found of armies stopped by such troops, unless, possibly in circumstances far different from the present. He believed that none of the generals whose names were familiar to us, either in earlier or more recent history, when they had beaten the army before them, ever asked leave of the peasantry of the country, to pursue their march in whatever direction they thought proper. Such notions belonged only to men, who were totally ignorant of what they were talking about, who had never heard a gun fired in anger,

"Nor in the division of a battle knew
"More than a spinster."

Men who had really pretensions to be heard upon such subjects, who spoke of what they knew and had seen, the men upon whom we must rely, and upon whom we might with confidence rely, should dangers of the sort in question really arise: these men would talk a different language, would tell us that invasion was neither to be despised nor dreaded, or was only to be dreaded, should it happen that by a foolish and ignorant policy it had previously been despised.—Upon the whole, whether he considered the interest of the country with a view to the war in general, or to the narrower and more immediate object of defence, he must equally condemn the present system, which went to create a great and disproportionate militia force, and by the same act, as well as by the means of carrying into effect, to impoverish and keep down the army.

Mr. Pitt said, he should say only a very few words upon this subject, he merely wished to ask whether the force which it was now proposed to vote, included the whole of the regular force that was to be proposed, or whether they were to expect in the present session, any more substantial augmentation to that which certainly was an unusually large peace establishment? He was averse to discussing in that House any question respecting the amount of the force necessary for the public safety. That ought certainly to rest in the first instance with ministers under the responsibility of their situation. It was a confidence that Parliament ought to place in them, and if they did not possess that confidence they ought not to retain their situation. But he did not apprehend that it was proper to discuss in that House the distribution of the public force, he therefore would not enter into any detail upon the subject. To ministers it belonged to prepare such a plan, and the House and the country looked for it with just uneasiness. It ought to be brought forward promptly; no time was to be lost; for in our present situation there was none.

The Secretary at War said, that in reply to the question of his right honourable friend, he had the satisfaction to say that a plan was under the consideration of his Majesty's ministers, which, he trusted, would be found fully substantial and efficacious, calculated to repel every danger, and to enable the country to put forth its arms for the complete attainment of the objects of the war. When his right honourable Friend (Mr. Windham) talked of a mere defensive war, he in fact conjured up a phantom in order to combat it, for it was by no means the purpose of ministers to confine their operations purely to defence. They had not shewn a disposition to leave any measure untried that could tend to the safety of the nation, and Gentlemen might rely that nothing would be omitted which could qualify us to strike the severest and strongest blows at the enemy. He spoke of arrangements subsequent to the treaty of Amiens; we had been in that short period of peace active in many respects; we had been put on a much stronger footing than we had been in any former period of peace. Our regular army was much more considerable now than it had been at the commencement of any war; our militia in like manner was in a much better state for military purposes than it had been at any former commencement of a war; we had in every respect a much greater force than we ever had before at the beginning of hostilities; but was he saying that this was therefore sufficient? No, he was not; but the energy of the country must be called forth, and there must be such a disposal of that force as to shew our enemies, of the disposition of its people, of its internal vigour, of its resources, and almost every thing about it, for very ignorant indeed were our enemies of all these things; but it was not a vote for a large sum of money that would raise a large disposable force, that would depend much more on the nature of the measures to be adopted for raising such force, than upon the vote for paying them; and he flattered himself that the measures about to be proposed for that purpose would be efficacious; that the men would be furnished as they should be found to be necessary, and they should be proposed to be under the command of officers of the regular troops, and a militia force was intended to be as a supplement to the regular army; and after this plan was completed, then there would remain to be done that which it would be in this country more easy perhaps to do than the rest of it, namely, to find the money. Voting a number of men however great, and voting a sum of money, however large, to pay them, did not appear to him to be wise, until the plan for raising the men shall have been matured, because until that was done it was only raising men upon paper, which was not what we wanted; neither did large votes, without method of carrying them into effect, prove very useful. Having said thus much generally, he would take now up a few of the points brought forward by the right honourable gentleman opposite to him, but not all of them, for of some he could not help saying, that although they were like every thing delivered by that right honourable gent., very sensible, yet in this case they did not appear to him to have an immediate reference to the question now before the committee. He could not help thinking that the right honourable gentleman had given way a little too much to a tone of despondency, as applicable either to the manner in which we were now preparing for war, or to the manner in which we concluded peace. He agreed however with the right honourable gentleman, it was right to state the situation of this country fairly, to state even the chance of an invasion, but he thought he might be permitted to say that the right honourable gentleman had considered that subject a little

too broadly. No man would say that the great military force of France had not great power; of that we must be all aware, and our measures must be with reference not only to this idea, or for the defence and security of the realm, but also to act against the enemy as occasion may occur. He thought it was high time that we should shew, not by words, but actions, we are not to be insulted by France, that we are not to be intimidated by any menace they may throw out, that it is not their shewing themselves in large numbers opposite to our coasts, that is to throw us into a panic.—"That they may throw a body of men into our country is practicable," said he.—"It may be done certainly under favourable circumstances, that is, if they be not sunk in the attempt; but it would not be long before they would be made prisoners; neither do I think that any of them would return. I think that it is time to shew that we are not to be taunted in this way with invasion, or intimidated with the threat of it." There was another part of the speech of the right honourable gentleman, which he should now shortly notice: he seemed to suppose that by the treaty of Amiens, we had relinquished for ever all right to consider of the affairs of the continent; and he said, that for the last ten years we had gone very much to leeward: that was not so. As to the treaty of Amiens, he approved of it at the time, under all the circumstances under which it was concluded. He was satisfied, even now, of the propriety of this country having entered into that treaty: but it was not correct to say, that by that treaty we had given up the continent; we had done no such thing; nor was it our inclination to do any think like it. If there had been any chance of any continental co-operations with us—if we had had the continuance of any continental alliance, then the peace of Amiens was a peace of which he should not have approved; but as we had no continental alliance left for carrying on the war, he thought that no advantage was to have been gained by the prosecution of the war; nor did he see how any one could expect any advantage to us by that continuance, under such circumstances. We therefore had agreed to the peace, and, in his opinion, we acted wisely by so doing. But the right honourable gentleman had asked, whether the last peace was not merely an experiment? Yes, it was; and whether it had not failed? Why, yes it had failed, as was evinced by our being now at war. The publication of our discussion with France had roused the indignation of the people to a pitch which he conceived to have decided the character of the cause in which we are engaged, for that it has united them, and made them, as it were, one man against France, and taught them to regard France as the oppressor of Europe in general, and one who wished to be the oppressor of this country. To have this sentiment thoroughly rooted in the hearts of Englishmen, was, to speak in the language of another gentleman on another occasion, a thing worth ten or twenty West-India Islands But the R. H. gentleman had said, that the hopes of this country were gone. He did not think so He did not think that we were a people likely to give up our hopes. He found nothing in the history of this country to justify that idea; nor did he think there was any thing in the conduct of this country to warrant the expression that we had given up all concerns with the affairs of the continent. On the contrary, the history of this country proved that our object had, since the revolution, been to preserve the balance of power on the continent; we had made a glorious effort to do so in the last war—we had continued in the contest for that purpose long after every British object had been attained, and as long as it was possible with any hopes of making an impression favourable to the general interests of Europe; we had continued in the contest until we were left without alliance for perseverance in it; and then we did what, under such circumstances, it was wise in us to do. The right honourable gentleman, after having charged us with neglecting our true interests, by adopting a system purely defensive, proceeded to state that the force we had hitherto proposed to adopt is not applicable to our case, and alluded to the militia. Now upon this subject he must be allowed to lament a little that the right honourable gentleman had not brought forward his objection to this system at the time it was first brought before the House, because abundant opportunities had been afforded to hear the reasoning of the right honourable gentleman upon the subject.—He was perfectly open at the time to conviction, and so he wished to be still, but he only wanted to know what the system of this country had always been, and whether the measure now proposed was not an improvement upon that plan, and whether the observations of the right honourable gentleman, if they had been made last year, would have induced Parliament to vote 100,000 men on the establishment. He thought not; our measures last year, however, enabled us to set a stronger force on foot than was ever known at the commencement of a war, and we had at this moment a considerable body of the best troops on foot we ever had; for which reasons he thought that government was not liable to reproach for negligence. He should not follow the right honourable gentleman through his observations on the militia. He lamented that the House had not been favoured with the opinion of the right honourable gentleman fully on this occasion formerly, but the question now was, whether the committee would not vote a force which on consideration last session was thought necessary? The right honourable gentleman said, that a regular army invading a country could be opposed only by a regular army: that was true, but it admitted of certain qualifications; it was true with regard to an engagement but not to a protracted war. America was a proof of this; the regular army indeed beat the Americans in every engagement, but at last they harassed, and finally overpowered the regular army. This was also the case of France herself against Prussia; the Prussian army was composed of the best regular troops, and the French who were opposed to them consisted of the national guards or troops of that description; and, he must say, that whatever character the French troops had acquired, and whatever they may now be, they had gone through a great deal of hard fighting, but they did not suffer themselves to despond or to be alarmed on account of their not being regular troops although they were to be opposed by regulars, they exerted themselves by a resolution which enabled them to get the better of their difficulties; and if this country had the same resolution, of which there could be no doubt, because we all felt the propriety of it, we should not only get over our difficulties, but we should teach this our insolent enemy we are not to be insulted with impunity, and if they attempt us, to use their own words, on our own dunghill, woe be to the assailants.

MR. PITT said, that he was happy to understand, from his R. H. friend, that ministers did not think that the present militia was all the additional force which the public service, at this interesting moment requires, and if they did not enter upon the subject at present, it was only because they had measures of

augmentation in view which were not mature; that they had not laid before the committee the means of knowing the plan now for that reason, but that they are satisfied a considerable augmentation must take place; being of that opinion himself, he should hardly have occasion to make more than one remark, which was, that in his view of the subject, on the principle which ministers had adopted, that of more vigorous measures than had been hitherto ever tried, to obtain that force which was of the best sort, that of supplemental force to the army, acting under commissioned and non-commissioned officers in the regular army. It did appear that it would have been fortunate if they had rather begun by establishing in the opinion of Parliament and of the country the necessity of the thing to be done, by preparing the public mind by an adequate vote for that purpose, because by commencing the course and pursuing the means which may be now desirable to animate the public mind to the adoption of what may be thought essential either for the safety of the Island, or what we should couple with it, the vigorous prosecution of the war with France, that of carrying on war with a force which may be at once adapted either for offence or defence, the best effects may be expected, but we are not in a state fit for war with France until we are in a situation to avail ourselves of every opportunity which may occur for offensive as well as defensive operations.—He applauded every desire which ministers could manifest to labour with perseverance to consider of the best means for the safety of the state; "But," said he, "do it effectually! and to do it effectually, you must do it soon. Doing it soon will be better, though you do it with difficulty, than if you do it some time hence, and after much deliberation, easily. I think it is better that the thing should be done at once, or as soon as possible, than that you should delay it—that is, I think it better that it should be voted without delay, and then that you should consider about the means; first vote the measure, and then come forward with the vote for defraying the expence, because by bringing the matter forward immediately you will call the spirit of the people into action. The question now is, will you save your country? Save it in the best and most prudent way, if you can; but save it! But if you are to take any mode for that purpose, in which you may have to encounter prejudices, or in which you may attach to yourselves a temporary odium; but the opinion I have of the people of England, will not allow me to think so, if you do but inform them rightly of your object: however, if any prejudice should arise against you—if any temporary odium should attach to your measure—if it be for the safety of the country, or for its honour, pursue it—pursue it, although you may have to contend with prejudice—pursue it, although you may have to encounter odium—pursue it, even although you may have to subdue resistance! Do it! for the country must be saved! I am ready to take my full share of the inconvenience. If, therefore, Gentlemen concur with me, as indeed I believe the House does, that the present force is insufficient, I wish them now to pledge themselves; to pledge Parliament, to pledge the nation too, that a strong measure shall be taken for the defence of the country without any loss of time. I must say too, that at a period when the statement of the finance of the country is about to be laid before us, it is fit you should bring this measure for our safety forward, together with an estimate of the expence of it; for it is fit the people should see the extent of their burthens; tell them their expences, and tell them at the same time their duty to themselves; shew them that their representatives are determined to act for their welfare, and for their glory. You cannot now go into the detail, but you can have no difficulty about the number of men, nor of the vote to cover the expence of it. My object, by all I have said, is, that the country should now be told at once that it is to prepare for measures of an unusual extent, to make exertions of an unusual nature; that the people should be impressed with a notion that extraordinary preparations must be made, that extraordinary means must be used. Whatever circumstances of difficulty may occur in the detail of the means for carrying the matter into effect, which I believe to be essential to the public service, I am anxious that at least as early a day as possible should be taken for this subject; that ministers, instead of talking of what they will do, should pledge themselves, and that this House should pledge itself that the thing shall be done. Let each person do his duty. Let ministers bring this matter forward, and I am assured that every member in the House will assist in it. Whatever degree of odium may be endeavoured to be cast on us for not chusing perhaps the mildest course that possibly might be found, if we had full leisure to consider it, we should not mind—the thing must be done—must be done immediately."—Mr. Pitt then proceeded to observe, that if he had to state here his objection, it would not be that the militia was too much; he thought that a militia to this extent we could bear, and he was ready to say, that another force calculated for offensive as well as defensive war, was superior, as a force, to a militia. He thought that a large portion of regular troops might be added to 70,000 militia, and must be kept at home or we should not have a sufficient force for home security.—He then proceeded to make several observations on this subject as it regarded the numbers of the militia, &c. and then said, he hoped that the additional force to be raised was not to depend upon a system of tardy and precarious recruiting, and that the forces should not be confined to serve at home as a force necessary merely for home defence, and that at all events that we should secure the advantages of the forces being under officers regularly trained. He wished the House to benefit from recollection, and judge of what we can do from what we have done. We knew that we had raised by ballot, without interfering with the agriculture or the industry of the country, 100,000 men. He knew, from the concurring opinion of almost all militia officers, that we could not hope to have on the militia plan officers for more than 70,000 men. He said he would not go beyond that, without engrafting on the militia officers from the regular force. Some means ought to be applied in aid of the army. If any better mode could be devised than any which had been yet stated, he should be glad of it; he would engage to give it his support. The country must be put in a proper state of military preparation; the best means might, perhaps, not be readily seen. It must have as much time for its consideration as was absolutely necessary to understand it, but no more; for whatever was wanted for the public defence, some how or other must be obtained.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, he was very glad that the questions put by his right honorable friend had given government an opportunity of declaring that they did not rely at the present crisis, upon the militia consisting of 70,000

men, great part of whom were at present in arms; that they did not rely upon the regular force of the country, which was at present greater than at any other period, except when an embarkation was about to take place; that they did not rely upon the brave and loyal yeomanry of the country, but that they were prepared to bring forward measures for the purpose of providing a large subsidiary force, to be officered in the manner pointed out by his right honorable friend. The right honorable gentleman (Mr. Windham) had complained of the large proportion of militia force, but that had been completely answered by his right honorable friend, at least that part of the right honorable gentleman's argument which related to a system entirely defensive. In looking to the population of the country, and the means of constituting a large and effective force, it was not merely an option on the part of government, whether such a force should be called out; it was not because the right honorable gentleman or government might think it possible to procure a large proportion of regular troops, but they must consider how, consistently with the feelings and opinions of the country, and the avocations of men of business, the largest and most effective force could be provided for defensive and offensive operations; it appeared to him, that those means ought to be resorted to which were calculated to provide such a force with the greatest public advantage, and the least possible inconvenience. The right honorable gentleman had adverted to the danger arising from an invading enemy; that right honorable gentleman would do him the justice to recollect that he never under-rated that danger, though he thought at the same time that it had been greatly over-rated. He begged leave to refer the right honorable gentleman to the conduct of government in the summer of 1801, and many individuals then in the House, upon whose justice he confidently relied, would attest that there was during that period no want of exertion on the part of government. The country was not generally aware of the extent of the preparations in the French ports at that period, nor of the steps taken by government to meet the threatened danger. At the time when the ships which defended our rivers were sent to the Baltic, then was the period of real danger. Government neither slumbered nor slept, but adopted all those measures which the exigencies of the moment required, with a fixed determination to call forth all the exertions of the country to repel the danger which then threatened us, but which did not happen. He was therefore entitled to refer to their conduct at that period as a pledge of their disposition. It had been stated, that a pledge ought to be given on the part of Parliament, that it would make such provision as circumstances should require. He conceived that Parliament had given that pledge; he conceived that when it carried to the foot of the throne the address in answer to his Majesty's message, though there was no specific pledge as to any particular measure, yet that a distinct and solemn pledge was given on the part of the country, that they would make every exertion which the exigencies of the case might require. That those exertions must be great he not only admitted, but contended; but he flattered himself that whenever he should appeal to the House either to meet financial difficulties, or to provide for increased military exertions, that such an appeal would not be made in vain. If any obloquy was attached to any such measures, he would cheerfully share it; but he trusted, that on the part of the people there would be on such an occasion but one sentiment and one opinion.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 13.—[*Min. p.* 906.]

[THE BUDGET.]—THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER brought forward the Budget, for which see page 906 of this volume.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, June 14.—[*Min. p.* 971.]

[REPORT OF THE BUDGET.]—LORD FOLKESTONE.—I do not rise, Sir, for the purpose of objecting to the bringing up of the report, nor to the taxes proposed, but to avail myself of this regular and parliamentary opportunity, of entering into some consideration of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers. Of the taxes in detail, I can say nothing, at present; because, if they be liable to objections, frequent opportunities will occur, hereafter, of stating them; but, on the general system of taxation now adopted, that of raising money for the support of the expenses of the war in each current year, by what are called war-taxes, I must say a word or two. To that system, I, for one, must object, as tending to make the war unpopular.

The war in which we are engaged, is confessed, on all hands, to be one of necessity, and for the very existence of the country. Every thing, therefore, that tends towards bringing it into disrepute should be carefully avoided. Such a system may be good in theory; there may be something noble and magnanimous in the idea of a people submitting to bear the whole burden of their own wars, and not to entail on posterity any inconveniences arising from their quarrels. But the policy of putting such a theory in practice depends upon circumstances, and the circumstances of the present times are clearly such as to render it impolitic. If the people were so eager for war, as to be ready at any, the slightest affront, to rush headlong into it; then such a system would be both just and politic; then it would be certainly proper to make them bear the whole burden of a contest brought on, perhaps, by their own precipitancy, and to endeavour to check that disposition, by making them feel the whole inconvenience of it. But if, on the other hand, the temper of the people be such, as in point of fact, we know to be the case with the people of this country at present; that they are rather too backward than too eager to begin the contest, that they are rather inclined to submit to insults, than to undergo the hardships and expenses of war to repel them, then it is, certainly, most impolitic to add, to that backwardness and reluctance for war, all the selfish feelings of dislike to make just sacrifices, and to undergo heavy burdens, which every one knows will be called forth by the present enormous taxes. On this ground, I, for one, think the system of war-taxes objectionable. Such a war as the present should be rendered as palatable and as popular as possible, inasmuch as the safety and very existence of the country, depend on the firmness, the vigour, and perseverance with which it is carried on. With respect to the mode in which ministers seem inclined to carry on that war, as far as I can judge of it, I must disapprove of it. I must disapprove of that defensive system which seems to be the one adopted. I know that I may be stopped here, *in limine*, and told that that is not the system intended to be pursued. But I must be permitted to rest in my opinion on that subject, as long as I see more symptoms of activity and preparation than I, a pro-

sent, witness. If a different sort of conduct were adopted, we should undoubtedly hear of plans of offence, we should see greater stir and more active preparation than are at present discernible. Nothing of this kind is any where to be met with; and, indeed, the universal idea amongst the public seems to be, that defence, and defence alone, is to be our object: that we are to stand on our own shore prepared to resist any attack made on us; but that any attack, on our parts, is wholly out of the question. This, certainly, may not be the plan of his Majesty's ministers; but this is certain, that all their measures lead one to suspect that it is, and they never have given this House a single reason to imagine that they have any other. But against this plan, whether it be theirs or not (I hope it is not), I must object *in toto*, and for this very plain and simple reason, that of all the plans that can be pursued, this, more surely than any other, will bring on the country, speedy and inevitable destruction; and the more complete the plan, the more likely to be adequate to the proposed effect, the more speedy and the more certain will be the ruin. In that case, the country will perish by the weight of its own defence. It will then be exactly in the case with a man, who, when attacked by an active enemy, should say, I do not want to hurt my enemy, I only wish to defend myself; so I will wrap myself up in a good suit of armour, in a coat of mail, that I know to be impenetrable, and then I may be perfectly at ease, because I know he cannot hurt me. But what would be the event? not only if any of the nails were to give way, or if there were to be a little rust, or any weak part, or the joints were to open, would the enemy be enabled immediately to thrust in his poniard, and give a mortal stab; but, without any such accident, would it not be certain that this man must soon fall down faint and oppressed, by the weight of his own arms? In like manner, if this defensive system, which is so popular, is to be adopted, will the country in a short time most inevitably faint, and fall down under the weight of its own armour; and the stronger the armour, the greater the means of defence, the more speedily will the necessary faintness and ruin come on.—Gentlemen seem to confound the idea of a defensive war, or a war of self-defence, with the defensive mode of carrying on war. They are things perfectly distinct. In strictness, a war of self-defence against present or future dangers, is the only justifiable war. But a defensive war may as well be carried on by offensive operations as by defensive, by weakening or destroying your adversary, as by repelling his attacks on you. Does a besieged garrison content itself with repelling the assaults of the besiegers? Do they not make sallies, and, in their turn, attack the assailants? Does not every schoolboy know, that Rome was defended under the walls of Carthage? Precaution for defence, in case of attack, must certainly be made, but our views must not be directed to defence alone. We must have recourse to more vigorous, to offensive measures.—Let us then consider a little what are the measures of offence that can be adopted in the present circumstances, and what means this country has for offensive operations. Now, generally speaking, the means of attacking France are threefold—1. By external attacks made by ourselves.—2. By external attacks made by the continental powers; and, 3, by internal attacks on the government of the country. With respect to the first of these methods of offensive operations, this country is pretty nearly impotent. We might attack and seize a sea-port, or destroy a fortress; but, after all, if the greatest expedition of this sort that we could send out were to meet with complete success, we should not have advanced one step towards gaining security for ourselves, or impairing the power of the enemy. Such a success would produce no greater effect than the scratch of a pin on a man's hand. From this mode of offence, therefore, no hope can be derived. What then remains? There remains, either, to animate the continental powers to join and make common cause with us in the contest, and so to attack France externally, or to attempt to destroy the government itself, and for this purpose, to raise up the royalists that remain in that country to join with us in the attempt. Now, whatever hopes might, under these circumstances, be derived from these modes of operation, must be greatly weakened so long as his Majesty's present ministers direct the affairs of state. For it is not to be conceived that any set of men, who can be selected, will be so unlikely to inspire confidence as the persons now in office. What confidence can any foreign power have in men, who have universally, whenever it suited them, abandoned and deserted the allies of the country? In men who lay it down as the very basis and foundation of all their negotiations with France, and who now send forth to the world, under their own signatures, that their principle is, that they shall retain compensation out of the conquests which this country may make for the increased power and territories of France? Now, to a man of plain understanding, this principle is no other than this—France may enrich herself by robbery, pillage, and rapine; we will not grumble or find fault if she will but allow us to have some share in the booty, so that we may in some degree keep pace with her. Will any man be astonished, in case the noble secretary of state were to direct any of his Majesty's ministers, at the foreign courts of Europe, to sound the dispositions of the government, and to find out whether they were willing to join with us in the present contest; in such a case, would any man be astonished, or would the noble lord himself be astonished, if he were to receive for answer—"We cannot trust you, we can-"not place any confidence in you. How can we be "sure that you will not abandon us, as you aban-"doned the King of Sardinia? How can we be sure "that you will not desert us, as you have deserted "in his time of need the Prince of Orange? How "do we know that you will not sell us, as you have "sold the Queen of Portugal for a colony or a sugar-"island?" A man might rather wonder if his Majesty's ministers were to receive any other answer than this. In like manner, too, it is impossible that any royalist in France could feel greater reliance on the faith of ministers. Once betrayed by them, once abandoned by them to the cruelties of their relentless enemies, after they had been exhorted to come forward by our declarations, by our promises of succour and assistance, by our assurances of support, without, as far as we know, a single word being spoken in their behalf, but certainly without any stipulation at all in their favour; thus betrayed and abandoned, will they, can they be expected to put that confidence in such men, as to be roused by them again to brave all the dangers, to undergo all the hardships and toils, to expose themselves to all the vengeance and cruelties from which they have now once escaped? Will they be willing to run the risk of all those calamities again, without some better security that they will not be again deserted? Or, have the published sentiments of the noble secretary of state any thing in them that is likely to

wipe off this crime in their eyes, and to teach them to put their trust in him? Will any man of loyalty, can any royalist in principle ever entertain that feeling for a man, who, as minister for this country, negotiating with a foreign power, has not hesitated to state, that, in his opinion, the French royalist emigrants would do well to lay aside the orders which they wear, those rewards of ancient deeds of valour, which they have received from the hands of their sovereign, and which they wear as emblems of their fidelity and attachment to him? Can the royalists confide in a man, who, without a blush, can give this to the world as his deliberate opinion? Surely not. May that noble lord never have the means of putting his opinions in practice! May it ever be out of his power to throw that disgrace on his sovereign, which, in his deliberate judgment, it would be proper for him, in certain circumstances, to do!—For these reasons, his Majesty's present ministers are the most unfit men in the world to apply, with effect, the means of offence which this country may have, against France. But as they are still his Majesty's ministers, as they still have his confidence, and the support of this House, it is their duty to employ those means as well as they can. Now what is the best method to exert these means? Confidence is to be gained: that is the first and principal point. The continental powers, on the one hand, the loyal part of France, on the other, are to be convinced that we will not again fail and desert them. And how can they be convinced of this, but by an open, explicit, unreserved declaration, on our part, of our views and objects? And what ought this object to be? The object most likely to gain that confidence is the destruction of the revolutionary government of France. And, Sir, this object is exactly conformable to the doctrines and opinions lately held by the two noble lords on the Treasury Bench. For if it is allowed to refer, for one moment, to what passed in former debates, the House will recollect that the first argument, used the other night by those noble lords, in defence of the necessity of the present war, was, that there existed, in the revolutionary government of France, such an hostile mind against this country, that it was quite impossible (and every one, it was concluded, must be convinced that it was impossible) to be at peace with the revolutionary government of France. If this is so, and my mind was fully, and long enough ago, convinced that it was so, what then is the necessary inference? What but this? Either that you must give up all hopes of ever having peace, or you must destroy the revolutionary government of France. A third alternative there is not.—Now it would be as unnecessary as insulting to the House to ask; if you would destroy the government of France, what other government would you raise in its room? None other, surely, but the monarchy in the person of the legitimate claimant of the crown. This, then, is the object to which I have been endeavouring to draw the attention of the House. This is the object to be declared and held forth to the people of France, on the one hand, and all Europe on the other. It must be declared explicitly, plainly, and decidedly. If it is not declared in that way, nothing is done; but if it is, the greatest hopes may yet be entertained of final success in our present undertaking.—I will not detain the House by entering into all the reasons which induce me, if this plan be openly and manfully pursued, to entertain the most sanguine hopes of success. I will only now state what will be the immediate effect of such a declaration and conduct. At home, I think, it will excite a new spirit, and give a new energy to our measures. Abroad, it will give confidence in our plans, and convince other nations of the rectitude of our views. In France, it will give new hopes and courage to all the loyal now remaining. It will, at once, bring them all into our interests. But the most important effect will be that which I think it will have on the government. It will palsy all its exertions and unhinge all its plans: so much so, that I do not hesitate to say, that if I were asked how I would prevent an invasion of Buonaparté, I would say, make this declaration. If I were asked how I would defend Hanover, I would answer, declare for the King of France. If I were asked how I would rescue Holland from the gripe of France; how I would secure Portugal from her attacks, or relieve Spain from her fraternity, I would to all these questions answer, make this declaration.—I find that the House is impatient: I am sorry, and beg pardon for having detained them so long; but this idea has pressed so strongly on my mind for some time past, that I could no longer reconcile it to myself to let slip an opportunity of stating it. If Gentlemen's minds and attention are directed to it, my object is in a great degree answered, as I am convinced that the more they think of it, the more they will incline to my opinion.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, June 16. (Min. p. 972).

[Dock-Yards.]——Mr. Whitbread said, that in bringing this business forward he had no desire to anticipate any judgment which might be formed on the reports of the commissioners appointed to inquire into abuses in the navy. A right hon. Gent. opposite (the Chancellor of the Exchequer) had pledged himself to found a proposition on these reports, which he had no inclination even to embarrass. He had different grounds for pressing his motion on the consideration of the House. Gent. were not unaware that the noble lord who, with so much honour to himself and so important advantage to the country, had fought our battles abroad, and who with not less honour had instituted inquires into abuses in the department over which he presided, had been exposed to a great deal of calumny and abuse. In nothing more than with respect to his conduct in examining into and providing remedies for the abuses in the dock-yards, had he been exposed to very gross censure. To do away any impression which these calumnies might have produced, he thought there was no better way of proceeding than by laying before the House a copy of the minutes taken by the noble lord, and the other noble lords, in the course of their visit of inquiry last year, and to which the commissioners in their first report alluded. In that report it was stated, that the conduct of the Admiralty Board was not only free from censure, but highly commendable. It was also stated, that cases of very flagrant delinquency

existed. It was therefore fair and just that the delinquents. should as speedily as possible be brought to justice, and he should with this view move for the production of the minutes, as at once clearing the conduct of the Board of Admiralty from injurious imputations thrown on their conduct, and bringing those delinquents, whose villainies they had exposed, to a speedier punishment. He concluded with moving for a copy of the minutes relative to the abuses in the dock-yards, in terms of his speech.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, that no one could feel a higher interest than he did in any thing connected with the character of the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty. No one had a more thorough conviction that the character of the noble lord stood far above all malignant calumny. He was, however, at the same time, less anxious that the motion of the hon. Gent. should be persisted in, as he was convinced that the talent, the soundness, and the solidity of the noble lord's conduct did not at all stand in need of any such support as the motion was calculated to afford. In this view, therefore, he thought the motion totally unnecessary; but in another point of view, he conceived that it still less rested on parliamentary grounds. The House had invested commissioners with full powers to inquire into abuses existing in the navy, and there was no reason to think that they had not employed their powers with assiduity and zeal. If it was meant to be stated, that the commissioners had been deficient in their duty, then there might have been fair ground of interference, and a motion of the nature now offered to the House might have been highly expedient. As, however, no suggestion of this kind had been made, he must contend that the motion of the hon. Gent. was at least premature, and could tend only to anticipate a judgment, which could be given with much more advantage when the whole facts of the case were fairly and fully submitted to the House.

Capt. MARKHAM said, he felt himself very unpleasantly situated between the anxiety he felt to maintain his own character and those with whom he had the honour of acting, and his respect for the opinion delivered by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Board of Admiralty had been goaded and calumniated in the public prints of the country, which had said the most degrading things of the Board, and had compared their visitation to a domiciliary visit. Under such circumstances it was impossible for the Board of Admiralty to carry on their duty if they were thus to be abused for the proper discharge of it. It was on this account that he expressed not only his own wish, but that of the noble lord alluded to, and the other members of that Board, that these papers should be produced.

Sir WM. ELFORD said, he thought the present motion did not go far enough; they should not only have the minutes of the proceedings of the Admiralty Board during the visitation, but they should have an account of the measures afterwards adopted by that Board in consequence of it. There was no panegyric which could be paid to the military conduct of that noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, and the other members of that Board to which he would not subscribe, but he could not pay the same compliment to their civil conduct, because he thought it had been attended with consequences injurious to the public; it had produced a great disgust, and if persisted in, would produce the most serious consequences to the country.

Sir A. HAMMOND said, that the Navy Board, to which he had the honour to belong, had never spared their labour; they constantly attended the duties of their office for seven hours a day; they had done their best for the service of their country. They had enjoyed the approbation of the two preceding Boards of Admiralty, but since the present Board was appointed, there had been such strong prejudices, that it was with the utmost difficulty that they could go on. He hoped that when the reports of those who had been appointed to inquire into the abuses, came to be taken into consideration, that the Boards might have an opportunity of being heard in their justification. No judgment could be formed upon the conduct of those Boards, or upon the report itself, before the parties were heard, and they were perfectly ready to enter into their justification.

Mr. COURTENAY said, it was well known that there had been strong and unfounded reflections thrown out upon the conduct of the Admiralty, and on the visitation which had taken place. The object of the motion was to shew the grounds upon which the Board of Admiralty had proceeded. One of the members of the Board of Admiralty had expressed his wish that these papers should be produced—it was also the wish of the first lord of the Admiralty. Of the high character of that noble lord, *clarum et venerabile nomen*, it was unnecessary to say any thing, but it was some satisfaction to know that there was one of the members of the administration who was respected abroad.

Admiral BERKELEY said, that at a moment like the present, when every one ought to stand forward in defence of the country, to see a squabble between the two Boards was really a scandal to the country. This was not the time for inquiry; it called for exertions. He thought consequences would ensue from what had happened, that would palsy the operation both of the Admiralty and the Navy Board.

The ATTORNEY GENERAL asked, if it would not be a most anomalous proceeding on the part of Parliament in the first instance to appoint commissioners to make inquiries, and then to call upon them for their minutes at the very time that their proceedings were going on, and while their inquiries were unfinished? It had been stated that the Admiralty Board felt concerned at some slanderous reports which had gone abroad, and to which some little countenance had been given in that House, and that they wished that all the documents relative to their conduct should be laid before the House. This certainly was very honourable to their feelings as individuals, but he begged leave to submit to them, whether their private consideration should not, for the present, be suspended. If the House wished to take the inquiry upon itself, it ought to have done it in the first instance, and not now, when

the commission was appointed, and when the inquiry was going on. It had also been stated that there were delinquents whose cases ought to be brought before Parliament, in order that they might be prosecuted. But there was no reason why the minutes should be laid before the House for that purpose, because the Attorney General might be ordered to prosecute them. And it was but justice to the parties, if they were to be prosecuted, that it should be done in the usual way, and not by order of that House, which would certainly raise unfavourable prejudices against them. He trusted, therefore, that the House would consider this an unreasonable application, to take that inquiry out of the hands of the commissioners, against whom no charge had been made.

Col. BASTARD could not agree with those who thought that the situation of the country being dangerous, was a reason for not going into the inquiry; on the contrary he thought that the more dangerous that situation was, the more was the necessity for such an inquiry. Some had said that the public service had been impeded by the difference which had existed between the Navy and the Admiralty Board, and others had said that the service could not go on while these differences subsisted: this was a conclusive reason for the House coming to some decision upon the subject, otherwise the public service would be still further impeded.

Capt. HARVEY said, as to the character of the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty, some persons had said some things against him, and others had vindicated him, but if the subject should ever come under discussion, he should say freely what he thought upon it, at the same time, he assured the House that he should not fall in with those who had praised. As to any criminality in any parties to which the report referred, if there existed any such criminality, the Attorney General was the proper officer to prosecute on such an occasion. He thought the period might come when the circumstances stated in the report may come before the House, and then the House would do rightly in demanding all documents necessary to facilitate the discussion; but there was no such ground at present.

Sir FRANCIS BARING said, there was no man upon earth that had more respect than he had for Ld. St. Vincent, but he was extremely concerned that the subject of the visitation of the dock-yards had been brought forward on this occasion. In the case now before the House, evidence was taken in a particular manner, and either directly or indirectly reflecting on certain persons who had no power to put one question on the other side. The motion tended to hold forth to the world that a number of frauds had been commited on the public, and might make a very great impression, when in truth the judgment of the public ought to be suspended until both sides had been heard.

Mr. SHERIDAN could not agree that the noble lord at the head of the Admiralty was not to be amenable to the House of Commons, because he was a member of the other House of Parliament. As he was first lord of the Admiralty, no question could be constitutionally entertained but that his conduct in such character might be discussed in that House. It was not for those who approved of, but for those who were dissatisfied with the conduct of the noble lord, to call for an inquiry into such conduct? and sure he was, that whenever that investigation took place, it would redound highly to the honour of that noble lord. He was aware that the House would pay no attention whatever to any libels which might have been published in any quarter upon this subject. But as the House had been told that the force of the Navy Board was impeded by the proceedings of the Admiralty Board, he thought that no time should be lost in adjusting the difference between the two Boards at this momentous crisis. An investigation should therefore take place without delay, so that those who deserve honour shall receive honour, and those who deserve punishment shall suffer punishment.

HOUSE OF LORDS.

Monday, June 20. (*Min. p. 973.*)

[KING'S MESSAGE ON THE ARMY OF RESERVE.] ——LORD HOBART moved the order of the day, for taking into consideration the best means of carrying into immediate execution, the desire expressed in his Majesty's message for the more effectual defence and security of the United Kingdom. He should not take up the time of their Lordships, in demonstrating to the House the *minutiæ* of any particular plan. He was well convinced that, whatever difference of opinion might exist in the minds of Noble Lords, as to the manner of executing the wishes expressed in his Majesty's message, there could be no difference of sentiment as to their expediency at the present crisis, when our country was avowedly threatened by a most implacable enemy. He thought it, however, respectful to their Lordships, and consistent with the duty of his situation, to state the outline of the plan which it was his intention at a future period to submit to their consideration, in order that they might be the better prepared for the discussion when it came regularly before them. In the first place, he must observe, that he thought it not only necessary that we should provide means for the defence of the Empire in case of any hostile attack, but also that we should be prepared in such a manner as to evince to the enemy the utter impossibility of obtaining any success in an attack upon our coasts. Every possible exertion had been made in the military department; but that was not sufficient for the present exigency: it was therefore necessary that a more extraordinary measure should be resorted to. He should be extremely sorry to introduce any plan of a compulsory nature, without the necessity of the state called for it in the strongest manner; and he was aware that it might be objected that such a measure would necessarily draw a large number of the community from their industry and the agriculture of the country. But when he looked at the danger to which the country was exposed, when he looked at the increased population and resources of the country, he saw, with the utmost confidence, that there was nothing to fear. In the last war we had a militia force of 114,300 men in England, Ireland,

and Scotland. At present we had 72,900. He only meant to propose an addition of 40,000 for England, and 10,000 for Ireland, to be raised from the age of 18 to 45; and this additional force he designed to appropriate to the defence of Great Britain, Ireland, and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. It was the intention of ministers that they should be officered by gentlemen possessing property in land, or holding his Majesty's commission. To this force we might look up with confidence; and by that means we might have a large disposable force in case of any emergency, well trained and ready for any service within the Empire. He concluded with moving an address to his Majesty, expressive of the disposition of that House to concert such measures as would be deemed most effectual for the immediate defence and security of the Empire.

The Duke of CLARENCE thought that the outline of the plan was infinitely less objectionable than that which had been generally supposed by the public to be in agitation. He contended that Malta was not the cause of war; the cause was to be found in the general system of aggression and insult which had been adopted and practised by the French government from the time of concluding the Definitive Treaty of peace to the present moment. It therefore behoved every loyal man; it behoved every Englishman, but more particularly it behoved the hereditary nobility of the United Kingdom to unite their utmost efforts to oppose such haughty strides of ambition and despotism as had been taken by the present rulers of France. He recapitulated the outline of the plan which had been stated by the noble Secretary of State; and entered into a history of the different invasions which had been designed against this country from the time of Queen Elizabeth to the present period, and shewed, that whether it was an invincible armada or a flotilla of gun-boats, their attempts were equally fruitless when opposed by the unanimity and manly spirit which had always distinguished the character of Britons. He next entered into a history of our militia, and the various changes which had taken place in the militia system, bestowing a high eulogium on the character of our militia officers, and on the nature of the institution: the militia officers had at every period of our history evinced a spirit honourable to the country and highly becoming the character of soldiers. He was particularly attached to the militia, as the constitutional defence of the kingdom, and thought that the country would not be safe without them. He therefore thought it incumbent on him to caution their Lordships against any innovations which might be made in that patriotic body; not that he meant to say that it was the intention of the present servants of the Crown to make any encroachment on that valuable institution: he only meant to say, that as since the reformation we did not think even the Pope at Rome infallible, it appeared to him necessary that their Lordships should be on their guard, least any measure submitted to their consideration should have a tendency to trench upon the original construction of their system. The minister that would break his faith with an English soldier, or the minister that would break his faith with an English sailor, he thought could not be deemed a friend to his Sovereign or worthy the service of his country. He had the utmost confidence in the zeal, the loyalty, and the bravery of the country; and he had no doubt of the result, if any attempt should be made upon our coast by the Corsican Harlequin of Mischief. If he had been a minister to his Majesty he would have advised a plan of offensive, not defensive war; he would have advised the raising of such a force as might be disposable at East, West, North, or South, as occasion might require; he would advise such a force to be raised as might, consistent with the tenor of their inrolment, be sent to any place in Europe, Africa, or Asia, where their services might be required.

LORD GROSVENOR expressed a similar dependence on the spirit and loyalty of the country, in case any mad attempt of invasion should be made by Buonaparté and his Legislative Body. He rejoiced that the present plan had been entertained by Ministers, thinking it better than the extension of the volunteer system, though he at the same time bore testimony to the zeal, alacrity, and public spirit of the volunteers who so honourably stood forward in the defence of their country last war.

EARL CAERNARVON observed, that notwithstanding the deference he paid to the opinion of the illustrious Prince, he must declare that it was his opinion that we were fighting for Malta—that we were fighting for a lease of Malta for ten years, with the return of the island of Lampedosa. If the French had given up that point, we would not now be at war. But in fact, the cessation of arms we had since the treaty of peace, he could not call a peace. He then objected to the mode proposed for raising men by ballot, and observed that it was only transferring the burden from the public purse to that of the individual on whom the lot might fall, without reference to the wealth or property of the person. It would be a most flagrant act of injustice to compel an individual to pay £20 which should be paid out of the purse of the nation. In some instances the utmost profusion of the public money was submitted to, and yet a disposition now appeared to throw the burthen on an individual who might not in many cases be able to bear it. If such was the inclination of his Majesty's ministers; if they wished to raise a land-tax and call it a tax upon income; if they wished to bankrupt the funds and call it an income tax; if they wished to levy an army and call it a militia; we should have more to fear from the conduct of administration than from the threats of the enemy.

LORD SUFFOLK said, that as a military man, he thought it right that he should inquire if any military plan of the country had been formed. The first object of a Roman governor always was, to have a military plan designed of the roads, the bridges, and different situations of the country which he had to defend. As a military man, he wished also to submit to their Lordships the propriety of having a number of carriages constructed and stationed at such convenient distances, that 20,000 men might be conveyed with the utmost possible expedition to any given point. He wished also to hint, the necessity of making Deputy Lieutenants, serving under Lord Lieutenants of counties, more efficient and responsible than they at present are. The Army of Reserve was a mea-

sure of the utmoſt importance, and deſerving of the moſt ſerious attention of their Lordſhips; and, for the great extent of the defence neceſſary to our inſular ſituation, it was neceſſary that we ſhould have men of the moſt diſtinguiſhed military talents, and of the moſt elevated rank, to whom the country might look up with the moſt perfect confidence, engaged in the active ſervice of their country. He then alluded to Lord Grey, Lord Rawdon, and Lord Hutchinſon, as eminently worthy of the peculiar attention of government at the preſent criſis. On mentioning the name of the latter nobleman, his Lordſhip delivered a moſt animated eulogium on the gallant conduct of that general in Egypt. By the conduct of miniſters in not employing ſuch a diſtinguiſhed officer, or employing him in a ſubordinate ſituation, they were plucking the laurels from his brows. He took a retroſpect of the conduct of the late war, and ſaid, that though the preſent meaſure was ſomething more vigorous than any which had been adopted during the late war, he did not think it went ſo far as the ſtate required.

EARL MOIRA —In anſwer to the flattering compliments which the partiality of a noble friend of mine (Lord Suffolk) has induced him to beſtow upon me, I have only to ſay, my Lords, that I am perfectly ſatisfied with whatever deſtination my Sovereign has been graciouſly pleaſed to allot to me, and that were his Majeſty to call upon me to ſerve in the ranks as a private, I ſhould in that ſubordinate ſtation unſheath my ſword with the ſame cheerful alacrity and ardent zeal as if I were called to the chief command of the moſt numerous and gallant army. While, however, I feel eager to expreſs theſe ſentiments, and to ſecond with my beſt endeavours whatever plan may be propoſed for a vigorous and effectual defence of the country, I cannot forbear ſaying, that I do not imagine that there is any thing irregular in what has been obſerved by my noble friend. The object of the meſſage, now under conſideration is, the moſt effectual mode to be adopted to prepare the defence and eſtabliſh the ſecurity of the country. In order, therefore, to chalk out that line of defence which it may be moſt expedient to purſue, it is neceſſary to enter into the particulars of the plan propoſed. Without taking theſe particulars into conſideration, it muſt be impoſſible to return any thing like a ſatisfactory anſwer in the propoſed addreſs to his Majeſty. It is by no means my intention to make any objection to it, for I perfectly agree with my learned and noble friend on the woolſack, that it is impoſſible for the Houſe not to concur in it. Neither am I inclined to object to the meaſure which miniſters intend to propoſe, for I conceive it to be the duty of every individual, at a criſis like the preſent, to exert every effort to ſmooth the difficulties that may ſtand in the way of the executive power, and to furniſh them with every poſſible aſſiſtance in giving a prudent and energetic direction to the reſources of the country. In that view, I am thoroughly convinced that the hands of miniſters ſhould be left unſhackled, and their power wholly uncontrouled; for more danger might be apprehended from harraſſing them in the plan they laid down, than benefit could be derived from projecting a better plan, which could only protract the execution of the former. There is not a moment to be loſt, and what I moſt anxiouſly apprehend is, that the noble Secretary is not ſufficiently aware of the expedition and diſpatch which ſhould be uſed in giving effect to his Majeſty's moſt gracious meſſage. I ſhould be ſorry to ſtoop to any thing ſo mean as the miſrepreſentation of what was advanced by the noble Secretary, in order to ground an argument upon that miſrepreſentation; but he ſeemed to have ſaid, that he looked forward to future parliamentary diſcuſſion with a view to improve and mature the plan, of which at preſent he had only ſketched the outline. To ſuch procraſtination, under ſuch circumſtances, I cannot bring myſelf to aſſent. There is not an hour, not a moment to be loſt. While your Lordſhips are debating, the enemy is acting; while we are deviſing plans of defence, they are executing means of attack; while we are idly preluding in a war of words, they will come on us in a war of action; they will ſurprize us unprepared, and overpower us ſlumbering at our fire-ſides.

Occupat incautum, patriasque obtruncat adaras.

On the activity of miniſters it is not in my power to beſtow any high-ſtrained panegyric. On the 8th of March they brought down a meſſage from his Majeſty, intimating the hoſtile projects of France, and they have ſince laid upon your table papers which amply unfold the repeated inſults and injuries which have been offered to this country by that power. If their feelings were ſuch at ſuch provocations, as no doubt thoſe of your Lordſhips and the country muſt be, muſt they not have foreſeen that war was inevitable? muſt they not have conjectured that event, from the very conſequences of the meſſage which they then delivered, and from the character, with which they do not profeſs themſelves to be unacquainted, of the perſon who now holds the helm of French affairs? All this they muſt have been thoroughly acquainted with in the month of March, yet it is late in the month of June before they come forward to propoſe meaſures of ſecurity; and even when they are thus late in propoſing them, they would ſtill adviſe protracting their execution, in the hopes of their being improved by Parliamentary diſcuſſion. This ſurely is not the way of meeting ſuch an enemy as that with whom we have to contend.——Under that impreſſion it cannot be my wiſh to enter into any detailed examination of the meaſure now brought forward: my anxious wiſh is, that every poſſible means of defence may be immediately reſorted to; and I cannot but partake in the apprehenſions of the illuſtrious Duke who has ſo ably diſcuſſed the queſtion, that the meaſure in agitation will not prove adequate to the emergency in which the country is now placed. It ſhould open a wider view, a broader ſcene of action; it ſhould look to other points than thoſe of mere internal defence. Dreadful, indeed, is the ſcourge of an hoſtile force invading our native ſoil, but next to it is the march of an hoſtile army in the boſom of a friendly country. The enemy who thus threatens or ravages what we are moſt intereſted in, we ſhould endeavour to embarraſs and annoy at every poſſible point; we ſhould more eſpecially endeavour to aſſail him where every feeling groans under his tyranny, and pants to be reſcued from ſuch ſervile ſubjugation. Since I laſt had the honour to addreſs you on this topic, events have occurred cloſely connected with the object of his Majeſty's Meſ-

sage, and which muſt ſtill come more nearly home to your feelings. Since that period his Majeſty's patrimonial poſſeſſions have been wreſted from his paternal care; and even should England be looked upon as disconnected with Hanover, ſtill should its loss be deeply lamented. How much more should it affect us when all its relations are duly considered, more especially when we behold the noble example of diſintereſtedness thus set to us by his Majeſty. If we are to look unconcerned on the fate of Hanover, in what light will other countries be disposed to consider us? Can Europe any longer look with confidence to the broad shield of British protection? This was a point on which we are moſt essentially concerned; it is one on which you cannot beſtow too much attention. Do but consult the map, and you muſt quickly perceive in what situation we are placed. With the possession of the coaſts of Holland and of Hanover, how can we now possibly come upon the back of the enemy? It muſt therefore be no light charge againſt miniſters that they have loſt such a point; that they have deprived themselves of such a guard, and disarmed themselves of means so material to the termination of the war.——As to the cause of the war, I muſt agree with the illuſtrious Duke who could not permit himself to believe that it was the possession of Malta. It has indeed aſtonished me not a little that miniſters should have held it forth in that shape. In their general conviction the real cause of the war was the impossibility of continuing to submit to the injuries and insults of the French government. Tamely to persevere in such a ſtate of peace would be nothing short of inevitable ruin. We may have attempted incautiously to slumber under its shade: but it has proved to be the shade of a poiſonous tree, the droppings from which have bliſtered us into sense. But now that we seemed to awake to our situation, what was proposed? A defenſive, a merely defenſive war! From such a war could any success be rationally expected? What could be the effect of such a war but to wrap up the spirit and energies of the country in the night gown and slippers of routine? Were we not threatened with a danger of a nature and magnitude that never before hung over this nation? How was it to be warded off? By vigilance, by promptitude, by decision. Yes; riſe, riſe, my country! riſe, or you must perish!—You have no doubt, my Lords, the feelings of Britons; but you muſt inspire them into others. British blood continues to flow in our veins, but its influence muſt vibrate through the heart of the nation. No measure can be too vigorous to repel the giant miſchief that assails us. No personal feelings can be now indulged. The common danger calls for common exertion. By that alone can we repel it: and can we indeed continue to shrink and shudder under the shade of a colossus that deprives us of the sight of Heaven, and of the cheering influence of the sun? In vain would we look to Austria, to Russia: no; our security muſt be in our own spirit, our safety in our own ſtrength. Did we not become timely aware of our danger, we might again have become the dupes of a miserable accommodation. But Providence seems to have at length opened the eyes of miniſters, and snatched us from the gulf of irretrievable ruin to which the acceptance of the enemy's terms would have hurled us. What have we now to look to but to measure the ſtrength of that enemy, and to prepare adequate powers to resist him. Resist him! No; we muſt crush him, or we perish. For that purpose there is no sacrifice or privation for which we muſt not be prepared; our purses and persons muſt be at the disposal of the country. Let us but hope that the hands that are to wield our ſtrength, may know how to guide its energies, and where to point its exertions. To the plan proposed I shall offer no objections; convinced that objectionable as it may be, it is wiser and more expedient to put it into immediate execution, than to lose time in devising a better, the operation of which muſt be deferred. In proſecuting the measure now proposed, experience may suggeſt amendments; but no time is to be loſt.

Lord Mulgrave expressed his unqualified approbation of this measure, because forty thousand men thus raised will enable an equal number of the troops of the line to act offensively; they will be an annoyance to the enemy whenever it shall please the Government in furtherance of its designs to employ them in active and offensive service; but without such a plan, the regular force would be confined to our shores, and be in a great measure useless. And why should they be reſtricted at such a time, or why should their proud spirit be repressed? He well knew the feelings and sentiments of an English soldier, they were these: "Tell me what I am to do.—Define my duty. I regard not the difficulties that are to be encountered—let me but know what I am to do, and my life shall be sacrificed, or the object shall be accomplished." But, if he thinks you trifle with him, or mean to impose on him, in vain will you hope for cordial or efficient exertion. He reprobated the delicacy that may be felt with regard to persons who may be balloted to serve in the cause or their country, and consequently in their own. It would be asked, will you force these persons to serve if they cannot provide subſtitutes? Yes. When the country is in danger it is incumbent on all descriptions to come forward

"Dulce et decorum eſt pro patria mori."

He was only sorry that so much time had been loſt, he should wish to see the people now under arms, and he could congratulate the country on having a valuable acquisition in those officers who belonged to battalions that had been disbanded; on their merit, knowledge of discipline, and service he placed great reliance, but very little indeed could he depend on those officers who came from the Eaſt-Indies, after having amassed fortunes, or with a view to recruit their impaired conſtitutions for the term of three years. But will it be said that this measure is ſtrong? So it ought to be. The bounds of what heretofore would be termed prudence muſt now be overleaped. This is an uncommon time; the exigency is imperious indeed. With the change of times we muſt alter our measures.

"Tempora mutantur, et nos mutamur in illis."

Away then with this idle cant and objection to regular armies. No danger is to be apprehended from an army of Englishmen now a-days; but without it we should have every thing to dread from France. This is our shield when we are to defend ourselves, and our sword when we are to draw and assert our independence and protect our rights.

LORD LIMERICK differed from the Noble Earl (Moira) in some things, and from the illustrious Duke who spoke third in the debate. What, though troops are sent, or even if it will be so, forced to the East or West-Indies, or elsewhere, they have before them those rewards which never fail to animate the truly generous breast. They have honour, laurels, and the approbation of their country:—they are enrolled for the service like freemen, and not like the slaves of a neighbouring country, who are compelled to quit their homes, their wives, their children, their fathers and mothers, in obedience to an arbitrary and tyrannical mandate. He was astonished to hear a Noble Earl (Carnarvon) declare that he would resist the system, (these were the words, for he had taken them down); he stated, that every thing was wrong, that improper selection of officers were made, that taxes were too oppressive, that property was actually invaded; but he hoped, that his feelings had hurried him too far, and that his principles did not correspond with his expressions, particularly when in a prophetic strain, he heard him declare, that this system would not be tolerated. Such opinions and wishes could only lead to the defeat of all our plans for securing our independence and rights, and furnish to the inveterate foe the surest means of succeeding in his desperate enterprise. As to the mode of raising the men, he thought it excellent in every point of view; but more especially, as the men were not restricted to serve in their respective counties, or countries—the only difficulty he saw was to get the clothes on the recruit, for when once he was dressed in a red, blue, or grey coat, he feared no danger; the man who would before dread to cross a brook, would then stem the torrent without dismay; give him facings and a cockade in his hat, then he flies away to glory.

DUKE OF RICHMOND felt as sensibly as any noble lord in the House the importance of this crisis, and the danger to which the country was exposed. He was aware that every thing we held most dear and sacred would be at issue in the contest. The independence and liberty of Great Britain were menaced with destruction by an enemy who had hitherto been but too successful. Every resource therefore, every energy should be called forth in defence of those rights, which it is our pride to inherit from our illustrious ancestors, and which, if we still possess English hearts, we will transmit to our posterity, pure and unsullied. How far it was safe or politic to engage in continental alliances, he would not now discuss; it must depend on circumstances: but he had no hesitation to observe generally, that such connexions were always useful when the real interest of this country was consulted. But deprived of these connexions, the country could do little to injure or materially affect the enemy on the Continent. —The third ballot comes now, amounting to 40,000 men, that is, more than double the number proposed in the first instance; this he really felt a strong measure, and would be considered as such by the nation. He apprehended also, that it would have the effect of damping the spirit of the people, without which, at this critical juncture, it would be absolutely impossible to accomplish any thing. He could speak with certainty from his own knowledge of the baneful effects that must inevitably flow from it. A regiment consisting of 800 men, which he had the honour to command, was deficient 200 from its operation. —To this measure he had another objection; the men to be raised were all infantry. Now, he thought cavalry the most efficient force that could be opposed to the enemy in such a country as England. He would also suggest the propriety of augmenting the horse artillery. It was a force too obviously useful to be neglected by the Government. He concluded with recommending, that the men should be taken out in districts, and be accustomed to shoot at marks on Sundays, so as to be prepared when there should be real danger and actual necessity for their exertion. Above all, it was the spirit of Englishmen, and nothing but this that could carry them through the difficulties in which they were involved; but let that be called forth, and Europe perhaps would be independent, at least Britain must be free.

LORD FITZWILLIAM could not help lamenting that the different plans proposed for raising the Supplementary Militia, and the additional force now to be called out, must materially obstruct the recruiting of the regular army. Indeed it was impracticable that those different plans could be carried into effect at the same time, as they naturally obstructed each others progress. It was therefore better to suspend the progress of the one until the other was completed.

LORD GRENVILLE said, that he could not agree to the motion, unless it had been accompanied with the observations by which it was introduced by the noble Secretary. He could not therefore conceive that there was any thing irregular in them. As to the measure itself, no time should be lost in putting it into execution. For twelve months past France had not ceased to pursue her insults and aggressions, and a quarter of a year had elapsed since the message was brought down, stating the necessity of resenting those aggressions. The very armaments which were then said to be preparing in the ports of Holland and France, were supposed to have in view the invasion of this country. That apprehension was entertained so far back as the month of March, yet we were now far advanced in the month of June without having matured any plan for repelling the meditated attack; and that plan, how was it to be executed? By ballot; a mode that must necessarily obstruct the progress of recruiting the army. Where then was the activity and energy of ministers? On the contrary, was not the danger that first threatened the country augmented tenfold by their supineness or indecision? On the loss of Hanover the noble lord then expatiated in the same strain as the noble Earl (Moira), and contended that the possession of that country made an inconceivable addition to the incredible means of annoyance with which the enemy were already provided. Indeed if the proper course had been early pursued in the month of March, the enemy would not have been able to possess themselves of Hanover, and other places which they are now known to occupy. If the treaty of Amiens had not cut us off from all continental connexion, the conduct which ministers have since observed, must have had that effect. As to the measure now proposed, whatever might be its defects, it should be immediately put into execution; for any thing was better than the state of disarma-

ment and unpreparedness in which the country was now left. He did not look upon it as a compulsory measure; and even if it was, he should not disapprove of it under the present circumstances of the country; for those who are protected are bound to defend. Common defence is the first condition of society itself, and every individual is called upon to contribute to it. This was the immediate principle of all government; a principle recognised by the British constitution, and which might easily be traced back to its formation. If the adoption of the measure now proposed should have the effect of rendering ministers unpopular, he was ready to bear his part of that unpopularity; for the extraordinary circumstances of the country fully justified government in resorting to extraordinary means of defence. The force that was thus to be raised should be applicable both to offensive and defensive operations. A defensive war did not deserve the name of war; no, not even that of defence.

LORD HOBART denied that ministers were liable to the charge of inactivity in preparing and maturing the plan. What delay it met with was not imputable to them, but to circumstances over which they had no controul. Into the defence of the Treaty of Amiens he should not now enter; he should only observe, that the peace, when concluded, disbanded the militia of necessity. Neither was the delay in recruiting the army imputable to ministers; nothing was more unfounded than such an imputation. He was sorry that those noble lords who so strongly objected to the present plan, did not condescend to propose a better. It was also objected to ministers that they did not adopt offensive measures; but the contrary was notorious to every body, for those measures had not only been employed, but they were known daily to succeed. As to the charge of leaving the Continent in the style in which it now stood, he could not help wondering that it should come from the noble Lord (Grenville) who had solely presided in the foreign department, and who had left the Continent nearly in the same condition in which it was now placed.

LORD SHEFFIELD could not help considering the proposed plan as a measure of the most oppressive and provoking nature. In the space of three months it would appear, that one hundred and ten thousand men were to be raised by ballot; and what must be the consequence, but to throw their wives and children upon their respective parishes.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 20. (*Min. p. 973.*)

[KING'S MESSAGE ON THE ARMY OF RESERVE.]—The SECRETARY at WAR: in calling the attention of the Committee to the subject of his Majesty's message, communicated on Saturday said, I wish, before I proceed to any details, to say a few words on the main objects of that message. The objects which it points out are, first, the adoption of steps for making more effectual provision for the security of the country against those threats of invasion which are so openly avowed by the enemy; and secondly, for enabling his Majesty to employ such a force for offensive operations as may lead to a more vigorous prosecution of the war. I do not think, that it will be necessary for me to employ much argument to prove that, at such a conjuncture as the present, it is the bounden duty of Parliament to make such a provision for the national security as the circumstances in which the country is placed appear to require. In providing for this security it is necessary to take into consideration the actual state of our present means of preparation, and the means of offence which now exist in the hands of the enemy. Looking then to this object, I believe that no gent. will be disposed to deny that a very considerable addition ought to be made to our present military establishment. In saying this, I beg it to be understood, that I allude to the times in which it is our lot to live, to the new and unprecedented circumstances in which the country is placed, to the extraordinary character and conduct of that person who is the sole depository of the power, the resources, the population of the French republic. In other times, and under other circumstances, adverting to common difficulties and common dangers incidental to a state of war, I have no difficulty in declaring, that our army on its present footing, or as it will stand in a very short period, and with a fleet commanding the sovereignty of the sea, we should be entitled to hold in complete contempt any threats of invasion. When I say this, I mean to apply it not to Great Britain alone, but to Ireland, and to all the dependencies of the British Empire. But in adverting to the present times and the present circumstances, it is needless for me to impress the necessity of taking much more enlarged and comprehensive views. We have heard, and that too on the highest authority, what the views of the present governors of France are with respect to this country. We have heard the declarations of a number of French generals in offering themselves to accompany the Great Consul in the vessel which was to carry to this country the destinies and the vengeance of the republic. What the destinies of France may be I shall not pretend to determine. All that every friend to the tranquillity of mankind can wish is, that they may ultimately lead to the happiness, justice, and freedom of the French people, as well as to the restoration of those principles on which essentially depends the repose of Europe. With respect to the other part of the cargo, I have no hesitation in saying, that it is of a very different description. We are told that it is to consist of the vengeance of France against this country. I verily believe, that if ever Buonaparté attempts a passage across the Channel, and endeavours to land on our coasts, he will find the passage more tremendous than the passage over the Styx, so beautifully described by one of the finest poets of antiquity.

" Stabant orantes primi transmittere cursum,
" Tendebantque manus ripæ ulterioris amore,
" Fata obstant, tristique palus inamabilis unda,
" Alligat, et novies Styx interfusa coercet."

I am sure that I only speak the sentiments of the great majority when I say, that the First Consul of France cherishes, as the object dearest to his heart, the destruction of the essential interests, the independence, the very existence of this country. These views have been too distinctly developed to

render it necessary for me to enter into any argument on the subject. These views cannot be better explained than by ſtating them ſhortly, as tending to the degradation of Great Britain from the rank which she has long held, to her ultimate reduction to the debased condition of vaſſalage to France.—What may be the result of the views of the Firſt Conſul of France, I ſhall not take on me to ſay, for it is not easy to determine what can be imputed to the workings of a mind influenced more by perſonal and falſe glory, than by plans of real advantage. But, irregular and extraordinary as was his whole conduct, it is not less neceſſary to watch againſt the conſequences of the mad paroxyſms of his ambition, than the more concealed projects of oppoſite characters. When we hear of ſucceſſive armies and fleets being ſacrificed in the project of invading this country; when we hear that no repulſe will divert him from his plan of injuring this country, and that he conſiders no ſacrifice too great. When we know this, I contend, that it is the ſolemn duty of government to ſubmit to the conſideration of Parliament, the propriety of taking ſome effectual ſteps to put the country in a ſtate of complete ſecurity. It is on theſe principles that I have now riſen, and that I hope the plan which I ſhall now ſubmit, will appear one ariſing out of the circumſtances in which the country is placed.—This plan is, that an additional body of fifty thouſand men ſhall be raiſed, aſſembled, and organiſed, with all poſſible expedition. Of this additional force, it is propoſed, that forty thouſand ſhall be raiſed in Great Britain, and ten thouſand in Ireland. It is intended that they ſhall be aſſembled with the leaſt poſſible delay, and immediately be placed under the command of military officers of approved character and experience. With this force, properly organized, added to the force already in exiſtence, I truſt, that under the bleſſings of Providence, we ſhall be placed in a ſtate of complete ſecurity againſt any attack on the part of the enemy, while we ſhall have applicable to offenſive purpoſe, a very conſiderable diſpoſable force. On this part of the ſubject I wiſh particularly to ſolicit attention. I believe it is not neceſſary for me to waſte any of the time of the Committee in attempting to prove that the conſequences of ſuch a ſyſtem muſt be highly beneficial. It has been too much the ſubject of regret, that at the commencement of war the ſtate of our military preparations has never at all correſponded with the means of exertions which the country poſſeſſed. At the commencement of the late war this diſadvantage was fully experienced. At that time the ſtate of our military power was not at all in proportion with our general reſources, with the other means of annoyance which we poſſeſſed. As far as I underſtand our preſent military ſyſtem, I think that an important change, ſooner or later, cannot be avoided. This is not, indeed, the time for inſtituting any changes in this very important department of the public ſervice. Such changes can with propriety only be introduced in a period of general tranquillity, but the whole ſyſtem ought, as ſoon as poſſible, to be probed to the bottom, and I truſt that whenever a fair opportunity is preſented, it will meet with due conſideration from Parliament. I adverted to this accidentally, but now return to the ſubject more directly under conſideration. In the plan which I ſhall now have the honour of ſtating, there are three leading principles. The firſt is, that a large additional force ſhould be, as ſpeedily as poſſible, collected for the more effectual ſecurity of the kingdom. The ſecond conſideration is, that the ſervices of the body of forces ſo raiſed ſhall be extended to every part of the United Kingdom. In defence of this part of the ſyſtem, it is not neceſſary to employ many words. Since the Union with Ireland, the identity of the two countries is eſtabliſhed, and, by extending the ſervices of this Army of Reſerve to Ireland, a much larger body of the regular troops will be left applicable to any purpoſe which may require a regular force. The third principle to which I wiſh to advert is, that the levies ſhall be conducted in a manner as little burthenſome as poſſible to the country. It is on theſe principles that I now go on to explain the details of the plan, by which a very large additional force is to be eſtabliſhed. As to the age of thoſe to be included, it is meant that all males from the age of 18 to 45 ſhall come under its operation. This army, when levied, ſhall be immediately aſſembled, and brought into a ſtate of proper diſcipline under officers to whom I ſhall preſently advert. I have already ſaid that the ſervices of this body, whom I ſhall characterize by the name of the Army of Reſerve, are to be extended to every part of the United Kingdom. I have ſtated the principle on which this extenſion is propoſed; and when I add that it is meant to extend their ſervices to the iſlands of Jerſey and Guernſey, I am confident that no gent. can have any reaſonable ground of objection. As to the time to which their ſervice is to extend, it has been judged expedient that for ballotted men the period ſhould be four years, or for ſix months after the concluſion of a treaty of peace. The mode in which the ballot is to be conducted is to be ſimilar to the ballot of the Militia, and, as far as they are applicable, all the regulations relative to the aſſembling of the Militia are to be adhered to. I will ſtate the grounds on which ſuch an arrangement has been adopted. The ballot appeared the moſt effectual and ſpeedy way of procuring the levies. I do not mean to ſay that voluntary offers of ſervice may not be found of high importance, and adopted to a very conſiderable extent. On the contrary, I entertain a perfect conviction that the people of this country are ſufficiently aware of the importance of the ſtruggle in which we are now engaged. I know when theſe feelings are properly excited there will be no want of national ſpirit, in ſupporting a cauſe involving intereſts of ſo important a nature. I know what has been done in a great national cauſe in former times. I can look back to the public ſpirit of this country in the time of King William, when in leſs than ſix weeks thirty battalions were organized for the public ſervice. At the ſame time giving the higheſt credit to the ſpirit, the zeal, and the loyalty of the country, I think it neceſſary for me to ſtate, that it has been judged expedient to follow the ſyſtem of the Militia Ballot, as the ſpeedieſt and the moſt effectual mode of raiſing the neceſſary ſupplies. I recollect what took place in 1797, on the ſyſtem for calling on each pariſh to furniſh a certain quota of men for manning the navy. The number propoſed to be raiſed was ſeven thouſand, but not more than fourteen hundred were made applicable to the public ſervice. It is from the knowledge of the plan being thus inefficacious that I am induced not to reſort to it.—The next point

is the manner in which it is proposed that the appointment of the officers shall be conducted. On this I have a few observations to offer, I think, generally, that it is highly important in appointing officers not to resort to those who have a qualification to be appointed officers in militia regiments. We know already, that in consequence of the augmentation of the militia to 70,000, there has been a necessity of recurring to the appointment of officers not recognised by the original laws of the militia. In the late war we found a similar inconvenience. I shall beg leave to state the sources from which I conceive that an adequate number of able officers may be procured The Committee cannot have forgotten that at the conclusion of the late war twenty battalions of troops whose term of service was limited to a particular period, were disbanded. Of the officers, though a number were afterwards employed in the army, a very large proportion are now unemployed, and ready to proffer their services at so perilous a moment. From this body of men a very large proportion of able and zealous officers might, without the smallest difficulty, be obtained. But there were many other channels from which officers may be procured. We have the whole body of the half-pay officers, among whom are to be found many individuals whose talents and whose services entitle them to be employed at a moment when whatever there exists of talent ought to be made subservient to the public interest. There are many whose domestic connexions do not permit them to continue in the army at a time when foreign service is rendered essential. These considerations we cannot fail to respect, and no one can doubt their readiness to take the most active part in the service of their country, if there was any prospect of their taking an active part for its honour and its interests. In this quarter I anticipate all that the most sanguine expectation can hope for. I bring those officers who have for a long time served in the pay of the East-India Company; there are many officers now in this country, who would willingly offer their services at the present moment. If it should be found necessary we can also recur to the services of the officers of the militia regiments, who during the last war distinguished themselves in Ireland, and who, in point of knowledge of all the details of military discipline, rank high among men of the first military character. I do not think that I am pressing this matter too far when I refer to the assistance which, may be drawn from the staff for carrying on the recruiting service. The gentleman who is now at the head of the department is, indeed himself a host. While I am enumerating so many sources, from which supplies of officers may be derived, I cannot pass over the corps of Marines, a body of men whose conduct has, on all occasions, been worthy of the highest admiration. From the officers on half-pay in this body, a most important augmentation of the national strength might be effected. It may be objected, that according to the principles which I lay down, the same sort of principle ought to have been extended to the Irish Militia. My answer to this objection is short, though decisive. When the General Militia Bill was before Parliament, the object was to simplify and methodize the existing laws, and therefore a bill which professes to be brought in on very different principles, and for different objects, ought not to be confounded with it. Having gone through these details, it is now my duty to describe how the plan is to be reduced to practice. I begin with explaining how the number to be provided for are to be drawn. For the counties of England there are not much upwards of thirty thousand, which is nearly the amount of the militia when in profound peace, and before the augmentation of the Supplementary Militia took place. It is meant, that the City of London, the Tower Hamlets, and the Cinque Ports, which have not hitherto contributed to the militia, shall furnish somewhat above three thousand more. Scotland is to furnish six thousand; and ten thousand are to be raised in Ireland, as the proportion to be furnished by that part of the United Kingdom. On this part of the subject I wish to direct the attention of the Committee to the state of the demand for military purposes at present, and during the late war. I wish the Committee to see, what was the proportion of the population then called for, and now demanded for the public security. The fact is, that during the late war the militia of Great Britain, including fourteen thousand forces, which, however, were never properly employed, was equal to a hundred and fourteen thousand men. Now reckoning for England seventy thousand militia, for Scotland eight thousand, for Ireland eighteen thousand, as the law now stands, the whole will be found to be not more considerable than was furnished at a time when reasons for exertion were not so evidently urgent. On the score of the pressure of the measure, therefore, it is not liable to any particular objection.—I come now to advert to the exemptions which it has been thought proper to establish. In these I have endeavoured to keep, as nearly as possible, sight of the provisions adopted when the bill for calling out the Supplementary Militia was published. It is hardly necessary for me to state, that all officers in his Majesty's service, that all privates connected with any particular regiment; that all officers on the half-pay, and all privates in the same situation, shall not be subject to the ballot. The next class of exemptions, is the case of the resident members of the two Universities. In Scotland the resident members of the Scotch Universities are to be exempted by a clause in their own militia bill. The clergy holding livings, and licensed preachers are as formerly to enjoy an exemption. In alluding to this last class of exemptions, I have to observe generally that while the principle of toleration, which has been religiously preserved since the accession of the Brunswick family, will be respected, care shall be taken to prevent the repetition of abuses which have been deservedly the subject of complaint. The artificers in his Majesty's dock-yards are as usual to be exempted. All poor persons having more than one child under ten years, are also to be exempted from the operation of the plan. As to yeomanry and volunteers, I cannot but express myself in the warmest terms of their important services to the country. No man is more ready than I am to do justice to their disinterested and patriotic conduct. No man can speak of them with more respect and affection. At the same time, when speaking of a measure, which will operate with such considerable pressure, it is proper that in forming exemptions, we should not go beyond what fairness and justice should prescribe. Applying this principle to the volunteers, it is intended, that the exemption shall extend only to those corps which were actually introduced on the day when his Majesty's last message was delivered. To this extent the exemption appeared founded on fairness and justice, but to extend it might have the the appearance of undue partiality.—I conceive that

the measure which is now proposed to the Committee, is one, which if carried into effect, will alike support the glory of the country in the prosecution of the contest, and tend to bring it to a speedy termination. I shall not be contradicted, when I say, that there is no more effectual way of carrying on the contest with honour and glory to the country, than by placing in the hands of government such a large disposable force as the measure which I have been recommending is calculated to afford. I need not remind the Committee how much stress has been laid on the war, which was to be waged against our financial resources. Happily we have already made such arrangements as will effectually defeat his projects in this respect, and we have now, only, to teach him, that if he was disappointed in his views of gaining any advantage over us, by endeavouring to ruin us by a war of finance, he was equally erroneous in his calculations, when he supposed, that the energy and the resources of the country were not equal to every emergency. I believe that the adoption of this measure, will not only discourage Buonaparté, but that it must enable us to attack him in some of his weak and vulnerable points, and ultimately force him, instead of looking abroad to the destruction of foreign nations, to survey his own internal situation, which was much more precarious than he was perhaps at present disposed to imagine. I believe that the system for which I have been contending, would produce perfect security at home, and by convincing the First Consul of France that the spirit of Englishmen never can be subdued, induce him to listen to proposals of an amicable description.—He concluded by moving first for an address to his Majesty, thanking him for his gracious message, and assuring him of cordial support.—He next moved, that the chairman be instructed to move for leave to bring in a bill for raising a large additional force for the more effectual defence of the country and the more vigorous prosecution of the war.—MR. WINDHAM *opposed the motion in an eloquent speech, of great length, which will be found at p.* 930 *of this volume.*

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, it was not his intention to follow the right hon. Gent. through the great variety of observations he had thought proper to make; but he would submit it to the candid judgment of the House, whether ministers were liable to the charge of bringing forward tardy and ill-considered measures of preparation. It was now only five weeks since his Majesty's message had been delivered to the House, and within that period 50,000 men had been voted, and the Supplementary Militia had been called out. Therefore he thought ministers had not preserved that kind of dignified calm which the right hon. Gent. would ascribe to them. He disclaimed the imputation of wishing to conceal the actual state of the country; and the facts he had stated relative to the increase of the navy, and the calling out of the Supplementary Militia were sufficient to shew that the assertion that ministers were secret in their preparations, was unfounded. In addition, it was now proposed to raise 50,000 men by ballot, similar to the militia, and free from two great objections which that right hon. Gent. had frequently urged against the militia system. It was to be extended in its service, and was to be officered by men of military experience; a circumstance which must secure that discipline which constituted the life and soul of an army. The proposed force, therefore, was not liable to the objections which would apply to the militia. Many of the arguments of the right hon. Gent. were entitled to very great weight; and if it was now a matter of option whether to have a regular or a militia force, he would have no difficulty in preferring the former, if in the present circumstances it were practicable to raise such a force by the ordinary means within reasonable time. The greater part, however, of the objections which the right hon. Gent. advanced this evening to the militia system, would have come with more propriety in the course of the discussions which took place last sessions upon that subject; but, though he now thought proper so strongly to urge his opposition to the measure, because it was founded on the plan of the militia, yet he admitted that the raising of a regular army in lieu of it was quite impracticable. Therefore, the right hon. Gent.'s only reason for declining to vote against this measure was, that it was better to have the proposed force than none at all. But, the right hon. Gent.'s chief charge against ministers was, their delay in bringing forward this measure.—That delay, however, was designed with this view, that both the regular and supplementary Militia should be fully supplied before the balloting necessary for the force now under consideration should commence. Such was the motive which influenced that conduct in ministers of which the right hon. Gent. complained. Ministers had proceeded by a gradual succession of measures to provide for the complete resistance of the enemy, and in a way which, he trusted, would meet the approbation of the House. As to the revision of the militia system, he would say that this was not the proper time for that discussion; and he would ask the right hon. Gent. how he could suppose it possible to recruit a regular army to the number of 50,000 men without resorting to means of compulsion which he hoped even the right hon. Gent. himself would not approve? With respect to the danger of the country he had no hesitation in saying, that he never under-rated it: neither in public or private did he ever attempt to disguise it. He felt it to be of that nature which could be contemplated without dismay, but which no worthy or rational man could contemplate with indifference. To the right hon. Gent.'s ideas upon the propriety of raising men for the regular army for a limited time, there were many objections, the force of which he felt, particularly in consequence of our colonial possessions; for, supposing men were enlisted for only five or six years, what numerous inconveniences would arise to the service, especially where regiments were stationed in America, the West Indies, or any remote quarter of the empire. Perhaps in the event of a whole regiment being ordered on any expedition, only the skeleton of such regiment would be forthcoming. In fact, the system of the right hon. Gent. scarcely ever prevailed in any nation which had colonial possessions, and in this country it would be quite absurd. Returning to the measure before the Committee, and the observation of the right hon. Gent. that it would create a difficulty and impediment, if not an insurmountable obstacle, in the way of recruiting the army, he would ask the House to consider its character and object fully, and if any better should be suggested to prefer it. If any member could devise a plan for raising a force within the proper time by means more effectual and constitutional, he should embrace it; but even the right hon. Gent. himself admitted that it was impossible. Why then did he oppose it? But his opposition was not quite correctly founded, for his arguments generally applied to extremes. He always dwelt upon comparisons between the regular army and the militia, and entirely left that middle course which was precisely the description of the force now under

consideration. He highly valued the services of the regular army; but however he relied on the assistance, or upon the zeal and exertions of our other forces, he begged the right hon. Gent., the house and the country to understand that government did not mean entirely to rely on these means, and that the proposition now before the Committee was not the limit of their arrangements for the attainment of the objects of the war; for, independently of the means already referred to, he had no doubt that should circumstances render it necessary, the great body of the country would, upon an appeal from their Sovereign, stand forward in defence of their rights and independence. Upon the prompt assistance of such a voluntary force he confidently reckoned; such a force as must render the country impregnable, and as must convince the person who now directs the government of France that it would be absurd to speculate upon a successful invasion of this country. Perhaps it is happy for the interests of this empire that the occasion now offers to shew that any projects of attack upon our finances and independence, such as the French government seems to entertain, must be vain and futile. Without enquiring into the general systems alluded to by the right hon. Gent. which it was not now necessary to discuss, he begged the Committee to consider whether the plan submitted to their judgment was or was not fit to be adopted in the present posture of affairs, and calculated duly to second the other arrangements made to meet the situation of the country. If it was so thought, he begged of gentlemen to turn in their minds, and to recommend the best means which might occur to them of rendering it more effectual, and carrying it into complete execution.

MR. PITT completely differed, with almost the whole of his right hon. Friend's ideas, though he concurred in the code upon which he (Mr. Windham) professed to found them, but to which, in his judgment, they did not apply. He had stated before, that as he agreed in the principle of the plan, he would not obtrude himself on the time of the Committee; for as his only desire was to render this plan effectual for its object, he would state his opinions in a future stage; but, as he was on his legs, he took occasion to say that his objections applied to some of the exemptions, and particularly to the proposal of allowing a pecuniary commutation for services, for he had very serious doubts whether it would be right in any case that a pecuniary fine should be accepted. His opinion was, that unless the individual balloted shou'd have his substitute forthcoming, personal service should be required. He declared that he felt great satisfaction at the outline of the plan under consideration, and he was therefore disposed to give a silent vote, if his right hon. Friend had not misconceived him, unwilling to throw out any expression that might tend to interrupt that unanimity which, for general reasons, was so much to be wished for at this conjuncture.

The SECRETARY at WAR, in reply, remarked that the right hon. Gent. (Mr. Windham) had complained, among other things, that the measure was tardy and ill-considered. That it was tardy he could not allow, for it could not have been brought forward earlier after the declaration of war than it had been; and whether it was ill-considered remained for the House to determine. It was open to the criticism of all. The same right hon. Gent. had said that ministers had scandalously neglected their duty in regard to all military operations. To this charge he pleaded not guilty. Ministers had not been inattentive to the means of calling forth and rendering efficient the force of the country. He ventured to assert that, whether with respect to the force which the war found in their hands, the military situation of this country would bear a comparison with our situation at the commencement of any war in which we ever were engaged. It would be found that every effort had been employed to keep up a force adequate to our security, and capable of being called forth with energy on any emergency. With many of the right hon. Gent.'s (Mr. Windham) opinions he agreed, though he looked upon some of them as ill-placed. What he had said on the subject of the militia would have come with better chance of attaining the object, had it been offered when the subject of the militia was under consideration last year. With respect to commuting the penalty for not serving personally, he contended that the object which was to raise men speedily, would not be answered. High bounties alone would not do, and had that been considered a fit and efficient mode of raising men, government would have proposed to Parliament to grant funds for that purpose, without waiting to levy them in companies or parties on individuals. But it was found that another system must be resorted to. It was men and not money that were wanted, and it was no objection to this measure to say, that it was not stronger than the necessity in which it was founded. He denied that the measure proposed would give us nothing but a militia. As to what had been said on the subject of young officers being allowed to raise men for rank, he denied that any such thing was now done or intended. He supposed that the right hon. Gent. had alluded to the circumstance which had taken place since the abolition of the field officers company, by which three more captains had become necessary in a regiment. He explained the nature of the change, and shewed, that allowing the first lieut. to raise 30 men, was in no respect allowing officers to raise men for rank. When these men were raised, it was at the regulated bounty, and one half of the money was paid back to the officer. If more bounty-money was given than the regulated sum, it was a contravention of the orders of his R. H. the commander in chief. The raising the men in this way was not the price of rank, but it promoted the recruiting service by inducing men to pay attention to the recruiting, which was not eagerly performed when the officer had no particular object to stimulate his exertions.

[IRISH BUDGET.]—MR. CORRY, the Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer, rose. He said, that he should be under the necessity of trespassing but a short time on that attention which the Committee and the House were always disposed to pay to the affairs of Ireland, while he laid before them a statement of the ways and means of the year, for that part of the United Kingdom. He had but little to do; because he had nothing to do but to present, in the usual manner, the charges and the provisions that were necessary for them. Although every man that was good and patriotic in Ireland must approve the great efforts and the important sacrifices of which England had already set the example for the support of the war, yet

the war was too young to admit of Ireland imitating that example, even to the extent of her comparative ability. He should proceed, therefore, without any general observations, to lay before the Committee the financial statements of the present year.

Supply.

The whole of the joint charges for England and Ireland, as had been stated by his right hon. Friend on a former day was 27 000,000l.

Of which the proportion of Ireland, in Irish money, was - -		3,602,000l.
The separate charges for Ireland were, interest of debt, Sinking Fund, &c. - - - -	2,040,000l.	
Compensation, the last that would be paid	300,000	
Navigations - -	150,000	
Treasury Bills - -	386,000	
		2,876,000
Making in all for Ireland - -		6,478,000l.

There were likewise in the hands of the Bank of Ireland Treasury Bills, similar to Exchequer Bills here, which the Bank of Ireland, he believed, would have no objection to renew.

Ways and Means.

To make good this sum of 6,478,000l. of charges, there were—

Balances in the Exchequer, similar to the growing produce of the Consolidated Fund in England -	350,000l.
Revenue for the current year -	3,000,000
Lottery the same as last year -	200,000
Which, with the proportion for Ireland of the late loan, amounted to	5,916,000l.

Leaving a deficit of upwards of 500,000l. To supply this deficit, he proposed to raise a loan in Ireland, to the extent of a sum not exceeding 1,000,000l. This would leave a surplus in the Exchequer of Ireland, which, when the circumstances of the present crisis, and the possibility of sudden emergencies were considered, would not appear improvident or unnecessary.—It remained for him to point out the new taxes by which he proposed to pay the interest of the loan. Before he proceeded to do so, he begged leave to say a few words on the subject of the trade of Ireland. Last year he had informed the Committee that the balance of trade for two years had not been so favourable for Ireland, as could have been wished. That balance, he was happy to find, was now more favourable than it had been, though he still confidently looked to great and important improvements. That the balance of trade was becoming more advantageous to Ireland, was proved by the amount of the exports and imports. He took occasion to remark, that this balance was more favourable than it appeared from the official value. The mode of account still continued in Ireland in this department. He shewed that the official value did not in reality shew the true value of the goods exported, which, where a duty was to be paid were rated at their bare value, without including the freight, profit, &c. of which the place consuming the goods must return to the merchant exporter. He had the satisfaction of thinking, therefore, that notwithstanding the exports were exceeded by the imports, it was not by so considerable a balance as at first appeared, and, as a portion of the imports was of raw materials, he trusted that the drains which had been so unfavourable to Ireland would gradually be diminished. Last year he had ventured to express a hope that the linen trade would this year increase, which from the circumstances of the times, the prevalence of scarcity, &c. had in the preceding year been confined. He was happy to think that this was in some measure the case, and that most of the old stock in Ireland had been carried off, and there was the prospect of an increasing demand. Under the head of provisions and corn there had been a considerable increase, independent of the extraordinary demand for provisions which the war would necessarily occasion. On the head of provisions there was an increase in the value of the exports of 250,000l. and on corn 550,000l. beyond the former year. Although he regretted the war, he was happy to think that in some respects it would be attended with superior advantages to Ireland, which would be some compensation for the increased burdens it would occasion. In regard to provisions, and in all probability corn also, we might next year confidently expect an increase. There were the best hopes that the linen manufacture would likewise be increased in an unusual proportion. The importation of flax had never been so great, and likewise the cultivation of this article, so important to the staple manufacture of Ireland, the principal source of its wealth, was never exceeded in any former period.—He next made some remarks upon the revenue of Ireland. He should not at present enter into a detailed statement on this subject, particularly as he should think it uncandid to do so in the absence of a right hon. Gent. with whom he had, on former occasions, some difference of opinion. Last year the revenue had turned out nearly what he had estimated, being about 3,350,000l. but for the present year he should not take it at more than 3,000,000l. The reasons for this were that the duty on tobacco had fallen off, as well as that on foreign spirits. The importation of sugar had likewise been excessive, and it was not probable that the duty would this year be so great. There were likewise some arrears of assessed taxes collected in the former year; so that upon the whole he did not think himself entitled to estimate the revenue for this year at more than 3,000,000l.

New Taxes.

He now came to the new taxes, in the statement of which he should be very brief, for there was nothing new in the principle, or extravagant in the rates of the taxes he meant to propose.—He proposed, in the first place, an increase upon the head of customs, and in consequence of the principles of the intercourse of England and Ireland, in consequence of the Union, this tax would fall entirely on foreign commodities. He proposed the amount to be 10 per cent.

The produce of this he took at	140,000l.
Carried forward -	140,000l.

Brought forward	140,000l.

The next was a duty of export on certain articles. Here he took occasion to remark that it was not the principle of the Union that the same articles in both countries should be subject to the same tax. The rates of revenue were to be proportioned, but the assets of taxation, and the quality of the tax might be separate and distinct. Where, however, it was equally consonant to the interest of both countries that the same object should be taxed, it was desirable to follow that progress to assimilate them. The exports of Ireland, however, he was sorry to say, was not so extensive as to promise a very large sum. This he took at 17,000l.

The next was an additional duty on home made spirits, and he was sure that as far as was compatible with the discouragement of the private stills, the House would feel that to discourage the use of spirituous liquors was to promote the industry and the good morals of the people. 9d. per gallon on home spirits, and a countervailing duty of 9d. per gallon on foreign spirits, over and above the 10 per cent. would give - - - - - 30,000

Here he noticed that from the duty of our imports, tobacco would be exempted, because it was found that in time of peace, it could not bear the present rate

The last object was malt. Malt, he said, was used in the distillery in proportion of one-half, and therefore the distillery would contribute on this part. He hoped, as far as it affected the brewery, the tax would not be attended with any inconvenience, because he considered the encouragement of the brewery in opposition to the distillery, was attended with the most beneficial effects. He proposed to make the tax 1s. the barrel of malt, the brewery in Ireland being subject to no other duty of excise. This he calculated at - - - - - - - - - 40,000

Total of taxes	389,000
Interest of the loan in England - - - - - -	143,000
In Ireland - - -	65,000
	208,000
Surplus - -	172,000l.

It might be asked why he proposed to levy taxes calculated to produce so much more than the interest of the loan? In answer, he observed, that the situation of the empire called upon us to make ample provision for future exertion. If peace took place, the produce of the present taxes would enable Parliament to reduce the rate on several objects which, during peace, could not be made to bear the rate they were now loaded with. If the war continued, the surplus would go in aid of the vigorous exertions which we should be called upon to make. If the people of Ireland looked at the brilliant and solid measures of finance, the sinking fund, the surplus of the assessed taxes, the income tax, of which the illustrious statesman who till lately presided over that department had given the example, and those energetic measures which his right honourable friend had lately brought forward for the support of the war, they would feel themselves impelled to follow the same course, and inclined to submit to larger temporary burdens, in order to secure their permanent interest and prosperity. It might be some time before the people of Ireland, fully aware of the dangers that impended, made up their minds for such sacrifices, but he hoped the time was not distant when, with the approbation and aid of all the intelligent classes of that country, he should be enabled, if he continued to stand in his present official situation, to propose a tax upon property as a war resource. He concluded with moving the resolutions for the new taxes.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thursday, June 23. (*Min. p.* 974).

[ARMY OF RESERVE BILL.]—Mr. CALCRAFT thought that before the Secretary at War brought forward this measure, which was admitted to be only a part of a larger system of defence, he ought to have stated the whole of the plan which government had in view, not only to provide a force for defensive but offensive operations; he meant that they ought to have stated the means they meant to adopt for recruiting the regular army. The necessity of filling up the regiments of the line, which had excellent and experienced officers, was generally admitted, but if 50,000 men more were to be taken out of the population of the country for defensive purposes alone, it ought to be stated how the regiments of the line were to be filled up for offensive operations. For his own part, so convinced was he of the necessity of completing the regular army, that he would concur in any measure, however strong, for that purpose, he would even have recourse for balloting for that purpose, if it could not be done by bounties. His great objection therefore to this measure was, that it would throw the greatest impediments in the way of recruiting for the line. It had been admitted that a sufficient number of men could not be raised for the regulars by bounties; if that was the case, it would be necessary to have recourse to a ballot, and it would be better to have recourse to that in the first instance, than after 50,000 men had been taken

from the population of the country, merely for the purposes of defence. Every body concurred in thinking that the war ought to be carried on with vigour, and certainly the beginning of the war was the time for vigorous offensive operations, before the enemy could have time to secure his vulnerable points.

Mr. SHERIDAN rose to deprecate what he considered as a premature discussion upon this bill. He hoped there would be no more invidious comparisons or acrimonious language respecting the militia. He hoped that gentlemen on all sides would occupy themselves only in augmenting the means of defence of the country; and he trusted that although the committee which had sat upon the King's Message had not asked leave to sit again, yet that some further means of defence would be adopted. He could not help differing from the honourable gentleman who spoke last, who said he would have no objection to balloting for men to fill up the regiments of the line. He was sure the honourable gentleman would not, upon reflection, think of forcing men into the regulars, who would then be at the disposal of the Crown, and who might be sent abroad upon any service that was thought proper. The case was very different as far as respected the internal defence of the country. Every man was bound to stand forward for the defence of the country in case of invasion, at the command of the Crown, or even the Sheriff; but it would be too much to force men by ballot into the regulars to serve during their lives.

Sir G. HEATHCOTE argued upon the necessity of adopting strong measures of defence, and not to wait till the enemy had landed. As to the rising *en masse*, he considered it as nonsense. If people were afraid to meet the danger, he should have but a gloomy prospect of the safety of the country.

Mr. W. ELLIOT said, his principal objection to the measure was, that it would go to prevent the establishment of a large regular force. This he considered as necessary for the future safety of the country. It was the only force that was fit for offensive operations, and certainly the best for defensive; for certainly a well-timed aggression was, in many cases, the best means of defence. This was so obvious, and so generally admitted, that it was not necessary for him to press it any farther. He knew that this country could not have the same military force that another country of equal population could have. The extent of her navy took away many men from the army, besides the general prosperity of the country, its opulence, and the extent of its manufactures, were many reasons why its army could not be recruited like those of other countries. But he thought the experiment of recruiting had never fairly been tried, because whenever they tried to get a large force for the regular army, it was always sure to be counteracted by raising a large force also for domestic service; and while ten guineas bounty was given for troops of the line, fifteen guineas at least, and sometimes more, were given for the militia service; so that the people of this country were taught to look for large bounties. There was a great diversity of opinion about the militia. He confessed he was a friend to the principle of the militia, and was afraid there was a shade of difference of opinion upon this point between him and his right honourable friend. (Mr. Windham seemed to indicate by his manner, that there was no difference of opinion between them.)—He was glad that he did not differ from his right honourable friend; but though he was a friend to the general principle of the militia, he certainly never would have consented to increase it beyond its original number of 30,000 men. It had been said, that 70,000 men might be raised in this way, without interfering with recruiting for the line; he admitted this might be true, if they were raised by ballot; but if they were raised by bounty, it certainly would interfere with it. He trusted that the government would see the impropriety of raising men for a limited time, and that they would never have recourse to the practice of drafting. He was of opinion that we should at last be obliged to have recourse to balloting to fill up the regiments of the line, for they must be filled up, and he did not see that it would be productive of more inconvenience than the present measure. The safety of the country would be risked, if they did not meet an invading enemy with the best force that could be procured. That the militia would upon that, and every occasion, be found full of courage and of enthusiasm, he had no doubt, but it certainly would be necessary to mix them with a very large proportion of regular troops. The case of America had, upon a former occasion, been alluded to, and it was said that the American militia were able to face regular troops; but the case of America was extremely different from that of England. In America the nature of the country was better calculated for irregular troops. That the American troops were very good ones after three or four campaigns, he admitted, and so would the militia of England with the same experience, be equal to any veterans upon earth, though he confessed he should be very sorry that they should be taught in that manner. Scotland had always furnished some of the best and bravest troops in our army, and certainly afforded the best means of recruiting from the existence of clanships, &c. but in order to prevent, as it were, recruiting in that country, a militia was formed, and 6000 men were locked up in it. In Ireland he did not doubt but that a large force would be obtained, and by the means of balloting, though they were told, some time ago, that balloting in that country was impracticable. At the close of the last war, the militia of Ireland was disbanded, and a fencible army was established, but it was not to leave Ireland: it was said, indeed, that they would volunteer their services to this country, but he had rather, for many reasons, that it should be a matter of original stipulation, than

of voluntary offer. If we were to persist in this timid, irresolute system, against an enemy who was all vigour and enterprize; he would not say he would despair, because he hoped such a sentiment would never enter his breast, but he confessed his hopes would be very much depressed. He saw no reason why this measure was not brought forward at a much earlier period. Ministers ought to have been prepared in March, when the King's Message was brought forward; they ought to have begun to prepare in November, when they detected the military spies who were sent into the country; they ought to have been preparing in December, instead of amusing the Public with delusive accounts of the state of the finance, and holding out prospects of a reduced peace establishment. They ought, in short, to have been preparing ever since the treaty of Amiens, for it appeared by his Majesty's Declaration, that from that time the conduct of France had been one series of insult and violence. He concluded with expressing his disapprobation of the present measure, for the reason he had already stated, and because it seemed as if ministers were determined to tread back the errors which had prevailed in our military system.

The Secretary at War said, he did entertain the hope that gentlemen would have delayed the discussion upon this bill till it was fairly before the House; if that course had been adopted, much discussion would have been avoided, because if they had seen the bill, they would have seen that there was no foundation for many of the objections which had been made. He admitted, that gentlemen were justified, if they thought proper, in discussing the bill in this stage. The honourable gentleman who had spoken last, had spoken of treading back our former errors, but how this measure, which was new in its principle and unprecedented in its extent, could be called treading back our former errors, he could not conceive. The honourable gentleman had also complained that this plan was ill-timed, and that it ought to have been produced sooner. Upon this point he did not think that the honourable gentleman was borne out by his Majesty's Declaration, but he contended, that ever since the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, every measure had been adopted, consistent with the practice of this country, to keep the army and the navy upon a large establishment. It was open to the honourable gentleman who spoke last and his friends, to come forward last session, and to have declared their sentiments, if they did not think ministers were doing enough for the security of the country. He now came to those observations which had been made respecting the advantage of a regular army. Nobody, he believed, ever asserted that a regular army was not the best; but the honourable gentleman had himself stated the reasons why we could not have as large a regular army as other countries of equal population. The insular situation of the country, its civil and commercial occupation, its opulence, the circumstance of our not having any internal war for above a century; these were all reasons why we could not have so large a regular army as other countries. The honourable gentleman had said, that the recruiting service had not been fairly tried, to this he could only say, that the contrary was the fact. The hon. gentleman seemed to think that it was a competition of bounties that kept men from the regular service: this he denied. It was not money that got soldiers for the regular service: men enlisted for many reasons, some because they wanted to go abroad, some because they wished to change their situation; in short they enlisted for many reasons beside that of money. In the course of the last year the number of recruits obtained for the army was equal to the average number generally obtained, and in the last 5 or 6 months, the number had been greater, although the recruiting for the militia was also going on. The recruiting for the army was now going on successfully (Mr. Elliot shook his head.) The hon. gent. seemed to deny that proposition, but as far as he was able to judge, his assertion was correct. The number of men now procured was upon an average as great as had been procured since the treaty of peace, that is to say, from 1000 to 1200 men per month. But it was obvious that if a larger force was immediately necessary, such a force could not be collected in that manner, and that recourse must be had to some other means. It had been said that we had not had recourse to the measures that were adopted last war: he had the highest respect, and even veneration, for the administration of that time, but still he could not aprove of all the measures which were then adopted. The right hon. gent. then adverted to the state of the army at different periods of the last war, particularly in 1796, and contended that it was such as ought not to induce gentlemen to advise the adoption of a similar system. The question now was simply this, what ought we to do at the present time, and under the present circumstances? We had a very large army on foot, but at the same time we were hard pressed on many points: it was absolutely necessary that a large force should be raised, and he denied that they could be raised by recruiting, in the time which was necessary. But it was said this was merely a defensive system, and it was recommended to ballot for the army. Upon this point he agreed with an hon. gent. (Mr. Sheridan), and should oppose such a measure upon every constitutional principle. Every man was bound to stand forward in defence of the country in time of danger, that was the principle upon which the militia was founded, and upon which this measure was founded. He should therefore object to the plan which had been suggested, because it was not regular, and because it was not constitutional. There was one thing he was sorry he did not mention, when he was opening this measure to the House, as it might have taken away some of the objections which he had made to this plan; he meant the power

which was to be given to men to enlist voluntarily from this force into the regulars. It appeared to him not to be necessary to introduce a clause in the bill for that purpose, because if there was no clause to prevent it, as there was in the militia laws, the men would of course be allowed to volunteer into the regulars. If, however, the House was of opinion that such a clause ought to be introduced, he had no objection. The hon. gent. seemed to consider Scotland as the *officina militum*, and had contended that the establishment of a militia system there had prevented recruiting; but he should recollect that the growing prosperity of that country, operated as strongly against recruiting as in England. The hon gent. should also recollect, that many of the Scotch Highlanders were furnished by London, and that there were perhaps as many English and Irish as Scotch in these regiments. He would not now take up more of the time of the House, he hoped they would consider this Bill, as the best that could be adopted to raise the greatest number of men in the shortest time.

MR. PITT said, he certainly viewed the question in a very different point of view from the Hon. Gent. who spoke last but one; indeed it was almost precisely upon those very points upon which the Hon. Gent. and his friends opposed this measure that he gave his assent to its general principle, subject to those improvements which might be adopted when it came into a committee. In his general approbation of the principle of this bill, he was the more confirmed by what had fallen from his Rt. Hon. Friend who had just sat down, particularly in the latter part of his speech. He considered this bill as being that which appeared to him to furnish the most prompt and efficacious method of providing for that which he considered as our first want, a large defensive force, and as laying the only sure foundation of giving us, within a reasonable time, that which he considered as necessary in the progress of the war, he meant the possession of a disposable force, to enable us to take advantage of any opening that might occur to act offensively against the enemy. If, however, he was asked, which of these two objects he wished to see first accomplished, he would reply, with great submission to those who seemed to have excluded every other consideration from their minds but that of offensive warfare, that although he wished, as much as any man, to see the spirit of the country raised; though he wished not only to see the attempts of the enemy repelled, but his presumption chastised, and his power reduced, yet he must say, that at such a moment as the present, we must take counsel from prudence, as well as from spirit; our first object, ought to be that of defending ourselves, before we concurred in the plans of those Hon. Gent. for inflicting vengeance for the aggressions and insults which we had sustained. If we were so romantic as to say, that the obtaining a defensive force, which would be sufficient to disappoint the proud expectations of the enemy, was a consideration below our notice, if to ensure our safety against an enemy who had conquered, terrified, and oppressed one half of Europe, was a task too humble for us to stoop to; if it was thought that we had better add to the list of his victims, if we could not be enrolled as his conquerors; if gentlemen carried their sentiments of heroism to that extent, they would certainly be justified in opposing this Bill; but he confessed such were not his sentiments. He therefore begged leave to state, that without renouncing active and offensive operations in due time, he was content to see that vigorous efforts were now made to ensure the defence of the country. Nay, he would go further and would say, that if he could not otherwise provide for the effectual security of these kingdoms, he would do it even at the cost of all offensive operations for the future. Therefore, if this alternative was put to him, you cannot in two months provide a regular army for general service, but you can in that time provide a force amply sufficient for the defence of this Island, he would without hesitation adopt it; he would make this Island a proud exemption from the shame and oppression which overwhelmed the Continent, rather than prematurely indulge in plans of offensive operations. Whatever was the number of our forces now, (and he believed it was more than double what we ever had at the commencement of a war), if we wanted to add to that force 100,000 or 120,000 men to secure the defence of these kingdoms, and if that number of men could be obtained for limited, though not for general service, and if we should at the same time have ruin threatening us at our very doors, he would rather submit to what some gentlemen considered as degrading concessions, and make our internal security our first, though our only object. He, however, by no means admitted that the measures which were now proposed to be adopted as the means of safety were such as would prevent us, when the opportunity occurred, from active offensive operations. He said this upon the best consideration that he was able to give the subject, and it was one to which he had not now turned his mind for the first time, but one upon which he had deeply and maturely reflected. He would not now enter into any discussion upon the state of the army last war, or upon the means by which it had been recruited, although that was a subject which appeared to be completely misunderstood by many gentlemen, and even by his Rt. Hon. Friend who spoke last. But without entering into that at present, he was of opinion that, even from the statement of those gentlemen themselves, the measure now proposed, and those which might naturally be engrafted upon it, was the best that could be adopted under the present circumstances, even for raising a force for general service. If then we had two objects to obtain, the first of which was to ensure our safety; and secondly, that of being strong and active for offensive warfare: if there was but one way of attaining the first object, viz. that of taking a large force for limited service, and if that could be shewn to be the best mode of collecting a large offensive force, he should desire to know what more could be necessary to recommend the principle of the measure now before the House? The House was not called upon to adopt it in all its details, the question was, whether they approved so much of the outline as to go into a committee upon it. He contended, that unless you meant to begin with a proposition, which appeared preposterous; unless they agreed with his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr.

Windham), that we ought to have no militia at all. He admitted, indeed, that his Rt. Hon. Friend seemed to indicate that such was not his opinion; but he was excusable in supposing such were the sentiments of his Rt. Hon. Friend, when even his Hon. Friend (Mr. Elliot) who not only had the pleasure of hearing his speeches in public, but had the advantage of knowing his sentiments in private, seemed to think there was a shade of difference of opinion between them. But if the House were to agree with those Hon. Gent. either that we were to have no militia at all, or only a militia of 30,000 men; if we were now to disband our large militia eſtablishment, he begged leave to ask, if gentlemen were aware what might happen to us in the three or four months which we should take to turn our militia into a regular army, unless we were to adopt the very syſtem which was now proposed. There must certainly subsist a certain degree of competition between the militia and the army, and the eſtablishment of a large militia force muſt necessarily obſtruct the recruiting for the army: this was a proposition which he was ready to admit; but this could not have escaped those by whom the militia was firſt eſtablished, and those by whom the various laws respecting the militia had since been proposed during a period of more than 40 years. It was said, that the eſtablishment of a militia was incompatible with our being a military country, and with our possessing the means of offensive operations. But before the House acquiesced in these propositions, he begged them to recollect when it was that the militia syſtem was introduced, and to see whether it was then such an impediment to the recruiting of the army: whether it did then so effectually damp the military spirit of the country? It was introduced at a period to which we should be referred (with the exception only of the glorious wars of Marlborough) at that period of our hiſtory, in which we had embarked the deepeſt in continental connexion, in which our army was pushed to its utmoſt extent, and when the general syſtem of this country bore more a character of vigorous and offensive warfare than it had ever done. He was therefore not a little surprised when he heard it gravely asserted that the exiſtence of a large militia force was incompatible with the exiſtence of a large military force, and deſtructive to the military spirit of the country. But it was admitted, even by those gentlemen, that this was a question of degree, and it was ſtated by his Rt. Hon. Friend (Mr. Windham) that all species of the force of this country were good in their different degrees. Now if it was admitted that the militia, to the extent of 30,000 men was good in its kind, and if that force was considered as necessary forty years ago, those Hon. Gent. would admit that under the present circumſtances, a larger force of every kind was necessary, and if we wanted 30,000 for the militia then, we wanted a much larger force now. It muſt be obvious to every man who considered the events which had occurred for the laſt few years in Europe, that the necessity for a defensive force was augmented in a much larger proportion than our necessity for an offensive force, because it could not be imagined that the force which we should want to carry on the war abroad, would be equal to that which we should want for the purpose of defence at home. The part in which the pressure had moſt increased was for the purposes of defence, not excluding at the same time the means of offence. He should therefore think that it was no objection to this measure, that it left us the means of offence equal to those possessed by our ancestors. He was ſtill ready to admit, that if we could procure, with equal facility and promptitude, a large force for general service, it certainly would be more desirable than a force for limited service. He admitted that a force that had seen a great deal of service abroad, where the officers had obtained skill by long service, and where the troops had been sharers in the labour and glories of the officers, where they had obtained that which no general rules of discipline could inculcate, and which could be learnt in no other school, he admitted, that such a force would be the beſt, both for the purposes of offence and defence. But if the plan which had been suggeſted was adopted, if you were to ballot men for general service, did gentlemen suppose that in balloting for men you could also ballot for skill and experience; if you took men from the loom and the plough, was it to be imagined that the mere circumſtance of their going into the regulars would at once convert them into experienced and disciplined soldiers? If you were now to ballot for men for general service, did any man suppose that in the course of this year they would be more expert, more disciplined, or more fit to meet the troops of Buonaparté than they would be if raised under the plan now proposed for limited service? If indeed Buonaparté could be prevailed upon to enter into a kind of cartel with you, not to attack you at home until your new levies had acquired experience and discipline abroad, he admitted the suggeſtions of the Hon. Gent. ought to be attended to, but as that was not likely to be the case, he thought the present plan was the moſt eligible that could be devised. If there were not means attached to this bill for making the force now proposed to be raised auxiliary to the general army, it would be an objection in his mind, and he was of opinion that an affirmative clause ought to be introduced into the bill upon that subject.—Unless it was determined to deſtroy the militia altogether, there muſt be a competition not only of men but of bounties. If this force was once raised, and if 15,000 men were wanted for the army by the end of this year, would any man doubt, after the experience they had had of the militia last war, that there would be any difficulty in obtaining them voluntarily? The men who served in the militia would have no inducement to enter into the regulars, but that feeling which belonged to them in common with every other good subject: they had besides strong feelings to attach them to their own regiments, and he knew that the officers of the militia felt a great reluctance that their men should enlist in the regulars. His opinion therefore of the resources that were to be obtained from this new force for the regulars, was not a matter of conjecture, but of certainty, from the experience we had already had upon the subject. Having said so much on the general outline of this measure, he would glance at a point which had been stated on a former occasion; he meant that of the power to recruit from any corps raised for a definite purpose, which might, if carried to a great extent, render it useless, by undermining its discipline: that was an observation which might be very true, and would have great force, if the re-

cruiting was allowed to be carried on at all times, and indiscriminately by all parties and descriptions, and more particularly so if that flagitious system, known under the name of Crimping, was to go on; but all these objections, or at least most of them, would be done away, if we recruited on given days of muster, in which a regiment was called over, and then some were immediately allowed to declare themselves for general service; in that way we might have twice or three times more than we wanted; and it should be left to the officers who should have the privilege of doing so, and then, he had no doubt but the result would be such as he had stated. He saw no necessity of stating long beforehand, the time when this recruiting was to take place; it should be left to his Majesty to declare the time and places where it should take place, a fortnight beforehand, and it might be provided that no more than a given number should be taken within the year. By this no soldier would know when he would be taken from his officer, under whose command he was serving, so that he would have all the inducements of his profession to be steady in the discharge of his duty. By these means he thought that the objection to recruiting from one corps into another, on the score of the bad effect it had upon discipline, would be obviated. He thought this observation grew out of the proposition he had stated upon this subject, and that it was a more ready mode, and would be more effectual in its execution for recruiting for the general service, than that which his right hon. friend would build on the destruction of the Militia. He thought the matter of bounty which would attend this, comparatively of less consequence. He did not mean to say it was no burthen on the country, and he thought the Bill should be framed as well as it could to keep down the price of substitutes; but as to recruiting the army, he wished to see that effected by moderate bounties. At the same time, as he stated on a former occasion, if it should appear doubtful whether any charge imposed by way of commutation would be sufficient to ensure a production of efficient service, that was to say, the certainty of a substitute for the person drawn, some other measure than a commutation should be resorted to; and to speak plainly, he had great doubt whether the system of pecuniary compensation for non-service should be adopted at all: whether any sum of money whatever should be taken instead of service, either by the person on whom the lot fell, or by his substitute; but on the contrary, that every man drawn shall either serve personally, or provide a substitute. At the same time, he should wish to avoid as much measures that might be thought unnecessarily strong, but to decline nothing that was really necessary, and with this sentiment he thought we should follow the principle of the Militia Law, and he would add, that a great part of the merit of the present plan consisted in its simplicity; it was that of raising a number of men out of the community for the purpose of defending it, and doing that in a way that was known to that community, and to which they had on no former occasion objected; and also raising officers to instruct and command them in a way that had been partly tried and approved of, because indeed, the body when raised could not be otherwise officered. He thought it desirable that we should adopt this measure without any hesitation; neither could it be objected to on the score of novelty, for novelty in principle it had none, either in the manner of raising the men, or in the burthen to be cast upon the country in consequence of it; and he thought highly indeed on the advantages it would produce to the country. If, however, it should be deemed prudent to admit of a pecuniary penalty for non-service, or of providing a substitute, it should be under some modifications. He did not hesitate to declare that he should prefer a positive enactment that every person ballotted should either personally serve or provide a substitute; but if it should be deemed expedient to allow a pecuniary compensation to be given instead of either, he should propose some alteration in the present plan in that particular. He should propose, that if a person ballotted neither offered to serve in person, nor produced a substitute, that then the pecuniary compensation should be equal to the rank, order, and degree in life of the person ballotted. He knew it might be said this was only raising a revenue, and that it was not money but men we wanted; he admitted the truth of that observation, but it was open to this answer, that if £20 were the penalty, the mass of society would think it enough for each individual, and many of them would on that sum either serve or provide a substitute, and so the object of the Bill, would, with regard to the mass of the public, be answered; for it was out of them, after all, our army must be made up, and their failing to produce a substitute would compel them to serve, and this would be evidence of the difficulty of commuting service for a small sum. But the sum of £20 would be nothing to persons of high condition: would answer no purpose, but be the very thing they would want; they would pay the sum cheerfully, and they would not in the least degree interest themselves in procuring men for the service; the sum therefore which they should be called upon to contribute, should bear a proportion to the rank and station of the party ballotted, so as to make it his interest to use his influence, to procure a substitute. The advantage of this distinction would be, that every man of fortune who should happen to be ballotted, was turned into a sort of recruiting officer in the service to save his purse, but if the sum was moderate, he would sooner pay it than to give himself any trouble. Undoubtedly, then, if the sum was moderate, it would not answer the purpose which all of us had in view, the raising speedily a large body of men. The sum should be such, then, as to quicken the industry of persons of the higher rank to procure men. He begged pardon for thus detaining the House upon these points, because they were more fit for a committee, but that he wished most of all to press upon the House, was that we were all agreed in the necessity of augmenting our force. He believed the House was very generally ready to adopt the plan of his right hon. friend (the Secretary at War,) and also to adopt the sentiment of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham), which was, that we ought to make use of all the means in our power to increase our force for general service; and also that we should raise still more temporary force for any emergency that may arise. He knew the warmth and noble ardour of his right hon. friend (Mr. Windham). He knew that no one burned more than he did with enthusiastic zeal and disinterested patriotism. He knew

there was no sacrifice either in fortune or in person, which he was not perfectly ready to make for the service of his country, either to preserve its rights at home, or to vindicate its glory abroad, in any way that might be deemed most useful, perhaps to retrieve the loft character of a great part of Europe, if it should be disposed at any time to change its present desperate situation. Those powers, if they were not loft to all sense of their situation, would find an opportunity of recovering their honour. But he trusted, that no zeal on that account, upon objects which were at present out of our reach, would induce his right hon. friend to obftruct a measure which was calculated for our immediate defence. He knew the feelings of his right hon. friend to be as much alive as those of any human being for the true interests of his country; and if he still opposed this measure, it muft be because he still remained unconvinced that the bill would have the effect which was expected from it. He should, indeed, be sorry to differ from his right hon. friend, upon this moft important measure, intended for the safety of the state, yet he had this consolation, that however widely his right hon. friend and himself differed in their votes upon the present measure, yet they agreed exactly in their sentiments.

Mr. WINDHAM proceeded to consider the different points which had been stated in support of the bill now before the House. He said that if he remained still unconvinced of the propriety of this measure, it was not owing to the want of clearness of the statement of his right hon. friend (Mr. Pitt) in the support of it. There was in addition to the advantage which the measnre itself received from the abilities of his right hon. friend another advantage, and that was an advantage to the opponents of the bill, for he had stated the subject so clearly that those who differed from him had their way cleared before them and their labour shortened, since he had brought into one view every point that had a bearing upon the subject.—There were two leading points to be considered upon this occasion: What were the best means for our defence, and what were the best means of prosecuting the war with vigour? His right hon. friend had misconceived his idea of the present case; that while we were looking forward towards our safety, he was considering other objects that were at a distance. It was with him, he hoped, as it was with all prudent men in the consideration of human affairs. His right hon. friend had said, that that which is most interesting to us at the present moment, is the safety of the country: Now, there was no doubt, that if those two objects, namely, the safety of this country, and the vigorous prosecution of the war in the way he recommanded it, by increasing our disposable military force could not be reconciled, which of the two objects should be preferred? The safety of the country was undoubtedly the first object, for, if we failed in that, there was an end of all consideration on our part of the queftion, of reftoring Europe by any means to be adopted by us; if the necessity on our part was so great as had been stated, we might lay every thing else out of our consideration. But he would take up the queftion simply, of how far this measure was calculated for our immediate defence? The first point was, what effect this measure might have on the future recruiting service of the army? He was not sanguine enough to expect that the recruiting of the army would go on with much celerity at any time under our military system; certainly less now, since the great bounties had been given; the very memory of such large bounties, even if they could be discontinued, would considerably impede the recruiting of the army, for men would be slow to enlist for less than others had been accustomed to receive. He did not deny that the present measure would procure more men in a short period at the present moment than could be procured in any other way; but here he came to a consideration which had hitherto been a great deal too much neglected. He thought that the error of ministers was, that of neglecting that which he had followed upon this occasion, namely, that of entire attention to the opinions of military men. A military man knew very well the difference between that which was important and that which was unimportant in military matters; between a regiment which had been long and one that had been newly raised, composed of good or of bad men; but a minister in the House of Commons knew nothing of any such difference: with him a regiment was a regiment, and that was all he knew of the matter; and this was the case with almoft every body who talked upon the subject in that House. But he could not help considering the nature of the force, and he was afraid his right hon. friend suffered himself to be deceived when he talked of the speedy progress which this system will make. As to providing officers for this body of men when raised, the firft ressource we had was the half-pay list; now, without disparaging the half-pay list, and feeling as he did from what had been said already by way of comment on his former speech, the necessity of caution in what he said, yet in speaking of the half-pay lift it muft be considered that we could not get from that lift, officers of the same description as those who were in actual service, although no man would deny there were in that lift many very excellent officers, many, indeed, who were upon that lift only because their regiments were reduced; some of them also were upon the lift because they had been wounded, but they were not all the better or the moft fit for service on that account. Many of them had been put upon that lift on account of declining health; they were not to be considered as the moft fit for service either. Many had been put upon that lift because it was not deemed proper they should continue active in the service. He hoped they were good officers, but yet these were considerations not to be disregarded, and we should not certainly expect from this lift as much exertion, as if the same number of officers were taken from the actual service; nor was there a comparison to be made between the progress they would make, and an equal number of officers in actual service, and therefore he could not help doubting the efficacy of this source of providing officers for this force, when raised. He thought the measure now proposed would not answer the purpose for which it was intended, and instead of it he wished to see the troops of the line increased. But it was said, that the urgency and pressing nature of the case demanded measures of expedition. Now, what

were our ideas on this subject? If he could be assured that the attempt on this island would be delayed for a time to suit our convenience, and until we had sufficiently increased our force, and made it fit for action, this measure would do well; but as we had no security for that, he thought we had better increase our army; and for that purpose he was of opinion that we should have recourse to compulsive measure; nor was he alarmed at the present crisis, left such measures, provided they were not accompanied by unnecessary harshness or severity, would be objected to as unconstitutional. He said this without any difficulty, because he did think, after much deliberation, that this was the only way to provide effectually for our safety; nor were we to talk too much of the sacrifice which we were to make. Upon this danger, againft which we were now talking of providing, what were we to say if it came upon us, as it might come upon us, within two months, when our bill was hardly paft? He was not speaking with any view of alarming miniflers, but he wished it to be remembered, that the bill now before the House would take some time in passing; and after passing he would ask, how long it would be before we get the men? and after we had got the men, he would ask how long would it be before they were fit for service? If we had the invasion at all, we might have it in the middle of our ballot; and he would ask what the House would think of a mass so full of defects as a military body as this muft be at its firft assemblingr full as it muft be from the nature of things, of discontent and sourness, incapable of military movements, and totally unfit for efficient military service; and discontented as they naturally would be, on leaving their houses and families. What sort of an army of reserve was this to be for our protection in the hour of peril? Suppose our other army should meet a check, was our laft ftake to be trufted to this army of reserve? The defeat of a regular army did not prevent it from operating again, for they knew how to rally, but a defeat of an irregular mass put an end to its operations; it was sure to be thrown into confusion, and to become useless after a defeat. He thought it a bad policy in us to put our laft ftake upon such an irregular force as this, by which one defeat might be our ruin. He objected to it, because people might truft too much to it, and might say they had provided a security againft all danger, by providing this mass, whereas the people ought to depend upon themselves. He thought that a smaller number of regular troops would be better than this mass. He recommended to us to imitate the conduct of the Vendeans, who although weak in themselves, yet by military skill and prudence, held out for years, nor did they give up at all, until the greateft part of Europe had given up. He did not, with some persons, think, that, let what would be the consequence, we ought to risk our all in a battle to save London. Those persons seemed to think, that, if London were taken, the country would instantly be subjugated; but, he trusted, that while we had an army, we should dispute the last inch of the land. He saw in this plan so many objections, that he knew not how to state them within a tolerable compass. He had asked how long it would be before we could get these 50,000 men, and when they were got, how long we should be before they were trained. He might ask how long we should be before we cloathed them? How long would it be before we had breeched our army of reserve? He was afraid that we migt have to encounter the danger againft which they were intended to provide long before they would be fit for service; and if they were employed in acftive service too soon, they might do more mischief than good. Having juftified his former language upon this subject, and disclaiming any intention of offending the militia by it, he concluded with observing, that he perceived the general opinion of the House appeared to be in favour of the measure now before the House, but he had thought it his duty to ftate his sentiments. He had great reliance on the militia which had been well trained, but he denied that such an assertion was inconsiftent with the opinion which he had given of the army of reserve. He objected to this syftem because it interfered with the recruiting service, and also because he was aware that this body would be inadequate to the end for which it was designed, that of an efficient and immediate military force; he was sure that great discontent would arise in the body on firft assembling, and that they would be much too deficient in military skill to juftify the hopes which were entertained of them. These were the grounds on which he differed from his right hon. friend; at the same time, if this measure was successful in Parliament, he should do every thing in his power to render it efficient; for he felt as others did for the safety of the country, and only differed from them as to the means of preserving it.

LORD CASTLEREAGH said he wished the present subject to meet the fulleft discussion. He admitted, with his right hon. friend, that the object of the enemy was the subjugation of this country, but he differed with him as to the means which they possessed of effecting that object. He could not however conceive why the right hon. gent. should think it necessary to discuss whether London was a primary or secondary object of consideration, nothing but a degree of baseness or cowardice in the people of this country, which he could not for a moment suppose, would suffer the enemy to advance far from the shore. The right hon. gent. had gone into one extreme with respect to relying upon the efficiency of regular troops, almoft to the exclusion of all other; and had then gone into another extreme, and contended for the advantages resulting from irregular troops, instancing La Vendée; ftill the right hon. gent. had contended that the present measure went to conftitute an efficient force. The country feel the advantages and the happiness which they enjoyed under their present conftitution and government, and feel that it was necessary to make great efforts to defend them. The arguments of the right hon. gent. went to this alternative, that there muft be either a much larger force maintained in time of peace, or that we muft be much weaker at the commencement of a war. He felt the necessity of placing the country so completely out of danger as to put and end to all speculation on the part of the enemy as to the probable success of any attempt againft it. With respect to the objection of this measure interfering with the recruiting for the the line, it would on the contrary assist it; those who were to be enrolled under the present bill, were to be permitted to enlift in regiments of the line, and there was every reason to believe

that a military spirit would be infused into them which would the more readily induce them to enter into the line. His right hon. friend had said that there were many old and infirm officers on the half-pay list unfit for service, but it should be recollected that there were twenty battalions disbanded last year, whose services for a limited time, the officers, of which there was every reason to believe were effective, and, besides, it was not mandatory in his Majesty to appoint those only: besides, if new regiments were to be raised according to the proposition of his right hon. friend, they must be officered in the same way. He conceived that no measure was better calculated to produce the desired effect than the present, and that the experiment of raising troops of the line proposed by his right. hon. friend, would place the country in great danger. With respect to the recruiting service being injured, it was a fact, that during the competition between the militia and the line, more recruits were obtained for the latter than before.

Dr. LAURENCE rose to expose the unfairness of the arguments with which his right hon. friend's (Mr. Windham) speech had been combated. There was nothing, in fact, preposterous in his supposition respecting the consequences of the possessions of the capital or the dock-yards by the enemy. It was fitting to urge every topic, drawn from every possible view of danger, arising from a contest with such an enemy as we have to contend with, as an incitement to ministers to watch carefully, and be ready to repel him, whenever and wherever we meet him. In case of invasion every hill ought to be a fortress, every ditch an entrenchment, and every peasant a sharp shooter. His right hon. friend had been accused of despairing. But what was the fact? He had said, that London taken, was not conquering the country! Was that the language of despair, or of imprudence? He had recommended making every man a warrior for his country, and exemplified its use by the Vendean war. Was that incorrect? No! By that war, he had it on good authority, more republicans fell, than by the arms of all the allies! The learned gent. then discussed, at considerable length, the nature of the different kinds of force, best suited to the circumstances of this country, in which he quoted the sentiments of Sir Walter Raleigh, and others. He had rather fight the enemy at first than wait for him too long. But this plan was sadly defective. It provided no means for the chastisement of the insolence of the foe, should he dare to invade us, and be successful enough to set his hostile foot on our shores. After driving him back with disgrace from our land, what means did this bill provide for carrying the war back upon himself, and for punishing his insolence and ambition? Why, then, you must new model your whole system, and wait the effect of new bills, and new plans of strengthening your disposable force! How long must it be after beating him from the coast of Essex or Kent, before you can chastise his guilty head for the insults he has committed on you. He has called us a nation of shopkeepers. Are we to lay like base metal, nailed to the counter, till he makes his appearance! Are we to wait for him! The learned gent. praised the minister highly for his proposals of finance, but he could not equally applaud him for his military efforts. As for the burthens on the country, he thought virtue could surely bear to be taxed as much for her own support as vice. There was, however, a radical defect in this new system of defence, from its confined operation. He did not think any thing within reason would serve as a bounty for the regulars, in consequence of this army of reserve. On the subject of the supplementary militia, a right hon. gent. (Mr. Burke), now departed from this mortal world, at the time of its proposal, expressed himself, as he always did, in terms too strong to be easily forgotten. In his last illness, when he could not raise his hand to write, he dictated the letter he should now read to the House on that subject. [The learned doctor then read the letter which will be found at page 966 of this volume].

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, that the melancholy presages contained in the letter just read, which came from the pen of a gent. whom none respected more than himself, had not been fulfided by subsequent circumstances. The very measure alluded to of calling out the supplementary militia, had tended to produce the greatest advantages, from thence we had derived those exertions in Egypt by which the country had been so materially benefited. With respect to the present measure, the point of issue was this, the right hon. gent. (Mr. Windham) would forego the immediate advantage of obtaining 50,000 men for the defence of the country, from amongst whom men would be permitted to enter into the line, for the sake of the chance of procuring men to recruit the line without the adoption of this measure. Another right hon. gent. (Mr. Elliot) would even forego the advantage of the additional 60,000 militia besides the present measure, for the sake of the regular army. He thought it was scarcely necessary to reason the question, experience had shewn that when the militia was kept up, they had the advantage of the largest army, disposable for foreign service, ever before known, and that the militia system did not interfere with the recruiting service for the regular army; but on the countrary, he felt that they could not do such a violence to the public feeling as to enact a conscription for the troops of the line, as to force persons to enlist in regiments which might be sent to any part of the world; such a measure would be contrary to the spirit of the constitution, and could tend to produce those discontents, which it was said by some, would arise from the present measure. Ministers had been charged with a criminal remissness, but he contended, that the facts proved that they had done all they could for the public service. He was convinced that there was

no chance of permanent or secure peace until they shewed that every attempt of the enemy against this country must be fruitless, and that they would not own their safety to the forbearance of any power whatever.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Monday, June 27 —(Min. 975.)

[Army of Reserve.]—The Secretary at War wished that the bill might be re-committed, in order to divide it into two: the one as it regarded England and Ireland; the other as it regarded Scotland. This division would be commodious, and would facilitate the execution of the measure.—He next requested the committee would permit him to go through the bill, and point out the amendments which it was thought advissble to make. If he should not enter into a minute explanation of all, it was because they were not of so much importance as to call for such an explanation. He should now begin with the clause which prescribed the quotas to be furnished by the different counties.—The quotas for Scotland being stated it would be necessary to leave out that clause. The number which each county was to furnish varied from the regulations contained in the militia act of last session upon that subject; because government was now in possession of the latest returns of the numbers of men liable to serve. By these returns it appeared that the number of men liable to serve in the militia for Great Britain, amounted to 900,000 men; of that number about 750,000 were liable to serve for England and Wales. The quota of the counties had been assigned in consequence of these returns, which furnished the most correct means of apportioning the number of men. They had also received some information from the returns under the Population Act. Upon the fullest examination which it had been possible to give to this subject, it appeared that 80 or 84 men out of every 10,000, of the general population, would furnish the 40,000 men to be raised by Great Britain. This was taken at a medium, but in no case was there taken above 16 more than the 84, nor in any case more than 16 less than the 84. As far, therefore, as England and Wales was concerned, he hoped the quota to be furnished by each county was correctly apportioned; he knew of no means that could be had recourse to, that were so likely to produce an equal apportionment. With regard to Scotland, the quota had been regulated upon precisely the same principle. He understood, however, that some objections might be made on the part of Scotland, to this part of the plan. It might therefore, be better to ressort to the numbers which Scotland was to furnish under the Militia Act. When the bill respecting Scotland came into the committee, it would be time enough to consider that part of the subject. At all events, the whole number to be furnished by Scotland was 6000 men.—The bill, as originally framed, proceeded upon the principle of the Militia Bill, and extended only to persons of from 18 to 45. The basis of the militia system being personal service, that regulation might be proper; but on this occasion it would be worth while to consider whether the burthen might not be in some degree alleviated by extending that provision. It would be necessary then to look to persons above the age of 45, who were possessed of competent property. It would therefore be proposed that persons between 16 and 45, if of a proper height, &c. should be liable to serve personally or by substitute, and that persons above 45, and being possessed of sufficient property, should, if drawn, be obliged to find a substitute. The criterion he should propose would be, that those persons above 45, who paid 30l. and upwards to the assessed taxes, should, if balloted for, be bound to provide a substitute.—The outline of the plan of exemptions was nearly the same as in the Supplementary Militia. He should propose to take the 22d of June, the day on which the bill was introduced, as the day beyond which some of the exemptions were not to extend — such as articled clerks, teachers of licensed congregations, volunteers, &c. Another class of exemptions was the yeomanry and volunteer corps. He proposed to strike out the proviso which related to them, and to introduce a clause stating that the exemption should extend to all volunteer corps whose services had been accepted previous to the 22d June, and whose services were co-extensive with the military district in which they were situated. In cases of large cities and towns, such as London, Bristol, Edinburgh, Liverpool, Glasgow, York, Leeds, Manchester, and Birmingham, he should propose to exempt the volunteers of those places, provided they consented to do garrison duty. It would, for many purposes, be necessary to have troops in those places, and if the volunteers would offer their services for that service, he thought they were entitled to exemption. He should also propose, that they should be bound to attend muster and exercise, a certain number of days in the year. By the last act, which was made with a view to a peace establishment, the number was fixed at five days in the year, but that would not be enough in time of war, he should therefore propose that they attend at least two days in the month. —It was proposed that no substitute should be taken who had more than three children,—Upon this subject it might not be improper to refer to the regulations respecting the Supplementary Militia. In that act there was no reference whatever to the number of children of the substitute. He felt it his duty to adopt the same principle in this measure, and also that the families of the substitutes should be provided for by the parishes, as in the case of the militia; and that the parishes should be re-imbursed by the receiver general, out of the public money.—The next clause which related to the fine which was to be paid by those who did not serve or provide a substitute, he should leave out, for the purpose of introducing one founded upon a suggestion of his right honorable friend (Mr. Pitt). By the militia laws every person who was balloted, and who did not appear or find a substitute, was fined in the sum of ten pounds. In the case of the Supplementary Militia, it was raised to fifteen pounds. He saw no objection to the introduction of a similar principle into this bill. But it appeared reasonable, that persons who were in very different situations with regard to property, should not be fined exactly in the same sum. He therefore proposed, that in the case of persons between 16 and 45, who did not provide substitutes or serve, that they should pay a fine of 20l.; that fine was to be paid to the parish, who would be called upon, at all events, to make up its quota. The parish were to be authorised to lay out as much of that money, in providing a substitute, as was necessary, and the surplus was to go in aid of the poor-rate. In addition to the fine, he should propose that a sum of 5l. should be paid for every 10l. which such person paid to the assessed taxes, until it amounted to 100l. That additional fine was to be paid to the receiver-general, to be applied to the recruiting service of the army. As it was an objet to encourage the raising of volunteers, he had proposed that when the volunteers

amounted to two-thirds of the number to be raised, a power was given to suspend the ballot; this plan had been tried upon a former occasion, and with success, and he hoped it might now be adopted with advantage. The next clause was that which allowed, that half the sum paid to volunteers should be given to such persons as chose to serve for themselves. This was the principle of the militia act, but he would propose, that the person who chose to serve for himself should not only have half the sum allowed to volunteers, but that he should also receive the sum of two guineas, instead of one guinea, which he would be entitled to when he joined his corps. He now came to those provisions of the act by which the King was empowered to model this army, and to appoint the officers. No officer was to command any of these battalions who was not a colonel or a lieutenant-colonel; he meant effective colonels, who go and take the command of their regiment, and not generals. As to the field and subaltern officers, they were to be taken from the half pay, and from those officers who might have quitted the army for family reasons, and for other considerations. It was intended to propose a clause to enable the colonel to discharge, from time to time, such of the men as might be inclined to volunteer into the line, under such regulations as the King might think proper. The regiments were to be formed as much as possible from the same counties. Where the number of men furnished by a county was too small, those of two neighbouring counties were to be joined together. An honorable gentleman had upon a former occasion expressed his apprehension that they would not be able to procure non-commissioned officers: this certainly might be urged upon the raising of any new raised corps. If these men were raised for the regulars, they could not all be absorbed into the line, and then there would be the same want of non-commissioned officers. But this difficulty would not be so great as was apprehended. At the beginning of the last war, a very large army was raised, and had been very well provided with non-commissioned officers. We had now very considerable resources; in the first place there were many serjeants who belonged to regiments raised last war for limited service; in the next place the recruiting staff of the army would furnish many very valuable non-commissioned officers, and many might also be procured from the regiments of the line in England, particularly if the new raised regiments should be considered as battalions of reserve to the regiments of the line, wearing the same facings, &c. There was one point which he wished to be most distinctly understood, which was, that no man was to be taken out of this army upon any pretence whatever unless with his own consent.—It was necessary for him to observe, that it was intended to propose regulations respecting the Cinque Ports, the City of London, and the Tower Hamlets. The Cinque Ports it was intended should raise 400 men. With regard to the City of London, with every regard to their privileges, they had been called upon on former occasions by act of parliament to provide men for the public service. He hoped on the report to be able to present a clause upon this point, and he trusted the magistrates of that city would lend their assistance upon the occasion.

In reply to some observations made by Mr. PITT, respecting the number fixed for the Cinque Ports, the SECRETARY at WAR said, it was his intention to leave out the clause alluded to, and to introduce another relative to the Cinque Ports. He proposed that the number of men to be raised by the counties should be 32,000, and by the city of London, the Tower Hamlets, and the Cinque Ports, 2000 more. The city of London and the Tower Hamlets, they had pretty good means of ascertaining the numbers, and he hoped that 400 men would not be thought too many for the Cinque Ports.—He afterwards moved, that the number of men to be furnished by the city of London should be 800, and by the Cinque Ports 400.

After some conversation between ALDERMAN COOMBE, the LORD MAYOR of LONDON and the SECRETARY at WAR, it was agreed that the clause respecting the city of London should be suspended.

In answer to a question made by Mr. W. SMITH, concerning the reasons why the age was taken at 16, instead of 18; and why women who possessed large fortunes were not compelled to find a substitute.—The SECRETARY at WAR said, he had omitted to state the reason why he took from the age of 16 rather than 18. It was, however, that by the old law of England, all persons from 16 to 60 were bound to stand forward in defence of the country when called upon by the Sheriff, and he saw no reason why the same principles should not be adopted in this case. As to the second proposition he knew no instance in which women had been called upon to provide substitutes, except in the case of the provisional cavalry, and there it was attended with such inconveniences, that he thought it was a sufficient reason for not introducing it into this bill. If the committee approved of it, he should propose to include all persons between 16 and 60, but that those between 45 and 60 should not be called upon to serve personally, but should be called upon to provide a substitute.

After some debate, the SECRETARY at WAR said, that he had intended to propose the age to be between 16 and 45, liable to personal service, or to find a substitute, and then from the age of 45 to 50, liable in like manner, provided the person was assessed 30l. a year for the assessed taxes; but now here collected that the committee wished the age should be from 18 to 45, and then from the age of 45 to 50, in case the assessed taxes of the persons were what he had stated them to be; but it was indifferent to him as to the ages betwen 45 and 50, provided the bill was carried with speed, and the number he had stated raised. He had thought that the age between 45 and 50 might be taken in upon the present occasion, but there might be another measure by which they might be called upon for service, or for substitutes, as he had already stated. As to the list, he had a clause in his hand to regulate the mode of making new lists, in cases where that would be necessary.

The CHANCELOR of the EXCHEQUER observed, that from the experience of the last war, we were justified in expecting that the country could furnish a much larger number than was here proposed. We might look to the list with increased confidence for producing this number by ballot, because a greater number of volunteers were then raised, who were entitled to exemption, than were now in that situation. These volunteers limited the number to be balloted in the last war. Such of them as had not been accepted would not now have that exemption, and therefore the number of those who were liable to be balloted under this bill would be proportionably increased; but, however, power might be given in particular cases to amend the list, in the event of some district not being able to furnish its number. But what he chiefly wished to impress on the consideration of the committee was, that from the ballot

from the age of 18 to 45, there was not a larger number called forth, or very little larger, under this bill, than had been balloted for the militia in the course of the last war, when the number of exemptions was greater, on account of volunteers, than at present; and besides this, there were a much greater number then in our army and navy than there are at present: so that, upon the whole matter, the risk of being drawn now was much less than it was at one period of the last war.

After it was determined by the committee that the old list for balloting should be abided by.—The SECRETARY at WAR said, he was persuaded, upon reconsideration, that his proposed amendments, as to the age and as to the alteration of the list, were rightly rejected for the reasons already given.

A conversation was carried on for a considerable time, which ended in exempting the clergy of the established church, and preachers who had held a licence to preach at one place for 12 months before the 22d of June instant. This was adopted in conformity to precedent.—On the subject of the exemptions of the volunteer corps, the SECRETARY at WAR proposed also to follow the precedent of the year 1796; that none should be exempted from this levy whose services had not been received on or before the 22d of this month, which produced a long conversation.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER observed, that it had not been deemed expedient for government to determine what volunteer service would be accepted until the sense of Parliament shall have been expressed upon the present levy.

It was proposed that the day should be altered from the 22d to the 6th of this month, for that it was observable that since the apprehension of this new levy, the volunteer corps had been greatly crowded; and it was generally expressed as an expectation that no volunteer corps shall be exempted unless some equivalent shall be given for the exemption, such, for instance, as security for continuance in the service, because otherwise persons might inrol themselves in a volunteer corps until after the ballot was over, and then discontinue such volunteer service. It was then agreed, that the exemption of the volunteer corps should take place only with respect to those whose services were accepted on or before the 22d of this month.

On Clause 13th.—COLONEL CRAWFORD suggested that the men balloted ought to be enroled to serve his Majesty in any regiment, his Majesty chose to appoint for that purpose. If the French landed, we must have an army of old and regular troops to oppose them, or otherwise they might gain possession of London, by which the country would be placed in a desperate situation. A great number of vessels were in a state of preparation in the ports of Holland, which were manned with as good pilots as the Trinity-House could afford, and the French had the means of transporting 100,000 men to this country. He could not conceive what difference it could make if the men balloted for were placed in any regiment of the line, provided the service of such regiment was limited to Great Britain and Ireland, Guernsey and Jersey.

THE SECRETARY at WAR said, a power was to be given to his Majesty to place the men raised under this act, in such regiments as his Majesty should think fit, provided such regiments should serve only in Great Britain and Ireland, Guernsey, and Jersey. The men raised under this act were not to be compelled to serve in any regiment enlisted for general service, but it was at their option to enlist for general service, if they chose.

Mr. MACNAGHTEN said, he could not sit silent and hear it insinuated that if the French could gain possession of London, that the country was lost. What if they did possess themselves of London, they did not by that means obtain possession of our iron and steel, or of the hearts of his Majesty's subjects. He hoped that we should never make peace until the French had tried the experiment of invasion; at present they held it *in terrorem* over us; let them try it, and if they did get to our coast, they would receive such a lesson that they would never come again.

Mr. WINDHAM said, that a great clamour had been raised against him a few days since, because he had ventured to hint at the possibility of the French obtaining possession of London: he was happy now to hear something in confirmation of that from the honorable officer who had lately spoken (Colonel Crawford), and from the honorable gentleman who just sat down, whose sentiments, so similar to his own, had now met with approbation. If the thing was possible, it ought to be provided against. He was glad to see them roused to a sense of their danger, which seemed to have been wanting. This measure, tardily brought forward, was not an answer to what he had urged; he could not see that spirit in the country which was talked of; he rather considered that there was a sort of apathy, which perhaps was in a great measure to be attributed to the want of confidence in ministers.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER said, the right honorable gentleman (Mr. Windham) had, after giving symptoms of that apathy which he imputed to the country, appeared to be roused by the sentiments uttered by the honorable gentleman (Mr. Macnaghten), and had now discovered a similarity of sentiment; but the language of the honorable gentleman was that of animation, whilst that of the right honorable gentleman tended to despondency and dismay. He gave the right honorable gentleman every credit for the warmth of his heart, and he was convinced that the right honorable gentleman would make every sacrifice for the good of his country; but still he could not help thinking that the language of the right honorable gentleman tended to feed and pamper the mind of one who was already too presuming, that of the Chief Consul of France. When the right honorable gentleman talked of the present situation of the country, he would ask, if when that right honorable gentleman formed a part of the administration, he did not then think that the measures pursued were inadequate to the danger of the country?—With respect to what had been said by the hon. officer (Col. Crawford) his right hon. friend had not said that the persons balloted were to be compelled to enter into the regiments of the line, but there was nothing to prevent them from entering into these regiments. It had been said, that the French had the means of sending out a large force—but were they therefore to take it for granted that the metropolis was in imminent danger? Was there not a chance that the armaments of the enemy would be prevented from reaching our coasts, by the exertions of our navy; and if they did reach our coast, was it too sanguine to suppose that by means of the large force we possessed, that the attempt would be rendered abortive, and be turned to the shame and disgrace of the invaders? All the regiments destined for the coast, would be at their respective destinations, in the course of the present week. Under the present circumstances of the country, he should hold himself criminal, if any thing was left to chance

or accident : he did not attempt to under-rate the danger, but he was surely juſtified in placing a confidence in those great means of defence, with which we were now provided and which were greater than at any former period.

A long converſation enſued in the courſe of which various amendments were ſuggeſted and adopted, and ſeveral new clauſes introduced by THE SECRETARY AT WAR.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Tuesday, June 28. (Min. p. 975.)

[CAPT. COCHRANE'S MEMORIAL.—The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER ſaid that he gave notice yeſterday, that it was his intention to move that the order made by the Houſe yeſterday for laying before the Houſe a memorial preſented by an hon. member of the Houſe now in his place (the hon. capt. Cochrane), and other papers to the lords commiſſioners of the Admiralty, in Jan. 1799, on the ſubject of appeals in prize cauſes, &c. be diſcharged. In the ordinary courſe of practice, it was to have been expected that no motion of importance would have been made without notice, in order that the parties moſt immediately concerned might prepare for its diſcuſſion ; and on referring to the order book he found that no notice had been given of this motion. It was true that the hon. gent. had previouſly communicated the intention to him, but the Houſe was not apprized of it. The hon. member had inferred from his ſilence that he had no objection to the motion, and as it was not oppoſed, the motion was carried ; but the truth was, that he had an objection to the motion. The objection was, that no parliamentary ground was laid before the Houſe for aſſenting to the production of theſe documents. He did not underſtand that any ſuch ground was laid for the motion, and as the effect of complying with it would be to caſt an imputation on the conduct of the Board of Admiralty, and on the conduct of the the executive government at that time, for all the government was in ſome meaſure included in the complainrs of that memorial ; and that being done without any foundation or parliamentary ground for inquiry, and three great law officers of the Crown being complained of in the memorial, namely, the King's attorney-general, the King's advocate, and the King's proctor, he thought it would be improper for the Houſe to order to be laid before it any document of this nature ; he ſaid this becauſe he was moſt credibly informed, that all this complaint againſt theſe learned and hon. officers, was wholly without foundation, and the proof of that the charges were well founded ought to have been adduced by the hon. member who made the motion. Beſides the imputation on the members of government, at the time of preſenting the memorial, there was another caſt on thoſe who at preſent compoſed the executive government ; and it would appear by this memorial as if they had neglected to take proper ſteps on that occaſion to redreſs the grievances which were ſtated in the memorial, a ſpecies of cenſure to which none of his Majeſty's miniſters could ſubmit, becauſe they were not conſcious of deſerving it. If the hon. gent. had ſtated that he meant to inſtitute an inquiry afterwards into the conduct of thoſe miniſters of government of whom he complained, and had laid before the Houſe ground of ſuſpicion, that they had miſconducted themſelves ; then it would have been regular for him to have made this motion, and indeed it would have been his duty to move for documents to elucidate the ſubject. But he had laid no parliamentary ground for the production of ſuch documents, it was unfit that they ſhould be laid before the Houſe, under an allegation of miſconduct, where there was not any ſuch. If ſuſpicion had been entertained, it was neceſſary that the fact ſhould be diſcloſed ; and he was happy to add, that if there was any thing irregular in any part of the caſe ſtated in the memorial, it had been long ſince corrected by his right. hon. friend, and that at this moment there was not the ſhadow of ground for complaint in theſe particulars againſt the Board of Admiralty. For theſe reaſons he thought he owed it to the hon. perſons alluded to in the memorial of the hon gent. as well as to his Majeſty's government at large, to move that firſt the order for laying this memorial and papers before the Houſe be read, and then to move that the ſaid be diſcharged.

Capt. COCHRANE ſaid, that he had a great many prize cauſes to be heard in the court of Admiralty, and he was diſſatisfied with the manner in which they had been conducted. He complained that in all caſes of prize cauſes the King's proctor muſt be employed by all the officers of the King's navy. He thought it was but juſt that each officer who had a prize cauſe ſhould be allowed to chuſe his own proctor. He ſaid, that in many inſtances the partner of Mr. Heſeltine, the King's proctor was often concerned for the party that was adverſe to the King's officer for whom the King's proctor was concerned. He complained that theſe practices were highly dangerous to his intereſts, and to the general intereſts of the officers of his Majeſty's navy concerned in prize cauſes. He complained of his intereſts being neglected, and of the proctor's bill being enormous, &c. He proceeded to ſtate all the proceedings he had at the Shakſpeare and other taverns, when a meeting was convened by him of a great number of officers of his Majeſty's navy concerned in prize cauſes—which ended in a memorial, the memorial in queſtion : and he obſerved, that after it was drawn, the officers moſt unaccountably deſerted him, and left him to preſent his memorial alone.

Dr. LAURENCE allowed the motives of the hon. member to be pure, but maintained that the ſubject of his complaint was founded on an entire want of knowledge of the nature of the legal proceedings in which he had been engaged ; theſe charges were brought forward in the abſence of knowledge of the true intereſt of the hon. officer himſelf ; this he undertook to aver from his own immediate and perſonal knowledge. He defended all the officers of doctors' commons, who had been alluded to, and aſſured the Houſe they had always conducted themſelves in a way that did them honour. He then went over all the charges brought forward, and ſaid they were entirely without foundation, for that he knew profeſſionally all the circumſtances of the caſe. He alledged that the charges in the bill were more moderate than the ſame buſineſs would have been charged at 20 years ago ; and as to every officer being allowed to employ his own proctor, in prize cauſes, it muſt be obſerved, that ſuch proceeding would interfere with the prerogative of the Crown—a prerogative of great value to his majeſty's ſubjects, ſince the management of matters of prizes were often intimately connected with

the affairs of foreign nations, and the queſtion of peace or war.

Sir W. SCOTT defended the gentlemen of the commons, and aſſured the Houſe that the cauſes of the hon. member were all of them conducted as well at it was poſſible, by Mr. Heſeltine the King's proctor, notwithſtanding a gent. in partnerſhip with him, had ſometimes been concerned on the other ſide; however, that was a practice which was unſeemly, and therefore he had cauſed it to be diſcontinued. He thought Capt. Cochrane miſguided in this caſe, and he reminded him of a maxim by which it was ſaid, that when a man becomes his own lawyer, he has not always the moſt prudent client.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Wedneſday, June 20.—(Min. 976.)

[ARMY OF RESERVE.]—Sir W. W. WYNNE obſerved, that in conſequence of an intimation of the wiſhes of government, ſeveral offers of volunteer corps have been made, upon condition of being exempt from ballots, which exemption was intended by government; and, therefore, he thought, that all the corps ſo *offering* before the 22d June, ſhould be exempt from the ballot of the army of reſerve.——Dr. LAURENCE ſupported an amendment to this effect, propoſed by Sir W. W. Wynne.——Mr. ADDINGTON oppoſed this; obſerving, that the offers were ſo numerous, that it was "to avoid throwing the additional burden "upon the people, that many of the offers were not "accepted."——Mr. PITT objected to the amendment, and "could not believe, that any perſon en-"tered into volunteer corps to ſave themſelves from "the effect of this ballot. If the Houſe," he ſaid, "were to go on extending the exemptions thus, they "would greatly narrow the means of obtaining a "large regular force. He hoped that offers of vo-"lunteer ſervice would come in, to a very great "amount; but he was ſure the volunteers would be "actuated by that feeling, which muſt govern the "breaſt of every Engliſhman, and not by any view "to exemption."——Upon the clauſe for drafting the men into the regiments of the line, Col. CRAWFORD obſerved, that he hoped thoſe regiments would be filled up as ſoon as poſſible; whereupon Mr. SHERIDAN ſaid, "I object to any *queſtion* being put to the men "thus diſpoſed of, as to *whether they are willing, to* "*volunteer for general ſervice.*"——Mr. PITT wiſhed for an amendment to enable his Majeſty to remove the men from one regiment to another.—Mr. SHERIDAN "repeated his objection as to any *queſtion* being put "to the men enrolled under this act, as to *whether* "*they were willing to enliſt for general ſervice.*"—— Mr. PITT thought, on the contrary, that there ought to be fixed days of muſter for the purpoſe of ſeeing who of theſe men were willing to volunteer for general ſervice.

HOUSE OF COMMONS.

Thurſday, June 30th—(Min. p. 976.)

[ARMY OF RESERVE.]—Upon a motion for the third reading of the bill, Mr. JOHNSTONE called upon miniſters to ſhew whether they had not involved the country in a new war becauſe merely for the ſake of keeping poſſeſſion of Malta for a certain number of years, while it had been offered by the French govern ment to give up Malta to Ruſſia, an offer which, if acceded to, would have placed our Eaſt India poſſeſſions, and every other intereſt connected with Malta, in as great, or even greater ſecurity than if we perſiſted in retaining it ourſelves. He was, therefore, juſtified in ſaying, that on the alternative of evacuating Malta depended, and was decided, the recommencement of hoſtilities. The hon. gent. next took a ſurvey of the finicial ſtatements laid before the Houſe by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and contended, that ſo far from their being accurate as to the expenditure which would be incurred by the war, it would, on the contrary, be found that the expenſes of the war would amount to nearly the double of what they were eſtimated at. He wiſhed, however, that the calculations on which he founded that aſſertion might prove fallacious; but much he feared that ſuch would not be the caſe. What then had we to expect? With all our preparations, whether for defenſive or offenſive war, he was ſure we ſhould not be able to make any impreſſion upon France.—The attempt was hopeleſs, and the diſappointment of the country would again compel government to ſue for peace. What then had we to look to but the mediation of Ruſſia? It was in vain to expect any ſucceſs from a ſuppoſed unpopularity of Buonaparté. He might be diſliked by ſome, but the great maſs of the French people muſt even, out of gratitude, be attached to him. In his opinion, therefore, attacks upon France muſt prove altogether futile.——Mr. HUTCHINSON ſaid, that, whenever the hour of danger arrived, Ireland would be found ready and willing to lend real and cordial ſupport to this country. If any thing like diſcontent prevailed there, it was comparatively as nothing, and only what was to be obſerved in every, even the beſt governed ſtates. The Iriſh people would ſhew themſelves as loyal and united as any ſet of men could do, and their cordial co-operation in the day of difficulty and danger might be confidently relied upon. The only conteſt that could ariſe between the two countries would be, which was to ſtand foremoſt in the battle.——Mr. ARCHDALL roſe to advert to the obſervations which the hon. gent. had thrown out reſpecting Ireland. There (he ſays) government has indiſpoſed one half of the people, without having conciliated the other. This was quite novel to him; not leſs ſo than ſeeing the hon. gent. ſtand up as the repreſentative of the feelings and affections of Ireland. If thoſe feelings were accurately ſcrutinized, the iſſue would moſt aſſuredly be found as *agreeable and welcome to the Houſe* as the iſſue of a late ſcrutiny. There exiſted a ſpirit in the country fully adequate to furniſh every means of that defence, and when the time came that ſpirit would diſplay itſelf. It was to that ſpirit we muſt truſt, and *not to government*; for whether Parliament aſſented or not to the meaſure now propoſed, *their voice would be of little avail without the concurring voice of the empire.*—— Lord de BLAQUIERE hoped that this force, when raiſed, would be employed in offenſive operations; and aſked what the late miniſter would not have effected, with a force ſuch as is now put into the hands of government.——Col. CRAWFORD was about to deliver his ſentiments upon the ſubject, when Mr. Yorke roſe and moved for the doors to be cloſed, by which ſtrangers were excluded for the remainder of the ſitting.

The remainder of the Parliamentary Proceedings, for this ſeſſion, will be found in the Supplement to the next volume, where the PARLIAMENTARY ACCOUNTS *alſo, and the* LIST *of* ACTS, *for the ſeſſion, will be found.*

OFFICIAL PAPERS ON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH THE PRELIMINARY AND DEFINITIVE TREATIES, &c.—PART II. TREATY OF AMIENS.

(*For* PART I. *see page* 1149.)

NEGOTIATIONS for a definitive and general peace, agreeably to the preliminaries, were opened at Amiens. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte was appointed plenipotentiary for France, and the Marquis Cornwallis was nominated in the same character on the part of England. The delay of the English minister in proceeding to France was calculated to excite astonishment. The First Consul, therefore, expressed, through the medium of Citizen Otto, his anxiety to see the preliminaries of the pacification immediately converted into a definitive treaty, which alone could establish the repose of the world. The Marquis Cornwallis repaired, in the first place, to Paris, where some previous conferences took place between Citizen Joseph Bonaparte and him in the beginning of Frimaire, year 10, (22d, 23d, &c. November, 1801). It was evident, from the first, that the article relative to Malta was that which would present the greatest difficulties in the treaty about to be concluded; though it appeared that nothing was necessary to be done on this point, in the definitive treaty, except to name the power to whom the guarantee of Malta should be entrusted. But the seat of the negotiation was scarcely removed to Amiens, when the British plenipotentiary began to start new questions, and to make new demands concerning Malta. He demanded, that, if there were to be a French langue in Malta, there should also be an English langue: it was agreed that there should be none for either of the two nations. He testified great anxiety respecting the future condition of Malta; and was not only desirous that the guarantee should be pointed out, but that the protection should likewise be specified to consist in the establishment of a considerable foreign garrison at Malta. To terminate these discussions, and to remove every inconvenience, the French plenipotentiary proposed that the Order of Malta should be modified with respect to its composition; that, instead of an order of knighthood, it should become, simply, an order of hospitality, conformably to its primitive institution; and, that the fortifications of Malta being demolished, that island should be converted into a great lazaretto, appropriated to the equal accommodation of all the different nations which trade in Mediterranean and the Levant. The English government would not consent to this proposition; and its refusal is recorded in the Protocol of the sitting of the 22d Nivose, year 10, in the following terms—

Amiens, 22d Nivose, Year 10. Jan. 12, 1802.—The French and British plenipotentiaries having met, Lord Cornwallis communicated to Citizen Joseph Bonaparte the answer of his government to the propositions for demolishing the fortifications of Malta; which answer is, that the said propositions being contrary to Articles IV. and XIV. cannot be adopted. After long discussions, it is agreed that the French minister shall present a plan of arrangement for the article relative to Malta. The conference is postponed until to-morrow.

Joseph Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

In the succeeding conferences, the article respecting Malta was discussed, on both sides, with an attention and minuteness which might have been expected to produce an immediate agreement: but, on the contrary, farther difficulties arose, both on this article, and on other points of the treaty to be concluded. The best manner of stating the discussions which took place on these topics, is to insert the Protocols of all the conferences of the French and English plenipotentiaries, from the 23d Nivose to the 18th Ventose.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 23d Nivose, Year 10, 13th Jan. 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, agreeably to his engagements in the preceding conference, proposed a new arrangement, in which he endeavoured to meet as much as possible the 10th article of the plan for a definitive treaty of peace, presented by Lord Cornwallis. He declared that he knew no inconvenience in restoring the island of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, under the immediate protection of the King of Naples, whose sovereignty over the said island should be formally acknowledged. As to the guarantee, he proposed to place it in all the great powers interested in the maintenance of the Order; namely, in France, England, Russia, Spain, Austria, and Prussia. With respect to the troops, he proposed (in case that those of the Order should be insufficient for garrisoning and defending the island), to make all the guaranteeing powers concur in furnishing an equal proportion. In this way each power might supply two hundred men, who should be paid by the Order, and whose officers should be appointed by the Grand Master; care being taken that the officers of each corps should be natives of the country to which that corps belonged. He also stated that France and England might concert as

an agreement with the other powers, in consequence of which all the belligerent nations should in time of war respect the independence of the island of Malta, and that it should be for each of them a lazaretto, under their common guarantee. Lord Cornwallis declared, that while he adopted part of the principles of the French government respecting Malta, he believed he should make the intentions of his court better known, by inserting in the Protocol the following articles, which he hoped would reconcile the views of the contracting parties:——The island of Malta, with its dependencies, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, on the following conditions:—I. In order to secure the absolute independence of that island, it shall be put under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. II. The ports of Malta shall be, at all times, neutral; and that neutrality shall be preserved, notwithstanding any hostilities whatsoever in which the powers above-mentioned may find themselves engaged. III. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem shall abolish the principle of a perpetual war against the infidels. IV. In regard to the sovereignty of the crown of Sicily, the ports of Malta, of Gozo, and of Camino, shall be shut against the armed vessels, or the prizes of any of the powers of Barbary whatsoever, every time that these powers shall be at war with his Sicilian Majesty. V. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate that island in three months, reckoning from the ratification of the present treaty; and it shall be surrendered in its present state to his Sicilian Majesty, who shall furnish the force which he shall judge necessary to form, conjointly with the Maltese troops, the garrison of the principal forts, during the space of ——— years. VI. In order to give his Sicilian Majesty the means of maintaining the said provisional garrison, his Britannic Majesty and the French Republic agree to pay, annually, in equal proportions (the payments being to be made every six months) the sum of ———. VII. After the said term of six months, the half, at least, of the garrison shall be composed of native Maltese; and for the remaining part, the Order shall have power to recruit among the natives of the countries which shall continue to possess langues in the Order. The native Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers; and the command in chief of the garrison, as well as the nomination of the officers, shall belong to the Grand Master of the Order. VIII. There shall be established a Maltese langue, which shall be maintained by the territorial revenues and the commercial duties of the island. IX. The ports of Malta shall be open to the commerce and the navigation of all nations, who shall there pay equal and moderate duties: the revenues accruing therefrom shall be applied to the maintenance of the Maltese langue, to that of the civil and military establishments of the island, and also to that of a lazaretto, which all nations may use, in case of necessity. X. The principle of perpetual hostility being abolished, the flag of the Order shall be under the protection of the above-mentioned powers. XI. The said powers shall be invited to accede to this arrangement. XII. The rights of sovereignty of the King of the Two Sicilies over the island of Malta, are formally recognized; consequently the Grand Master of the Order of Malta, or his representative, shall henceforth receive, in the name of the Order, the oath of fidelity to the crown of Sicily, which was taken at the time of the original grant, as also an oath (similar to that taken by the commissaries of the Order at that epoch) to maintain the rights and privileges of the people of Malta and Gozo, as they are specified in the present arrangement. The conference was deferred to the following day.

Cornwallis, J. Bonaparte.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 28th Nivose, Year 10, *18th Jan.* 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte proposed to pursue the discussion relative to Malta. He declared that, animated with the desire of a prompt conciliation, his government would renounce a part of the articles which it had proposed, and admit several of those in the project presented by the British minister; that as to the IIId, IVth, and Xth articles, relative to the abolition of the principle of perpetual warfare against infidels, and the stipulation which (as their consequence) would open to them the ports of Malta, it conceived that those articles, though conformable to the soundest ideas, would nevertheless meet with many obstacles on the part of the states possessing Maltese langues, unless a reciprocity were established on the part of the states of Barbary. But, in the present system of hostilities, how can it be proposed to those powers to supply the Order of Malta, whose ports would offer an asylum to their enemies, and a station where the Barbary corsairs would lye in wait for the mercantile vessels as they came out of the ports of Sicily, the Adriatic, and the Levant? On the other side, is this the moment for commencing a discussion which affects so many different interests, and the solution of which could not fail to retard the conclusion of a work expected by both nations with too much impatience to permit its progress to be interrupted by accessary

objects? It seems proper to leave it to the wisdom of the two governments to choose the moment when, secure from all the existing prejudices, it will be an easier task to attempt the abolition of a system proscribed by the liberal principles which direct the two nations. The following articles may conciliate the rights and the interests of all parties. Art. I. The islands of Malta, of Gozo, and of Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. II. The Knights of that Order shall be invited to repair thither, as soon as the ratifications of the present treaty shall have been exchanged. They shall there assemble in a general chapter, and proceed, within the space of three months, to the election of a Grand Master, should such choice not have been made on the continent before that epoch. III. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications: it shall be restored to the Order in the state in which it now is. IV. There shall be established a Maltese langue, which shall be maintained by the territorial revenues and commercial duties of the island. V. One-half of the garrison, at least, must always be composed of Maltese; for the remainder, the Order shall have power to recruit among the natives of the countries which continue to possess langues. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers. The chief command of the garrison, as also the nomination of the officers, shall belong to the Grand Master of the Order. VI. The island is put under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. VII. The permanent neutrality of the Order of Malta is proclaimed. VIII. The ports of Malta shall be open to the commerce and navigation of all nations, who shall therein pay equal and moderate duties. Those duties shall be applied to the maintenance of the Maltese langue, the civil and military establishments of the island, and also to that of a general lazaretto, open to all flags. IX. The powers of Barbary are alone excepted from the dispositions of the preceding article, until they themselves shall have renounced their system of habitual hostility. In this case the contracting parties engage to preserve for them the enjoyment of the same rights in Malta with every other nation. X. The Order shall continue to be governed, both as to spiritual and temporal affairs, by the same statutes which were in force at its departure from Malta. XI. The powers whose guarantee is invoked in the 6th article, are invited to accede to the present arrangement. Lord Cornwallis has reserved to himself to answer the antecedent proposition, at an early conference. *J. Bonaparte.*

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 29th Nivose, year 10,—19, *Jan.* 1802. —The plenipotentiaries of France and England, having met for the continuation of their labours, observed, that both nations must expect, with equal impatience, the signing of the definitive treaty; and that the only means of attaining that object was doubtless to inform each other mutually, and without delay, of the points which each of the governments was disposed no longer to contest. Lord Cornwallis instantly declared that he consented to adopt the form of the preamble employed in past treaties between the French Republic and other powers. He likewise consented to stipulate in the definitive treaty, the maintenance of the privileges, ranks, and prerogatives, enjoyed by ambassadors, ministers, and other agents of the contracting powers, before the war. As to what related to—1. The exchange of the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon for a part of the island of Newfoundland,—2. The cession of an establishment for the fishery in the Malouine isles,—3. The neutrality of fishers in time of war; Lord Cornwallis said, that these articles having been presented and rejected before the signing of the preliminaries, could not be re-produced with greater success. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, in his turn, declared that he desisted from the demands relative to the above three articles. Lord Cornwallis then declared, that his government could not consent to the abolition of salutes at sea, because that was unprecedented, and had no connection with the present war. He demanded from what motive the French government, in its counter-project of treaty, affectedly detailed all the restitutions which were to be the result of peace; whilst it was more simple and more proper to place the parties in the same state as before the war. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte replied,—1. That salutes at sea being a source of pretensions and disputes, it appeared proper to stipulate their abolition. 2. That the nominal description of the objects to be restored, had for its object to make known, by a single law, the positive state of the contracting nations, so as to have no longer any occasion to recur to anterior treaties. He added, that notwithstanding the merit of the considerations relative to these two articles, his government was disposed also to desist from them in favour of peace. Lord Cornwallis demanded, that the article relative to the sequestrations should be inserted literally in the definitive treaty as it stood in the preliminaries, and in the project presented by his government. He observed, that the addi-

tional clause of the counter-project which says, that "English creditors in France cannot be more favoured than the French themselves," would be prejudicial to the English nation, inasmuch as the English government had not touched the property, the effects, or the funds of any Frenchman; that of France, on the contrary, had seized all that the English had in France, and had made only imaginary reimbursements. Whatever right the French government had to proceed in this manner towards French citizens, according to the law of circumstances, it could not so dispose of what belonged to the English. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte took this article *ad referendum*—Lord Cornwallis then proceeding to reply to the demands made by citizen Joseph Bonaparte, relative to the augmentation of the French territory and commerce in India, said, That the conditions proposed by France would produce endless discussions, and that the English government persisted in the return to the same state in which both nations were before the war. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte observed, that the pure and simple restitution of the French possessions in India, being rather to be considered as a charge than a benefit, it would be natural enough that France should insist upon her demands relative to important ameliorations; but that this government, wishing to accelerate the epoch of a peace so desirable for the whole world, insisted only on the following dispositions:—1. That England shall give up, or cause to be given up to France, the seven Joukans, or tolls of Villehour; inasmuch as the district of Villehour forming part of the territory of Pondicherry, was granted without any reserve or restriction, by the Soubah of Dekan and the Nabob of Arcot, to the French East-India Company. That the treaty of 1783 confirmed this property, (and that, too, without any restriction,) and yet France has the dissatisfaction still to see, that duties, to her burdensome, and extremely inconvenient, are levied in her own territory, in the name of a foreign power. A remonstrance was presented upon this subject in 1785, by Messrs. De Bussy and Coutanceau to Lord Macartney, who answered, that the joukans in question formed part of the ancient district of Valdahour, and belonged to the Nabob of Arcot. It was replied, that the district of Villehour had, itself, formed part of the district of Valdahour; and yet that, since the grant and confirmation above mentioned, it had formed a district completely separate; that, consequently, each proprietory nation should enjoy the accessories of its portion. Nothing was decided with respect to this just demand, by the explanatory convention of 1787; and it is hoped that it will at length be done justice to. 2. That England shall consent to exchange the district of Valdahour for that of Bahour, which belongs to France; inasmuch as this arrangement, which, it is said, was to have been made at the time of the treaty of 1783, would secure to the inhabitants of Pondicherry the articles of the first necessity; and that, without requiring an important sacrifice, it would terminate continually reviving difficulties. 3. That at the period of the restitution of Yanaon, France shall also be put in possession of the tract which always belonged to her, on the left bank of the Coringny, where the merchandize intended for Yanaon is embarked; and as the river has successively encroached upon the greater part of the tract where the workshops are situated, there shall be granted an equivalent tract on the opposite bank; so that the weavers driven out by the inundations, may still find an asylum. And that, in execution of the treaties of 1783 and 1787, the French may have, for the trade carried on by them on the coast of Coromandel, and particularly for the execution of their contracts in the interior of the country, the same means of security and protection as in Bengal. 4. That on the Malabar coast, France, in entering into possession of Mahe and its dependencies, shall equally recover the petty territory of Courchy, which has always belonged to her since the cession made by the king of Colastrie, to M. Mahe de Labourdonnaye, and of which Tippoo Sultaun never had a right to dispose in favour of the English, as he was not the proprietor of it; and, lastly, that France should have permission to establish a factory at Alepe, should she think proper, in order to have a share of the pepper trade in the country of the King of Travancore. Lord Cornwallis said, that he reserved himself to answer, in the subsequent conferences, the demands above stated. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, not being able to lose sight of the important article of the fishery, stated that France, in renouncing the XI, XII, XIII and XIVth articles of her counter-projet, had only reserved to herself to propose modifications, which from experience seem to be indispensable, and which had been foreseen by the XIIIth article of the preliminaries; wherein it is said, "that in the definitive treaty, just or reciprocally advantageous arrangements shall be taken, to place the fishery of the two nations in the state best adapted for maintaining peace." We are charged to demand accordingly,—1. That the French fishermen of the island of Newfoundland, shall be protected in the same manner as the English themselves. 2. That France, should she deem it proper, shall have a commercial agent at St. John. 3. That, in virtue of several treaties, we shall have the right of fishing exclusively, and at all seasons, on the

coasts which have been assigned to her, inasmuch as, when she ceded the property of the island of Newfoundland, under the reserve of fishing within a determined extent, she did not impose upon herself the condition of not fishing but a certain kind of fish, and during a particular season of the year, but only that of not being at liberty to fortify any place, nor to erect any building, except the scaffolds and huts necessary for drying the fish. That hence necessarily result several tacit rights, viz. the right of cutting wood, erecting hospitals on shore, and providing for the first necessities of life; in fine, the right of leaving persons to protect the boats and utensils of the fishery. The greater part of these rights have been frequently contested, and frequently recognized, since the Court of London has, on different occasions, granted indemnities to the French proprietors of boats, which had been burnt or destroyed by the English; but it is to be apprehended, that the same subjects of dispute may recur, unless a remedy is provided by precise dispositions. The French Government observes, that the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon are about to be restored to her, entirely ravaged by the consequences of the war; that it, consequently, hopes to obtain that the permission formerly given to the French, of cutting wood in the bay of St. George, which is at a distance from all their establishments, shall be applicable to the bays of Fortune or Despair. Lord Cornwallis reserved himself to consult his government, and the conference was adjourned to the following day. *J. Bonaparte.*

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 7 *Pluviose*, *Year* 10, 27 *Jan.* 1802.—The Plenipotentiaries of the French Republic, and his Britannic Majesty, after having anew discussed several points, on which nothing could be determined without waiting for the decision of their respective governments, conceived that, to accelerate the labour with which they were charged, they ought, without further delay, to agree as to the form and wording of several articles already agreed upon as to their substance. Accordingly they drew up the following articles:

TREATY OF PEACE, &c.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, and his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, &c. being animated with an equal desire to put an end to the calamities of war, have laid the foundation of peace in the preliminary articles signed at London, the 9th Vendemiaire, year 10, [1st Oct. 1801.] And as, by the XVth art. of the said preliminaries, it has been stipulated, that plenipotentiaries should be named on each side, who should proceed to Amiens for the purpose of concluding a definitive treaty, in concert with the allies of the contracting powers;—The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, has named citizen Joseph Bonaparte; and his Britannic Majesty, the Marquis Cornwallis. His Majesty the King of Spain, the Indies, &c. and the Batavian Republic, after having acceded to the preliminaries, have named for their plenipotentiaries, viz. His Catholic Majesty, the Chevalier d'Azara; and the Batavian Republic, the Sieur Schimmelpenninck, &c. Who, after having duly communicated to each other their full powers, as transcribed at the end of the present treaty, have agreed upon the following articles:—Art. There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding between the French Republic, his Majesty the King of Spain, his heirs and successors, and the Batavian Republic, on the one part; and his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors, on the other part. The contracting parties shall give the greatest attention to maintain between themselves and their states a perfect harmony, without allowing, on either side, any kind of hostilities, by sea or by land, for any cause, or under any pretence whatsoever. They shall carefully avoid every thing which might hereafter affect the union, happily established, and they shall not afford any assistance or protection, directly or indirectly, to those who should cause prejudice to any of them. Art. His Britannic Majesty restores to the French Republic, and her allies; namely, his Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic, all the possessions and colonies which belonged to them respectively, and which had been occupied or conquered by the British forces in the course of the present war, with the exception of the island of Trinidad, and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon. Art. The territories, possessions, and rights of the Sublime Porte, are maintained in their integrity, such as they were before the war. Art. The limits of French and Portugnese Guiana shall be determined by the river Arawari, which falls into the ocean below the North Cape, near Isle Neuve, and the island of Penitence, about a degree and one third of north latitude. These limits shall follow the course of the river Arawari, from that of its mouth, which is at the greatest distance from the north Cape, to its source, and thence in a direct line from its source, to the river Branco towards the West. The northern bank of the river Arawari, from its mouth to its source, and the lands which are situated to the north of the line of the limits above fixed, shall consequently belong in full sovereignty to the French

Republic. The southern bank of the said river, from its source, and all the lands to the southward of the said line of demarkation, shall belong to her most Faithful Majesty. The navigation of the river Arawari, throughout the whole of its course, shall be common to both nations. Art. The Republic of the Seven Islands is acknowledged. Art. The evacuations, possessions, and restitutions stipulated for by the present treaty, shall take place in Europe, within ————; in the continent and seas of America, and of Africa, within three months; and in the continent and seas of Asia, within six months after the ratification of the present definitive treaty. Art. In all the cases of restitution agreed upon by the present treaty, the fortifications shall be delivered up in the state in which they may have been at the time of the signature of the preliminary treaty; and all the works which shall have been constructed since the occupation, shall remain untouched. It is farther agreed, that in all the cases of cession stipulated in the present treaty, there shall be allowed to the inhabitants, of whatever condition or nation they may be, a term of three years, to be computed from the notification of the present definitive treaty of peace, for the purpose of disposing of their property, acquired and possessed, either before or during the war; in which term of three years they may have the free exercise of their religion, and the enjoyment of their property. The same privilege is granted, in the countries restored, to all those who shall have made therein any establishments whatsoever, during the time those countries were in the possession of Great Britain. With respect to the inhabitants of the countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be prosecuted, disturbed, or molested in their persons or properties, under any pretext, on account of their conduct or political opinions, or of their attachment to any of the contracting powers, nor on any other account, except that of debts contracted to individuals, or on account of acts posterior to the present definitive treaty. Art. In order to prevent all causes of complaint and dispute which may arise on account of prizes which may have been made at sea after the signature of the preliminary articles, it is reciprocally agreed, that the vessels and effects which may have been taken in the British Channel, and in the North Sea, after the space of twelve days, to be computed from the exchange of the ratifications of the said preliminary articles, shall be restored on each side; that the term shall be one month from the British Channel and the North Seas, as far as the Canary Islands, inclusively, whether in the ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from the said Canary Islands as far as the Equator; and, lastly, five months in all other parts of the world, without any exception, or any more particular description of time or place. Art. The ambassadors, ministers, and other agents of the contracting powers, shall enjoy, respectively, in the states of the said powers, the same rank, privileges, prerogatives, and immunities, which public agents of the same class, delegated by the contracting powers, enjoyed previous to the war. Art. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in the space of twenty days, or sooner, if possible. And the ratifications shall be exchanged in due form at Paris.

Joseph Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 8th Pluviose, Year 10, Jan. 28, 1802.—The following article has been agreed upon by the French, English, and Batavian ambassadors:—The Cape of Good Hope remains in full sovereignty to the Batavian Republic, as it was before the war. French and English vessels of every description shall have the right to put in there, and to purchase such supplies as they may stand in need of; they shall always be admitted on the same footing.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis, Schimmelpenninck.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 13th Pluviose, Year 10, Feb. 2, 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Lord Cornwallis presented the projet which had been communicated by the French minister, in the conference of the 28th Nivose, (18th January); he declared that he was prepared to adopt it, with the modifications contained in the following article, which would form the fifth of the projet:—Inasmuch as the Order has not, at this time, either troops, or the means of paying them, it is agreed, that the King of Naples shall be invited to furnish two thousand men, to be employed in guarding the fortifications, under the orders of the Grand Master. France and England mutually engage to pay each twenty thousand pounds sterling yearly, for the subsidiary pay of this garrison: this pay shall be continued until the 1st of January, 1805, the period at which the troops of the Order, formed in the manner stated in the sixth article, shall be alone entrusted with the defence of the fortifications. After considerable discussion, the French minister agreed to refer the matter to his government.

Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 15th Pluviose, Year 10, Feb. 4, 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having

met, Citizen J. Bonaparte announced that he had communicated to his government the difficulties which had arisen upon the articles relative to Malta; that he had it in charge to insist on their being inserted in the treaty, as they were transcribed in the Protocol of the 28th Nivose (18th January); that if this be refused by Lord Cornwallis, he consented to depart from it, and to recur to the literal execution of the preliminaries. He added, these stipulations have become a fundamental law, from which none of the contracting parties are permitted to deviate; an unwillingness to execute them, is an unwillingness for peace. To the religious observance of this principle, I have sacrificed several articles which in no respect are prejudicial to the interests of Great Britain; it was my duty to renounce them without hesitation, the moment it was demonstrated to me that they were not strictly included in the preliminaries. How can an article be now demanded, which is, in every respect, opposite to them? What do the preliminaries say?—That Malta shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. Is the King of Naples the Order of St. John of Jerusalem? Is the Order too weak? The projet gives them for guarantees and protectors the principal powers of Europe. The preliminaries are satisfied with one power. The French government has thought, that the object of the preliminaries would be better accomplished by the united guarantee of the great powers; that it was more respectable and more proper: nevertheless as, above all, it desires the absolute, nay, literal execution, should that be required, of the preliminaries, it is ready to sacrifice for them this article, which a kind of political decency had dictated. I cannot, therefore, too strongly demand the insertion of the projet in the treaty, or the literal execution of the fourth article of the preliminaries. Lord Cornwallis reserved to himself to communicate this representation to his government, and to give his answer at an early conference. *J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.*

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 22d Pluviose, Feb. 11, 1802.—The British and French plenipotentiaries having met, Lord Cornwallis observed, that in a conference which had just taken place between him and the Batavian plenipotentiary, relative to the indemnities due to the Prince of Orange, as well on account of his dignities and charges, as on account of his property, the Batavian plenipotentiary replied, on the express authority of his government, that France had taken upon herself to obtain the said indemnities, without laying any part of the burthen on the Batavian Republic. Upon which Lord Cornwallis thought proper to request Citizen Joseph Bonaparte to explain to him the precise intentions of the French government with respect to this matter. The French plenipotentiary replied, that France would employ her good offices, in order that the Prince of Orange might receive the indemnity which was due to him. It was afterwards proposed to confer on several points which had remained in suspense. Lord Cornwallis communicated the answers of his government respecting the propositions stated in the Protocol of the 19th of January last. These answers amount to this statement, that every thing relative to the fishery of the island of Newfoundland, the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon, and the French possessions in India, may remain entirely on the same footing as before the war. However, to prevent any disputes which might arise on account of the fishery, Lord Cornwallis was authorized to renew the declaration made after the treaty of 1783, which was conceived in the following terms:—

DECLARATION.—In order that fishers of both nations may not be involved in daily quarrels, his Britannic Majesty shall take the most effective measures to prevent his subjects from troubling in any manner, by their competition, the fishing of the French during the temporary exercise of the privilege granted to them on the coasts of the island of Newfoundland, and will for that purpose cause the settled establishments formed there to be withdrawn. His Britannic Majesty will also give orders to prevent any interruption to the French fishers in the cutting of the wood necessary for repairing their scaffolds, cabins, and fishing vessels. The mode of fishing which has always been recognized, shall be the model on which the fishery shall be carried on. The French fishers shall build nothing but their scaffolds, shall confine themselves to repairing their vessels, and shall not winter on the island. The subjects of his Britannic Majesty, on their part, shall in no manner molest the French fishers during their fishery, nor damage their scaffolds during their absence.

Citizen Joseph Bonaparte said, he would make no observation at present on this declaration, the insufficiency of which was acknowledged in the preliminaries, which state the necessity of making some just and reciprocal arrangements which may be useful towards the preservation of peace. But that he would transmit the answers which had been made to his government.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 29th Pluviose, Feb. 18, 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Lord

Cornwallis announced that he had communicated to his government the statement relative to Malta, made by Citizen Joseph Bonaparte in the Protocol of the 4th of this month; that he was directed to declare that his government would always adhere to the 4th article of the preliminaries, in the sense and spirit in which it must necessarily be understood by all who read it, and in which it was, in fact, understood by the French government when that article was agreed upon. That article expresses, not only that Malta shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, but that the island *shall be placed under the guarantee and protection of a third power*. The word *protection*, which was added to *guarantee*, was inserted for the purpose of designating an effective and not an ideal protection; and no one can doubt the necessity of an effective protection until the Order be in a condition to maintain the independence of the island against an external attack, as well as to support itself against the dangerous opposition which it is obvious it must experience on the part of the inhabitants who continue to manifest the greatest animosity against the Order of St. John. The British government possess very accurate information respecting that opposition, and Lord Cornwallis has had the honour of mentioning that subject on several occasions to Citizen Joseph Bonaparte. It is impossible that the Order of Malta can of itself, for some time at least, possess a sufficient force for those objects. Lord Cornwallis therefore considers himself authorized to declare on his part, and with the greater reason, that not to be willing to grant to the Order the means of taking possession of the island, and of maintaining itself in that possession, is not to desire the execution of the preliminaries, and not to desire the peace. In the first conference which Lord Cornwallis had the honour to have with Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, at Paris, on the 24th of November, that minister suggested the King of Naples as the natural guarantee and protector of the island of Malta, on account of his sovereignty. Objections having been made to that guarantee, he afterwards named the Emperor of Russia; but he did not think it would be proper to admit a Russian garrison into the island. He concluded that day by proposing a plan, by which a Neapolitan garrison would be given to the island until the Order of Malta should be in a state to provide for its proper security. He even proposed that that garrison should be paid conjointly by France and England. Further, in the counter-projet of a treaty which Citizen Joseph Bonaparte transmitted to Lord Cornwallis, it is again proposed that the island of Malta shall be placed under the *guarantee* and *protection* of his Sicilian Majesty. The same idea of giving a foreign and temporary protection to the Order has always been entertained by the two contracting parties. At last there remained no difference between them on that point, except as to the means of paying the garrison; and though the French plenipotentiary declared, three weeks ago, that France would not consent to pay any thing, he has not yet declared that his government would depart altogether from its former determinations, if the means of defraying the expence could be pointed out. He only made known that resolution in his statement of the 4th of this month, in which it is declared in a manner very little conciliatory. The British government, however, could not deviate from the sentiments expressed on this subject. It is still thought and believed, that all the powers will be of the same opinion, that a garrison is absolutely necessary, in the first place, for the protection of the island. The British government must, therefore, insist for a protection of that kind, as the only means of restoring the island to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and consequently of accomplishing the execution of Article IV. of the preliminaries. Meanwhile, the English government, desirous to spare no pains in endeavouring to bring about an arrangement on this subject, and to accelerate peace, has drawn up a plan, in which Citizen Joseph Bonaparte will find the point relative to the definition of the Order of Malta, which appeared to him doubtful on the discussion, fully particularized; and he will perceive that almost all the propositions in his project of the 18th of January, are adopted. Lord Cornwallis has the honour of proposing to the French minister, in the following terms:—1. The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, on the conditions and under the stipulations which follow: 2. The Knights of the Order whose langues shall continue to exist after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, shall be invited to return to Malta as soon as the said exchange shall have taken place. They shall there form a General Chapter, and proceed to the election of a Grand Master, if that election has not been previously made in consequence of the declaration of the Emperor of Russia of the 16th of March last. It being understood that, in so far as may be compatible with the stipulations included in Article IV. of the present arrangement, the Order shall be held to consist solely of such of the Knights as were qualified to vote for the election of a Grand Master at the period

of that declaration. 3. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies, within the three months following the exchange of the ratifications. At that period it shall be restored to the Order in its present state, provided that the Grand Master, or commissioners fully authorized according to the laws of the Order, shall be in the island to receive the possession, and that the provisional force to be furnished by his Sicilian Majesty, agreeably to Art. XII. shall have actually arrived at Malta. 4. The contracting parties having agreed to discontinue the French and English langues, a Maltese langue shall be established, which shall be supported by the territorial revenues and commercial duties of the island. There shall be annexed to this langue specific dignities, with competent appointments, and an inn. No other qualification shall be required of the Knights of this langue than that of belonging to the present order of nobility. He may hold any situation in the Order, and shall enjoy all the privileges the knights of the other langues may enjoy. The native inhabitants of Malta shall be admitted to all municipal, administrative, and other employments under the government of the island. 5. The half of the garrison at least shall always consist of native Maltese; with respect to the remainder, the Order shall have the power of recruiting only among the natives of the countries who continue to possess langues. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers. The chief command of the garrison, as well as the appointment of officers, shall belong to the Grand Master of the Order. 6. The independence of the islands of Malta and Gozo is, with the present arrangement, placed under the guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. 7. The permanent neutrality of the Order of Malta is declared. 8. The ports of Malta shall be open for the trade and navigation of all nations, who shall there pay equal and moderate duties. These duties shall be applied to the maintenance of the Maltese langue, in the manner specified in Article IV.; to the civil and military establishments of the island, and to that of a general lazaretto, to be open to all flags. 9. The Barbary powers are alone excepted from claiming any share to the provisions of the preceding Article, until a favourable opportunity arrives for abolishing the system of hostility which subsists between the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and those powers. 10. The Order shall be governed, both in spiritual and temporal matters, by the same laws which were in force when the knights surrendered the island, in so far as make compatible with the regulations there specified. 11. The regulations contained in Articles IV. V. VII. VIII. and X. shall be converted into perpetual statutes of the Order, in the usual form; and, after the restoration of the island, the Grand Master, as well as his successors, shall be held to take an oath for the punctual observance of all the said regulations, which shall for ever be preserved by the order. 12. The rights of the sovereignty of the King of the Two Sicilies over the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, are formally acknowledged and confirmed as unalienably annexed to the Crown of the Two Sicilies. On this account his Sicilian Majesty shall furnish two thousand troops to garrison the fortresses of the island, until the order be in a condition to raise a sufficient number of troops in the manner proposed by article V; and the Grand Master, or his representative, shall renew, when the island is restored, the oath of fidelity which was taken at the time of the primitive donation of the island to the Knights; as well as an oath similar to that which was at that period taken by the Order, for maintaining all the rights and privileges of the people of Malta and Gozo. The different powers specified in article VI, namely, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia, shall be invited to accede to the present arrangement. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte deferred his answer until the ensuing conference.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 29th Pluviose, Year 10, *Feb.* 18, 1802.

The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Lord Cornwallis repeated what he had the honour to state to Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, in the conference of the 11th of this month, but which had been omitted in the Protocol of that conference; namely, That the Ottoman Porte having formerly acceded to the Preliminaries of Peace between his Britannic Majesty and the French Republic, and their respective allies; and notified to the English Government the refusal of the Turkish Government to ratify the treaty concluded by Ali Effendi, the Turkish Ambassador Extraordinary at Paris; has, in consequence thereof, nominated the said Ali Effendi Plenipotentiary to the Congress of Amiens, to confer in the definitive peace. The British Government must, therefore, demand, that the Sublime Porte be admitted, either as a contracting party, or an acceding party to the said treaty. Lord Cornwallis afterwards communicated to the French Plenipotentiary, that his Britannic Majesty could not recognize the King of Tuscany, unless the district of Olivenza was restored by Spain to Portugal, and the *presidi* to the King of Naples; and, finally, until the King of Naples was

re-established in Piedmont. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte postponed his answer until the next conference. *J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.*

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 30th Pluviose, Feb. 19, 1802.—The Plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte proposed the insertion in the Protocol of the following note, in reply to the statement made by Lord Cornwallis in yesterday's conference. The undersigned has read with particular attention all the papers of the negotiation, without discovering any trace of the proposition supposed to have been made by France, for delivering up the island of Malta to the troops of his Sicilian Majesty. Article IV. of the preliminaries cannot be interpreted in that manner. When the undersigned first had the honour of seeing Lord Cornwallis at Paris, on the 24th Brumiaire, he was far from imagining that their reciprocal felicitations on the facility with which the mission entrusted to them might be terminated, could be regarded as propositions and plans for a treaty; he had not even then received his powers. They were not delivered to him until the 30th of Frimaire, and it was only on the 14th of Frimaire that they were communicated to the British Minister: the latter, however, arrived in Paris, furnished with the instructions of his Government. In his first visit he spoke of Malta as an embarrassing article, though it had been agreed that there should be in that island a garrison, consisting of troops of another power, until the order had time to organize its armed force. Spain appeared to Lord Cornwallis inadmissible as a guaranteeing power, on account of her alliance with France: Russia he thought too distant, and Naples too feeble. The English Plenipotentiary, insisting constantly on a garrison to be furnished by the guaranteeing powers, as a basis agreed upon, observed, that Naples could not support the expence of such a garrison. It is possible that the undersigned may have added, that a consideration of that kind could not arrest two powers such as France and England. For the rest, the positive discussion of all these objects was referred to the time when the negotiation should be commenced. In the conferences which took place at Amiens, in the Protocols, in the project of the treaty of the 14th Nivose (Dec. 16,) the undersigned never suggested an idea which could make it be supposed that his Government would consent to the island of Malta being given up to the Neapolitan troops, to be guarded by them for three years. On the contrary, he proposed in the Protocol of the 23d Nivose (Jan. 13,) to place Malta under the guarantee of the principal powers of Europe, who should each furnish 200 men. That island would thus have been guarded by 1200 good troops paid by the order, Lord Cornwallis having himself observed, that the revenues of the boundary appropriated in reserve, would supply the means. The anonymous paper transmitted to the undersigned bears no mark of authenticity: it appears to be drawn up by some discontented persons. It is not the language of the inhabitants of Malta, of a country which would have been nothing but for the order. When they are made acquainted with the article of the treaty which relates to them, they will rejoice at the re-establishment of an order in Malta, of which they are to form an integral part. Admitting that circumstances require a provisional and intermediate garrison for Malta, from the time of its evacuation by the British forces, until the period in which the order shall have formed a body composed of Maltese and strangers, it is proved that the 4th article of the preliminaries, which *restores the island to the order*, should be departed from as little as possible. This article foresees the necessity of a guaranteeing and protecting power, the means of its execution are left to the wisdom and good faith of the two Governments. They are to do every thing that Malta may be restored to the order, and nothing else; nothing that may restrain its prerogatives; nothing, which, instead of offering a protection to the Knights, would appear to give them a master, or diminish the exclusive influence that they ought to have in Malta. The French Government, by its *projet*, gives the order for its protectors, England, Austria, Spain, Russia and Prussia: it was hardly possible for the order to be restored with more lustre, or be more efficaciously protected. Why was there to be a Neapolitan garrison of 2000 men for three years? Was it against foreign enemies? The protection of the six powers above named was doubtless sufficient. Was it against the Maltese? The order will be beloved then, if the stipulations are carried into effect. It will be the best internal defence that can be given to it. But in agreeing to the necessity of a garrison, was it only for security and for the internal police, is it necessary to be three years forming a corps of 1000 men, which, joined to four hundred Knights and 600 Maltese, would be abundantly sufficient? Now that the plan is admitted of delegating the guarantee and protection of the order to the great powers, would it be very important, or convenient that the King of Naples should garrison it for three years? Would it be agreeable either to the protecting powers, or to the protected, or to the Grand Master, to see the order guarded by the troops of that Prince who has long claims on the sovereignty of the island.

Would it not be more conformable to the preliminaries, to what is proper, if a foreign force is to be introduced into Malta, to raise a corps of a thousand Swiss, the officers of which should be named by the commandary, and should be selected from them who have not borne arms in the present war. They would probably ultimately fix themselves at Malta; far from any foreign influence, dependant on the Grand Master, they alone would be the soldiers of the order, and Malta would be to them a second country. The order would have every thing to gain in consideration and in independence, with a garrison composed of Knights, Maltese, and a Swiss corps, such as all other powers have in their pay. It results from the observations, that France never consented to the establishment of Neapolitan troops at Malta, and consequently not that *the island should be given up to his Sicilian Majesty, to form, in concert with the Maltese, the garrison of it for three years.* That was what was proposed by Lord Cornwallis in the conference of the 15th of January. The French government, after the perseverance of the English to prolong for three years the stay of a foreign garrison in the island, and of giving it up formally, not to the order, but to his Sicilian Majesty, could not avoid thinking, and were warranted in saying, that they were departing from the preliminaries, and that the preliminaries were the basis of the peace. If this language did not appear conciliatory, it was not that the dispositions of France were changed; but when one, in a discussion, has exhausted every argument without being able to convince, it is impossible that, in the common course of reasoning, each party should not conclude that the other declines all manner of arrangement. If the intention of the English government is to maintain the Order of St. John and the island of Malta in perfect independence, (as the undersigned wishes to suppose,) he hopes that the following *projet*, which endeavours as much as possible to remove all foreign influence, will meet the approbation of Lord Cornwallis. This *projet* is certainly preferable in every point of view to those which have been hitherto presented, —the undersigned cannot too strongly press its adoption. If, however, the *projet* which establishes a Neapolitan garrison at Malta, should be irrevocably adopted by the British government, the undersigned, to hasten the moment of pacification, will consent to adopt it in the manner it is drawn up at the end of this note. Lord Cornwallis will see, in the two versions of the *projet* relative to Malta, the application of the principle that the undersigned has just developed. He is also charged with insisting on the insertion in the treaty of an article respecting the powers of Barbary, as it is drawn up in this *projet*, and for the union of the contracting parties, to put an end to the hostilities which the Barbary powers exercise in the Mediterranean, to the disgrace of Europe and of modern times. The simple notification of the toil of the contracting parties in this respect, will give peace to the trade of the United States, Portugal, Naples, and the other states of Italy. And if any nations have to fear the rivalship, which would then be greater in the Mediterranean trade, it is undoubtedly France and Spain, who by their position and their connexions with the Barbary Powers, have at all times the greatest security and advantages in this branch of commerce. It is they then which would make the greatest sacrifice; but in questions which interest the political morality and the dignity of the nations of Europe, is it possible to confine one's views merely to considerations of self-interest? Strength is given to nations, as well as individuals, to enable them to protect the weak. It will be consoling and glorious to see a war which has produced so many calamities, terminate by an important benefit to all commercial nations. This question is also connected with Malta, and cannot be separated from it. If the contracting parties do not take upon themselves to put an end to the hostilities of the Barbarians, it must then be truly said, that the Order of St. John is bound, by its original engagement, to wage an eternal war with the nations of Barbary. Those generous men who founded the *Commanderies*, did it for the purpose of protecting the Christians against the piracies of the Barbarian Powers; and all the political societies in Europe must agree, that if the order was to cease to discharge that duty, and fulfill the object of its institution, it would lose its right to the possession of that property which was given to it for that consideration. Lord Cornwallis has reserved his reply for one of the next conferences.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

SWISS VERSION*.—Art. I. The isles of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order on the following conditions:— II. The Knights of the Order are invited to return to Malta, as soon as the ratifications of this treaty shall have been exchanged. They shall form there a general Chapter, and proceed to the election of a Grand Master, if that shall not have been already done. III. France and England, wishing to place the Order of St. John in the most perfect inde-

* Alteration of Article I.—Article I. The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to be held by it on the same conditions according to which it enjoyed before the war, and under the following stipulations.

pendence with respect to them, agree, 1st. That there shall be neither English nor French langue at Malta. 2dly. That no individual of either country can be admitted into the Order, or allowed to remain in it. IV. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its depeadencies, within three months after the ratifications are exchanged. At this epoch it shall be restored to the Order in its present situation; provided that the Grand Master, or commissaries fully authorized, according to the ancient statutes, should be in the island to take possession of it, and that the force hereafter stipulated shall be then arrived. V. There shall be raised, at the expence of France and England, a body of a thousand Swiss, whose officers shall be named by the Landamman. They shall be chosen from them who have formerly served in Holland, Spain, and Sardinia, but who have not borne arms in the present war. They shall repair to Malta, and the fortifications shall be put in their possession by the Grand Master, or his representatives. They shall be paid by France and England for a year, reckoning from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty; after which time the corps is to be in the pay of the Order. It is to be recruited from among the Maltese and the nations which preserve langues at Malta. VI. There shall be established a Maltese langue, which shall be kept up by the territorial revenues of the island, and the commercial duties. This langue shall have dignities, pensions, and a hotel like the others. Nevertheless proofs of nobility shall not be rigorously required for admission into this langue. The knights shall be admissible to all employments and privileges like the knights of the other langues. The principal, civil, and judicial employments in the nomination of the government, shall be occupied (at least a half of them), by the native inhabitants of Malta. VII. Half of the garrison at least, must be always composed of Maltese, except in the case mentioned in the 5th article; for the remainder, the Order shall have the liberty of recruiting only among those countries which possess langues. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers. The command in chief of all the troops in the island shall belong to the Grand Master, who shall also have the nomination of the officers. VIII. The independence of the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, as well as the present arrangement, are put under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. IX. The permanent neutrality of the Order of Malta is proclaimed. X. The ports of Malta are open to the trade and shipping of all countries, who shall there pay equal and moderate duties; these duties shall be applied to the support of the Maltese langue, to the civil and military establishments of the isle, as well as to the establishment of a general lazaretto, to be open to people of all nations. XI. The powers of Barbary are the only powers excepted from the dispositions of the two preceding articles, until they shall have themselves renounced their system of habitual hostilities. In that case the contracting parties engage, that they shall enjoy in Malta the same rights as all other nations. XII. The Order shall be governed both in their spiritual and temporal affairs by the same statutes which were in force when the knights left the island, unless altered by the present treaty. XIII. The dispositions declared in the 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 10th articles, shall be changed into laws, and be fixed in the usual manner among the perpetual statutes of the Order; and the Grand Master, as well as his successors, shall be bound to cause them to be punctually obeyed. XIV. The different powers specified in the 9th article shall be invited to accede to the present stipulations.

J. Bonaparte. Cornwallis.

NEAPOLITAN VERSION *.—Art I. The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, on the following conditions:—II. The Knights of the Order shall be invited to return to Malta as soon as the ratifications are exchanged. They are there to hold a general chapter, and proceed to the election of a Grand Master, if he is not before appointed. III. France and England, wishing to place the Order of St. John in the most perfect independence, with respect to themselves, agree, 1st, That there shall be neither English nor French langue. 2dly, That no individual belonging to either power can be admitted into the Order, or allowed any longer to continue in it. IV. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the island and its dependencies within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty. At this epoch it shall be ceded to the Order in its present condition, provided that the Grand Master, or commissioners fully authorized, according to the ancient statutes, shall be then in the island to take possession, and that the provisionary force, hereafter stipulated, shall have arrived. V. There shall be established a Maltese langue, which shall be supported by the territorial revenues, and com-

* Alteration from Art. I.—Art I. The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and to be held by it on the same conditions by which it enjoyed them before the war, and under the following stipulations.

mercial duties of the island. This langue shall have dignities, pensions, and a hotel, like the other langues. Nevertheless, proofs of nobility shall not be rigorously required for the admission of its knights. They shall be admissible to all posts and privileges like the knights of the other langues. The municipal, civil, and judiciary employments in the nomination of the government, shall be filled (at least one half of them) by native inhabitants of Malta. VI. Half of the garrison, at least, shall be always composed of native Maltese; as to the remainder, the Order shall have liberty to recruit from the natives of those countries which continue to possess langues. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese officers. The command in chief of the garrison of the island, as well as the nomination of the officers, shall belong to the Grand Master of the Order. VII. The independence of the isles of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, as well as the present arrangement, are placed under the protection and guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. VIII. The permanent neutrality of the Order is proclaimed. IX. The ports of Malta shall be open to the commerce and shipping of all nations, who shall there pay equal and moderate duties: those duties shall be applied to the support of a Maltese langue, and to the civil and military establishment of the island, as well as for the establishment of a general lazaretto, which shall be open to every flag. X. The powers of Barbary are alone excepted from the dispositions of the two preceding articles, until they shall have themselves renounced their system of habitual hostilities. In that case the contracting powers engage to make them enjoy in Malta the same privileges as other countries. XI. The Order shall be governed, both in spiritual and temporal affairs, by the same statutes which were in force when the knights left the island, except as the statutes may be altered by the present treaty. XII. The dispositions of the 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 10th articles, shall be converted into laws and perpetual statutes of the Order, in the accustomed manner: and the Grand Master, as well as his successors, shall make oath to observe them punctually. XIII. His Sicilian Majesty shall furnish a corps of 1000 men, to serve as a garrison for Malta. This corps shall remain there a year, reckoning from the date of the exchange of the ratification to the present treaty. It is to be composed of old soldiers, natives of the dominions of his Sicilian Majesty. XIV. The different powers specified in the 7th article shall be invited to accede to the present stipulations.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

2d Ventose, Year 10, *21st Feb.* 1802.—The plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and of his Britannic Majesty, having met, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte demanded the insertion in the *protocol* of the following note, in answer to the declaration of Lord Cornwallis, contained in the *protocol* of the conference of the 29th Pluviose (18th February, 1802), relative to the Ottoman Porte. The preliminaries of peace have been signed between France and the Porte: they have been ratified by the Porte with this simple restriction, "Provided they are not contrary to the treaty of London:" as they are not contrary, the French government considers them duly and explicitly ratified. The Grand Seignior, in a letter to the First Consul, expressed a desire to treat directly with France, and to convert into a definitive treaty the preliminary articles. In consequence, the ambassador of the Porte at Paris received full powers, and all necessary instructions. This ambassador has been presented to the First Consul, and has appeared convinced that France was necessary to Turkey, that he was ready to sign a definitive peace; but that he was bound, out of respect and deference, to acquaint the British minister with it. The First Consul consented, that he should immediately write to the British minister to inform him of this step, and a definitive peace will be concluded. Every peace which is not concluded directly between two such great powers as the Porte and France, may be a truce, but it will be a chimerical peace. There is, in the diplomatic system, two sorts of alliances, natural and accidental alliances. The alliance between England and the Porte being only accidental, it was the part of France, in the preliminaries, to stipulate the cessation of hostilities; but particular arrangements must be treated by our direct negotiation: to act otherwise, would be to place those powers in the second rank of states, and both of them belong to the first rank. All the assurances then which the French plenipotentiaries can give, are, 1st, That there shall be no secret article in this treaty. 2d, That it shall be entirely founded on the preliminaries. Any claim further than this would be unreasonable. In answer to the declaration of the English minister, with respect to the King of Etruria, contained in the same *Protocol*, and to the verbal declarations which have been formerly made with respect to the republics of Italy, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte has announced to his government the repugnance which his Britannic Majesty would have to acknowledge the King of Etruria, the Italian Republic, and the republic of Genoa. The acknowledgment of these powers by his Bri-

tannic Majesty, being of no advantage to France, the French plenipotentiary will no longer insist upon them. He desires, however, that the observations he now offers should be taken into the most serious consideration by the British cabinet. The political system of Europe is founded on the existence and acknowledgment of all those powers which share its vast and fine territories. If his Britannic Majesty shall refuse to acknowledge those powers which hold so distinguished a place in Europe, he renounces then all interest about the people which form these states. Nevertheless, how can the supposition be admitted, that the commercial interests of England should be indifferent to the trade of Genoa, of Leghorn, the mouths of the Po, and the Italian Republic? If its commerce should suffer any restraints in those countries, to whom could his Britannic Majesty complain, the reciprocity on his side being nothing, inasmuch as Genoa, Tuscany, and the Italian Republic, transact no commercial business in England, but are useful and necessary markets for British commerce? If those three powers, displeased at finding themselves not acknowledged by the great power, should make changes in their organization, and seek a refuge by an incorporation with a great continental power, his Britannic Majesty would debar himself from the right of complaining, and yet it is a subject he could not consider with indifference. There are sometimes complaints of the increase of the French Republic on the continent; and how can it be otherwise, when the great powers place the small states of Italy under an absolute necessity of seeking refuge and protection in France alone? The Cisalpine Republic, although acknowledged by the Emperor at the treaty of Campo Formio, never could succeed to get its ambassador received at Vienna. It continued to be treated by that prince as if the treaty of Campo Formio had never existed at that time. Doubtless, as the general peace was not concluded, the court of Vienna looked upon its treaty as a truce: but, now that a general peace is made, if those powers were to remain uncertain of seeing their independence acknowledged, they would fear being again treated in that slighting manner which they have already experienced, and would feel the necessity of connecting themselves more closely with the French people. The same principle which induced France to abandon three-fourths of the conquests she had made, has dictated to the First Consul the part of not intermeddling in the affairs of those small powers more than is necessary to re-establish order, and to found some stable organization. Must his moderation then have to conflict (we speak frankly) with the false and badly combined measures of other powers; or is the peace to be only considered as a truce? Afflicting prospect! discouraging to all good men, but which must infallibly be productive of consequences which cannot be calculated. Lord Cornwallis has reserved the communication of this answer to his government.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 16th Ventose, Year 10, *March* 16, 1802.—The ministers of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty having met, Citizen Joseph Bonaparte presented the note and *projet* following:—The undersigned has removed from this *projet* every thing which might protract the discussions. It is composed—1st. Of articles taken literally from the preliminaries: they are unattackable *. 2d. Articles already agreed to by the two plenipotentiaries in the different *Protocols* which have been signed since the opening of the negotiations: those cannot be rejected without prolonging the negotiation indefinitely †. 3d. Lastly, of articles either wished for by the British minister, and entirely voluntary on the part of France, as the 18th article, or arising from the preliminaries, the preceding stipulations and verbal conventions; such as the residence of the French troops at Otranto, whilst Malta shall be occupied by the English; or as the 19th, relative to the Republic of Genoa—If that republic, as an ally of France, is at war with Great Britain—if the minister of his Britannic Majesty should declare that his government is at peace with that state, the 19th article becomes useless, and the undersigned withdraws it. The 10th article, with respect to Malta, has been approved by Lord Cornwallis in all its parts: he has only asked, in the *Protocol* of the 13th Pluviose (2d Feb.) that the King of Naples should be invited to furnish 2000 men, to be employed to guard the fortifications of Malta. The 1st of January 1800, was fixed in his *projet* for the evacuation of the island by the Neapolitan troops: there can therefore be no question about the 12th paragraph of the 10th article. The French government has refused every *projet* which did not tend to render the Order as completely masters of Malta as circumstances would permit. It was in this spirit that it presented the *projet* of an auxiliary Swiss force, as likely to be more dependent on the Order than the troops of a neighbouring prince. Those reasons are detailed in the *Protocol* of the 30th Pluviose (19th Feb.) It would be superfluous to repeat them here, and it would be difficult to

* 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 16th.

† Articles 6th, 10th, 17th, and 20th.

prove that they were not more agreeable both to the spirit and the letter of the preliminaries than any other *projet*. Notwithstanding, such is the desire of the French government to answer the expectations of two great nations, and of all Europe, that it has sacrificed its *projet* to that feeling. It has consented that the fortifications of Malta shall be entrusted to a corps of Neapolitan troops, but it thinks that the number of troops should be limited to 1000 men, and the time of their staying there to a year; persuaded that before that epoch the Order will have formed a corps of troops sufficient for the interior service of an island, guaranteed and protected by the great powers of Europe, and that the Order will be more completely masters in Malta, and the spirit of the preliminaries more followed, when the Order shall be defended, served, and obeyed by its own soldiers. The undersigned adds, that if the British ministers persist in thinking that at first 1000 Neapolitans would not be sufficient, the French government will doubtless consent that the number shall be encreased even to 2000, according to the English *projet*. This condescension will incline Lord Cornwallis not to insist on the term of three years. The French government cannot consent to it, without abandoning the 4th article of the preliminaries, which gives Malta to the Order, and not to the King of Naples. In consenting to give up that island to the troops of his Sicilian Majesty during the first year, the situation of the Order, and, above all, the desire of the French government to arrive at a speedy conclusion, may explain that stipulation—any other condescension could justify it neither in its own eyes, nor in those of the nation and posterity. The undersigned has no doubt that Lord Cornwallis allows the proper weight to the sentiments expressed in this note, and to the omission of several important articles, sacrificed to the desire which both governments entertain of a speedy and honourable peace, which can subsist only in as far as it shall be founded upon the preliminaries. The undersigned believes that he has proved, by the most convincing demonstration, the agreement of the *projet* of the definitive treaty annexed with the preliminaries signed at London.

Treaty of Peace between the French Republic, the King of Spain and the Indies, and the Batavian Republic, on the one hand, and his Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, on the other.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French nation, and his Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, equally actuated by a desire of putting an end to the calamities of war, have laid the foundations of a treaty of peace, by the articles signed at London the 9th Vendemiare, in the year 10 (1st of October, 1801). And as by the XVth article of the above-mentioned preliminaries, it has been agreed, that both on the one side and on the other, plenipotentiaries shall be appointed who shall repair to Amiens, there to proceed to digest the definitive treaty, in concert with the allies of the contracting powers; the First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, has appointed Citizen Joseph Bonaparte; and his Majesty the King of Great Britain, Marquis Cornwallis. His Majesty the King of Spain and the Indies, &c. and the Batavian Republic, after having acceded to the preliminaries, have named for their plenipotentiaries, viz. his Catholic Majesty the Chevalier d'Azara, and the Batavian Republic the Sieur Schimmelpenninck; who, after having duly communicated their credentials and full powers, transcribed at the end of the present treaty, have agreed upon the following articles:—Article I. There shall be peace, friendship, and a good understanding, between the French Republic, his Majesty the King of Spain, his heirs and successors, and the Batavian Republic, on the one part, and his Majesty the King of Great Britain and Ireland, and his heirs and successors on the other. The contracting parties shall pay the greatest attention to the maintenance of perfect harmony between themselves and their nations, without allowing, either on the one side or the other, any sort of hostility to be committed either by land or by sea, upon any ground or pretext whatever. They shall carefully avoid every thing that may eventually interrupt the union happily established, and shall give neither assistance nor protection, either directly or indirectly, to those who would wish to injure any of them. II. All the prisoners shall be restored on one side and on the other in one month, at farthest, after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, after paying the particular debts which they may have contracted. III. His Majesty the King of Great Britain restores to the French Republic, the King of Spain, and the Batavian Republic, all the possessions and colonies occupied or conquered during the course of the last war, with the exceptions of the island of Trinidad, and the Dutch possessions in the island of Ceylon. IV. His Catholic Majesty cedes and guarantees the whole property and sovereignty of the island of Trinidad to his Britannic Majesty. V. The Batavian Republic cedes and guarantees to his Britannic Majesty the whole property and sovereignty of all the possessions and establishments in the island of Ceylon, which belonged to it before the war.

VI. The Cape of Good Hope remains in complete sovereignty with the Batavian Republic, as previous to the war. French and English vessels of every kind shall have the right of trading there, and carrying from thence such necessary provisions: they shall always be received on the same footing. VII. The territories, possessions, and rights of the Sublime Porte, are maintained in all their integrity as before the war. VIII. The limits of the French and Portuguese Guiana are fixed to the river Arawary, which falls into the ocean below Cape Nord, near New Island, and the Island of Repentance, about a degree and one third of northern latitude; these limits follow the river Arawary from its mouth farthest removed from Cape Nord to its source, and then stretch westward in a straight line from that source as far as Rio Branco. So that the northern banks of the river Arawary, from the place where it last discharges itself to its source, and the countries which lie to the north of the line of those limits, fixed on as above, shall belong in full sovereignty to the French Republic. The southern bank of the said river, from the same place of discharge, and all the countries to the south of the said line of limits, shall belong to her Majesty of Portugal. The navigation of the Arawary along its whole course shall be common to both nations. The arrangements that have taken place between the courts of Madrid and Lisbon, for the settling of their frontiers in Europe, shall be executed according to the treaty of Badajoz. IX. The Republic of the Seven Islands is recognized. X. The Isles of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, to be by it possessed and held upon the same conditions as before the war, and under the following stipulations:—1. The Knights of the Order are invited to return to Malta as soon as the exchange of the ratifications shall have taken place. There they shall form a general chapter, and proceed to the election of a Grand Master, if it shall not have been done before. 2. France and England wishing to put the Order of St. John in a state of the most perfect independence in regard to them, agree that there shall be neither a French nor English langue, and that no individual of either nation shall be there admitted, nor continue to form part of the Order. 3. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate that island and its dependencies in three months after the exchange of the ratifications; at that time it shall be delivered to the Order in the condition in which it was found, provided that the Grand Master, or his commissaries fully authorized according to the ancient regulations, shall be in the island to take possession, and that the provisionary force hereafter stipulated shall have arrived. 4. There shall be established a Maltese langue, which shall be maintained out of the territorial revenue and commercial duties of the island. This langue shall have the same dignities, and the same income and residence, as the others. The municipal employments, administrative and others, civil and judiciary, at least as far as one half, shall be held by the native inhabitants of the island. 5. The one half, at least, of the garrison shall always be composed of native Maltese; as for the rest, the Order shall have the liberty of recruiting them among the natives of those countries only who continue to possess langues. The Maltese troops shall have native officers. The chief command of the whole garrison of the island, as well as the nomination of the officers, shall belong to the Grand Master of the Order, without the power of delegating his authority to any particular commander. 6. The independence of the isles of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, as well as the present arrangement, are placed under the protection and guarantee of France, Great Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia. 7. The permanent neutrality of the Order of Malta is proclaimed. 8. The ports of Malta shall be open to all nations, upon payment of equal and moderate duties. The duties shall be applied to the maintenance of the Maltese langue, to that of the military and civil establishments of the island, as well as to that of a lazaretto general, open to the flags of all nations. 9. The powers of Barbary are alone exempted from the dispositions mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs, till they have renounced their system of habitual hostility. 10. The Order shall be governed by the same laws, spiritual and temporal, which were in force while the knights were out of the island, provided they be not contrary to any thing herein stipulated. 11. The dispositions mentioned in paragraphs 4th, 5th, 7th, 8th, and 10th, shall be converted into perpetual laws and statutes of the Order, in the usual form; and the Grand Master and his successors shall be obliged to take an oath punctually to observe them. 12. His Sicilian Majesty shall furnish a corps of 1000 men to garrison Malta. This corps shall be placed there within a year from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty. It can only be composed of the ancient native troops of the states of his Sicilian Majesty. 13. The different powers specified in paragraph 6th, shall be invited to accede to the present stipulations.—XI. The French troops shall evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and the dominions of Rome. XII. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions, stipulated by the present treaty, shall be executed for Europe in one month; for the con-

tinent and seas of America and Africa, in three months; for the continent and seas of Asia in six months, after the ratification of the definitive treaty. XIII. In every case of restitution agreed upon in the present treaty, the fortifications shall be restored in the condition in which they were previous to the signature of the preliminaries, and all the works constructed since the occupation shall remain untouched. It is farther agreed, that in every case of stipulated cession, the inhabitants, of whatever condition or nation, shall be allowed three years, reckoning from the ratification of the treaty, to dispose of their property, acquired or possessed, whether before or during the present war; during which term of three years they may freely exercise their religion, and enjoy their property. The same liberty is allowed in the countries restored to all those who may have made establishments of any sort during the time when those countries were in possession of Great Britain. With regard to the other inhabitants of countries restored or ceded, it is agreed that none of them shall be persecuted, disquieted, or troubled in his person or property, under any pretext, on account of his political conduct or opinions, or on account of his attachment to any of the contracting parties, or for any other reason except for debts contracted with individuals, or for behaviour posterior to the present treaty. XIV. All the sequestered property placed on either side, in the funds, revenues, and trusts, of whatever sort they may be, belonging to any one of the contracting powers, or to its citizens and subjects, shall be delivered up immediately after the signature of this definitive treaty. The decision of all claims between the individuals of the two nations, for debts, property, effects, or rights of any sort, which, according to the received usages and laws of nations, ought to be restored at the time of the peace, shall be committed to competent tribunals: and in this case they shall render prompt and entire justice in the countries where the claims shall be respectively made. XV. The fisheries on the coast of Newfoundland and the adjacent islands, and in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, are placed upon the same footing upon which they were before the war. The fishermen of Newfoundland, and the inhabitants of the isles of St. Petre and Miquelon, may cut the wood necessary for them in the bays of Fortune and Despair during the first year. XVI. To prevent all subjects of complaint and dispute that might arise on account of the prizes which may have been made on the sea after the signature of the preliminaries, it is reciprocally agreed upon, that the vessels and effects which shall have been taken in the Channel and Northern Seas, after the space of twelve days, reckoning from the exchange of the ratifications of the preliminary articles, shall on both sides be restored: that the term shall be one month, from St. George's Channel and the Northern Seas, to the Canary Isles inclusively, whether in the ocean or Mediterranean; two months from the Canaries to the Equator; and, in fine, five months in every other part of the world, without any exception or particular distinction of time or place. XVII. The ambassadors, ministers, and other agents of the contracting powers, shall enjoy respectively, in the dominions of the said powers, the same rank, privileges, prerogatives, and immunities, which agents of the same class sent by the said contracting powers enjoyed before the war. XVIII. France shall procure for the branch of the House of Nassau, which existed in Holland, indemnities in Germany equivalent to all the losses it has sustained. XIX. The present treaty is declared common to the Ligurian Republic. XX. The present treaty shall be ratified by the contracting powers in the space of five days, or sooner if possible, and the ratifications in due form shall be exchanged at Paris.

Secret and separate Art. &c.—The French troops shall evacuate Otranto, when the island of Malta shall be evacuated by the forces of his Britannic Majesty. Lord Cornwallis reserves his answer for the next conference.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 6th March 1802; (15th Ventose, An 19.) The Plenipotentiaries of his Britannic Majesty and of the French Republic being again met, Lord Cornwallis declared, that his government having perused with the most serious attention the two *projets* relative to Malta, presented by the French Minister in the protocol of the 19th of February (which was not signed till the 23d) has found that only practicable, and consequently admissible, which proposes to put a Neapolitan garrison in that island. But the number of troops proposed appears to that government evidently too small, and the time of their remaining in the island too short; so that without extending these two dispositions, the *projet* in question cannot be adopted as a practicable mean of fulfilling the intention of the preliminaries. There are others, too, which it is very essential to explain more clearly, to prevent as much as possible, the difficulties that might arise in the execution of the *projet*. It is very important for the two nations, and also for all Europe, to fix a plan of arrangement for that island, that may leave no uncertainty as to its future condition. It is upon this principle that the British government

acts, a principle that could only arise from its desire to remove every cause of misunderstanding for the future between itself and the French government. With this view it has employed itself anew to draw up another plan, in which it has endeavoured to new-model some of the same dispositions that are in the former *projets*. It believes them indispensable for the attainment of the object which it is desired to arrange, and cannot, therefore, insist upon them too strongly. The new plan proposed by the British government is as follows:—I. The isles of Malta, Gozo, and Camino, shall be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, in the condition in which they were held by that Order before the commencement of hostilities between Great Britain and France, and under the following stipulations. II. The Knights of the Order, of whom the langues shall continue to subsist after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, shall be invited to return to Malta as soon as the exchange shall have taken place: they shall form a general chapter, and proceed to the election of a Grand Master, if it shall not have been done before, in consequence of the declaration of the Emperor of Russia, of the 16th of March 1801. It is understood, that while it shall be compatible with the dispositions mentioned in article 4th, the Order shall consist only of those Knights who were qualified to vote at the election of a Grand Master at the time of that declaration. III. The governments of Great Britain and France, desirous to place the Order of St. John, and the island of Malta, in a state of entire independence, of both the one and the other of these powers, agree, 1st, That there shall be neither a French nor an English langue. 2d. That no individual belonging to one or the other power shall be admitted into the Order. IV. There shall be established a Maltese langue, to be maintained by the territorial revenues and commercial duties of the island. There shall be annexed to that langue specific dignities, with a proportional income and residence. The Knights of the said langue shall not be required to produce any other proof to be admitted into the Order than that of actual nobility. They shall, in other respects, be admissible to all charges, and shall enjoy all privileges as the Knights of the other langues. The municipal employments, administrative, and others, civil and judiciary under the government of the island, shall be held in the proportion of at least one half, by the native inhabitants of Malta, Gozo, and Camino. V. The forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate that island and its dependencies, in three months after the ratifications shall be exchanged. At that time it shall be restored to the Order in the same state in which it was found, provided the Grand Master or commissioners fully authorised, according to the statutes of the Order, shall be in the island to take possession of it, and provided that the force to be furnished by his Sicilian Majesty, according to article XIII. shall have arrived. VI. The half of the garrison at least shall be composed of native Maltese. For the rest, the Order shall have the liberty of recruiting among the natives of those countries only that shall continue to possess langues in the Order. VII. The independence of the isles of Malta, Gozo and Camino, as well as the present arrangement, shall be placed under the protection and guarantee of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain and Prussia. VIII. The permanent neutrality of the isle of Malta is proclaimed. IX. The ports of Malta shall be open to the commerce and navigation of all nations, upon payment of an equal and moderate duty. Those duties shall be applied to the support of the Maltese langue, in the manner specified in article IVth, to that of the civil and military establishments of the island, as well as the lazaretto general, open to the flags of all nations. X. The Powers of Barbary are alone excepted from the dispositions of the two preceding articles, till by an arrangement to be brought about by the contracting parties, the system of perpetual hostilities which has subsisted for so long a time between these Powers and the Order of St John, shall be terminated. XI. The Order shall be governed in spiritual and temporal concerns by the same statutes that were in force since the Knights left the island, as far as they shall be compatible with the different regulations specified. XII. The dispositions contained in the articles III. IV. VI. VIII. and XI. shall be converted into perpetual laws and statutes of the Order in the usual form; and the Grand Master or his representative, after the island shall be restored, as well as his successors, shall be obliged to take an oath punctually to observe the said dispositions, as being the stipulations under which the isle of Malta has been restored to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and which shall be preserved by the Order for ever. XIII. His Sicilian Majesty shall furnish a force of two thousand men for a garrison to the different fortifications of the said islands. That force shall remain there one year from the date of the restitution of the island to the Knights. If, after the expiration of that term, in the opinion of the guaranteeing Powers, the Order shall not have raised a number of men sufficient to serve for a garrison in the island and its dependencies, in the manner proposed by the 6th article, the Neapolitan troops shall remain there till re-

lieved by a sufficient force, upon which the guaranteeing powers shall agree. XIV. The different powers specified in the 7th article, namely, Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia, shall be invited to accede to the present arrangement. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte reserves his answer till the first conference. *Cornwallis, Bonaparte.*

PROTOCOL.

Amiens, 18th Ventose, An 10, *March* 9, 1802. The Plenipotentiaries of the French Republic and his Britannic Majesty being met, Lord Cornwallis demanded the insertion in the protocol of the following note, in answer to that which Citizen Joseph Bonaparte has published in his note inserted in the protocol of the 2d Ventose, (21st of February) relative to the Ottoman Porte. Lord Cornwallis has communicated to his Government, as well as to the Ambassador of the Sublime Porte at Paris, this note of the French Plenipotentiary. It ought to be mentioned that the Ambassador has already announced to him on the 10th of January, that he had received the orders of the Sublime Porte to repair to Amiens to treat of a definitive treaty of peace with France, in concert with the allies of the Sublime Porte; and that he had applied to the Minister of Foreign Affai s of France in consequence, who was then at Lyons. The same Ambassador, according to the communication undermentioned, of what had passed relative to him between the French and Britannic Plenipotentiaries, has testified to Lord Cornwallis, of the date of the 27th of February, that which follows: That not having received an answer from the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the first request that he had made to be admitted to the Congress of Amiens, he had renewed that demand when that Minister had returned to Paris. That for the same purpose he had presented himself to the First Consul of the French Republic, who had replied, that it was not necessary for him to attend the Congress, and that he might treat directly at Paris, when an explanation had taken place between the French Republic and the British Cabinet, on the subject of the peace between France and Portugal, of which the case was similar to that which existed between France and the Sublime Porte. That having answered, that he could do nothing without communicating with the Allies of the Sublime Porte, he had insinuated to him to write on this subject to the Minister of his Britannic Majesty at London.

That having consulted his instructions, he had informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs, that he was not authorised to correspond with the British Cabinet, but only to concert with the British Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Amiens. That he had not yet received an ultimate and categorical answer to his demand on the part of the Minister of Foreign Relations: and that, finally, he always persisted to demand his admission to the congress. Citizen Bonaparte will easily perceive how this declaration of the Ottoman Ambassador himself differs from that which is contained in the note inserted in the Protocol of the 2d Ventose (21st of February.) It appears from this, that the Ambassador has not received any other powers or instructions than those by which he is ordered to repair to Amiens, there to treat of a definitive peace, in concert with the Allies of the Sublime Porte. Lord Cornwallis will take this opportunity of observing, upon what the First Consul appears to have said to the Ottoman Ambassador, that he cannot discover in it any exact resemblance in the two cases between France and Portugal, and France and the Sublime Porte. The Ex-Ambassador of the Porte has made a treaty with France at Paris, posterior to the preliminaries signed at London. The Sublime Porte has judged it proper to refuse to ratify the treaty, and to adhere to the preliminaries: this is what has been communicated to the British Government. Portugal, on the contrary, does not appear to have refused to ratify her separate treaty with France; this case, therefore, cannot be considered as resembling that which exists between the Sublime Porte and France. The British Government having seen the aforesaid *protocol* of the 2d Ventose (21st February) and the answer of the Ottoman Ambassador upon what is there thrown out, has ordered Lord Cornwallis to renew his demand to the Plenipotentiary of the French Republic, that the Ottoman Porte may be admitted as a contracting party, or as an acceding party, to the definitive treaty of peace.

Lord Cornwallis has therefore the honour to intreat Citizen Joseph Bonaparte to receive, on his part, the very pressing applications which he is charged to make to him in this respect. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, in his insisting upon his preceding declarations, has reserved to himself to answer, at greater length, in the next conference.

J. Bonaparte, Cornwallis.

The official documents on the negotiation of Amiens, give undeniable proofs of the great anxiety which the First Consul manifested in pressing it to a conclusion. To surmount the difficulties which still opposed it, he gave special instructions to Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, to afford the negotiation all the accommodations compatible with the honour and interest of France; confining himself in other repects, and on all occasions, to the spirit of the preliminaries. In consequence of these directions the French Plenipotentiary

remitted the *projet* of the treaty, inserted in the *protocol* of the 15th Ventose. In the conversations which followed, between the two Plenipotentiaries, Marquis Cornwallis declared that he had enforced, in his correspondence with his Court, the observation of the French Government, namely, that the French troops should remain at Otranto as long as the English remained at Malta. Meanwhile, the Cabinet of London evinced some repugnance to insert a clause which bore expressly upon the Court of Naples; and it was altogether out of respect to that Court, and from an entire confidence in the good faith of the British Government, that the Cabinet of Paris desisted from the clause it had demanded, and which was acknowledged just by the English Ambassador himself. This new proof of condescension and of sincerity, did not prevent the negotiation from being still protracted by the delay of the answers which Marquis Cornwallis expected from London. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte addressed to him a note for expediting matters; to which the English Plenipotentiary replied, without expressing any decision upon the contested points. These two documents were in the following terms:

Amiens, 19th Ventose, An 10. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte has received from Paris, the answers which he could desire, upon the articles which have been the object of the last conferences. He believes the discussion so completely exhausted, that the period of the negotiation cannot be much longer retarded. He prays, therefore, that Lord Cornwallis will have the kindness to declare the moment when, having received the explanations which he still waited for yesterday, upon the article of the prisoners and others, he will be in condition to conclude. The moment of the epoch so much desired, will no longer depend but upon the Plenipotentiaries. Lord Cornwallis will, doubtless, partake in the impatience of the undersigned.

J. Bonaparte.

Note of Lord Cornwallis. Amiens, March 11, 1802. Lord Cornwallis, in place of answering the whole subject of the note which Citizen Joseph Bonaparte has done him the honour to address to him, of yesterday's date, conceives that he stamps a higher value upon it by transmitting it immediately to his Government. He has received the most lively pleasure from learning, that that Minister believes that the period of the negotiation cannot be retarded. The desire of the British Government to see it terminated, cannot be equalled but by the personal wishes of Lord Cornwallis in that respect. He will be eager, therefore, to communicate to Citizen Joseph Bonaparte the information which regards the article of the prisoners the very moment it arrives. He has nothing to wait for but this article; and he has too much confidence in the justice of the French Government to believe, that if his Government conceives it still contrary to its honour to comply, in any manner, with the desires which France has expressed upon the other objects, of which he gave an account yesterday, that that refusal of his Government will prove any obstacle to the conclusion of the peace. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte may be well assured, that Lord Cornwallis will partake in all his impatience to accelerate that epoch, when the final adjustment of the matter shall only depend upon the Plenipotentiaries. *Cornwallis.*

The answers from London, for which Lord Cornwallis waited, so far from expediting the negotiation, were calculated only to retard it. He himself was convinced of the fact; and, in a conference of seven hours, which he had on the 27th Ventose, with Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, who, having recapitulated all the accommodations and all the sacrifices which France had been induced to offer with the hope of obtaining a prompt and honourable termination of differences between the two nations, Lord Cornwallis appeared to be personally affected by the delays which the negotiation still experienced, and expressed a hope that his Government would desist from changes which it had proposed. The moment was decisive. At the conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace, a circumstance took place similar to that which had previously occurred at the conclusion of the preliminary treaty; namely, that at the moment of signing England multiplied difficulties and chicaneries, as if it had never had a sincere desire to terminate hostilities, and that some afterthought had always remained to delay that general repose, so desirable to all Europe. Citizen Joseph Bonaparte, to point out, in vivid terms, all the contradictions of such a conduct, in the last note which he sent on the 28th Ventose, resumed with as much clearness as energy, the numberless proofs which the First Consul had given of his uniform inclination for a speedy and favourable conclusion of the definitive treaty.

Amiens, 28th Ventose, An 10.

NOTE.—The undersigned has seen, with as much pain as astonishment, the alterations made by the British government upon the plan of the definitive treaty, the joint result of the labour of the plenipotentiaries, since the commencement of the conferences, and solemnly communicated to the ministers of Spain, and of the Batavian Republic, in the meeting of the 22 Ventose. That work, so difficult, was drawn up in the conference of 29 Nivose. In that of the 7 Pluviose,

the preamble and ten articles (articles I. III. VII. VIII. IX. XII. XIII. XVI. XVII. and XXII.) were agreed to. The article regarding the Cape of Good Hope was agreed to in the conference of the 8 Pluviose, at which the Batavian minister assisted. In that of the 15 Ventose (March 6), several other articles (articles IV. V. XIV. XV. XVIII.) were drawn up in concert. There remained no farther difficulties but upon paragraph 12 of article X. regarding Malta; upon article XIX. relative to the accession of the Ligurian Republic; upon the separate article, relative to the continuance of the French troops at Otranto; upon the accession of the Ottoman Porte; and upon article II. regarding the prisoners. Lord Cornwallis having proposed the reducing to writing of paragraph 12, and of some other less important paragraphs of the article relative to Malta, that proposal was adopted. The article relative to the Sublime Ottoman Porte was also inserted in the treaty upon the same day, 17 Ventose. The articles relative to criminals, and to the general guaranteeing of the stipulations, were adopted in the same conference, agreeably to the desire which the British minister manifested in regard to them. The article concerning the prisoners, discussed at great length during the first days of the negotiation, had at length appeared to Lord Cornwallis not to present any farther obstacle, having several times assured the undersigned, that he believed the period of the negotiation was arrived, seeing there was no more but that article to discuss of it. Lord Cornwallis believing, as the undersigned also did, that moment arrived, was pleased to inform him that he was eager to demand of his court the final terms of that article, the principal stipulations of which had been already agreed to. In the mean time, in his answer to the note of the undersigned, of 19 Ventose, Lord Cornwallis expressed the wish, *that if the English government conceived it still contrary to its honour to comply, in any manner, with the desires which France had expressed upon the other objects, of which he had given any account, that refusal of his government would not prove an obstacle to the peace.* Those objects which could still retard the conclusion were now reduced to the article of the accession of the Ligurian Republic, and to the continuing of the French troops at Otranto. The undersigned was fortunate enough to be authorized to announce, upon the 20th, to Lord Cornwallis, that these last obstacles were removed by the condescension of his government, which consented to the admission of the article regarding the evacuations without restriction, and to the admission of that article relative to the Ligurian Republic. The moment so much desired, was at length arrived. It was agreed that, upon the 22d, the plenipotentiaries of the four contracting powers should meet to adjust several articles of detail, such as the language in which the treaty should be reduced to writing, the titles, &c. That meeting took place at the house of the Batavian minister. The English and Spanish ministers having desired an alteration as to article VI. regarding the Cape of Good Hope, it was adopted after some trifling discussions. Lord Cornwallis was pleased to express to the undersigned, how much he was struck with the facility with which the Batavian minister had given up the article which had been previously subscribed, and with the conciliating manner in which M. le Chevalier D'Azara had relinquished the desire which he had always expressed, of having the treaty reduced into the Spanish language, in order to avoid the delay which the dispatching a new courier would occasion. Article V. was of new discussed between the English and Batavian ministers, and it was agreed that there should be added, for the greater precaution, to the words already agreed upon, "and to its East India Company." A separate article, containing some reservations as to the *langues*, was also agreed upon. Lord Cornwallis having expressed, in the same conference, to the undersigned, that he was particularly desirous, that in article XIX. the Ottoman Porte should be described as the ally of his Britannic Majesty, the undersigned readily assented to it. These corrections were made upon the different original minutes by the secretaries of legation; and it was at the same time agreed, that the secretary to the French legation should undertake to have copies, conformably to the alterations then made, prepared for the ministers of Spain, and of the Batavian Republic. The article concerning the prisoners alone, of which the British ministry had reserved the final wording, was still not literally adjusted. Marquis Cornwallis waited for it with the greatest impatience: all the plenipotentiaries, particularly the undersigned, fully participated in the confidence expressed by him; but, yesterday, in place of a simple article drawn up in a spirit of conciliation, agreeably to the preliminaries, and to the promises of the British plenipotentiary, the undersigned received a *projet*, which does away several important articles, puts back the negotiation, endangers its fate, even at a period when it appeared happily arrived at its termination; at the same time, too, is an order to arm in their ports, given by the British government. To appreciate every extraordinary circumstance which this change presents, it is sufficient to compare the definitive terms of the treaty, such as

have been adopted by the four plenipotentiaries, with the new plan which has been communicated to him by Lord Cornwallis, and of which he has sent him a copy upon the 27th current. The undersigned wishes still to believe that the efforts of the plenipotentiary cannot have been made in vain; that Lord Cornwallis will experience from his government the same confidence which the undersigned has had the happiness to inspire into his, and which he has employed to bring matters to such a point, that it was impossible for any wise and moderate man not to regard the work of pacification as accomplished. It is, above all, in these circumstances, that the undersigned is desirous of authentically renewing to Lord Cornwallis, the homage and profound esteem with which his sentiments and his character inspire him: he begs that he will be pleased to accept of his high consideration.

J. Bonaparte.

Art. I. There shall be peace, friendship, and good understanding, between his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, their heirs and successors. *Observation.* In the first article of the treaty drawn up with the concurrence of the plenipotentiaries, only four powers were enumerated; namely, France, England, Spain, and Holland: in the new *projet*, on the contrary, the Sublime Porte is introduced as if that government had been mentioned in the act. II. All the prisoners made on either side, by sea or land, and the hostages carried away and given during the war, and to this day, shall be restored, without ransom, in six weeks at latest, reckoning from the day of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty; and on paying the debts which they may have contracted during their captivity. Each contracting party, to whom prisoners have been restored, or may be restored, shall respectively pay the advances which have been made by any of the contracting parties, for the subsistence and maintenance of those prisoners in the countries in which they have been detained, conformable to the receipts, proved accounts, and other authentic documents, which shall be furnished by both parties. Commissioners shall be appointed by the contracting parties to regulate and adjust the claims and demands of each, as well as the amount due on the said credits. *Observation.* The part of article 2d, which relates to the compensations for the maintenance of prisoners, ought to have been drawn up either according to the preliminaries, or according to the repeated promises of the English plenipotentiary; but the new article is drawn up upon an opposite, or, at least, a very different principle. III. Conformable. IV. Conformable. V. The Batavian Republic cedes and guarantees, in full property and sovereignty to his Britannic Majesty, all the possessions and establishments in the island of Ceylon which did belong to the republic of the United Provinces, or to its East India Company. *Observation.* In art. 5, it is endeavoured to change the denomination of the Batavian Republic, into that of the Republic of the *United Provinces*. VI. The Cape of Good Hope is restored in full sovereignty to the Batavian Republic. Its ports shall be open for the trade and navigation of the contracting parties, whose subjects and citizens shall, with respect to the payment of duties, be placed on the same footing as the citizens of the Batavian Republic. *Observation.* This article does indeed grant to France and England the greatest advantages in the ports of the Cape of Good Hope. But the French minister considers it his duty to observe, that article six of the *projet*, generally adopted, was agreed upon by the plenipotentiaries, and inserted in the *Protocol*. VII. Conformable. VIII. It seems just that the paragraph added to this article should be omitted, as his Britannic Majesty is not directly a party to the exception in question: but if the paragraph be preserved, it will be necessary to add another, affirming the integrity of Portugal in other respects. *Observation.* It has been recognized that it is indispensable to declare the preservation of the integrity of the Portuguese possessions; but with the reduction resulting from the cession of Olivenza to Spain, which could not be more properly expressed than in article eight, which it is proposed to change. IX. Conformable. X. Words to be substituted in paragraph first, instead of those which follow:—PREVIOUSLY. From the exchange of the preliminary articles of peace, it is expected that the election should be made conformable to the statutes and forms established for regulating the election of a Grand Master. The office of Grand Master of the Order is considered by the contracting parties as having been vacant at the time the preliminary articles were signed. To insert in paragraph three these words, "*Existing Nobility.*" To insert in paragraph nine, the following words: "The system of perpetual hostility, which has so long subsisted between those powers and the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, shall be terminated." To insert at the end of paragraph eleven, the following words: "Shall be held to make oath to observe punctually the said regulations, they being the stipulations under which the island of Malta is to be restored to the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and which shall for ever be observed by the Order."

Observation. This addition contains a superfluous stipulation, relative to the non-continuance of the former Grand Master. The change proposed in the ninth paragraph, renders the concurrence of the contracting powers, relative to the cessation of hostilities by the Barbary states, only applicable to the hostilities which these states carry on against the Order of Malta. This, though infinitely less advantageous to the general good, is still honourable, but very difficult of execution; for, either the powers which have langues in Malta, and remain in war with the Barbary states, must abstain from the advantages they would obtain by being admitted into the ports of that island, or the Barbary powers themselves must renounce those advantages. The addition proposed to paragraph eleven, is only a repetition of that which is stipulated by the same paragraph, and which is also literally expressed in the first paragraph. The changes suggested to be made in the twelfth paragraph, depart from the spirit of independence and impartiality, according to which it was pretended the new organization of Malta was to be regulated; since, according to that change, the King of Naples may send a garrison to Malta, consisting of many liable to be greatly prejudiced. In the course of the negotiation, Neapolitan troops have always been mentioned; but Swiss troops in the service of Naples are not Neapolitans. XI. Conformable. XII. To add to this article after the words, "by this present treaty," the following words: "Except in the case in which it is expressly otherwise disposed of." XIII. XIV. XV. and XVIII. Some words which differ in the translation, of no importance. XVI. Conformable. XVIII. All the property which belonged to the Prince described by his Britannic Majesty as Prince of Orange, and by the French Republic as Prince of Nassau, in the month of December, 1794, and which has been sequestered since that period, shall be restored to him. XIX. The Sublime Ottoman Porte shall be invited by the contracting parties to accede to the present definitive treaty of peace, on the terms and conditions therein specified, and to transmit the ratifications at the end of three months, or sooner, if possible.

Joseph Bonaparte.

Six days after the delivery of this note, the treaty was signed; and the same hand which regulated the affairs of the continent with so much glory and success at Luneville, consummated, at Amiens, the maritime peace.

[*Here follows the definitive treaty, for which see Cobbett's Annual Register, Vol. I. page 321.*]

Thus was the treaty of Amiens concluded: the ratifications were exchanged, and there was, on the part of France, no delay in the punctual execution of all the articles. In three months, the kingdom of Naples, Tarentum, and the Papal States, were evacuated. Both nations began to taste the fruits of the peace. But the war-faction of London suffered no opportunity in parliament to escape them of provoking hostilities; and even from the language of the ministry during the discussions, it appeared that they only waited for intelligence from the continent, in order to violate the peace. A number of execrable men, who had survived our intestine revolutions, and whom the English government had employed during the war, were still pensioned, and were now meditating assassinations in Jersey and London, at the same time that they were publishing, in periodical papers in the French language, every thing which could excite the indignation of the republic. Some priests, unworthy of that sacred character, rebels against the authority of the Pope, and the disgrace of the Catholic Church, continued to hold meetings in London, where they fabricated *mandata*, and used every means in their power to promote trouble and disorder in the interior of France. After the English government had frequently promised to put a period to such offensive abuse, the government of the republic, finding that all those promises were ineffectual, thought proper to present an official note on the subject, to ascertain at least the intentions and the object of the British cabinet, and to propose that whatever should be prohibited in France, with respect to the reciprocal interests of the two countries, should also be prohibited in England. This note, which was delivered by Citizen Otto, was conceived in these terms:—

[*Here follows a note from M. Otto to Lord Hawkesbury, dated London, August 17, 1802. See No. 12 of the papers on the negotiation, laid before Parliament on the 18th of May, 1803, at page 1003 of this volume.*]

This note remained without any official answer; the British ministry contenting themselves with stating, that they would cause satisfactory explanations to be made at Paris: but though this was promised, nothing was performed. The periodical papers in the French language were encouraged and circulated with additional profusion; and the plots and intrigues continued. Persuaded, at last, that this proceeded, not from inattention, but from design, on the part of the British government, the French government sacrificed, to its love of peace, the resentment which these wretched libels occasioned, and no farther notice was taken of them. Accordingly, from the

month of Thermidor, year 10, there was not, in the intercourse between the two governments, any mutual complaint, or any exchange of official documents. England, however, did not evacuate Egypt, though the period fixed for that evacuation had expired several months; and the arrangements made at Malta indicated an intention of keeping her troops there. Some conversations took place, both at Paris and London, between the ambassadors and the ministers of both countries. England, at first, declared that she waited for the guarantee of the powers mentioned in the treaty of Amiens; and, afterwards, that she waited for the election of a Grand Master. The guarantees were given; the Grand Master was appointed; all obstacles were removed; it was even thought that some transports which passed through the straits of Gibraltar had been sent to bring away the English troops; and that Malta was about to be delivered up to the Neapolitan garrison: but, without any explanation, without any previous note, the King of England sent to his parliament a message, which was conceived in the following terms:

[*Here follows his Majesty's Message communicated to both Houses of Parliament on the 8th of March* 1803. *See Parliamentary Minutes, at page* 403 *of this volume.*]

The Ambassador of the Republic at London, finding that the British Government had made false assertions for the purpose of exciting a clamour for war, and that they spoke of negotiations which did not exist; saw that this conduct could only proceed from a determination to violate the treaty of Amiens, and compel the Republic to accede to dishonourable stipulations. He therefore thought it his duty to enter into some explanation, and presented the following note:

[*Here follows a note from Gen. Andreossi to Lord Hawkesbury, dated Portland Place, March* 10, 1803. *See No.* 41 *of the Papers on the Negotiation, laid before Parliament on the* 18*th of May, at page* 1042 *of this volume.*]

It was not until the 24th of Ventose (March 15,) seven days after the message had been sent to Parliament, that Lord Hawkesbury transmitted the answer of his Cabinet: which was in the following terms:

[*Here follows a note from Lord Hawkesbury to Gen. Andreossi, dated Downing-street, March* 15*th. See No.* 45, *of the papers laid before Parliament on the* 18*th of May, at page* 1047 *of this volume.*]

The complaints and explanations contained in this note should have been made long before the message was sent to parliament. The moment when the three months fixed for the evacuation of Malta were about to expire, was the time for stating the grounds on which the evacuation ought to be refused or delayed. Some discussions would then have arisen between the two Governments; and, however legitimate the pretensions of England might have been, she certainly ought to have employed the means of negotiation before she appealed to arms. On the contrary, the British Government began with warlike projects and preparations; and then stated, for the first time, the complaints which were the motives of its determinations. The singularity of this conduct, and the suspicions which it justly excited, did not prevent the First Consul from replying to the note of the British Cabinet. This answer was delivered by General Andreossy, and was conceived in the following terms:

[*Here follows a note from General Andreossi to Lord Hawkesbury, dated London, 7th Germinal, An* 11. *See the first inclosure in No.* 49, *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, at page* 1053 *of this volume.*

Particular circumstances occasioned new solicitudes. English cruizers appeared on the coasts of Holland; and the French Minister for foreign affairs addressed the following note on the subject to the English Ambassador:

Paris, 4th Germinal, Year 11.

The undersigned minister for foreign affairs is charged to demand of the English Ambassador a categorical explanation respecting the violation of the French territory, which has taken place by the landing of 24 brigands between Ostend and Dunkirk, who were thrown on the coast by vessels belonging to his Britannic Majesty. Information has farther been received, that one of his Majesty's brigs also anchored in the road of Ostend; and that this brig compelled a French boat to carry on shore sixteen foreigners, who have served in the ranks of the British army. It is asked with astonishment, who could thus dare to violate the territory of France, and throw on her coasts the profligate of every country? Several English frigates have appeared before Helvoetsluys, to cruise before the road; and the captains have declared to all the Dutch boats with which they have spoken, that they are directed to prevent the sailing of French vessels. The London papers have published a pretended letter from the First Consul to the King of England, and also an account of the wreck of several vessels loaden with 100,000 stand of arms, for Ireland, with the colours of the United Irish on board. All these clamours seem to have evidently for their object to irritate the French nation, and to lay her under the obligation of repelling force by force. This proceeding on the part of the British Government is not worthy of its power. If his Britannic Majesty wishes,

in fact, to declare war, he ought to do it frankly and openly; but while war is not declared, he ought not to permit violations of territory and of flag. The conduct of the First Consul, during the fortnight in which he has received every kind of provocation, has been full of candour and good faith, and extreme moderation; but they will be strangely deceived, who suppose that this moderation can be carried so far as to view coolly any violations of territory or flag.

Ch. Mau. Talleyrand.

A new circumstance soon demanded a new remonstrance. It was known that the first orders which were transmitted for the evacuation of the Cape, had been revoked; that the evacuation had not taken place; and that, in a state of perfect peace, a capitulation had been concluded between the English and Dutch troops: whence it resulted, that the latter were only tolerated at the Cape, while the English troops preserved the possession of it. The Minister for foreign affairs addressed the following note upon this subject, to Lord Whitworth:

Paris, 9th Germinal, Year 11.

The newspapers have just published a pretended capitulation between the English and Dutch troops; whence it would result, that the Cape of Good Hope is still in the possession of the English. Though the First Consul has not been able to give any credit to the news of so extraordinary a violation of the treaty of Amiens, the reports which are circulated on this subject are so strongly accredited, particularly in London, and the details of the capitulation are so explicit, that the undersigned is charged to demand from the Ambassador of England such explanations as may dissipate every doubt on so serious a fact. The undersigned entreats the Ambassador of England to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

Ch. Mau. Talleyrand.

The answers of the English Ambassador, dated the 15th and 17th Germinal, relative to the cruizers, and the non-evacuation of the Cape, are thus expressed:

Paris, April 5th, 1803.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty, having transmitted to his Court the copy of the note communicated to him the 25th of the last month by M. de Talleyrand, Minister for foreign affairs, has it in charge to communicate to his Excellency, that the British Government has no knowledge of the facts which are therein represented as a violation of the territory of France. The Ministers of his Britannic Majesty have nevertheless thought it their duty to use all the means in their power, to inform themselves of the circumstances to which such an interpretation has been given; and, in order to facilitate these inquiries, the undersigned requests that M. Talleyrand will have the goodness to communicate to him the particulars which have reached the French Government upon this subject. As to the English frigates which are supposed to be cruizing before the ports of the Batavian Republic, his Britannic Majesty does not conceal that there are several ships of war in the seas adjoining those ports; but if the officers who command them have made any movements, or held any language which can be regarded as hostile, their conduct, in that respect, has been directly opposite to their instructions. The King relies with entire confidence in the assurances given him by the French Government, that the troops destined for Louisiana will not sail in the present circumstances. The undersigned can only repeat, what he has often declared to M. de Talleyrand, on the subject of the articles which have appeared in the English journals; that is, that the British Ministry cannot be responsible, except for what appears in the paper which is published by their authority, under the title of the London Gazette. The undersigned refers to the moderation and the candour which have distinguished the conduct of the British Government during the course of the present discussions, to prove with what sincerity it desires to avoid every thing that might give rise to animosity between the two nations. The undersigned entreats M. de Talleyrand to accept the assurance of his high consideration.

Whitworth.

Paris, April 7, 1803.

The undersigned Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty, is charged by his Court to communicate to the French Government, in answer to the note which M. de Talleyrand, Minister for foreign affairs, addressed to him on the subject of the occupation of the Cape of Good Hope by the British troops, that orders were dispatched on the 20th November last, to cause that colony to be evacuated forthwith by his Majesty's forces; and consequently that there is no doubt that that establishment is already restored to the Batavian Republic. The undersigned entreats his Excellency M. de Talleyrand to accept the assurance of his high consideration. *Whitworth.*

The answer of Lord Hawkesbury to the note of the 7th Germinal was received at the same time, and on the same day the British Ambassador transmitted the subjoined note. These two papers were conceived in the following terms:

[*For the first of these, see a note from Lord Hawkesbury to General Andreossi, dated Downing-street, April* 3, 1803, *which note is the second inclosure in No.* 49 *of the papers laid before Parliament on the* 18*th of May. See page* 1057, *of this volume.*]

[*For the second, see a note from Lord Whitworth to M. Talleyrand, which was enclosed in No.* 52 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, and which may be found at page* 1061 *of this volume.*]

After the delivery of these notes, a long conference took place, on the 18th of Germinal, between the Minister for foreign affairs and the English Ambassador; in consequence of which, Lord Whitworth agreed to write the following letter to his Government:

[*This letter is the inclosure referred to, in No.* 53 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, and may be found at page* 1063 *of this volume.*]

The English Ambassador received instructions from his Court in answer to this dispatch, in consequence of which, he sent the following note, without signature or date, on the 27th Germinal.

[*This note is the inclosure referred to in No.* 58 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May; and may be found at page* 1068 *of this volume.*]

This proposition was preceded by an overture, still more unreasonable, which required that Malta should be ceded in full sovereignty, and in perpetuity, to the British government. But neither the first nor the second of these propositions could be made the subject of serious discussion, because they were both in complete contradiction to the treaty of Amiens, and consequently to the basis of the negotiation proposed by France, and on which Lord Whitworth, himself, founded the discussion, by the letter he wrote to his court after the conference of the 18th Germinal. Such was the state of affairs on the 6th Floreal, when Lord Whitworth read the last instructions he had received, and in consequence of which he required, 1st, That his Britannic Majesty should retain his troops at Malta for ten years: 2dly, That the island of Lampedosa should be ceded to him in full possession: 3dly, That the French troops should evacuate Holland. Lord Whitworth added, that in case a convention was not concluded upon the above basis within the course of seven days, his orders were to leave Paris, and return to England. He therefore presented these conditions as the *ultimatum* of his government. The minister for foreign affairs then thought proper to require, that Lord Whitworth would reduce to writing, and sign those propositions which contained the final decision of his court. Lord Whitworth refused; alledging that his instructions did not permit him to comply with this request. A mode of proceeding so totally new, as the exhibition of a verbal *ultimatum*, when the rupture of a formal treaty was in question, excited the greatest surprise: and it was for some days expected that the English ambassador would at last consent to present his propositions in writing: but the French minister applied to him in vain to do so; and no solicitation could induce him to depart from a course which he considered to be irrevocably traced out for him. The First Consul still persisted in giving a new testimony of the uniformity of his desire for peace; and, after some days spent in fruitless expectation, he ordered that the verbal propositions of Lord Whitworth should be replied to, in the same manner as if they had been regularly made under the official signature of the ambassador. The following is a copy of the answer:—

[*See the first inclosure, referred to in No.* 66 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, at page* 1078 *of this volume.*]

When the preceding note was on the point of being transmitted to the English ambassador, the minister received an official demand from him for passports to leave France. He, therefore, accompanied the note with a letter, in which he expressed his hopes that the communication might prove of such a nature as to change the ambassador's resolution. His resolution, however, remained unchanged; and he persisted in his demand for passports by the following note, in answer to that which had been transmitted to him.

[*See the second inclosure referred to in No.* 66 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, at page* 1079 *of this volume.*]

Notwithstanding the positive manner in which Lord Whitworth demanded his passports, the First Consul, who had constantly reflected on the means of avoiding a rupture, resolved to make a last effort, and accordingly directed the minister for foreign affairs to transmit the following note to the English ambassador:—

[*See a note from M. Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth, being the inclosure referred to in No.* 67 *of the papers presented on the* 18*th of May, at p.* 1080 *of this volume.*]

The English minister took this note *ad referendum*, and determined to send a messenger to his court. By the return of this courier, who was the bearer of a new and important overture, Lord Whitworth received instructions, in consequence of which he presented the note and plan of convention which are here subjoined:—

[*This note is the first inclosure referred to in No. 70 of the papers presented on the 18th of May, and may be found at page 1085 of the present volume. The copy of this paper, as it was published by the British ministry, has been declared by the French government to be garbled. By turning to page 856, the reader will see the genuine paper.*]

[*The projet alluded to is the second inclosure referred to in No. 70 of the papers presented on the 18th of May, and may be found at page 1085 of this volume.*]

Far from offering terms of conciliation, this *projet* of the court of London only repeated some inadmissible propositions, which were still farther aggravated by the terms in which they were drawn up. Besides, this note contained an assertion so contrary to the known dispositions of the court of Russia, that it was thought proper to reply to it immediately by the following note :—

[*Here follows a note from M. Talleyrand to Lord Whitworth, dated Paris, 22d Floreal, an 11, which note may be found in No. 2 of the papers presented on the 24th of May, at page 1135 of this volume. That copy the French government has declared to be garbled. For the genuine paper, see page 856 of this volume.*]

This note produced no effect. The ambassador of his Britannic Majesty confined himself to acknowledging the receipt of it; and so positive were his instructions, that he persisted in demanding his passports. His last note was in the following terms :—

[*See a note from Lord Whitworth, dated Paris, May 12, 1803, which note is marked No. 3, of the papers presented on the 24th of May, and may be found at page 1136 of this volume.*]

The passports which were demanded by Lord Whitworth, with a perseverence that appeared to have been imperiously dictated, were sent on the 22d Floreal, after three successive messages on his part. The ambassador began his journey about nine o'clock that evening. The First Consul was desirous that he should not leave the territory of the republic without bearing to his government a manifestation still more formal than all the preceding, of the constant disposition of the French government; and he directed the undersigned to transmit to him the following note :—

[*Here follows a note from M. Talleyrand to the British minister for foreign affairs, dated May 14th, 1803. This note was, on the 20th, communicated by the Counsellors of State to the Conservative Senate, and may be found among the public papers, at page 840 of this volume.*]

[*The concluding paper in this collection is a message, signed by Bonaparte, and sent, on the 20th of May, to the Senate, Legislative Body, and Tribunate. This message may be found among the public papers, at page 847 of this volume.*]

OBSERVATIONS ON THE MANIFESTO OF THE KING OF ENGLAND.

[*From the Moniteur of the 7th of June, 1803.*]

"Si la vérité était bannie de la terre, elle devrait se réfugier dans le cœur des rois."

"Though good faith were banished from the rest of the earth, she ought still to retain her habitation in the breasts of princes*."

IF we may judge from the false allegations which abound in his various messages to parliament, as well as in the solemn declaration which has recently been issued from a throne, which peace only could render secure; it is not, assuredly, in the breast of the King of Great-Britain that good faith has found this asylum. Is it Europe that this monarch attempts to impose upon by this turbulent manifesto? Is it France he wishes to mislead or divide by his groundless accusations? Is it the allies of the republic whose confidence he hopes to alienate, by a hypocritical interest in their past situation? Is it his own subjects he is desirous of plunging into error, for the purpose of engaging them in a war purely ministerial? Or, rather, is it not the shameful violation of the sworn faith of nations, that his Britannic Majesty has undertaken to disguise? Is it not the evident dispositions of the letter and spirit of the treaties of pacified Europe that he has attempted to misconstrue? Is it not to palliate long-premeditated depredations on the commercial and maritime powers of the continent, that deceitful messages and faithless communications have been made to the British parliament; that, with an alarming ostentation, and in the moment of profound peace, he has organized military preparations in all his ports, a simultaneous aggression upon every ocean without motive, and rapacious hostilities without shame? But, if the causes of his complaints were legitimate, why force

* See Hume's England, vol. ii. p. 471. T.

the negotiations? Why, by an act of despotism, irrevocably close the door of reconciliation? Why oppose the interference of a mediating power? Why mutilate official papers? Why deceive the national representation? Why conceal the truth from a powerful people? Why change, in an unaccountable manner, the constitutional publicity of their parliamentary deliberations? Are the King of England and his ministers accustomed to imagine, that armed injustice is the power alone worthy of governing the universe? And do they not know, that violence and falsehood are ever injurious to the best of causes? The destiny of empires is more closely connected with the maintenance of treaties, and a due observance of the pledged faith of nations, than we are generally led to acknowledge. To the French government we commit the glorious task of victoriously replying, by the last and irresistible argument of governments and of nations, to these odious recriminations. In its moderate, pacific, and generous proceedings, it has been actuated by motives of duty: to the patience and dignity with which it has fulfilled that duty, the whole nation bears witness. Two years will scarcely have passed over our heads, before the genius of Europe, armed for peace, will have written, in characters of terror, on the shores of Britain, the merited punishment for the infraction of treaties. We shall confine ourselves to a simple refutation of the motives avowed in the manifesto of the King of England; and leave our readers to judge, whether the causes assigned for entering upon a war of so dreadful a nature betray, in the aggressor, a greater portion of injustice or of hatred, of falsehood or of blind infatuation. In voluntarily declaring war against France, at the expiration of a short twelve months of peace, the King of England pretends, "*that it was his sincere desire, not only to put an end to the hostilities which subsisted between the two countries, but also to adopt such measures as might most effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe**." And what were these measures? They are distinctly written in the treaty of Amiens: to restore the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch, in exchange for the valuable island of Ceylon; to restore Minorca to Spain, in exchange for the favourable colonial position of Trinidad; to evacuate Egypt, at a moment when the plague at Alexandria was the only powerful motive which induced the English to abandon that town; and, lastly, to evacuate the island of Malta, whose command over the commerce of the Mediterranean whispers to his avarice the perpetual possession. Such are the "measures" which he has adopted for "effectually consolidating the general tranquillity of Europe!" In what, then, does this new method of "consolidating the general tranquillity of Europe" consist? In declaring war against one of its principal powers, and in seizing upon every maritime position, calculated to secure to Great Britain an universal tyranny.

"*The same motives*," continues the King of England, "*by which his Majesty was actuated during the negotiations, have since invariably governed his conduct**." If these secret motives "during the negotiations" were *not* to abandon the possession of the island of Malta, it is, indeed, evident, that these same motives have not ceased to direct his conduct; but, if we may be permitted to speak the language of frankness and sincerity, it is far more evident, that the motive which has *invariably* actuated the conduct of the King, has been the perpetual usurpation of the island of Malta, by not executing the 4th paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. Is this evincing a desire "*effectually to contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe?*" Or is it not, on the contrary, commencing his declaration with a false and ridiculous proposition; since a manifest violation of the treaty of Amiens, in one of its most important dispositions, consists in his not restoring Malta to its legitimate sovereigns, the Mediterranean and navigation to their natural independence, and the commerce of nations to its indispensable and prescriptive liberty. The King declares, that he was actuated by a desire "*to consolidate the tranquillity of Europe before the negotiations for peace, as well as since that period.*" This is by no means the fact. The retention of Malta was the first act of this "consolidation of the peace of Europe;" and, at the present moment, more than at any former period, the cannon of the English tyrannizes in the Mediterranean from the heights of this rock, and insults the general commerce of that ocean, in the same degree *since* the signature of peace, as before that event was consummated. Facts speak louder than words. The stubborn and hostile retention of the island of Malta is the sole reply to these pretended "*amicable intentions*," to this "*sincere desire of his Britannic Majesty, to contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe.*"

1st CHARGE. The King of England complains, that "*the proceedings of the French government relative to commerce, afford the most striking contrast to his open, liberal, and friendly conduct;*" and that "*the prohibitions which*

* See present vol. p. 743.

* See p. 743.

*had been placed on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects during the war have been enforced with increased strictness and severity**." Here, then, we behold the conduct of the King of England suddenly become *open*, *liberal*, and *friendly!* Doubtless, yes; if *openness* consists in signing a treaty which was never intended to be executed; if *liberality* consists in prohibiting the introduction of French silks the moment they became fashionable in London; if *friendship* consists in carrying on war, with calumnies and with poignards during peace, and in hating and annoying, under the mask of benevolence and good neighbourhood. Can, then, the conduct of the King of England, under these points of view, be considered as *open*, *liberal*, and *friendly?* Far more correct would it have been, to have termed his conduct dexterous and cunning, in the deceitful, political senses of those expressions; for the King, in order to flatter the manufacturing and mercantile spirit of the English, in which alone their public spirit consists, has not scrupled to assert in his declaration, that "*the prohibitions on the commerce of his Majesty's subjects have been enforced with increased severity.*" That this assertion, also, is not founded in fact, proof upon proof might be adduced; but the following will be sufficient for our purpose. During the war, no British vessel landed her cargo in France; since the peace, our ports have been crowded with them. The introduction of English coal was prohibited during the war; it has been permitted since the peace. Besides, how can prohibitions of this nature be made a ground of complaint? Seeing that they are reciprocal, and in no country are so numerous or so rigid as in Great Britain. Our merchandize, and even our territorial produce, have invariably been rejected. Our wines can with difficulty find their way thither, and the duties upon them are exorbitant. The British government, jealous of the prosperity of all nations, would render all nations subject to its industry, and permit no consumption but the exports of its own commerce. Has France renounced her powers of industry, and her commercial spirit, by setting her hand to a treaty of peace? Has she sanctioned at Amiens the exclusive commerce and manufactures of Great Britain? Has not the latter her prohibitions, her imposts, and her custom-house duties? And in no respect does France infringe upon the treaty of peace, by organizing, in her turn, her customs and her prohibitions, according as the interest of her commerce and industry may require.

With the same want of correctness, the King of England asserts, that *all prohibitions on French commerce imposed during the war were removed**." This cannot possibly be true; for, previous to the war, a treaty of commerce between France and Great Britain was in existence. The various prohibitions during the war had destroyed the stipulations of this treaty. In order, therefore, that "*all*" the prohibitions "*imposed during the war*" should be completely removed, it would have been necessary to restore the advantages stipulated, with regard to France, by the treaty of commerce; and this, assuredly, is what Great Britain has not done. On the contrary, whatever could prove favourable to the commerce of France, has either been totally prohibited in England, or made subject to duties tantamount to a prohibition. Is not Great Britain, of all nations, the most exclusive in her commerce? Is it not the only one in possession of a Navigation Act? But have the other powers of Europe discovered a motive for warfare, either in her Navigation Act, or her system of exclusion? It is, therefore, highly absurd for England to behold, in our proceedings relative to British commerce, a subject of war. If she entertains the foolish idea, that France will sacrifice the manufactures and industry of her inhabitants to the manufactures and industry of England, and that war must last till she has attained this object, Great Britain must first succeed in disarming us; which she will find no easy enterprize against a nation of 33 millions of individuals, accustomed to victory, and who have successfully resisted the combined force of all Europe leagued against them; against a nation which, through ten years of triumphs, has taught the astonished universe, that, in spite of civil wars and dissentions, in spite of coalitions and crimes, organized and paid for, with unbounded prodigality, by the British government, nothing can result from the imprudent attacks which have been, and which may be made upon her, but an accession of power, of genius, and of courage; and that rivers can oppose but a feeble barrier to her conquests, and her just vengeance for violated treaties.

The King of England declares, that "*acts of violence have been offered to English vessels and their property; and that, in no case has justice been afforded, nor any satisfactory answer given to the repeated representations made by his Majesty's ministers or ambassador at Paris*†." When intended as the bases of national hostilities, acts of violence so flagrant ought, at least, to have been distinctly specified, and clearly proved. On the contrary, his Britannic Majesty has avoided

* See p. 743.

* See p. 743. † Ibid.

distinct enumeration, for the purpose of rendering still more vague and extensive, a grievance totally unfounded. As to the pretended non-success of the representations made by his ministers or ambassador, in behalf of some British merchants, it is a fact of incontestible notoriety, that no one representation from the ministers of the King of England has not been taken into consideration. More than *two hundred decisions in favour of British merchants* could be cited in support of this assertion. So much for our "refusal to afford justice," and this "legitimate motive" for entering upon a new war!

2nd CHARGE. "*The French government has had recourse*," says the King's Declaration, "*to the extraordinary measure of sending over to England a number of persons, for the professed purpose of residing in the most considerable sea-port towns of Great Britain, in the character of commercial agents; a character to which they could have no pretensions, but from a commercial treaty; and no treaty of that description was in existence between his Majesty and the French Republic**." If the French government have employed commercial agents, it has been by virtue of the usage and universally acknowledged law of Europe. Since commerce, the principal agent of modern civilization, forms also the grand basis of the prosperity, the riches, and the strength of nations, commercial relations have become a sort of natural right, a law of nations among civilized people. To be authorized to employ commercial agents in a foreign country, it does not necessarily follow, that a commercial treaty must exist between us and that country. Thus it is that we send them to Sweden, Denmark, Austria, Prussia, and America; and that these powers dispatch other commercial agents to us in return, although we have no commercial treaty with those powers. Thus it is, that England herself maintains them in Holland, and in various other countries, although no such treaty is in existence between them; and that, from time immemorial, commercial agents have been reciprocally admitted among all nations. Commerce and its respective agents are anterior to all treaties, whether of diplomacy or of commerce; and are, above all, independent of those very treaties. This, therefore, is not, as the King of England is pleased to assert, an "*extraordinary measure*" on the part of the French government.

"*There was, consequently, too much reason to* CONJECTURE," continues the declaration, "*that the real object of their mission was, by no means of a commercial nature; and this* SUSPICION *was confirmed, not only by the circumstance that some of them were* MILITARY MEN, *but by the actual discovery, that several of them were furnished with instructions to obtain the soundings of the harbours, and to procure military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside. His Majesty represented to the French government the necessity of withdrawing them**."

Here, then, we are favoured with *conjectures* and *suspicions*, as pretexts for the violation, with regard to our commercial agents, of the established law of nations! *Suspicions* and *conjectures* for the ground-work of a declaration of war!!! The reasoning, it must be confessed, is most clear and convincing; but let us enquire, for a moment, into the correctness of the facts? In the first place, the French government has dispatched no commercial agents into Great Britain, but with regular, formal instructions, similar to those which have invariably been given, from the ministry of Colbert to the present day. *Secondly*, the French government has distributed none of these commercial commissions to any "*military man*" whatever. To be convinced of the truth of the assertion, that none of the commercial envoys sent to England were "*military men*," an examination of the public printed list of the commercial agents will alone be sufficient. But, admitting that they had formerly been employed in the service of the army, if this circumstance be a motive for hostilities, how happens it that the King of England never thought proper to complain of the French ambassador, who was, at one and the same time, both a "*military man*" and an engineer? *Thirdly*, the whole commercial world knows, that Citizen Coquebert, the first who arrived in England on a mission similar to that of all the others, was extremely well received by the British government, and that his Majesty's ministers apparently beheld his arrival with satisfaction. With respect to the representation on the subject of the pretended mission for the purpose of "obtaining the soundings of the harbours, and procuring military surveys of the places where it was intended they should reside," was such a representation, we wish to ask, ever made to the French government? Without an answer to this query, we cannot seriously enter into a refutation of the charge; seeing that the soundings of harbours, and plans of fortified towns, are to be met with in publications, within the reach of every person, and that none of our commercial agents were dispatched to places of this description.

Nevertheless, his Britannic Majesty "*felt it to be his duty, to prevent their departure to*

* See p. 745.

* See p. 744.

their respective places of destination. It cannot be denied," he observes, "*that the circumstances under which they were sent, and the instructions which were given them, ought to be considered as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions of the government by whom they were employed* *." Thus it is, that after the conclusion of a solemn treaty of peace, the English government has prevented the departure of the commercial agents of France to their respective places of destination (this open avowal of the infraction of the rights of peace and of reciprocity between two friendly nations is extremely curious); thus it is, that it interprets, at its pleasure, the instructions it supposes to have been given to these commercial agents, instructions which have nothing hostile or suspicious in them, but the false interpretations put upon them by the British government: thus it is, that this government, after having formed merely *conjectures* and *suspicions* as to the mission of these commercial envoys, suddenly considers the "*circumstance of the peace established at Amiens, and the instructions given to the commercial agents, as decisive indications of the dispositions and intentions of the government by whom they were employed:*" henceforth, therefore, the powers of Europe will no longer declare war upon grounds of aggression, upon acts of hostility, or upon self-evident facts. England opens to us a shorter course to the mad thirst of war. A new treatise on peace and war will speedily spring from the diplomatic heads of the cabinet of St. James's; and, in future, *conjectures*, upon *suspicions* of enmity, upon *indications*, upon *dispositions*, upon *intentions*, will the powers of Europe, in imitation of England, found their declarations of war. Former publicists have written merely upon positive facts, upon absolute acts of hostility; but the publicists of Westminster have established a new political code, and have given a far greater latitude to the chances of war, by establishing the benevolent system of *intentional* hostilities.

After the introduction of such a system into the politics of England, it is by no means surprising that the king should conclude, that "*the conduct of the French government, with respect to the commercial intercourse between the two countries is ill-suited to a state of peace* †." At what period, then, may we expect that England *will* consent to receive the commercial agents of France, since the moment of peace appears to her unfavourable to this species of relation? In a time of war a commercial intercourse would, certainly, not be agreeable to her: consequently no possible contact, whether commercial or political, can take place between the two countries, seeing that peace and war embrace all time. The British government, faithful to its blind and inveterate hatred, declares also, that "*the proceedings of the French, in the whole of their political relations, are altogether inconsistent with every principle of good faith, moderation, and justice* *." The King of England, then, imagines himself in the exclusive possession of these sublime virtues. He imagines himself the possessor of "*every principle of justice*"—by seizing, by force or by cunning, upon every thing suitable to his convenience, and by fancying, that every thing suitable to his convenience instantly becomes his property. He imagines himself the possessor of "*every principle of moderation*," by granting to one of the greatest powers of the continent, the space of thirty-six hours, for the cession of Lampedosa, an island which does not belong to it, and for consenting to the usurpation of Malta, the property of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem and the Maltese! He imagines himself the possessor of "*every principle of good faith*"—by openly violating the treaty of Amiens, which engaged him to evacuate Malta in the space of three months, by presenting to Europe the example of a monarch, one day dispatching orders for the restitution of the Cape of Good Hope to the Dutch, by virtue of the treaty of Amiens, and the following day commanding the retention of it, in direct violation of the same treaty: a system of "justice," of "moderation," and of "good faith," scarcely to be met with among barbarians; a system which, happily, the moral code of Europe is, by no means, disposed to admit, and which all the naval forces and all the diplomatic quirks of the British government will never succeed in introducing among civilized nations.

3rd CHARGE. "*His Majesty had entertained hopes that he should have succeeded in bringing France to adopt a system of policy, which, if it had not inspired other powers with confidence, might, at least, have allayed their jealousies* †." But to what "system of policy" did the King of England hope to "bring the French government?" Was it to a system of apathy, which, throughout Europe, would have left peace or war, partition or boundary, commerce or destruction, industry or subjection, the examination of vessels in time of peace, and the destruction of the ports of the various states of the continent, entirely at the insolent disposal of Great Britain? Was it to a system of general disarming, of military abasement of spirit, of non-vigilance over our coasts and principal

* See p. 744. † Ibid.

* See p. 744. † Ibid.

towns? Was it to a system of hostility against our own customs, and of preference to British manufactures over those of our native country? Was it, in short, to a system of dissimulation in the non-execution of the treaty of Amiens, the tardy evacuation of Alexandria, the retention of the island of Malta, and of ambition secretly turned towards the two Sicilies? The King, it must be confessed, expresses himself feebly on these heads; his language is, nevertheless, perfectly intelligible. It is evident, that the British government still remember those *happy* times, when indolent sovereigns and venal ministers delivered over their deluded and vilified country, without opposition or remorse, into the hands of the British ministry. It is evident, that the King of England turns, with affliction, his tender regards to that fortunate period, when, by means of a few corrupt millions and diplomatic menaces, he exercised absolute controul over the politics and general direction of affairs in France. How unfortunate it is for the illustrious and pacific reign of George the Third, that he can no longer hope to behold one of his *honourable* commissaries, seated upon the ruins of Dunkirk, commanding the French, with the gold and the arrogance of his master, not to erect stone upon stone in the dishonoured fortifications of that port, as its existence endangered the security and repose of Great Britain!

But to enter into a more serious refutation of these charges. "*His Majesty had entertained hopes of bringing France to adopt a system of policy, which, if it had not inspired confidence, might at least have allayed their jealousies.*" Confidence apart, (since that is a sentiment which the King of England does not wish to inspire) which are these same powers, whose *jealousies* stood in such need of being *allayed?* Is it the Emperor of Russia, with whom France acted in concert, in the arrangement of the affairs of the Germanic body, and whose generous and pacific character has unceasingly led him to desire the tranquillity of Europe? Is it the King of Prussia, over whom the influence which France has obtained, by her victories and her justice, has nothing diminished of his rights and his political importance? Is it, lastly, the Emperor of Germany, he who has no longer any point of contact with France, and who, by the late treaties, has acquired a maritime existence and territorial concessions, in one of the finest portions of Italy?—Alas! so little does France distrust the justice and the friendly dispositions of these powers, so great in themselves, and so powerful from their enlightened policy, that the French government has repeatedly manifested its express wish, that the present discussions, and the motives for entering upon the present war, might be sovereignly decided, through their mediation. Is the English government able to say as much? Has that government, which speaks so loudly of the pretended "jealousy" of these powers, dared to discover the same confidence in their intervention? Has it not refused their justice, or eluded their mediation? Does it not rather perceive, that the jealousy of these powers is turned, with more justice, towards England herself, and that if, at any moment, they stand in need of encouragement, it is when they reflect upon the gigantic ambition, the secret views, the deceitful politics, and, above all, the presumption with which the British government arrogates to itself universal monarchy, general colonization, the tyranny of commerce, and the sovereignty of the seas? In vain does this Machiavellian government wish to turn aside the attention of the powers of Europe, by seeking to excite their jealousy against France. Never will those powers lose sight of the great CONTINENTAL interest: they feel that France exists but to preserve them from British piracies in the Mediterranean; that she extends her power over the shores of the west and the north, but to guarantee the commerce and industry of the continent from the ravages of British merchants. The ports of France are the bulwarks of Europe against the pirates of Great Britain; her armies are the dread of the *tyrant of the seas:* and if ever the scourge of English colonization should strike with slavery and desolation this beautiful and magnificent portion of Europe, it will not be till France shall have lost her political existence and her victorious armies. But what do I say? France is continental, populous, rich, powerful, enlightened, and governed by the genius of war, who arms but for general peace and universal commerce. And yet England,—her power factitious, her riches artificial, her government head-strong and ignorant, her politics venal, her colonies oppressed, her friends doubtful, her citizens discontented, her credit in danger, her administration overwhelmed with debts; still dares to violate treaties, and threaten the conquerors!!!

What an astonishing contrast! The King of England, nevertheless, ventures to declare, that "*if the French government had proved their dispositions to be essentially pacific, allowances would have been made for the situation in which a new government must be placed, after so dreadful and extensive a convulsion, as that which has been produced by the French revolution**." What does the King of England

* See p. 744.

understand by "*dispositions essentially pacific?*" Doubtless, that France and her allies should be left entirely unprepared, that we should no longer maintain forces sufficient to guarantee the security of the country, the English government secretly propose to attack or invade, that we leave her a free entrance into Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, the Island of Elba, Naples, and the Sicilies, and that we should no longer possess the military means of forcing the power to execute a treaty, which, in signing it, had faithlessly premeditated its non-fulfilment. On such conditions of weakness and of inconceivable humiliation, would the King of England have consented "*to make allowances*" for the French government! Must then the French government be absolved in London for the crime of being victorious, powerful, and pacific, of being beloved by the nation, and of maintaining, with honour and courage, the majesty of the French people? Or rather, must it not retort upon the English government itself, this pretended "system of *violence, aggression*, and *aggrandizement?*" Was it not a system of *violence*, to refuse, in the midst of immense maritime preparations, to execute the treaty of Amiens, and forcibly to expel the Neapolitan garrison, which was never admitted into the forts, but sent back to Messina? Was it not a system of *aggrandizement*, to seize upon Malta in direct violation of the faith of treaties, and thus to domineer at pleasure over the whole commerce and navigation of the Mediterranean? And yet, the King of Great Britain, whose "system of violence and aggrandizement" is the sole cause of the renewal of hostilities, does not blush to prefer, still further, his charges against the French government!

"*They have continued*," he exclaims, "*to keep a French army in Holland against the will, and in defiance of the remonstrances of the Batavian Government, and in repugnance to treaties. They have, in a period of peace, invaded the territory, and violated the independence of the Swiss nation, in defiance of the treaty of Luneville. They have annexed to the dominions of France, Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and the island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia, whom they have despoiled of the most valuable part of his territory, though they were bound by a solemn engagement to the Emperor of Russia**."

This charge is as unfounded as the preceding ones. This we shall briefly endeavour to prove: 1st. *With respect to Holland:* At the moment of the King's Message, it was not known whether or not the Cape was evacuated, but it was positively known that Malta and Alexandria were not. The stay of the French troops in Holland was the necessary consequence of the garrisons which the English kept up, and were incessantly augmenting, at Malta. Besides, the stay of the French troops in Holland gave no offence to the Batavian government, whilst the reinforcement of the garrison of Malta, and the non-admission of the Neapolitan garrison into the forts of that island, discovered to Europe a project of ambition in the Mediterranean, and a premeditated violation of a solemn treaty of general peace.—If, by an article in the treaty of Amiens, France had been obligated to evacuate Holland, the non-execution of the conditions accepted by England, would have released her from her engagement. But so far is this from being the case, that the treaty of Amiens stipulates in no shape whatever, for the evacuation of Holland: France, nevertheless, concluded a treaty with Holland, in which she expressed her readiness to withdraw 3000 men who still remained there, the moment the execution of the treaty in the three quarters of the globe, and particularly the evacuation of the Cape, was known to have taken place. In addition to this, France has repeatedly declared, during the period of the late negotiations, her willingness to evacuate Holland, the instant the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens were completely fulfilled.

2nd. *With regard to Switzerland:* the French government engaged, in the treaty of Amiens, to evacuate the kingdom of Naples, and the states of the Pope; it did not engage to evacuate Switzerland. At the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, there were no fewer than twelve thousand French troops in Helvetia! It is, therefore, untrue to assert, that since the signature of this treaty France "has invaded the territory of Switzerland." But, in framing the treaty of Luneville, it is not Switzerland that was acknowledged; it is the "*Helvetic Republic, one, and such as it existed at the signature of this treaty.*" France, from her territorial and political situation with Switzerland, possessed the natural obligation of retaining French troops in those unfortunate countries, in order to preserve them from the fatal influence of British agents, who poured into it their poison and their gold, and made it the receptacle of their arms and ammunition, their merchandize, and their abominable calumnies against France.—The Helvetic senate demanded, officially, the intervention of France, in order that a term might be put to their dreadful intestine commotions. It was, then, at the *express desire* of the Helvetic government, that France interfered in the unfortunate affairs of Helvetia. But why

* See p. 744.

was this republic necessitated to throw herself upon France? And why did France behold herself obliged to interfere? The King of England answers these questions himself, when he informs us, that "*measures were taken by him to ascertain the real situation and wishes of the Swiss Cantons.*"* Now, it was not the Swiss Cantons which were acknowledged at Luneville, but the Helvetic Republic, existing in a system of unity. Thus, then, while his Britannic Majesty was *generously* labouring to assist the Swiss Cantons, and to light up the torch of civil discord, it is he alone who has been endeavouring to destroy one of the stipulations of the treaty of Luneville. This avowal, on the part of the King of England, is extremely remarkable in the same manifesto, in which he complains, that France has appeased the civil dissensions which it was so much his interest to excite! —Switzerland, however, has at last arrived at a state of perfect tranquillity. The French troops, far from violating her independence, have secured to her repose, and her ancient constitutions; for she now enjoys the same system of government, as she possessed before the blow aimed at her existence by the Executive Directory, and has regained her ancient customs, her ancient manners, and her ancient federation. Such is the testimony which the powers bordering upon Switzerland have borne to the conduct of France. For the King of England tells us, with extreme candour, "*that having ascertained the sentiments of the other cabinets of Europe, he has learned, with the utmost regret, that none of the powers most immediately interested in preventing these reprated infractions of treaties and acts of violence, had manifested no disposition to counteract them*†." If, then, Austria herself, in spite of the instigations of the cabinet of London, does not conceive that France has committed "*acts of violence*," or "*infractions of treaties*," why has not this testimony of the "*cabinets the most immediately interested*," a testimony every way favourable to France, arrested the turbulent and insidious pen of the author of the Anglican manifesto?

3rd. The King of England is not a whit more correct in what concerns the "*union of Piedmont, Parma, Placentia, and the island of Elba, without allotting any provision to the King of Sardinia.*" From this expression in the royal declaration, one would be led to suppose, that, at the moment of signing the treaty of Amiens (Ventose, year 10), the King of Sardinia was still reigning at Turin. On the contrary, this Sovereign had lost Piedmont long before that period, which country was united and incorporated with France at the time of that treaty. The customs and national administrations were completely established, organized, and in full activity. This union was so evidently completed, and a diplomatic fact of such notoriety, that *at the conferences at Amiens, Lord Cornwallis offered to acknowledge Etruria, provided France would restore Piedmont to the King of Sardinia.* This proposition was, however, rejected. If, then, England, in the year 10, did not make the restitution of Piedmont one of the conditions of peace, on what ground does she make, in the year 11, the retention of Piedmont by France a ground of hostilities? This portion of the manifesto is as absurd and contradictory, as it is disgusting and contemptible.—To hear the complaints of England on the union of Piedmont to France, one would imagine his Britannic Majesty was touched with the most lively interest in favour of the King of Sardinia. But, no! He, apparently, manifested the same disposition at the framing of the treaty of Amiens. The French government proposed to him, to leave Ceylon to the Dutch, and in lieu of that island, to make such an arrangement in behalf of the King of Sardinia, as he might propose: but the King of Great Britain, who takes in the fate of all sovereigns, but a speculative and purely diplomatic interest, speedily declined the proposition; and the King of Sardinia saw himself abandoned by the very man, who has set himself up, in the present manifesto, for his ostensible defender.—Thus, then, since his Britannic Majesty has been unwilling to make any sacrifices for the King of Sardinia, *who, assuredly, lost his estates from his alliance with England;* or make any stipulation for him in the treaty of Amiens, why, from the present condition of that prince, conjure up a cause of complaint against the French government? We might, perhaps, be contented, as an equivalent for Piedmont, with the restitution of the estates of Tippoo Saib to his unfortunate children! But, the fact is, that when England spoke of the King of Sardinia in her *ultimatum*, she was told that the French government were extremely willing to treat upon that subject. Why, then, make a ground of war, of what was a proposed article of negotiation?

With respect to the island of Elba, Porto Ferrajo, the principal town was given up to France, in execution of the treaty of Amiens, *by the English garrison itself;* and the treaty existing between France and the King of Etruria was known to all Europe.

As to *Parma* and *Placentia*, it is not true that these countries are united to France.

With regard to the officious interest his Britannic Majesty is pleased to take in the completion of the engagements subsisting between France and Russia, we shall only observe, that France has proposed the mediation of

* See p. 745. † Ibid.

the Emperor of Russia on the different points in dispute, and that his Imperial Majesty will then decide which of the two powers has been the most equitable in this respect. Be it as it may; the stipulations which France may have made with the cabinet of St. Petersburgh, the cabinet of St. James's will not be called upon to execute. It is really a pity, that this latter cabinet does not endeavour to get rid of those notions of universal monarchy, and that rage for imagining itself the sovereign *director* of all the powers of Europe!

4th CHARGE. "*It was about this time,*" says the royal manifesto, "*that the French government first distinctly advanced the principle, that his Majesty had no right to complain of the conduct, or to interfere with the proceedings of France, on any point which did not form a part of the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens, and the pretension to exclude his Majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers.*"* On this subject his Majesty enters into a long, metaphysical discussion of the "*state of possession*, the *engagements existing at the time of the treaty of Amiens*," and concludes with invoking the "*general law of nations.*"—An imperious sentiment of indignation dictates various replies to these charges. *In the first place:* did the French government ever make use of these expressions? Have its ministers or ambassadors ever produced a single official note, or diplomatic paper, containing such propositions?—*Secondly*, if Great Britain takes upon herself to interfere in the concerns of Europe, she must, on her part, permit the continent to interfere in the concerns of India. If England will meddle with the affairs of continental Europe, she must not incessantly attack the rights of sovereignty and independance of other nations, by insulting their flag, by visiting their neutral vessels, and by arrogating to herself the intolerable pretension of exclusive supremacy over the seas.—*Thirdly*, the most recent facts contradict the assertion of the King of England. Has he not lately voted on the subject of the arrangements of the Germanic empire? He has not, then, been "prevented from interfering in the concerns of the continent."—*Fourthly*, if the French government had been desirous to exclude the King of England from all interference in the concerns of the continent, it could only have done so, in concert with all the other continental powers; and if this concert, which, one day, the ambition, arrogance, usurpation, and perfidy which characterize the operations of England, will render but too necessary, had already existed, from that moment her interference in the concerns of the continent would have been irrevocably interdicted.—The King of England has only set up this pretended charge because he feels, beforehand, the justice of such a measure, in the real interests of Europe. What powers are they, that would consent to commit their destiny into his hands? Is it the Emperor or Germany? No! for has not that prince been shamefully abandoned by the English government; he, who, for the interest of Great Britain alone, endangered his crown, and the security of his possessions? Did not the English government refuse its consent to a maritime armistice until the French army were at the very gates of Vienna? Has it not constantly paid with great irregularity the disastrous subsidies it had promised him? Similar to a vile usurer, has it not caused him to suffer immense losses in the *discount* and *exchange* of the sums it conveyed him? Certainly, if the English government were desirous of securing allies on the continent, it ought to have relinquished its desire of seizing, by the treaty of Amiens, on Ceylon and Trinidad, in order to obtain an increase of territory for Austria, which had suffered so heavily upon its account.—What, on the contrary, has been the conduct of the British government? It has abandoned the Emperor; it has *concluded a separate peace*, in which it has taken especial care to secure to itself an increase of territory, influence, and colonies.—Is it the Elector of Bavaria? No! for this prince forfeited the greater part of his estates in the service of the common cause; and Great Britain has taken no interest in its restitution.—Is it the King of Sardinia? Certainly not! for, to support the impious cause of England, it was, that he took part in a war which cost him Piedmont; and yet, the English government would not consent to make any sacrifice for the benefit of this unfortunate sovereign.—Is it the Emperor of Russia? No! for did not the English government atrociously sacrifice the Russian army in Holland? Did it not expose it, singly, to all the impetuosity of the French troops in the memorable battle of the Helder? Has it not so far carried its abandonment of the interests of a nation, which had voluntarily served in its cause, as to refuse to exchange the soldiers of the Emperor taken in that day's battle, against the French prisoners in England?—Is it the powers of the Baltic? No! for has not the English government repeatedly proclaimed its ambitious pretension, that it alone possesses the right of doing whatever it pleases upon the ocean, because its marine is the most powerful? Has it not repeatedly forfeited the good-will of these powers, by oppressing their maritime commerce, by threatening to make itself master of the Sound, by bombarding their capitals, and by alarming their cabinets? In recently giving

* See p. 745.

his vote in the House of Lords, did not a son of the King of England tear aside the political mask which still covered the extent of the atrocity of British ambition and British piracy? "I hope," said the Duke of Clarence, "that we shall shortly be in a situation to say to France, *you shall not have St. Domingo; you shall not have Louisiana;* to Spain, *you shall not have the Floridas;* and to all those who are protected by the all-powerful Consul, *you shall have nothing but what Great Britain pleases to let you have**." This haughty and insulting language of the royal family is sufficiently clear, sufficiently stimulating for the powers of the north and south of Europe.

Thus, England, by her insolent egotism, her turbulent politics, her diplomatic tyranny, her boundless ambition, and her abominable perfidy, is alone driven from the continent, and excluded from interfering in the concerns of Europe. It is her violation of the laws of nations, and the faith of treaties, which has rendered her foreign and odious to the powers of the continent. It is her system of prohibition, her navigation act, her hire of battalions, her plan of corruption and venality, and her constant habit of treating with states and cabinets like avaricious merchants, disposing of their gold at the highest rate, and on the most burthensome conditions. Such is the *tutelar* government which proposes to us a "*state of possession*;" as if no change could take place in Europe without its interference and permission! Such is the *immutable* government which tells us of "engagements subsisting at the conclusion of the treaty;" as if the interests not specified in the treaty, might undergo no variation, but by its express permission! Such is the government *faithful* to the religion of treaties, which opposes to us the "*general law of nations!*" It well becomes you, violent usurper of the island of Malta, to speak of the "law of nations antecedent to all political agreements, and always superior to all treaties!" Has the treaty of Amiens been executed by England, or has it not? Has the island of Malta been evacuated, or has it not? Such are the questions of fact, presented to the view of all Europe. Neither the raving metaphysics of Mr. Pitt, the subtleties of the British cabinet, nor royal manifestos, can, in any degree, change the nature of this essential fact. Malta is not evacuated; this island is not restored to its masters; the Mediterranean is no longer free; and the commerce of all nations is in the hands of England.—Worthy ministers of the King of Great Britain! oppose to this sublime invocation of the "general law of nations," the arbitrary orders you have dispatched to your squadrons and battalions, to retain Malta, and to embark the Neapolitan garrison. Oppose to your moral dissertation on "that natural law which ought to regulate the conduct of all governments," the following expressions of Mr. Dundas; "under what point of view we consider Malta, we shall see, that it is to us a place of the last importance. I maintain that this island can no longer be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, and that *we ought to keep it for ourselves; we ought to keep it for our own interest as well as for that of the other powers; we ought to keep it, not only during the war, but in perpetuity: the war is undertaken for Malta, and Malta must henceforward belong to us for ever**."—O! ye great politicians of Europe, ye statesmen of all nations, ye orators of all parliaments, ye publicists of all countries, humble yourselves before this sublime and consolatory creed of the British government—to seize upon whatever is convenient; to declare just all they can commit with impunity; to declare lawful property all they can obtain, by crimes, by violation of contracts, or by infraction of treaties! Such is the system of political morality acted upon by the King of Great Britain!

5th CHARGE. How has his Britannic Majesty been able to establish as a ground of war, "*his being* CALLED UPON *by the French government to evacuate the island of Malta*†? This assertion is altogether false. For though, by the 4th paragraph of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the British troops were *to evacuate Malta in three months after the exchange of ratifications*, nevertheless, until the moment of the abrupt and inaccurate message to parliament, it did not appear that any demands had been made to engage the English government to evacuate Malta.—Is not this an evident proof of the patience and moderation of the French government? The intention of the powers concerned was, to constitute Malta independent, equally of France and of England. From this motive, so consolatory to all Europe, it was, that the treaty of Amiens, conformable in this respect to the preliminary negotiations carried on in London, imperiously enjoined the evacuation of Malta by the British troops, in the space of three months; nevertheless, it was not till the expiration of a year that France demanded the execution of the 10th article of the treaty. Idly does the English government descant upon "the abolition of various langues," the "diminution of the revenues of the order," and its inability to preserve the island independent. The treaty of Amiens has fore-

* See the Debates in Parliament on the 23d of May.

* See the Debates in Parliament on the 23d of May.

† See p. 746.

seen all, and refuted every objection, by the provisional establishment of the Neapolitan garrison, and the triple guarantee of the powers of the north. Thus, nothing can justify the violation of the treaty.

The independence of Malta is the basis agreed on by the powers concerned. The English government has, therefore, violated the treaty, usurped the territory of the island, destroyed its independence, and insulted all Europe, by its violent and prolonged retention, as well as by its refusal to evacuate a possession, which neither can nor must belong to it, if Europe wishes for security, justice, and commerce.—The whole of what the declaration asserts with respect to *the guarantee of Malta, which it pretends was refused by the Emperors of Germany and Russia, as well as by the King of Prussia*, are all equally untrue. The official papers lately published decidedly prove the very reverse. They shew that those powers did accept the guarantee of Malta; and that, after those guarantees had been obtained, and every obstacle removed, the English government still persisted in its refusal to evacuate Malta, by unveiling its formal intention of making the island the perpetual property of Great Britain.

With the same want of correctness, the declaration asserts, that "*since the conclusion of the treaty, the langues of Arragon and Castile have been separated from the order by Spain, and that part of the Italian langue has been abolished by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma to France* *." These langues have not been suppressed; but had the king's assertion been true, it would not have justified England in violating the treaty. The Pope has not yet declared himself on the measure taken by the King of Spain, and there was every reason for believing that an arrangement with his Catholic Majesty might have been easily obtained. As to Piedmont, the possessions of the Order of Malta in that country were disposed of five years ago. The possessions of the order in the Dutchy of Parma remain in their former situation.—But, says the King of England, in justification of his conduct, "*there is strong reason to believe that it has been in contemplation to sequestrate the property of the Bavarian langue, and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian langues within the dominions of the Emperor* †." This assertion is untrue. Neither the Russian nor Bavarian langues have been separated from the order; and France cannot have interfered in changes which have no existence.—Bavaria and all Germany well know, that, far from recommending the destruction of the German langues, the First Consul has exerted his powerful interference to procure them an increase of possessions.

Lastly; to retain Malta, there is no exertion, no stratagem, no subtlety, no species of imposition, that the English government does not make use of, when it puts into the mouth of his Majesty, "*that he was authorized in believing, that it was the determination of the French government to violate the articles of the treaty, stipulating the integrity of the Turkish empire, and the independence of the Ionian islands* *." If the independence of these islands of the Adriatic have been acknowledged by all powers, and if Russian garrisons have been kept in them for a certain period, it has solely been for the purpose of quieting the intestine divisions of those unhappy countries. The Emperor of Russia would, doubtless, have willingly evacuated them, if he had conceived that, in so doing, he could have prevented England from again disturbing the repose of the world, and the prosperity of nations.—The King of England grounds his declaration upon "*views*" and "*projects*," which he attributes to the French government, "*against the integrity of the Turkish empire, and the independence of the Ionian islands.*" But is it upon *views, projects*, and *suppositions*, that a wise government declares war against a powerful one? Is it in the face of enlightened Europe that the King of Great Britain has hoped to mask his ambition and want of fidelity, by attributing to the French government, which has stipulated for, and solemnly proclaimed to the world, *the guarantee of the integrity of the Ottoman empire*, the project of division or conquest? Is it by pretended conversations, that the English government are to be absolved for its non-fulfilment of the faith of treaties? Doubtless, no; and if, on the points in discussion, Europe were to deliver in her opinion, founded upon *ideas, views*, and *projects*, would she not decide against the English government? These *views* of partition, these *projects* of conquest, were they not clearly expressed in the delay of the British army in Egypt; a country, which it had engaged in the treaty to evacuate in three months? Were not these *views* and *projects* proclaimed to all Europe, by the conduct of England towards the Ottoman Porte, and by the just and extreme inquietude expressed by that power? Were not these *projects* confirmed by the engagements which had already taken place between the British troops and the Turkish army, by the correspondence between the British army and the Mamelukes, whom it

* See p. 747. † Ibid.

* See p. 748.

paid and supplied with ammunition of every kind: and, lastly, by the opinion of the Porte, "that the English were desirous of retaining *Suez and Alexandria as factories?*"

Thus, then, the project of oppressing the Ottoman empire has, indeed, been conceived; but it was by England, and not France. It is well known to all the cabinets of Europe, that previous to the evacuation of Egypt, the cabinet of London made repeated efforts with the Ottoman Porte, and with another power, to retain this province, the modern object of its restless ambition. The great importance it attaches to the retention of Malta unravels still more this ulterior project of maritime tyranny, and universal dominion.—If it is asked, why England places such vast importance in the possession of Malta, we answer—because she wishes to establish there a Levant Company; the Bombay of which would be Malta, and the pachas or beys of Egypt, Tripoly, Tunis, Candia, the Morea, Albania, Syria, Smyrna, &c. &c. its nabobs. They would be incited to revolt against the Porte, which would represent the Court of Delhi. Around all these beys and pachas would be placed agents. Money would be scattered in profusion; and every attempt to injure the commerce of France would be lavishly rewarded. Thus would France and Spain be entirely excluded from the trade of the Levant, and we should be told, that the navigation of those seas was the exclusive prerogative of the British Crown.—Thus, with the assistance of a single garrison, no great sums of money, and a series of intrigues, would England succeed in excluding all Europe from the commerce of the Black Sea, and the towns of the Levant. But this dishonourable thirst of gold will hasten the downfal of Great Britain.

6th CHARGE. We shall now proceed to refute the unjust inferences which the King of England is desirous of drawing from Colonel Sebastiani's report, and the communications of the First Consul with the legislative body and Lord Whitworth. These the King of Great Britain is pleased to call "*the repeated outrages which the French government have not ceased to offer to the British crown, and the British nation* *."—In the first place; it is rather curious that such a pretext of war should be urged by a government, which daily allows so many infamous libels and barefaced insults to be printed and published against the French government, and particularly against its first magistrate.—Does, then, the King of England wish to establish a censorship over every thing written and transacted in France? Is there, we ask, a single sitting of parliament in which ministers have not provoked France, by insults and outrages; now, upon the nature of her government, and now, upon the perpetual mistrust and jealousy with which they should watch her operations. Are not all their speeches so many philippics against her? And if the First Consul has said, that he had 50,000 men, was it not for the purpose of replying to that "*peace establishment*," which the British minister had announced, some months before, would be very considerable, and nearly approaching the military establishment in time of war?—A nation, which in its writings, and in the speeches of its orators, insults every other nation with which it is at peace, has founded four of its charges against France upon articles taken from gazettes and other publications!!—We shall not retail all that has been said, since the peace, by ministers, princes, and their most celebrated parliamentary speakers. It would be offering an insult to human nature, to imagine that we ought to discover a ground of war in objects, which, at the utmost, could only become the subject of a duel. And in this place, we feel ourselves obliged to say, that *it is a most severe misfortune for a nation to be governed by a* WEAK, IGNORANT, *and* INEFFICIENT MINISTRY.—Colonel Sebastiani's report * contains not a word against his Majesty's government, the British nation, or the British army. It attacks, it is true, a colonel of that nation; but what has an attack, made by an individual, to do with the important interests of the two governments of France and England? Is it permitted to insert in the balance of Europe the names even of all the English colonels, past, present, or to come? And ought Colonel Stuart to expect the high honour of being revenged by an European war for a few expressions uttered in Africa, and a few just replies to the insults offered to the hero and the army, which have defended the world by their victories, and filled it with their renown? What! may not a French officer reply to insults proffered by a British officer against the army and its chief, without entailing upon the injured country all the calamities of war? To what, then, is this official recrimination reduced? The affair of Colonels Sebastiani and Stuart is purely *personal*, and, consequently, cannot become *national:* the laws of honour, and military usage, have sufficiently provided for such occurrences. But, does it become the King of England to complain, even diplomatically, of the answer given by Colonel Sebastiani to the charges brought against Bonaparte and the French

* See p. 748.

* See p. 215 of the present vol.

army, by a British officer, in a publication in which he accuses Bonaparte of having poisoned his army; a publication, which his Majesty has been pleased to receive with his own hands? Did not Colonel Sebastiani defend his own life against this English officer, who chose, the moment in which the former arrived at Cairo, to accuse him before the pacha, by sending him a letter, to which was joined an order of the day, issued by the First Consul, when he commanded in Egypt *? Alas! if satisfactions of this sort were to be demanded, they might with justice have been demanded against the odious conduct of an English general, who endeavoured to procure the assassination of a French officer, by devoting him to the poignards of the Turks. We shall hereafter enter into the detail of this transaction, as it is essential to prove to Europe the ridiculous injustice of the complaints of his Britannic Majesty. Besides, nothing can be too minute, when connected with the rights of humanity. The King of England, ever ingenious in seeking for outrages to fill up his manifesto, discovers a fresh theme of complaint in the *communication of the* FIRST CONSUL *to the legislative body* †. It is in that part of it, where Bonaparte, in according with all the great politicians and generals of Europe, proclaims this great truth, *that England, single-handed, is no longer able to contend against France* ‡. But this is neither a challenge, nor a vain boast. In this expression of a great general, and an enlightened statesman, we discover only profound views, and important political conclusions. When the First Consul, after presenting to the legislative body the situation of the several powers of Europe, describes Great Britain as *no longer able to contend single-handed against France*, he only draws from it a conclusion favourable to general pacification. Besides, does not England possess her Duke of Clarence to guard her from every attack on the part of France? "*I desire,*" said this prince most eloquently, "*I desire to see the French nation employ its vast resources, to convince this powerful Consul, that we are capable of contending single-handed against France, and against all those that may join her. I desire to see Great Britain chastise France; it will not be the first time she has done so.*"—No! France does not consider this language of the Duke of Clarence an outrage against her. Victorious over all coalitions, triumphant over all the crimes and intrigues paid for by British gold, she cannot conceive herself wounded by the contemptible rodomontades of a young lord, who fancies that France can be chastised in the same manner as France formerly chastised the Duke of York and his soldiers at Honscole, and on the downs of Dunkirk. It well becomes a young English prince to brave thus the warlike spirit of France, at the moment when she has scarcely laid down her victorious arms, at the moment when the star of Albion grows pale, when her national debt threatens to swallow up all her riches, when oppressed India approaches even nearer the verge of revolution than humiliated Ireland, when liberty is preparing the expulsion of the English from the Antilles, when continental Europe, at length alive to her real interests, beholds with joy the approaching destruction of the trident which sways the subjugated universe. Has this young prince forgotten those lessons of experience, for which England has paid so dear? Does he not know that FORTY-FIVE descents upon this same Great Britain have been successful? Does he not know that a handful of Normans were sufficient to chastise England, and dictate to her the law.

The communications made by the First Consul to the legislative body are, then, no more insults upon the English government, than are his communications with Lord Whitworth. *In the first place*, it is certain that this conversation, the details of which this ambassador transmitted to his government, is false in its principal parts; it has been formally contradicted in the official journal*. Besides, what the First Consul really did say, he had previously said in his message to the legislative body a few days before: "The Ottoman empire is crumbling on all sides, but it is the interest of France to uphold it." *Secondly:* it is published by a government, convicted of having changed, mutilated, and shamefully falsified the most important parts of the official negotiations, lately printed and laid before parliament. *Thirdly:* when the First Consul expressed a wish to indulge Lord Whitworth with a private interview, it was not, assuredly, to furnish the Machiavelian government of London with weapons against himself, but purely to convince the English ambassador of his real views, his moderate sentiments, and the love of peace by which the French government was actuated.—*Lastly*, could it be imagined that there existed a government, established for more than a century, renowned for its political skill, and the regularity of its diplomatic proceedings, that does not blush to ground a declaration of war upon *views*, *ideas*, *indications*, *suspicions*, and *conjectures*; upon fugitive conversations, incorrectly stated, as well as incorrectly interpreted?—It is, nevertheless, upon another conversation of the First Consul with Lord

* See p. 220. † See p. 306. ‡ See p. 375.

* See the French State Papers on the Negotiation.

Whitworth, in the presence of the diplomatic body, that his Majesty wishes to found a fresh example of provocation on the part of the French government; as if, on the day when the first message of the King of England was known at Paris, it were possible for a first magistrate, whose every action is dictated by honour and truth, could so far contain himself as to dissemble the profound indignation which falsehood and want of fidelity must ever inspire. If we consider the situation in which he found himself placed, the conduct of the First Consul was extremely moderate; he discovered on the occasion the energy of his mind, and his sincere love of peace. After a message so insulting to the French nation, after a message founded upon too evident untruths, after a message falsely announcing that "*very considerable preparations were carrying on in the ports of France, and that discussions of great importance were subsisting between the two governments**," there is no power, no government, that would not have broken off all communication with a power, capable of rekindling the torch of war by such unfounded assertions.

How could the King of England present also to his parliament, as a legitimate ground of war, a *Hamburgh paper*†, containing a pretended article inserted by the interference of the French minister, "*propagating*," according to his opinion, "*the most offensive and unfounded calumnies against his Majesty and his government*‡." His Britannic Majesty, in preferring such a charge, must have imagined that a French commissary would not have been permitted to shew to the world, that his Majesty has been induced, by his wise and able ministry, to communicate to the English nation two most revolting falsehoods, in his first message to parliament; that "considerable preparations were carrying on in the ports of France," and that "discussions of great importance were subsisting between the two governments." If to prove the evident fallacy of these two assertions be to insult his Majesty, and calumniate his government, what must we say of that mass of scandalous libels, of gross insults, and bitter calumnies, which daily appear in the English journals under the authority of the King and his ministers; journals which have inundated Europe, and insulted, principally since the conclusion of peace, the honourable head of the French government? What name can we give to a system of government, which declares inviolable, or rather unpunishable, these periodical calumniators, provided they asperse the governors of other nations, and incessantly labour to decry the governments of other countries? provided they carry on a vile and disgraceful warfare against all the great men and enlightened governments, unwilling to acknowledge the universal supremacy of England, or humble themselves before the super-eminent abilities of her prudent and sagacious ministers?

"*For the purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insulting his Majesty and his government*," continues the Royal Declaration, "*the French government has repeatedly called upon him, to violate the laws of hospitality, with respect to persons who had found an asylum within his dominions, and against whose conduct no charge whatever has at any time been substantiated**." One must be totally unsupplied with reasons, or extremely blind in its hatred, to present similar grounds of war; for it will scarcely be credited, that this government, which now complains, that the French government called upon it, in the name of justice and of general security, to remove to a distance a few poisoners, assassins, and hired calumniators, shamefully protected in the British islands, is the same government which *proposed to France the banishment of those very wretches, in return for the occupation of Malta for ten years*. If, then, France would have consented to violate a treaty, England would have consented to "violate the laws of hospitality." If France had been willing to abandon to the English the commerce of all nations, Great Britain, grateful for the favour, would have consented to transport a handful of abandoned miscreants. But France refused to subject the navigation of the Mediterranean; and these acknowledged malefactors instantly became, in the estimation of Great Britain, men of irreproachable lives, against whom she cannot "violate the laws of hospitality." Such is the government which boasts of its morality, moderation, and justice, and which complains of calumnies, insults, and provocations! Such are its noble and generous motives for rekindling the torch of war throughout all Europe!—A few bales of merchandize not freely received into France, while the English repel from their country our territorial productions;—a few commercial agents, obtaining the soundings of harbours, and military surveys of towns, printed and to be procured every where, while we receive without suspicion the thousands of English who visit us;—a few Swiss cantons, which France has not wished to see torn to pieces by internal dissentions, nor invaded by foreign wars, while the English sent into it emissaries, arms, ammunitions, and plans of civil extermination;—a few French troops stationed in Holland, while the English organized secret plans of

* See p. 403. † See p. 527. ‡ See p. 749.

* See p. 749.

ambition upon this country and its colonies; —a few invitations to the English to evacuate Malta, in execution of the treaty of Amiens, while they complained in their journals, that France would not execute it on her part;—a few *ideas* or *suspicions* that France still coveted Egypt and the Ionian islands, while the English left their troops in Alexandria for twelve months after the treaty of Amiens, and would not evacuate Malta;—a few conversations incorrectly stated, and faithlessly interpreted, while the English in their journals incessantly insulted France and the chief of its government. Such are the weighty and legitimate causes of the present "*just* and *necessary* war;" causes officially laid before the nation by his Britannic Majesty, who declares, at the close of his manifesto, that "*he is solely actuated by a sense of what is due to the honour of his crown, and the interests of his people; and by an anxious desire to obstruct the farther progress of a system, which, if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world**." King of Great Britain! You speak of *the honour of your crown* in declaring a new war; but you are silent on *the honour of your royal word* in maintaining a solemn treaty of peace! You are penetrated for the *interests of your people*, who could not contain their joy when you signed the peace, and you invoke the interests of the same people, when your declaration of war saddens all the reflecting and industrious classes of your subjects! You speak of the desire of *obstructing the farther progress of a system which may prove fatal to every part of the civilized world*, and the better to civilize the world, you restore to it all the calamities of war! Alas! of what system do you speak? Of that system of *power*, *dominion*, and *aggrandizement*, of which your ministerial orators incessantly accuse France, to conceal from the eyes of all nations the colossal power, the insatiable ambition, and the perpetual aggrandizement of England? Would you speak of the energy, the ambition, and the vast political views of the First Consul, whom your journalists and diplomatists are incessantly striving to injure in the estimation of other governments? But let your periodical libellists, your orators, and your diplomatic men revile, as much as they please, a life so glorious, and a government so energetic; let them, in their unjust and contumelious language, call the dignity with which they charge the French government *pride*; its immoveable career in well-doing, *stubbornness*; its profound energy of execution, *severity*; its avowed determination never to suffer the French nation to be insulted *arrogance*; its views for the defence and security of the south of Europe, *ambition*; such censures will never convince the world that genius is not genius; that to desire peace by every species of sacrifice is not an unalterable love of humanity; that to resist the invasions and perfidies of the English is not to defend its country, and to uphold Europe; but will prove only, that the benevolent and peaceable views of Bonaparte have been equally misunderstood and calumniated at Windsor, and in the halls of Westminster. But before what tribunal must such questions be decided? Before the tribunal of all Europe, and of posterity, will the French republic denounce Great Britain. What an important cause, in which the blessings of peace and the calamities of war are hung in the balance; in which the parties are two powerful governments, and the whole world their tribunal! on which side, then, is the spirit of ambition, aggrandizement, aggression and universal pre-eminence?

France, by the success of her arms, had acquired possession of all the countries, from the North Sea to the Adriatic, and from the Danube to the canal of Messina. What has she done for the sake of general peace?—She restores Batavia to herself; she restores Switzerland to her independence and her ancient constitutions; she cedes the Venetian countries to Austria; territorial indemnities are allotted to the electors of the Germanic body; the Venetian islands regulate their government under the influence of Russia and the Porte; Italy beholds the establishment of the Luccese, the Italian and Ligurian republics; the French troops evacuate the states of the Pope and the kingdom of Naples; Etruria receives a king; the French army at the gates of Vienna, return to the left bank of the Rhine; and Portugal is evacuated, and restored to her former independence.—Alas! if France had entertained projects of ambition, and views of aggrandizement, would she not have preserved Italy entire, under her direct influence? Would she not have extended her dominion over Batavia, Switzerland, and Portugal? Instead of this easy aggrandizement, she presents a wise limitation of her territory and her power; she suffers the loss of the immense territory of St. Domingo, as well as the treasures and armies destined for the restoration of that colony;—she makes every sacrifice to obtain the continuance of peace.

England, on the contrary, seizes upon the opulent island of Ceylon, and the entire navigation of the gulph of Bengal; she obtains the important possession of Trinidad; she essays, by a secret treaty with the Mamelukes, to invade Egypt, by supplying them with arms and ammunition; she remains in Alexandria long after the time appointed for

* See p. 750.

its evacuation, and only abandons it because the ravages of the plague began to terrify her; she violates the treaty of Amiens in order to retain Malta, to direct the operations of the barbarous corsairs, to carry on the exclusive commerce of the Adriatic, the Levant, the Dardanelles, and the Black Sea, and to shut up from all nations the navigation of the Mediterranean; she unites her efforts to prevent France from retaining St. Domingo*, and enjoying Louisiana; she excites dissensions in the Swiss Cantons, and furnishes arms and ammunition for their civil extermination; she sends squadrons into the North Seas, and before the Texe. and the Meuse, threatening to invade Batavia; she covets the possession of Sicily, demands the island of Lampedosa, and occupies Sardinia. The four quarters of the globe, gulphs, capes, straits, opulent colonies, nothing can satisfy her political and commercial cupidity. The extent of her avarice and ambition is at length discovered. The mask falls, England assigns but thirty-six hours for the continuance of peace. She has speculated on a sudden war, for the purpose of seizing, at once, upon the riches deposited on the ocean, which the Spanish, Portugueze, and Batavian colonies were at last sending to their mother countries, as well as upon the ships of the French republic, and the vessels of her scarcely revived commerce. England, at the will of a few hateful and powerful passions, disturbs the tranquillity of the world, violates, without shame, the rights of nations, tramples under foot the most solemn treaties, and falsifies the sworn faith of governments; that ancient and eternal faith, which even savage hordes acknowledge, and religiously respect.—One obstacle only arrests the progress of her ambitious career; it is France victorious, moderate, and prosperous; it is her energetic and enlightened government; it is her illustrious and magnanimous chief. These are the objects of her delirious envy, her reiterated attacks, her implacable hatred, her diplomatic intrigues, her maritime conspiracies, and her official denunciations. But Europe beholds; France prepares for battle; history relates—that ROME OVERTHREW CARTHAGE.

* According to the Duke of Clarence (debate of the 25d of May), it is *to the exertions of Great Britain that France may attribute the loss of St. Domingo.*

DECLARATION OF THE KING OF ENGLAND, ACCOMPANIED WITH OBSERVATIONS.

[*From the Moniteur of the 12th of June*, 1803.]

DECLARATIONS of war, we well know, are neither appeals to reason, nor to justice. In instruments of this nature, it is not uncommon to discover among the alledged motives of hostility, a variety of charges more or less hazarded; injuries are carried to extremes, complaints are exaggerated, and a strong colouring is given to facts, for the purpose of encreasing their general effect. We, nevertheless, are induced to believe, that in no public paper, made sacred by the name of a King, have been ever collected together a greater number of assertions authentically false, of improbable accusations, and of forced conclusions, than are to be met with in all the pages of the long Declaration of the King of England; a translation of which we herewith present our readers.—Were history supplied with no other data, by which she might enlighten posterity as to the real causes of the passing events, than the papers called in to support the allegations of this manifesto, they would alone be sufficient to teach her, and, through her, to teach future ages, what have been the gravity and the vast importance of the engagements entered into and broken, and to whom this violation of the sworn faith of nations ought to be attributed. Yes; this collection, which the British government have thought necessary to their justification, will rise up in judgment against them, and convict them of all those acts of injustice, with which they are now desirous to load France.—It is our intention to follow them in an examination of their charges, and a developement of their anterior operations. We shall successively examine the royal Declaration, the official notes of the ministers, and the correspondence of their agents, and shall arrest the attention of the reader, not upon all, but upon the most palpable proofs which the English government, by the publication of these papers, have themselves given us, of their perfidy, their political incapacity, and their abominable duplicity. And if, among the readers of these observations, any should be found who consider our conclusions too severe, let them turn their views to the future, let them behold in perspective the accumulated ills which may, and which must result, from the present war—commerce pursued on the ocean, disorganized on the continent; the chain of its connection broken, its activity paralyzed, towns destroyed, countries ravaged, shores stained with blood; and, lastly, two nations, nearly disabled from

injuring each other by the means of accustomed hostilities, forced, in order to obtain the object of war, to concert and to execute against each other enterprizes of the most extraordinary nature. .....! At such a prospect, every friend of humanity must, indeed, shudder with horror! At a prospect so dreadful, yet so hastily approaching, where is the man, however insensible, that can withhold a sentiment of the deepest indignation against the abused or perverted government, which, after resolving upon a measure from whence may arise the severest calamities to nations and to ages, expects to screen itself from the judgment of its contemporaries, by propping the grounds of its decisions on falsehood and imposture?—But, if insulted humanity authorizes in her name, and for her defence, the language of just reprobation, the interests of truth demand no less a calm and temperate refutation. A few plain but positive notes, subjoined to the declaration and correspondence of his Britannic Majesty's ministers, will be altogether sufficient for this purpose —England has declared war because she desired it; and because she stood in need of charges, she has fabricated them. Had France been desirous of doing the same, had she wished to found them on facts collected and transmitted by her diplomatic agents, we should have seen grounds of complaint far different from those now urged by Great Britain; but the French government has already declared its opinion, that what ought only to become the subject of a duel, cannot constitute the grounds of a war. France beholds herself dragged into the contest, not from motives of her own choice, nor for objects, on the possession of which she has already determined: she is not even at war for the evacuation of Malta, but solely for the purpose of repelling an unjust aggression.—The whole explanation of the conduct of France is included in this single proposition: the French government *has incessantly discovered, and proved its desire of coming to a good understanding on every point in dispute—nevertheless, France has been attacked.* —We shall now see in what manner the English government explains, and defends its conduct.

(1.) " His Majesty's earnest endeavours for " the preservation of peace having failed of " success, he entertains the fullest confidence " that he shall receive the same support from " his parliament, and that the same zeal and " spirit will be manifested by his people, " which he has experienced on every occasion " when the honour of his crown has been " attacked, or the essential interests of his " dominions have been endangered."

The discussions between France and England commenced on the 8th of March, the epoch of the King's message. The first act, constituting on the part of England a state of negotiation, is Lord Hawkesbury's letter of the 15th of March. From the period of this note to the 7th of April, the French minister received three laconic notes, two of which were upon points of inferior importance. On the 7th of April, Lord Whitworth announced the alternative of his departure.—*His Majesty's earnest endeavours*, therefore, *for the preservation of peace* are reduced to a vague and indolent negotiation, which, from the twenty first day, cast off even the appearance of pacific dispositions. In a fortnight after, the English ambassador peremptorily demands his passports, and in the course of another fortnight quits France. Such have been *his Majesty's earnest endeavours for the preservation of peace!*—We shall make no reflections on the remaining part of the introductory paragraph. The *zeal and spirit manifested by his people*, the *attack on the honour of his crown*, and the *dangers with which his dominions have been threatened*, are the mere trappings of speech, and falsehoods set down " according to due form and order."

(2.) " During the whole course of the negotiations which led to the preliminary and " definitive treaties of peace between his Majesty and the French republic, it was his " Majesty's sincere desire, not only to put an " end to the hostilities which subsisted between " the two countries, but to adopt such measures, and to concur in such propositions, " as might most effectually contribute to consolidate the general tranquillity of Europe.— " The same motives by which his Majesty was " actuated during the negotiations for peace, " have since invariably governed his conduct. " As soon as the treaty of Amiens was concluded, his Majesty's courts were open to " the people of France for every purpose of " legal redress; all sequestrations were taken " off their property; all prohibitions on their " trade, which had been imposed during the " war, were removed, and they were placed, " in every respect, on the same footing with " regard to commerce and intercourse, as the " inhabitants of any other state in amity with " his Majesty, with which there existed no " treaty of commerce."

These two paragraphs are connected together: the first is an eulogium on the justice of his Britannic Majesty, who has had the generosity, since the peace, to place Frenchmen on a footing with the inhabitants of Bremen, Lubeck, Leipsic, and Frankfort. On the tardiness of their courts of justice, the chicanery of their lawyers, and the repugnancy of English debtors to settle their accounts, the government of the republic has not deemed it proper to publish the complaints it has received on the part of French creditors. It concluded that charges of this nature might arise from impatience, exaggeration, and, in some instances, from injustice;

but from the perfect equity of its own intentions, and *the silence of the British ambassador on this head of complaint*, it had a right to conclude, that it could not be made the article of a manifesto.—Thus, the assertion of the British government, with respect to "*the repeated representations made by his Majesty's ambassador*," is totally unfounded. The French collection of official papers proves that no remonstrance on this subject was ever presented, and the English collection does not afford us a single complaint or procedure of this kind; but, since the English government were resolved upon making a political charge of this pretended non-success of the representations made by their ministers, it is rather surprising, in a collection so arbitrarily compiled, digested at leisure, and arranged according to the good inclination of those by whom it was published, that no real, or pretended letter, signed Hawkesbury, Merry, or Whitworth, should make its appearance in support of the royal allegation.—The assertion that "acts of violence have been offered to the property and vessels of his Majesty's subjects," is equally false: and here, if the simple denial of a charge, hazarded at random, did not carry its conviction with it, the shameful embarrassment betrayed by the English ministry when they were called on, in the early part of the present sittings of parliament, to produce proofs and specify facts, would alone render every developement on this head altogether superfluous.

(3.) "To a system of conduct thus open, "liberal, and friendly, the proceedings of the "French government afford the most striking "contrast. The prohibitions which had been "placed on the commerce of his Majesty's "subjects during the war, have been enforced "with encreased strictness and severity; vio-"lence has been offered in several instances "to their vessels and their property: and, in "no case, has justice been afforded to those "who may have been aggrieved in conse-"quence of such acts, nor has any satisfactory "answer been given to the repeated repre-"sentations made by his Majesty's ministers or "ambassador at Paris. Under such circum-"stances, when his Majesty's subjects were "not suffered to enjoy the common advan-"tages of peace within the territories of the "French republic, and the countries depend-"ent upon it, the French government had re-"course to the extraordinary measure of send-"ing over to this country a number of persons "for the professed purpose of residing in the "most considerable sea-port towns of Great "Britain and Ireland, in the character of com-"mercial agents or consuls. These persons "could have no pretensions to be acknow-"ledged in that character, as the right of being "so acknowledged, as well as all the privi-"leges attached to such a situation, could only "be derived from a commercial treaty; and "as no treaty of that description was in exist-"ence between his Majesty and the French "republic."

On this point, the ministers of his Britannic Majesty are explicit, beyond what we had a right to expect from their known prudence. A peace without a treaty of commerce, a peace without unlimited freedom in the consumption of their produce; a peace, in short, which does not leave them the exclusive privilege of introducing every where the fruits of their industry, and of proscribing at home the industry of other countries, is no peace at all. We must either renounce the right to establish custom-houses, and encourage national manufactures, or declare war!—This doctrine is, indeed, strange. What! are there no general laws of commerce? Can we have no trade with England without a commercial treaty? Can we not employ commercial agents, unless we have especial commercial stipulations? Well! be it so; let us have no commercial agents in England? But why must England possess the right of interdicting all access to her ports, and why may not France exercise the same right at the entrance of her own territory? Why, in this as well as in every thing else, should not reciprocity be the rule admitted and acknowledged between two rival nations? Who forbids you to proscribe the consumption of French produce? And what power on earth can compel us to consume the productions of England? Is it not the height of presumption to say to us: "unless the peace is alone profitable to our industry, we will break it; you shall either leave French industry to languish and perish, or we will arm in defence of the industry of England; in short you shall either pay dearly for the labour of our manufactures, or you shall have war."—In avowing so openly this insolent and tyrannical doctrine, we know not whether the object of the British government be to render the war they are about to commence popular in England. If such should be their intention, and if, by this means, they should succeed in attaining that object, it will then be for the powers of the continent to determine what degree of importance is attached in England to the opinions, the rights, and the interests of those nations, which have not the happiness to trade and navigate under the flag and protection of the British government. It will then be for them to decide, whether the war now commenced by England against France, like all those she has waged for a century past, be not the necessary and inevitable consequence of a system, uniformly hostile, on the part of English industry, to the industry of all other nations.—If the motive above given should be that by which the British government is actuated, the future question between England and Europe may be reduced to this double alternative: If Eng-

land possesses public spirit, and Europe should be destitute of that spirit, woe to Europe!—But should Europe prove not destitute of public spirit,—if the English government should not succeed in making the present war popular, woe to that government!—if it should succeed in making it popular, woe to England!

(4.) "There was consequently too much "reason to suppose, that the real object of "their mission was by no means of a com- "mercial nature, and this suspicion was con- "firmed, not only by the circumstance that "some of them were military men, but by "the actual discovery, that several of them "were furnished with instructions to obtain "the soundings of the harbours, and to pro- "cure military surveys of the places where it "was intended they should reside. His Ma- "jesty felt it to be his duty to prevent their "departure to their respective places of des- "tination, and represented to the French go- "vernment the necessity of withdrawing "them; and it cannot be denied, that the "circumstances under which they were sent, "and the instructions which were given to "them, ought to be considered as decisive "indications of the dispositions and intentions "of the government by whom they were em- "ployed."

The English ministers brave ridicule with a degree of hardihood altogether unparalleled. The French government dispatched into England, as it has done into every part of the globe a certain number of commercial commissioners. Out of eighty agents of this description, whom the republic maintains in foreign countries, several of them have served either in the last war, or in preceding ones. It was discovered, that among the number of those appointed for England, *one* had served in the armies of the republic; and instantly a cabinet alarm multiplies the number of these military agents of France, as the appearance of a *few* fishermen was formerly multiplied into the advanced guard of a fleet destined to make a descent, and spread terror throughout the whole country. This foolish exaggeration might, without any great impropriety, have made its appearance in an English newspaper, but to introduce it into a royal manifesto, was, in our opinion, contrary to all decency.—The second subject of alarm to the British ministry is still more ridiculous. A few questions to be answered, on the state of commerce, such as might have appeared in a public journal, were addressed to a commissary of the republic. For more than one hundred and fifty years this series of questions has formed part of the patent instructions of the commercial agents of France. So little were they calculated to excite distrust, that those agents transmitted them to the sub-agents of the district in which they resided, who frequently were merchants entirely independent of France. In short, these instructions, put together with no other view but that of obtaining such information as it was the interest of those very places to extend and propagate as much as possible, are written and addressed without any mysterious form, and it is thus that they have traversed Europe in ostensible characters. It is then through the medium of the post-office that this grand secret has been brought to light; and, after all the outcry which has been raised against these instructions, it appears to us, that nothing has been proved, but that the sanctity of correspondence is not religiously respected at the post-offices of England, and that letters are opened by the agents of government.—For the rest, we cannot but applaud the prudence of his Britannic Majesty, in not permitting these French agents to repair to their respective places of destination, since, on the faith of the alarms of his cabinet, they would have been taken for military men, and had they been suffered to proceed, would certainly have dispatched to their government extracts from journals and almanacks, on the balance of exports and imports, on the banks and commercial houses, the duties of tonnage, and other mysteries of equal importance.

(5.) "The conduct of the French govern- "ment, with respect to the commercial inter- "course between the two countries, must "therefore be considered as ill suited to a state "of peace, and their proceedings in their "more general political relations, as well as "in those which immediately concern his "Majesty's dominions, appear to have been "altogether inconsistent with every principle "of good faith, moderation, and justice. His "Majesty has entertained hopes, in conse- "quence of the repeated assurances and pro- "fessions of the French government, that "they might have been induced to adopt a "system of policy, which, if it had not in- "spired other powers with confidence, might "at least have allayed their jealousies. If the "French government had really appeared to "be actuated by a due attention to such a sys- "tem; if their dispositions had proved to be "essentially pacific, allowances would have "been made for the situation in which a new "government must be placed after so dread- "ful and extensive a convulsion as that which "has been produced by the French revo- "lution."

It is difficult to discover the real intention of the ministry in making this observation. Did it wish to point to the recent origin of the French government? Certainly, it is not without reason that it seeks to recall the recollection of the past; for it is so completely lost in the blaze of glory which has signalized the birth of this government, and in the noble train of power, of energy, of wisdom, and of dignity which followed, that the respect and love we bear towards it is confounded, in the imagination of the people, with sentiments confirmed by habit, and

transmitted by long tradition. There is one expression in this paragraph, the arrogance of which is so excessively ridiculous, that it does not even excite our indignation. The word *allowance* in English is nearly equivalent to *indulgence*; and it results from this sense of the expression, which is but a very slight equivoque, that the government of his Britannic Majesty, on certain conditions which it takes the trouble to point out, was disposed to judge without rigour, and to excuse with goodness, the government of the French republic. What magnanimous condescension! The English government would have pardoned France! And what would it have pardoned? Its vigilance, its greatness, its glory? This we can with difficulty believe. But for what consideration would it have shewn so much indulgence in favour of the recent existence of the French government? This consideration deserves to be weighed.—The English government is of no great antiquity; and if it be true that princes can only be naturalized by glory, it may be permitted us to ask, whether the branch of the House of Brunswick, now reigning in England, is not yet foreign? It may be permitted us to ask, what it has done to confirm and establish its naturalization? It is rather a doubtful point whether, at a future period, the difference of date between the accession of George the First, King of Great Britain, and the election of Bonaparte, called by the French people to be First Consul of France, will cause any great sensation in the festivals of Europe. There is, indeed, an interval between these two epochs; but the learned men of future ages will, with difficulty, unravel to posterity the precise manner in which the princes of the House of Hanover passed their time during that interval.

(6.) "But his Majesty has unfortunately had "too much reason to observe and to lament, "that the system of violence, aggression, and "aggrandizement, which characterized the "proceedings of the different governments of "France during the war, has been continued "with as little disguise since its termination."

This accusation of violence and ambition, directed against all the governments which have existed in France since the revolution, the affectation of not wishing to make any distinction, together with the naked and indeterminate comparison between the government of the First Consul and all those which preceded it, afford sufficient reason to believe, that the British government has been no stranger to the system of offence and insult, employed with the most virulent perseverance, by the English journalists during the short interval of peace. Since it now copies these very insults, have we not a right to conclude, that while it was constrained to behave with decency towards us, it secretly dictated to these periodical writers the outrages which now, only, it dares openly to avow?

(7.) "They have continued to keep a "French army in Holland against the will, "and in defiance of the remonstrances of the "Batavian government, and in repugnance to "the letter of three solemn treaties."

The French army has not continued in Holland in defiance of stipulations, but in conformity to the stipulations of a treaty with the government of that republic. Must the notions transmitted by the English cabinet to parliament infringe upon engagements consented to, in order to make known the real intentions of a government? And these notions, all insufficient, all uncertain as they appear to be, on what are they founded? From what source have they reached the British government? By whom have ministers been informed, that there were no stipulations between France and Holland? These questions have been addressed to them in parliament, and they have eluded a reply; nor could they produce a single dispatch from their minister. We shall nevertheless see, in the course of our examination of the official papers, that they are not sparing of their dispatches, and that, in a case of necessity, they know how to arrange them according to their views, when they find in them disclosures which they deem it their interest to suppress.

(8.) "They have, in a period of peace, "invaded the territory, and violated the in- "dependence of the Swiss nation, in defiance "of the treaty of Luneville, which had sti- "pulated the independence of their territory, "and the right of the inhabitants to choose "their own form of government."

We shall here venture to ask the English government, whether it is at one and the same time the judge, the commentator, the guarantee, and the avenger of the treaty of Luneville? When all Europe is tranquillized by the blessings of that memorable compact, what interest or what right has a power, that would not interfere in the negotiation, and who, from views of animosity or ambition, at that period separated itself entirely from the contracting states, to refer to a treaty to which it was not a party, and which has for its guarantee the greatest powers of the continent? Is it a contempt of those powers? Is it a pretention to European supremacy? Or, rather, is it not the expression of bitter regret which it cannot conceal, that without England, and in spite of England, Europe remains in peace, by the force of a treaty, which it *was* not in the power of England to prevent, which it *is* not in the power of England to disturb?

(9.) "They have annexed to the dominions
" of France, Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia,
" and the Island of Elba, without allotting any
" provision to the King of Sardinia, whom
" they have despoiled of the most valuable
(10) " part of his territory, though they were
" bound, by a solemn engagement to the Em-
" peror of Russia, to attend to his interests,
" and to provide for his establishment. It
" may, indeed, with truth be asserted, that
" the period which has elapsed since the con-
" clusion of the definitive treaty, has been
" marked with one continued series of ag-
" gression, violence, and insult on the part of
" the French government."

If the King of Sardinia has been unjustly despoiled of "the most valuable part of his territory," why has England, who conducted this prince to the state of abasement in which the fortune of war has thrown him, made no exertions during the war, no sacrifices at the period of the negotiations for peace, to compensate him for the evils which British instigation and British interference have brought upon him? Such is the fate of monarchs who devote themselves to the politics of this power! A despotic and haughty direction traces out to them the road which conducts to the abyss of destruction. Are they precipitated into it? She closes her ears to their complaints; she combats, she negotiates, she demands, she stipulates,—but for herself only. Nevertheless, one great, one final consolation awaits them: they may rest assured, that, at the renewal of hostilities, they will obtain an honourable mention in the manifestoes of England.

(10.) Of what concern is it to England, whether France is "bound," or not bound "by solemn engagements with other powers?" Do the treaties existing between the powers of Europe stand in need of the sanction of the King of England? Is the continent, in what relates to its public rights, under the necessary tutelage of the English nation? Such pretensions are neither more nor less than so many insults, not only to France, but to all the powers of the continent. Must not the unfortunate King of Sardinia consider himself a-fresh insulted by the tardy and offensive pity which England now expresses, a pity, which serves only to signalize the ungrateful indifference with which his interests were discussed by her at the negotiations of Amiens?

(11.) "In the month of October last, his
" Majesty was induced, in consequence of
" the earnest solicitation of the Swiss nation,
" to make an effort, by a representation to the
" French government, to avert the evils which
" were then impending over that country.
" This representation was couched in the most
" moderate terms; and measures were taken
" by his Majesty for ascertaining, under the
" circumstances which then existed, the real
" situation and wishes of the Swiss cantons, as
" well as the sentiments of the other cabinets
" of Europe. His Majesty learned, however,
" with the utmost regret, that no disposition to
" counteract these repeated infractions of
" treaties, and acts of violence, was mani-
" fested by any of the powers most immedi-
" ately interested in preventing them; and his
" Majesty therefore felt, with respect to these
" objects, his single efforts could not be ex-
" pected to produce any considerable advan-
" tage to those in whose favour they might be
" exerted."

We see in the official papers, that a Swiss, dispatched by one of the parties which were then openly and actively in a state of civil war in Helvetia, not finding at Paris any access to the ministers of Vienna and Petersburgh, was received, directed, and encouraged by the British minister. We see, also, that at this period the English government dispatched into Switzerland an agent charged to inflame the minds of the people, to disperse money, to keep alive the spirit of faction, and to light up every where the embers of civil discord. At this juncture the First Consul interposed, in order to arrest the farther effusion of blood. A simple invitation suspended the fury of adverse parties. An army, appointed for the sole purpose of giving to the citizens exasperated against each other an opportunity of coming to a friendly understanding, was stationed in Switzerland; these citizens met, and all their disputes were terminated. A constitution, had it been dictated by wisdom herself, would never have been permanent, if imposed by a victorious party. A constitution, the work of a good understanding on both sides, has succeeded in recalling to the bosom of Switzerland its antient institutions, its antient manners, its antient peace, and, by the free choice of its citizens, its ancient magistrates. Such is the real history of this interference, which the British government dares to call an invasion. Let Europe now judge between the views of England and the views of France, and let her characterize the audacity of those men, who venture to reproach the First Consul for having, against their will, and in spite of their intrigues, restored to happiness and to concord one of the most interesting, and most respectable nations of the continent.

(12.) "It was about this time that the
" French government first distinctly advanced
" the principle, that his Majesty had no right
" to complain of the conduct, or to interfere
" with the proceedings of France, on any point
" which did not form a part of the treaty of
" Amiens. That treaty was unquestionably
" founded upon the same principle as every
" other antecedent treaty or convention, on
" the assumption of the state of possession,
" and of engagements existing at the period of
" its conclusion."

It will be necessary to examine the principle obscurely laid down by the English Go-

vernment, "*that the treaty of Amiens, like every other treaty, was founded upon the state of possession, and of engagements existing at the period of its conclusion.*" This principle means apparently (for here the obscurity of the text stands in singular need of being explained by the conduct of the English Government), that treaties have no absolute value; that their sanction does not depend on the engagements and good faith of the contracting powers; that the law which renders them binding does not proceed from the very clauses of the treaty; and the consent of those by whom it was signed; that it is not in the negotiation nor in the connection between the two states that we must seek the motives and legality of the stipulations, but in other countries, and in the great scene of relations which may exist between all the states of the world, and in the chance of all the events which, after the negotiation, may operate a change in the existence of one of the two negotiating powers. This theory goes to establish the doctrine, that treaties may, indeed, have a positive form, but that their sanction, and especially their execution, are essentially conditional and eventual. Such, in substance, is the new law of nations which the English ministry now propose for the examination of the publicists of the continent. Should this principle be once adopted, such a change must also be effected in the usual instruments, as shall perfectly characterize the degree of perfection which this principle will have given to the law of nations. For instance, in the full powers of their plenipotentiaries, it is usual for governments to say, "We promise to ratify and execute the engagements which shall have been entered into in our name." To this *formula* must be henceforth added, "unless, however, it is found, after a fresh examination of the comparative state of the two powers, that we might have exacted more, and that we conceive ourselves authorized by the future state of things to demand ampler compensations." Thus, treaties of peace will deceive no one, and will only present the real degree of good understanding, obligation, and stability, which England is pleased to give them. We will, however, lay aside the discussion of right, and leave the English Government in the quiet enjoyment of its new doctrine. We shall venture to attack it on the basis of its own hypothesis. We allow them for granted, and fear not to assert that it is easy to overthrow the edifice of its pretensions, by sapping them with the very principle it wishes to establish. In the French official publication, every thing has been said upon the pretended aggrandizement of France since the treaty of Amiens, but nothing upon the aggrandizement of England. We shall endeavour to supply this omission. The Carnatic is a portion of Indostan, extending from Gontoor Cirian, all the length of the Coast of Coromandel, to Cape Comorin, and includes Tanjour, Maravar, Trichenapali, Maduré, and Zinnerilly. Its length is about 570 English miles, its breadth 120. The population of this state is about five million souls, and the revenue of the sovereign amounts to a million sterling. Since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, this rich possession has been added to the power and riches of the English nation in Europe. We shall say nothing as to the mode, form, and title, by which this possession was acquired. The English would probably answer us, that justice, like language, is local; that the public law of Europe cannot regulate actions which take place in Asia; that the English, in this part of the globe, are not tied down by any of those laws which direct the conduct of the people of this continent; that scourges, equal to the plague and famine, brought upon millions of fellow creatures, by simple views of speculation; that the slavery of nations, that imprisonment, that even the poisoning of princes, and the usurpation of their estates, are events which, by reason of their distance, cannot be comprehended and judged of so far off; and, lastly, that Indians, whether kings, priests, or slaves, are not men. But we shall solely ask them, whether the revenue of a million sterling does not produce them gold, and whether this gold is not serviceable to them, in those intrigues, corruptions, and bloody disputes, which the public law has never been able to prevent, and, still less than ever, since the treasures of India have been called in to support the English in that system of audacity, turbulence, and exterior liberality, which, for half a century, has been practised with so much success to themselves, and so much misery to others? We call on the partizans of the English Government to answer these two questions.

We have only spoken of acquisitions made by England, and known to Europe, since the treaty of Amiens; acquisitions which, according to the *professed principle of the Declaration*, now constitute "*a state of possession* different from that which existed at the period of the treaty." We, however, conceive it our duty, in order to clear up the great question of the aggrandizement of the two states, to recapitulate the acquisitions made by this very country, during the course of the last war. We shall not speak of the history of the conquest of Tippoo Saib. If ever a controversy should arise, on the comparison of the acts and politics of revolution-

ary Europe with the system which England has latterly pursued in India, we undertake to prove, that not only in France, at the most violent epoch of her revolution, but, also, in no other country of the globe, and at no period of the history of man, has any administration ever manifested a more iniquitous, a more greedy, a more inhuman ambition, than that of which the English administration in India has given us the example, both before and during the war which laid low one of the most powerful sovereigns of Indostan. The result of power and of riches, for which the English are indebted to the injustice of their Government in India, is as follows: The portion of the bloody heritage of Tippoo Saib which fell to the lot of England, is composed of several provinces, rich in culture, and important from their position. Its extent is 500 miles in length, and 300 in breadth. The army of Tippoo consisted of 150,000 men, 70,000 of whom were regular troops. For fear of falling into error, and considering the diversity in the relations of historians and travellers, we shall not venture to estimate the population acquired by England, nor the revenues of its new usurpations. But to dwell on facts generally admitted: we venture to assert, that since the destruction of the power of the Mysore, there no longer exists any force in Bengal, and in the peninsula to the south of the Mahratta country, capable of opposing the slightest check to the ambition of England; that the people and states of this country lost, in the overthrow of Tippoo-Saib, the sole support of their independence, and the ultimate hope of their weakness; that these states, now defenceless, compose when united to those under the government of England, a population of forty million souls; and that those to which British authority does not immediately extend, are not in a situation less miserable or less dependant; since their princes are incessantly alarmed by a neighbour who overawes them, since the exclusive system of English commerce forbids the participation of other European nations in the commerce of India, and thus, the inhabitants of this country, though not governed by the laws of England, are no less subject to the despotism of her speculations, no less oppressed by her avarice, and no less the slaves of her industry.

(13.) "If that state of possession and of engagements is materially affected by the voluntary act of any of the parties, so as to prejudice the condition on which the other party has entered into the contract, the change so made, may be considered as operating virtually as a breach of the treaty itself, and as giving the party aggrieved a right to demand satisfaction or compensation for any substantial difference which such acts may have effected in their relative situations; but whatever may be the principle on which the treaty is to be considered as founded, there is indisputably a General Law of Nations, which, though liable to be limited, explained, or restrained by Conventional Law, is antecedent to it, and is that law or rule of conduct to which all sovereigns and states have been accustomed to appeal, where Conventional Law is admitted to have been silent. The Treaty of Amiens, and every other treaty, in providing for the objects to which it is particularly directed, does not therefore assume or imply an indifference to all other objects which are not specified in its stipulations, much less does it adjudge them to be of a nature to be left to the will and caprice of the violent and the powerful. The justice of the cause is alone a sufficient ground to warrant the interposition of any of the powers of Europe in the differences which may arise between other states, and the application and extent of that just interposition is to be determined solely by considerations of prudence. These principles can admit of no dispute; but if the new and extraordinary pretension advanced by the French Government, to exclude his Majesty from any right to interfere with respect to the concerns of other powers, unless they made a specific part of the stipulations of the Treaty of Amiens, was that which it was possible to maintain, those powers would have a right, at least, to claim the benefit of this principle, in every case of difference between the two countries. The indignation of all Europe must surely then be excited by the declarations of the French government, that, in the event of hostilities, these very powers who were no parties to the Treaty of Amiens, and who were not allowed to derive any advantage from the remonstrances of his Majesty in their behalf, are nevertheless to be made the victims of a war which is alledged to arise out of the same Treaty, and are to be sacrificed in a contest which they not only have not occasioned, but which they have had no means whatever of preventing."

The conclusion of this paragraph is totally unintelligible. There is here a confusion of powers which renders it incomprehensible. Which, we wish to know, are the states "in whose behalf the English government has made remonstrances," and which are those, that, "not being able to occasion or prevent the contest, may nevertheless be made the victims of it?" These powers are not thus confounded without design; for it is always so easy to explain our intentions clearly, that obscurity, in objects of great and manifest interest, must ever be considered as the certain sign of dissimulation, or of a conscience stung with reproaches. But what is here the secret intentions of the English government? Of these we are totally ignorant. We know only, that the states, in whose behalf England has made remonstrances, have no great reason to express their gratitude. Her deceitful promises proved fatal to the King of Sardinia. They would also have succeeded

in undoing Switzerland, had not the First Consul snatched that devoted country from their solicitations. As to the states that may suffer from the war which England is about to rekindle, we imagine this to be one of the consolations which her generosity is preparing, to efface the impression of their miseries and alarms. Should this war draw after it a ten years train of fresh desolations and destruction, England, by her foresighted declaration, is already prepared to say to her victims—" Of what have you to reproach me? It is true I rekindled the war; it is true I foresaw all that you were to suffer; but read my manifesto, and see whether or no I did not say, that you *had neither occasioned nor prevented it*, and expressly recommended that *you might not be sacrificed in this contest.* These generous ideas, we doubt not, will inspire the cabinet writers, the first time they have occasion to manufacture one of those laboured productions, entitled, *The Speech from the Throne*, and which, annually, informs the good people of England, of all that the anxiety of ministers for their happiness has projected, and of the happy unanimity subsisting between them and the legislature.

(14.) " His Majesty judged it most expedient, under the circumstances which then affected Europe, to abstain from a recurrence " to hostilities on account of the views of ambition and acts of aggression manifested by " France on the continent; yet an experience " of the character and dispositions of the French " government could not fail to impress his " Majesty with a sense of the necessity of increased vigilance in guarding the rights and " dignity of his crown, and in protecting the " interests of his people.—Whilst his Majesty " was actuated by these sentiments, he was " called upon by the French government to " evacuate the island of Malta. His Majesty " had manifested, from the moment of the " signature of the definitive treaty, an anxious " disposition to carry into full effect the stipulations of the treaty of Amiens relative to " that island. As soon as he was informed " that an election of a Grand Master had taken " place, under the auspices of the Emperor of " Russia, and that it had been agreed by the " different priories assembled at St. Petersburgh " to acknowledge the person whom the court " of Rome should select out of those who had " been named by them to be Grand Master of " the Order of St. John, his Majesty proposed " to the French government, for the purpose of " avoiding any difficulties which might arise in " the execution of the arrangement, to acknowledge that election to be valid: and " when, in the month of August, the French " government applied to his Majesty to permit the Neapolitan troops to be sent to the " island of Malta, as a preliminary measure for " preventing any unnecessary delay, his Majesty consented without hesitation to this " proposal, and gave directions for the admission of the Neapolitan troops into the island. " His Majesty had thus shewn his disposition " not only to throw no obstacle in the way of " the execution of the treaty, but, on the contrary, to facilitate the execution of it by " every means in his power. His Majesty " cannot, however, admit, that at any period " since the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens, " the French government have had a right to " call upon him, in conformity to the stipulations of that treaty, to withdraw his forces " from the island of Malta. At the time when " this demand was made by the French government, several of the most important " stipulations of the arrangement respecting " Malta remained unexecuted: the election of " a Grand Master had not been carried into " effect. The tenth article had stipulated " that the independence of the island should " be placed under the guarantee and protection of Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Spain, and Prussia. The Emperor of " Germany had acceded to the guarantee, but " only on condition of a like accession on the " part of the other powers specified in the article. The Emperor of Russia had refused " his accession, except on the condition that " the Maltese langue should be abrogated; " and the King of Prussia had given no answer " whatever to the application which had been " made to him to accede to the arrangement. " But the fundamental principle, upon the existence of which depended the execution of " the other parts of the article, had been defeated by the changes which had taken place " in the constitution of the Order since the " conclusion of the treaty of peace. It was " to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem that " his Majesty was, by the first stipulation of " the 10th article, bound to restore the island " of Malta. The Order is defined to consist of " those langues which were in existence at the " time of the conclusion of the treaty: the " three French langues having been abolished, " and a Maltese langue added to the institution. The Order consisted, therefore, at " that time of the following langues, viz. of " Arragon, Castile, Germany, Bavaria, and Russia. Since the conclusion of the definitive " treaty, the langues of Arragon and Castile have " been separated from the Order by Spain, a " part of the Italian langue has been abolished " by the annexation of Piedmont and Parma " to France. There is strong reason to believe " that it has been in contemplation to sequestrate the property of the Bavarian langue, " and the intention has been avowed of keeping the Russian langues within the dominions of the Emperor."

The British government, by what it advances in this historical developement, stands evidently accused. On the arrival of the Neapolitan troops at Malta, its dispositions, at least apparently so, were conformable to the treaty of Amiens, and the two countries lived in a state of good understanding. Every thing that precedes this event may, too late, be remembered with bitterness, and represented in a false point of view; but it is certain, that, at that period, the communications, official and non-official, between the two governments, were amicable and temperate. If the English government, at this time, suspected France of "*views of ambition*," and could have accused her of "*mani-*

fested aggressions," why can they not be traced in the official notes or dispatches of its Ministers?—It is then, clear, that the irritation of the English government takes its date from the very moment it was called on to execute the treaty of Amiens, in a point that counteracted its projects of ambition. It is clear, that it has now no other charge against France; it is clear, that all those which precede it, were mere amplifications of office, a vain display of blustering declamations and diplomatic bathology, deemed necessary to draw the attention of the public from the real object of the rupture.

(15.) "Under these circumstances, the Order " of St. John, cannot now be considered as " that body to which, according to the stipula- " tions of the treaty, the island was to be res- " tored; and the funds indispensably necessary " for its support, and for the maintenance of " the independence of that island, have been " nearly, if not wholly, sequestered. Even if " this had arisen from circumstances which it " was not in the power of any of the contract- " ing parties to the treaty to control, his Ma- " jesty would nevertheless, have had a right " to defer the evacuation of the island by his " forces, until such time as an equivalent ar- " rangement had been concluded for the pre- " servation of the independence of the Order " and of the island. But if these changes have " taken place in consequence of any acts of " the other parties of the treaty; if the French " government shall appear to have proceeded " upon a system of rendering the Order whose " independence they had stipulated, incapable " of maintaining that independence, his Ma- " jesty's right to continue in the occupation " of the island, under such circumstances, will " hardly be contested. It is indisputable, " that the revenues of the two Spanish Langues " have been withdrawn from the Order by his " Catholic Majesty; a part of the Italian " Langue has in fact been abolished by France, " through the unjust annexation of Piedmont " and Parma, and Placentia, to the French ter- " ritory. The Elector of Bavaria has been in- " stigated by the French government to se- " questrate the property of the Order within " his territories; and it is certain, that they " have not only sanctioned, but encouraged " the idea of the propriety of separating the " Russian Langues from the remainder of the " Order.—As the conduct of the governments " of France and Spain, have, therefore, in " some instances directly, and in others, indi- " rectly, contributed to the changes which " have taken place in the Order, and thus de- " stroyed its means of supporting its inde- " pendence, it is to those governments, and " not to his Majesty, that the non-execution " of the 10th Article of the treaty of Amiens " must be ascribed.—Such would be the just " conclusion, if the 10th Art. of that treaty " were considered as an arrangement by itself. " It must be observed however, that this Ar- " ticle forms a part only of a treaty of peace, " the whole of which is connected together, " and the stipulations of which must, upon a " principle common to all treaties, be con- " strued as having a reference to each other. " His Majesty was induced by the treaty of " Peace to consent to abandon and to restore " to the Order of St. John the island of Malta, " on condition of its independence and neu- " trality. But a further condition which must " necessarily be supposed to have had consi- " derable influence with his Majesty in in- " ducing him to make so important a conces- " sion, was the acquiescence of the French " government in an arrangement for the secu- " rity of the Levant, by the 8th and 9th Arti- " cles in the treaty, stipulating the interests of " the Turkish Empire, and the independence " of the Ionian islands."

It will here be necessary to recall to our recollection the 10th Article of the treaty of Amiens, which we shall transcribe entire:

" The islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino, shall " be restored to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem*, " to be held on the same conditions on which it pos- " sessed them before the war, and under the follow- " ing stipulations:—1. The Knights of the Order, " whose *Langues* shall continue to subsist, after the " exchange of the ratification of the present treaty, are " invited to return to Malta, as soon as the exchange " shall have taken place. They shall there form a " general Chapter, and proceed to the election of " a Grand Master, chosen from among the natives " of those nations which are to preserve their " *Langues*, unless that election has been already " made since the exchange of the preliminaries.— " It is understood that an election made subsequent " to that epoch, shall alone be considered valid, " to the exclusion of any other that may have taken " place at any period prior to that epoch.—2. The " governments of the French Republic, and of " Great-Britain, desiring to place the Order and " island of Malta in a state of entire independence " with respect to themselves, agree that there shall " not be in future either a French or an English " *Langue*; and that no individual belonging to " either the one or the other of these powers shall " be admitted into the Order.—3. There shall be " established a Maltese *Langue*, which shall be sup- " ported by the territorial revenues, and commer- " cial duties of the island. This *Langue* shall have " its peculiar dignities, an establishment and a man- " sion-house. Proofs of nobility shall not be ne- " cessary for the admission of Knights of this *Langue;* " and they shall be moreover admissible to all of- " fices, and shall enjoy all privileges in the same " manner as the Knights of the other *Langues*. At " least *half* of the Municipal, Administrative, Civil, " Judicial, and other employments depending on " the Government, shall be filled by inhabitants of " the islands of Malta, Gozo, and Comino. 4. The " forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the " island and its dependencies, within three months " from the exchange of the ratifications, or sooner " if possible. At that epoch it shall be given up to " the Order in its present state, provided the Grand " Master, or Commissaries, fully authorized accord- " ing to the statutes of the Order, shall be in the " island to take possession, and that the force which " is to be provided by his Sicilian Majesty, as is " hereafter stipulated, shall have arrived there.— " 5. One half of the garrison, at least, shall be al- " ways composed of native Maltese; for the re- " mainder, the Order may levy recruits in those " countries only which continue to possess the " *Langues*. The Maltese troops shall have Maltese " officers. The commandership in chief of the " garrison, as well as the nomination of the offi- " cers, shall pertain to the Grand Master, and this " right he cannot resign even temporarily, except " in favour of a Knight, and in concurrence with

" the advice of the Council of the Order—6. The " independence of the isles of Malta, of Gezo and " Comino, as well as the present arrangements, " shall be placed under the protection and gua- " rantee of France, Great-Britain, Austria, Spain, " Russia, and Prussia.—7. The neutrality of the " Order and of the island of Malta, with its de- " pendencies, is hereby proclaimed.—8. The ports " of Malta shall be opened to the commerce and " the navigation of all nations, who shall there " pay equal and moderate duties: these duties " shall be applied to the maintenance of the Mal- " tese *Langue*, as specified in paragraph 3, to that " of the civil and military establishments of the " island, as well as to that of a general Lazaret, " open to all colours.—9. The States of Barbary " are excepted from the conditions of the pre- " ceding paragraphs, until, by means of an arrange- " ment to be procured by the contracting parties, " the system of hostilities, which subsists between " the states of Barbary and the Order of St. John, " or the powers possessing the *Langues*, or con- " curring in the composition of the Order shall " have ceased.—10. The Order shall be governed " both with respect to Spirituals and Temporals, " by the same statutes, which were in force, when " the Knights left the isle, as far as the present " treaty does not abrogate them.—11. The regu- " lations contained in the paragraphs, 3, 5, 7, 8, " and 10, shall be converted into laws and perpe- " tual statutes of the Order, in the customary man- " ner; and the Grand Master, or, if he shall not " be in the island at the time of its restoration to " the Order, his representative, as well as his suc- " cessors, shall be bound to take an oath for their " punctual observance.—12. His Sicilian Majesty " shall be invited to furnish 200 men, natives of his " states, to serve as a garrison in the different for- " tresses of the said islands. That force shall re- " main one year, to bear date from their restitution " to the Knights; and if at the expiration of this " term, the Order should not have raised a force " sufficient, in the judgment of the Guaranteeing " Powers to garrison the island and its dependen- " cies, as is specified in the 5th paragraph, the " Neapolitan troops shall continue there until they " shall be replaced by a force deemed sufficient by " the said Powers.—13. The different Powers de- " signated in the 6th paragraph, to wit, France, " Great-Britain, Austria, Spain, Russia, and Prussia, " shall be invited to accede to the present stipu- " lations."

The letter and spirit of every part of this article agrees on one point, which, both with regard to the order of Malta, and the respective interests of France and England, is the most important of all—that within three months from the exchange of the ratifications, the island of Malta shall be evacuated by the British forces, and that the order shall remain sovereign, and independent of any of the contracting powers.—This article consists of thirteen paragraphs; and this division, expressly and numerically marked, indicates that they are distinct, and totally independent of each other. Some of these paragraphs are conditional; others absolute. Of the former description are, necessarily, those which speak of the concurrence of the powers not contractants to the treaty. Of the latter, are, necessarily, those which require only the concurrence of the contracting powers in order to its execution.—There is, however, one exception in the fourth paragraph, and that exception is clearly expressed: the island shall not be evacuated by the English troops, but on the arrival of the Grand Master or Commissaries fully authorized according to the statutes of the Order, and of the Neapolitan troops. Here we find the positive clause of the evacuation of Malta united to two conditional clauses. But the exception establishes the rule, and is the clearest evidence, that the evacuation of Malta by the English cannot be connected with a third hypothesis. The two conditions just cited entered necessarily into the sense and object of the negotiation, and, for this reason, were inserted in the fourth paragraph. The preamble of the article declares, in an absolute manner, that the order shall be master of Malta; the second paragraph declares, in an absolute manner, that the order and island of Malta shall be in a state of entire independence of France and of England. It is therefore necessary, in a manner equally absolute, that the two conditions, the presence of a commissary of the order, and of the Neapolitan troops destined for the provisional protection of the island, and the order of Malta, should be realized, in order to the execution of the preamble and the fourth paragraph. But neither in the nature of things, nor by the contexture of the 10th article, can the evacuation and independence of Malta be connected with any other conditional paragraphs of this article. The two governments agreed that Malta should be restored to the order. One renounced the rights acquired by the treaty made with the order; the other, the rights attained by conquest; and, in order that these sacrifices might not experience the least obstacle, and the smallest possible delay, they made the act of restitution to depend wholly on one power, and took care to interest that power in the restoration of the order, by stipulating, in the preamble, for the preservation of its individual rights. In the same spirit of foresight have they provided, in the 4th and 10th paragraphs, against the alternative, that the grand master should not be elected, or that he could not repair to the island, to receive it from the British officers. Such were the positive and absolute views of the two governments, relative to the order of Malta. But this order being feeble, dispersed, and without a chief, it became their duty, at the same time, to turn their attention to the changes which circumstances had rendered necessary, both in its constitution and its future interests. For this purpose they decreed the accessory clauses

relative to reforms deemed beneficial, and to political guarantees the most capable of procuring to the order security, prosperity, and consideration. These clauses are to be found in the paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, and 13 of the Xth article. But none of these clauses essentially interest the existence of the order. Langues may be established or suppressed; the order may be more or less rich; its existence may be guaranteed by a greater or less number of powers: these hypotheses effect, in no degree whatever, the essence of the re-establishment of the order in its chief place of residence, and, still less, can they alter the force of the engagements which the two powers have contracted on their own part, and on the part of each other. This theory of right is so plain, that nothing but the most notorious bad faith could render an exposition of it necessary. Nothing, too, but the most bare-faced ambition can dispute the truth of its conclusions. Let us suppose, for a moment, that on this point the conduct of England had been sincere and disinterested; what would have been her language? "The powers who are to guarantee the "10th article of the treaty of Amiens have "delayed giving this guarantee; it will ar- "rive quite as soon after as before the eva- "cuation. Is this guarantee, in some re- "spects, incomplete? We will negotiate to "obtain one without modification; or else "the contracting powers will yield to the "modifications demanded. In short, the "guarantee, such as is wished for, can it not "be obtained? Well! the order shall ex- "ist under the guarantee of the contracting "powers, and those who have not acceded "to the demands stipulated in the 6th and "13th paragraphs of the 10th article, are "too generous and too just ever to attach "the security of an order, in the re-esta- "blishment of which, their wishes and their "kind offices have as much contributed as "the consent and the inclinations of the "contracting powers." With respect to the clauses relative to reforms, her language would have been this: "the order in elect- "ing the grand master since the treaty of "Amiens, the Emperor of Russia in autho- "rizing this nomination, the sovereign pon- "tiff in concluding this election, have im- "plicitly adopted the reforming paragraphs. "Will a more direct discussion of these "clauses give birth to difficulties in their "execution? These difficulties shall be ex- "amined, explained, and either adopted or "rejected. It little imports the tranquillity "of the world, whether the changes in the "statutes of the order be few or many; but "it highly imports the honour of England, "that this order should exist, be imme- "diately re-installed, and its chief residence "restored to it. In short, the order of "Malta is menaced in its possessions by so- "vereigns, to whom the invasion of the "island of Malta has become either an ob- "ject of encouragement and imitation, or a "motive for now endeavouring to plunder "the order of a rich portion of her terri- "tories. Is this danger, then, a reason for "taking advantage of those acts of violence "which this unfortunate order is in dread of "experiencing? And, because it is poor, "and runs the risk of becoming more so, "is it generous to seek to add to the mea- "sure of its miseries, by plundering it of its "subjects, its fortresses, its ports, and its "title of sovereignty." Such would have been the language of the minister of the King of England, had it been intended in the privy council to establish, on grounds of justice and good sense, the determination his Britannic Majesty had entered into.

(16.) "His Majesty has, however, since "learnt, that the French government have en- "tertained views hostile to both these objects; "and that they have even suggested the idea of "a partition of the Turkish empire. These "views must now be manifest to all the world, "from the official publication of the report of "Colonel Sebastiani, from the conduct of that "officer, and of the other French agents in "Egypt, Syria, and the Ionian islands, and "from the distinct admission of the First Con- "sul himself, in his communication with Lord "Whitworth. His Majesty was, therefore, "warranted in considering it to be the deter- "mination of the French government to vio- "late those articles of the treaty of peace, "which stipulated for the integrity and inde- "pendence of the Turkish empire, and of the "Ionian islands, and consequently he would "not have been justified in evacuating the "island of Malta, without receiving some "other security, which might equally provide "for these important objects. His Majesty "accordingly feels that he has an incontestible "claim, in consequence of the conduct of "France since the treaty of peace, and with "reference to the objects which made part of "the stipulations of that treaty, to refuse, "under the present circumstances, to relin- "quish the possession of the island of Malta."

The war of the English government has two alledged pretexts. The former we have already analyzed; the latter is an affected inquietude as to the fate of the Ottoman empire. We shall next examine the declared motives of this inquietude. In the first place, the English government "*learnt that the French entertained views hostile to the integrity of the Ottoman empire*;" and these views, say they, "*must now be known to all the world*." By what means has the English government learnt that France entertained such views? And on what evidence does it assert, that these views were known to all the world? The declaration is silent on this

charge, and, doubtless, no human sagacity can supply the place of such an omission!—To "learn" a little sooner, what "all the world knows" a little later, may be a great effort of foresight. But what is here wanting to complete the reader's instruction, is the proof that these designs were known before the time of their public revelation; that these designs are generally known even now; and, what is of still more importance, that these designs had ever any real existence. Where are the proofs of this assertion? Not in the declaration; for that refers us, with an assurance which we cannot sufficiently admire, to the report of Colonel Sebastiani, and the "distinct admission" of the First Consul himself, in his communication with Lord Whitworth. Thus instructed, the reader hastens to the official collection, where he first of all turns to the communications of the First Consul with the British Ambassador, and afterwards to the report of Colonel Sebastiani, "which discovers to the whole world the views of the French government." During the course of Lord Whitworth's mission, did there ever exist a negotiation between this ambassador and the French ministry? Would the First Consul have deigned to assist at an official conference? Would there have been a minute of these conferences? And would the First Consul have authorized the insertion in this minute of what he had been pleased to say? Had this been the case, there would, we conceive, have been a regular, authentic communication. But no; nothing of this sort appears in the official collection. But what do we find in it that applies to the assertion of the English minister? A conversation of two hours, comprised in a dispatch of three pages; an acknowledgment, often repeated, of the difficulty of the writer to retain and arrange his recollections, a confession of not being able to confide in his memory, and a sentence carefully underlined, for the purpose of pointing out the grand mystery and *distinct admission* of the views of the First Consul against the Ottoman empire. This sentence runs thus: "He now went back to Egypt, and told "me, that if he had felt the smallest incli- "nation to take it by force, he might have "done it a month ago, by sending 25,000 "men to Aboukir, who would have pos- "sessed themselves of the whole country, "in defiance of the 4000 British in Alex- "andria. That instead of that garrison "being a means of protecting Egypt, it was "only furnishing him with a pretence for "invading it. *This he should not do, what-* "*ever might be his desire to have it as a co-* "*lony, because he did not think it worth the* "*risk of a war, in which he might, perhaps,* "*be considered as the aggressor, and by which* "*he should lose more than he could gain, since,* "*sooner or later, Egypt would belong to* "*France, either by the falling to pieces of the* "*Turkish empire, or by some arrangement* "*with the Porte.*" Is it possible to play thus audaciously with the good sense of the people of the 19th century! And is it the nation that produced a Locke, a Nepier, and a Newton, whose determination to spill her blood, to squander her treasure, to torture her industry, and to draw down upon her shores a scourge which, in the course of events, may degenerate into a war of extirmination, is now attempted to be justified! From our respect to the First Consul, we abstain from entering into the particulars of a conversation, the truth and even probability of which is absolutely indifferent to the discussion. Whether this letter be written by Lord Whitworth or by ministers, or partly by one and partly by the other, the use made of it by the framers of the declaration answers, by no means, the object they had in view. It is a mass of inconsistency, absurdity, and a total forgetfulness of the respect which governments owe to themselves, as well as to public opinion. Readers, disappointed with the perusal of the ministerial dispatch, have no other means of arriving at the discovery of the pretended designs of France against the Ottoman empire, than the report of Colonel Sebastiani. And here the English cabinet leaves its readers to themselves. Not a sentence is underlined, and through the long and varied details of a journey to Tripoly, Alexandria, Cairo, Damietta, and Jaffa, must they search for the traces of those fatal designs, which no official indication has attributed to them. Vain researches! We find, in the report, that Colonel Sebastiani was received every where with marks of esteem, of confidence, and of attachment; that every thing, but the conduct of an English officer, and the stay of the English army in Egypt, completely answered his expectations; that the name of the First Consul was blest and revered in the East; that the French nation was beloved; that the delay of the English was a subject of alarm and discontent: not a sentence, not a single expression is there in the whole report, that can, by the most forced interpretation, be construed into a design of France against the Ottoman empire. Of this we may be well assured. For if the most distant allusion to these pretended designs could have been traced, the aid of *italic characters* would, doubtless, have been called in, to designate the points of the report, on which the attention of the reader

should be arrested. Thus, then, it is evident, that the English government falsely boasts of having "learnt the views of France against the Ottoman empire;" that it wrongfully accuses France of entertaining such views, and that the French government has better known than itself the means of making it *generally understood*, that the "views hostile to the security of the Ottoman empire" belong solely to the English ministry, by shewing that it waited to the last moment before it evacuated Egypt, and that, in defiance of every consideration of justice, of decency, and of public right, it obstinately refused to evacuate Malta.

(17.) "Yet notwithstanding this right, so "clear and so unquestionable, the alternative "presented by the French government to his "Majesty, in language the most peremptory "and menacing, was the evacuation of Malta, "or the renewal of war.—If the views of am- "bition and aggrandizement, which have thus "been manifested by the French government "since the conclusion of the treaty of peace, "have in so very particular a manner attracted "the attention of his Majesty, it has been "equally impossible for him not to feel and "not to notice, the repeated indignities which "have been offered by that government to his "crown and his people."

The English government is absolutely determined to exculpate itself from every charge by means of simple recrimination, without any authority but its own assertions, and to throw them entirely upon France. We have already seen that it was France who entertained *views against the Ottoman empire*. We now see, that it is France who has employed *language the most peremptory and menacing*. At a future day, perhaps, it will endeavour to prove, that it was the First Consul who, in a message to the legislative body, insulted truth, by two assertions notoriously false; that it was he who forbad his ministers to make known his propositions in writing; that it was he who imposed the alternative of 36 hours; that it was he who recalled his ambassador from London; that it was he who caused to be printed garbled dispatches, and who published as official papers, letters without connection, without interest, and without authenticity; that it was he, in short, who declared war.

(18.) "The report of Colonel Sebastiani "contains the most unwarrantable insinuations "and charges against his Majesty's govern- "ment, against the officer who commanded "his forces in Egypt, and against the British "army in that quarter. This paper cannot be "considered as the publication of a private "individual; it has been avowed, and indeed "bears evidence upon the face of it, that it "is the official report of an accredited agent, "published by the authority of the govern- "ment to which it was addressed, who there- "by have given it their express sanction."

Much has been said in the London journals respecting the Moniteur, and the official character of this periodical paper: this is pure jealousy of the editors. But what have governments to do with what is published in a newspaper? When a government authorizes a journal to inform its subscribers that it is official, it thereby makes known that the acts of administration, published in that journal, are authentic, and that the laws and deliberations of the constituted authorities published by its editors, are literally printed from the copies transmitted them, either by the clerks of those authorities, or from the secretary of state's office. All that is printed in London is official in relation to France, as being countenanced by the public authority; in this sense, also, all that is printed in France is official, in relation to England. But to argue from a report made to the chief magistrate of a government, in order to signalize projects and views of high administration, is to take observations presented to an authority, for the intentions of the authority itself. To argue from what has been published in a newspaper, in order to fix upon a government political dispositions it has not made known by the acknowledged agents of its measures, by the appointed organs of its views, is to suppose, that there exists in the political organization of Europe, neither rules, nor forms, nor principles. It is singular that it should fall to the lot of Frenchmen, emerging from a revolution, during which so many things were displaced, so many laws misunderstood, to correct a government pretending to be old in the most common notions of the forms, the nature, and the various departments of the administration of a state; and that to men who, for ten years, have incessantly reproached us with having overturned every thing, we should have occasion to say—"You present us with articles of a "newspaper for acts of government; and "you place in the mouth of a king, infor- "mations of facts, which the most discre- "dited news-monger would not venture to "insert in his journal: you attach so much "importance to extracts from German pa- "pers, that you think it your duty to pre- "serve them in a collection of state papers; "and in this very collection you refuse to "give place to important official notes, trans- "mitted you under the signature of the mi- "nister of a foreign government: you pub- "lish, as official, letters without date, with- "out signature, or only signed by persons "unknown, ministerial dispatches which you "have re-written, abridged, or lengthened "at leisure; and you imagine that the ar- "chives of the public law of Europe are, "henceforward, to be encumbered with "these puerile rhapsodies, and that the pub-

" licists of the Continent will conceive it " their duty to pay any deference to docu- " ments devoid of all interest and authen- " ticity. This is carrying assurance a little " too far, and relying too much on the igno- " rance and credulity of the public."--Colonel Sebastiani has nobly and frankly rendered an account of a mission, which he nobly and faithfully discharged. It is false that he has inculpated either the British government or the British army; and if one hazarded expression, to use the language of the Declaration, could be found in the report, does any one doubt, that the Englsh Ministers would not have hastened to render it conspicuous in their collection, by the assistance of *italic characters?*

" (19.) This report had been published a " very short time, when another indignity was " offered to this country in the communication " of the First Consul of France to the Legis- " lative Body. In this communication he pre- " sumes to affirm, in the character of Chief " Magistrate of that country that Great Britain " cannot singly contend against the power of " France; an assertion as unfounded as it is " indecent, disproved by the events of many " wars, and by none more than by those of the (20) " war which has been recently concluded. " Such an assertion, advanced in the most so- " lemn official act of a government, and " thereby meant to be avowed to all the " powers of Europe, can be considered in no " other light than as a defiance publicly offered " to his Majesty, and to a brave and powerful " people, who are both willing and able to " defend his just rights, and those of their " country, against every insult and aggression."

The French government, in beholding the audacious system of insults, of insolent defamations, and of mad imprecations, which all the English journalists, without exception, had adopted against France, with a warmth and perseverance of which no war furnishes us the example, could not but consider this infamous species of tolerated and authorized abuse, as the menace of an actual war. The stay of the British troops in Egypt, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope and Goree, confirmed it in the idea, that England was desirous of imposing on France, by a system of pride, of violence, and of obstinacy; and to shew how little disposed it was to receive such impressions, it thought proper to declare its opinion of the actual situation of France and England, and to invite the French nation to trust to its government the charge of repelling aggresion, of maintaining its rights, and of watching over its future security. We must here remark, that in this instance, also, the quotation in the manifesto is, according to the practice of the English Cabinet, mutilated, and does not, in the " View of the State of the Republic," possess that general and absolute sense, which Ministers have thought proper to give it in the declaration.—Let us, besides, refer to the time in which the View of the State of the Republic appeared, and we shall discover what was, at that period, the political line of conduct which the English government affected to adopt with regard to the states of the Continent.—The King's speech to Parliament at the opening of the session, that is to say, on the 18th of November, three months before the date of the " View of the state of the Republic," is an act of government to which present circumstances give a considerable degree of importance, and which ought to be perused with peculiar attention. —In this speech, the King refers to the relative situation of England, and the opinion he expresses is far from being a guarantee for his perseverence in a pacific disposition. France is not mentioned, and his Majesty does not once call the attention of Parliament to the recent connection between the two countries. He enlarges, however, upon the state of Europe, and the *connection* of the continental powers with England; and declares, that he *will never lose sight of that wise system of policy, by which the interests of other states are connected with his own.* His Britannic Majesty adds, that *he cannot be indifferent to the changes that may take place in their strength and relative situations, and that his conduct shall invariably be directed by the consideration of the state of Europe.* What, in the eyes of the French government, could possibly signify this *connection* of the continental powers of England, and these considerations drawn from the changes that might take place in Europe, *in determining the duration of the sincere desire of his Britannic Majesty to maintain peace?* For it is worthy of observation, that in this very paragraph, the assurance of the pacific dispositions of his Britannic Majesty is presented under conditional forms: it is positively modified by the eventual consideration of the *connections* of England with the states of the continent.—Thus, in seven months after the peace, the English government professes, on the first opportunity of manifesting its sentiments, an uncertain, eventual, and unconditional opinion on the peace. It is not engagements it has contracted; it is not new relations between France and England, with which it amuses the nation. It presents to her the states of the Continent as the sole object which ought to fix her attention; it is anxious that she should not lose sight, for a moment, of the *wisely established system* which unites the politics of Europe with the conduct of the governments of those states; lastly, it wishes to re-kindle her mad thirst for continental connections. And when his Majesty

enlarges upon *the happiness of Great Britain, the prosperity of his people, the flourishing state of the manufactures and public revenue*, would it be credited, that he imputes no portion of these advantages to the blessings of peace?---Had not the government of the Republic, we ask, sufficient reason to fear, that the English government did not wish to rely upon the peace, and that it was fascinated with those dangerous and turbulent illusions, which, at the commencement of the last war, rendered it the apostle and instigator of coalitions, and which might again inspire her with the desire of preaching and provoking a new one? The attention excited by the King's speech naturally turns us to those of his Ministers. We shall now hear their sentiments, on the grand question of peace, of war, and of continental connections. In the sitting of the 23d of November, one of the Ministers said, that "his Majesty had made peace, because the "powers of the continent were neither able "nor willing to continue the war, and that "at the moment when England, as well as "Europe, *felt herself depressed by the weight "of the burthens imposed during the course of "a long war*, rather than continue it without "allies, *he had thought it preferable to try the "experiment of peace*."---"War," said another "of the Ministers, "is a certain evil; peace, "on the contrary, is a positive good. Prepared as we are for either alternative, it "best suits us to embrace the *chance* of the "continuation of this good."---In the same sitting, the Secretary of State for foreign affairs, developed in a more precise manner, the maxims which had only been slightly touched upon in the Speech from the Throne. "The relation of England with other States "ought not," said he, "*to place her in the "situation of a nation animated by a spirit of "knight-errantry, interfering in all disputes "for the purpose of adjusting them. This "system of policy has been too much that of "England; we must have the wisdom to abandon it.* These relations must be founded "upon the interests of England, and upon the "means she may possess of rendering effectual her interference in the disputes of other "countries. In the last century, we did not "prevent the House of Bourbon from "reigning in Spain. We did not prevent "the destruction of Poland. It was prudent in us to throw no obstacle in the way "of these inevitable events." The same Minister continues: "*With respect to the "present state of England and Europe, the "different negotiations which have succeeded "each other, and the notes and representations "which have been addressed to the different "powers; it is a subject of such delicacy, that "I am confident the House will not press for "an explanation.*" He concludes by assuring it, that "*there is no hope but in a powerful co-"operation of some of the great states of "Europe.*" Such were, a short time before the publication of the "view of the state of the Republic," the Royal and Ministerial declarations of the English Government! Now, what must have been the effects of these declarations on the public opinion in France? Must not distrust, and uncertainty, doubts as to the continuance of peace, and suspicions on the new projects of coalition in case of a continental war, have arisen on all sides? And what then became the duty of the French government?---To trace, in the first place, the progress of those *negotiations, remonstrances and official notes announced by the English government*;---to endeavour to discover whether the *hope* with regard to *continental connections, and the powerful co-operation of the Great States*, was founded; and when it was satisfied that, upon a point, so important to the repose of Europe, the English government had abandoned itself to the grossest delusions, to put a period to those inquietudes which might prevent the French nation from re-animating her industry, restoring her manufactures, and giving a greater portion of activity to her commercial speculations; lastly, to announce to France, that she had no reason to dread the *Continental Connections* of England, and that *England had no allies on the Continent.*

(20.) The reading part of the European world will feel no great inclination, we believe, to search into history for the unknown wars in which "England alone has been able successfully to contend against France." The one recently concluded, is within all our recollections: it commenced with the almost general coalition of all the powers against France. England was neither the first nor the last to combat, and has, therefore, never contended singly against France. The German empire, Holland, and Italy, were at war when England entered the field. Hostilities had ceased before the peace of Portugal; the treaty of peace with the Ottoman empire was posterior to the treaty with England. Nevertheless, the Declaration expressly declares, of the assertion that Great Britain cannot singly contend against France, that *this assertion is especially disproved by the events of the war which has been recently concluded.*

(21.) "The conduct of the First Consul to his Ma-
"jesty's ambassador at his audience, in pre-
"sence of the ministers of most of the sove-
"reigns and states of Europe, furnishes another
"instance of provocation on the part of the
"French government, which it would be im-
"proper not to notice on the present occasion,
"and the subsequent explanation of this trans-

" action may be considered as having the " effect of aggravating instead of palliating the " affront "

With respect to a pretended conversation between the First Consul and the English ambassador, we scarcely know which is entitled to the greater share of credit, the extract from the Hamburgh paper, or the letter, No. 38 of the Official Collection, attributed to Lord Whitworth. The ministers have given to these two pieces the same degree of importance, by including them in the same collection; and, by the date of their publication, they are entitled to an equal share of credit. We leave the credibility of such things as these to be defended by the journals. When ministers descend to such ground, and bring to the aid of newspaper recitals the correspondence of their agents, or to the correspondence of their agents the recitals of newspapers, they forget every idea of political decency; but those who know them are, thereby, spared the pains of entering into a discussion of charges, which are only supported by such proofs. Thus are conversations, the reality of which is doubtful, placed in the rank of political offences. States can only injure each other by acts of injustice, and England is well versed in this species of offence; but conversations are not the weapons of governments, and still less can they become the object of complaint, when we have no means of establishing the charge, but upon letters published long after their date, and testimonies extracted from public journals. There are two conversations about which the ministers of his Britannic Majesty have made a considerable degree of clamour; that reported by the English ambassador and the Hamburgh journalist, and that which appears in the official papers, No. 38, and of which Lord Whitworth is the sole narrator. As to the fact of this conversation, we will venture to say, that it is absurd to insert, in a discussion rendered public, the details of a conversation to which there could be no witnesses; and that it betrays the height of folly and inconsistency, to produce, under an official form, and with a view to inculpation, an account clumsily narrated, liable, at the moment of writing, to misconstructions, through defect of memory, and still more liable to misrepresentation from the bad faith of the parties by whom they are published. For the rest, it is generally understood, that a conversation did really take place between the First Consul and the British ambassador. It is even known, from the apparent impression it made upon Lord Whitworth, that this conversation was, on the part of the First Consul, full of mildness, a desire to remove difficulties, and views of the most conciliatory nature. In its motive and object, it has been considered as one of those unusual and spontaneous movements which an ardent love of virtue and of justice, could alone inspire, and only to be equalled by the letter written, by the same personage, to his Britannic Majesty. The First Consul had reason to hope that it had not failed in its object, since the British ambassador was, apparently, as much affected by it as could possibly have been desired. If the dispatch which has appeared under his name has not been altered by the bad faith of his government, Lord Whitworth is not deserving of pity; but if it has been mutilated, amplified, and perverted, according to the views and interest of the ministers to whom it was written, he is extremely unfortunate in being obliged to sacrifice to the cause of his King, the interests of truth and propriety. For the rest, the government of the republic has stated, in its View of the Situation of the Republic, what were its intentions with regard to the Ottoman empire: Europe will not hesitate between such an act, and the pretended official papers of the British government; between the solemn declaration of the First Consul and the miserable accusations secretly prepared, and ready to be produced whenever its bad faith may stand in need of them. " A French ambassador," said he, " is at " Constantinople, charged with renewing " and fortifying the ties which attach us to a " power which seems to be threatened with " destruction, but which it is our interest to " sustain and support the foundations by " which it is upheld."

(22.) " At the very time when his Majesty " was demanding satisfaction and explanation " on some of the points above-mentioned, the " French Minister at Hamburgh endeavoured to " obtain the insertion in a Hamburgh paper of " a most gross and opprobrious libel against " his Majesty; and when difficulties were " made respecting the insertion of it, he avail- " ed himself of his official character of Minis- " ter of the French Republic, to require the " publication of it by order of his Government " in the Gazette of the senate of that town.— " With this requisition so made, the Senate of " Hamburgh were induced to comply; and " thus has the independence of that town " been violated, and a free state made the in- " strument, by the menace of the French " Government, of propagating throughout " Europe, upon their authority, the most of- " fensive and unfounded calumnies against his " Majesty and his government."

The justification of this charge is to be found in the collection of official papers published by the English government. We have nothing to say as to the fact. Here is a simple assertion, which, at the moment of the rupture there was no opportunity to verify; since the interval between the accusation

against the Minister of the Republic and the appearance of the Manifesto, was not sufficient to establish whether or no it was well founded. But, without entering into the details of what took place, or upon what we had then no document, what do we find in the correspondence of the English Ministers in support of this charge? That the measure attributed to an agent of the Republic has been totally disavowed, and that every degree of satisfaction was promised, if it appeared that this Minister was really culpable. After such an assurance, with what justice can it be made the subject of complaint, or obtain a place in a declaration of war? Since the dispute, however, fresh proofs have reached us, to confirm our doubts as to the truth of the accusation. No note, no letter, no requisition of the Minister of the Republic at Hamburgh ever was made; and the assertion of the Ministry, as well as the sanction his Britannic Majesty has given it in his Manifesto, rests on the sole faith of a news-paper editor, who thought proper to insert, at the head of this article, *By Requisition.*—But shall we pass over without remark, that pathetic declaration on *the independence and the violated liberty of the free Senate* of this very Republic, from the bosom of which, not five years ago, an English Minister Plenipotentiary, performing the function of a Chief of banditti, forced from his asylum, an officer in the service of France, dragged him to prison, and, by the threat of a bombardment and invasion of the town and its territory, obliged this identical *free senate* in violation of all the laws of hospitality, to give up this defenceless man to the vengeance of Judges, who afterwards condemned him to death. To this degree do the English Ministers brave even the memory of their most recent transactions, from its blind and headstrong desire to impute to France every species of injustice.

(23.) "His Majesty might add to this list of "indignities, the requisition which the French "government have repeatedly urged, that the "laws and constitution of this country should "be changed relative to the liberty of the Press.

It is not incumbent on the French government to be acquainted with the nature of the English constitution. It has reason, however, to think that the English government itself is not perfectly skilled therein, at least upon the particular point relative to the political and civil right of the liberty of the press; for that there should be a country governed by a constitution authorizing incensed and ferocious men to preach rebellion, murder, and poison, against foreign governments, and that this country should be England, is what we cannot possibly admit. Nevertheless, whatever may be, in this respect, the boundary of private rights and public authority, the French government has never entertained or discovered the least desire to encroach upon it. It complained of the numberless outrages it received; a deaf ear was turned to those complaints; and it was, at length, content to adopt the principle, that whatever was authorized in England with regard to France, should be authorized in France with regard to England.—France remains persuaded that the English government possesses the power of suppressing every species of literary licentiousness; that what has been tolerated during the space of the short lived peace which has recently been put an end to, was of the most serious and punishable nature, and that, even without having recourse to laws, the rigour of which it was its duty to employ, it was easy, by the simple exertion of *that powerful influence* it well knows how to employ when it becomes its interest to do so, to put a check to the factious and mercenary petulance of a class of miserable scribblers, who well know that the opinion which procures them a subsistence is far from being independent of the opinion of the ministry; who write but for bread, and who have no courage but that arising from hunger. Besides, it is well known, that the Editor of the *Courier de Londres* received 500 livres per month from Lord Pelham's office.

(24.) "His Majesty might likewise add the "calls which the French government have on "several occasions made upon him to violate "the laws of hospitality with respect to per"sons who had found an asylum within his "dominions, and against whose conduct no "charge whatever has at any time been sub"stantiated. It is impossible to reflect on "these different proceedings, and the course "which the French government have thought "proper to adopt respecting them, without "the thorough conviction that they are not the "effect of accident; but that they form a part "of a system which has been adopted for the "purpose of degrading, vilifying, and insult"ing his Majesty and his government. Under "all these insults and provocations, his Ma"jesty, not without a due sense of his dignity, "has proceeded with every degree of temper "and moderation to obtain satisfaction and re"dress, while he has neglected no means "consistent with his honour, and the safety of "his dominions, to induce the government of "France to concede to him what is, in his "judgment, absolutely necessary for the fu"ture tranquility of Europe. His efforts in "this respect have proved abortive, and he "has therefore judged it necessary to order his "ambassador to leave Paris."

The English government touches upon this charge with great delicacy. We shall return to it in our examination of the official papers, and shall then ascertain whether it be true, that "no charge has at any time been substantiated" against the individuals protected and paid by the English ministry. On the

subject of English hospitality, we shall make one short remark: an alien, in England, has no protection; he is out of the pale of the law. One of the lowest agents of police enters his apartments, seizes upon his papers, makes no reply to his remonstrances, gives him no proof of his authority for so doing, abandons him to his own reflections, and remains deaf to all his entreaties. An alien is ordered before an agent of government; he is verbally informed that he must quit England in three days; the cause of his disgrace is concealed from him: he must depart, and if he dares to stay beyond the time limited, he is seized and sent off to Botany Bay for twenty years. Such is the conduct of the English administration! Such is English hospitality!

(25.) "In having recourse to this proceeding, it has been his Majesty's object to "put an end to the fruitless discussions which "have too long subsisted between the two governments, and to close a period of suspense "peculiarly injurious to the subjects of his Majesty. But through the provocations which "his Majesty have received might entitle him "to larger claims than those which he has advanced, yet anxious to prevent calamities "which might thus be extended to every part "of Europe, he is still willing, as far as is consistent with his own honour and the interests of his people, to afford every facility to "any just and honourable arrangement, by "which such evils may be averted. He has "therefore, no difficulty in declaring to all "Europe, that notwithstanding all the changes "which have taken place since the treaty of "peace, notwithstanding the extension of the "power of France, in repugnance to that treaty, "and to the spirit of peace itself, His Majesty "will not avail himself of these circumstances, "to demand in compensation all that he is entitled to require, but will be ready to concur, "even now, in an arrangement, by which satisfaction shall be given to him for the indignities which have been offered to his crown "and to his people, and substantial security "afforded against further encroachments on "the part of France.—His Majesty has thus "distinctly and unreservedly stated the reasons "of those proceedings to which he has found "himself compelled to resort. He is actuated "by no disposition to interfere in the internal "concerns of any other state; by no projects "of conquest and aggrandizement; but solely "by a sense of what is due to the honour of "his crown, and the interests of his people, "and by an anxious desire to obstruct the further progress of a system, which, if not resisted, may prove fatal to every part of the "civilized world."

We are now arrived at the conclusion. The English government, *always calm, always moderate*, solely actuated by a *sense of honour*, and a desire to maintain the *security of its states*, retains Malta, and declares war.—What are the charges? What are, on this head, the injuries of France? We have exposed them; we have explained them; but we must here repeat, that of all the grievances of England, the only ones to which she attaches her determination to declare war, are the three following:—*First*, the demand to execute the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens. *Second*, an extract from the Hamburgh Journal. *Third*, the report of Colonel Sebastiani.—England assures us she had no ground of war prior to the above; it was, however, at a period considerably anterior to these three grievances, that the English government dispatched to the extremities of Africa a counter-order for the non-evacuation of the Cape; at which time, the *secret views* of the First Consul against the Turks had not been discovered, the instructive letter, No. 38, in the collection, and the report of the Colonel had not yet enlightened the world, with regard to the destructive projects of France. But what can inductions, reasonings, or even positive proofs avail, when opposed to the express declaration of his Britannic Majesty, who positively declares, that he only makes war upon the demand made to him to execute the treaty of Amiens, upon a conversation with Lord Whitworth, upon an article in a German newspaper, and upon the report of Colonel Sebastiani!

Thus, because the French government demands the execution of the 10th article of the treaty of Amiens, the English government breaks that treaty by a manifesto. Because the editors of German newspapers have declared that they inserted, *by authority*, an article, in which Europe is informed that the First Consul denied two falsehoods transmitted to parliament by the King of England, the King of England pretends to consider himself insulted by France. Because ministers assure us, that Lord Whitworth forwarded them the details of a conversation, in which they pretend the First Consul declared that the duration of the Turkish empire would not be eternal, and that the Grand Seignior might one day be induced to cede Egypt to France, they endeavour to make Europe believe that the security of the Turkish empire has been menaced by France. Because a French colonel has stated that the Mamelukes were encouraged and supported by England, and that the Porte saw with suspicion and alarm the stay of the British army in Egypt, the English ministers conceive themselves justified in asserting that the Turks are mistaken, that France has calumniated the English government, and that it is she alone who entertains "views of ambition hostile to the security of the Ottoman empire." And, lastly, because the Ottoman empire is threatened, the English ministers are anxious to be within reach of its ill-subdued Mamelukes, its insubordinate pachas, its discontented Greeks, in order to dispel the alarms of the Porte, and present it, in the moment of danger, with a perspective of the succour ever at hand of

an English squadron, which, in the space of a week, could convey to her capital an army of liberators, similar to those who watched over the Nabob of the Carnatic in his last moments, who threw his son into prison where he expired, and seized upon his heritage by benefit of inventory! Such is the logic of the declaration on which we have just commented! Such are the politics of the government whose maxims of morality it expresses! Let us turn from this path of deceit and falsehood: we have seen what England has said, we shall now see what she has not been willing to say. The English government yielded, in making peace, to the cries of the people, the shame of being abandoned by other nations, the fear of long remaining singly in that bloody field, where so many miseries and so much ruin had been occasioned by its barbarous politics, and its obstinate and inhuman instigations. After the peace was concluded, it discovered that the war had cost it dear, and that the acquisition of Ceylon and Trinidad was not sufficient to satisfy the national pride, to compensate for the treasures it had squandered, and to allay the jealousy excited by the greatness and glory of France. It repented of the peace. It placed itself in a mixed position. It discovered dispositions of peace, and took measures of hostility; it protested its desire for the continuance of peace, and prepared at a distance pretensions for breaking it. In its measures, in the speeches of its ministers, in its diplomatic correspondence, we see it uniformly engaged in the two-fold object of coming to an open rupture, and of justifying its conduct in having effected that object. But in these measures, in the speeches of ministers, and in the diplomatic correspondence, this object is sufficiently apparent. The King's speech after the peace is a confession at his distrust of the peace. The speeches of ministers during the whole sitting of parliament were confessions of their distrust of the peace. The counter-order sent to the Cape of Good Hope was a positive confession of their desire to break the peace. In short, the delay of the evacuation of Egypt was an hostile determination, and the refusal to evacuate Malta an absolute and definitive violation of the peace.—What was the object of England in remaining in Egypt? She was already so powerful, that before her all regrets, all past humiliations ought to have vanished. To keep Egypt was to possess a position memorable as well as important, and the only post from Tunis to Constantinople. The banks of the canal had been broken, lake Mareotis enlarged, and Alexandria was become an impregnable town. From Alexandria it could support the revolt of the beys, assist them in becoming independent, excite them afterwards against each other, and maintain in Egypt a perpetual state of anarchy and dissention. Alexandria would have been another Bombay, and the beys, like so many divided nabobs, would have trembled before the power of England. From this step to unlimited projects of commerce, destruction, and invasion, nothing was necessary but time and the almost certain chance of the blindness of the nations of Europe, had not France happily stepped in to prevent its completion. The voyage of Colonel Sebastiani gave the first alarm. Hence have arisen the transports of rage, the outcries, and the complaints against the report of this voyage. Europe is not foolish enough to suppose, that the publication of a report to the First Consul, and complaints of the conduct of an English general towards a French colonel, would have caused so much clamour, if the bitter regret at beholding a vast plan of ambition laid open, did not discover itself under expressions of a vain and ridiculous susceptibility. These projects were well conceived. They required, on the part of England, only a garrison of 4000 men at Alexandria, and two or three million of livres, to stir up the misunderstanding between the beys. They required also, it is true, that the First Consul should wink at what was passing in Egypt; and here it is, that England has been deficient of foresight. But, disconcerted in this project, it did not abandon all hope, and Malta was pitched on to supply the place of Alexandria. Hence the importance attached to Malta in the discussions since the publication of Sebastiani's report; hence the efforts of England to retain that island. And how, in fact, can we suppose that England, preponderant over every sea, powerful in Europe, predominant in America, without a rival in India, rich in possessions, in colonies, in countries beyond the reach of the rest of the universe, would, for the sake of a miserable rock, have menaced, and even declared war, unless, in her secret views, this rock was not considered as the guarantee of the success of her ultimate plans of invasion, as the terror of Turkey, and the means of uniting her usurpations in India to those she foresaw she might one day attempt on the ruins of the Ottoman empire? England has not said all this; but facts speak louder than words. Colonel Sebastiani, escaped from the dangers of his journey, has reported what he has seen. The English have loaded this report with opprobrium, but they have not overthrown its assertions.—Nevertheless, their unveiled projects still remain, and still threaten the rights

and the repose of Europe. From their first theatre of action they have been dislodged, but the means and the end are the same. In quitting Egypt, they left there the germs of those divisions, which it was their interest to excite. One of the boys they have conducted to Malta, who will be for them a mean of communication, an hostage, and an instrument of cherishing in Egypt a constant spirit of disobedience, of corruption, and of anarchy.

We shall here conclude this long discussion with one important observation. It is a consolatory reflection for Europe, that public opinion, attentive and eager to learn whatever is connected with the happiness of man, and the interests of nations, possesses such a variety of means of arriving at the source of events, and of seizing, in the passions, the character, and the talents of those who govern, the source of those calamities which threaten to lay waste human nature. But these advantages which belong to, and indeed constitute the progress of civilization, will be attended with no useful result, if public opinion, in the midst of crimes of the deepest dye, remains indolent and mute; if she does not intimidate by her sentence, if she does not deter by her censure, those men unworthy or unfit to govern, who, from vain ideas of false pride, or from criminal views of retaining their exalted situations, compromise the discernment and justice of their sovereign, sport with the sufferings of the people, and unconcernedly balance the uncertain hope of aggrandizing themselves, with the certainty of embruing land and seas with blood, and of carrying to the four corners of the globe war, murder, and desolation. Posterity will doubtless detest the memory of these inhuman or unskilful men, who either will not or cannot govern without destruction, and whose whole administration presents one unvaried scene of violence, injustice, and rapacity. But contemporary governments should know, that the very character of the age they live in will be tarnished, if, from want of penetration, of courage, and of unanimity, their sentiments are not loudly manifested, if they do not teach the enemies of the human race, that infamy can reach all stations, that dishonour unarms all powers, and that in a social state of society, like that enjoyed by the nations of the nineneeth century, the enlightened opinion of the people, when it seasonably bursts forth, is alone sufficient for their vengeance, can arrest the course of public calamities, and prevent the return of crimes like that which the English government has recently committed, by violating, after ten months of peace, a treaty which the cries and entreaties of Europe, after ten years of disaster, had, with so much difficulty, obtained from its greedy and inhuman ambition.

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE SWISS CANTONS, AS SETTLED BY THE MEDIATION OF THE FIRST CONSUL OF FRANCE AND THE DEPUTIES OF THE CANTONS.

Dated Paris, February 19, 1803.

GENERAL DISPOSITIONS.—Art. 1. The 19 cantons of Switzerland, viz. Appenzell, Argovia, Basle, Berne, Fribourg, Glaris, Grisons, Lucerne, St. Gall, Schaffhausen, Schwitz, Soleure, Tessen, Thurgovia, Underweld, Uri, Vaud, Zug, and Zurich, are to be federally united, according to the principles of their respective constitutions. They reciprocally guarantee those constitutions, as well as their territories, liberty, and independence, either with a reference to foreign powers, or the usurpation of any particular canton, or the conduct of factions.—2. The contingencies, either in troops or money, which will be necessary for the due execution of those guarantees, are to be furnished by the respective cantons in the following proportions. —[*Here follows the quota, &c. which it is proposed each canton shall furnish.*]—3. There shall exist no longer in Switzerland provincial subjects, nor any species of privilege, either local, hereditary, personal, or appertaining to families.—4. Every Swiss citizen shall have the liberty of removing his residence from one canton to another, and freely to exercise his industry in any. It is permitted him to acquire political right in whatever canton he establishes himself. But he shall not enjoy, at the same time, political rights in more than one canton.—5. The ancient laws of commerce, external or internal, are abolished. The free exchange and circulation of commodities, cattle, merchandizes, &c. are guaranteed. All exclusive commercial privileges are abolished in the interior of Switzerland. The customs, &c. payable on the frontiers, shall go to the treasury of the adjoining canton; but the rates and proportions of these shall be submitted for the approbation of the diet.—6. Each canton shall reserve to itself the tolls destined for the repairs of the roads, keeping in order the banks of the rivers, bridges, &c. but the rates of these shall, as in the foregoing instance, be left to the discretion of the diet.—7. The monies coined in Switzerland shall be

of a uniform description, which is also to be determined by the diet.—8. No canton shall afford asylum to a criminal legally convicted, nor even to one legally accused.—9. The number of stipendiary troops to be supported in any one canton shall not exceed two hundred.—10. All partial alliances of one canton with another, or with any foreign power, is interdicted.—11. The government, or the legislative body of any canton which shall violate a decree of the diet, is liable to be cited as rebellious, before a tribunal composed of the presidents of the criminal tribunals of all the other cantons.—12. The cantons shall possess all those powers which are not expressly delegated to the federal authority.

OF THE DIRECTORIAL CANTON.—13. The diet is to assemble by rotation, and at annual periods, at Fribourg, Berne, Soleure, Basle, Zurich, and Lucerne.—14. The cantons, of which the above cities are the chief places, shall, in succession, become the directorial canton: the year for those purposes commences on the first of January.—15. The directorial canton shall provide suitable residence, and a guard of honour for the deputies; it also supplies the expences of the session.—16. The avoyer or burgomaster of the directorial canton, shall unite to those titles that of landamman of Switzerland. He shall have custody of the seal of the Helvetic republic. He cannot absent himself from the city. The supreme council of his canton shall accord to him an appropriate establishment, and shall defray the extraordinary expence of his official functions.—17. The foreign ministers are to present to the landamman their letters of credence, or of recall; and must apply to him on all matters of negociation. He has also in charge the other diplomatic concerns.—18. At the opening of the diet, he is to communicate to them the necessary information respecting the domestic and foreign concerns of the republic.—19. No canton shall be allowed to call out or put in motion more than five hundred militia, until it shall have apprized the landamman of Switzerland of such an intention.—20. In case of a revolt in the interior of any canton, or on any other pressing occasion, the troops of one canton may march into another canton: but this shall take place only on the requisition of the supreme or petty council of the canton which wants such assistance; and after taking the advice of the petty council of the directorial canton, the diet, however, is to be convoked after the cessation of hostilities, or if the danger continues.—21. If, during the vacations of the diet, any disagreement should arise between any two or more cantons, they are to address themselves to the landamman of Switzerland, who, according to circumstances, shall appoint conciliatory arbiters, or refer the case to the consideration of the diet on its next sitting.—22. He is to make known to the cantons every instance in which he deems their conduct likely to interrupt the tranquillity of Switzerland, and every thing which takes place of an irregular nature, and militating against either the federal act, or their particular constitution. He may, in some cases, convoke the supreme council, or that of the *Landsgemeindes*, in those places where the supreme authority is immediately exercised by the people.—23. The landamman of Switzerland sends, in cases of need, inspectors for the purpose of examining the state of the roads, rivers, &c. Where necessity requires it, he can direct the immediate execution of public works, and make the necessary arrangements with respect to the expences thereof, &c.—24. His signature attaches a national credit and character to those acts to which it is affixed.

OF THE DIET.—25. Each canton sends a deputy to the diet, who may be accompanied by one or two substitutes, who shall be eligible to act as such in case of the absence or indisposition of the principal.—26. The deputies to the diet are to have instructions and limited powers; they cannot vote contrary to their instructions.—27. The landamman of Switzerland is, *ex officio*, deputy of the directorial canton.—28. The 19 deputies, who compose the diet, shall have 25 votes in the deliberations, in manner as follows:—The deputies of those cantons, of which the population is more than 100,000 inhabitants, viz. those of Berne, Zurich, Vaud, St. Gall, Argovie, and the Grisons, shall have each two votes. The deputies of those cantons, of which the population is less than 100,000 souls, namely, those of Tessen, Lucerne, Thurgovie, Fribourg, Appenzell, Soleure, Basle, Schwitz, Glaris, Schaffhausen, Underwald, Zug, and Uri, shall have but one vote each.—29. The diet, at which the landamman of Switzerland presides, is to assemble the first Monday in June; its session shall not exceed the term of one month.—30. There shall be extraordinary diets on the following occasions: 1. On the demand of a neighbouring power, or of one of the cantons, supported by the supreme council of the directorial canton, which shall be assembled on such occasion, if not sitting at the time. 2dly. On the determination of the supreme council, or of the lands-gemeindes of five cantons, who can, on such an occasion, demand the proceeding, though the directorial canton may not concur in it. 3dly. When they shall be convoked by the landamman of Switzerland.—31. The declaration of war, and the treaties of peace or of alliance, emanate from the diet; but the concurrence of three-fourths of the cantons, on such occasions, is necessary.—32. It shall alone have the power of concluding treaties of commerce, &c. for the foreign service. It authorizes the cantons in case it shall deem expedient, to treat particularly in other concerns with a foreign power.—33. The diet has the direction of the contingent of the troops to be furnished by each canton, according to Art. 2. It appoints the commanding officer, and in short, adopts all the measures necessary for the security of Switzerland, and for the execution of the other dispositions of the first article: this power also comprises internal concerns.—34. It nominates and dispatches ambassadors extraordinary.—35. It decides finally upon all matters in dispute between the cantons. For this purpose it forms itself into a *syndicat*, but in such case each deputy has but one voice—neither are previous instructions necessary on this occasion.—36. The verbal process of the diet is to be entered into two registers, of which one remains with the directorial canton, and the other with the State Seal, which at the end of December is to be removed to the chief place in the directorial canton.—37. A Chancellor, and a Greffier, appointed by the diet for two years, and paid by the directorial canton (at the rate the diet shall think proper) shall always accompany the State Seal and the register.—38. The constitution of each canton, engrossed on parchment, and sealed with the seal of the canton, shall be deposited in the archives of the diet.—39. The present federal act, as well as those of the particular constitutions of the 19 cantons, shall abrogate and annul all anterior dispositions whatever that may be contrary to it; and no law relative to the internal affairs of the cantons, or to the relations between them, can be found on the ancient political state of Switzerland.—The repose of Switzerland, the success of the new institutions now forming, require that the necessary operations for carrying them into effect, and to transmit to the new Magistrates, the care of the

public happiness and welfare, be secured from the influence of the passions, and executed with moderation, impartiality, and wisdom.—We cannot hope for a prosperous issue unless the commissioners, named by the act of mediation, be animated by the spirit which dictated it.—By these considerations, we in our said quality, and with the reservations before expressed, do constitute as follows:—1. For the year 1803, Fribourg to be the directorial canton.—2. The citizen Louis d'Affry to be landamman of Switzerland for the said year, and invest him with the extraordinary powers until the assembling of the diet.—3. The original act of mediation shall be transmitted to the landamman, in order to be deposited in the archives of the directorial canton.—4. In each canton a commission of seven members, and of which one shall be appointed by us, and six chosen by the ten deputies selected to confer with us, is charged to put into activity the constitution, and to administer it provisionally.—5. These commissions are composed as follows: [*Then follow the names of persons appointed to fill the commissions of the different cantons.*]—6. On the 10th of March next, the central government shall dissolve itself, after having transmitted its papers and archives to the landamman of Switzerland.—7. Each commission shall assemble on the 10th of March, at the chief place of the canton, and notify its assembling immediately to the prefect.—8. Within 24 hours after that notification, the prefect shall transmit to the commission, the papers of administration.—9. In those cases which may require instructions, or special authorities, the commissions shall address themselves to the landamman of Switzerland.—10. On the 15th of April the commission shall be put into a state of activity, in order that on the 1st of June each canton may elect its deputies to the diet, and prepare their instructions, and on the first Monday in July, in the present year, the diet shall assemble.—11. The affairs pending before the Supreme Tribunal shall be carried to the Tribunal of Appeal of the canton in which the parties reside. The Supreme Tribunal shall cease all its functions on the 10th of March.—12. The Helvetic troops, at present in the pay of Switzerland, who shall not be employed by the 1st of May by the cantons, shall be taken into the service of France.—13. No prosecution shall be carried on for crimes relating to the revolution, committed, or pretended to be committed, either by individuals, or in the exercise of any public function.—The dissolution of the central government, and the reinstatement of the sovereignty in the cantons, requires that there should be a provision made for the discharge of the Helvetic debt, and of the disposal of the property declared national. We, in our said quality, and with the reserve before expressed, appoint as follows—Art. 1. The property heretofore belonging to the convents shall be restored to them, not only the property situated in the same canton but also in any other.—2. The administration of national property other than that heretofore belonging to Berne, in the cantons of Vaud and Argovia, is provisionally transmitted to the cantons to which it belonged. The documents respecting the claims of Berne, shall be provisionally transmitted to those commissioners appointed by the cantons of Berne, Vaud and Argovia.—3. In each canton burdened with debts anterior to the revolution, there shall be assigned funds for their funding or discharge, out of what remains of the property heretofore belonging to the canton.—4. There shall be re-constituted for each city a revenue proportioned to its municipal expences.—5. The national debt shall be liquidated, to which purpose all claim shall be appropriated. If the debt exceeds the amount of the credit in a proportion according to what remains of their ci-devant immoveable property, after the discharge of the cantonal debts anterior to the revolution, and the recomposition of the patrimony of the cities.—6. The moveable and immoveable property which shall remain after the formation of the communal funds, the discharge of the cantonal and national debts, shall return to the possession of those cantons to which it had belonged. The property which shall remain in the cantons of Vaud and Argovia shall be belong to them. What may remain of the claims of Berne, shall be equally distributed amongst the cantons of Berne, Vaud, and Argovia.—7. A commission composed of five members, namely, the citizens Stapfer, Minister of the Republic, Kuster, Ex-Minister of the finances, Raemy, ci-devant Chancellor of Fribourg, and at present member of the Administrative Chamber, Sutzer, of Winterthur, Helvetic deputy, Laurent, mayor of Lucerne, President of the Administrative Chamber, shall determine the extent of the wants of the municipalities, and of the funds necessary for re-constituting their revenues, shall liquidate the debts of the canton, and the national debt, shall assign to each debt the funds necessary to operate its discharge, and shall determine the property which shall return into the possession of each canton.—8. It shall publish the result of its labours with respect to the debts on the 10th of May, and with respect to the revenues of the cities and the patrimony of the cantons on the 10th of June: It shall send the result of each labour to the first landamman of Switzerland, and to each canton, for the purpose of being carried into execution.—9. The commission shall assemble at the chief place of the directorial canton, and shall remain there till the end of its labours. The present act, the result of long conferences between wise men and friends of virtue, appears to us to contain those dispositions which are most proper to ensure the peace and happiness of Switzerland. As soon as they shall be executed, the French troops shall be withdrawn.—We recognize Helvetia, constituted conformably to the present act, as an independent power.—We guarantee the federal constitution, and that of each canton, against the enemies of the tranquillity of Helvetia, whomsoever they may be, and we promise to continue those relations of beneficence, which for so many ages have united the two nations.—Made and done at Paris, 19th February, 1803.

(Signed) BONAPARTE.
The Secretary of State.
(Signed) HUGUES B. MARET.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs.
(Signed) C. M. TALLEYRAND.
The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic.
(Signed) J. MARESCALCHI.

The present act has been transmitted by the senators commissioners undersigned, to the ten Swiss deputies undersigned, at Paris, 19th February, 1803.

(Signed) BARTHELEMY, ROEDERER, FOUCHE, DEMEUNIER,

(Signed) LOUIS D'AFFRY, PIERRE GLUTZ, EMMANUEL JAUCH, H. MONNOT, REINHARD, SPRECHER BERNYS, P. A. STAPFER, PAUL USTERY, R. DE WATTERVILLE, DE MONTENAY, Y. VON FLUE.

PAPERS

PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

AMERICAN CONGRESS.

The following letter from Mr. STANLEY, a member of the House of Representatives, from North-Carolina, to his constituents, contains a fair and impartial review of the proceedings of that body. Mr. STANLEY is a moderate opposer of the present administration of the United States; and in his remarks may be discovered the opinions of those in America, who formerly supported the governments of GEN. WASHINGTON and MR. ADAMS.

The attention of Congress was early called to a "violation, on the part of Spain, of the treaty between the United States and the King of Spain." To understand this business, you will recollect, that Spain holding the territory on the west of the Mississippi, extending to the Gulf of Mexico, and on the east of the Mississippi, south of the southern boundary of the United States, in the 31 deg. N. latitude, is consequently proprietor of both sides of the mouth of the river. The great difficulty, and in fact the impossibility at some seasons of ascending the river Mississippi in sea vessels, to a height convenient to receive the produce of our Western States, had convinced the United States of the necessity of obtaining from Spain the right to deposit our produce on their territory, from whence it was conveniently accessible by our ships; and also of securing to them the free use of this highway to market. These objects were obtained by the treaty concluded with Spain the 27th day of October 1795, by the 22d article of which it stipulated, "That His Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the United States for the space of three years to deposit their merchandize and effects in the port of New Orleans, and to export them from thence without paying any other duty than a fair price for the hire of the stores, and his Majesty promises either to continue this permission, if he finds during that time that it is not prejudicial to the interest of Spain, or if he should not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them *on another part of the banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establishment.*" It was now suggested that our ships had been excluded from New-Orleans, and the right of deposit prohibited. No information on this subject being given in the message of the President, the House of Representatives, on the 17th December 1802, by resolution, requested the President to "cause to be laid before the House such information in the possession of the department of state, as relates to a violation, on the part of Spain, of the 22d article of the treaty of friendship, navigation, and limits, between the United States and the King of Spain." From the communication of the President, in consequence of this resolution, it was ascertained that the Intendant of New-Orleans, the officer intrusted with the commercial concerns of the province, had by proclamation on the 16th of October 1802, interdicted the American right of deposit at New-Orleans, without assigning any other "equivalent establishment." It was also known, that the governor-general of Louisiana, at New-Orleans, did not condemn, but explicitly vindicated the measure. This act, directly violating a solemn treaty, producing immediately an immense loss to a great portion of our citizens, and viewed by many as the commencement of measures intended to deprive us of a place of deposit, and to obstruct the free navigation of the river, (rights essential to the prosperity of the Western States,) affected too deeply the honour and interest of the United States, not to merit the earliest and most serious consideration. The claim of this subject to attention was rendered peculiarly strong, as connected with the cession of Louisiana by Spain to France, placed within the notice of Congress by the President's mention of it in his message "as making a change in the aspect of our foreign relations, and entitled to just weight in deliberations of the legislature connected with that subject." To enable Congress to act with understanding on this subject, and to judge what measures if any were necessary to be taken, Mr. Griswold, on the 5th January, moved the following resolution:

"*Resolved*, That the President of the United States be requested to direct the proper officer to lay before this house copies of such

such official documents as have been received by this government, announcing the cession of Louisiana to France, together with a report, explaining the stipulations, circumstances, and conditions under which that province is to be delivered up, unless such documents and report will, in the opinion of the President, divulge to the House particular transactions not proper at this time to be communicated."

This resolution was opposed—That the province of Louisiana had been ceded by Spain to France—that this cession, if carried into effect, would change the aspect of our foreign relations, and therefore entitled to weight in legislative deliberation, were facts too deeply interesting to the United States to have escaped notice, even though they had not been pressed into the view of the legislature, and recommended to their attention by the high authority and solemn sanction of the President. An opposition, therefore, to a call for information—a call respectful in its terms, submitting the extent of the communication to the judgment of the President, was not to have been expected. The majority of the House discovered strong jealousy of this resolution, and after various unsuccessful attempts to have it considered, it was at length taken up and rejected. In discussing this resolution much extraneous matter was introduced; the only arguments which I could discover against the adoption of the resolution were, that such an enquiry implying a suspicion of unfriendly or improper conduct on the part of Spain towards us might irritate that nation; and that negociations were about commencing between our government and Spain and France. The doctrine advanced on this occasion, that although the transactions of a foreign nation shall be solemnly mentioned by the President in an official communication, as changing the aspect of our foreign relations, and entitled to weight in our deliberations; and although measures highly injurious to our rights and interest, and probably a consequence of this transaction, have been adopted, yet that a fear to irritate shall oblige us to forbear from enquiry; to shut our ears to any information on the subject, lest we discover a suspicion of unfriendly designs, that in fact (for it amounts to this) we shall never prepare to meet a hostile design until it is "known to us by its *execution*," is a doctrine not only novel but too palpably dangerous to e admitted as the real objection to this resolution. As to the objection on the ground that negociation was about commencing, let it be conceded that the direction of the negociation belongs solely to the executive, does it result, or can it be seriously contended, that under our government the determination of the *executive* to negociate, takes from the *legislature* their constitutional power of considering what measures are necessary for the public welfare? Such a doctrine can consist only with a supremacy in the executive—a doctrine at variance with the fundamental principles of our government. If the cession of Louisiana was a subject not proper for the consideration of Congress, why was it mentioned in the message? And if this consideration was rendered improper by the intention to negociate, why was that intention never communicated? The belief that there were yet other objections to this resolution not advanced by its opponents, forces itself on the mind, and is strengthened by the circumstance, that in their own resolution of 17th Dec. the transactions of New-Orleans were, without fear to irritate, openly and properly called "a *violation* of our treaty on the part of Spain." Surely, too, the President would not have hazarded the public safety by pressing on our notice in a public communication a transaction deeply interesting to our rights and interests, but which was covered with a veil not to be raised but with danger or indelicacy. The President knew it to be his duty to acquire information on the subject---to presume that he has not done so, would be to reproach him with reprehensible indifference to, and neglect of, our interests. Yet, improbable as the suggestion might otherwise be, the circumstances go far towards compelling a belief, that the President had neither sought nor obtained any *official* information on the subject, or that his enquiries had not been treated with that respect which is due to the American nation; and that a rejection of the resolution was resorted to as the only mode of shielding him from the mortifying disclosure. Mr. Griswold also moved the following resolutions:

"*Resolved*, That the people of the United States are entitled to the free navigation of the Mississippi.

"*Resolved*, That the navigation of the river Mississippi has been obstructed by the regulations recently carried into effect at New-Orleans.

Resolved, That the right of freely navigating the river Mississippi ought never

never to be abandoned by the United States.

"*Resolved*, That a committee be appointed to enquire whether any, and if any, what legislative measures are necessary to secure to the people of the United States the free navigation of the river Mississippi."

These were not acted upon, the majority *refusing to take the motion into consideration*. The following resolutions on the same subject were afterwards agreed to with closed doors:

"*Resolved*, That this House receive with great sensibility the information of a disposition in certain officers of the Spanish government at New-Orleans, to obstruct the navigation of the river Mississippi, as secured to the United States by the most solemn stipulations.

"That adhering to that humane and wise policy which ought ever to characterize a free people, and by which the United States have always professed to be governed; willing at the same time to ascribe this breach of compact to the unauthorized misconduct of certain individuals, rather than to a want of good faith on the part of his Catholic Majesty; and relying with *perfect* confidence on the vigilance and wisdom of the executive, they will wait the issue of such measures as that department of the government shall have pursued for asserting the rights, and vindicating the injuries of the United States; holding it to be their duty, at the same time, to express their unalterable determination to maintain the boundaries and the rights of navigation and commerce through the river Mississippi, as established by existing treaties."

To these resolutions it was objected, that the soft language of "sensibility" was inadequate to the expression, by the representatives of a free people, of the national sense of a great national wrong. That the resolution discovered a timid disposition in calling that a "disposition to violate" our treaty which was proved to us to be an actual and avowed, not a contemplated or suspected, infraction of the treaty. That it contained a declaration of "perfect confidence in the wisdom and vigilance" of the executive, and determination to wait the issue of measures pursued by that department, at a time that we had no knowledge whether any measures had been taken, and that it pledged the United States to wait the result of negociation, (the only measures the executive can pursue without the authority of congress,) when the interest and safety of the United States may render such delay dangerous, and demand measures, if not of action, at least of preparation. — Nothing urged in answer to these objections had the effect of obviating them in my mind. A separate question was taken on the different members of this resolution. Although many thought them liable to the objections I have stated, and would have preferred the adoption of those moved by Mr. Griswold, yet they united in the vote in favour of such principles as accorded with their own. The declaration of a sense of the wrong; the disposition to adhere to that humane and wise policy which should always characterize a free people, and by which the United States had always professed to be governed; and the determination to maintain the rights of boundary, and the free navigation of the river Mississippi, were *unanimously* agreed to. It was moved to strike out the declaration of *perfect confidence* in the wisdom and vigilance of the executive, and the determination to wait the issue of such measures as that department *shall have* pursued. On this question I voted in the affirmative, because the solemn vote of *perfect confidence* on an occasion where no such expression was necessary, and on a subject where the language of compliment or servility should not be heard, is only due to the exertion of those qualities in measures known and approved: whereas in the present case, so far from measures being known and found to merit approbation, we were left to conjecture whether any had been taken. Indeed the rejection of the call for information regarding Louisiana, ascribable only to the neglect of the executive to procure any; the want of *official* information what measures had been adopted, and the appointment of a minister extraordinary to negociate on this subject *not until after* these proceedings in the house, warrant the opinion, that at the time of this vote of confidence, the executive had not even taken those measures which his own judgment suggested to be necessary. In support of this blindfold vote of confidence it was argued, that it was the theory of our constitution to ascribe "wisdom and vigilance" to the executive in the exercise of powers confided to that department. Permit me here to remark, that it is the theory of the British government to attribute such "perfect wisdom and vigilance" to their king that it has become the maxim of their

constitution "that the king can do no wrong." If the theory of our constitution be as advanced on this occasion, it differs but in sound from the deformity of the British; and under ours, as under that "the theory and practice will frequently be at variance." I prize our constitution, as the rock of our safety. The obligation of an oath adds not to my disposition to support it: but neither my attachment or duty can induce me to ascribe "perfect wisdom and vigilance" to a branch of the government in particular where the evidence rather militates against, than supports the claim. —The motion to reject this part was lost.— Upon the question to agree to the whole resolution, those whose objections had not been obviated: who thought their vote of perfect confidence improper; having recorded their votes in favour of such parts of the resolutions as were necessary or proper; and believing that the resolutions submitted by Mr. Griswold, were preferable, and that no injury could arise, if those under consideration were rejected, voted against them. I concurred in this vote. To shew that those who differed from the majority in the preference of the resolutions adopted, to those moved by Mr. Griswold, were not, as malice or ignorance may suggest, necessarily advocates for immediate measures of hostility; and that on an occasion similar to the present, under an administration meriting and possessing the perfect confidence of the people, a line of conduct was pursued corresponding to that which it was the object of Mr. Griswold's resolution to obtain, I beg leave to recall to your recollection the proceedings of Congress in consequence of the unjustifiable order of the King of England to his naval commanders to capture our ships in the year 1798. At the opening of the session of Congress the President (Washington) communicated the subject to Congress, accompanying his communication with a copy of his instructions given by him to our Minister at the British Court for demanding redress.—The language of Washington on this occasion was: "There is a rank due to the United States among nations which will be withheld, if not absolutely lost, by the reputation of weakness. If we desire to avoid insult, we must be prepared to repel it.... If we desire to preserve peace, one of the most powerful instruments of our rising prosperity, it must be known that we are at all times ready for war." Had a fear to irritate those who had done us wrong, enfeebled the mind of that great man, he would have withheld until called for the information of the injury done us. But with the firmness which marked his character and which elevated the American character under his administration, he communicated the information uncalled for: Not afraid to trust the national council with a constitutional participation in devising measures for the preservation of our rights, he communicated also the instructions he had given for demanding redress. Just, as was the claim of this President to approbation, the legislature forebore from adulation. But with the independence of freemen and a promptness becoming the guardians of the rights of their fellow-citizens, they trusted not the safety and honour of their country to soft expressions of "sensibility"—they *acted*. They authorised the President to embody and call out 80,000 militia, if circumstances should render it necessary---they suspended, for a time by embargo, all commercial intercourse---they adopted and acted upon the opinion of their wise and vigilant President, "That to avoid insult we must be prepared to repel it."

On the 7th of January, the President nominated to the Senate James Monroe, as Minister Extraordinary to the Courts of the King of Spain and First Consul of France, to act in conjunction with our Ministers at these Courts to negociate, it is presumed, respecting the shutting the port of New-Orleans, and the cession of Louisiana. This gentleman was formerly our Minister to France, and was recalled by Washington for misconduct.

From the report of the Secretary of the Treasury, it appears that there was in the Treasury of the United States, on the 30th September 1802, in cash, dollars 4,439,675.

The receipts of the United States for the year ending the 30th Sept. 1802, was, dollars 15,258,453, which was derived from the following sources:

	Dolls.	*Ct.*
Duties on impost and tonnage,	12,298,938	6
Direct tax,	226,804	19
Sales of public lands,	179,575	52
Postage of letters,	50,500	
Proceeds of sales of bank shares,	1,287,600	
Dividends on bank stock,	39,960	
Pay't on acct. sales of armed ships,	212,342	83
Sales of prizes,	31,943	22
Internal taxes,	806,765	65
Miscellaneous,	124,028	64
Dolls.	15,268,258	11

The

The expenditures of the government in same period were, dollars 13,667,501 27 cts.

The payments into the Treasury from duties on imports and tonnage being derived from bonds due for duties accruing before the late peace, the President reminds us "that the effect of peace is not yet fully ascertained."—This effect, though not fully ascertained, has yet evinced its operation. It appears from the statements from the Treasury Department, that the amount of duties on goods imported and tonnage secured in the last year, and which will form the receipt of the next, is dollars 2,256,895 less than the year preceding.

"The funds annually appropriated to the discharge of our debt, are, by act of Congress, under the direction of the Vice President, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the Chief Justices of the United States, who are styled the "Commissioners of the Sinking Fund." Of these commissioners the Secretary of the Treasury is the agent, the power of the others is barely nominal. The commissioners have laid before Congress at the present session, a report of the Secretary of the Treasury made to them, containing a detail of the measures pursued in the year 1802, in relation to their duty. It does not appear that the Chief Justice of the United States had been consulted on these proceedings: his name does not appear to the report.---This report of the Secretary of the Treasury states,

"That during the year 1802, there has been drawn from the Treasury of the United States, on account of principal and interest of the domestic debt, the sum of stiv. 9,372,752 28

"That of the money drawn from the Treasury in the year 1801, which remained unapplied at the expiration of that year, and was applicable to the Dutch debt, there was 2,313,846 guilders 10 stivers, equal at 40 cts. each guilder to 925,538 40

Forming the sum in their hands in the year 1802, 10,298,290 68

"Of this sum the Secretary renders the following account:

"1. That to the payment of interest on the debt accrued in the year 1802, there has been applied dolls. 4,065,738 47

"2. To the reimbursement of principal of domestic debt, 1,290,000

Dutch debt, due in 1802 1,344,000

Making the sum *actually applied* to the discharge of the debt, in the year 1802, dolls. 6,699,738 47

"3. That to meet the instalment of domestic debt, first due in the year 1803, they have retained the sum of dolls. 1,117,869 37

"The Secretary further states, that at the close of the year 1802, there remained (exclusively of protested bills outstanding, and *unapplied* balances in the hands of agents) *an unapplied* balance of guilders 5,914,606 10 stivers, applicable to the payment of Dutch debt, in the year 1803, equal to dolls. 2,365,842 40

"Making the sum drawn from the Treasury in the year 1802, but *not applied* in that year, dolls. 3,483,711 77

"If to the sum which is stated to have been *applied* to the reduction of the debt in 1802, viz. stiv. 6,699,738 47

be added the last sum, stated to be in the hands of agents, and *not applied*, viz. dolls. 3,483,711 77

"The sum, accounted for in some way or other, is dolls. 10,183,450 24

which deducted from the sum in their hands, dolls. 10,298,190 68

leaves a balance, which the report does not account for in any way, dolls. 114,740 44

"From these facts I am led to remark, that the act of last session placed among the proudest plumes of the present administration, entitled "An Act providing for the redemption of the whole public debt of the United States," makes it expressly the duty of the commissioners of the sinking fund to apply annually the sum of 7,300,000 dollars to the discharge of the debt---and that it appears the sum of dollars 6,699,638 47 only has been applied in the year 1802---leaving a deficit of dollars 600,261 53. As to the large sum of 3,483,711 dollars *drawn from the Treasury, and not applied*, it would have been more satisfactory to "that jealousy which, however detestable in private, is the loveliest trait of political character," had we been informed in whose hands as agents this immense sum was resting. As to myself, I should be glad to have been informed what necessity induced the drawing so large a sum from the Treasury, so long before it was to be applied? Why money was remitted to Europe (if the fact be so) to meet a debt not yet due, at a time that a balance of 600,000 dollars remained, as it still does, unpaid of the sum expressly required to be paid in each year. And I cannot repress the expression of my astonishment and alarm, that the Secretary of the Treasury in an official report, professing to account for the due application of dollars 10,298,190 68, after vaguely stating dollars 3,483,711 77, to be unapplied and in the

the hands of agents; should, notwithstanding, leave a balance *wholly unaccounted for* of dollars 114,740 44."

The president, in addressing the present Congress after a review of our revenue, and the payments on account of the debt, remarks, "When effects so salutary result from the plans you have already sanctioned; when merely by avoiding false objects of expence, we are able without a direct tax, without internal taxes, and without borrowing, to make large and effectual payments towards the discharge of our public debt, and the emancipation of our posterity from that mortal canker, it is an encouragement of the highest order to proceed as we have begun in substituting economy for taxation, and in procuring what is useful for a nation placed as we are, rather than what is practised by others under different circumstances." The constitution requires of the president that he should give Congress information of the state of the union, and recommend such measures as he may judge necessary and expedient. Perhaps it would comport better with the dignity of the first magistrate, if in discharging this duty he should not feel himself emancipated from the obligations imposed by official propriety. If he should refrain from such reflections as are evidently intended to establish his own reputation by casting reproach on his predecessors, or avoid such a display of measures and professions as argue a thirst for popularity; as his own feelings must regulate his conduct in this particular, it is at his option to adopt or reject such stale instruments for procuring popular favour. So far, however, as I deem them disingenuous or unfounded, it is my duty and a right I feel disposed to use, to examine his statement. The remarks I have quoted from the message are predicated on the state of our revenue, "resulting (says the president) from the plans *you* have already sanctioned." Now it is an indisputable truth, that the plans adopted under the present administration have been to *diminish* and not to increase the revenue. By the repeal of the internal taxes, in which I concurred, though I wished to retain such parts of them as fell on luxury and wealth, the revenue was lessened near one million of dollars per year. No one measure has been adopted, or in the language of the message, "sanctioned" in the present administration which adds one cent. a year to the revenue of the United States. The regulations of commerce, under which the duties from imports and tonnage arise and are collected, remain as established by the former administration. The progressive increasing population, wealth and commerce of the United States, occasioned the regular annual increase of this revenue, and in the usual course, the receipts of the last year were greater than the former.---But says the message, this state of things is the result "merely of avoiding false objects of expence." Some diminution of expenditure has indeed been made under the present administration, but they have in a very great degree resulted from the change in our situation and circumstances, not been produced, I presume to say, by the present administration. Let it be remembered, that in the few years preceding the accession of the present administration, millions were necessarily expended for securing and protecting our commerce, to which not only the agricultural, but every other interest owes its prosperity. Light houses and fortifications were erected---Insurrections, Indian and Algerine wars exhausted large sums; by depredations of the English, French and Spanish nations, property supposed to exceed thirty millions of dollars, was lost, and the revenue consequently greatly diminished. Naval sites and arsenals were established: arms and ordnance to a large amount purchased; and armouries for manufacture of arms set in operation. A navy was not only built which restored our commerce and revenue; but when on the return of peace its longer support on the first establishment was rendered unnecessary, most of the ships were sold, by which measure the amount of the annual expenditure of the navy was greatly lessened; and the proceeds of the sales brought back into the Treasury, to form a part of that aggregate which the message suggests to be the result of the "mere avoiding false objects of expence." The great objects, therefore, of expence, upon which much money was expended by the former administration, are the erection of light houses and fortifications —suppressing insurrections; establishing naval sites and arsenals; the purchase of arms and ordnance; establishing armouries, and protecting commerce against Algerine and French pirates by building a navy. Let any candid man reflect whether, under the same circumstances, the present administration ought not to resort to the same measures.—Whether the injustice and violence of foreign nations may not compel us

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at any time, and however pacific the disposition of the administration, to resort to measures of defence, and then let him say whether these were false objects of expence. There are however other objects of expence not adopted, or rather "avoided," by the present administration,—such as the reduction of the expence of the judiciary department by the repeal of the judicial system adopted February 1801—the reduction of the army, and the dismissing the officers employed in collecting the internal taxes. The expenditure retrenched by the repeal of the judiciary was surely not the cause of our former poverty or of our present wealth, because the system repealed had been in operation but one year, and the saving does not exceed thirty thousand dollars, a sum less than the expence of repealing it.

The reduction of the army was justified in my estimation and supported by my vote; but I am of opinion, that while our differences subsisted with the European powers with whom we were contending---the force retained was necessary to garrison our forts and guard our frontiers. The restoration of harmony, which authorised a reduction of the navy, justified a like reduction of the army. A change of circumstances had in this instance rendered that force useless, which a few months before had been indispensable. By repealing the internal taxes the expence of collection was dispensed with. This measure did not expedite the discharge of the debt or replenish the treasury; for while it saved the expence of one hundred thousand dollars, it prevented the receipt of ten times that sum. I cherish the hope that neither the public fate nor public safety may require a resort to direct for internal taxes, or to loans. But however sincere the present administration may be to avoid these measures, yet it certainly is not correct to claim as a merit due to them, that they have replenished our treasury, and reduced the debt, "*without*" these aids; because the documents from the Treasury department shew, that they have received from the direct tax and internal taxes, the large sum of two millions seven hundred and sixty thousand dollars. The arrears of taxes yet unpaid, are estimated by the Secretary of the Treasury, at upwards of one million of dollars, which will also be at the disposal of the present administration. It appears then, that the present administration have the benefit of near four millions of dollars from the direct tax and internal taxes.

The present administration have done much. With the happy fortune of receiving the government and every branch of its revenue, "in the full tide of successful experiment;" unembarrassed by foreign dissentions: relieved from the necessity of great expenditures on national objects which their predecessors had completely or greatly advanced. With an increasing population, commerce and wealth; and a revenue yielding them in two years the immense sum of thirty-one millions of dollars; much was to be expected. Let any candid and intelligent American review these things; he will see with pleasure and with pride the prosperous situation of our country; but he must admit that we do not owe it to the "plans sanctioned" or false "objects of expence avoided" by the present administration. The planter who succeeds to the possession of a farm already well improved and planted, should be content with reaping the profits of the industry and skill of his predecessor, without detracting from his merits. He derives no merit from the boasts—I have gathered an harvest which I might have destroyed.

The President recommended to Congress, to appropriate a sum of money for erecting at this city a dry dock, in which, by employing water drawn from a source above the level of the tides, as practised in lock navigation, the ships of our navy might be placed "on a dry and sheltered bed," in which situation the progress of decay would be arrested. The estimate of this work submitted to the President was four hundred and twenty thousand dollars. No subject can more justly merit the attention of the legislature than the preservation of our navy: the solicitude of the President on this occasion is honourable to him; but unfortunately the project, by every light afforded by philosophy or experience, was judged not to be adapted to its object, and would be less conducive to the preservation than to the destruction of the navy. After some discussion it was agreed, without a dissenting voice, to permit the subject to rest without a decision.

At the last session of Congress, a proposition was made for repealing the several acts of Congress, by which foreign ships arriving in our ports are liable to higher tonnage duty than our own, and goods imported in them subjected to an additional duty of 10 per cent.; the repeal to take effect whenever it should be ascertained that any foreign

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nation had adopted the same policy towards us, by a repeal of their discriminating and countervailing duties. The question was not decided at that session. It is understood that our minister at London was instructed to propose this subject to the British government, and that in consequence of this communication, the British Parliament passed an act, authorizing their King to abolish their discriminating and countervailing duties, upon the event of the United States concurring in the measure. At the opening of this session of Congress, the President says, he "communicates with satisfaction" the act of the British Parliament, and submits to Congress the propriety of meeting them, in the abolition of these duties. The committee of commerce and manufactures, to whom this subject was referred, made a detailed report, which concludes by recommending a resolution for repealing the acts imposing discriminating duties. While this resolution lay on the table, the chambers of commerce of Philadelphia and New-York, and some other cities, and the mechanics of New-York, petitioned against the measure. They state in substance, that experience under these acts had proved their benignant effects: that our shipping had increased to an amount sufficient for carrying all our productions intended for exportation and the importation of such articles as are necessary for our home consumption. That by a repeal of these duties the ships of Great Britain would be permitted to bring us the products and manufactures of all countries, while by the operation of their navigation act, we should be restricted in our trade to that nation to the carriage of goods the growth or production of our own country only; that the vessels of all nations would be allowed equal privileges with American built ships, without any equivalent on their part: That the European nations not only build and equip their ships much cheaper, but also navigate them at much less expence than we can, which advantages in their favour must prevent our competition with them in navigation, and leave American vessels idly to rot in our docks. They all conclude with expressing a confidence that repealing our discriminating duties would discourage shipbuilding, deprive us of the profits at present derived from the employment of American vessels, and make us dependent on foreign nations for the exports of the products of our soil; that it must be prejudicial to various important interests in the community, detrimental to the revenue of the country, and, in a national point of view, extremely impolitic. The subject was postponed from day to day, and at length the friends of the project consented to let it pass undecided this session. Whether this abandonment proceeds from a hope that delay may enable the friends of the measure to repel the objections urged so strongly, and from sources so respectable, or is the result of a conviction of the inexpediency of the measure in the minds of those who first cherished it, I cannot decide.

Our affairs with Tripoli remain as they were at the close of the last session of Congress; neither restrained by a regard to justice, nor intimidated by the apprehension of our force, those pirates continue to cruise against our ships engaged in the Mediterranean trade. The public armed ships stationed there have proved sufficient to watch them so closely, that one merchant ship only has fallen into their hands, and this might have been re-taken, but for the danger of our large ships venturing near the shore to intercept the prize conducted by their small gallies. To render the protection to this trade more effectual, the House of Representatives, without a dissenting voice, passed a bill, appropriating 96,000 dollars for the building or purchasing four small vessels to carry sixteen guns each, which, in conjunction with our force already in the Mediterranean, will, it is not doubted, prevent these pirates from venturing into the sea. This bill was returned from the senate, with an amendment, appropriating 500,000 dollars for the building fifteen gun-boats. When this amendment was under consideration in the house, information was asked for what purpose these gun-boats were intended? It was suggested that they were not necessary for the Mediterranean service, and not calculated to supply the place with revenue cutters. In reply, it was intimated they were to be employed, if necessary, on the Mississippi: upon this information the amendment was agreed to. Thus we see the gentleman, who in January manifested the amiable disposition of relying on declarations of "sensibility," and the magnanimity of an aggressing neighbour for redress of injuries done us, who at that time refused peremptorily even to consider whether preparations for defence, if necessary, should not be adopted, seem now, so far as we

we can judge from this measure, to incline to the opinion, that *acts* may be efficacious where words will fail: and that waiting with perfect confidence for negociation to "vindicate our injuries," may be beautiful in theory but dangerous in practice.

At the last session of Congress the President communicated the articles of agreement and cession entered into between the commissioners appointed on the part of the United States, and the commissioners on the part of the State of Georgia, by virtue of an act passed May 1800---for the amicable settlement of limits with the State of Georgia. By these articles, Georgia cedes to the United States all her right to the jurisdiction and soil of the territory lying on the Mississippi, south of the State of Tennessee, north of the Spanish provinces of Florida, and west of a line beginning on the river Chatahouchie, where the Spanish boundary crosses the same, and runs up that river to the great bend thereof, next above the creek called "Uchee," then a straight line to Nickajack on Tennessee river, and with that river to the Tennessee line.---On the part of the United States it was stipulated that there should be paid to Georgia from the first sales of the lands thus ceded, 1,250,000 dollars, and that a land office for the disposition of the vacant land thus ceded, should be opened within one year after the assent of Georgia to the agreement.

That actual settlers, under titles from the British government of West Florida, or the Spanish government, or an act of Georgia, called the Bourbon-act, should be confirmed in their titles---that the lands ceded should be a common fund for the benefit of the United States, with the reservation of five millions of acres, which the United States might apply to the satisfaction of claims other than those before recognized.

That the United States should extinguish the Indian title to the county of Tallissee, in the State of Georgia.

That the territory thus ceded shall form a State when it shall contain 60,000 free inhabitants.

The State of Georgia, by an act passed June 1802, have ratified the agreement of the commissioners, which has become obligatory also on the United States. In this session an act has passed the House of Representatives, and is now before the Senate, for opening a land-office in this territory. This bill prescribes, that a surveyor be appointed by the President, who shall survey all the lands in the territory to which the Indian title has been extinguished into townships of six miles square each, which shall be subdivided into sections of 640 acres, and half sections of 320 acres each; plats of which surveys shall be filed with the registers in the territory, and with the Secretary of the Treasury. That the President by proclamation shall appoint a day on which all the said land shall be offered for sale to the highest bidders, in lots of sections and half-sections; but no sale shall be made at less than two dollars per acre. The lands unsold at the expiration of three weeks shall be disposed of by the registers of the land-office, at the same price (two dollars per acre) and in the same manner as the United States lands north west of the Ohio are disposed of. The terms of sale in both cases are:

That the purchaser shall pay at the rate of six dollars for every section he may purchase, for surveying expenses---he shall deposit one-twentieth part of the purchase money, to be forfeited, if within forty days he fail to pay one fourth part of the whole purchase money. One fourth part of the purchase money shall be paid within forty days—one fourth within two years---one fourth within three years---and one fourth within four years after the day of sale, with interest at six per cent. from the day of sale, on the three last payments. A discount of eight per cent. a year shall be allowed on any of the three last payments, if anticipated.

By this bill, the titles of persons actually settled within the territory, under Spanish and British grants, and under the Georgia Bourbon act, are confirmed. A right of pre-emption is also given to persons, who, at the time of passing the act, shall be actually settled on lands of the United States without title.

The claims other than those expressly provided for in the articles of agreement, and for the satisfaction of which the right to dispose of 5,000,000 acres of land were reserved, being very considerable in their amount, and extraordinary in their nature, a brief account of them may not be unacceptable.

[Mr. S. here adverts to the claim of the *South Carolina Yazoo* Company, under an act of the State of Georgia of Dec. 1789. This claim, it will be recollected, was attempted to be supported before the supreme court of the United States, in a suit against the

the State of Georgia, but which was terminated by an amendment of the constitution, relative to the suitability of States. The controversy was afterwards referred to the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of State, and Attorney General, as Commissioners on Georgia claims, who reported that "there was no equitable claim either for the land, or compensation from the United States." The other class of claimants consists of those companies which engaged in the celebrated Georgia speculation under the act of the legislature of that state, of 1795; but whose bright prospects were cut off by "the rescinding act" of the legislature in the subsequent year, and who received back the purchase money. These companies now apply to Congress for 8,500,000 dollars, for which they propose to relinquish *all their claim*.

Upon these claims the Commissioners report, "that they feel no hesitation in declaring that the title of these claimants cannot be supported." But they add, "that the interest of the United States---the tranquility of future settlers, and various equitable considerations, render it expedient to enter into a compromise on reasonable terms. They therefore submit a plan of indemnity to the claimants, viz.

That the residue of the 5,000,000 acres reserved for this purpose, after satisfying the claims of settlers and others as recognized by the articles of agreement with Georgia, shall be granted the claimants under the act of Georgia of 1795, to be located on lands to which the Indian title is not yet extinguished---or that the said claimants shall receive certificates, bearing interest after the 1st of January 1804, for 2,500,000 dollars, or at their option, certificates for 5,000,000 without interest, to be paid out of the sales of the land, after the payment stipulated to be made to Georgia.

Although it cannot be ascertained that the purchasers from the original companies had notice of the fraud in which the transaction was founded, yet there is strong reason to presume they were apprised that the title was questionable; because in the conveyance to them a special warrantee only is found against the acts of the granters, and a special covenant "that the granters shall not be liable to refund any money in consequence of any defect of title from the state of Georgia."

A bill is before the House of Representatives, predicated on this project of the commissioners. Its fate I consider doubtful—my own impressions are, that the claimants under the act of 1795 have no equitable claim on the United States. This being also the opinion of the commissioners, I conceive it improper for the United States to sanction a fraud so vile. The claim under the act of 1789 has much equity, because by the same kind of testimony which proves the fraud in the act of 1795, there is strong reasons to believe the intention of the act of 1789 was to receive the evidences of the debt of the state in payment of the purchase money: Nor can I believe that "the interest of the United States, the tranquility of the future inhabitants, or equitable considerations," should induce a distinction in favour of the claimants under the fraudulent act of 1795, in preference to the honest but perhaps mistaken purchasers of 1789. I am the more satisfied in the decision to vote against this grant, because it is questionable whether Georgia ever had a right to grant this land; and if the claimants have a good title, they can support it in the courts of the United States.

Early in the present session, a resolution was submitted to abolish the mint: this has not been acted upon; but the disposition of the House I judge to be in favour of preserving the establishment, an appropriation having been made in the general appropriation bill as passed by the house, for the support of the mint, in the year 1803, and a bill being before the house for continuing the establishment at Philadelphia, two years longer.

From the report of the director of the mint it appears that there was coined at the mint in the year 1802,

In Gold coins,	dolls. 423,350	
Silver,	58,343	
Copper,	34,422	83
Total amount of coins issued in 1802,	dolls. 516,115	83

That on the coinage of the above quantity of copper, a profit has arisen of dollars 5,644 82; the expenditures of the year was, dollars 17,462 65, deducting from which the gain on copper, the expence is reduced to dollars 11,818 83. When this sum is contrasted with the advantages of adding 500,000 dollars to the circulating cash of the country, coined principally from bullion, which would otherwise be exported; when it appears that the result of the institution is a national profit, the saving of the reduced

sum of expenditure cannot render necessary the destruction of this institution.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

JOHN STANLEY.

WASHINGTON, MARCH 1803.

LIST OF ACTS passed during the second session of the Seventh Congress of the United States of America, held at the city of Washington, from December 6, 1802, to March 4, 1803.

1. An act for the relief of Charles Hyde.

2. An act authorising the sale of a piece of land, parcel of the navy yard belonging to the United States, in Charlestown, in the state of Massachusetts, to the proprietors of the Salem turnpike road and Chelsea bridge corporation.

3. An act for the relief of Henry Messonnier.

4. An act for the relief of the sufferers by fire, in the town of Portsmouth.

5. An act to provide for the granting of clearances to ships or vessels owned by citizens of the United States, lying in the river Mississippi, south of the southern boundary of the United States; and therein to amend an act, intituled "an act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage;" and for other purposes.

6. An act in addition to an act, intituled "an act fixing the military peace establishment of the United States."

7. An act supplementary to the "act concerning consuls and vice-consuls," and for the further protection of American seamen.

8. An act to provide an additional armament for the protection of the seamen and commerce of the United States.

9. An act to prevent the importation of certain persons into certain states, where, by the laws thereof, their admission is prohibited.

10. An act in addition to an act, entituled "an act more effectually to provide for the national defence, by establishing an uniform militia throughout the United States."

11. An act for continuing in force a law, intituled "an act for establishing trading houses with the Indian tribes."

12. An act for the relief of Moses White.

13. An act in addition to an act, intituled "an act concerning the registering and recording of ships and vessels of the United States," and to the act entituled "an act to regulate the collection of duties on imports and tonnage."

14. An act supplementary to the act, intituled "an act providing passports for ships and vessels of the United States."

15. An act making an appropriation for the support of the navy of the United States for the year one thousand eight hundred and three.

16. An act making appropriations for the support of government for the year one thousand eight hundred and three.

17. An act in addition to the act, intituled "an act regulating the grants of land appropriated for the refugees from the British provinces of Canada and Nova Scotia."

18. An act concerning the salt springs on the waters of the Wabash river.

19. An act concerning the insurance of buildings, goods and furniture, in the county of Alexandria, in the territory of Columbia.

20. An act in addition to and in modification of the propositions contained in the act, intituled "an act to enable the people of the eastern division of the territory north-west of the river Ohio, to form a constitution and state government, and for the admission of such state into the Union, on an equal footing with the original states, and for other purposes."

21. An act to make Beaufort and Passamaquody ports of entry and delivery; to make Easton and Tiverton ports of delivery; and to authorise the establishment of a new collection district on Lake Ontario.

22. An act more effectually to provide for the organization of the militia of the district of Columbia.

23. An act for the relief of insolvent debtors within the district of Columbia.

24. An act to prolong the continuance of the mint at Philadelphia.

25. An act in addition to an act, intituled "an act to amend the judicial system of the United States."

26. An act making appropriations for the military establishment of the United States for the year one thousand eight hundred and three.

27. An act to revive and continue in force an act in addition to an act, intituled "an act in addition to an act regulating the grants of land appropriated for military services, and for the society of the United Brethren for propagating the gospel among the heathen;" and for other purposes.

28. An act authorising the transfer of the duties of supervisor to any other office.

29. An act concerning the city of Washington.

30. An act for the relief of Joshua Havey, and others.

31. An act regulating the grants of land, and providing for the disposal of the lands of the United States, south of the state of Tennessee.

32. An act to provide for the due execution of the laws of the United States within the state of Ohio.

33. An act to alter the time of holding the court of the United States in Kentucky district.

34. An act to alter the time for the next meeting of Congress.

35. An act directing a detachment from the militia of the United States, and for erecting certain arsenals.

American Official Documents, presented, at various times, to the Congress of the United States, concerning the Revenues, Expenditure, Public Debt, Trade, Tonnage, Seamen, and Fisheries, of those States.

REPORT *laid before the House of Representatives, on the 16th of December 1802, by the Secretary of the Treasury, concerning the Revenue and Expenditure of the United States.*

In obedience to the directions of the act supplementary to the act, entituled, "An Act to establish the Treasury Department," the Secretary of the Treasury respectfully submits the following Report.

The permanent revenues of the United States, exclusively of fees, fines, and penal-

ties, which, in a general view of the subject, may be omitted, consist of duties on merchandize and tonnage, proceeds of the sales of public lands, and duties on postage.

The duties on postage, which were, in the annual report of last year, estimated at 50,000 dollars, have, during the year ending on the 30th day of September last, yielded 50,500 dollars. The decrease of ship letters, the extension of the establishment through unproductive roads, and the acceleration of the progress of the mail, may, however, cause some defalcation in the receipts of the ensuing year.

Three hundred and twenty-six thousand and fifty-two dollars and eight cents have been received during the same year, on account of public lands, of which sum, 17,162 dollars and 50 cents were paid in the Treasury, in evidences of the public debt, and 179,575 dollars and 52 cents specie; the local situation of the land offices not having yet rendered it practicable to draw the balance from the receivers of public monies.

Three hundred and forty thousand acres of land have been sold for six hundred and eighty thousand dollars, during the year ending on the 31st day of October last; of which quantity near ninety-seven thousand acres were sold on account of pre-emptions claimed by purchasers under *John Cleve Symmes*, and two hundred and forty-three thousand acres are the result of *Current Sales*. The annexed statement (A) designates the quantities respectively sold in the several districts, and the annual payments receivable on account of the balance of nine hundred and sixty thousand dollars due on these and on the preceding sales.

From those several results it appears probable that the annual receipts under this head will not, on an average, fall short of the sum of four hundred thousand dollars, at which they have been estimated.

Although it had been anticipated that the receipts in the treasury, on account of duties on merchandize and tonnage, could not, for the present year, be affected by the restoration of peace in Europe, yet the sum actually paid has exceeded the most sanguine expectations; twelve millions two hundred and eighty thousand dollars have been received during the course of the year ending on the 30th day of September last; a sum larger, by two millions of dollars, than the amount received for the same duties during the preceding or any other year, and which exceeds, by twelve hundred thousand dollars, the aggregate heretofore collected, in any one year, on account of both the impost and the internal duties, repealed by an act of last session.

This excess, which had not been calculated upon, is considered alone as amply sufficient to cover any possible defalcation which might, during the next and ensuing year, reduce that branch of the revenue below last year's estimate, of *nine millions five hundred thousand dollars*. Such defalcation is not, however, apprehended; for although there are not yet sufficient data precisely to ascertain the effect of peace on the amount of duties, those which are in the possession of this department tend to corroborate the presumption, that that sum at least (nine millions and a half,) will hereafter be annually received. The statement (B.) which exhibits a comparative view of that revenue for each quarter during the two last years, shews that the amount of duties accrued, during the nine first months of the present year, exceeds eleven millions three hundred thousand dollars; and after deducting three millions five hundred thousand dollars, amount of debentures issued during the same period, on account of the re-exportations of foreign goods, leaves for those three quarters a balance of more than *seven millions eight hundred thousand dollars*, subject to no other deduction than the expences of collection; and from the knowledge already obtained of the comportations during the present quarter, as well as from the gradual diminution of re-exportations, no doubt remains that the net revenue, accruing during the whole year, will exceed the estimate.

From present appearances, the whole of the permanent REVENUES of the UNITED STATES may therefore be reasonably computed at *ten millions of dollars*---of which sum, seven millions three hundred thousand dollars are appropriated for the payment of the principal and interest of the *public debt*, and two millions seven hundred thousand dollars are applicable to the current expences of government.

According to the estimates for the year 1803, those expences will, exclusively of a sum of 180,000 dollars, wanted to cover the navy deficiencies of the years 1801 and 1802, but including sundry permanent appropriations, which make no part of the annual estimates, amount to 2,660,000 dollars, to wit:

For

	Dolls.
For the Civil Department, and all Domestic Expences of a civil nature,	680,000
For expences attending the intercourse with Foreign Nations, including prize causes, and *Barbary powers*, -	250,000
For the *Military* and *Indian* departments,	830,000
For the *Naval* establishment, calculated on a supposition that six frigates shall be kept in constant employment,	900,000
Dollars	2,660,000

Neither the payments due on account of the convention with Great Britain, and which will, for three years, amount annually to eight hundred and eighty-eight thousand dollars, nor the installments and interests due on account of the 200,000 dollars loan obtained from the state of Maryland, for the *city* of *Washington*, are included in that calculation, as they may be defrayed out of the following resources, which make no part of the permanent revenues, viz.

1st, The surplus of specie in the treasury, which, as the whole amount there will not at the close of the present year, fall much short of five millions of dollars, far exceed the sum which it is prudent to keep.

2dly, The uncollected arrears of the direct tax, estimated at *four hundred thousand dollars*;

And 3dly, The outstanding uncollected internal duties, amounting to near *seven hundred thousand dollars*.

The only embarrassment experienced during the course of last year, arose from the difficulty of procuring remittances necessary to meet the large installments of the *debt* due in *Holland*. The impossibility of obtaining bills on that country, to the amount wanted by government, and the loss which, on account of the rate of exchange, must be incurred, by remitting circuitously through England, induced the secretary of the treasury to recommend, in a report to the commissioners of the sinking fund (marked C.) a recourse to bank stock as the most favorable mode of remitting.

Of the five thousand shares in the stock of the bank of the United States, originally subscribed by the United States, 2,780 shares had been sold in the year 1796 by virtue of the act, intituled "*An act making provision for the payment of certain debts of the United States;*" and for the purpose of discharging a part of the debt due to the *bank*. The remaining 2,220 shares were now, under the same authority, sold at 45 per cent. advance; the 1,287,600 dollars which they produced were, in conformity to the provisions of the said act, applied towards discharging an equal amount of that part of the debt which had become due to the bank before or during the year 1796; and the purchaser of the stock sold, at the same time, to the treasury, an equal sum in bills on Holland at 41 cents per guilder; the securing of which large amount at that rate was the inducement on the part of government to dispose of the bank stock on those terms. As the dividend usually received on the bank stock sold, and the annual interest payable on the debt due to the bank, thus extinguished, were nearly equal, the July half yearly dividend on the stock was in fact the premium paid for the purpose of effecting the remittance; and government has hereby been enabled to obtain, without raising the price of exchange, the whole amount wanted to meet the payments due in Holland till the month of September 1803.

Exclusively of, and in addition to, the debt of 1,287,600 dollars thus paid to the bank out of the proceeds of the sales of bank shares, a sum of eight millions three hundred and thirty-four thousand, seven hundred and fifty-seven dollars, and eighty-nine cents, has been paid out of the treasury during the year ending on the 30th day of September last, on account of the principal and interest of the *public debt*, and the payments in part of the principal of the debt, made during the same period, have been as follows:

1st. The payments on account of the principal and interest of the domestic debt, have been dolls.		4,628,105 39
From which deducting one year's interest on the same		3,470,259 75
Leaves a sum applied to the disbursement of the principal of the six per cent. and deferred stocks, of		1,157,845 64
2d. Paid to foreign officers, and for the registered debt,		9,603 18
3d. Principal of domestic loans, (exclusively of the 1,287,600 dollars paid out of the proceeds of bank shares)		292,408 0
4th. Evidences of public debt paid for lands,		17,102 50
5th. The payments on account of the principal and interest of the foreign debt have been	3,310,874 32	
From which sum deducting one year's interest and charges, equal to	462,731	
And on account of the different rates at which bills have been purchased, and of sundry bills returned for non payment, & now in suit, a farther sum of	82,284 94	
	545,015 94	
Leaves applicable to payment of the principal,		2,765,858 34
		4,152,869 66

Amounting altogether to four millions, one hundred and fifty-two thousand, eight hundred and sixty nine dollars, and sixty-six cents.

And

And if to that sum shall be added the dollars paid on account of the principal of the debt due to the bank, out of the proceeds of the sale of the bank shares, the total amount of debt extinguished during that year, will be found to exceed five millions four hundred and forty thousand dollars	1,287,000 0 5,440,469 66

The balance of specie in the treasury, which on the 1st day of October 1801, amounted to 2,948,718 dollars and 73 cents, had encreased on the 1st October 1802 to the sum of 4,539,675 dollars and 57 cents, making a difference in favor of the treasury of 1,590,956 dollars and 84 cents, which last sum, added to the above-mentioned payment of 4,152,869 dollars and 66 cents, made out of the treasury on account of the principal of the public debt, makes an actual difference in favor of the United States, of more than five millions seven hundred and forty thousand dollars, during that year.

The payments on account of the principal of the public debt, from the 1st day of April 1802 to the 30th day of September 1802, exclusively of, and in addition to, the bank debt, discharged out of the proceeds of bank shares, amounts to 5,339,886 dollars 44 cents, viz.

	Dolls.
On account of the Domestic Debt,	1,334,942 : 81
On account of the Foreign Debt,	3,302,543 : 63
And in re-payment of temporary Loans,	702,400 : 0
	5,339,886 : 44
And if to that sum shall be added the encrease of specie in the Treasury during the same period, which (as the amount on the 1st of April 1801, did not exceed 1,794,044 dollars and 85 cents) amounts to	2,745,630 : 72
The difference in favour of the United States, for those eighteen months, will be found equal to eight millions eighty-five thousand five hundred and seventeen dollars and sixteen cents.	8,085,517 : 16

Of the annual appropriation of 7,300,000 dollars for the principal and interest of the *public debt*, about three millions nine hundred thousand dollars will be wanted to pay the interest which falls due in the year 1803, and the residue amounting to three millions four hundred thousand dollars, may be considered as the sum applicable, during that year, to the extinguishment of the principal of the public debt.

From all which it results, that so long as the *United States* shall not be afflicted by any unforeseen calamity, and whilst the *public expenditures* shall be kept within their present limits, there does not appear any necessity for encreasing the *public revenues*.

All which is most respectfully submitted

By Albert Gallatin,
Secretary of the Treasury.

Treasury Department, Dec. 16, 1802.

Statements A. B. and C. accompanying the Report of the Secretary of the Treasury.

(A.) *STATEMENT of LANDS sold in the Districts of Cincinnati, Steubenville, Chillicothe, and Marietta, shewing the monies paid thereon, and the amount due, on the 1st November* 1802.

Districts where sold.	Sales when made.		Period.	Quantities of land.	Amount of purchase money.	Amount of 8 per cent. expences.	Amount paid on account of purchase.	Amount due on account of purchase.	Amount of forfeitures.
	From	*To*		*Acres. Hdths.*	*Dolls. Cts.*	*Dolls. Cts.*	*Dolls. Cts.*	*Dolls. Cts.*	*Dolls. Cts.*
Cincinnati,	1 Nov. 1801.	1 Nov. 1802.	12 months.	47,106	95,012	451	33,218 06	62,703 94	71 92
Pre-emption lands in do.	ditto.	ditto.	ditto.	96,689 50	193,379	1,415 45	56,668 60	137,510 40	
Steubenville,	ditto.	ditto.	ditto.	164,145 62	328,291 24	1,551	114,116 25	215,174 99	
Chillicothe,	ditto.	ditto.	ditto.	29,766 40	59,532 80	300	17,212 25	42,320 55	65 32
Marietta,	ditto.	1 July, 1802.	8 months.	1,902 25	2,854 00	18	1,252 18	1,601 82	
				340,009 77	680,019 54	3,735 45	222,867 34	459,152 10	207 24

Periods of Payment for the Instalments due, per the above Statement.

Districts where payable.	1803.	1804.	1805.	1806.	*Total.*
			(see other page).		
Cincinnati,	42,398 10	66,855 96	70,354 30	18,895 98	198,504 34
Steubenville,	15,696 88	65,302 50	28,447 10	53,468 50	215,174 98
Chillicothe,	1,440	13,842 57	14,196 23	12,838 75	42,316 55
Marietta,	18 94	951 12	931 12	631 12	2,552 31
Add—Instalments due per statement for 1801,	181,221 47	199,167 39	170,989 63	85,854 35	561,018 63
	240,135 39	345,959 04	335,221 44	85,854 35	1,404,170 83
Deduct—Paid in anticipation for lands purchased previous to Nov. 1, 1801,					50,558 50
				Dollars.	959,612 33

Treasury Department, Register's Office,
December 6, 1802.

JOSEPH NOURSE, Register.

(B.) *A STATE-*

(B.) *A STATEMENT exhibiting the Amount of Revenue accrued on account of Duties on Importations, for each quarter, from the* 1st *day of October*, 1800, *to the* 30th *day of September*, 1802.

Quarters ending.	DUTIES ON			Debentures issued.	Bounties and Allowances.	Revenue. (a)	PAYMENTS.		Outstanding at the end of each quarter.		
	Merchandize.	Tonnage.	Passports and Clearances.				In the Treasury.	Debentures.	Bonds.	Debentures.	Revenue.
31 Dec. 1800,	4,291,216	37,393	3,314	1,379,937	5,246	2,946,740	2,090,769	1,362,583	11,952,834	2,256,132	9,696,702
31 March, 1801,	2,746,225	29,864	4,616	1,445,411	77,215	1,257,779	2,172,680	1,323,772	11,917,357	2,377,771	8,639,586
30 June, - -	6,231,092	49,957	5,316	1,906,244	7,077	4,373,044	2,868,068	1,468,474	12,817,838	2,815,541	10,002,297
30 Sept. - -	6,243,774	45,968	3,786	2,233,320	7,645	4,054,363	2,904,747	1,801,194	14,167,515	3,247,667	10,919,848
31 Dec. - -	4,803,985	43,644	3,740	2,275,133	10,933	2,565,303	2,715,334	2,082,434	14,067,868	3,440,316	10,627,552
(b) 31 March, 1802,	2,688,302	31,698	3,116	1,259,976	87,077	1,376,063	2,859,479	1,768,294	11,739,528	2,931,998	8,827,530
(b) 30 June, - -	5,153,384	41,616	4,490	1,422,944	6,718	3,769,828	3,208,885	1,591,243	12,081,392	2,763,694	9,317,698
(b) 30 Sept. - -	3,408,248	36,899	2,440	778,833	7,687	2,661,567	3,515,242	1,343,858	10,670,822	2,098,669	8,572,153

(a) This column shews the true amount of gross revenue accruing during each quarter (after deducting from the total amount of duties, the amount of debentures, bounties, and allowances granted for, or in lieu of drawback on the re-exportation of foreign articles,) and subject to no other deductions but the expences of collection.

(b) The accounts of several small ports, for these three quarters, are on estimate.

(C) STATEMENT *giving an account of the proceedings of the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund.*

At a meeting of the commissioners of the sinking fund, on the 7th of June 1802, present, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General of the United States;

The Secretary of the Treasury reported to the board, that provision has already been made to meet nearly all the demands which will become due in Holland, during the course of the present year, but, that it is necessary to make immediate provision for the payments on account of principal and interest which fall due there, during the first five months of the year 1803, and amounting to four millions, four hundred and thirty-nine thoufand eight hundred and thirty guilders, and payable at the following periods, viz.—1st January, 872,700 guilders; 1st February, 986,350 ditto; 1st March, 601,000 ditto; 1st June, 1,979,780 ditto.

That from the great diminution of trade between this country and Holland, he has ascertained during his late excursion to New York and Philadelphia, that it is impracticable to obtain bills on Holland to that amount: That the rate of exchange is already forty-one cents per guilder; and that any attempt on the part of the Government to procure the large amount now wanted, would indubitably raise considerably the rate of exchange: That if it shall be attempted to remit by the way of England, the loss will be also considerable, the present rate of exchange with that country being now above par, and rising, and would indubitably be enhanced, should Government come into the market for large purchases; and the rate of exchange between England and Holland, being by the last advices ten guilders eight stivers per pound sterling, nor likely to become more favourable, which supposing the whole amount in bills on England to be procurable (which is not believed to be the fact) at 168, would, including the commission of one per cent. in England, amount to forty-three and a half cents per guilder: That the Bank of the United States having been applied to, has refused to undertake to contract for making the necessary remittance: and that the two only considerable offers made to the Secretary are now submitted to the

Board,

Board, viz. The Manhatten Company offer to remit the whole, at the rate of forty-three cents. per guilder. Alexander Baring offers to remit guilders 8,140,488 16 1-2 payable in Amsterdam, at the following dates, viz.—1st January 1803, 605,000 guilders.—1st February, 685,000 ditto.—1st March, 425,000 ditto.—1st June, 1,425,487 16 1-2 ditto— And at a rate of forty-one cents per guilder, provided, however, that the United States shall sell to him the two thousand two hundred and twenty shares of the Bank of the United States, owned by the United States, at forty-five per cent. advance, or at the rate of five hundred and eighty dollars per share; which last proposition is recommended by the Secretary of the Treasury, as the most eligible; as exclusively of the advantageous rate of exchange, thereby secured, the transaction will not have any unfavourable effect on the rate of exchange generally, and by so considerably diminishing the demand, will enable the United States to obtain what is still wanted at a reasonable rate: and because in his opinion, the price obtained for the Bank shares is more than could be obtained, were they thrown in the market for sale, and more than their intrinsic value.

Whereupon it was resolved, by the board, "That the Secretary of the Treasury be authorised to sell the shares of the stock of the Bank of the United States, belonging to the United States; and that the proceeds thereof be applied to the payment of the capital or principal of any part of the debt of the United States, which had become due to the Bank of the United States, before or during the course of the year 1796, and which remains still unpaid, in conformity to the provisions of the act entituled "An act making provision for the payment of certain debts of the United States," passed on the 31st day of May 1796."

(Signed)

JAMES MADDISON, *Secretary of State.*
ALB. GALLATIN, *Sec. of the Treasury.*
LEVI LINCOLN, *Attorney General.*

Attest. EDWARD JONES, *Secretary to the Board of Commissioners of the Sinking-Fund.*

REPORT LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE SINKING FUND, ON THE 7TH FEBRUARY 1803.

The commissioners of the sinking fund respectfully report to Congress as follows:

The measures which have been authorised by the Board subsequent to their report of the 19th of December 1801, as far as the same have been completed, are fully detailed in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury to this board, dated the 3d day of the present month, and in the proceedings of the officers of the Treasury therein referred to, which are herewith transmitted, and prayed to be received as part of this report.

All which is respectfully submitted by A. BURR, Vice President of the United States, and President of the Senate—JAMES MADDISON, Secretary of State—ALBERT GALLATIN, Secretary of the Treasury—LEVI LINCOLN, Attorney General of the United States.

Washington, Feb. 5, 1803.

Report of the Secretary of the Treasury to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, for 1801 *and* 1802.

The Secretary of the Treasury respectfully reports to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund,

That since the date of the last report to Congress of the 16th Dec. 1801, and to the 1st Jan. 1802, the following parts of the principal of the public debt have been discharged:

1. In the payment of instalments of six per cent. stock, viz.	
Seventh instalment of the 6 per cent stock, which, pursuant to the "Act making further provision for the support of public credit, and for the redemption of the public debt," passed the 3d March 1795, and the act in addition thereto, passed the 28th April 1796, became payable for the year 1801, - - - -	805,846 30
First instalment of the deferred 6 per cent. stock, which, pursuant to the acts above recited, also became payable in the year 1801, - -	272,416 24
	1,078,262 54
2. In payment of the tenth and last instalment of the subscription loan for bank stock due on the last day of December 1801, - - -	200,000 0
Amounting to dollars,	1,278,262 54

Which payments were made out of the following funds:

1. The interest fund on sums which accrued on the stock purchased, and transferred to the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, in trust for the United States, - - - -	312,282 68
2. The fund arising from the payment of debts which originated prior to the present constitution, - -	420 0

3. The

3. The fund arising from dividends on the capital stock which belonged to the United States in the bank of said States, from 1st January 1800, to 30th June 1801, after deducting the interest on the subscription loan, for the same period; - - - - - 94,320 0

4. The fund arising from the sale of public lands, being the amount drawn by the agent to the commissioners, pursuant to the act of 3d March, 1795, - - - - - 162,021 29

5. The proceeds of the duties on goods, wares and merchandize imported; on the tonnage of ships or vessels, and on stills and spirits, distilled in the United States, appropriated by the 8th section of the act of 3d March, 1795, intituled "an act making further provision for the support of public credit, and for the redemption of the public debt," - 709,218 57

Making in the whole the amount of the reimbursements of 6 per cent. stock, and the 10th and last instalment of the subscription loan for bank stock as above stated, dolls. 1,278,262 54

That besides the above-mentioned reimbursements, there remained at the close of the year 1801, an unapplied balance of guilders 2,814,846 9st. applicable to the payment of the principal and interest of the Dutch debt for the year 1802, and consisting of remittances purchased and paid for before the 1st day of January, 1802, beyond the sums wanted to meet the demands in Holland during the year 1801.

That during the year 1802, the following disbursements were made out of the Treasury, on account of the principal and interest of the public debt:

1. There was paid on account of the reimbursement and interest of the domestic debt, the sum of stiv. 4,654,699 61

2. On account of principal of monies borrowed of the bank of the United States, - - - 1,290,000 0

3. On account of interest on domestic loans, - - - - - 162,205 0

4. On account of reimbursement of capital and interest of Dutch debt, exclusive of repayments into the Treasury, - - - - - 3,243,065 91

5. On account of debts due to foreign officers, - - - 7,994 92

6. On account of certain parts of the domestic debt, - - - 14,966 84

dolls. 9,372,752 28

Which disbursements were made out of the following funds:

1. From the funds appropriated by the 1st section of the "act for the redemption of the whole of the public debt," viz.

From the fund arising from the interest on the domestic debt, transferred to the commissioners of the sinking fund, - - - - - 316,449 92

From the fund arising from payments into the Treasury, of debts which originated under the late government, - - - - - 888 79

From the fund arising from dividends on the capital stock, which belonged to the United States, in the bank of said states, from 1st July, 1801, to 31st December following, 33,960 0

From the fund arising from the sale of the public lands, being the amount of monies paid into the Treasury, in the year 1802, - - 179,575 52

From the proceeds of duties on goods, wares and merchandize, imported, and on the tonnage of ships or vessels, - - - - - 6,759,125 77

Making in the whole the annual appropriation by law for the year 1802, under the act aforementioned, 7,300,000 0

2. From the proceeds of goods, wares, and merchandize imported, and on tonnage advanced by the Treasury, in order to enable the commissioners in Holland to make the payments in time, conformably to the 5th section of the "act making provision for the whole of the public debt," and being in part, and on account of the annual appropriation of 7,300,000 dollars for the year 1803, 785,152 28

3. From the proceeds of 2220 shares of the capital stock of the bank of the United States, which have been sold in pursuance of the "act making provision for the payment of certain debts of the United States," the proceeds of which have been placed in the Treasury, - - 1,287,600 0

Dollars, 9,372,752 28

That the above-mentioned disbursements made during the year 1802, and amounting to dollars 9,372,752, 28, together with the above-mentioned balance of guilders 2,814,846 9st. which remained unexpended on the 1st January, 1802, have been applied as follows; that is to say,

1. To the payment of the interest which, during the year 1802, accrued on the whole of the public debt, including domestic loans, dolls. 4,065,738 47

2. To the reimbursement of the following parts of the debt of the United States which have been discharged during the year 1802, viz.

Temporary loans obtained of the bank of the United States:

From the proceeds of 2220 shares of bank stock, - - dolls. 1,287,600 0

From the proceeds of duties on merchandize and tonnage, - 2,400 0

Instalments of the Dutch debt, which became due by contract in 1802, viz.

Second instalment of 2,000,000 loan of 4th Mar. 1784, - guilders 250,000

5th and last ditto of 1,000,000—of 1st of June, 1787 - - -	200,000		
4th do. of 1,000,000—of 13th March, 1788,	200,000		
3d do. of 3,000,000—of 1st Feb. 1790, - -	600,000		
1st do. of 2,500,000—of 2d March, 1791, -	500,000		
1st do. of 2,050,000—of 30th Nov. 1791, -	410,000		
1st do. of 6,000,000—of 14th Dec. 1791, -	1,200,000		
		3,360,000	0
at 40 cents in stiv.		1,344,000	0
Making together the sum of stiv.		2,634,000	0

3. To the provision necessary for the reimbursement of the 8th instalment of the 6 per cent. stock, and the 2d instalment of the deferred 6 per cent. stock, becoming payable the 1st January, 1803, estimated at the sum of dolls. 1,117,269 37

And that besides the above-mentioned reimbursements and payments, there remained at the close of the year 1802, exclusively of the amount of sundry protested bills still outstanding, and of unexpended balances in the hands of agents, an unapplied balance, estimated at guilders 5,914,606 10 st. applicable to the payment of the principal and interest of the Dutch debt for the year 1803, and consisting of remittances purchased and paid for before the 1st day of January, 1803, beyond the sums wanted to meet the demands in Holland during the year 1802. No purchases of the debt of the United States have been made since the date of the last report to Congress, and the accompanying statements exhibit for the years 1801 and 1802 respectively, the operations at the Treasury, in the transfer of stock to the commissioners of the Sinking Fund, in trust for the United States upon the reimbursement of the foreign debt in the years 1800 and 1801, and include also the sums in the several species of stock transferred in each of those years in payment for lands sold belonging to the United States, that is to say,

In 1801, Dollars, 23,816 58
1802, 15,518 49

All which is respectfully submitted.

ALBERT GALLATIN, *Sec.*

Treasury Department, Feb. 3d, 1803.

REPORT laid before the House of Representatives, by the Secretary of the Treasury, respecting the Fisheries of the United States, on the 29th of Jan. 1803.

Treasury Department, 29th Jan. 1803.

SIR,—I have the honour to enclose a statement prepared in obedience to the resolution of the House of Representatives, of the 24th inst.

The duties paid on the importation of foreign fish being laid on the value, and not on the quantities, there are no documents in this department by which those quantities can be ascertained.

As the number of seamen employed in the cod fishery could not be ascertained, for each of the ten years embraced in the statement, without delaying for a considerable time the report, it was thought best to transmit at present only the number employed for the year 1800; which, by a comparison of the tonnage for that year, with that for each of the preceding years, will shew, without any material error, the number of seamen employed during each year. The general result gives an annual average of about 33,000 tons, and 5,000 seamen, employed in the cod-fishery.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.

ALBERT GALLATIN.

The speaker of the House of Representatives.

Abstract of the quantity of Fish exported from the United States; the amount of bounties and allowances paid; also the tonnage of vessels employed in the Cod and Whale Fisheries, and duties accruing thereon, for the years 1791 *to* 1800 *inclusive.*

YEARS.	FISH EXPORTED.			* Bounties on fish and provisions exported.	Allowance to vessels employed in the fisheries.	Tonnage employed in the cod fishery.	Tonnage employed in the whale fishery.	*Duties on Tonnage.*
	Quintals.	*Barrels.*	*Kegs.*					
				Dollars.	*Dollars.*	*Tons.*	*Tons.*	*Dollars.*
1791	383,237	57,424	——	27,787	——	32,542	† ——	651
2	364,898	48,277	——	44,772	——	32,062	——	641
3	372,825	45,440	——	16,731	72,965	38,177	——	764
4	436,907	36,929	——	13,768	93,769	23,121	4,139	711
5	400,818	55,999	——	14,855	66,280	30,939	3,163	809
6	377,713	84,558	5,256	16,999	76,890	36,556	2,364	873
7	406,016	69,782	7,351	12,399	80,476	40,423	1,104	875
8	411,175	66,827	6,220	19,220	94,684	40,964	763	865
9	421,495	63,542	15,993	20,769	128,606	31,003	562	656
1800	392,726	50,388	12,403	18,325	87,853	25,787	652	555

* This column includes the payments made for bounties on the exportation of both fish and salted provisions; and from the informality with which several of the collectors returns are made out, the payments in many instances being blended together, it is impossible to make a correct discrimination.

† The documents in the Treasury do not distinguish the tonnage employed in the whale fishery prior to the year 1794, and those only enrolled vessels.

The number of men employed in the cod fishery for the year 1800, was 3,141, which would give, on the average of 10 years, between 4 and 5,000 men per ann.

None of the returns shew the number of men employed in the whale fishery.

Treasury Department,—Register's Office, Jan. 28, 1803.

JOSEPH NOURSE, Register.

REPORT LAID BEFORE THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, BY THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY, RESPECTING THE TONNAGE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE 8TH OF FEBRUARY, 1803.

Treasury Department,—Register's Office, Feb. 17*th*, 1803.

SIR,—I have the honour to transmit the annual statement of the district tonnage of the United States, on the 31st December, 1801; formed from the quarter yearly abstracts rendered by the several collectors of the ports of the United States to this office, and exhibiting,

	Tons.	*95ths.*
The registered tonnage at - - -	632,907	8
Enrolled or licensed ditto, - - -	278,271	31
Fishing vessels, - - - - - -	36,398	9
Amounting to tons, - - - - -	947,576	48

The registered tonnage, according to the mode prescribed for the collectors, and as stated in your communication to Congress of the 27th Feb. 1801, has been corrected in all the districts except eight ports; the names and estimated existing tonnage whereof are, viz.

Estimated existing registered tonnage calculated on a reduction of other ports.

	Tons.	*95ths.*	*Tons.*	*95ths.*
Marblehead, - - - -	9,083	30	— 7,500	
Plymouth, - - - - -	5,405	15	— 4,600	
Perth Amboy, - - -	436	76	— 436	76
Philadelphia, - -	109,036	40	—70,000	
Vienna, - - - - - -	778	68	— 778	68
York Town, - - - -	1,073	40		
Wilmington, N. C. - -	3,637	30	— 2,600	
Waldoborough, - - -	3,805	13	— 3,000	
	133,256	27	—88,915	45
Difference to be deducted from the registered tonnage, - - -	44,340	73		
	133,256	27		

Deducting, therefore, 44,340 73-95ths from 632,907 8-95ths, the registered tonnage, on the 31st Dec. 1801, may be stated at 588,566 30-95ths.

	Tons.	*95ths.*
The registered tonnage being calculated at - - - - - - -	588,566	30
The enrolled tonnage at the amount on which duties were paid for the year 1801, at - - - - - - -	224,740	
And the fishing vessels, ditto, - -	35,997	
Exhibits the actual tonnage of the United States on the 31st Dec. 1801, to be - - - - - - -	849,303	30

With respect to the licensed and enrolled tonnage and fishing vessels, a variation of about 50,000 tons more is stated from the abstracts as rendered by the collectors than upon the amount upon which duties were collected. But as every enrolled vessel by law renews her license every year, the duties, licensed, and enrolled tonnage, exhibits, from a recent examination, more correctly, the aggregate tonnage in the coasting trade in each year, than can possibly be formed from the abstracts, which are continually varying, from an exchange of marine papers at the custom-houses. Any further correction of this species of tonnage, other than arises from the usual examination of the marine abstracts, may, it is presumed, be dispensed with.

The total amount of tonnage on which duties were paid in the year 1801, was

	Tons.	*95ths.*
Registered tonnage, - - - -	799,304	
Coasting ditto, - - - - - -	224,740	
Fishing vessels, - - - - - -	35,997	
	1,060,041	
The total amount of actual district tonnage, as above estimated, 31st Dec. 1801, was, -	849,303	30
Difference,	210,736	65

Arising from vessels employed in the coasting trade, making more than one voyage in a year, the same being subject to a duty upon each voyage—vessels were built in the several districts in the year 1801, and which took out registers for the foreign trade, - - - - - 91,890 42

And which took out licenses and enrolments for the coasting trade, - - - - - 32,864 81

In all, tons 124,755 28-95ths.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c. &c.

JOSEPH NOURSE, Register.

Hon. Albert Gallatin, Secretary of the Treasury.

A MEMORIAL *on the question,* "Whether it be advantageous for France to take possession of Louisiana?"—*Presented to the French Government by Mr. Livingston, the American Minister at Paris.*

This question presents itself in two points of view: First, in the relation of commerce

and manufactures: Secondly, in those of the positive or relative force of France.

Colonies do not excite interest for their own sake, but only as respects the influence they may have on a nation; and as one man alone is more useful by remaining at home, than two by removing at a distance, a wise nation does not seek to colonize, until she has a superabundance of population, which she cannot usefully employ in any other way.

Though very considerable, the population of France is very far from having reached the term which renders colonies necessary: her soil, climate, and local situation give her, as a commercial, and especially as a manufacturing nation, great advantages over all the nations of Europe. The spirit of invention, the taste and industry of its inhabitants, place her in the first rank. But those advantages are wonderfully abridged by the want of capitals sufficient to make use of them. A rival nation, greatly inferior in every one of these particulars, has, by the effect alone of an immense capital, obtained the superiority, not only in commerce, but also in manufactures; and these advantages, by increasing the national fortune, furnish it with the means of maintaining that very superiority.

Capitals increase the number of manufactures, by the introduction of machines, by the regular payment of workmen, by the reduction of the interest of money, and especially by the possession of new markets.

None but rich individuals can undertake those slow and expensive speculations, which often give the superiority to a manufacture. A poor merchant cannot undertake long voyages, returns from which are slow; they are reserved for the wealthy, who can give credits long enough to tempt foreign nations to give his articles the preference over those of other nations, which expect a quick return for theirs. The want of capitals in France, is such, that no manufacturer has at his command a quantity of articles sufficient to answer the demands; and consequently no foreigner can be sure to obtain from his French Correspondent wherewith to make his returns without retarding his vessel in port, or, at least, without being obliged to take a considerable quantity of articles of inferior quality, picked up in a number of different manufactories; so that if he commits any fraud, no one can be charged with it. This renders the character of a manufacturer of very little importance in the eyes of a French workman.

Hence when a foreign vessel, especially if owned at a great distance, sells her cargo in France, she is ordered to take nothing but wines or brandies, because they are the only articles which the owner is sure to procure in sufficient quantities, in the fixed time.

In England, on the contrary, he will find all sorts of goods, in one hour, from one manufacturer, the reputation of which would suffer, if the whole supply were not of the same quality with the sample. This consideration will ever induce a foreigner to apply to an English, in preference to a French merchant, for a purchase of goods of the same kind. Hence cargoes are sold in France, and the proceeds carried to England, there to be sold for articles which France might supply, if her manufacturers were rich enough to answer every demand, in a short time, without compelling the purchaser to have recourse to a great number of manufactories.

This inconveniency can only be removed by increasing the capitals of manufacturers. It would be too great a deviation from my subject, to point out the means of obtaining those capitals; but it is evident, that they must be considerably lessened by the forming of a navy, at the expence of manufactures, or by using the capitals of the nation in distant countries. It is beyond doubt, that capitals open new channels; for nothing is more natural for merchants whose capital is small, than to content themselves with acting the part of brokers or commission-merchants, to those who can supply them with goods on credit; and for this very reason, England lost nothing by the independence of America. Her immense capitals have created a monied dependence, which, in a commercial relation, replaced the supremacy she had lost in the government. The increase of capital in America, frees it in some degree from that dependency, and by furnishing her with the means of extending her commerce, and even to offer capitals to other nations, which know how to calculate the value of the markets which she offers to manufactures and to the luxury of Europe.

It will be readily granted, that colonies beyond the seas add nothing to the force of a nation; these are, on the contrary, weak points, which are guarded at a very great expence,

expence, both in men and money; especially if they be in hot and unhealthy climates.

The question, therefore, is reduced to this---*Has France a superfluity of men and money great enough to justify the settling of a new colony?*

Those which France already possesses in the West-Indies and at Cayenne, are more than sufficient for her wants, and even the wants of all Europe, if they were cultivated so as to produce all they are capable of. But how are they to be cultivated? Expeperience has proved that the inhabitants of hot climates never work from want: force alone can supply the two great spurs to labour in northern climates, hunger and cold, which nature has placed in those severe climates. Hence slavery alone can fertilize those colonies, and slaves cannot be procured but at a great expence.

The Spanish part of Hispaniola was almost uncultivated for want of slaves. It is now possessed by France; and, to render it of advantage, it will be necessary to lay out immense capitals in slaves, in buildings, and in improvements of uncultivated lands. Others will be necessary to make up for the losses of the French part of that, not to mention the other islands. Where are those capitals to be found? Men who travel into distant and unhealthy climates are seldom wealthy. Those riches must therefore be found in France, or in some country that has a superfluity of capital. If they are found in France, it can only be, to a certain degree, at the expence of internal manufactures. It may, however, appear advantageous, in a national point of view, to encourage the use of the riches of France for that object; considering the extreme fertility of the French West Indies, and their present situation of culture, those funds will soon yield a profit. But as long as money will command so high an interest; so long as the interior of the republic shall offer monied men a source of speculations, and property shall lie in so few hands, it will be difficult to induce the majority of them to dispossess themselves of this capital to send it at a distance, and run the risk of the integrity of their agents, and all those whom recent examples have taught them to dread.

Foreign coin was formerly introduced into France, through the United Provinces; but the present state of the Batavian colonies, and the losses they have sustained by the war, leave but little hope, that much may be used in the restoring of French colonies.

The United States possess considerable capitals in money, and productions necessary to the restoration of the islands. No great credit, in money, will probably be given to the planters; but with suitable encouragements, there is no doubt they will be able to obtain those productions which must, were it not for that circumstance, be paid for in cash; and the commercial speculations of the United States will extend to the French islands, when the public and private credit of France shall have been restored; and when experience shall have convinced the people how unwise it is to establish a revenue upon foreign trade, while it is, in fact, collected from their own citizens. At Hispaniola, a duty of 20 per cent. is paid upon articles introduced by strangers. This duty is in fact paid by strangers; and it happens that fraud, and the bad administration of the custom-houses, is, as usual, a source of vexation for foreign merchants. But it is the planter who furnishes the money, for this tax is always added to the price, and even an interest is advanced upon it as a compensation for the vexations which the captains experience in their commerce. What then is the effect of that operation, if not to take from the planter one-fourth part of the money which he had so much difficulty to get from France? Or otherwise to stop, by that means, partly the re-establishment of the capitals which alone can render the islands finally productive? I say finally, for it is folly to believe that they would yield to France a compensation for her actual outsets, unless it be after a great many years. I will even say, that unless the ports of Hispaniola are open to every vessel loaded with articles of necessity, unless the inhabitants have the right of buying cheap, and selling dear, by encouraging the rivalry between the sellers and purchasers, unless every sort of vexation is removed, and strangers receive every possible security for their capitals in the islands, ages will pass away before Hispaniola will cease draining France of its riches and strength, without offering her any equivalent return.

It is, therefore, evident, that if France had no other possession beyond the seas, except her islands, it might easily place all the capital of which she now can, and probably hereafter will be able to dispose in a long series of years.

But

But if to all this we add the immense possessions in Guyana, her productions, and the capitals necessary to carry the whole of it to its full value; if we add the settlements necessary to be made in India, if the design be to bring into the ports of France that variety of articles which invite exchanges, and give commerce its due activity, we shall find, that one century at least will pass away before France may want possessions of that kind.

But as France has, like other countries, but a confined capital, the only question is, *where shall this capital be placed?* Shall it be here? in the West Indies? at Cayenne? in India, or at Louisiana? For it is obvious, that what will be placed in one of those settlements will be at the expence of another; it is equally so, that the national expenditures will increase with her colonies; and that, in case of war, the points of attack and defence will be multiplied in the same ratio.

Able statesmen have questioned, whether colonies were useful to a country situated like France; but my design is not to examine this theory. France has colonies; she has invited her citizens to go and carry their riches to them; honor requires that she keep and protect them; but she is under no obligation to create new ones; to multiply points of defence; to squander away the capitals she wants at home and abroad. How could the possession of Louisiana be useful to her? In the first place, its cultivation is to be carried on, as in all warm countries, by slaves; the capitals spent in buying them, or the slaves themselves, would have been carried to the Islands, if this new channel had not opened. This rivalry will rise the price of slaves for the planters, and may thus much retard the settlement.

On their arrival at Louisiana the slaves will be employed in the barren occupation of felling the large forests with which this immense country is covered, a labour but little suited to slaves, for it requires being long accustomed to the axe; and force and activity are seldom found in slaves. They must be clothed, fed, and maintained during whole years, before any profit can be derived from them. What I am about to relate may serve to determine that period. In the northern and middle states of America the usual term of a quit-rent lease in the new lands is ten years free from rent, and after this the lessee pays 12 bushels of wheat for every 100 acres, for ever. It is, therefore, obvious, that the first ten years are considered as a time of expense, during which term the owner requires no payment. But in the Southern States new lands cannot even be given out on those terms, because the white planter sets a higher value on his labour, and the clearing of forests requires too great outsets for any one but the owner of the land.

Who then will cultivate Louisiana with slaves? Who is the citizen willing to bestow large capitals upon so precarious a property, with the prospect of a distant return?

It may be asked, why does it not happen in the Southern States? It is answered, first, because none are southerly enough to be wholly free from the colds of winter, which renders savage life very difficult to men born in hot climates; and secondly, because the Southern States are mostly surrounded by the sea, and by mountains, the whole population of which is white, and which cut off the communication between the slaves and the vast forests of the interior parts.

But let us suppose all these difficulties overcome, what commercial advantages can France derive from the settlement of this colony? The productions of Louisiana being the same with those of the West-Indies, no advantage is to be reaped; for the islands, being well cultivated, will suffice for the wants of France, and even all Europe. The introduction of those from Louisiana would only lessen the price, without adding any thing to the value, and France would be obliged, to prevent the ruin of those who had employed their funds in the colonies, to imitate the Dutch, who destroy their spices and teas, when the quantity of these commodities in Europe is large enough to cause a depreciation of their value.

The productions of Louisiana, which do not grow in the West Indies, are only lumber, and perhaps rice; but it is certain that those productions, considering the difficulties of procuring them in a hot and unsalubrious climate, will not cover the outsets, or at least will not yield the same profits as would be procured by raising them in the islands, in procuring the same or other and more valuable articles.

The proof of this is found in the United States:---It is not from Georgia nor South Carolina that the West-Indies are supplied with lumber, but chiefly from the Northern States, where forests are more scarce and more valuable than in the South: the cause of this is, that the supplying of lumber, the

the mills necessary to prepare them for sale, all these are the work of free hands, which are satisfied with a moderate price.

I shall presume farther to lay down, however paradoxical it may seem, that it is not advantageous for France to supply herself with lumber, even if she could procure it from Louisiana.---I have two reasons to offer: What lumber the Northern States supply her colonies with, is paid for in molasses and some rum. The first article costs the planter nothing; for, were it not for that, this would be an useless production of his sugar, and the second is but a very moderate expense for distillation. If it were not consumed in America, molasses would be thrown away as useless, and this was the case when America was a British colony, because French commerce does not offer any other market for that commodity.

It may, therefore, be said, that the colonies have from the United States *lumber for nothing*. Should, on the contrary, a settlement be formed in Louisiana for the supplying of that article, every expense and outset of this establishment, all the labour necessary to cut, saw, and transport it to the place where it is to be sold, would be a real loss for the nation, even admitting that the cutters, and other men employed, should take, as payment, molasses and rum, because their labour would produce nothing to the nation.

But it is certain that Louisiana could not furnish a market for molasses or rum; it is only in New-England, (Northern States,) that those articles are consumed. The inhabitants of the South prefer ardent spirits, distilled from grain, apples, and peaches, to those distilled from molasses.

On the supposition, therefore, that the planters supply themselves with lumber in a French colony, exclusively at Louisiana, they would be forced to pay for it in money, or objects of real value. If the right of supply is not exclusive, it is null, because the labourer of a southern climate cannot work as cheap as the robust son of the North.

It might be thought that molasses would still find a market in New-England, though it were no longer the price of lumber. It would be an error. They have no other reason to take it, than its being offered in exchange for an article, for which they have few other markets. Let the colonies refuse lumber from the North, spirits from grain, apples, &c. will immediately be substituted to those from sugar, because the price of rum would immediately be higher. Then it will be that every sort of commerce between them and the colonies will cease, unless it be for provisions, which they will necessarily require to be paid for in money, or what will pass in foreign markets for money.

The second reason why France ought not to get her lumber from Louisiana, even though she might do it, is, that in case of war, supposing England should preserve her naval superiority, no sure calculations could be made upon receiving provisions; and they could not be supplied from the United States, for that commerce, having been abandoned since the peace, those whom it then employed have sought other objects of industry; and saw-mills, erected to prepare that lumber, are out of use, and will not easily be set up again at the renewal of hostilities; so that the misfortunes which are the consequence of it would be doubly distressing to the colonies.

It is therefore very evident, the colonizing of Louisiana would, in a commercial point of view, be very injurious to France, because it would employ capitals, which would be more usefully employed in other colonies; because those capitals would lie dormant for several years, and because admitting they should become productive for individuals, they would add nothing to the national mass, and would have no other effect than to lower the price of colonial produce, and lessen the profits of their labour.

It might however be thought, that the possession of Louisiana would afford one more market to French manufactures, and thus compensate the expence of the nation for its settlement. This question deserves a particular examination, and the provisioning or the consumption of French manufactures may relate either to the free or bond population.

If it be the free class that is to be mustered by emigrants from France, it will be composed of that portion of the people, which not only could support themselves in France, but, besides, increase the national riches by their industry. For France is not overburthened by her population, and consequently every emigration will form a vacuum somewhere, or abandon some useful branch, which will no longer be carried on. The emigrant carries away with him a portion of the general good, in the mass of the

productive labour of the mother country; he also carries away with him a portion of the capital, for he never goes with empty hands, and as I have already observed, ten years must pass away before his settlement produces beyond his first necessaries. He must, at the same time, live with the strictest economy, for having nothing to offer in exchange, he receives scarcely any thing from the mother country, and the nature of the southerly climates require very few of the articles necessary in Europe. It is therefore beyond all doubt, that as to the present emigrant, the few articles furnished him by French manufactures will not cover the loss which the nation will sustain of his own labour; besides he will consume much less in America than he would in France, and besides, his labour, the manufacturer, who supplied his wants in both countries, will be a loser by his emigration.

Black population will still less contribute to the support of French manufactures, because their consumption in articles of dress is very small; and even in South Carolina it does not amount to more than forty livres a year for each negro. At Louisiana, where the winter is still less severe, it will be reduced in proportion; it will consist in cotton, principally worked in the country, and still more smuggled from the United States. But if the whole were brought from France, after deducting the raw materials, which must be purchased, the whole profit of the French manufacturer will not amount to more than 30 livres for each negro every year. Now, as each slave will cost the nation 1000 livres, and as this capital would have produced in France at least ten per cent. in every other commerce or manufacture, the difference between 100 livres French produce, and 30 livres produce of the Louisiana clothing, gives the real loss to be sustained by France in the first ten years, during which they can only, as I have said before, supply their first wants, if so much; and as a certain number must die by the change of climate, and a number will run away, the real loss of France on every slave imported and employed in Louisiana must be 100 livres every year.

But if we add to this the profit which this very slave could have furnished, if transported to the islands, (and it is certain that all the slaves carried to Louisiana are so many hands taken from the islands) we shall find that the actual loss of the nation, in the interruption of labour, will amount to upwards of 600 livres per annum, so that the first loss for the nation, in the introduction of 1000 slaves to Louisiana, will be 600,000 livres. It is true, that if peace continues, and if, in opposition to expectation, the colony should prosper, the rich planters will make a great consumption of French goods, but that of the slaves will ever be very small, or their labour without profit, because, as I have already observed, being employed to cultivate articles which the islands can more easily supply for every demand, and the sale of which is confined, by increasing the quantity, they will only lessen the prices of those commodities which it is essential for France to keep high, because she possesses the most fertile islands. I know there is an opinion entertained by many, *viz.* That French goods, in their way to the Mississippi, will find a market in the western part of the United States. The most complete ignorance of the navigation of that river could alone have given rise to such an opinion, which is likewise grounded on the ignorance of the wants of the inhabitants. It is certain that the wines of France are not fit for climates as hot as those they must cross before they arrive in the Western States; that they are still less suited to the means and taste of the inhabitants, who are more accustomed to their own liquors, such as cider, beer, whiskey, and peach-brandy; the latter, with time, becomes superior to the best French brandy; so that, instead of receiving those articles through Louisiana, they might themselves supply the colony with them. As to the articles of glass and earthen-ware, they are made in every part of the Western States, where the raw materials are every where found. The demands for china-ware are small, but if they were large, French ware is too dear to hurt the sale of china.

Large iron works are also wrought on the spot, and English hard-ware has so well-known a superiority over the French, that the latter would certainly remain unsold, if both were exposed at market. The only articles which might, perhaps, be introduced into the country, would be silks, cambrics, and a few other articles of luxury. But even all these can never pass through the river Mississippi. The dangerous navigation of the gulph, the long and expensive distance to go against the current, the large capitals of the English and American merchants at Philadelphia, and the great improvements which are made every day in the

the roads and inland navigation, will cause land carriage to be preferred as far as the Ohio, and other rivers, whence they are carried to the settlements easily and cheaply. It is a well known fact, that dry goods have been carried from Philadelphia to New Orleans by land, by that route, in preference to sea carriage. It is, therefore, visionary to believe that goods from France will be carried that way; whilst the enterprising English, who have the right of navigating that river, and the prejudices of the Americans in favour of their manufactures, never attempted to introduce their goods that way, because they well know that they are more easily brought by Philadelphia and Baltimore. But should France be desirous of introducing, that way, more bulky articles into the Western States, and accustom the inhabitants to their wines and manufactures, it could only be *by putting New Orleans into their hands, with the reserve, that it shall ever be a free port for French vessels and goods, without being subjected to any other duties than those paid by the Americans.* By this means the American merchants, settled at New Orleans, may be interested in their commerce; instead of going to England, their capitals will go to France; the latter will have all the advantages of a colony without the expence of supporting it, and the money which American activity obtained from the Spaniards, would go to France; for England, which has not the same means, and which pays higher duties, could not supply those goods at so low a rate.

But should France, on the other hand, resolve to keep the island, a great proportion of the capitals of the commerce of New Orleans, which are especially in the hands of the English and Americans, will naturally take the course which the United States shall fix, and that must be a rival place of commerce with New Orleans, which being rid of the vexations consequent upon a military government, at a distance from the sovereign, will draw, in spite of all the disadvantages of its situation, the whole commerce of which the other is at this day the centre.

The boundaries established between Spain and the United States, and very lately between the English and Spanish possessions, have deprived the inhabitants of Louisiana of their share of the fur-trade, which it must be confessed was not, nor could ever be, very important, as the peltry of the South are of but little value; the few skins are of no importance to commerce, as may be seen in the tables of importation of New Orleans. Goods are ever to be transported from the Mississippi in the United States, that way.

In these considerations I have kept no account of the pains, expences, and loss of men, which are inseparable from new settlements in a marshy country, and a burning climate; the invasion of Indians; the insurrection of slaves; the insubordination of the troops; the abuses committed by officers, remote from the sovereign's eye. All these inconveniences united, or only a few of them, are enough to stop an undertaking, and ruin a settlement. A very important observation is, however, to be made, and that is of some weight. Many of those who will carry their families to Louisiana, observing that the lands are as cheap on the American side, will prefer settling there, even in time of peace; some, because they will prefer the government of that country, others by caprice, others through spite, or to rid themselves from a military government, such as that of Louisiana must necessarily be. That wish must be general in the case of a war between France and England; for admitting that the latter maintains her naval superiority (as I have already proved in another place she must, unless France changes her commercial system in order to establish it upon more liberal principles), the mouth of the Mississippi will be blocked up, and the planters in the French colonies will be reduced to the greatest distress, while those of the United States will derive from the war the greatest benefit.

Then it will be, that a great part of the capitals brought from France to Louisiana, will pass into the United States, where are found farms, already cleared, for one half of what it would have cost a French planter to clear his: because an American, familiarized from his infancy to the use of the ax, has acquired a dexterity and a muscular strength which are never obtained by a man used to other business.

The experience of the past is wholly in support of these observations. Though settled for one century, Louisiana has never prospered under either the French or the Spanish government. And one half of the commerce of New-Orleans is *now* carried on with American capitals, under the guarantee of their treaty with Spain. As soon as the French will plant a rival colony, that

commerce will be carried on in any other place in the United States, which the policy of their government may judge proper to encourage.

If the settlement of Louisiana is not advantageous to France in a commercial view, because it diverts capitals from a much more important channel, it is still more contrary to her interests in a political point of view. —America is of the utmost importance to France, whether considered as a commercial or maritime power. I have explained my opinion fully in this first relation, on another occasion; as to the other, there is no question than an agricultural nation, which, by her industry and her raw materials, is able to procure all the superfluous luxuries of Europe, and whose habits and occupations prevent them from manufacturing for themselves, there can be no question that such a nation must afford a very important market to the inhabitants of the old world.

In this view, the commerce of the United States is considered as very profitable to England; but when French manufactures shall have obtained all the improvement of which they are capable, when commerce shall be established upon a suitable basis, it will present a much greater variety of articles upon which to support itself, than the commerce of England. Woollen articles and hardware are the only articles which America receives from England; but France shall furnish not only all these, but her agriculture will gain by the sale of her wines, her brandies, and her oils. Those advantages, added to the relative situation of France and the United States, which removes every suspicion of rivalry between them, both by sea and land, have exhibited France as the natural ally of the United States, to the eye of those who have considered, in the extent of her power, a new pledge of the security of their commerce and their future tranquillity. They have done homage to the wisdom of those statesmen who, at the conclusion of an advantageous war, have thought that France would gain more by securing the solid friendship of the United States, than by acquiring a territory which would be for them an object of jealousy, and might again force them under the domination of a people whose yoke they had just assisted them to shake off.

I am not ignorant how delicate it is to foretell political misfortunes, which might result to France and the United States from the possession of Louisiana and the Floridas by the former. I must either conceal that which truth would have me say, or on the other hand frighten certain querulous minds, who may fancy they see a threat in my frankness. Nevertheless, a citizen of one of the two nations, and strongly attached to the other, I hope that those to whom this memorial may be delivered, will be able to set a just value on the motives of my conduct, and will see in it nothing but my exertions to remove every subject of dispute between two people formed to assist one another; and although I am too well acquainted with the resources of my own country to dread the power of any of the European nations, it will easily be seen, that I am incapable of conceiving the ridiculous idea of threatening a government which has seen all Europe bend the knee before its power.

I have observed, that France and the United States are in a respective situation, so fortunate as to have no point of collision. They may assist, without being tempted to hurt one another in any manner. This commerce is useful to both nations; this union of sentiments and interests rests upon principles which ought to form the maritime code, and deliver the universe from the tyranny founded by Great Britain, which she maintains, and which never will be combatted with success, until the other powers, by uniting, will abridge her means, by transferring to nations more moderate a part of her commerce; and as there are no nations on the globe whose consumption offers to foreign manufactures resources as vast as those offered by the United States, if we consider with what rapidity this consumption increases, the means which America has of creating a navy when her political situation shall render it necessary, we shall be obliged to own that France must have very strong motives and very powerful, to induce her to abandon these advantages, and change a natural ally, from a warm friend, into a suspicious and jealous neighbour, and perhaps hereafter into a declared enemy.

Experience has proved, that two nations could not be neighbours without being rivals; and if this be true of two neighbouring nations, it may be said with still more truth of a colony formed by a great and powerful nation, removed from the metropolis, and of a people bordering on the territory of the other. The reason of this is plausible; where two nations are neighbours,

neighbours, every thing passes under the inspection of the sovereign; the quarrels are as soon extinguished as kindled, but when the governor of a colony, calculating upon the protection of the metropolis, is guilty of an act of hostility, the wound gets gangrened, before a physician can be called. The offended sovereign, who also thinks that the offender will be so much the more strongly supported, as his nation is more powerful, tries every means, in order to anticipate on the hostilities which he dreads, uses reprisals, and both nations are at war before any explanation has taken place.

If there be a situation in the world which may be attended with these consequences, it certainly is that of France, when she is in possession of New-Orleans. It is situated in such a manner, as to block up the great passage towards the sea from a great number of States, and a very extensive population which increases rapidly.

A military government is about to be established on the island. The General, proud, with reason, of the glory of his nation, will cast on every thing that surrounds him a look of superiority; commerce will be degraded; and merchants, subjected to the despotism of men, who will seek, in the laying up of riches, a recompence for their privations in the remote and insalubrious country whither they are sent. The colony presents no lawful means of growing rich, except those (slow and progressive) of commerce and agriculture---ill suited means for soldiers. However vigilant the mother country, she will not prevent, at that distance, the vexations which may be exercised. On the other hand, the government of the United States will not be able, in a thousand instances, to restrain the petulence of the near inhabitants, bordering on the limits of the Mississippi; to confine their vengeance wholly, and compel them to expect from diplomatic representation a slow justice. Hatred will take place between the two people; the bonds of friendship will be destroyed, and the government of the United States, which ever shares the sentiments of the people, will be forced, by its situation, to alter its political relations. Then, for the sake of guarding themselves against their old ally, for a pretended act of hostility, they will form a cautionary connection with England, which will be sedulous in obtaining her alliance, and will excite her resentment against France; because in that alliance she will see the means of preserving her commerce with America, which she now possesses almost exclusively, securing her colonies to be able, in case of war, to invade the French colonies, and especially, of preventing the union of the commerce and navy of France and the United States, upon which alone France can engraft her naval superiority.

It may be asked, why those jealousies which I seem so much to dread for France, have not taken place for England, in possession of Canada? First, because Great Britain has prudently separated her territory by a natural limit which prevents the contact of the two nations. While she occupied the western posts, the United States saw her with jealousy, and it is beyond doubt that hostilities and a national hatred would have been the consequence when the increase of American population in that part had taken place; when those forts were given up, numerous symptoms had already manifested themselves.

Secondly, because the usual road of the exports of the United States being made through their own rivers, there is no important communication between them and Canada.

But it is chiefly because Upper Canada is inhabited by American emigrants, who, in case of a rupture, would join, according to all appearances, to the United States, had not the spirit of their government been to prevent the extending of their limits.

But, after all, what political or commercial advantage can France receive from the possession of New Orleans, and of the East Bank of the Mississippi, that may balance the loss which, in these two points of view, she will sustain in the rivalry with the United States? The Floridas are a narrow strip of barren land, incapable of defence in case of a rupture, and which will cost more than it is worth to guard, garrison, and the presents to the Indian Tribes. However advantageous New Orleans might be for the United States, it will be of very inconsiderable value for France, when the foreign capitals shall be taken from it, or a rival city shall be established on the American side. From the best information, I find that one-third of the best commercial houses employed in New Orleans, are American.—No sooner will a military government be established in the country, than all these commercial houses, with the capitals which support them, will pass into the United States, to that place assigned them by the

treaty with Spain, or to the Natchez, where every vessel which may go to New Orleans may be received.—Large vessels, from France, have already arrived there, and unloaded their cargoes without difficulty, and as the soil is so much the more advantageous as we penetrate further, there is very little doubt this establishment will rival that of New Orleans, when the American capitals shall have been taken out of it. When the United States shall have declared the Natchez a free port, New Orleans will be very little as a place of commerce, and only an object of useless expence for France, and an inexhaustible source of jealousy between France and the United States.

The cession of Louisiana is nevertheless very important to France, if she applies it to the only use which sound policy seems to dictate. I speak of Louisiana alone, and, by this, I do not comprehend the Floridas, because I think they are no part of the cession. As it can, by this cession, acquire the right of carrying on the Mississppi a free trade, if she knows how to profit of this circumstance, by a perfect understanding with the United States, she will find markets for a very great variety of articles, when she has accustomed the inhabitants of the western countries to prefer them to the English, which she can only obtain by selling them cheaper, and she can only sell them cheaper, by interesting the American merchants to sell them, to have the use of their capitals, and by engaging the government of the United States to give them the preference. All this can take place only by the cession of New Orleans to the United States, *with the reserve of the right of entry, at all times, free from all other duties than those paid by American vessels, together with the right of navigation on the Mississippi.* This would give her vessels an advantage over the vessels of all other nations, will retain and even increase the capitals of New Orleans, where the provisions for the islands will be bought at the cheapest rate possible, and where the articles of her manufactures will be introduced in the western countries:—The United States will have no interest in preventing it, for every reason of rivalry will be removed. Then France will command respect, without inspiring fear to the two nations whose friendship is the most important for her commerce, and the preservation of her islands; and all these advantages will be obtained without the expence of establishments, which ruin the public treasure, and divert capitals from their true object.

But if, on the one side, France keeps New Orleans, by attempting to colonize Louisiana, she will become an object of jealousy to Spain, the United States, and England, which powers will not only discourage her commerce, but will compel her to make expensive establishments to secure the possession of it.

In the foregoing observations I have confined myself to observations which presented themselves, without having recourse to subtilties, which only serve to mislead the judgment. I have exposed simple facts with candour and all the simplicity of language. If a reply is made, it will be by pursuing a contrary course. With eloquence and sophistry they may be combatted and obscured; time and experience will demonstrate their solidity.

An Agreement between the Seneca Indians and a company of Dutch Merchants, for the sale of lands in Ontario County, in the State of New-York.

Thomas Jefferson, President of the United States of America, to all whom these presents shall come, greeting.—Whereas a treaty was held on the 30th day of June last, under the authority of the United States, with the Seneca Nation of Indians, at Buffaloe Creek, in the county of Ontario and State of New York, and at the said treaty, in the presence of and with the approbation of John Taylor, Esq. a commissioner of the United States, appointed to hold the same, an indenture or agreement was entered into between the said nation of Indians and Wilhem Willink and others hereinafter mentioned, which indenture or agreement is in the words following:—This indenture made the 30th day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two, between the Sachems, chiefs and warriors of the Seneca Nation of Indians of the first part, and Wilhem Willink, Peter Van Eeghem, Hendrick Vollenhoven, W. Willink the younger, I. Willink the younger, (son of Jan) Jan Gabriel Van Staphorst, Roelof Van Staphorst the younger, Cornelius Vollenhoven and Hendrick Seve, all of the city of Amsterdam and republic of Batavia, by Joseph Ellicott, Esq. their agent and attorney of the second part. Whereas, at a treaty held under the authority of the United States

States with the said Seneca Nation of Indians, at Buffaloe Creek, in the county of Ontario and state of New-York, on the day of the date of these presents, by the hon. John Taylor, Esq. a commissioner appointed by the President of the United States to hold the same in pursuance of the constitution, and of the act of the Congress of the United States in such case made and provided, a convention was entered into in the presence and with the approbation of the said commissioner, between the said Seneca Nation of Indians and the said Wilhem Willink, Peter Van Eeghen, Hendrick Vollenhoven, W. Willink the younger, I. Willink the younger, (son of Jan) Jan Gabriel Van Staphorst, Roelof Van Staphorst the younger, Cornelius Vollenhoven, and Hendrick Seve, by the said Joseph Ellicot their agent and attorney, lawfully constituted and appointed for that purpose. Now this indenture witnesseth,—That the said parties of the first part, for and in consideration of the lands hereinafter described, do hereby exchange, cede, and for ever quit claim to the said parties of the second part, their heirs and assigns, all those lands situate, lying and being in the county of Ontario and state of New-York, being part of the lands described and reserved by the said parties of the first part in a treaty or convention held by the hon. Jeremiah Wadsworth, Esq. under the authority of the United States, on the Genesse river the 15th day of Sept. 1797, in the words following, viz. Beginning at the mouth of the eighteen mile or Koghquawqa creek, thence a line or lines to be drawn parallel to lake Erie, at the distance of one mile from the lake, to the mouth of Cataraugos creek, thence a line or lines extending twelve miles up the north side of said creek, at the distance of one mile therefrom, thence a direct line to the said creek, thence down the said creek to lake Erie, thence along the lake to the first mentioned creek, and thence to the place of beginning. Also one other piece at Catarangus, beginning at the shore of lake Erie on the south side of Catarangus creek, at the distance of one mile from the mouth thereof, thence on a line parallel thereto to a point within one mile from the Con-nou-dan wegea creek, thence up the said creek one mile on a line parallel thereto, thence on a direct line to the said creek, thence down the same to lake Erie, thence along the lake to the place of beginning; reference being thereunto had will fully appear. Together with all and singular the rights, privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances thereunto belonging, or in any wise appertaining. And all the estate, right, title and interest whatsoever of them, the said parties of the first part, and their nation, of, in and to the said tracts of land above described, to have and to hold all and singular the said granted premises, with the appurtenances, to the said parties of the second part, their only proper use, benefit and behoof for ever.

And in consideration of the said lands described and ceded as aforesaid, the said parties of the second part, by Joseph Ellicot, their agent and attorney as aforesaid, do hereby exchange, cede, release and quit claim to the said parties of the first part and their nation, (the said parties of the second part reserving to themselves the right of preemption,) all that certain tract or parcel of land situate as aforesaid. Beginning at a post marked No. O, standing on the bank of lake Erie, at the mouth of Cataraugos creek, and on the north bank thereof, thence along the shore of said lake N. 11 degrees, E. 21 chains, E. 13 degrees E. 45 chains, N. 19 degrees E. 14 chains 65 links to a post thence east 119 chains to a post, thence south 14 chains 27 links to a post, thence east 640 chains to a post standing in the meridian between the 8th and the 9th ranges, thence along said meridian south 617 chains 75 links to a post standing on the south bank of Cataraugos creek, thence west 160 chains to a post, thence north 290 chains 25 links to a post, thence west 482 chains 31 links to a post, thence north 219 chains 50 links to a post standing on the north bank of Cataraugos creek, thence down the same and along the several meanders thereof to the place of beginning. To hold to the said parties of the first part in the same manner and by the same tenure as the lands reserved by the said parties of the first part, in and by the said treaty or convention entered into on Genesse river the 15th day of September, 1797, as aforesaid were intended to be held. In testimony whereof the parties to these presents have hereunto, and to other indentures of the same tenor and date, one to remain with the United States, one to remain with the said parties of the first part, and the other to remain with the said parties of the second part, interchangeably set their hands and seals, the day and year first above written.

Con-nea-ti-a—Koe-en-twah-ha, or Corn-planter—Wou-dou-gooh-ka.—Te-kon-nou-

du—

du—Te-ki-am-dau—Sa-goo-yes—Jaw-yo-cau-na, or Blue Sky—Koving-quan-tah, or Young King—Ka-oun-doo-wand, or Pollard. Con-na-wan-de au—Soo-no-you—Au-wen-nau-sa—Soo-goo-ya-wou-law, or Red Jacket — Cosh-kau-tough — Te-yo-kai-hossa — Oua-ya-wos, or Farmer's Brother—So-nau-goi-es—Gish-ka-ka, or Little Billy—Sus-sa-oo-wau.

Wilhem Willink—Pieter Van Eeghen—Hendrick Vollenhoven—W. Willink, the younger—I. Willink the younger, (son of Jan) Jan Gabriel Van Staphorst, the younger —Cornelius Vollenhoven — and Hendrick Seye—by their attorney, JOSEPH ELLICOT.

Sealed and delivered in the presence of John Thomson, Israel Chapin, James W. Stephens,—and Horatio Jones, and Jasper Parrish, Interpreters. Done at a full and general treaty of the Seneca Nation of Indians, held at Buffaloe creek, in the county of Ontario, and state of New-York, on the thirteenth day of June, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and two, under the authority of the United States. In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and seal the day and year aforesaid, JOHN TAYLOR. Now be it known, that I, THOMAS JEFFERSON, President of the United States of America, having seen and considered the said indenture or agreement, do, by and with the consent of the senate thereof, accept, ratify, and confirm the same in every clause and article thereof. In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the United States to be hereunto affixed, and signed the same with my hand. Done at the city of Washington, the twelfth day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and three, and in the twenty-seventh year of the Independence of the said United States, THOMAS JEFFERSON.

By the President, JAMES MADISON, Secretary of State.

The following reply of Mr. Adams, late President of the United States, to some gentlemen who congratulated him on the anniversary of his birth day, throws great light on some parts of his administration which have hitherto been considered, in some measure, inexplicable.

Gentlemen,—As every gentleman here is at least as independent of me, as I can pretend to be of him; as there is no imaginable motive of hope, apprehension, or any sinister or private interest, which could have prompted you to such a manifestation of your friendly sentiments, I am fully assured that this visit is the result of feeling, and not of ceremony. The performance of the parts which were cast to me, in the course of the revolution, though the scenes were in the secret conclave of a congress, without galleries, and with closed doors, or at a thousand leagues distance beyond seas, and the few spectators or witnesses are almost all dead, I shall leave to the candour of the public, and the judgment of posterity, with such traditionary lights as they may possess. After as careful a review as I am capable of taking of the civil administration, during the period when I was President of the United States, I see nothing of any consequence to repent or regret. Some measures were the effect of imperious necessity, much against my inclinations.—Others were the measures of the legislature, which, although approved of when passed, were never previously proposed or recommended by me.---Some of them, left to my discretion, were never executed, because no necessity for them, in my judgment, ever occurred. I shall say no more upon this subject at present, but this, we were emancipated from two burthensome yokes, the French Treaty and Consular Convention, which were grievous to us, and would have been intolerable to our children. The nation in future, unshackled with positive stipulations, will have only to consider her duties to foreign powers by the law of nations, and to estimate her interest by an honest and impartial policy. Let me add one observation more. Under the continual provocations, breaking and pouring in upon me from unexpected as well as expected quarters, during the two last years of my administration, he must have been more of a modern epicurean philosopher than I ever was, or ever will be, to have borne them all without some incautious expressions, at times, of an unutterable indignation. I have no other apology to make to individuals or to the public. The prospect of national greatness is as sure and certain as that of national existence. The Union is our rock of safety, as well as our pledge of grandeur. And for this reason I hesitate not to recommend to you as a sentiment---"a union of honest men." I wish you, gentlemen, for the day, and for your lives, all the honest joys and felicities which you can possibly wish for yourselves.---JOHN ADAMS.

Quincy, Oct. 30, 1802.

Extracts

Extracts from the American Papers, relative to the NAVIGATION *and* COMMERCE *of the Countries bordering on the* MISSISSIPPI, *and also relative to the* EXPORTS *from the British province of* CANADA.

Louisville, Dec. 1, 1802.—During the last month, a brig of 200 tons burthen was built at this place for Messrs. Meeker and Co.; she sailed down the Ohio, to the mouth of Cumberland river, where she took in a cargo of cotton, and then descended the Mississippi, bound for Liverpool.

Natchez, Jan. 17.—On Wednesday last arrived at this port the ship Mary, Captain Darling, from Boston; she came up with a fair wind, and afforded a most pleasing spectacle to a great number of our citizens, who assembled on the bluff to witness the arrival of the first American ship that has attempted to ascend the Mississippi thus far. Also arrived on the same day the schooner Bee, Captain Brag, from the same port. We are informed that the schooner Nancy, Captain Morris, from Philadelphia for this port, passed Fort Adams a few days since.

Pittsburgh, Feb. 11.—The ship Pittsburgh, of 270 tons burthen, was launched on Tuesday last from the ship-yard of Messrs. Tarascon Brothers, James Berthoud, and Co; she is owned by those gentlemen, and was built under the direction and superintendance of Captain Beebee. Judges pronounce her a very handsome vessel, and her materials are of the best and most substantial kind.

New-York, March 8.---Exports from the British province of Canada, during the year 1802: 144,189 beaver skins; 25,808 martins; 18,855 otters; 11,148 minks; 7,377 foxes; 16,899 bears; 184,256 deers; 148,882 racoons; 17,377 open and casted hats; 1,483 elks; 4,562 wolves; 26,289 musquash; 5,719 kitts; 3,356 squirrels and hares; 892 seals; 180 castorum; 6,407 fisher; 988,413 bushels wheat; 28,297 barrels flour; 22,042 cwt. biscuit; 4,680 bushels barley; 16,121 cwt. pot ash, (last year ten times this quantity); 2,300 tons of new shipping, independent of vast quantities of lumber, beef, &c.

AMERICAN DISCRIMINATING DUTIES.

The following able examination of the operation of the American discriminating, and of the British countervailing duties on the commerce of the two countries, appeared in the New York Evening Post, under the title of "An Examination of the Report of a Committee of the American Congress," recommending a repeal of the discriminating duties. The report will be found at length in page 417 of vol. I. and various other papers on the subject, will be found by referring to the indexes of the three volumes of the Register.

The Committee have saved us the trouble of proving it, by expressly admitting in the outset, that the "discriminating duties have tended greatly to increase the navigation of the United States, have given the ship-owners an advantage over foreigners in the carriage to the United States of salt, wines, &c. &c. and enabled them to be almost exclusively the carriers of all the fine articles of importation necessary to the consumption of the country. This policy, (they add) combined with the advantages resulting from the late war in Europe, had increased the American tonnage to an amount (it is believed) not inferior to that of any nation in Europe, except Great Britain."

After this broad and important admission, we think we are justified in demanding from those who now propose to give up those duties, very satisfactory reasons for the measure. And what reasons have they given? They shall be candidly examined.

We did expect to have found among the first, the late peace. This was solely relied upon last winter, when the subject was first introduced by General Smith. It was then said by this Gentleman, and echoed by his friend Mr. Giles, that although our discriminating acts operated like a charm in time of war, yet were they calculated to injure us in time of peace, and they were both, therefore, very urgent to have them repealed at once. The house, however, were not quite able to discover the force of their observations, refuted by the bare inspection of the annual return of tonnage for the last ten years, and the subject was suffered to sleep for that last session. It is now revived with equal ardour, indeed, but its advocates, instead of relying on the change in circumstances, produced by peace, abandon that, and confine themselves to another and distinct ground, then also taken, though rather as a subordinate one. It was then said by them, in the house, that the English had "*overdone*" the treaty, and carried the right reserved to them, further than they were warranted to carry it; and now the Committee say, "it is believed that the Parliament

Parliament of Great Britain, by a statute passed the 4th of July 1797, (in exercise of that reserved right) have exceeded the fair intent and meaning of the treaty of amity, &c. &c. and that *to obviate the disadvantages thence resulting to the carrying trade of the United States*, it is expedient to relinquish our discriminating duties in favour of such foreign nation, as will agree to abolish such of their discriminating or countervailing duties, as are in their operation injurious to the interests of the United States."

That such a reason should be advanced by certain speakers in the heat of debate, is not very surprising, but that it should be gravely incorporated into a formal report of a Committee of Congress, as the leading motive of a Resolution, is matter of unfeigned astonishment. What is the amount of it?

Great-Britain, under pretence of making provision to carry into effect a particular stipulation in her favour, as reserved to her by treaty, passes an act which on the face of it palpably violates an important article of that very treaty. To put the case: We oblige importations in British bottoms to pay, say 10 per cent. more than importations in our own; by treaty they have a right to countervail by doing the same thing, instead of which they pass an act obliging our importations to pay 20 per cent. more than their own. What is in this case to be done? What course shall the United States pursue? Shall we remonstrate against the injury, and in terms becoming a great nation, demand immediate and adequate redress, or shall we give up our 10 per cent. which had produced important advantages to individuals, and a great accession to the revenue, in hopes that Great Britain will in turn give up her 20 per cent. Oh! the latter by all means, says an American politician; let us have no difficulties if they can any way be avoided; let us by all means forego our rights though they are indisputable, for in this quiet and economical manner all the disturbance may be *hushed up* at once. But we shall observe to this Committee, that however advisable and even laudable it may be in one individual to overlook offences, or to submit to compromise, yet he must be little acquainted with what belongs to the character of a Statesman who supposes this is the course to be pursued by a nation. "Seldom is it safe for it (says Vattel) to dissemble or to pardon an injury;" "suffering an injury without requiring complete satisfaction is always imputed to weakness, and is the means of soon receiving others that are the most atrocious." Can we then refuse to say as to the case before us, that if we allow the accusation of the Committee against Great-Britain to be well founded, the course they recommend is no less despicable for its pusillanimity than it is remarkable for its folly. But before we give way any further to our indignant feelings against the English, it may not be amiss to bestow a few moments in examining how far the Committee are warranted in advancing this charge.

By our countervailing act passed in 1790, importations in foreign vessels were made liable to pay 10 per cent. on the several rates of duties payable on importations in American bottoms; and in the second section of the 15th article of the treaty of amity, commerce and navigation between Great Britain and the United States, the right was reserved to the former to impose a duty adequate to countervail the difference of duty then payable to the latter on importations in British bottoms here, that is to say, 10 per cent. on the several rates of duties payable in their own country by their own importers. The treaty was made in 1794, but the British Government did not proceed to avail themselves of the stipulation in her favour till July 1797, and the act was to go into operation in January 1798. To prevent all dispute and cavil as to the exact import of this act, we republished it at length in the Evening Post on the 27th of January last, when we had this subject first under consideration. And now let General Smith, or any of the Committee, turn to the act, and tell us in what part of it they find the obnoxious clause which authorises them to charge Great Britain with having "exceeded the fair intent and meaning of the treaty of amity, &c." On this subject we take a direct issue with the Gentlemen, and deny, explicitly, that the act does in any one instance swerve from the "fair intent and meaning of the treaty;" nay, if we were disposed to be the advocates of a foreign nation, we could go further, and say, that this statute is in the highest degree liberal, allowing in one very important instance a favourable construction for us, where to say the least it was doubtful. It is for those who take the affirmative to make good their allegation;

at

at present it is sufficient to oppose assertion to assertion.

We proceed to examine the correctness of the report as to the countervailing duties on certain articles which they have selected to shew in what manner Great Britain "has exceeded the fair intent and meaning of the treaty," or wherein she gets an advantage over us in its strict observance. We shall take up the several articles in their order.

Fish Oil, and Tobacco, are first mentioned as objects on which the highest countervailing duties have been imposed. The former is interesting to the northern, the latter to the southern States, and if the repeal of the discriminating duties will tend to raise the value of these articles, it must of course be popular both in the north and south. We shall soon see how the truth lies.

"The countervailing duty on *fish oil*, (say they) is 1163l. 12s. 2d. sterling per ton of 252 gallons, and upon tobacco 1s. 6d. per 100lb." The facts are correct as far as they go, but candor we think forbad them to make this partial statement. Fair dealing required of the Committee, if they meddled with these articles at all, to state every tilting material to a right understanding of the subject. We shall now do it for them.

Great Britain, strongly impressed with a due sense of the policy of encouraging her fisheries as a nursery for seamen, has passed several statutes for this purpose, during the reigns of William, William and Mary, Ann, and more especially of his present Majesty. By sundry acts passed 20, 27, 28, and 29 Geo. III. British built ships, owned by British subjects, and manned by three-fourths British sailors, are entitled to large bounties for the whale fins, oil and blubber, caught by them in the Greenland, Southern-whale, Newfoundland, or British fisheries, so called, according to the tonnage of the vessel, the number of hands employed, and a priority of arrival. By the statutes Car. II. and Geo. III. oil, blubber, and whale fins, taken by British ships, whose owners and crews are of Great Britain, and imported there, are duty free. If taken by natives of British plantations, and imported in ships whose owners are of such plantations, the duty on train oil is 13s. 3d. per ton, drawback 10s. 2d.; if taken by natives of British plantations, and imported in ships of British owners only, the duty is 9s. 11d. per ton, drawback 8s. 5d.; but if imported in British or foreign ships from Europe, the duty on train oil, blubber, or fish oil, is 19l. 1s. 1d. (fractions are rejected) and imported in American ships from the United States, 20l. 17s. 5d.

From this statement it is perceivable at once, that the object of Great Britain was to afford encouragement to her own fishermen, not importers merely, and that for this purpose she has imposed so heavy duties on all oil not taken by her own subjects, in her own vessels, fitted out for the purpose, and in them imported, as in short amounts, and was intended to amount to a prohibition to all the world besides. But this she had an indispunable right to do, and we have no cause to complain, provided the *countervailing duty* does not exceed 10 per cent. on the duty laid on the same article, when imported under the same circumstances in her own ships. Now according to the table furnished by the Committee, that duty amounts to 19l. 1s. 1d. and 10 per cent. on that would be 1l. 18s. 1d. The duty laid is 1l. 16s. 3d. nearly 2s. less than she had a strict right by treaty to lay. But we shall now assert in contradiction to the implied opinion of the Committee, that this *countervailing* duty never has, nor never can have any weight in preventing the exportation of the article thither. *Fish oil* is not, nor had been for many years before any countervailing duty was laid, (excepting a very few tons at the close of the late war) exported by any merchant from the United States to Great Britain.

The Committee add, that "in *consequence of the countervailing duty*, a British ship of 250 tons, carrying 250 tons of oil to Great Britain from the United States, will pay 458l. 15s. sterling less duty thereon, than the same oil would pay, if imported into Great Britain in an American ship;" instead of which they should have stated, that such British ship would have to pay as duty on her *oil* 4763l. 10s. 10d. (a duty so enormous as to render the importation in such ship next to impossible,) and that an American ship would have to pay 452l. 15s. more than the British ship; but as the duty before was prohibitory, this addition as a *countervail*, is nearly or quite immaterial.

The Committee therefore, in selecting this as an article on which countervailing duty has been laid by the British, "to an extent greater than the treaty will warrant," as well as in the endeavour to make it be believed that it is the *countervailing* duty which prevents us from exporting it thither, are justly charged with material misrepresentation. It would not become us to say this has originated in design; we would charitably impute it to carelessness or ignorance.

In the article of *Tobacco* they have not been more fortunate. "By the same operation, (say they,) a British ship of 250 tons, carrying 400 hogsheads of tobacco of 1200lb. each, to Great Britain from the United States, would pay 360l. sterling less duty than would be payable on the same quantity of tobacco imported in an American ship; the whole freight at 35s. sterling per hogshead would only amount to 700l. sterling, which (after deducting the countervailing duty of 360l.) would leave to the American a net freight of only 344l. sterling." Let us understand this subject a little more fully than we are able to do from this statement of the Committee.

By the 6th section of the British act, tobacco of the United States is made liable to the same duties of custom and excise as tobacco im-

ported by British subjects from any British colony or plantation in America; subject nevertheless, to all the regulations and restrictions relating to the importation and exportation thereof, provided in an act passed the 29th year of his Majesty's reign, entitled, "An act for repealing the duties on tobacco and snuff, and for granting new duties in lieu thereof;" and in another act, passed the 13th year, with the same title. By those acts, tobacco imported into Great Britain, whether in British or American bottoms, may be warehoused free of expence on the importer's own bond for payment of the duties within 18 months, and if within that time the same is taken out for re-exportation, the bond is cancelled without payment of any duty whatever; but if it is taken out for home-consumption, it is then subject to the full duties payable by law, which duties are 6-20d. customs and 1s. 1d. excise, making in the whole, 1s. 7d. 20 sterling per pound, *subject also if imported in American vessels, 1s. 6d. the* 100 *pound*, or 7-10ths of a farthing per pound, and averaging hogsheads at 1100lb. (which is believed to be nearer the truth than 1200, as asserted by the Committee) makes 16s. 6d. the hogshead; standing thus,

Duty of customs and excise on hogsheads			
imported in British ships, - - -	£87	1	8
If imported in American ships, - - -	87	17	2

From this statement it will be seen, first, that what is called the countervailing duty on tobacco, instead of being 10 per cent. on the duties, as it might have been by the treaty, and which in place of 16s. 6d. would have amounted to l. 8-14-2, per hogshead, falls some fractions short of 1 per cent. Secondly, That this duty is only paid by the purchasers for home consumption; that is, the English tobacconist advances the duty, which is ultimately paid by the consumer. Thirdly, That the exported tobacco from Great Britain pays no duty at all. And here it may be observed that all things being equal, that tobacco will have the preference for exportation, which is entitled to the drawback, thus leaving the British imported tobacco for home consumption, and giving the preference to the American; on the whole it is believed and it is calculated by those most conversant with this subject, that three hogsheads in four will be re-exported, so that three-fourths of the tobacco is not even affected by the countervailing duty; 400 hogsheads, as stated by the Committee, may be taken as the average burden of ships; 100 only, we have seen, are subject to the countervailing duty, which at 16s. 6d. the hogshead, is 82l. 10s. or 366 dollars 66-100 cents. more on a cargo, if imported in American, than imported in British bottoms, instead of between fifteen and sixteen hundred dollars. Thus then we see, that the amazing duty on tobacco, which has been magnified to an amount too enormous to be borne or even looked at with patience, appears, on examination, to be too trifling to have any effect on the mind of the purchaser; not enough to outweigh the difference of different samples.

The report next states, that "Rice, when imported into Great Britain in an American ship, is charged with a duty of eightpence 8-10ths sterling per hundred weight more than when imported in a British ship; this extra duty amounts on a tierce of rice, to about 3s. 9d. sterling; the freight of a tierce of rice may be estimated at 12s. sterling. No person will give 15s. 9d. in an American, when he can have the same carried for 12s. in a British ship." Here we have the same charge to make against the Committee as in the two preceding articles, that they have presented so lame and partial a view of the subject, as is calculated to mislead those who are not already conversant with the business.

By the 7th article of the British statute of July 1797, it is provided that any rice, being the growth of the United States, which shall be imported from thence into Great Britain, may be landed in certain enumerated ports, and warehoused under the joint locks of his Majesty and the importer, in such warehouses as shall be approved of by the commissioners of customs, free of duty, unless it shall afterwards be taken out for home consumption, in which case the rice is liable, previously to its being taken out of the warehouse, to the full duties payable by law on British imported rice, and also to the countervailing duty, which, as appears from inspection of the table, is considerably under the 10 per cent. But it is important to observe, that when the article is in the greatest demand, and consequently when it will command the greatest price, which happens not unfrequently, it is admitted entirely *duty free*.

Again, "Pot and pearl ashes pay a countervailing duty of 2d. 14-15ths the hundred weight. A cask of ashes contains about three hundred weight: the extra duty on that by an American ship will be nine-pence per barrel—the freight of such barrel is presumed to be 5s. or 5s. 6d. sterling in time of peace; a difference of nine-pence sterling per barrel will effectually give the carriage to British ships of all the ashes exported from the United States to Great Britain."

The Committee are undoubtedly correct in point of fact, as far as they go, (except that instead of 5s. or 5s. 6d. it should be 7s. 6d. or 8s.) but their statement is materially defective, and their conclusion altogether erroneous. Suppose two ships in the port of London of 250 tons each, and capable of carrying say 1500 bbls. the one American, the other British, and both up for freight, and a merchant wanted to get brought from the United States a cargo of pot or pearl ashes. The British ship, by not being liable to the countervailing duty on her return home, would save her nine-pence sterling per barrel on her ashes, or about 140 dollars on the whole cargo; but as they have each to bring out a cargo of English goods on which

which the duties amount to 50,000, as is sometimes the case, the American ship, as an offset to the 140 stivers, the countervail at London, pays a less duty here than her competitor, by 5,000 dollars. This observation will substantially apply to *Cotton*, and the other articles afterwards mentioned. It would be the same thing if the first voyage was made from the United States to Great Britain. Really it perplexes us not a little to comprehend the force of the Committee's conclusion, that suffering the countervail to remain on both these vessels, would effectually give the carriage to the British ships of all the ashes exported from the United States to Great Britain.

"The Committee take leave to refer the House to a table of duties imposed by Great Britain, on goods imported in American and British ships, which was printed the last session of Congress, and is herewith exhibited." We do the same thing, and then ask the Committee to single out an article, if they can, on which the countervail exceeds "10 per cent. on the produce and amount of the several duties of customs due and payable by law on the importation of the like goods and merchandize from the United States in British-built ships or vessels," And if they cannot, all their complaints are utterly groundless.

The Committee next tells us, that "the Parliament of Great Britain, by a statute, bearing date the 7th of May 1802, has imposed new and additional duties on certain articles, the produce or manufacture of the United States," and as this of course raises the countervail, they think proper to say, "adds further to the *injury* already sustained by American ships carrying such articles." Surely it will hardly be contended that each nation, whenever it deems it expedient, is not at liberty to increase its own revenue, regardless of the rise of the countervail on the other nation. The Committee seem to forget, that since the treaty we also have laid additional duties, and of course have raised the countervail upon them; and therefore, if it is an injury on one side, it is also an *injury* on the other.

"The Committee take leave further to state, That by the same statute of Great Britain, of the 7th of May last, a duty of one half per cent. is imposed on all goods, wares and merchandize, (of the growth or manufacture of Great Britain) on their exportation to any port in Europe, or within the Straits of Gibraltar, and of one per cent. on similar goods when exported to any place not being in Europe, or within the Straits of Gibraltar, thus subjecting the United States to a duty on exports double that which is paid by the nations of Europe. This discrimination your Committee believe to be *in contradiction to the spirit of the treaties* existing between the United States and Great Britain."

We have not been able to find the statute here referred to in this city, but we may, however, observe, that according to the Committee's *own shewing*, in Barr phraseology, "here has been nothing like a violation of the treaty, nor any *contradiction of its spirit.*" The treaty relates exclusively to duties on *importations*; it neither mentions nor refers to *exportation* duties; if it had, it would have been the first time we believe that two nations, ever by treaty stipulated with each other that they would or would not lay *exportation* duties on their own *goods, wares,* or *merchandize*, which, in fact, is neither more nor less than laying a home-tax, and collecting it in the several ports, as the most convenient and certain way of getting it in. Besides, as this export-tax relates equally to British as to American bottoms going out of Europe, and bears just as hard on the British colonies as on us, we see no propriety in calling it a *discrimination.*

[The arguments advanced by this writer, and the conclusions he has drawn from them, are supported by the following important documents, being memorials to Congress from the *Merchants* of *Philadelphia* and *New York*, against the repeal of the discriminating duties.—Presented Jan. 4, 1803.]

To the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States.—The Memorial of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce—Respectfully sheweth, That the acts of Congress, entitled "An Act, imposing duties on the tonnage of ships and vessels," and "An Act, making further provision for the debts of the United States," passed in the year 1790, have been attended with the most beneficial consequences to the trade of the United States, by increasing the shipping thereof to an amount sufficient for the carriage of all our productions intended for exportation, and of all foreign articles necessary for our home consumption.

Impressed with a conviction of the necessity of these laws for the protection of our navigation, your memorialists feel great alarm for the proposition of their repeal, which they are informed is now under the consideration of Congress.

The experience of twelve years has proved their efficacy. The importation of foreign merchandize is secured to our own vessels, and employs a great amount of tonnage; and, although the countervailing duties of Great Britain may give to the ships of that nation a preference in the carriage of a few articles from America, yet, so long as the import trade is carried on in our own vessels, we shall retain by far the greatest share of the export trade.

The repeal of the countervailing duties on the part of Great Britain will not compensate us for allowing them a participation in our import trade. The duties on most of the articles imported into Great Britain from America are so low, that the addition of ten per cent. will not enable them to enter into competition with vessels enjoying the advantages of the return freights; but should the acts of 1790 be repealed, the ships of Great Britain will be permitted to bring to the United States the products and manufactures of all countries, whilst

by the operation of their navigation act we shall be restricted in our trade to that nation, to the carriage of goods, the growth or manufacture of our own country only. Nor will a repeal of the act alluded to give to Great Britain alone the advantages we have mentioned; they will be enjoyed by other nations, whose vessels will be allowed all the privileges of American built ships, without an equivalent on their part.

Your memorialists believe, that laws for the protection of American built vessels, owned by American citizens, are equally advantageous to the agricultural, manufacturing and commercial interests. Placed at a great distance from Europe, we may hope we shall seldom be involved in the wars which so often afflict that portion of the globe, and our experience for several years past demonstrates the advantages enjoyed by a neutral nation, possessing the means of exporting its own merchandize in its own vessels.

Believing that a repeal of the laws before mentioned will discourage ship-building, deprive our country of the profits at present derived from the employment of American vessels, and again make us dependent on foreign nations for the exportation of the products of our soil, your memorialists pray that the said laws may not be repealed.

[*Presented January* 24, 1803.]

TO THE HON. THE SENATE AND HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES THE MEMORIAL OF THE CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, RESPECTFULLY SHEWS,

That your memorialists view with much alarm the renewal of an attempt to repeal the acts making discrimination between American and foreign duties on imports and tonnage, and pray leave to submit to the consideration of Congress the following objections:

1st, It will diminish the revenue to an amount, which, taking past years as the guide, would not be less than 450,000 dollars per annum.

2dly, It will essentially injure the commerce of the United States, as its effect will be by opening the market for freight to the lowest bidder, to shift the carrying trade from the hands of our own merchants into those of foreigners. This, your memorialists believe, will appear from the following considerations:

1st, Foreigners build their vessels much cheaper than we can do. From actual calculation, it is found that a vessel, built of European oak, and equal to those built of our live oak, (which besides is nearly exhausted) costs, when equipped for sea, at the rate of 36 stivers 25 cents. per ton; and if built in Finland, of their fir, of which they have abundance, equal in duration to our common oak, and fitted for sea in the same manner, she will cost at the rate of 19 stivers per ton; while the American vessels, built of our common oak, and not so well equipped, will cost at the rate of from 40 stivers to 45 stivers per ton; but if built of live oak and cedar, she will cost at the rate of from 50 stivers to 55l. per ton.

2dly, The materials composing equipment, such as iron, hemp, sail cloth, &c. &c. are all cheaper abroad than they are here, and the price of labour for working them is supposed to be 50 per cent. less there than in the United States.

3dly, Foreigners navigate cheaper. Seamen's wages are lower, and many of their crews consist of apprentices without wages. The apprentice act of Great Britain renders it incumbent on every owner or master of a vessel to take with him a certain number of apprentices, and this they find so advantageous, that they frequently double or treble that number; more especially vessels from the north of England. Every merchant engaged in commerce knows that the Hollanders, Hamburghers, Danes, Swedes, &c. &c. man their vessels with a still greater proportion of apprentices; and in the cheapness of their living, cloathing, &c. &c. they have a very material advantage over the vessels of the United States.

Thus it appears that foreigners can build cheaper, and sail their vessels cheaper than we can; and it may be added, that Europeans are generally satisfied with a less gain than the American merchant can afford to receive.

Lastly, Although it has been said, that for us to meet the advance on the part of Great Britain, and to repeal our countervailing acts, would place the two nations on an equal footing, yet your memorialists conceive, that while Great Britain retains her present navigation act, this would be very wide of the truth. We on our part should thus permit Great Britain to bring hither not only goods the growth or manufacture of that country, but of all others, while on her part, by the navigation act we have just referred to, we shall be expressly confined to the carriage of goods, the growth or manufacture of the United States. To this may be added, that British vessels would then bring a cargo from their own country to this, take a freight here to their colonies, where our vessels are not admitted, and from thence a third freight home, making thus three freights in one voyage. The value of the importation cargoes is so much greater than the value of our exportation dutiable cargoes, that the extra duties paid by the foreigner are, in many cases, equal, and in some cases more than equal, to the whole freight; so that the acts which are now proposed to be abolished, operate nearly as a prohibition to the foreigner, and leave us, in a manner, without competitors in our own market.

After all that has been said, it hardly needs to be added, that if our ports are thrown open to foreign, on the same terms with our own, vessels, as by this repeal is contemplated, (for it is in vain to attempt to confine the measure to the British,) they will crowd our wharves, underbid our freight, monopolize the markets, and

and leave the American vessels idly to rot in our docks. Your memorialists have, therefore, no hesitation in declaring, that in their opinion this measure will be a fatal blow to the American carrying trade.

It would be easy to show in the detail that this would in its consequences prove extremely injurious to the agricultural and the mechanical classes of our citizens. A few general observations only will be indulged.

1st, As to the agricultural.—Although, generally speaking, freight is paid by the consumer, and therefore it may be said it is immaterial to the farmer how high or how low it may be, yet this is not the case when the demand ceases or slackens; it then falls back on the husbandman. But to transfer our carrying trade to foreigners, will be to lessen very much the chance of the demand. The active enterprize of the American merchant is constantly looking abroad to every part of the world for a market, and if it is any where to be found, or if there is only a reasonable presumption that it may be found, the farmer meets with a ready vent for his produce. Perhaps the calculations of the merchant may be disappointed, and he even ruined; yet the misfortune reaches not the farmer, he has the same benefit of a good market. But should the American vessels once disappear, he must then lie entirely at the mercy of chance-adventurers for a market; and when the demand is not very great, the price of the freight will be deducted from the article itself. All this must necessarily tend essentially to lessen the value of the farmer's produce.

2dly, As to the mechanics.—That numerous class of mechanics, who are connected with ship-building, the carpenter, the blacksmith, the sail-maker, the rope-maker, &c. &c. will of course be deprived of employment; their labour will neither be wanted nor paid for.

To conclude.—Our ships being thus banished from our shores, we shall no longer furnish a nursery for our seamen, but that valuable class of citizens will be driven to seek for their bread in other countries, and in any future European wars which may happen, and which are constantly liable to happen, we shall find ourselves without seamen or ships to avail ourselves of that neutral position, which reflection and experience equally warrant us in calculating upon, as one of the blessings allied to our remote and secure situation.

On the whole, your memorialists cannot refrain from expressing the belief with which they are strongly impressed, that to repeal the discriminating laws which have operated so happily to increase our navigation and commerce, would be a measure highly prejudicial to various and important interests in the community, detrimental to the revenues of the country, and in a national point of view, extremely impolitic. They therefore pray that the repeal may not take place.

ON THE CULTIVATION AND MANUFACTURE OF COTTON IN AMERICA.

[The following Essay was originally published in the Philadelphia Aurora. The author clearly points out the propriety of establishing some branches of manufacture in the United States, for the consumption of part of the staple commodities of the country. After a comparison of all the different branches which may be pursued, he gives the preference to that of *Cotton*, which, from various causes, he proves might be carried on with great advantage to America.]

TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Enquiries which respect the internal economy of our country are of a peculiar importance to a nation without transmarine dominions, and which was born and educated under the instructions and regimen of an European parent. It was not 'till after the lapse of fourteen years from the period of separation, that we became united in that system of civil polity (different from every ancient or modern plan) which we enjoy at this time.—It was not till after a longer term that we freed the American mind from the influences of the principles of the ecclesiastical *establishments and institutions*, which predominate in fact or by law in the three kingdoms, in union with which we commenced our being. The commercial spirit of those kingdoms passed over to us, occasioned our eyes to be long shut to the important truth, that *the agricultural interest* was the most important in our country. Blinded by the same cause, we did not perceive that we were capable of the useful arts and trades, though necessary and profitable manufactures had grown up among us as spontaneously as the trees of our forests.

America has ever profited by deliberate and calm self-examination, and no disquisitions have tended more to her honour and prosperity than those, which have been calculated to produce a conduct grounded on *the nature and circumstances of things at home*.

It is now seventeen years since the course of those enquiries led us to enter upon the subject of the MANUFACTURING BRANCHES *of trade*, in more form and with as much zeal as at any former period. The advancement of the manufactures of *the instruments of defence*, of paper, books, maps, prints, and other things instrumental to useful knowledge and science, of household fabrics, of the implements of agriculture, navigation, and the useful trades, of every description of furniture and carriages, of sugar, snuff and tobacco, of malt and spirituous liquors, &c. &c. evince the beneficial consequences.

The object of this address is to pursue *domestic enquiry*—to pursue it in relation to *home manufactures*—to pursue it *with a view to the adoption (perhaps) of a new principle of public conduct*. To this end a question is proposed to be respectfully submitted to the federal and state governments.

" *Whether the United States may not safely*
" *and profitably make an experiment of well*
" *devised and complete encouragements to some*
" *one branch of American manufactures; and*
" *what that branch should be?*"

Many of the most early and zealous friends of American manufactures have hitherto refrained from suggesting that the productions of our domestic arts and trades should be *generally* encouraged by high duties on the importation of foreign rival goods. They have feared to impede *the improvements of the country* by excessive duties on foreign articles used in building houses, stores, mills, &c. They have feared to impede *the progress of knowledge* by excessive duties on foreign books, and the instruments of science. They have feared to burthen *the poor, the young beginners, the industrious, and the great mass of the people*, by excessive duties on foreign manufactured goods, *for their clothing, furniture, and general consumption*. The best friends of American manufactures have feared that high *general* duties might embarrass or derange our finances and public credit, by affecting fair and free importation. They have prudently respected the doubts of many of our fellow-citizens about our *interest in manufactures*, and *our abilities to produce them*. They have been uncertain about the acquisition of foreign machinery, manufacturing secrets, and artizans. They have seen the possibility that foreign trade laws might be so framed as entirely to prevent the importation of the *properest* raw materials. They have feared that too many of our farmers might be diverted from agriculture to manufactures. Other objections have occurred, and the moderation, prudence, and candour of the friends of American manufactures have chearfully yielded to every reasonable doubt, and to every fair argument, in its full weight.

It has happened, however, that *for the mere purposes of revenue*, an impost has been laid upon all foreign rival *manufactures*. This impost has been gradually increased from 5 to 7 1-2 10 and 12 1-2 per cent. which last is, at this time, the lowest rate of duty. It is also true, that *for the proper and dictated encouragement of certain manufactures*, additions to the lowest rate of duty have been made of 2 1-2, 5, and 7 1-2 per cent. so that various American manufactures are encouraged by duties on the *foreign rival* commodities of 2 1-2, 15, 17 1-2 and 20 per cent. Besides these, there are import duties upon particular articles, which are at higher rates. The duties, for example, of 8 cents per gallon, on all *fermented* malt liquors, and 20 cents per gallon on *distilled* grain; spirits 6 1-2 to 9 cents per *lb.* on refined sugars; 50 cents per doz. on wool and cotton cards; 400 cents per *cwt.* on the twine and pack-threads; 25 cents per pair on shoes; 2 cents per *lb.* on soap and candles; 10 cents and 22 cents per *lb.* on manufactured tobacco and snuff, &c. &c.

Under these gradual, moderate and prudent encouragements commenced by the States before 1789, and pursued since by the federal government, a scene of *domestic* manufactures, reflecting honour upon the internal economy of the United States, and greatly redounding to their benefit, has imperceptibly arisen. We hazard once more a revised sketch of them, and upon *mature reflection*, we are not disposed to doubt the correctness *of the interesting sum total.*

An attempt to estimate certain American manufactures.

Refined sugar, of all kinds, -	*Dollars*	1,000,000
Shoemakers' manufactures, - -		8,000,000
Hatters' ditto, - - - -		1,225,000
Carriages for *pleasure*, including repairs within the year, - - -		500,000
Carriages for *work*, including like repairs,		500,000
All leathern goods, exclusive of shoes, boots, slippers, and carriage leather,		1,000,000
Cabinet work of all kinds, framing pictures, and compositions, - -		1,000,000
Gold and silver plate and wares, and set and fancy work, - - -		500,000
The *whole* of our *iron* manufactures, including farming implements, cannon, muskets, steel, &c. - - -		4,000,000
The *whole* of our *hemp, flax, cotton, hair, wool, and silk, which are manufactured*, exclusive of Lots, - - - -		20,000,000
Beer, ale, and porter, - - -		500,000
Distilled spirits, 10,000,000 gallons from molasses, grain, fruit, &c. - -		5,000,000
Coppersmith's work, lead, pewter, and brass wares, - - - -		500,000
Tinmans' ditto, - - - -		200,000
Coopers' wares, oak, pine, cedar, &c. for *home use*, and for our *exports*,		1,000,000
Ships, boats, and oars, &c. including repairs, - - - - -		3,000,000
Earthen, glass, and stone wares, -		350,000
Windsor chairs, settees, and painted, gilt, and varnished ditto, - -		100,000
Horn, ivory, and whalebone manufactures, - - - - -		10,000
Starch, hair-powder, wafers and glue,		50,000
Soap and candles, - - -		500,000
Wire-work, including cotton and wool cards, - - - - -		50,000
Wheel-barrows, hand ditto, corn fans, plane stocks, machinery, &c. -		50,000
Paper making, including hangings,		500,000
Gunpowder, - - - -		500,000
Book printing, binding, and engraving,		1,000,000
	Dollars	50,835,000

It is not believed that any item in the preceding estimate materially exceeds the truth, and we are *confident* that if all unnoticed branches were added, it would be impossible to reduce the total sum below fifty millions of dollars.

If the list shall be carefully examined it will be found that these manufactures give a *vast*—an *immense* support to our planters, farmers, freeholders, and fishermen, by the demand for our country and fishing produce, and for buildings, and that some of them are highly favour-

able

able to the American ship owners, by employing imported molasses, sugars, skins, woods, dyes, metals, hemp, flax, wool, tallow, and other raw materials and ingredients.

Are we prepared to sacrifice *this noble encreasing branch of American industry?*—Will we suffer ourselves to neglect it for a moment? Will we not rather continue prudently to nurse, to foster, and to encourage the useful arts and manufactures? There can be but one opinion—one reply. But it ought to be the unanimous endeavour to promote American manufactures *with as much deliberation and prudence* as effect. Let us take care not to disturb our *necessary* revenues, not to derange our *well ordered* finances, not to impose *unreasonable* burdens on the consumer, not to attempt manifest *impracticabilities*, not to impede our *young* improvements, and not to aim at *too much* by touching the subject with strong alternatives at *too many points*.

We cannot at this crisis encourage, by additional, encreasing and prohibitory duties, *all* American manufactures, without producing most of the evils we have held up, in candid prudence, in this investigation. It is not meant therefore to press upon the public consideration, at this moment, any *general measures* to promote American manufactures. It is not intended here to ask *even the consideration* of such measures in favour of any *two* branches; it is merely wished that new and proper protections and encouragement may be *considered* in reference to some *one* single branch. No *material* or *sudden* diminution of our revenues can be produced by higher duties not very slowly encreasing upon a single branch; and no objection to a general forcing of manufactures more deserves to be respected than the possible injuries to our revenue, finances and public credit. These are *never* to be *injured*—*never* to be put at *hazard*. Let them be *for ever* protected by all our prudence, and by perfect good faith. But let us proceed to select, merely by way of example, a single branch of American manufactures, and apply to its discussion our soundest principles and our best reflections.

The cotton manufacture of the United States of America is proposed to be encouraged, extended, protected and established by all the means in our power. Being a *single* branch of manufacture, it cannot put any large sum of *present* revenue at hazard. The amount of cotton goods imported is very far inferior to that of the *woollen* goods imported; it is also supposed to be considerably inferior to the value of the linen goods imported. The iron goods imported are likewise greater in value; the duties on foreign liquors, and foreign sugars are much greater. As therefore the present duties on cotton goods are not even of *secondary* consequence in our scale of revenue, *gradual* diminution of that part of the revenue could not sensibly affect our resources. As the revenue from no *single* article can derange our treasury business, so this particular revenue (from foreign cotton goods) cannot from its moderation be even felt; but if we raise the duty on such goods from 12 or 15 to 20 or 25 per cent. the first year, the *extra* duty on a *less* quantity imported may yield nearly an equal revenue. It is respectfully submitted, whether these considerations do not obviate the objections, justly urged at this time, against the dangers of *universal* high protecting duties destroying or deranging our *impost revenue*.

The vast extent of country which will produce cotton, is a serious consideration to induce a selection of it for extraordinary encouragement. From the southern boundary to the fortieth degree of north latitude, cotton has certainly been produced. It may therefore prove to be worthy of the attention of all our citizens, living south of a line drawn from Tom's river, through Philadelphia and Pittsburg; and this invaluable plant does not refuse its increase in light, weak and stony soils.

The manufacture of cotton merits the universal consideration of the American people, because it will render cotton-wool a permanent staple article of agriculture and trade; and, by fixing it for ever upon that footing, will make an important addition to the variety of American commodities, and of course to the stability of their prices. If all our countrymen were employed in raising rice, tobacco, wheat, and cattle, those commodities would often be distressingly low from their redundance; but if half the states shall raise tens of millions of cotton, then will our wheat, cattle, &c. support much better prices.

As the cotton manufacture is effected more than any other by labour, saving machines, it is freer from the objection of the dearness of labour than any other; and it is perfectly clear, that the dearness of labour is an argument for any labour-saving plan.

As there are very few of our native citizens who understand the cotton manufacture by machines, the promotion of this branch will not divert many of our farmers from agriculture.

We have an unlimited command of the powers of steam, horses, draught oxen and water, to move our cotton machines and mills.

We have lately disengaged the powers of the earth to produce cotton, by the discovery and extensive use of a variety of mills and machines, to free the cotton-wool from the cotton-seed. Fifty thousand dollars have been granted by a single state to purchase the patent right of a cotton-ginning or cleaning machine within its own jurisdiction. This fact does honour to the wisdom, spirit and fairness of South Carolina.——We have obtained and possess the common hand spinning jenny, which makes by one person, male or female, from 40 to 120 cotton threads at one time; also the carding machine to go by hand, horse, ox, or water; also the roving machine, to reduce cotton wool into ropes or yards of the size of a goose quill; also

also the mule, spinning by hand 120 fine threads; also the water-spinning machinery of Arkwright, to spin perpetually at any mill seat. We also possess the machinery for doubling and twisting thread, for hosiery, and the British and German stocking-weaver's looms, for making every article of hosiery, from feet-socks to pantaloons.

There have arrived in the United States from Europe, a very considerable number of engine and machine makers, carders, spinners, rovers, twisters, weavers, callico-printers, dyers, &c. ready to work on wages as moderate as they received in Great Britain, Ireland, and other parts of Europe. These persons want employment in their own proper lines of business. Every man among them who succeeds in this country, will induce others to follow him. There are important and unalterable circumstances in the United States to draw men to us, who are acquainted with every useful art and manufacture. Some of the most obvious of these are, perfect religious liberty; a sober equality of civil rights; the cheap and easy acquisition of freehold estates for residence, manufactories, and farms; the cheapness of government, and consequent moderation of taxes; the rare phenomenon of a voluntary executive and legislative reduction and abolition of duties and excises; the non-existence of tythes, excises, and national land-tax; the perfect security of property; the uniform success of numerous well intentioned emigrants, and particularly from Great Britain and Ireland, Germany, France, Holland, Switzerland, and Sweden. It is impossible to conceive, that there can be any miscalculation, in confidently relying upon every necessary acquisition of the aid of foreign artists to conduct the American cotton manufactory, if it shall be vigorously and effectually encouraged by law, when we remember the great numbers of useful and able men, who have come to us from foreign countries, as ministers of religion, instructors of the rising generation, agriculturists, lawyers, physicians, merchants, land and sea officers, manufacturers, mechanics, journeymen, mariners, and labourers in every line. If we have had such extensive advantages in procuring valuable foreign emigrants, who have been completely successful in branches not connected with labour saving machinery, can we doubt much more rapid and great success in branches, where the saving of labour by the ingenuity and skill of one thousand hands will yield them and us the benefits of ten thousand?

It is favourable to an attempt to establish the cotton manufacture, that a large proportion of the foreign cotton goods, which we import, are dyed, stained, printed, or in some way coloured: because, indigo, woad, madden, various barks, and other dye-stuffs are produced in the United States; and other dye-stuffs, which we do not produce, are daily imported from foreign countries, and reshipt from hence to other foreign parts.

In ancient Greece and Macedonia, now enslaved provinces of European Turkey, twenty thousand bales of cotton-wool, each weighing three hundred pounds, are spun annually into yarns or threads, and dyed with their own vermillion. The Greek and Macedonian women use neither the great nor the small spinning-wheel, nor the jenny, the mule, the water spinning machinery, nor the carding nor roving machinery. They use only the spindle, without any addition. It is impossible then to doubt, that these states must succeed in the manufacture of their own cotton, with the powerful and various aids of the modern European labour-saving machinery, to card, rove, spin, and twist. With such aids, and with all our other means and advantages, we cannot fail to succeed in a business, in which the unhappy subjects of the civil and religious despotism of Turkey have, for a series of years, done so much for domestic and foreign consumption.

There is an important reason for promoting our own cotton manufactures, arising out of the present circumstances of the East Indies. We receive from thence great quantities of cotton goods, which are not (as the manufactures of Great Britain) made out of our own cotton. The use of those East India cotton goods is doubly injurious: first, because we do not manufacture them; and, secondly, because we do not produce the cotton of which they are made. Though those ports of India belong to Great Britain, the parliament has absolutely prohibited the consumption of their cotton manufactures in Britain and Ireland. Those goods, of course, come to us in much greater quantities to rival the foreign and domestic manufacturers of our cotton. If we were to refuse or burden the importation, the British East Indian would extend the cultivation of sugar, coffee, cocoa, ginger, spices, pimento, arnatto, and other things adapted to their climate, which we consume and do not ourselves produce.—They would manufacture more silks, more saltpetre, and other fabrics, which we might require and admit, because they do not injure our agriculture, nor interfere with our cautious, but steady and unceasing endeavours to establish the American manufacture of cotton goods.

It is obvious to every man of correct information relative to the four original eastern states, that they are in a very serious situation as to wood and fuel. Their buildings are very generally of wood, and require large quantities of boards, scantling, and logs to keep them in repair.—Much wood is also wanted for new buildings, old and new fences, ships and boats, casks for their fish, pot ash, spirits, beef, pork, molasses, &c. and for the household fuel and workman's-fuel. Their population is great and increasing. They have no mines of coal. The coal mines of the east are all in the hands of the British colonists. On these facts an important suggestion is respectfully submitted to the

the consideration of the people of the states east of the ship channel of the Hudson; that in every system of measures to promote the domestic or internal industry of those states, endeavours should be made to avoid new calls for wood and fuel of every kind. This suggestion is of a deeper intrinsic importance than may appear, at first view, to those to whom it is new. We will offer, as two examples, the British manufactures of iron, and the British manufactures of cotton. We believe that the permanent and extensive establishment of the British manufactures of iron, in the states east of the parts of the Hudson navigable by ships, would prove very difficult from the total want of mines, pit or fossil coal, from the scarcity of wood for making charcoal, from the great scarcity of peat and turf there, and from the scarcity of wood for fuel and buildings. But we believe, that the very small use of fuel in the cotton manufacture itself, and the limited use of fuel by the people in that branch, which, effected by machinery, requires little fire to warm the small proportion of persons employed, are circumstances plainly and greatly in favour of the adoption of the cotton branch in the eastern parts of the United States. It is certain, that wood is become extremely scarce in all the old counties east of Hudson's river, and that not one productive coal-mine has been discovered between the Delaware river and the eastern boundary of the United States. The wood and timber of Maine are consuming with great rapidity, and since freights are reduced by peace, will go forth in immense quantities. It is so distant from Connecticut, Rhode Island and Providence, and Massachusetts proper, that it will become a dear, as well as a mere temporary source of supply to them for timber and fuel, if manufactures by fire employing numerous persons, who must be kept warm in a moist and cold climate, are to be extensively and permanently pursued. The true manufacturing policy of our eastern states is to carry to the utmost all household manufactures, and establish factories by labour, saving machinery at the heads of their ship or boat navigation, where they can derive the highest possible degree of benefit of their own wood and fuel, and of wood and fuel imported coastwise or from foreign ports. Cotton it will be found, therefore, is the properest raw material for them to employ. The same remarks apply to New Jersey and Delaware in full force.

If the north-eastern moiety of the United States shall forthwith establish extensive and profitable manufactures employing cotton, which can be raised in immense quantities in the southern states, it will bind the members of our union more and more together. To defend, promote, and preserve our union, is the fondest object of every sound mind, of every faithful heart, native or foreign, which partakes in the numerous blessings of our country.

It is beyond a doubt, that the use of cotton cloth for the under garments of man, next to the skin, contributes greatly to health in damp, chilly, and cold climates. In this view shirting, sheeting, and hosiery of cotton would prove far more salubrious than of flax, in certain seasons, in every quarter of America, and particularly in the parts east of the Hudson.

Every extensive manufactory that depends on a foreign raw material, is extremely precarious, because foreign laws, treaties, and wars may diminish or prevent the importation. But as cotton is raised by ourselves, and will ever be redundant, the cotton manufacture will rest upon a more certain foundation than a manufacture which should employ any other raw material whatever.

The variety of fabrics, to the making of which cotton can be applied, is a very important consideration in favour of attempting the cotton manufacture, in preference to any other. The stoutest and the coarsest blankets can be made of the refuse cotton, and cambric muslins, of the most exquisite fineness, can also be made of cotton; the most beautiful table-cloths and napkins, and coarse carpets; the stoutest corduroys, and muslins light as air; dimities, Marseilles-quilting, shirting, sheeting, tickings, pillow-cases, jeans, jeanets, fustians, denims, cottonades, fine and coarse hosiery for every age and sex, pantaloons, vests, mock cassimers, mock serges, mock coating, mock cloths, neck and pocket handkerchiefs, lining and pocketings, dress and undress, and chamber gowns, bed and window curtains, furniture covers, cravats, swansdowns, mole-skins, plushes, velvets, and in short various goods applicable, as usual, to every purpose, or as substitutes for other fabrics heretofore made of wool, hemp, flax, silk, and hair. Such is the unlimited capacity of the native North American raw material, whose future manufacture, under the protection of our government, we earnestly and respectfully recommend to the immediate consideration of all our public authorities.

A FRIEND OF AGRICULTURE.

Table of the Number of Bankruptcies, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April.	May.	June.	Total.
58	79	61	56	90	73	417

Table of the Prices of the Three per Cent. Consols, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

Day.	Jan.	Feb.	Mar.	April.	May.	June.
1	—	70 5/8	71 1/2	63	—	59 1/2
2	—	—	71 1/8	63 1/2	63 5/8	59 7/8
3	73 3/8	70 1/8	71 3/8	—	63 1/2	59 1/2
4	73 1/8	70 1/2	71	62	63 1/4	—
5	73 1/4	70 1/4	71 1/8	61 1/4	73	—
6	—	—	—	62 1/8	62 1/4	59 7/8
7	72 7/8	70 3/8	71 1/2	62 1/4	63 1/4	59 3/8
8	73 1/2	70 1/8	70	—	—	59 1/4
9	—	70 1/4	64 3/8	62 3/4	65 1/4	58 3/4
10	73 1/8	70 1/2	63 1/8	—	63 1/2	59 1/8
11	72 3/8	70 1/8	62 1/2	—	63 1/2	59 1/2
12	73	70 1/8	62	—	64 3/8	—
13	72 1/2	—	—	62 3/8	65 1/2	60 1/2
14	72 1/4	70 1/2	63 3/8	63 1/2	65 1/2	58 1/2
15	72 1/4	71 1/2	62 1/8	64 1/2	—	57 1/4
16	—	71 1/2	64	64 3/8	60 3/8	57 5/8
17	71 7/8	71 1/2	66 1/4	—	59 1/8	58 1/2
18	71 7/8	71 5/8	65 1/2	64 1/2	59 1/4	57 3/4
19	71 7/8	71 3/8	64 3/8	66	60	—
20	72 1/2	—	—	66 3/8	59 3/8	57 1/2
21	70 5/8	71 1/2	65 3/8	67 1/4	59 3/4	57 7/8
22	70 7/8	71 1/4	64 3/8	66 1/4	—	57 3/8
23	—	71 1/2	64 1/4	64 1/2	58 1/2	57 1/4
24	70 5/8	72 1/8	64 1/2	—	57 1/2	—
25	70 3/8	71 3/8	63 3/8	65	57 1/4	57 5/8
26	70 3/8	71	63 1/4	65 7/8	58 1/8	—
27	70 3/8	—	—	66	57 1/2	57 1/8
28	70 5/8	71 1/8	65 1/8	65 1/8	59 1/4	57 1/8
29	71		64	64 1/4	—	—
30	—		63 1/2	62 1/2	—	57 1/4
31	—		61 1/4		—	

Table of the Prices of the French Five per Cent. Consolidés, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

Day.	Jan.	Feb.	March.	April.	May.	June.
1	—	58 10	63 80	51 25	—	48
2	—	58 80	64 60	52 25	53 20	48 25
3	56 65	59 40	65 20	—	53 25	48 25
4	56 50	58 60	66 60	52 30	53 10	48 75
5	—	58 85	64 75	54	—	—
6	56 20	—	—	56 25	54 25	49 25
7	56 10	—	—	55 70	54 75	48 25
8	56	58 90	—	55 10	—	48 10
9	—	58 60	—	54 90	54 35	48 50
10	56	58 85	61 25	—	53 40	49
11	—	58 80	61 60	54 65	53 20	—
12	56 30	58 80	—	54 60	52 30	—
13	56 20	—	—	54 40	51 30	49 50
14	56 40	58 95	—	54	52 65	49 35
15	56 40	59 05	—	54 20	—	49 10
16	—	—	58 50	53 80	52 60	48 80
17	56 75	59 70	59	—	52 20	48 90
18	56 90	59 90	—	52 85	51 80	—
19	57	—	59	53 60	—	48 90
20	57	—	—	53 70	—	—
21	57	—	59	53 60	50 10	48 90
22	56 95	60 60	57	53 40	—	49 90
23	—	61	55 90	54	—	49 50
24	57 15	—	55 60	—	—	—
25	57 30	62 65	55	54 10	—	49 80
26	57 20	63	54 80	54 10	—	—
27	57 25	—	—	53 80	47 80	49 80
28	—	64	54 30	53 85	48 50	49 85
29	57 70		53 60	53 50	—	49 50
30	—		52 75	53 40	—	50 35
31	57 75		52 25		47 80	

Table of the Number of Christenings and Burials within the Bills of Mortality, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

Epochs.	Christened.		Buried.												
	Males.	Females.	under 2.	2 to 5.	5 to 10.	10 to 20.	20 to 30.	30 to 40.	40 to 50.	50 to 60.	60 to 70.	70 to 80.	80 to 90.	90 to 100.	Total buried. Males.	Total buried. Females.
Jan.	779	694	411	190	80	40	91	137	164	152	124	67	37	7	760	740
Feb.	794	678	447	187	81	42	109	172	216	185	145	89	40	6	835	884
March	1031	963	575	228	95	85	203	296	335	322	274	182	82	11	1356	1332
April	976	1097	315	166	59	42	100	149	224	189	152	114	43	6	817	853
May	759	728	335	131	52	27	104	143	150	134	112	77	36	3	651	653
June	1049	902	385	151	53	44	111	181	200	175	116	83	49	5	800	756
	3853	5062	2168	1053	420	280	718	1078	1289	1157	923	612	287	38	5219	5218

Tot. christ. 10,400 — Total buried 10,437

Table of the Prices of the Quartern Loaf, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

Jan.		Feb.		Mar.		Apr.		May.		June.	
Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.	Day.	Price.
	d.		d.		d.		d.		d.		d.
4	9 3/4	1	9 1/2	1	9	5	9 1/2	3	9	7	9 3/4
11	9 1/4	8	9 1/4	8	9 1/4	12	9 1/4	10	9	14	9 3/4
18	9 1/4	15	9 1/4	15	9 1/4	19	9	17	9	21	9 1/4
25	9 1/4	22	9	22	9 1/4	26	9	24	9 1/2	28	9 1/4
				29	9 1/4			31	9 1/2		

Table of the Prices of Meat and Sugar, from January to June 1803, inclusive.

	Jan.		Feb.		March.		April.		May.		June.		
	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d.	s.	d	
Beef	4	9	5	6	4	9	5	1	5	6	5	7	per stone of 8lb. to sink the offal.
Mutton	5	6	5	10	5	6	5	6	5	10	5	10	
Pork	5	1	5	4	4	6	4	10	5	4	5	3	
Sugar	37	0 1/2	40	0 1/2	39	7 1/2	41	7 1/2	46	7	48	5 1/2	per cwt.

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